v. 156:

Dicere porro hominum causa voluisse [scil. Deos] parare Præclaram mundi naturam, &c. Desipere est. Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis Gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti, Ut nostra quidquam causa gerere adgrediantur? Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?... Exemplum porro gignundis rebus et ipsa Notities hominum, Dis unde est insita primum; ... Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?

Conf. iv. 820; v. 78; 195; 419. In these views, he is only following Epicurus. Heavenly phenomena, says the latter, in Diog. 76, μήτε λειτουργοῦντός τινος νομίζειν δεῖ γίνεσθαι καὶ διατάττοντος ἢ διατάξαντος καὶ ἅμα τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετ’ ἀφθαρσίας· οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσι πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ χάριτες τῇ μακαριότητι, ἀλλ’ ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίον ταῦτα γίνεται. Ibid. 97: ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῆ προσαγέσθω, ἀλλ’ ἀλειτούργητος διατηρείσθω καὶ ἐν τῇ πάσῃ μακαριότητι. Ibid. 113. With these passages Cic. N. D. i. 20, 52, and Plut. Plac. i. 7, 7 (likewise ii. 3, 2; Stob. i. 442), are quite in agreement.

[1156] Lucr. i. 440:—

Præterea per se quodcumque erit aut faciet quid Aut aliis fungi [πάσχειν] debebit agentibus ipsum, Aut erit, ut possint in eo res esse gerique. At facere et fungi sine corpore nulla potest res, Nec præbere locum porro nisi inane vacansque. Ergo præter inane et corpora tertia per se Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui.

Epic. in Diog. 67: καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀσώματον πλὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ κενοῦ. τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον δι’ ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέχεται. ὥσθ’ οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματαιάζουσιν. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν εἰ ἦν τοιαύτη.

[1157] Diog. 68; 40. Lucr. i. 449, who expresses συμβεβηκότα by conjuncta, and συμπτώματα by eventa. Among the latter Lucretius, 459, reckons time, because in itself it is nothing, and only comes to our knowledge through motion and rest. Likewise Epicurus, in Diog. 72 (conf. Stob. i. 252), shows that time is composed of days and nights, and their portions, of states of feeling or unconsciousness, of motion or rest, and hence that it is only a product (σύμπτωμα) of these phenomena; and these being again συμπτώματα, time is defined by the Epicurean Demetrius (Sext. Math. x. 219; Pyrrh. iii. 137): σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ μοναῖς. The distinction between abstract and sensuous or undivided time (Steinhart, l.c. 466) does not appear to exist in Diogenes. His χρόνοι διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὶ (Diog. 47) are imperceptibly small divisions of time, tempora multa, ratio quæ comperit esse, which, according to Lucret. iv. 792, are contained in every given time.

[1158] Lucret. i. 358.

[1159] Lucret. l.c. and i. 329; Diog. 40 and 67; Sext. Math. vii. 213; viii. 329. Most of the remarks in Lucret. i. 346 and 532 point to the same fundamental idea: Without vacant interstices, nourishment cannot be diffused over the whole bodies of plants or animals, nor can noise, cold, fire and water penetrate through solid bodies, or any body be broken up into parts. The same in Themist. 40, b; Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol. in Arist. 484, a, 26.

[1160] Lucr. i. 440; Diog. 39; Plut. Adv. Col 11, 5.

[1161] Body is defined by Epicurus (Sext. Math. i. 21; x. 240; 257; xi. 226) as τὸ τριχῆ διαστατὸν μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας, or as σύνοδος κατὰ ἀθροισμὸν μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ βάρους. Emptiness is (according to Sext. x. 2) φύσις ἀναφὴς or ἔρημος παντὸς σώματος. When occupied by a body, it is called τόπος; when bodies pass through it, it is χώρα; so that all three expressions, as Stob. Ecl. i. 388 rightly observes, are only different names for the same thing. To the same effect is the statement in Plut. Plac. i. 20.

[1162] Hence, in Diog. 69, ἄθροισμα and συμπεφορήμενον are used of bodies; in Diog. 71, all bodies are called συμπτώματα; and according to Epicurus (Sext. Math. x. 42), all changes in bodies are due to local displacement of the atoms. Plut. Amator. 24, 3, p. 769, observes that Epicurus deals with ἁφὴ and συμπλοκὴ, but never with ἑνότης.

[1163] Epic. in Diog. 40: τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι συγκρίσεις τὰ δ’ ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηνται· ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα εἴπερ μὴ μέλλει πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθαρήσεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἰσχύοντα ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων ... ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀτόμους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σωμάτων φύσεις. Ibid. 56; Lucr. i. 147; ii. 551; 751; 790. Further arguments for the belief in atoms in Lucret. i. 498: Since a body and the space in which it is are entirely different, both must originally have existed without any intermingling. If things exist composed of the full and the empty, the full by itself must exist, and likewise the empty. Bodies in which there is no empty space cannot be divided. They may be eternal, and must be so, unless things have been produced out of nothing. Without empty space, soft bodies could not exist, nor hard bodies without something full. If there were no indivisible parts, everything must have been long since destroyed. The regularity of phenomena presupposes unchangeable primary elements. All that is composite must ultimately consist of simple indivisible parts. If there were no indivisible parts, every body would consist of innumerable parts, as many in the smaller as in the greater body (conf. Epic. in Diog. 56). If nature did not reduce things to their smallest parts, it could not make new things. These arguments, very unequal in value, were borrowed by Lucretius from Epicurus. Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. 1, 8, 9, quotes, as an Epicurean principle, that unchangeable Being must be at the bottom of everything.

[1164] Epicurus and Lucretius, l.c. Lucr. i. 529; Sext. Math. ix. 219; x. 318; Stob. Ecl. i. 306; Plut. Pl. Phil. i. 3, 29.

[1165] Epic. in Diog. 41; Lucret. i. 528; Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol. in Arist. 484, a, 23.

[1166] Diog. 44 and 55; Lucret. i. 266, where it is proved, by many analogies, that there may be invisible bodies; Stob. l.c.; Plut. l.c.; Simpl. Phys. 216, a.

[1167] Diog. 44; 54; Lucr. ii. 736 and 841; Plut. l.c. See page 433, 2.

[1168] Lucret. v. 235.

[1169] Diog.; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 29. The statement there made, that Democritus only allowed to atoms size and shape, and that Epicurus added weight, is not correct.

[1170] Diog. 42; Lucr. ii. 333 and 478; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 30 (where, however, it would be against the sense to substitute ἢ for μὴ as Steinhart l.c. p. 473 note 94 does); Alex. Aphr. in Philop. Gen. et Corr. 3, b; Cic. N. D. i. 24, 66. It does not, however, appear that Lucret. ii. 333, made the variety of figures as great as the number of atoms. (Ritter, iv. 101.)

[1171] Lucret. i. 500.

[1172] Diog. x. 55; Lucr. ii. 381.

[1173] See the passages quoted, p. 442, 6, and 445, 5. The text of Stobæus, Ecl. i. 346, must be corrected by the aid of these passages. Plut. Plac. i. 12, 5.

[1174] Epic. in Diog. 41: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἄπειρόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ πεπερασμένον ἄκρον ἔχει· τὸ δ’ ἄκρον παρ’ ἕτερόν τι θεωρεῖται. ὥστε οὐκ ἔχον ἄκρον πέρας οὐκ ἔχει, πέρας δ’ οὐκ ἔχον ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ πεπερασμένον. The same argument is used by Lucret. i. 951; 1008–1020. He continues 984, 1021: If space were limited, all bodies would collect towards its lower part by reason of their weight, and their motion would cease. Unless the quantity of matter were unlimited, the amount lost by bodies in their mutual contact could not be supplied. Conf. also Plut. Adv. Col. 13, 3; in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9; Plac. i. 3, 28; Alex. in Simpl. Phys. 107, b, who mentions the above-quoted argument of Epicurus as the chief argument of the Epicureans.

[1175] We have but little information; but it has been already shown p. 433, 2, and follows too as a matter of course, that he referred all the properties of bodies to the shape and arrangement of the atoms. Whenever he found in the same body different qualities combined, he assumed that it was composed of different kinds of atoms. For instance, he asserted of wine: οὐκ εἶναι θερμὸν αὐτοτελῶς τὸν οἶνον, ἀλλ’ ἔχειν τινὰς ἀτόμους ἐν αὑτῷ θερμασίας ἀποτελεστικὰς, ἑτέρας δ’ αὖ ψυχρότητος. According to the difference of constitution, it has on some a cooling, on others a heating effect. Plut. Qu. Conviv. iii. 5, 1, 4; Adv. Col. 6. This agrees with the remarks made on Democritus in vol. i. 597.

[1176] Diog. 43; 47; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54. What idea Epicurus formed to himself of motion we are not told. We learn, however, from Themist. Phys. 52, b, that he replied to Aristotle’s proof of motion, that no constant quantities can be composed of indivisible particles (Phys. vi. 1), by saying: Whatever moves in a given line moves in the whole line, but not in the individual indivisible portions of which the line consists. With reference to the same question, the Epicureans, according to Simpl. Phys. 219, b, asserted that everything moves equally quickly through indivisible spaces.

[1177] Cic. Fin. i. 6, 18; Lucret. i. 1074.

[1178] Lucr. ii. 1052 (the text being faulty); Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol. in Arist. 510, b, 30; 486, a, 7. The latter writer inaccurately groups Epicurus together with others (Democritus and Strato). The same point, according to Simpl. Phys. 113, b, was a subject of contention between Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Epicurean Zenobius, at the close of the second century after Christ.

[1179] As Aristotle had already done.

[1180] Diog. 60; conf. Plut. Def. Orac. 28, p. 425.

[1181] Epic. in Diog. 43; 61; Lucr. ii. 225; Plut. C. Not. 43, i. p. 1082. This objection was borrowed from Aristotle by Epicurus.

[1182] Lucr. ii. 216; 261; Cic. Fin. i. 6, 18; N. D. i. 25, 69; De Fato, 10, 22; Plut. An. Procr. 6, 9, p. 1015; Solert. Anim. 7, 2, p. 964; Plac. i. 12, 5; 23, 4; Stobæus, Ecl. i. 346, 394.

[1183] Diog. 44; conf. 62; 90; Plut. Plac. i. 12, 5; Fac. Lun. 4, 5, p. 921; Stob. i. 346; Lucret. v. 432.

[1184] Diog. 73; Lucr. i. 1021. See above, p. 437, 1; Plut. Def. Or. 19, p. 420.

[1185] Cic. Fin. i. 6, 17. See p. 444, 3.

[1186] Diog. 45; 73; Lucret. ii. 1048; Plut. Plac. ii. 1, 3. It need hardly be remarked that by worlds world-bodies are not meant. In Diog. 88, Epicurus defines the world as a part of the heaven, surrounding the earth and stars, having a definite shape, and, towards other parts of the heaven, bounded.

[1187] Diog. 45; 74; 88; Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 2; 7, 3; Stob. i. 490; Cic. N. D. ii. 18, 48; Acad. ii. 40, 125.

[1188] Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9: Epicurus says, ὅτι οὐδὲν ξένον ἀποτελεῖται ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρὰ τὸν ἤδη γεγενημένον χρόνον ἄπειρον.

[1189] Diog. 73; 89; Lucret. ii. 1105; v. 91 and 235, where the transitory character of the world is elaborately proved; Cic. Fin. i. 6, 21. Stob. i. 418; Epicurus makes the world decay in the greatest variety of ways. Plut. Plac. ii. 4, 2.

[1190] Diog. x. 89.

[1191] v. 324, arguing that historical memory would otherwise go much further back, and arts and sciences be of much greater antiquity.

[1192] On this point see Lucret. ii. 1112. The principle that similar elements naturally congregate is there explained in this way.

[1193] Lucr. v. 416–508; Plut. Plac. i. 4. The latter view has been referred, in vol. i. 604, to the Atomists. It would now appear that it must be deduced from Epicureanism, and its agreement with the views attributed to Leucippus in other places explained by the well-known connection between Epicurus and Democritus. The views of Epicurus on the formation of the world do not entirely agree with those of Democritus. It was probably with an eye to Democritus (compare the extracts in vol. i. 608 from Orig. Philosoph. p. 17) that Epicurus, in Diog. 90, denied that the world could be increased from without, or that sun and moon could be possibly absorbed in our world. Lucret. ii. 1105, however, supposes an increase of the world from without to be possible.

[1194] On these mœnia mundi, which, according to Lucretius, coincide with the ether or fire-belt, see Epic. in Diog. 88; Id. περὶ φύσεως, xi. (Vol. Herc. ii.) col. 2; Plut. Plac. ii. 7, 3; Lucr. i. 73; ii. 1144; v. 454.

[1195] On this point see page 434.

[1196] See p. 437, 1.

[1197] In Diog. 77; 81; Lucret. v. 78 and 114, where the contrast is more fully brought out. By ζῷα οὐράνια, in Plut. Plac. v. 20, 2, we must by no means think of the stars.

[1198] Examples have already been met with, p. 436. A complete review of the Epicurean astronomy is not worth our while. It may be studied in the following passages: For the substance of the stars, consult Plut. Plac. ii. 13, 9; for their rising and setting, Diog. 92; Lucr. v. 648; Cleomed. Met. p. 87; for their revolution and deviation, Diog. 92; 112–114; Lucr. v. 509; 612; for the appearance of the moon, Diog. 94, and Lucr. v. 574, 703; for eclipses of sun and moon, Diog. 96; Lucr. v. 749; for changes in the length of day, Diog. 98; Lucr. v. 678.

[1199] Diog. 91; Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 82; Fin. i. 6, 20; Sen. Qu. Nat. i. 3, 10; Cleomed. Met. ii. 1; Plut. Plac. ii. 21, 4; 22, 4; Lucr. v. 564. The body of the sun was considered by Epicurus (Plut. Plac. ii. 20, 9; Stob. i. 530) to consist of earth-like and spongy matter, saturated with fire. According to Lucret. v. 471, sun and moon stand midway between ether and earth in point of density.

[1200] It is still more difficult to imagine the world as stationary, which is tacitly assumed. It would then be bounded by endless space, and soon come into collision with other masses.

[1201] Lucr. v. 534. Conf. Epic. in Diog. 74, and περὶ φύσεως, xi. col. 1. In the latter passage, Epicurus appeals to the fact that the earth is equidistant from the bounds of the world.

[1202] Further particulars: on clouds, Diog. 99: Lucr. vi. 451; Plut. Plac. iii. 4, 3; on rain, Diog. 100; Lucret. vi. 495; on thunder, Diog. 100; 103; Lucret. vi. 96; on lightning, Diog. 101; Lucr. vi. 160; on sirocco, Diog. 104; Lucr. vi. 423; Plac. iii. 3, 2; on earthquakes, Diog. 105; Lucr. vi. 535; Plac. iii. 15, 11; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 20, 5; on winds, Diog. 106; on hail, Diog. 106; Plac. iii. 4, 3; on snow, thaw, ice, frost, Diog. 107–109; on the rainbow, Diog. 109; on the halo of the moon, Diog. 110; on comets, Diog. 111; on shooting-stars, Diog. 114. Explanations are given by Lucretius of volcanoes (vi. 639), of the overflow of the Nile (vi. 712), of Lake Avernus (vi. 738–839), of the magnet (vi. 906–1087), of the reputed chilling of the springs in summer (vi. 840).

[1203] Lucret. ii. 1157; v. 780. Otherwise, we learn that the Epicureans were as far as the Stoics from attributing to plants a soul. Plut. Plac. v. 26, 3.

[1204] Lucr. ii. 1155; v. 787, giving further particulars as to the origin and maintenance of living beings, and the subsequent abatement of the productive powers of earth.

[1205] Epic. in Diog. 74.

[1206] Anaximander, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Democritus, all taught the procreation of living beings from earth.

[1207] Lucr. v. 834–921.

[1208] v. 922–1008. Conf. Plato, Polit. 274, B; Arist. Polit. ii. 8, 1269, a, 4; Horace, Serm. i. 3, 99, appears to have had an eye to Lucretius.

[1209] Lucr. v. 1009–1025.

[1210] Epicurus, in Diog. 75, thus sums up his views on the origin of language: τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰς τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πασχούσας πάθη καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν ... ὕστερον δὲ κοινῶς καθ’ ἕκαστα τὰ ἔθνη τὰ ἴδια τεθῆναι πρὸς τὸ τὰς δηλώσεις ἧττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι ἀλλήλοις καὶ συντομωτέρως δηλουμένας. He who invents any new thing puts, at the same time, new words into circulation. Lucret. v. 1026–1088, explains more fully that language is of natural origin. On the voice, Ibid. iv. 522; Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 2.

[1211] Epic. in Diog. 75: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτὴν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι· τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα καὶ ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν, ἐν μέν τισι θᾶττον ἐν δέ τισι βραδύτερον.

Lucr. v. 1450:—all arts

Usus et impigræ simul experientia mentis Paulatim docuit.

Ibid. 1103:—

Inque dies magis hi victum vitamque priorem Commutare novis monstrabant rebu’ benigni Ingenio qui præstabant et corde vigebant.

In harmony with these premises, Lucretius then tries to explain various inventions. The first fire was obtained by lightning, or the friction of branches in a storm. The sun taught cooking (v. 1089). Forests on fire, melting brass, first taught men how to work in metal (v. 1239–1294). Horses and elephants were used for help in war, after attempts had been previously made with oxen and wild beasts (v. 1295). Men first dressed themselves in skins; afterwards they wore twisted, and then woven materials (v. 1009; 1348; 1416). The first ideas of planting and agriculture were from the natural spread of plants (v. 1359). The first music was in imitation of birds; the first musical instrument was the pipe, through which the wind was heard to whistle; from this natural music, artificial music only gradually grew (v. 1377). The measure and arrangement of time was taught by the stars (v. 1434); and, comparatively late, came the arts of poetry and writing (v. 1438).

[1212] Lucr. v. 1106.

[1213] Lucr. iii. 161; Diog. 67. See p. 439, 1.

[1214] Lucr. iii. 177; Diog. 63.

[1215] Diog. 63: ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερὲς παρ’ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα (the body), παρεσπαρμένον· προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι. 66: ἐξ ἀτόμων αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλοτάτων πολλῷ τινι διαφερουσῶν τῶν τοῦ πυρός.

[1216] Lucr. iii. 231; 269; Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 5 (Stob. i. 798), conf. Alex. Aphr. De An. 127, b.

[1217] Lucr. iii. 288.

[1218] According to Plut. Plac. v. 3, 5, he considered the seed an ἀπόσπασμα ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος; and, since he believed in a feminine σπέρμα, he must have regarded the soul of the child as formed by the intermingling of the soul-atoms of both parents. Ibid. v. 16, 1.

[1219] Diog. 63; Lucret. iii. 216; 276; 323; 370.

[1220] Metrodor. περὶ αἰσθητῶν (Vol. Herc. vi.), col. 7.

[1221] Lucr. iii. 98, contradicts the assertion that the soul is the harmony of the body; Epicurus having already replied (in Philop. De An. E. 1) to one of the objections urged against it by Plato.

[1222] Diog. 66; Lucr. iii. 94; 136; 396; 612; Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 3. Lucretius calls the rational part animus or mens, and the irrational part anima. The statement, Pl. Phil. iv. 23, 2, that Epicurus made feeling reside in the organs of sense, because the ἡγεμονικὸν was feelingless, can hardly be correct.

[1223] Diog. and Lucr. In sleep, a portion of the soul is supposed to leave the body (Lucr. iv. 913, conf. Tertull. De An. 43), whilst another part is forcibly confined within the body. Probably this is all that is meant by Diog. 66.

[1224] Epic. in Diog. 64. Lucr. iii. 417–827, gives an elaborate proof of the mortality of the soul. Other passages, Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 27, 1 and 3; 30, 5; Sext. Math. ix. 72, hardly need to be referred to. Observe the contrast between Epicureanism and Stoicism. In Stoicism, the soul keeps the body together; in Epicureanism, the body the soul. In Stoicism, the soul survives the body; in Epicureanism, this is impossible. In Stoicism, the mind is a power over the world, and hence over the body; in Epicureanism, it is on a level with the body, and dependent on it.

[1225] Epic. in Diog. 124–127, for instance: τὸ φρικωδέστατον οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἐπειδήπερ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν· ὅταν δὲ ὁ θάνατος παρῇ τόθ’ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμεν. Id. in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 229 (Alex. Aphr. Anal. Pri. 117, Top. 9. Gell. N. A. ii. 8, 1; Stob. Serm. 118, 30): ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμας· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Lucr. iii. 828–975.

[1226] Lucr. iii. 830.

[1227] Diog. 81; 142; Lucr. iii. 37.

[1228] Lucr. ii. 991:—

Denique cœlesti sumus omnes semine oriundi, &c.

999:—

Cedit item retro de terra quod fuit ante In terras: et quod missum est ex ætheris oris Id rursum cœli rellatum templa receptant.

[1229] Democritus, from whom Epicurus has borrowed the rest of this theory, makes them mould the air.

[1230] Epic. in Diog. 46–50; 52; and in the fragments of the second book περὶ φύσεως; Lucr. iv. 26–266; 722; vi. 921 Cic. Ad Famil. xv. 16; Plut. Qu. Conviv. viii. 10, 2, 2; Plac. iv. 3, 1; 19, 2; Sext. Math. vii. 206; Gell. N. A. v. 16; Macrob. Sat. vii. 14; the remarks of Lucr. iv. 267; 568; Plut. Plac. iv. 14, 2, on reflected images and the echo belong likewise to the doctrine of idola.

[1231] For instance, the impressions in the minds of dreamers and madmen. Diog. 32; Lucr. iv. 730.

[1232] Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: εἰ δὲ χρὴ γελᾷν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὰ εἴδωλα γελαστέον τὰ κωφὰ καὶ τυφλὰ καὶ ἄψυχα, ἃ ποιμαίνουσιν [sc. οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι] ἀπλέτους ἐτῶν περιόδους ἐμφαινόμενα καὶ περινοστοῦντα πάντη τὰ μὲν ἔτι ζώντων τὰ δὲ πάλαι κατακαέντων ἢ κατασαπέντων ἀποῤῥυέντα.

[1233] Lucr. l.c.

[1234] Sext. l.c.; Lucr. iv. 351.

[1235] Lucr. iv. 766–819; and on the incessant streaming forth of images, v. 141; Diog. 48.

[1236] Epic. in Diog. x. 52: τὸ δὲ διημαρτημένον οὐκ ἂν ὑπῆρχεν, εἰ μὴ ἐλαμβάνομεν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνημμένην μὲν, διάληψιν [al. διάλειψιν] δʹ ἔχουσαν κατὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν συνημμένην τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ [impression on the senses], διάληψιν δ’ ἔχουσαν ἐὰν μὲν μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται, ἐὰν δὲ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ τὸ ἀληθές.

[1237] As to terminology, Epicurus, according to Plut. Plac. iv. 8, 2, Diog. 32, called the faculty of sensation αἴσθησις, and sensation itself, ἐπαίσθημα.

[1238] Lucr. iv. 874; conf. Galen, De Hipp. et Plat. v. 2, vol. v. 367, K.

[1239] Diog. 133: τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον· ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν. ἐπεὶ κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένῃ δουλεύειν.

[1240] Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70: [Epicurus] pertimuit, ne si concessum esset hujusmodi aliquid: aut vivet cras aut non vivet Epicurus, alterutrum fieret necessarium; totum hoc; aut etiam aut non negavit esse necessarium. Acad. ii. 30, 97; De Fat. 10, 21.

[1241] Steinhart, p. 466.

[1242] Cic. De Fato, 16, 37, at least says, referring to the above question: Nisi forte voluimus Epicureorum opinionem sequi, qui tales propositiones nec veras nec falsas esse dicunt, aut cum id pudet illud tamen dicunt, quod est impudentius, veras esse ex contrariis disjunctiones, sed quæ in his enuntiata essent eorum neutrum esse verum. Cicero indeed adds: O admirabilem licentiam et miserabilem inscientiam dicendi! but he has no reason for this exclamation; for the proposition: Either A or B must follow is not identical with the proposition: It may be stated either of A or of B that it will follow. Epicurus could, therefore, justly allow the former and deny the latter. In so doing he is really following Aristotle.

[1243] Diog. x. 123: οἵους δ’ αὐτοὺς [τοὺς θεοὺς] οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἵους νομίζουσιν. ἀσεβὴς δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν ἀλλ’ ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς προσάπτων. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 16, 42.

[1244] iii. 14; vi. 49; and, specially, the celebrated passage i. 62:—

Humana ante oculos fœde cum vita jaceret In terris oppressa gravi sub relligione, Quæ caput a cœli regionibus ostendebat Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans, &c.

as far as to 101:—

Tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum.

Conf. Epic. in Diog. 81, and above p. 423, 3; 437, 1.

[1245] Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 4: [Ἐπίκουρος] ἅπασαν ὁμοῦ ποιητικὴν ὥσπερ ὀλέθριον μύθων δέλεαρ ἀφοσιούμενος. Ibid. c. 75.

[1246] Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: Ἐπικουρείων δὲ χλευασμοὺς καὶ γέλωτας οὔτι φοβητέον οἷς τολμῶσι χρῆσθαι καὶ κατὰ τῆς προνοίας μῦθον αὐτὴν ἀποκαλοῦντες. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 2: διαβάλλοντες τὴν πρόνοιαν ὥσπερ παισὶν Ἔμπουσαν ἢ Ποινὴν ἀλιτηριώδη καὶ τραγικὴν ἐπιγεγραμμένην. In Cic. N. D. i. 8, 18, the Epicurean calls πρόνοια anus fatidica, to which it was often reduced, no doubt, by the Stoics.

[1247] See p. 460, 1.

[1248] Lucr. v. 196; ii. 1090; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 10. Conf. the disputation of the Stoic and Epicurean in Lucian, Jup. Trag. c. 35, and especially c. 46.

[1249] Lucr. v. 165; conf. p. 437, 1; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 8.

[1250] Diog. 76; 97; 113; see p. 437, 1; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 52; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 7.

[1251] Cic. l.c. 54.

[1252] Plut. Def. Orac. 19; Plac. i. 83.

[1253] Conf. the captious argument of Hermarchus, in Procl. in Tim. 66, E: If prayer is necessary for everything, it is necessary for prayer, and so on, ad infin.

[1254] Diog. 135; Lucr. v. 379; Plut. Plac. v. 1, 2; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 55; Divin. ii. 17, 40; Tertull. De An. 46.

[1255] Lucr. v. 1159–1238; conf. iv. 33; vi. 49; Sext. Math. ix. 25; vi. 19; Diog. 98; 115.

[1256] This view is especially prominent in Lucretius. See p. 462, 2. Conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 10; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54.

[1257] He drew up separate treatises περὶ θεῶν and περὶ ὁσιότητος. Diog. 27; Cic. N. D. i. 41, 115; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 11.

[1258] Posidonius, in Cic. N. D. i. 44, 123; Conf. 30, 85; iii. 1, 3; Plut. l.c.

[1259] Epic. in Diog. 123: θεοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσι· ἐναργὴς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ γνῶσις. The Epicurean in Cic. N. D. i. 16, 43: Solus enim [Epicurus] vidit, primum esse Deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quæ est enim gens aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam Deorum? quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus, &c. These statements must, however, be received with some caution, since Cicero appears to give up his own views as to innate ideas. Inasmuch, however, as he expressly refers to Epicurus’ treatise περὶ κανόνος, we may assume that belief in Gods with Epicurus rests on a general πρόληψις.

[1260] In support of this view, see Cic. N. D. i. 18, 46. It is there said of the form of the Gods: A natura habemus omnes omnium gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam Deorum. Quæ enim alia forma occurrit umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? φυσικὴ πρόληψις is here referred to sensations derived from εἴδωλα. Ibid. 19, 49; and Lucr. vi. 76:

de corpore quæ sancto simulacra feruntur In mentis hominum divinæ nuntia formæ.

[1261] Diog. 121. Cic. N. D. i. 17, 45: Si nihil aliud quæreremus, nisi ut Deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat dictum: nam et præstans Deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et æterna esset et beatissima ... et metus omnis a vi atque ira Deorum pulsus esset. Ibid. 20, 56: We do not fear the Gods, et pie sancteque colimus naturam excellentem atque præstantem. Ibid. 41, 115. Sen. Benef. iv. 19, 3: Epicurus denied all connection of God with the world, but, at the same time, would have him honoured as a father, propter majestatem ejus eximiam singularemque naturam.

[1262] Cic. N. D. i. 18, 46; Divin. ii. 17, 40; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 218; Plut. Pl. Phil. i. 7, 18 (Stob. i. 66); Phædr. (Philodem.) Fragm. col. 7; Metrodorus, περὶ αἰσθητῶν (Vol. Herc. vi.), col. 10; col. 16, 21.

[1263] Cic. N. D. i. 34, 95.

[1264] Epic. in Diog. 123: πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων ... μηδὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσαπτε, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. 139. Cic. N. D. i. 17, 45; 19, 51; Lucr. ii. 646; v. 165.

[1265] Cic. N. D. ii. 23, 59; i. 18, 49; 25, 71; 26, 74; Divin. ii. 17, 40; Lucr. v. 148; Metrodor. περὶ αἰσθητῶν, col. 7; Plut. l.c. Epicurus has, as Cicero remarks, monogrammos Deos; his Gods have only quasi corpus and quasi sanguinem. They are perlucidi and perflabiles, or, according to Lucretius, tenues, so that they cannot be touched, and are indestructible.

[1266] Cic. Divin. ii. 17, 40; Lucr. ii. 646; iii. 18; v. 146; Sen. Benef. iv. 19, 2.

[1267] Epic. in Diog. 77; 97; 139; Cic. N. D. i. 19, 51 (amongst other things: nos autem beatam vitam in animi securitate et in omnium vacatione munerum ponimus, both of which features must therefore be attributed to the Gods); Legg. i. 7, 21; Lucr. ii. 646; iii. 1092; iv. 83; vi. 57; Sen. Benef. iv. 4, 1; 19, 2. Conf. p. 436; 464, 1; 466, 1.

[1268] In the fragments of his treatise περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν εὐστοχουμένης διαγωγῆς, κατὰ Ζήνωνα, col. 12.

[1269] The κλίσια discussed by Hermarchus and Pythocles, col. 13, 20, had reference to these, and not to ordinary feasts.

[1270] Col. 14: The reason being assigned that λέγονται μὴ πολὺ διαφερούσαις κατὰ τὰς ἀρθρώσεις χρῆσθαι φωναῖς, καὶ μόνον οἴδαμεν γεγονότας θεοὺς Ἑλληνίδι γλώττῃ χρωμένους. The first statement seems to refer to the words of the divine language quoted by Homer; the second statement, to stories of appearances of the Gods. For the whole tone of the system militates against our thinking of men who have afterwards become Gods. The sceptical question, Whether the Gods possess speech? raised by Carneades in Sext. Math. ix. 178, appears to refer to this μυθολογία Ἐπικούρου.

[1271] Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54; Sen. Benef. iv. 19, 1.

[1272] Philodem. De Mus. iv. (V. Herc. i.) col. 4, says that the Gods do not need this worship, but it is natural for us to show it: μάλιστα μὲν ὁσίαις προλήψεσιν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ πάτριον παραδεδομένοις ἑκάστῳ τῶν κατὰ μέρος.

[1273] Cic. l.c. i. 19, 50, the sentence, et si quæ interimant, belonging, however, to Cicero only. For Epicurus cannot have described his ease-taking Gods as sustainers of the universe.

[1274] Cic. N. D. i. 19, 49: (Epicurus) docet eam esse vim et naturam Deorum ut primum non sensu sed mente cernatur: nec soliditate quadam nec ad numerum, ut ea, quæ ille propter firmitatem στερέμνια appellat, sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis: cum infinita simillimarum imaginum species ex innumerabilibus individuis exsistat et ad Deos (probably instead of Deos, which gives no sense, we should read nos. See the commentators in the editions of Moser and Kreuzer) affluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam infixamque nostram intelligentiam capere quæ sit et beata natura et æterna. The meaning of these words appears to be, that ideas of the Gods are not formed in the same way as the ideas of other solid bodies, by a number of similar pictures from the same object striking our senses (nec soliditate nec ad numerum, Diog. x. 95), but by single pictures emanating from innumerable divine individuals, all so much alike that they leave behind them the impressions of perfect happiness and immortality. The passage of Diog. x. 139, ought probably to be corrected by that in Cicero. It runs: ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι, τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητοὺς εἶναι· οὓς μὲν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοειδίαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιῤῥύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένους ἀνθρωποειδῶς. The similarity of most of the expressions leaves no doubt that Diogenes followed the same authority as Cicero (probably the same as Plut. Plac. i. 7, 18 followed), but in the words οὓς μὲν κ.τ.λ., it asserts the very opposite of this and the Epicurean teaching. There must, therefore, be some error here, either due to Diogenes or a copyist. This error does not apparently belong to the words κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, which Cicero renders ad numerum, so that Steinhart’s suggestion, p. 477, καθ’ ἁρμὸν or καθ’ ἁρμοὺς, is clearly wrong. It is more probably to be found in the words οὓς μὲν—οὓς δὲ. We might suggest for οὓς μὲν, οὐ μέντοι.

[1275] In Phædrus (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας), Fragm. col. 7 (10) it is said in answer to the Stoics: ἐπιδεικνύσθωσαν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἕνα μόνον [θεὸν] ἅπαντα λέγοντες οὐδὲ πάντας ὅσους ἡ κοινὴ φήμη παρέδωκεν, ἡμῶν οὐ μόνον ὅσους φασὶν οἱ Πανέλληνες ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείονας εἶναι λεγόντων ἔπειθ’ ὅτι τοιούτους οὐδὲ μεμήκασιν ἀπολείπειν, οἵους σέβονται πάντες καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμολογοῦμεν. ἀνθρωποειδεῖς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐ νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ ἀέρα καὶ πνεύματα καὶ αἰθέρα, ὥστ’ ἔγωγε καὶ τεθαῤῥηκότως εἴπαιμι τούτους Διαγόρου μᾶλλον πλημμελεῖν. It is then shown how little the natural substances of the Stoics resemble Gods (col. 9): τὰ θεῖα τοιαῦτα καταλείπουσιν ἃ καὶ γεννητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ φαίνεται, τοῖς δὲ πᾶσιν ἡμεῖς ἀκολούθως ἀϊδίους κἀφθάρτους εἶναι δογματίζομεν. Here we have a phenomenon witnessed in modern times, Deists and Pantheists mutually accusing one another of atheism, the former missing personality, the latter missing activity in the deity of their opponents.

[1276] See p. 469, 1.

[1277] Lucr. ii. 598, explains the Mother of the Gods as meaning the earth. ii. 655, he allows the expressions, Neptune, Ceres, Bacchus, for the sea, corn, and wine. iii. 976, he interprets the pains of the nether-world as the qualms now brought on by superstition and folly.

[1278] Epic. in Diog. 128: τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῇν ... πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον ... πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ ... ἀγαθόν.... καθάπερ καὶ ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα κακόν. Ibid. 141. Cic. Fin. i. 9, 29; Tusc. v. 26, 73: Cum præsertim omne malum dolore definiat, bonum voluptate.

[1279] Diog. 129: ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φευγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει τὸ ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες. Plut. Adv. Col. 27, 1.

[1280] Diog. 137; Cic. Fin. i. 7, 23; 9, 30; ii. 10, 31; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 194; Math. xi. 96.

[1281] Stob. Ecl. ii. 58: τοῦτο δ’ [the τέλος] οἱ κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον φιλοσοφοῦντες οὐ προσδέχονται λέγειν ἐνεργούμενον, διὰ τὸ παθητικὸν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ τέλος, οὐ πρακτικόν· ἡδονὴ γάρ· ὅθεν καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἀποδιδόασι τοῦ τέλους, τὸ οἰκείως διατεθεῖσθαι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν χωρὶς τῆς ἐπ’ ἄλλο τε ἁπάσης ἐπιβολῆς. Alex. Aphr. De An. 154, a: τοῖς δὲ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον ἡδονὴ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον ἔδοξεν εἶναι ἁπλῶς· προϊόντων δὲ διαρθροῦσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἡδονήν φασι.

[1282] Diog. 129; Cic. Fin. i. 14, 48; Tusc. v. 33, 95; Sen. De Otio, 7, 3.

[1283] Epic. in Diog. 139 (Gell. N. A. ii. 9, 2): ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. Id. in Diog. 128: τούτων γὰρ [τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν] ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπαναγαγεῖν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν. ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῇν ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἅπαντα πράττομεν ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμὼν οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι ... τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρείαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα. Ibid. 131; 144; conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 3, 10; Stob. Serm. 17, 35; Lucr. ii. 14; Cic. Fin. i. 11, 37.

[1284] Epicurus and Metrodorus, in Plut. l.c. 7, 1.

[1285] Diog. 136, quotes the words of Epicurus: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναὶ, ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται. Ritter, iii. 469, suggests instead of ἐνεργείᾳ ἐναργείᾳ, but ἐνεργείᾳ gives a very fair meaning: they appear actually in motion. Sen. Ep. 66, 45: Apud Epicurum duo bona sunt, ex quibus summum illud beatumque componitur, ut corpus sine dolore sit, animus sine perturbatione.

[1286] Hence Sen. Brevit. Vit. 14, 2: Cum Epicuro quiescere. Benef. iv. 4, 1: Quæ maxima Epicuro felicitas videtur, nihil agit.

[1287] Diog. 131. Similar views are expressed by Metrodorus, in Clement, Strom. v. 614, B, in praise of philosophers who escape all evils by rising to the contemplation of the eternal καθαροὶ καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου, ὃ νῦν σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν. Id. in Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 4: ποιήσωμέν τι καλὸν ἐπὶ καλοῖς, μόνον οὐ καταδύντες ταῖς ὁμοιοπαθείαις καὶ ἀπαλλαγέντες ἐκ τοῦ χαμαὶ βίου εἰς τὰ Ἐπικούρου ὡς ἀληθῶς θεόφαντα ὄργια.

[1288] Epic. in Diog. 122: μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν μήτε γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν. οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστιν οὔτε πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον. He who says it is too early or too late to study philosophy means πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μήπω παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι. Id. in Sen. Ep. 8, 7: Philosophiæ servias oportet, ut tibi contingat vera libertas.

[1289] Epic. in Diog. 127: τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ αἱ δὲ κεναί· καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον. τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῇν. Ibid. 149, further particulars are given as to the classes. Ibid. 144; Lucr. ii. 20; Cic. Fin. i. 13, 45; Tusc. v. 33, 94; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 3, 10; Eustrat. Eth. N. 48, b; Sen. Vit. Be. 13, 1.

[1290] Sen. Benef. iii. 4, 1: Epicuro ... qui adsidue queritur, quod adversus præterita simus ingrati. Epic. in Sen. Ep. 15, 10: Stulta vita ingrata est et trepida, tota in futurum fertur; and Lucr. iii. 929.

[1291] Diog. 11; 130; 144; 146; Stob. Floril. 17; 23; 30; 34; Sen. Ep. 2, 5; 16, 7; 25, 4.

[1292] Diog. 144: βραχεῖα σοφῷ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διῴκηκε. The like in Stob. Ecl. ii. 354; Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63; Sen. De Const. 15, 4; Epicurus and Metrodorus in Cic. Tusc. v. 9, 26, and Plut. Aud. Po. 14, p. 37.

[1293] Diog. 135: κρεῖττον εἶναι νομίζων εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν ἢ ἀλογίστως εὐτυχεῖν.

[1294] Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 20, 4.

[1295] Diog. 118; Plut. l.c. 3, 9; Sen. Ep. 66, 18; 67, 15; Cic. Tusc. v. 26, 73.

[1296] Diog. 22; Cic. Fin. ii. 30, 96; Tusc. ii. 7, 17; M. Aurel. ix. 41; Sen. Ep. 66, 47; 92, 25; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 18, 1, the latter perverting Epicurus’ words to a terrible extent.

[1297] Diog. 137: ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκοὺς διαφέρεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ χείρους τὰς σωματικὰς ἀλγηδόνας λέγουσι τῶν ψυχικῶν ... ὁ δὲ τὰς ψυχικάς. τὴν γοῦν σάρκα διὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον χειμάζειν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ διὰ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον. οὕτως οὖν καὶ μείζονας ἡδονὰς εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς. Further particulars in Plut. l.c. 3, 10: Cic. Tusc. v. 33, 96. The Epicureans spoke of bodily pleasure by ἥδεσθαι, mental by χαίρειν. Plut. l.c. 5, 1.

[1298] Diog. 145. Epicurus appears to have first used σὰρξ to express the body in contrast to the soul: σῶμα, in his system, includes the soul. See Diog. 137; 140; 144; Metrodor. in Plut. Colot. 31, 2. (Plut. in N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Plut. has γαστρὶ instead of σαρκί.)

[1299] Diog. x. 6, from Epicurus περὶ τέλους: οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονὰς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς δι’ ἀφροδισίων καὶ τὰς δι’ ἀκροαμάτων καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφᾶς (-ῆς). The like, in a more expanded form, in Cic. Tusc. iii. 18, 41.

[1300] Plut. l.c. 16, 9: ὡς καὶ ἐχάρην καὶ ἐθρασυνάμην ὅτε ἔμαθον παρ’ Ἐπικούρου ὀρθῶς γαστρὶ (see previous note) χαρίζεσθαι; and: περὶ γαστέρα γὰρ, ὦ φυσιολόγε Τιμόκρατες, τὸ ἀγαθόν. Conf. ibid. 3, 1.

[1301] See p. 478, 1, and Epic. in Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 4, 10: τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις. Ibid. 5, 1: τὸ μὲν ἡδόμενον τῆς σαρκὸς τῷ χαίροντι τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπερείδοντες, αὖθις δ’ ἐκ τοῦ χαίροντος εἰς τὸ ἡδόμενον τῇ ἐλπίδι τελευτῶντας.

[1302] Conf., besides the extracts on p. 478, 1 and 2, Cic. Fin. i. 17, 55: Animi autem voluptates et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis voluptatibus et doloribus; it is only a misapprehension on the part of several Epicureans to deny this fact. Mental pleasures and pains may therefore be the stronger ones for the reasons assigned above.

[1303] In his last letter (Diog. 22), after describing his painful illness, Epicurus continues: ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ.

[1304] Diog. 142; Cic. Fin. ii. 7, 21.

[1305] Diog. 140; 133; Cic. Fin. i. 15, 49; Plut. Aud. Po. 14, p. 36; M. Aurel. vii. 33, 64.

[1306] Diog. 140: οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῇν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ δικαίως ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. The same p. 132, 138. Cic. Tusc. v. 9, 26; Fin. i. 16, 50; 19, 62; Sen. Ep. 85, 18.

[1307] Sen. Vit. Be. 13, 1 (conf. 12, 4): In ea quidem ipse sententia sum (invitis nec nostris popularibus—the Stoics—dicam), sancta Epicurum et recta præcipere, et si propius accesseris tristia: voluptas enim illa ad parvum et exile revocatur, et quam nos virtuti legem dicimus eam ille dicit voluptati ... itaque non dico, quod plerique nostrorum, sectam Epicuri flagitiorum magistram esse, sed illud dico: male audit, infamis est, et immerito. Ep. 33, 2: Apud me vero Epicurus est et fortis, licet manuleatus sit. Seneca not infrequently quotes sayings of Epicurus, and calls (Ep. 6, 6) Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyænus, magnos viros. Conf. Cic. Fin. ii. 25, 81.

[1308] Epic. in Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 3: ἐγὼ δ’ ἐφ’ ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς παρακαλῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀρετὰς, κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ ταραχώδεις ἐχούσας τῶν κάρπων τὰς ἐλπίδας.

[1309] Diog. 138: διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι οὐ δι’ αὑτάς· ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν, καθά φησι καὶ Διογένης. Cic. Fin. i. 13, 42 (conf. ad Att. vii. 2): Istæ enim vestræ eximiæ pulchræque virtutes nisi voluptatem efficerent, quis eas aut laudabiles aut expetendas arbitraretur? ut enim medicorum scientiam non ipsius artis sed bonæ valetudinis causa probamus, &c. ...; sic sapientia, quæ ars vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur si nihil efficeret; nunc expetitur quod est tanquam artifex conquirendæ et comparandæ voluptatis. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b: [ἡ ἀρετὴ] περὶ τὴν ἐκλογήν ἐστι τῶν ἡδέων κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον.

[1310] Sen. Ep. 85, 18: Epicurus quoque judicat, cum virtutem habeat beatum esse, sed ipsam virtutem non satis esse ad beatam vitam, quia beatum efficiat voluptas quæ ex virtute est, non ipsa virtus.

[1311] Diog. 132; Cic. Fin. i. 13, 43; 19, 62.

[1312] Cic. Fin. i. 13, 47.

[1313] Cic. l.c. 13, 49. Diog. 120: τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν φύσει μὴ γίνεσθαι, λογισμῷ δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος.

[1314] Cic. Fin. i. 16, 50; Diog. 144; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 6, 1; Sen. Ep. 97, 13 and 15. Lucr. v. 1152: The criminal can never rest, and often in delirium or sleep betrays himself. Epicurus, however, refused to answer the question, Whether the wise man would do what is forbidden, if he could be certain of not being discovered? Plut. col. 34, 1.

[1315] Philodemus, De Rhet. Vol. Herc. v. a, col. 25: The laws ought to be kept τῷ μὴ τὰ διωρισμένα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τὴν ὁμοείδειαν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα διαφυλάττειν, κἀκεῖνα μὴ μόνον συνειδότων, ἀλλὰ κἂν λανθάνωμεν ἀπαξάπαντας, καὶ μεθ’ ἡδονῆς, οὐ δι’ ἀνάγκην, καὶ βεβαίως, ἀλλ’ οὐ σαλευομένως.

[1316] Diog. 117; 118; 119.

[1317] Plut. Adv. Col. 19, 2.

[1318] Diog. 118; Sen. Ep. 81, 11. The Stoic assertion of the equality of virtues and vices was, however, denied by the Epicureans. Diog. 120.

[1319] Diog. 135; conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 7, 3; Lucr. iii. 323.

[1320] Cic. Fin. i. 19, 61; v. 27 80: Semper beatum esse sapientem. Tusc. v. 9, 26; Stob. Serm. 17, 30. See p. 477.

[1321] Diog. 117.

[1322] Diog. 117: τὸν ἅπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν μήδ’ ἐπαλλάττειν ἑκόντα. The latter words appear to admit the possibility of an involuntary loss of wisdom, perhaps through madness.

[1323] Diog. 126; 145; Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63.

[1324] See also page 476, 2.

[1325] We gather this from the fragments of Philodemus’ treatise περὶ κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν οἷς εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ἅ. The 10th book of this treatise gives a portrait of the ὑπερήφανος, and kindred faults, after the manner of Theophrastus; the 9th, a mild criticism of Xenophon’s and Aristotle’s οἰκονομικός. It is objected to the latter that the master of the house is there made (col. ii. 30) to rise earlier than his servants, and to go to bed later than they do, such conduct being ταλαίπωρον καὶ ἀνοίκειον φιλοσόφου.

[1326] Diog. 144; 146; 130; Stob. Floril. 17, 23; Sen. Ep. 16, 7; Lucr. ii. 20; iii. 59; v. 1115; Philod. De Vit. ix. col. 12: φιλοσόφῳ δ’ ἐστὶ πλούτου μικρόν· ὃ παρεδώκαμεν ἀκολούθως [for thus and not by εὐκαίρως must the defective -ως be represented] τοῖς καθηγεμόσιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ πλούτου λόγοις. Conf. p. 476, 3; 477.

[1327] Diog. 130.

[1328] Stob. Floril. 17, 24 and 37; Sen. Ep. 21, 7; 14, 17; 2, 5: Honesta, inquit, res est læta paupertas. Ep. 17, 11: Multis parasse divitias non finis miseriarum fuit, sed mutatio.

[1329] Stob. Flor. 17, 30. Conf. Sen. Ep. 9, 20: Si cui sua non videntur amplissima, licet totius mundi dominus sit tamen miser est.

[1330] Diog. 11; Stob. Floril. 17, 34; Cic. Tusc. v. 31, 89; Sen. Ep. 25, 4. Epicurus lived very abstemiously. The charge of luxury brought against him was fully disposed of by Gassendi, De Vit. et Mor. Epic. 153. Timocrates, on the strength of one of his letters, asserts that he spent a mina every day on his table. If this statement be not a pure invention, it must refer to the whole circle of his friends. It could otherwise only have happened at such a time as the siege of Athens by Demetrius Poliorcetes, when a modius of wheat cost 300 drachmæ, and when Epicurus counted out to his friends the beans on which they lived. Plut. Demetr. 33. The further statement of Timocrates—(Diog. 6: αὐτὸν δὶς τῆς ἡμέρας ἐμεῖν ἀπὸ τρυφῆς)—is certainly an unfounded calumny. The moderation of Epicurus is admitted by Sen. Vit. B. 12, 4; 13, 1; and Epicurus flatters himself, in Sen. Ep. 18, 9: Non toto asse pasci, Metrodorum, qui nondum tantum profecerit, toto; and, in Diog. 11, because he was satisfied with bread and water. Ibid. he writes: πέμψον μοι τυροῦ Κυθνίου, ἵν’ ὅταν βούλωμαι πολυτελεύσασθαι, δύνωμαι. Still less have we any reason to connect the diseases of which Epicurus and some of his scholars died (as Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 5, 3 does, herein following Timocrates in Diog. 7) with their presumed luxuriousness.

[1331] Stob. Floril. 17, 30. See p. 477, 2.

[1332] Epicurus and Metrodorus, in Stob. Floril. 16, 28; 20, Conf. Plut. Tran. An. 16, p. 474: ὁ τῆς αὔριον ἥκιστα δεόμενος, ὥς φησιν Ἐπίκουρος, ἥδιστα πρόσεισι πρὸς τὴν αὔριον.

[1333] Serious charges on this head, against which Gassendi defends him, are preferred against Epicurus by Timocrates, in Diog. 6; but neither the testimony of Timocrates, nor the fact that a woman of loose morality (see above p. 406) was in his society, can be considered conclusive. Chrysippus in Stob. Floril. 63, 31, calls Epicurus ἀναίσθητος. Epicurus is, however, far below our standard of morality. Thus, in the quotation on p. 479, 1, he reckons ἡδοναὶ δι’ ἀφροδισίων among the necessary ingredients of the good. By Eustrat. in Eth. N. 48, such pleasures are included among φυσικαὶ (see p. 476, 3), not among ἡδοναὶ ἀναγκαῖαι. They are treated in the same light by Lucr. v. 1050; and Plut. Qu. Conviv. iii. 6, 1, 1, not only discusses the most suitable time for the enjoyment of love, but quotes as the words of Epicurus: εἰ γέρων ὁ σοφὸς ὢν καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος πλησιάζειν ἔτι ταῖς τῶν καλῶν ἁφαῖς χαίρει καὶ ψηλαφήσεσιν (N. P. Suav. V. 12, 3). These enjoyments, according to Epicurus, are only then allowed when they do not entail any bad consequences (Diog. 118), or produce passionate states of feeling. Hence he not only forbids unlawful commerce (Diog. 118), but declares οὐκ ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν. Diog. 118; Stob. Floril. 63, 31. Eros is defined (Alex. Aphr. Top. 75) = σύντονος ὄρεξις ἀφροδισίων. Conf. Plut. Amat. 19, 16, p. 765. It is consequently a passionate and disturbing state, which the wise man must avoid. The Stoics, on the contrary, allowed Eros to their wise man. The same view is taken of Eros by Lucretius, who cannot find words strong enough to express the restlessness and confusion entailed by love, the state of dependence in which it places man, and the loss to his fortune and good name. His advice is to allay passion as quickly as possible by means of Venus volgivaga, and to gratify it in a calm way.

[1334] Diog. 120; 140; Cic. Tusc. ii. 12, 28; Lucr. iii. 59; 993.

[1335] Sen. De Const. 16, 1.

[1336] Diog. 118: οὐδὲ ταφῆς φροντιεῖν.

[1337] Lucr. iii. 74.

[1338] See pp. 479, 455. A further argument may, however, be here quoted. In Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 16, 3, he says: ὅτι νόσῳ νοσῶν ἀσκίτῃ τινὰς ἑστιάσεις φίλων συνῆγε, καὶ οὐκ ἐφθόνει τῆς προσαγωγῆς τοῦ ὑγροῦ τῷ ὕδρωπι, καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων Νεοκλέους λόγων μεμνημένος ἐτήκετο τῇ μετὰ δακρύων ἡδονῇ. It is true that a certain mawkishness and self-conceit may be detected in this language.

[1339] Diog. 119; Philodem. De Vit. ix. 12; 27, 40.

[1340] Diog. 120: κτήσεως προνοήσεσθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος. 121: χρηματίσεσθαί τε ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας ἀπορήσαντα. The limitation implied in the text would, however, seem to require μόνης. Philodem. in the same sense l.c. 23, 23, says that Epicurus received presents from his scholars, Conf. Plut. Adv. Col. 18, 3, also 15, 31.

[1341] Diog. 121: εἰκόνας τε ἀναθήσειν εἰ ἔχοι· ἀδιαφόρως ἕξειν ἂν μὴ σχοίη (Cobet, not intelligibly: ἀδιαφόρως ἂν σχοίης).

[1342] Epic. in Diog. 130: καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν οὐχ ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλὰ τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι ἥδιστα πολυτελείας ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἥκιστα αὐτῆς δεόμενοι.

[1343] The Epicurean in Cic. Fin. i. 15, 49: Si tolerabiles sint [dolores] feramus, sin minus, æquo animo e vita, cum ea non placeat, tanquam e theatro exeamus. Epic. in Sen. Ep. 12, 10: Malum est in necessitate vivere, sed in necessitate vivere necessitas nulla est. On the other hand, Ep. 24, 22: Objurgat Epicurus non minus eos qui mortem concupiscunt, quam eos, qui timent, et ait: ridiculum est currere ad mortem tædio vitæ, cum genere vitæ ut currendum esset ad mortem effeceris. Diog. 119, the older editions read: καὶ πηρωθεὶς τὰς ὄψεις μεθέξειν αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου. Cobet: μετάξειν αὑτὸν τοῦ βίου. Instead of πηρωθεὶς πηρωθέντα is read, or, as we might prefer, instead of μετάξειν μετάξει. Suicide was only allowed by Epicurus in extreme cases. In Seneca’s time, when an Epicurean, Diodorus, committed suicide, his fellow-scholars were unwilling to allow that suicide was permitted by the precepts of Epicurus (Sen. Vit. B. 19, 1).

[1344] Epict. Diss. ii. 20, 6: Ἐπίκουρος ὅταν ἀναιρεῖν θέλῃ τὴν φυσικὴν κοινωνίαν ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κ.τ.λ.

[1345] Diog. 150; 154. From this point of view, Lucr. v. 1106, gives a long description of the rise of a state.

[1346] Stob. Floril. 43, 139.

[1347] Diog. 150; Lucr. v. 1149; Sen. Ep. 97, 13, and 15; Plut. Adv. Col. 35. See p. 482, 4.

[1348] Diog. 150–153.

[1349] Diog. 140.

[1350] Plut. Adv. Col. 31; 33, 4; N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Epictet. Diss. i. 23, 6; Lucr. v. 1125; Cic. pro Sext. 10, 23. Philodem. περὶ ῥητορικῆς (Vol. Herc. iv.) col. 14: οὐδὲ χρησίμην ἡγούμεθα τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν, οὔτ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς κεκτημένοις, οὔτε ταῖς πόλεσιν, αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτήν· ἀλλὰ πολλάκις αἰτίαν καὶ συμφορῶν ἀνηκέστων, when combined with uprightness, it benefits the community, and is sometimes useful; at other times, harmful to statesmen themselves.

[1351] Plut. De Latenter Vivendo, c. 4. In this respect, T. Pomponius Atticus is the true type of an Epicurean, on whose conduct during the civil war and withdrawal from public life, see Nepos, Att. 6.

[1352] Metrodorus, in Stob. Floril. 45, 26: ἐν πόλει μήτε ὡς λέων ἀναστρέφου μήτε ὡς κώνωψ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκπατεῖται τὸ δὲ καιροφυλακεῖται.

[1353] Seneca well expresses the difference on this point between Epicureans and Stoics in the passage quoted, p. 320, 3.

[1354] Plut. Tranq. An. c. 2, p. 465.

[1355] Epic. in Sen. Ep. 29, 10: Nunquam volui populo placere; nam quæ ego scio non probat populus, quæ probat populos ego nescio. Similar expressions from Stoics have been previously quoted.

[1356] Diog. 121: καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν [τὸν σοφόν]. Lucr. v. 1125:—

Ut satius multo jam sit parere quietum, Quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere.

[1357] Epict. Diss. i. 23, 3 (against Epicurus): διατὶ ἀποσυμβουλεύεις τῷ σοφῷ τεκνοτροφεῖν; τί φοβῇ μὴ διὰ ταῦτα εἰς λύπας ἐμπέσῃ; ii. 20, 20: Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν ἀνδρὸς πάντ’ ἀπεκόψατο καὶ τὰ οἰκοδεσπότου καὶ φίλου. The last words prove with what caution these statements must be taken.

[1358] Diog. 119. The passage is, however, involved in much obscurity, owing to a difference of reading. The earlier text was: καὶ μὴν καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφὸν, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς διαπορίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς περὶ φύσεως. κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου οὐ γαμήσειν. Cobet reads instead: καὶ μηδὲ γαμήσειν μηδὲ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφόν ... κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου γαμήσειν. What the MS. authority for this reading is, we are not told. In sense it agrees with Hieron. Adv. Jovin. i. 191, quoting from Seneca, De Matrimonio: Epicurus ... raro dicit sapienti ineunda conjugia, quia multa incommoda admixta sunt nuptiis. Like riches, honours, health, ita et uxores sitas in bonorum malorumque confinio, grave autem esse viro sapienti venire in dubium, utrum bonam an malam ducturus sit.

[1359] Plut. Adv. Col. 27, 6; De Am. Prol. 2, p. 495; Epictet. Diss. i. 23, 3.

[1360] Diog. 10: ἥ τε πρὸς τοὺς γονέας εὐχαριστία καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς εὐποιΐα. Diogenes himself appeals to Epicurus’ testament, ibid. 18.

[1361] Diog. 120: καὶ τὴν φιλίαν διὰ τὰς χρείας [γίνεσθαι] ... συνίστασθαι δὲ αὐτὴν κατὰ κοινωνίαν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς. Epic. Ibid. 148 (also in Cic. Fin. i. 20, 68): καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὡρισμένοις ἀσφάλεαν φιλίας μάλιστα κρήσει δεῖ νομίζειν συντελουμένην. (Cobet, however, reads: φιλίας μάλιστα κατιδεῖν εἶναι συντελυμένην, in which case φιλίᾳ should be substituted for φιλίας or else κτήσει for κατιδεῖν.) Sen. Ep. 9, 8: The wise man needs a friend, non ad hoc quod Epicurus dicebat in hac ipsa epistola (a letter in which Stilpo’s cynical self-contentment is blamed), ut habeat, qui sibi ægro adsideat, succurrat in vincula conjecto vel inopi; sed ut habeat aliquem, cui ipse ægro adsideat, quem ipse circumventum hostili custodia liberet. Cic. Fin. i. 20, 66: Cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur animus et a spe pariendarum voluptatum sejungi non potest, etc. On the same grounds, Philodem. De Vit. ix. (V. Herc. iii.) col. 24, argues that it is much better to cultivate friendship than to withdraw from it.

[1362] Cic. Fin. i. 20, 69.

[1363] Ibid. 70.

[1364] Ibid. 67.

[1365] The same need finds expression in the advice given by Epicurus (Sen. Ep. 11, 8; 25, 5): Let every one choose some distinguished man as his pattern, that so he may live, as it were, perpetually under his eye. Man requires a stranger to give him moral support.

[1366] As illustrations in modern times, the reunions of the French freethinkers, or the societies of Rousseau, Mendelssohn, Jacobi, may be mentioned. It deserves notice that in these societies, as amongst the Epicureans, an important part was played by women. This is quite natural, when philosophy is confined to cultivated intercourse and conversation.

[1367] Diog. 148: ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις. Cic. Fin. ii. 25, 80: Epicurus exalts friendship to heaven. In Diog. 120, Cobet reads instead of the usual φίλον τε οὐδένα κτήσεσθαι [τὸν σοφὸν], which is altogether untrustworthy, φίλων τε οὐδὲν κτήσεσθαι.

[1368] Sen. Ep. 19, 10, with the addition: Nam sine amico visceratio leonis ac lupi vita est.

[1369] Plut. Adv. Col. 8, 7; Diog. 121. We have no reason to suppose, with Ritter, iii. 474, that this was not the expression of a real sentiment. That it is inconsistent we can well allow.

[1370] The Epicureans in Cic. Fin. i. 20, 65: At vero Epicurus una in domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione consentientes tenuit amicorum greges! quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis. Ibid. ii. 25, 80.

[1371] Instances have already been quoted, p. 418, 2, of the extravagant honours required by Epicurus; nor did he fail to eulogise his friends, as the fragments of his letters to Leontion, Themista, and Pythocles (Diog. 5) prove. When Metrodorus had tried to obtain the release of a captive friend, Epicurus applauded him (Plut. N. P. Sua. Vivi, 15, 5, Adv. Col. 33, 2): ὡς εὖ τε καὶ νεανικῶς ἐξ ἄστεως ἅλαδε κατέβη Μίθρῳ τῷ Σύρῳ βοηθήσων. Ibid. 15, 8, he expresses his thanks for a present: δαΐως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἐπεμελήθητε ἡμῶν τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σίτου κομιδὴν, καὶ οὐρανομήκη σημεῖα ἐνδέδειχθε τῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ εὐνοίας. He wrote of Pythocles before he was 18: οὐκ εἶναι φύσιν ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀμείνω, καὶ τερατικῶς αὐτὸν εὖ ἀπαγγέλλειν, καὶ πάσχειν αὖ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, εὐχόμενος ἀνεμέσητα εἶναι πάντα καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ νεανισκοῦ (Plut. Adv. Col. 29, 2); and he also said (Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας, Fr. 6, V. Herc. v. 2, 11): ὡς διὰ Πυθοκλέα τύχην θεώσει παρὰ τὸ τεθεμισμένον. Compare the remarks on p. 488, 3.

[1372] Diog. 11: τόν τε Ἐπίκουρον μὴ ἀξιοῦν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν κατατίθεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας καθάπερ τὸν Πυθαγόραν κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων λέγοντα, ἀπιστούντων γὰρ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον· εἰ δ’ ἀπίστων οὐδὲ φίλων.

[1373] Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας (V. Herc. v. 2), Fr. 15; 72; 73, mentions Epicurus and Metrodorus as patterns of genial frankness towards friends. Probably the words in Sen. Ep. 28, 9—initium salutis est notitia peccati—are taken from a moral exhortation addressed to a friend.

[1374] Not only does Diogenes 9, praise his unequalled benevolence, his kindness to his slaves, and his general geniality, but Cicero calls him (Tusc. ii. 19, 44) vir optimus, and (Fin. ii. 25, 30) bonum virum et comem et humanum.

[1375] Diog. 118: οὔτε κολάσειν οἰκέτας ἐλεήσειν μέντοι, καὶ συγγνώμην τινὶ ἕξειν τῶν σπουδαίων. 121. ἐπιχαρίσεσθαί τινι ἐπὶ τῷ διορθώματι.

[1376] Plut. N. P. Suav. Vi. 15, 4 (similarly C. Princ. Philos. 3, 2, p. 778): αὐτοὶ δὲ δήπου λέγουσιν ὡς τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἥδιόν ἐστι τοῦ πάσχειν. Conf. Alex. Aphr. Top. 123. A similar maxim is attributed by Ælian, V. H. xiii. 13, to Ptolemy Lagi. Conf. Acts xx. 35.

[1377] Cic. Fin. ii. 25, 81: Et ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei fuerunt et hodie sunt, et in amicitiis fideles et in omni vita constantes et graves nec voluptate sed officio consilia moderantes. Atticus is a well-known example of genuine human kindness and ready self-sacrifice, and Horace may be also quoted as an illustration of the same character. See Steinhart’s remarks, l.c. p. 470.

[1378] See p. 445.

[1379] Conf. p. 126, 2, with 439, 1.

[1380] It has been already stated, p. 405, 1, 4, that Epicurus admitted his debt to Democritus, but not without some reserve; otherwise he claimed to be entirely self-taught, and to have learned nothing from the ancient teachers, and expressed himself with such conceit and scorn as to spare neither them nor their writings. Diog. 8, besides mentioning his abuse of Nausiphanes (sup. 342, 1), refers also to his calling the Platonists Διονυσοκόλακας, Plato himself in irony the golden Plato, Heraclitus κυκητήν, Democritus Ληρόκριτον, Antidorus Σαινίδωρον, the Cynics ἐχθροὺς τῆς Ἑλλάδος, the Dialecticians πολυφθονέρους, Pyrrho ἀμαθῆν and ἀπαίδευτον, and charging Aristotle and Protagoras with vices in their youth. Diogenes refuses to allow that any of these statements are true, Epicurus’ friendliness being well known. But the devotion of Epicurus to his friends and admirers does not exclude hatred and injustice towards his predecessors (see p. 418, 2), of whom a fair estimate was rendered impossible by the superficial nature of his knowledge and the onesidedness of his point of view. Sext. Math. i. 2, attests τὴν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δυσμένειαν; Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 1, mentions a false objection to Arcesilaus; and Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93, says: Cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phædoni Socratico turpissime maledixerit, etc. The rude jokes mentioned by Diogenes are in harmony with a man whom Cic. N. D. ii. 17, 46, calls homo non aptissimus ad jocandum minimeque resipiens patriam. On these jokes he apparently prided himself as well as on a certain bombastic elegance. See p. 496, 6. In this Epicurus was followed by his pupils. Cic. N. D. i. 34, 93, says of Zeno: Non eos solum, qui tunc erant, Apollodorum, Silum, ceteros figebat maledictis, sed Socratem ipsum ... scurram Atticum fuisse dicebat (according to Cic. Brut. 85, 292, Epicurus had already expressed a disparaging opinion of the Socratic irony), Chrysippum nunquam nisi Chrysippam vocabat.

[1381] Compare in this connection the quotations from Metrodorus on p. 476, 1.

[1382] Democritus had denied all truth to sensuous impressions. The same sceptical tone was more strongly apparent in Metrodorus (Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 19, 5; Sext. Math. vii. 88; Epiphan. Exp. Fid. 1088, A, although he cannot be considered a full Sceptic, notwithstanding his usual agreement with the physical views of Democritus (Plut. in Eus. l.c. i. 8, 11; id. Fac. Lun. 15, 3, p. 928; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 19). Scepticism appears to have passed from him to Pyrrho, Anaxarchus being the middleman (see p. 518, 2, 3), and herewith may be connected the Sceptical imperturbability. This doctrine of imperturbability being held by Epicurus, the pupil of Nansiphanes, it might be supposed that before Pyrrho’s time a doctrine not unlike that of Pyrrho had been developed in the School of Democritus, from whom it was borrowed by Epicurus. The connection is, however, uncertain. We have seen that the doubts of Democritus extended only to sense-impressions, not to intellectual knowledge. The case of Metrodorus was similar. His sceptical expressions refer only to the ordinary conditions of human knowledge, that of ideas derived from the senses: greater dependence is, however, placed on thought. We must therefore take the statement ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶν ὃ ἄν τις νοήσαι subject to this limitation. Anaxarchus is said (Sext. Math. vii. 87) to have compared the world to a stage-scene, which involves no greater scepticism than the similar expressions used by Plato as to the phenomenal world. However much, therefore, these individuals may have contributed to Pyrrhonism, a simple transference of Scepticism from Democritus to Pyrrho is not to be thought of. And as regards imperturbability, Epicurus may have borrowed the expression from Pyrrho, whom, according to Diog. ix. 64 and 69, he both knew and esteemed.

[1383] Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1; Diog. ix. 61. We are indebted almost exclusively to Diogenes for our information respecting Pyrrho. Besides Antigonus the Carystian, Apollodorus, Alexander Polyhistor, Diocles, &c., are the chief authorities drawn upon by Diogenes.

[1384] Attention has been drawn to the chronological difficulties in ‘Socrates and the Socratic Schools,’ p. 255, note 1 (2nd edition). Either Pyrrho is falsely called a pupil of Bryso, or Bryso is falsely called the son of Stilpo. The former seems more probable, Diog. ix. 61, having derived his statement from Alexander’s διαδοχαί, and it is quite in the style of the compilers of the διαδοχαὶ to assign a Megarian teacher to a Sceptic whose connection with that School was sufficiently obvious.

[1385] Diog. ix. 61; Aristocl. l.c. 18, 20; 17, 8. We gather from them that Pyrrho was originally a painter. Suidas, Πύῤῥων, only copies the present text of Diogenes with a few mistakes.

[1386] Besides the passage quoted from Sextus, p. 515, 1, which is little known, we have no proof of the sceptical tone in Anaxarchus which Sextus, Math. vii. 48, attributes to him, and since the latter quotes no proofs, it may be assumed that he had none. Anaxarchus appears to have been unjustly included among the Sceptics, like so many others who were called Sceptics by later writers on the strength of a single word or expression. According to other accounts, he belonged to the School of Democritus. Plut. Tranq. An. 4, p. 466. In Valer. Max. viii. 14, ext. 2, he propounds to Alexander the doctrine of an infinite number of worlds; and Clemens, Strom. i. 287, B, quotes a fragment, in which, agreeing with Democritus, he observes that πολυμαθία is only useful when it is properly made use of. Like Epicurus, Anaxarchus followed Democritus, calling happiness the highest object of our desire; and this assertion probably gained for him the epithet ὁ εὐδαιμονικός (Clemens, l.c.; Athen. vi. 250; xii. 548, b; Æl. V. H. ix. 37). In other respects, he differed from Democritus. For first he is charged by Clearchus in Athen. xii. 548, b, with a luxurious indulgence far removed from the earnest and pure spirit of Democritus; and according to Plut. Alex. 52, he had, when in Asia, renounced the independence of a philosopher for a life of pleasure; Timon also in Plut. Virt. Mor. 6, p. 446, says he was led away by φύσις ἡδονοπλὴξ contrary to his better knowledge. Again, he is said to have commended in Pyrrho (Diog. ix. 63) an indifference which went a good deal beyond the imperturbability of Democritus; and Timon commends him for his κυνικὸν μένος. He meets external pain with the haughty pride expressed in his much-admired dictum under the blows of Nitocreon’s club—Diog. ix. 59; Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 10, p. 449; Clemens, Strom. iv. 496, D; Valer. Max. iii. 3, ext. 4; Plin. Hist. Nat. vii. 87; Tertull. Apol. 50; Dio Chrysos. Or. 37, p. 126, B. But he treats men with the same contempt; and whilst meeting the Macedonian conqueror with an air of independence, he spoils the whole by adroit flattery. Conf. Plut. Alex. 52; Ad Princ. Iner. 4, p. 781; Qu. Conv. ix. 1, 2, 5; Æl. V. H. ix. 37; Athen. vi. 250. His indifference was, at any rate, very much lacking in nobility. Respecting Anaxarchus see Lusac. Lect. Att. 181.

[1387] Diog. ix. 64; 109.

[1388] According to Diog. 64, they made him head-priest, and, on his account, allowed to philosophers immunity from taxation. According to Diocles (Diog. 65), the Athenians presented him with citizenship for his services in putting a Thracian prince Cotys to death.

[1389] Diog. 66; 62.

[1390] Examples in Diog. 67. It sounds, however, highly improbable; and doubts were expressed by Ænesidemus whether his indifference ever went to the extent described by Antigonus, Ibid. 62, of not getting out of the way of carriages and precipices, so that he had to be preserved from danger by his friends. He must, moreover, have enjoyed a special good fortune to attain the age of 90, notwithstanding such senseless conduct.

[1391] All the dates here are very uncertain. Neither the date of his death nor of his birth is given, and the notice in Suidas that he lived after the 111 Olympiad (336–332 B.C.) is indefinite. If, however, as Diog. 62 says, he attained the age of 90, and if he joined Anaxarchus at Alexander’s first invasion of Asia, being then between 24 and 30, the statements above given are true.

[1392] Diog. Pro. 16; 102; Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1 are better authorities than Sext. Math. i. 282, or Plut. Alex. Fort. i. 10, p. 331. Neither does Sextus say that the supposed poem on Alexander was extant. The whole statement is evidently untrustworthy.

[1393] Timon (see Wachsmuth, De Timone Phliasio, Leipzig, 1859) was a native of Phlius (Diog. ix. 109). A public dancer at first (Diog. 109; Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 12), when tired of this mode of life he repaired to Megara, to hear Stilpo (Diog. 109). Stilpo being alive in the third century, and Timon’s birth having happened approximately between 325–315 B.C., the connection is not so impossible as Wachsmuth, p. 5, and Preller, Hist. Phil. Gr. et Rom. 398, suppose, though in the uncertainty of chronological data it cannot be positively stated. Subsequently Timon became acquainted with Pyrrho, and leaving his staunch admirers (Diog. 109, 69; Aristocl. l.c. 11, 14, 21), removed with his wife to Elis. He then appeared as a teacher in Chalcis, and, having amassed a fortune, concluded his life in Athens (Diog. 110; 115). It appears from Diog. 112 and 115, that he survived Arcesilaus (who died 241 B.C.), having nearly attained the age of 90. His death may therefore be approximately fixed in 230, his birth in 320 B.C. For his life and character, see Diog. 110; 112–115; Athen. x. 438, a; Æl. V. H. ii. 41. Of his numerous writings, the best known is a witty and pungent satire on previous and cotemporary philosophers. Respecting this satire (Diog. 110) consult Wachsmuth, p. 9 and 3. The latter, p. 51, has collected the fragments.

[1394] Diog. 67–69, mentions, besides Timon, a certain Eurylochus as his pupil, who, however, was not very successful in the way of keeping his temper; also Philo, an Athenian, Hecatæus of Abdera, the well-known historian (on whom see Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 384); and Nausiphanes, the teacher of Epicurus. The last assertion is only tenable on the supposition that Nausiphanes appeared as a teacher only a few years after Pyrrho, for Pyrrho cannot have returned to Elis before 322 B.C., and Epicurus must have left the School of Nausiphanes before 310 B.C. See p. 406, 3. According to Diog. 64, Epicurus must have become acquainted with Pyrrho whilst a pupil of Nausiphanes. Nausiphanes is said not to have agreed with Pyrrho, but only to have admired his character (Diog. l.c.), so that he cannot properly be called his pupil. The mention of Numenius, by Diog. 102 (conf. 68), among Pyrrho’s συνήθεις, is suspicious, because Ænesidemus is named at the same time. It may be questioned whether he as well as Ænesidemus does not belong to a later period of Scepticism.

[1395] According to Diog. 115, Menodotus (a Sceptic belonging to the latter half of the second century after Christ) asserted that Timon left no successor, and that the School was in abeyance from Timon to Ptolemæus, i.e. until the second half of the first century B.C. Sotion and Hippobotus, however, asserted that his pupils were Dioscurides, Nicolochus, Euphranor, and Praÿlus. His son, too, the physician Xanthus, followed the father. (Diog. 109.) That Timon was himself a physician, as Wachsmuth, p. 5, supposes, cannot be concluded with certainty from the words ἰατρικὸν ἐδίδαξε, since these words only imply that he had received instruction in medicine. On the other hand, according to Suid. Πύῤῥων, the second Pyrrho, called Timon’s pupil, was a changeling. If Aratus of Soli was a pupil (Suid. Ἄρατος; conf. Diog. ix. 113), he was certainly not a follower of his views. See p. 43, 2.

[1396] In Diog. 116, Eubulus is called a pupil of Euphranor, also on the authority of Sotion and Hippobotus. If Ptolemæus was the next one who is said to have come after him, no philosopher of Pyrrho’s ἀγωγὴ can have been known for 150 years.

[1397] Diog. 114.

[1398] Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 2: ὁ δέ γε μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ Τίμων φησὶ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς τρία ταῦτα βλέπειν· πρῶτον μὲν ὁποῖα πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα· δεύτερον δὲ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτὰ διακεῖσθαι· τελευταῖον δὲ τί περιέσται τοῖς οὕτως ἔχουσιν.

[1399] Aristocl. l.c.: τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματά φησιν αὐτὸν (Pyrrho) ἀποφαίνειν ἐπίσης ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἀστάθμητα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα, διὰ τοῦτο [τὸ] μήτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡμῶν μήτε τὰς δόξας ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. Diog. ix. 61: οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε εἶναι ἕκαστον. Gell. xi. 5, 4: Pyrrho is said to have stated οὐ μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει τόδε ἢ ἐκείνως ἢ οὐθετέρως.

[1400] See the above-quoted passage of Aristocles and Diog. ix. 114.

[1401] Timon, in Diog. ix. 105: τὸ μέλι ὅτι ἐστὶ γλυκὺ οὐ τίθημι· τὸ δ’ ὅτι φαίνεται ὁμολογῶ.

[1402] Diog. ix. 61: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔφασκεν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε αἰσχρὸν οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων, μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν, οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε εἶναι ἕκαστον. Sext. Math. xi. 140: οὔτε ἀγαθόν τί ἐστι φύσει οὔτε κακὸν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα νόῳ κέκριται κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα.

[1403] In this sense the words of Ænesidemus, in Diog. ix. 106, must be understood: οὐδέν φησιν ὁρίζειν τὸν Πύῤῥωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν. See note 1.

[1404] Diog. ix. 114, on Timon: συνεχές τε ἐπιλέγειν εἰώθει πρὸς τοὺς τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετ’ ἐπιμαρτυροῦντος τοῦ νοῦ ἐγκρίνοντας· συνῆλθεν Ἀτταγᾶς τε καὶ Νουμήνιος. The meaning of this proverb has been already explained.

[1405] Diog. ix. 79 refers these τρόποι to Pyrrho, but inasmuch as he was there describing Sceptic views, the author of which to his mind was Pyrrho, nothing follows from his statement. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 36 generally attributes them to the ancient Sceptics, by whom, according to Math. vii. 345, he understood Ænesidemus and his followers. Aristocles, l.c. 18, 11, refers them to Ænesidemus, and they may easily have been referred to Pyrrho by mistake, since Ænesidemus himself (Diog. ix. 106) and subsequent writers (Favorin. in Gell. xi. 5, 5; Philostr. Vit. Soph. i. 491) call every kind of sceptical statement λόγοι or τρόποι Πυῤῥώνειοι. That they cannot belong to Pyrrho in the form in which they are presented by Sextus and Diogenes is clear, since they obviously refer to later views.

[1406] Sext. Math. vi. 66; x. 197 quotes an argument of Timon against the reality of time, and further states (Math. iv. 2) that Timon, in his conflict with the philosophers of nature, maintained that no assertion should be made without proof: in other words, he denied dogmatism; for every proof supposes something established, i.e. another proof, and so on for ever.

[1407] Aristocl. l.c. 18, 3: διὰ τοῦτο οὖν μηδὲ πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς δεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἀδοξάστους καὶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους εἶναι περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου λέγοντας ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτ’ οὐκ ἔστιν. Diog. ix. 61. Ibid. 76: οὐ μᾶλλον means, according to Timon, τὸ μηδὲν ὁρίζειν ἀλλὰ ἀπροσθετεῖν.

[1408] Ænesidem. in Diog. ix. 106: οὐδὲν ὁρίζειν τὸν Πύῤῥωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν, τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν. Timon. Ibid. 105. See p. 522, 3.

[1409] Diog. ix. 103: περὶ μὲν ὧν ὡς ἄνθρωποι πάσχομεν ὁμολογοῦμεν ... περὶ δὲ ὧν οἱ δογματικοὶ διαβεβαιοῦνται τῷ λόγῳ φάμενοι κατειλῆφθαι ἐπέχομεν περὶ τούτων ὡς ἀδήλων· μόνα δὲ τὰ πάθη γινώσκομεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ὁρῶμεν ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ τὸ ὅτι τόδε νοοῖμεν γινώσκομεν, πῶς δ’ ὁρῶμεν ἢ πῶς νοοῦμεν ἀγνοοῦμεν· καὶ ὅτι τόδε λευκὸν φαίνεται διηγηματικῶς λέγομεν οὐ διαβεβαιούμενοι εἰ καὶ ὄντως ἐστί ... καὶ γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον τιθέμεθα οὐχ ὡς καὶ τοιοῦτον ὄν· καὶ ὅτι πῦρ καίει αἰσθανόμεθα· εἰ δὲ φύσιν ἔχει καυστικήν, ἐπέχομεν.

[1410] Diog. l.c.: περὶ δὲ τῆς Οὐδὲν ὁρίζω φωνῆς καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων λέγομεν ὡς οὐ δογμάτων· οὐ γάρ εἰσιν ὅμοια τῷ λέγειν ὅτι σφαιροειδής ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἄδηλον, αἱ δὲ ἐξομολογήσεις εἰσίν. ἐν ᾧ οὖν λέγομεν μηδὲν ὁρίζειν οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁριζόμεθα. Diog. gives this view in its later form, probably following Sext. Pyrrh. i. 197, but agreeing in substance with the quotations from Timon and Pyrrho.

[1411] Diog. ix. 61 and 107; Aristocl. l.c. The expressions ἀφασία, ἀκαταληψία, ἐποχὴ, invariably mean the same thing. Later writers use instead of them, ἀῤῥεψία, ἀγνωσία τῆς ἀληθείας κ.τ.λ. If, according to Aristocles and Diog. 107, Timon first mentioned ἀφασία in dealing with the third of his questions, this statement is obviously inaccurate.

[1412] Πυῤῥώνειοι, σκεπτικοὶ, ἀπορητικοὶ, ἐφεκτικοὶ, ζητητικοί. Conf. Diog. 69.

[1413] Aristocl. l.c. 2: τοῖς μέντοι διακειμένοις οὕτω περιέσεσθαι Τίμων φησὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀφασίαν ἔπειτα δ’ ἀταραξίαν. Diog. 107: τέλος δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοί φασι τὴν ἐποχὴν, ᾗ σκιᾶς τρόπον ἐπακολουθεῖ ἡ ἀταραξία, ὥς φασιν οἵ τε περὶ τὸν Τίμωνα καὶ Αἰνεσίδημον. Apathy is substituted for ataraxy in Diog. 108; Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 130.

[1414] Timon, in Aristocl. l.c. 18, 14, speaking of Pyrrho:—

ἀλλ’ οἷον τὸν ἄτυφον ἐγὼ ἴδον ἠδ’ ἀδάμαστον πᾶσιν, ὅσοις δάμνανται ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε (conf. Wachsmuth, p. 62) λαῶν ἔθνεα κοῦφα, βαρυνόμεν’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἐκ παθέων δόξης τε καὶ εἰκαίης νομοθήκης.

Id. in Sext. Math. xi. 1: The Sceptic lives—

ῥῇστα μεθ’ ἡσυχίης αἰεὶ ἀφροντίστως καὶ ἀκινήτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ μὴ προσέχων δειλοῖς ἡδυλόγου σοφίης.

Id. in Diog. 65.

[1415] Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43: Quæ (externals) quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime ægrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse. iii. 3, 11: Cum Pyrrhone et Aristone qui omnia exæquent. Acad. ii. 42, 130: Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quæ ἀπάθεια nominatur. Epictet. Fragm. 93 (in Stob. Serm. 121, 28): Πύῤῥων ἔλεγεν μηδὲν διαφέρειν ζῇν ἢ τεθνάναι.

[1416] Cic. Fin. iv. 16, 43: Pyrrho ... qui virtute constituta nihil omnino quod appetendum sit relinquat. The same Ibid. ii. 13, 43; iii. 4, 12.

[1417] See p. 521, 3; 525, 3.

[1418] Diog. 105: ὁ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνί φησι μὴ ἐκβεβηκέναι [τὸν Πύῤῥωνα] τὴν συνήθειαν. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰνδαλμοῖς οὕτω λέγει· ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον παντὶ σθένει οὗπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ. (Conf. Sext. Math. vii. 30.) Ibid. 106, of Pyrrho: τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν. See p. 519, 4.

[1419] See p. 524, 1, 2.

[1420] Sext. Math. xi. 20: κατὰ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον τούτων ἕκαστον ἔχομεν ἔθος ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον προσαγορεύειν καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς ἰνδαλμοῖς ἔοικε δηλοῦν ὅταν φῇ

ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω ὥς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι μῦθον ἀληθείης ὀρθὸν ἔχων κανόνα· ὡς ἡ τοῦ θείου τε φύσις καὶ τἀγαθοῦ αἰεὶ, ἐξ ὧν ἰσότατος γίγνεται ἀνδρὶ βίος.

[1421] According to an anecdote preserved by Antigonus of Carystus (Aristocl. l.c. 18, 19; Diog. ix. 66), Pyrrho apologised for being agitated by saving: It is difficult to lay aside humanity altogether. This language only proves what his aim was, and that he had found no mediating principle between the apathy required by his system and practical needs. Neither do the remarks of Ritter, iii. 451, prove that the doctrine of moderation belongs to Pyrrho and his school.

[1422] Conf. Diog. ix. 114. Tennemann’s view (Gesch. d. Phil. iv. 190), that Arcesilaus arrived at his conclusions independently of Pyrrho, does not appear to be tenable.

[1423] Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 10; 6, 5, says that Zeno and Arcesilaus were fellow-pupils under Polemo, and that their rivalry whilst at school was the origin of the later quarrels between the Stoa and the Academy. The same may have been stated by Antiochus, since Cic. Acad. i. 9, 35, ii. 24, 76, appeals to him to prove that they were together at school. Still the assertion is valueless. There can be no doubt that both Zeno and Arcesilaus were pupils of Polemo, but it is hardly possible that they can have been under him at the same time; nor if they were, could the intellectual differences of the two schools be referred simply to their personal relation.

[1424] Cic. De Orat. ii. 18, 68; Diog. iv. 28; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16; Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220. Clemens, Strom. i. 301, C, calls Arcesilaus the founder of the New (second or middle) Academy.

[1425] Arcesilaus (see Geffers, De Arcesila, Gött. 1842, Gymn. Progr.) was born at Pitane, in Æolia (Strabo, xiii. 1, 67, p. 614; Diog. iv. 28). His birth-year is not stated; but as Lacydes (Diog. iv. 61) was his successor in 240 B.C., and he was then 75 years of age (Diog. 44), it must have been about 315 B.C. Having enjoyed the instruction of the mathematician Autolycus in his native town, he repaired to Athens, where he was first a pupil of Theophrastus, but was won for the Academy by Crantor (Diog. 29; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2). With Crantor he lived on the most intimate terms; but as Polemo was the president of the Academy, he is usually called a pupil of Polemo (Cic. De Orat. iii. 18, 67; Fin. v. 31, 94; Strabo). On the death of Polemo, he was probably a pupil of Crates; but it is not stated by Diog. 33, or Numen. in Eus. l.c. xiv. 5, 10, that he was a pupil of either Pyrrho, Menedemus, or Diodorus. If Eusebius seems to imply it, he may have misunderstood the statement that he made use of their teaching. Fortified with extraordinary acuteness, penetrating wit, and ready speech (Diog. 30; 34; 37; Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2; Plut. De Sanit. 7, p. 126; Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7; ii. 1, 10, 4; Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 193, 28), learned, especially in mathematics (Diog. 32), and well acquainted with native poets (Diog. 30, who mentions his own attempts at poetry, quoting some of his epigrams), he appears to have early distinguished himself. From Plut. Adv. Col. 26, p. 1121, it appears that in Epicurus’ lifetime, consequently before 270 B.C., he had propounded his sceptical views with great success. Apollodorus, however, appears to have placed his career too early (Diog. 45), in making his ἀκμὴ between 300 and 296 B.C. On the death of Crates, the conduct of the School devolved upon Arcesilaus (Diog. 32), through whom it attained no small note (Strabo, i. 2, 2, p. 15; Diog. 37; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 14). From public matters he held aloof, and lived in retirement (Diog. 39), esteemed even by opponents for his pure, gentle, and genial character (Diog. 37; quoting many individual traits, 44; vii. 171; ix. 115; Cic. Fin. v. 31, 94; Plut. De Adulat. 22, p. 63; Coh. Ira, 13, p. 461. Ælian, V. H. xiv. 96). On his relations to Cleanthes, conf. Diog. vii. 171; Plut. De Adulat. 11, p. 55. He left no writings (Diog. 32; Plut. Alex. Virt. 4, p. 328).

[1426] Cic. De Orat. iii. 18, 67: Arcesilas primum ... ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit: quem ferunt ... aspernatum esse omne animi sensusque judicium, primumque instituisse ... non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se sentire dixisset, disputare. This is, in fact, the calumniandi licentia with which Augustin, herein doubtless following Cicero, c. Acad. iii. 17, 39, charges him, contra omnia velle dicere quasi ostentationis causa.

[1427] Conf. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv, 6, 12, and above, p. 86, 4.

[1428] Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 2; Cic. Acad. i. 12, 44. Ritter’s view of the latter passage, that Arcesilaus quoted the diversities of philosophic teaching by way of refuting it (iii. 478), appears to be entirely without foundation. He rather quoted its uniform resemblance by way of overcoming doubt.

[1429] Cic. De Orat. iii. 18. See p. 530, 1.

[1430] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 234; Diocles of Cnidus, in Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, 5; Augustin, c. Acad. iii. 17, 38. Geffers regards Arcesilaus as a true follower of the older Academy.

[1431] Sext. Math. vii. 153.

[1432] Sext. Math. l.c. 154.

[1433] Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 27. Zeno asserted: An irresistible or conceptional perception is such an impression of a real object as cannot possibly come from an unreal one. Arcesilaus endeavoured to prove nullum tale visum esse a vero, ut non ejusdem modi etiam a falso posset esse. The same view in Sext. l.c. To these may be added discussions on deceptions of the senses and contradictions in the statements of the senses in Sext. vii. 408, and others attributed to the Academicians. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70: Urgebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret, quæ sensibus viderentur, Zenon autem nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia. To these attacks on Zeno Plut. De An. (Fr. vii.) 1, probably refers: ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν αἴτιον τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὡς Ἀρκεσίλαος. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη τῆς ἐπιστήμης αἴτια φανεῖται. All that is here attributed to Arcesilaus is the assertion that ἐπιστητόν is the cause of ἐπιστήμη, and that it is so when it produces a φαντασία καταληπτική. The connection in which these statements were made by Arcesilaus was probably this: If there is such a thing as knowledge, there must be objects which produce it. These objects, however, do not exist, there being no object which does not admit a false opinion equally well with a true one.

[1434] Sext. 155: μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ κατάληψις γενήσεται· ἦν γὰρ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσις· μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταλήψεως πάντα ἔσται ἀκατάληπτα.

[1435] Sext. l.c.; Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Adv. Col. 24, 2; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16; 6, 4. By Sext. Pyrrh. i. 233, it is thus expressed: Arcesilaus regards ἐποχὴ as being a good in every case, συγκατάθεσις as an evil.

[1436] Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45.

[1437] Cic. Fin. ii. 1, 2; v. 4, 11; De Orat. iii. 18, 67; Diog. iv. 28; conf. Plut. C. Not. 37, 7.

[1438] Stob. Floril. 82, 4: Ἀρκεσίλαος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔφη τοὺς διαλεκτικοὺς ἐοικέναι τοῖς ψηφοπαίκταις (jugglers), οἵτινες χαριέντως παραλογίζονται; and, Ibid. 10 (under the heading: Ἀρκεσιλάου ἐκ τῶν Σερήνου ἀπομνημονευμάτων): διαλεκτικὴν δὲ φεῦγε, συγκυκᾷ τἄνω κάτω.

[1439] The authority is a very uncertain one, particularly as Arcesilaus left nothing in writing, and the remarks quoted would seem to be more appropriate to the Chian Aristo (see p. 59) than to Arcesilaus. Still, if Chrysippus condemned the dialectic of the Sceptics (according to p. 66, 1), Arcesilaus may very well have condemned that of the Stoics and Megarians. Does not even Cic. Acad. ii. 28, 91, probably following Carneades (see p. 541, 4), object to dialectic, because it furnishes no knowledge?

[1440] This fact is recognised not only by Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, 4, but by Sext. Pyrrh. i. 232. The difference which the later Sceptics draw between themselves and the Academicians, viz. that they assert the principle of doubt tentatively, whereas the Academicians assert it absolutely, does not apply to Arcesilaus (see p. 533, 1). Even Sextus says the same, but with some diffidence (πλὴν εἰ μὴ λέγοι τις ὅτι κ.τ.λ.). On account of this connection with Pyrrho, the Stoic Aristo called Arcesilaus (following Il. vi. 181): πρόσθε Πλάτων ὄπιθεν Πύῤῥων, μέσος Διόδωρος. Sext. l.c.; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 11; Diog. iv. 33.

[1441] It has been already seen that this was the key to the position which the Stoics and Epicureans took up against the Sceptics.

[1442] Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 3, defending Arcesilaus against the attacks of Colotes, says: The opponents of Scepticism cannot show that ἐποχὴ leads to inactivity, for πάντα πειρῶσι καὶ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὑπήκουσεν ἡ ὁρμὴ γενέσθαι συγκατάθεσις οὐδὲ τῆς ῥοπῆς ἀρχὴν ἐδέξατο τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἀγωγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐφάνη μὴ δεομένη τοῦ προστίθεσθαι. Perception arises and influences the will without συγκατάθεσις. Since this statement was controverted by Chrysippus (Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 12. See above 87, 1), there can be no doubt that it was propounded by Arcesilaus.

[1443] Sext. Math. vii 158: ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔδει καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ Βίου διεξαγωγῆς ζητεῖν ἥ τις οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν ἀποδίδοσθαι, ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τουτέστι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος, ἠρτημένην ἔχει τὴν πίστιν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὅτι ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κανονιεῖ τᾶς αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς καὶ κοινῶς τὰς πράξεις τῷ εὐλόγῳ, κατὰ τοῦτό τε προερχόμενος τὸ κριτήριον κατορθώσει· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν περιγίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς φρονήσεως, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν κινεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς κατορθώμασι, τὸ δὲ κατόρθωμα εἶναι (according to the Stoic definition) ὅπερ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν. ὁ προσέχων οὖν τῷ εὐλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει. It is a mistake to suppose, with Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, that, Arcesilaus denied probabilities.

[1444] In Plut. Tran. An. 9, sub fin. p. 470, he gives the advice rather to devote attention to oneself and ones own life than to works of art and other external things. In Stob. Floril. 95, 17, he says: Poverty is burdensome, but educates for virtue. Ibid. 43, 91: Where there are most laws, there are most transgressions of law. Plut. Cons. ad Apoll. 15, p. 110, has a saying of his as to the folly of the fear of death. Id. De Sanit. 7, p. 126, Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7, records a somewhat severe judgment on adulterers and prodigals. Quite unique is the statement in Tertull. Ad. Nation. ii. 2: Arcesilaus held that there were three kinds of Gods (in other words he divided the popular Gods into three classes): the Olympian, the stars, and the Titans. It implies that he criticised the belief in the Gods. It also appears by the language used in Plut. C. Not. 37, 7, respecting the Stoic theory of a κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλου, that his criticism of dogmatism extended to natural science.

[1445] Conf. p. 529, 3 sub fin.

[1446] Geffers, De Arcesilæ Successoribus (including Carneades): Gött. 1845. Arcesilaus was succeeded by Lacydes of Cyrene, who died 240 B.C., after presiding over the School for 26 years. In his lifetime (probably shortly before his death) he entrusted it to the care of the Phocæans Telecles and Euandros (Diog. iv. 59–61). The statements made in Diog. l.c., Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, Plut. De Adul. 22, p. 63, Ælian, V. H. ii. 41, Athen. x. 438, a. xiii. 606, C, Plin. H. N. x. 22, 51, refer to individual peculiarities which he appears to have had. They must be received with caution, particularly the gossip which Diog. 59 mentions casually and Numenius dwells upon with intolerable garrulity. Diog. calls him ἀνὴρ σεμνότατος καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγους ἐσχηκὼς ζηλωτάς· φιλόπονός τε ἐκ νέου καὶ πένης μὲν, εὔχαρις δ’ ἄλλως καὶ εὐόμιλος. To his admirers belongs Attalus I. of Pergamum. A visit to his court was however declined in skilful language (Diog. 60, which Geffers, p. 5, clearly misunderstands). In doctrine, he deviated little from Arcesilaus, and, having been the first to commit to writing the teaching of the New Academy (Suid. Λακ.: ἔγραψε φιλόσοφα καὶ περὶ φύσεως—the latter is somewhat extraordinary for a Sceptic), he was by some mistake called its founder (Diog. 59). According to Diog. vii. 183, see p. 46, 1, he appears to have taught in the Academy during Arcesilaus’ lifetime. Panaretus (Athen. xii. 552, d; Æl. V. H. x. 6), Demophanes, and Ecdemus or Ecdelus (Plutarch. Philopon. 1; Arat. 5, 7) are also called pupils of Arcesilaus. The most distinguished pupil of Lacydes, according to Eus. xiv. 7, 12, was Aristippus of Cyrene, also mentioned by Diog. ii. 83. Another, Paulus, is mentioned by Timotheus, in Clemens, Strom. 496, D. His successors were Telecles and Euander, who jointly presided over the School. Euander, however, according to Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Diog. 60, Eus. l.c., survived his colleague, and was followed by Hegesinus (Diog. 60; Cic. l.c.) or Hegesilaus (as he is called by Clemens, Strom. p. 301, C). who was the immediate predecessor of Carneades. Respecting these individuals nothing is known beyond the names.

[1447] Carneades, the son of Epicomus or Philocomus, was born at Cyrene (Diog. iv. 62; Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p. 838; Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 5), and died, according to Apollodorus (Diog. 65), 129 B.C., in his 85th year. Lucian, Macrob. 20, assigns to him the same age. With less probability Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Valer. Max. viii. 7, 5, extend his age to 90, making his birth-year 213 B.C. Later admirers find it remarkable that his birthday, like Plato’s, occurred on the Carnean festival (Plut. Qu. Conv. viii. 1, 2, 1). Little is known of his life. He was a disciple and follower of Hegesinus, but at the same time received instruction in dialectic (Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 98) from the Stoic Diogenes, and studied philosophic literature with indefatigable zeal (Diog. 62), more particularly the writings of Chrysippus (Diog. 62; Plut. Sto. Rep. 10, 44; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 13). In 156 B.C. he took part in the well-known association of philosophers, and produced the greatest impression on his Roman hearers by the force of his language and the boldness with which he attacked the current principles of morals. Shortly before his death, probably also at an earlier period, he became blind (Diog. 66). He left no writings, the preservation of his doctrines being the work of his pupils, in particular of Clitomachus (Diog. 66, 67; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 98; 32, 102). Respecting his character, we may gather from a few expressions that, whilst vigorous in disputation (Diog. 63; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10), he was not wanting in a repose of mind which was in harmony with his principles (Diog. 66). That he was a just man, notwithstanding his speech against justice, we can well believe (Quintil. xii. 1, 35).

The quotation in Diog. 64 (ἡ συστήσασα φύσις καὶ διαλύσει) does not indicate fear of death, but simple resignation to the course of nature. Still less does his language on Antipater’s suicide, and also what is quoted in Stob. (Floril. 119, 19) that he made a faint-hearted attempt to imitate him which he afterwards abandoned. It was only a not very clever way of ridiculing an action which appeared to Carneades eminently mad.

[1448] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12; Lucian, Macrob. 20.

[1449] His School held him in such esteem, that it considered him, together with Plato, because of his birthday (unless the idea grew out of his name), to be a special favourite of Apollo. Tradition says that an eclipse of the moon (Suid. Καρν. adds an eclipse of the sun) commemorated his death; συμπάθειαν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, αἰνιττομένου τοῦ μεθ’ ἥλιον καλλίστου τῶν ἄστρων (Diog. 64). Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p. 838, says of him: οὗτος δὲ τῶν ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας ἄριστος φιλοσόφων ὁμολογεῖται. There was only one opinion among the ancients as to the force of his logic, and the power and attraction of his eloquence. These gifts were aided by unusually powerful organs (see the anecdotes in Plut. Garrul. 21, p. 513; Diog. 63). Conf. Diog. 62; Cic. Fin. iii. 12, 41; De Orat. ii. 38, 161; iii. 18, 68; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10; Numen. in Eusebius, Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 2 and 5; Lactant. Inst. v. 14; Plut. Cato Maj. 22. The latter, speaking of his success at Rome, says: μάλιστα δ’ ἡ Καρνεάδου χάρις, ἧς δύναμίς τε πλείστη καὶ δόξα τῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἀποδέουσα ... ὡς πνεῦμα τὴν πόλιν ἠχῆς ἐνέπλησε. καὶ λόγος κατεῖχεν, ὡς ἀνὴρ Ἕλλην εἰς ἔκπληξιν ὑπερφυὴς, πάντα κηλῶν καὶ χειρούμενος, ἔρωτα δεινὸν ἐμβέβληκε τοῖς νέοις, ὑφ’ οὗ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν καὶ διατριβῶν ἐκπεσόντες ἐνθουσιῶσι περὶ φιλοσοφίαν.

[1450] Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16.

[1451] See p. 536, note.

[1452] Sext. Math. vii. 159: ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος. ὁ δὲ Καρνεάδης οὐ μόνον τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀντιδιετάσσετο περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου. In Math. ix. 1, Sextus charges the School of Carneades with unnecessary diffuseness in discussing the fundamental principles or every system. The Stoics were, however, the chief object of his attack. Cic. Tusc. v. 29, 82; N. D. ii. 65, 162; Plut. Garrul. 23, p. 514; Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 17, 39.

[1453] Sext. l.c.: καὶ δὴ πρῶτος μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ κοινὸς πρὸς πάντας ἐστὶ λόγος καθ’ ὃν παρίσταται ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, οὐ λόγος οὐκ αἴσθησις οὐ φαντασία οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συλλήβδην διαψεύδεται ἡμᾶς.

[1454] Sext. l.c. 160–163.

[1455] Conf. Sext. vii. 403; Cic. Acad. ii. 15, 47; 28, 89—where Carneades is undoubtedly meant, although he is not mentioned by name. For the other sceptical arguments which Cicero mentions tally with those which Sextus attributes to Carneades, and Cicero makes Antiochus refute them, who was the immediate adversary of Carneades.

[1456] According to Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 40; 26, 83, the Academic system of proof rests on the four following propositions: (1) that there are false notions; (2) that these cannot be known, i.e. be recognised as true; (3) that of two indistinguishable notions, it is impossible to know the one and not the other; (4) that there is no true notion by the side of which a false one cannot be placed indistinguishable from it. The second and third of these propositions are not denied at all, and the first is only denied by Epicurus in regard to impressions on the senses. Hence all importance attaches to the fourth proposition, to which Sextus, vii. 164 and 402, and Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 4, look as the most important argument.

[1457] Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 42: Dividunt enim in partes et eas quidem magnas: primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quæ ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt (the συνήθεια against which Chrysippus already directed severe attacks. See p. 46, 2; 91, 2). Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne ratione quidem et conjectura ulla res percipi possit. Hæc autem universa etiam concidunt minutius.

[1458] Sext. vii. 409; Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 84; 7, 19; 25, 79; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 5. Therewith is probably connected the statement in Galen, De Opt. Doct. c. 2, vol. i. 45, K, that Carneades persistently denied the axiom that two things that are equal to a third are equal to one another. His assertion probably comes to this, that it may be possible to distinguish two things as unequal, which cannot be distinguished from a third, that therefore two things may appear equal to a third without being or appearing equal to one another.

[1459] Sext. 402 and 408.

[1460] The fallacy called ψευδόμενος is carefully investigated in Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 95 (by Carneades as he says, 98), as an instance in point.

[1461] Sext. 416; Cic. l.c. 29, 92. Since Chrysippus tried to meet the chain-argument, it may be supposed that this fallacy had been used by Arcesilaus against the Stoics.

[1462] Sext. vii. 164; Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 5, 11.

[1463] Sext. 165.

[1464] Cic. Acad. ii. 28, 91, who here appears to be following Philo, and, subsequently, Carneades as well. Carneades also gives utterance to a similar view of dialectic in Stob. Floril. 93, 13 (conf. Plut. C. Not. 2, 4), comparing it to a polypus consuming its own tentacles. It is able, he conceives, to expose fallacies, but not to discover truth.

[1465] Cic. Acad. ii. 36, 117. Carneades is not mentioned by name, but there can be no doubt that the reference is to some Academician, and it is probable that it was the work of Carneades.

[1466] Diog. iv. 62.

[1467] Cic. N. D. i. 2, 5, after a brief description of the Stoical views of Gods: Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret homines non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem.

[1468] Cic. N. D. i. 23, 62; iii. 4, 11. Here, too, Carneades is not mentioned by name, but the reference to him is made clear by Cicero’s remark that he is quoting the Academic view.

[1469] Conf. Cic. N. D. iii. 5, 11.

[1470] The Academician in Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120. That these arguments were used by Carneades is clear from Plut. in Porphyr. De Abst. iii. 20, where, traversing the arguments of the Stoics, he justifies the existence of vermin, poisonous plants, and beasts of prey. In answer to Chrysippus’ assertion, that the final cause of a pig is to be killed, Carneades argues: A pig, therefore, by being killed, must attain the object for which it was destined; it is always beneficial for a thing to attain its object—therefore it must be beneficial to a pig to be killed and eaten.

[1471] Cic. N. D. iii. 25, 65–70. It is here presumed that the leading thoughts in Cicero’s description belong to the School of Carneades.

[1472] Ibid. 31, 76.

[1473] Ibid. 32, 79.

[1474] Cic. N. D. iii. 32, 80.

[1475] Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120; N. D. iii. 11, 28.

[1476] Cic. N. D. iii. 8, 21; 10, 26; 11, 27.

[1477] Ibid. 10, 25.

[1478] L.c.

[1479] Cic. N. D. iii. 12, 29; 14, 34.

[1480] Cic. N. D. iii. 13, 32. More fully Sext. Math. ix. 139–147. Here too Carneades is expressly mentioned. But were he not mentioned the agreement of the argument with that given by Cicero would show that the same person was being referred to.

[1481] Cic.; Ibid. Further proofs of the transient nature of all earthly beings are there given.

[1482] Sext. Math. ix. 152–175, quotes the same argument for σωφροσύνη, and so does Cic. N. D. iii. 15, 38. Neither mentions Carneades by name, but since both writers introduce these proofs in the same position in a longer argument, in which Carneades is expressly mentioned both before and after, there can be no doubt that to him they refer.

[1483] Sext. ix. 176. The argument has a look of sophistry about it. It alludes to the important question which engaged so much attention in the middle ages, viz. How is the universal related in Deity to the individual? Are goodness and reason a law for God independent of His will or not?

[1484] As Epicurus did. See p. 468, 3.

[1485] Sext. 178.

[1486] Sext. l.c. 148–151; 180. That Sextus here refers to Carneades is clear from his agreement with Cic. N. D. 12, 29–31; 14, 34. Cicero introduces his remarks with the words: Illa autem, quæ Carneades afferebat, quemadmodum dissolvitis? Sextus himself seems to refer not only individual arguments, but the whole series of them, to Carneades, when he continues, 182: ἠρώτηνται δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καρνεάδου καὶ σωριτικῶς τινες κ.τ.λ.

[1487] Sext. 182–190. More fully in Cic. N. D. iii. 17, 43. Sextus also observes, 190: καὶ ἄλλους δὴ τοιούτους σωρείτας ἐρωτῶσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι θεούς.

[1488] To him, or probably to his School, belongs the learned argument given by Cic. N. D. iii. 21, 53, to 23, 60, in which he proves the want of unity in traditional myths by the multiplicity of Gods of the same name. The whole drift of this argument shows that it was borrowed from some Greek treatise.

[1489] See Cic. Divin. i. 4, 7; 7, 12.

[1490] Ibid. ii. 3, 9.

[1491] Ibid. v. 13; but Carneades is not here mentioned by name.

[1492] Ibid. i. 13, 23; 49, 109.

[1493] Cic. l.c. and Divin. ii. 21, 48.

[1494] Cic. l.c. ii. 11, 27.

[1495] Cic. De Fato, 11, 23; 14, 31. The freedom of the will, he there says, may be asserted even granting that every motion is referred to a cause, for it is not necessary that this law should hold good of the will. He will therefore confine it to bodily motion, and not allow to it unconditional validity.

[1496] Lact. Instit. v. 14, following Cic. De Rep. iii. 4; Plut. Cato Maj. c. 22; Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 35.

[1497] Lactant. l.c. 16; Cic. De Rep. iii. 8–12; 14; 17; Fin. ii. 18, 59. On the above casuistical cases see De Off. iii. 13; 23, 89, and above, p. 299, 2. Probably Carneades was the cause of the study of casuistry among the later Stoics.

[1498] Cic. Acad. ii. 34, 108; conf. 31, 98. In Id. Att. xiii. 21, he compares this ἐποχὴ to the drawing up of a charioteer, or to the guard of a pugilist. No doubt it is with reference to ἐποχὴ that Alex. Aphr. De An. 154 a, says: The Academicians consider ἀπτωσία the πρῶτον οἰκεῖον, πρὸς ταύτην γάρ φασιν ἡμᾶς οἰκείως ἔχειν πρώτην, ὥστε μηδὲν προσπταίειν. ἀπροσπτωσία or ἀπροπτωσία is, according to the Stoic definition (Diog. vii. 46) = ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μή. It consists, therefore, in not giving a hasty assent to any proposition. According to the Sceptics, this is only possible, and you are only then safe from error, when you give assent to none whatever. ἀπροσπτωσία becomes then identical with ἐποχὴ or ἄγνοια, which Max. Tyr. Diss. 35, 7, speaks of as the ultimate end of Carneades. Hence Carneades, as Arcesilaus had done before him, spoke for and against every subject without expressing a decided opinion. Cic. N. D. i. 5, 11; Acad. ii. 18, 60; Divin. ii. 72, 150; Rep. iii. 5, 8; Tusc. v. 4, 11; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12.

[1499] Cic. Acad. ii. 9, 28.

[1500] Sext. Math. vii. 166: ἀπατούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτός [ὁ Καρνεάδης] τι κριτήριον πρός τε τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τὴς εὐδαιμονίας περίκτησιν δυνάμιν ἀπαναγκάζεται καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸν περὶ τούτου διατάττεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 99 (of Clitomachus): Etenim contra naturam esset, si probabile nihil esset, et sequitur omnis vitæ ... eversio. Ibid. 101; 32, 104: Nam cum placeat, eum qui de omnibus rebus contineat se de assentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit ejusmodi visa, quibus ad actionem excitemur, etc. Hence the assurance (Ibid. 103; Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 234) that the Academicians do not wish to go into the question of perception. They accept it as a phenomenon of consciousness and a basis of action, but they deny that it strictly furnishes knowledge. The senses are ὑγιεῖς, but not ἀκριβεῖς.

[1501] Sext. and Cic. l.c.

[1502] Sext. l.c. 167–170.

[1503] Ibid. 171–173; or, as it is expressed by Cicero, Acad. ii. 24, 78: It is possible nihil percipere et tamen opinari. It is of no importance that Philo and Metrodorus said Carneades had proved this statement, whereas Clitomachus had stated, hoc magis ab eo disputatum quam probatum. Acad. ii. 48, 148; 21, 67, attributes the statement to Carneades, without any qualification, adding only: Adsensurum (aliquando, as the latter passage adds) non percepto, i.e. opinaturum sapientem.

[1504] Conf. Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 11, 26 (undoubtedly in point of matter and probably in terms following Cicero): Id probabile vel verisimile Academici vocant, quod nos ad addendum sine adsensione potest invitare. Sine adsensione autem dico, ut id quod agimus non opinemur verum esse aut non id scire arbitremur, agamus tamen. To the same effect, Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12: Carneades declared it impossible to withhold judgment on all points, and asserted πάντα μὲν εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα, οὐ πάντα δὲ ἄδηλα. Conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 17, 54, where the objection is raised to the new Academicians: Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod nolunt; ea dico incerta, quæ ἄδηλα Græci.

[1505] Sext. l.c. 173; 175–182; Pyrrh. i. 227; conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 11, 33; 31, 99; 32, 104.

[1506] Sext. l.c. 173; 181.

[1507] Ibid. 176; 183.

[1508] Ibid. 184.

[1509] Sext. l.c. 174; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 99.

[1510] Cic. l.c. 32, 103; 48, 148. This explanation does away with the charge of inconsistency which is brought against Carneades in Cic. Acad. ii. 18, 59; 21, 67; 24, 78 (see p. 554, 3), on the ground that he allowed, in contradistinction to Arcesilaus, that the wise man will sometimes follow opinion, and will give his assent to certain statements. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 7, even asserts that he expressed his own convictions to his friends in private; but this assertion is no more true of him than of Arcesilaus (see p. 531, 3), as may be seen from the passage on p. 557, 2.

[1511] Sext. Pyrrh. i. 226: ἀγαθὸν γάρ τί φασιν εἶναι οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὶ καὶ κακὸν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ὃ λέγουσιν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον; καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὁμοίως.

[1512] See p. 553, 2; 554, 4.

[1513] Here the question arises, Whence does the Sceptic derive his conviction as to probabilities in morals? and as perception is not available for the purpose, Geffers concludes (De Arc. Successor. 20) that Carneades assumed a peculiar source of conviction in the mind. For such an assumption, however, our authorities give no proof. It cannot be gathered from the hypothetical language respecting the freedom of the will in Cic. De Fato, ii. 23. See p. 551, 2. Nor is it, indeed, necessary that Carneades, who never pretended to hold any psychological theory, should have had any opinion on the subject. Supposing he did have it, he might have appealed to experience quite as readily or more so than the Stoics, and have been content with the fact that certain things are far more agreeable or disagreeable, and either promote or disturb happiness.

[1514] Cic. Fin. v. 6, 16, to 8, 23; conf. Tusc. v. 29, 84; Ritter, iii. 686, has hardly expressed with accuracy Carneades’ division, or he would not have accused it of being inaccurate and superficial.

[1515] Cic. Acad. ii. 45, 139.

[1516] Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 131: Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui iis rebus, quas primas natura conciliavisset (οἰκειοῦν). Similarly Fin. v. 7, 20; Tusc. v. 30, 84. This view differs from that of the Stoics, because it makes the highest Good consist not in natural activity as such, but in the enjoyment of natural goods.

[1517] Cic. Fin. ii. 11, 35: Ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri (pleasure), alter Hieronymi (freedom from pain), Carneadis tertius (the satisfaction of natural instincts). Conf. Ibid. v. 7, 20; 8, 22.

[1518] Cic. Acad. ii. 45, 139: Ut Calliphontem sequar, cujus quidem sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam videretur. Callipho is reckoned among those who consider honestas cum aliqua accessione—or, as it is said, Fin. v. 8, 21; 25, 73; Tusc. v. 30, 85, voluptas cum honestate—the highest Good.

[1519] Plut. Tranq. An. 16, p. 475.

[1520] Cic. Tusc. iii. 22, 54. Let it be observed that this view of Carneades is specially placed under the head of conviction on probabilities. It is said, he attacked the proposition, videri fore in ægritudine sapientem patria capta. The other statements of Carneades on ethics, such as that in Plut. De Adulat. 16, p. 51, have nothing characteristic about them.

[1521] See p. 279.

[1522] Plut. C. Not. 27, 14; Stob. Ecl. ii. 134. Plutarch, however, only quotes it as the opinion of individuals. It appears more probable that it was an opinion of Chrysippus which Antipater defended against Carneades. Carneades even practically attributes it to the Stoics.

[1523] Cic. Fin. iii. 12, 41: Carneades tuus ... rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit, in omni hac quæstione, quæ de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum.

[1524] Fin. iii. 17, 57.

[1525] Cic. Tusc. iii. 25, 59.

[1526] Ibid. v. 29, 83: Et quoniam videris hoc velle, ut, quæcumque dissentientium philosophorum sententia sit de finibus, tamen virtus satis habeat ad vitam beatam præsidii, quod quidem Carneadem disputare solitum accepimus, etc.

[1527] He explicitly says, Fin. v. 7, 18, that as each one defines the highest good, so he determines the honestum (the καλὸν, virtue). The view of the Stoics, he says, places the honestum and bonum in activity aiming at what is according to nature; adding that, according to the view which places it in the possession of what is according to nature, the prima secundum naturam are also prima in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina.

[1528] See p. 560, 3, and Plut. Tranq. An. 19, p. 477, where, however, the greater part seems to belong to Plutarch.

[1529] Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 35. See above 536, 1, end.

[1530] Cic. N. D. iii. 17, 44: Hæc Carneades aiebat, non ut Deos tolleret—quid enim philosopho minus conveniens?—sed ut Stoicos nihil de Diis explicare convinceret. In this sense the Academician in Cicero (i. 22, 62) frequently asserts, that he would not destroy belief in God, but that he finds the arguments unsatisfactory. Likewise Sextus, Pyrrh.