CHAPTER VII

FRENCH AND OTHER SPOLIATIONS

ON July 25, 1785, while the schooner _Maria_, Captain Isaac Stevens, of Boston, was sailing past Cape St. Vincent, on the southwest corner of Spain, she was captured by an armed ship from Algiers, and carried to that port. Five days later the ship _Dauphin_, Captain Richard O'Brien, of Philadelphia, when fifty leagues west of Lisbon, suffered a similar fate. These vessels with their cargoes were confiscated, and the crews, numbering twenty-one men all told, were sold into slavery.

In connection with these facts consider a quotation from Lord Sheffield's _Observations on the Commerce of the United States_, published in 1784;--

"It is not probable that the American States will have a very free trade in the Mediterranean; it will not be the interest of any of the great maritime powers to protect them from the Barbary states. They cannot protect themselves from the latter; they cannot pretend to a navy."

It will now be instructive to recall a letter written by Edward Church, American consul at Lisbon, on October 12, 1793, in regard to the Algerine pirates. Portugal had been protecting her trade from the Algerines by means of war-ships, and had incidentally afforded convoy to such American merchantmen as needed it in those waters. Having learned that a number of Algerine corsairs had gone cruising in the Atlantic, Consul Church went to the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs to learn why the Portuguese war-ships had allowed them to leave the Mediterranean. The minister replied that Charles Logie, British consul at Algiers, acting under orders from the British government, had _concluded_ a treaty of peace between Algiers and Portugal. Portugal, he said, had not authorized such a treaty, nor had she been consulted as to the terms. The British government had guaranteed the execution of the treaty, and the payment of the tribute that it called for, however, and with the British to aid them the pirates had gone forth to prey on commerce. Church, with more attention to accuracy than diplomatic language, termed the arrangement thus made a "hellish conspiracy" against American shipping.

A brief account of the Algerine pirates will now prove interesting. For time out of mind the people of the north coast of Africa lived by piracy, but it was not until the seafaring outlaws of Europe taught them to build and handle large ships that they became really menacing to commerce. While the English were fighting the Dutch in the middle of the seventeenth century, they were obliged to send Blake with twenty-five well-armed ships to overawe these pirates. In 1672 another squadron was sent for the same purpose. These two squadrons proved that it was easy and inexpensive to crush the power of the pirates; but instead of continuing to use their navy to protect their merchantmen, the British made no further attacks upon the pirates until 1816. Indeed, instead of crushing their power, the British government adopted the policy of adding to their means of destroying commerce. And in this policy several European powers soon joined.

Secretary of State Jefferson, in a report on "Mediterranean Trade," dated December 30, 1790, said that Spain paid "from three to five million dollars to Algiers" in one lump to induce the Dey to make "peace." France in 1788 had paid an unknown sum in hand, and had since paid an annual subsidy of $100,000 for immunity from attack. Great Britain paid an annual subsidy of 60,000 guineas to the four Barbary powers. Portugal alone of the European maritime powers used her fleet to protect her trade. In addition to the regular subsidies, the powers named made presents to the Barbary chiefs, and these presents included usually, if not always, armed ships and other war material.

The reason for paying subsidies instead of fighting is most interesting. It was done to encourage the pirates to ravage the shipping belonging to the rivals of the subsidy payers.

In 1793 England was at war with France. America was the leading neutral maritime nation. The British statesmen saw that the American shipping would secure much of the trade in the Mediterranean which English ships had been doing, unless checked promptly by some extraordinary means, and it was to administer this check that the pirates were loosed upon the Atlantic.

The injury done to our shipping in the raid mentioned above was insignificant, save only as the story gives emphasis to the other facts given--facts which show the state of civilization among the most enlightened nations of Europe. The state of American civilization, at the time, is shown by the treaty made with the pirates, under which we agreed to pay them tribute; for it was tribute and not subsidy as in our case. We paid it in war material, too, as shown by the following extract from the _Life of General William Eaton_, who, in 1798, was American consul at Tunis:--

"On the 22d of December Mr. Eaton ... went on board the U. S. brig _Sophia_, Capt. Henry Geddes, commander, bound to Algiers; in company with the _Hero_, a ship of 350 tons burden, loaded with naval stores for the Dey of Algiers; the _Hassan Bashaw_, an armed brig of 275 tons, mounting eight 6-pounders, destined to Algiers; the _Skjoldabrand_, a schooner of 250 tons, 16 double fortified 4-pounders, destined to Algiers; and the _La Eisha_, of 150 tons, 14 4-pounders, also destined to Algiers. All these vessels excepting the _Sophia_ were to be delivered to the Dey of Algiers, for arrearages of stipulation and present dues."

With these facts in mind we shall be able to comprehend why American shipping was subjected to ruthless spoliations during the entire period between the end of the War of the Revolution and our second war for liberty, which we began in 1812. The sole criterion of right in international affairs was might.

As the reader remembers, the French spoliations grew out of the anarchy prevailing during the French Revolution. To appreciate the facts, one needs to put himself in the place of the French people and feel not only their aspirations but their blinding indignation. A well-meaning, most energetic, and (more or less) hysterical National Convention displaced an impotent monarchy. "Of the 11,210 decrees passed by the Convention one-third have a political aim, two-thirds have a humanitarian aim." (Hugo, in _Ninety-Three_.) The surrounding nations, alarmed lest republican principles gain headway among the "common people," formed a coalition to avenge the death of the French king and destroy the French Republic. England, without declaring war, held in her ports all merchantmen (including neutrals) bound for France, and then began to capture and send into port all neutral ships found at sea with cargoes of food for French consignees. It was then that France began to strike back in a way that affected American shipping. In March and April, 1793, our Minister at Paris had to complain of several ships captured by French privateers, and in one of his letters to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs he said:--

"I avoid troubling you with the afflicting recital of the violences committed on those different occasions, and which were so much the less excusable inasmuch as they took place after the prizes were taken possession of, and when no resistence was met with."

On May 9, 1793, the French government authorized the seizure of "all neutral vessels which shall be laden wholly or in part" with food products and "destined for an enemy's port."

The decree was contrary to the treaties made between France and the United States in 1778, but it was confirmed on the 27th of July.

This decree was avowedly made because food was scarce in France and because England was trying to starve the French into submission by stopping all food-laden ships bound for France. In the French view it was justified as a measure of necessity.

On July 2, 1796, however, it was decreed that "the flag of the French Republic will treat neutral vessels either as to confiscation, as to searches or capture in the same manner as they shall suffer the English to treat them."

In the meantime the United States had made, under duress, a treaty with England (Jay's, 1794), which gave the English advantages of which the French, though by treaty our allies, were deprived; and this treaty was ratified in spite of the fact that the British aggressions had exceeded the French not only in extent, but in their aggravating character. Moreover, this treaty was not promulgated until May 9, 1796, and France justly complained of the concealment as disingenuous. It was partly because of the resentment thus created that the decree of July 2, 1796 was made, and it was wholly because of resentment that, on March 2, 1797, a decree was issued declaring that "every American vessel shall be a good prize which has not on board a list of the crew in proper form, such as is presented by the model annexed to the treaty of the 6th February, 1778."

No American vessel had carried this _rôle d'equipage_ since the end of the War of the Revolution; the decree was passed with the intention of driving all American ships from the sea. Then, as a final thrust at America, it was decreed that, October 29, 1799, American sailors found serving on the ships of enemies should be treated as pirates, and that they should not be allowed to plead in extenuation that they had been impressed.

The following stories of French aggressions illustrate well the usual course of life at sea in American ships during the period under consideration:--

In 1796 the French privateer _Flying Fish_ came to Philadelphia, purchased supplies, and made repairs. In the meantime her captain, aided by the French consul, obtained information about all the ships then loading with valuable cargoes for foreign ports. With these facts in hand the captain then went to the Capes of the Delaware, waited until one of the most valuable of the American ships passed out to sea, and then captured her and turned her crew adrift in a small boat.

In the same year, while the American ship _Hare_ was lying in London, with a valuable cargo on board, her captain went to Paris and arranged with the French Minister of Marine to bring her into French waters and have her condemned as a prize to him as captor. And this bargain was carried out.

Some Philadelphia merchants fitted out a vessel named _Les Jumeaux_ as a French privateer. When going to sea she drove off a revenue cutter that tried to stop her, and she finally made a prize of a vessel belonging to neighbors of her owner.

The brigantine _Patty_, Captain Josiah Hempsted, belonging to Justus Riley, of Wethersfield, Connecticut, was captured while on her way to St. Bartholomew, on July 31, 1796. When Captain Hempsted appeared before the "special agent" (a sort of governor and judge in admiralty) ruling at Guadaloupe, that official shook his fist under the captain's nose, and said:--

"I have confiscated your vessel and cargo, you damned rascal."

The French frigate _Thetis_, having captured the brigantine _Eliza_, of New York, a seaman named Henry Doughty, a native-born citizen of Boston, was placed with a number of English sailors who had been captured, and was then delivered to the British in exchange for French sailors. Using American sailors in effecting exchanges became a common practice with the French naval commanders.

The crews of American vessels taken to the West Indies were commonly turned ashore without clothing (except what they were wearing), or food, or means of procuring either. On November 10, 1797, seven captured American vessels were lying at Petit Guave, three-fourths of the crews of which had died because of the hardships they had suffered when thus turned ashore. In some cases the crews were imprisoned. Captain Breard, of the schooner _Zephyr_, of Portsmouth, who ventured to go on board the privateer that had captured him and there beg for a little of the food of which he had been robbed, was thrown over the rail. Captain Codwise, of the brig _Glasgow_, was thrown into prison at Leogane and kept for thirty-six hours without food.

A more cheerful picture of the life at sea in American ships at that time is found in a letter (written in 1799) from Captain Elias Hasket Derby, Jr., to his father. The young man was in command of the Salem ship _Mount Vernon_, and he had arrived at Gibraltar after a passage of seventeen and a half days.

"The first of our passage was quite agreeable; the latter, light winds, calm, and Frenchmen constantly in sight for the last four days. The first Frenchmen we saw was off Tercira--a lugger to the southward. Being uncertain of his force we stood by him to leeward on our course and soon left him. July 28th, in the afternoon, we found ourselves approaching a fleet of upwards of fifty sail, steering nearly N. E. We run directly for their center; at 4 o'clock found ourselves in their half-moon; concluding it impossible that it could be any other than the English fleet, continued our course for their center to avoid any apprehension of a want of confidence in them. They soon dispatched an 18-gun ship from their center, and two frigates, one from their van and another from their rear, to beat towards us--we being to windward. On approaching the center ship under easy sail I fortunately bethought myself that it would be but common prudence to steer so far to windward of him as to be a grapeshot's distance from him, to observe his force and maneuvering. When we were abreast of him he fired a gun to leeward and hoisted English colors. We immediately bore away and meant to pass under his quarter, between him and the fleet showing our American colors. This movement disconcerted him, and it appeared to me he either conceived we were either an American sloop of war, or an English one in disguise, attempting to cut him off from the fleet; for while we were in the act of wearing on his beam he hoisted French colors and gave us a broadside. We immediately brought our ship to the wind, and stood on about a mile--wore towards the center of the fleet--hove about and crossed him on the other tack, about half grapeshot distance, and received his broadside; several shot fell on board of us without much damage. All hands were active in clearing ship for action, for our surprise had been complete. In about ten minutes we began firing our stern chasers and in a quarter of an hour gave him our broadside in such style as evidently sickened him, for he immediately luffed in the wind, gave us his broadside, went in stays in great confusion, wore ship afterwards in a large circle, and renewed the chase at a mile and a half distance--a maneuver calculated to keep up appearances with the fleet and escape our shot.

"At midnight we had distanced them; the chasing rocket signals being almost out of sight. We have been in constant brushes ever since. The day after we left the fleet we were chased till night by two frigates, whom we lost sight of when it was dark. The next morning off Cape St. Vincent, were chased by a French lateen-rigged vessel, apparently 10 or 12 guns, one of them an 18-pounder. We brought to for him, [but] his metal was too heavy for ours, and his position to windward.... [As] it was not in my power to cut him off we of course bore away and saluted him with our long nines. He continued his chase till dark, and when we were nearly by Cadiz, at sunset, he made a signal to a consort whom we had just discovered ahead. Having a strong breeze I was determined to pass my stern over him if he did not make way for me. He thought prudent to do so. At midnight we made the lights in Cadiz city, but found no English fleet. After lying to till daylight concluded that the French must have gained the ascendancy in Cadiz and thought prudent to proceed to this place, where we arrived at 12 o'clock, popping at Frenchmen all the forenoon. At 10 A.M., off Algesiras Point, were seriously attacked by a large lateener who had on board more than 100 men. He came so near our broadside as to allow our 6-pound grape to do execution handsomely. We then bore away and gave him our stern guns in a cool and deliberate manner, doing apparently great execution. Our bars having cut his sails considerably, he was thrown into confusion, struck both his ensign and his pennant. I was then puzzled to know what to do with so many men. Our ship was running large, with all her steering sails out, so that we could not immediately bring her to the wind; and we were immediately off Algesiras Point, from which I had reason to fear she might receive assistance, and my port, (Gibraltar) in full view. These circumstances induced me to give up the gratification of bringing him in. It was, however, a satisfaction to flog the rascal in full view of the English fleet who were to leeward. The risk of sending here is great indeed for any ship short of our force in men and guns--but particularly [when short of] heavy guns. Two nines are better than six or eight sixes, and two long twelves do better than twenty sixes.... I have now, while writing to you, two of our countrymen in full view who are prizes to these villains. Lord St. Vincent, in a 50-gun ship, is in the act of retaking one of them. The other goes into Algesiras without molestation."

Spain took scores of American ships, and when the French privateers carried an American ship into a Spanish port, the Spanish officials invariably assisted in the robbery. The other nations robbed in proportion to their power and opportunity. The third volume of our _Foreign Relations_ contains a list of fifty-one American ships that were carried into the ports of Denmark and Sweden. The French aggressors were inspired primarily, as said, by indignation; the English were acting in defence of their maritime supremacy, as shall appear further on, but these smaller powers of Europe were animated by no other motive than that of the Algerine pirates.

As to the total of the damages suffered from the French republicans, it must be said that no complete calculation was ever made. But documents written under oath show that more than 600 ships were despoiled before the year 1800, and that losses amounting to more than $20,000,000 were sustained. These losses included ships and cargoes only; incidental losses due to the conditions at sea could not be measured.

Though really a part of our naval history, perhaps it may be worth adding that when, at last, our naval ships, though few in numbers and small in size, were ordered to sea to protect our trade, no more than three or four well-fought actions were needed to bring the French Republic spoliations to an end. It was, and, unhappily, it is yet, in human nature to despise any appeal to altruistic notions of right in an effort to secure justice, but all accord hearty respect to him who is able and willing to fight for his rights. We were amused by the antics of the Japanese as a nation of artists; we took off our hats and stood erect with our heels together in the presence of the heroes of the Battle of the Yellow Sea.