xv. 15, 1: κόσμος is the name for τὸ ἐκ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας ποιὸν, and for

τὸ κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν τὴν τοιαύτην καὶ διάταξιν ἔχον. In the former sense, the world is eternal, and the same as God; in the latter, created, and subject to change. Compare also the quotations from the mathematician Diodorus, in Ach. Tat. Isag. c. 6. p. 129, b.

[330] See p. 148. The two ideas blend. Thus Seneca, Nat. Qu. Prol. 13, says God must be the Reason of the world and must also be the universe itself; and he continues: Quid ergo interest, inter naturam Dei et nostram? Nostri melior pars animus est, in illo nulla pars extra animum est. Totus est ratio, &c.

[331] The connection of the two, like the connection between soul and body, and the argument quoted by Tertullian from Zeno on p. 148, 1, is κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων. See p. 135.

[332] Stob. Ecl. i. 60: Βόηθος τὸν αἰθέρα θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο.

[333] Diog. 143: Βόηθος δέ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῷον τὸν κόσμον. The words of Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, C—ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ τοὺς ἀντιδοξοῦντας ὁ θεὸς—imply the same, but these words evidently are not taken from Boëthus.

[334] Diog. 148: Βόηθος δὲ ἐν τῇ περὶ φύσεως οὐσίαν θεοῦ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν· which must be understood in the same sense as the corresponding statements of other Stoics: the ἡγεμονικὸν of the world resides in the purest part of the ether. Yet, inasmuch as the world is no living being, nor is deity the soul of the world, it must, according to the view of Boëthus, act upon it from without. This is expressly stated in Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, B, God is described as the charioteer guiding the world, and παριστάμενος the stars and elements. But this passage, beginning at καὶ μήποτ’ εἰκότως, is evidently Philo’s own expansion of what he has just quoted from Boëthus.

[335] Diog. vii. 136: κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτὸν ὄντα [τὸν θεὸν] τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου τοιοῦδε ὑπολιπέσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ ἐνεργὸν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἑξῆς γένεσιν, κ.τ.λ. Seneca, Nat. Quæst. iii. 13, 1: Fire will consume the world: hunc evanidum considere, et nihil relinqui aliud in rerum natura, igne restincto, quam humorem. In hoc futuri mundi spem latere. Stob. Ecl. i. 372 and 414, 5. See pp. 161, 2; 164, 2.

[336] Stob. i. 370: Ζήνωνα δὲ οὕτως ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαρρήδην· τοιαύτην δεήσει εἶναι ἐν περιόδῳ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διακόσμησιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας. ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς τροπὴ εἰς ὕδωρ δι’ ἀέρος γένηται τὸ μέν τι ὑφίστασθαι καὶ γῆν συνίστασθαι, ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν διαμένειν ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀτμιζομένου ἀέρα γίνεσθαι, ἐκ τινος δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος πῦρ ἐξάπτειν. Diog. vii. 142: γίνεσθαι δὲ τὸν κόσμον ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς ἡ οὐσία τραπῇ δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὑγρότητα, εἶτα τὸ παχυμερὲς αὐτοῦ συστὰν ἀποτελεσθῇ γῆ τὸ δὲ λεπτομερὲς ἐξαερωθῇ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπιπλέον λεπτυνθὲν πῦρ ἀπογεννήσῃ; εἶτα κατὰ μίξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ ἄλλα γένη. Chrys. in Plut. St. Rep. 41, 3, p. 1053: ἡ δὲ πυρὸς μεταβολή ἐστι τοιαύτη· δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ τρέπεται· κἀκ τούτου γῆς ὑφισταμένης ἀὴρ ἐνθυμιᾶται· λεπτυνομένου δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος ὁ αἰθὴρ περιχεῖται κύκλῳ. The same writer observes, in the Scholia on Hesiod’s Theogony, v. 459, ὅτι καθύγρων ὄντων τῶν ὅλων καὶ ὄμβρων καταφερομένων πολλῶν τὴν ἔκκρισιν τούτων Κρόνον ὠνομάσθαι. Conf. Clemens, Strom. v. 599, C, and Stob. i. 312.

[337] Stob. Ecl. i. 442, also affirms that the creation of the universe begins with earth.

[338] Stob. l.c.: Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πώς φησιν· ἐκφλογισθέντος τοῦ παντὸς συνίζειν τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, εἶτα τὰ ἐχόμενα ἀποσβέννυσθαι δι’ ὅλου. τοῦ δὲ παντὸς ἐξυγρανθέντος, τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρὸς, ἀντιτυπήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ μέσου, τρέπεσθαι πάλιν εἰς τοὐναντίον (the probable meaning is, that the last remains of the original fire begin a motion in the opposite direction) εἶθ’ οὕτω τρεπόμενον ἄνω φησὶν αὔξεσθαι· καὶ ἄρχεσθαι διακοσμεῖν τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τοιαύτην περίοδον ἀεὶ καὶ διακόσμησιν ποιουμένου τοῦ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσίᾳ τόνου (for this favourite expression of Cleanthes, see p. 127, 5; 128, 2) μὴ παύεσθαι [διακοσμούμενον τὸ ὅλον]. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἑνός τινος τὰ μέρη πάντα φύεται ἐκ σπερμάτων ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μέρη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις φύεται. καὶ ὥσπερ τινὲς λόγοι τῶν μερῶν εἰς σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνυνται καὶ αὖθις διακρίνονται γενομένων τῶν μερῶν, οὕτως ἐξ ἑνός τε πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἓν συγκρίνεσθαι, (conf. Heraclit. in vol. i. 467, 1), ὁδῷ καὶ συμφώνως διεξιούσης τῆς περιόδου. A few further details are supplied by Macrob. Sat. i. 17. The myth respecting the birth of Apollo and Artemis is referred to the formation of the sun and moon. Namque post chaos, ubi primum cœpit confusa deformitas in rerum formas et elementa nitescere, terræque adhuc humida substantia in molli atque instabili sede nutaret: convalescente paullatim æthereo calore atque inde seminibus in eam igneis defluentibus (the connection of Zeus, i.e., of Ether, with Leto, the Earth) hæc sidera edita esse creduntur; et solem maxima caloris vi in superna raptum; lunam vero humidiore et velut femineo sexu naturali quodam pressam tepore inferiora tenuisse, tanquam ille magis substantia patris constet, hæc matris. The statement that besides other things plants and animals had their origin in the intermingling of elements (Stob. and Diog.) must be understood in the sense of generatio æquivoca. Lactant. Inst. vii. 4, says the Stoics make men grow like sponges out of the earth, and Sext. Math. ix. 28 says the Stoics speak of the earth-born men of prehistoric ages.

[339] There must always be some remainder of heat or fire, as Cleanthes and Chrysippus avowed, or else there would be no active life-power from which a new creation could emanate. Philo, Incorrupt. M. 964, C, observes that, if the world were entirely consumed by fire at the ἐκπύρωσις, the fire itself would be extinguished, and no new world would be possible. διὸ καί τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ... ἔφασαν, ὅτι μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν, ἐπειδὰν ὁ νέος κόσμος μέλλῃ δημιουργεῖσθαι, σύμπαν μὲν τὸ πῦρ οὐ σβέννυται, ποσὴ δέ τις αὐτοῦ μοῖρα ὑπολείπεται.

[340] Chrys. in Plut. l.c. 41, 6: διόλου μὲν γὰρ ὢν ὁ κόσμος πυρώδης εὐθὺς καὶ ψυχή ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἡγεμονικόν. ὅτε δὲ μεταβαλὼν εἰς τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναπολειφθεῖσαν ψυχὴν τρόπον τινὰ εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν μετέβαλεν ὥστε συνεστάναι ἐκ τούτων, ἄλλον τινὰ ἔσχε λόγον.

[341] Nemes. Nat. Hom. C. 2, p. 72: λέγουσι δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν εἶναι δραστικὰ τὰ δὲ παθητικά· δραστικὰ μὲν ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ, παθητικὰ δὲ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ. Plut. Com. Not. 49, 2. See above p. 127, 5. From this passage a further insight is obtained into two points connected with the Stoic philosophy, which have been already discussed. It can no longer appear strange that the active power, or deity (and likewise the human soul), should at one time be called Fire, at another Air-Current, for both represent equally the acting force; and the statement that properties are atmospheric currents—as, indeed, the whole distinction of subject-matter and property—follows from this view of things.

[342] The Stoics, according to Diog. 141, where, however, there is apparently a lacuna in the text, prove that the world (διακόσμησις, not κόσμος, in the absolute sense, see p. 158, 1) will come to an end, partly because it has come into being, and partly by two not very logical inferences: οὗ τὰ [vulgo οὗ τε τὰ, Cobet: οὗ τά τε] μέρη φθαρτά ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὰ δὲ μέρα τοῦ κόσμου φθαρτὰ, εἰς ἄλληλα γὰρ μεταβάλλει· φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ κόσμος· and εἴ τι ἐπιδεκτικόν ἐστι τῆς ἐπὶ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς, φθαρτόν ἐστι· καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἄρα· ἐξαυχμοῦται γὰρ καὶ ἐξυδατοῦται. Conf. Alex. Meteora, 90. In Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 2, p. 1054, Chrysippus asserts that the οὐσία is immortal, but to κόσμος belongs a ὥσπερ ἀφθαρσία.

[343] Plut. Sto. Rep. 39, 2, p. 1052: [Χρύσιππος] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ προνοίας τὸν Δία, φησὶν, αὔξεσθαι μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὑτὸν ἅπαντα καταναλώσῃ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ θάνατος μέν ἐστι ψυχῆς χωρισμὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ οὐ χωρίζεται μὲν, αὔξεται δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὑτὴν ἐξαναλώσῃ τὴν ὕλην, οὐ ῥητέον ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν κόσμον. Stob. Ecl. i. 414 (according to Numenius: see Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1): Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν οἷον εἰς σπέρμα τὸ πῦρ (Philo, Incorrupt. M. 956, B, expresses himself against this description) καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμησιν οἷα πρότερον ἦν. Seneca, Consol. ad Marciam, gives a graphic description of the end of the world, which recalls the language of the Revelation. Compare, on the subject of ἐκπύρωσις, Diog. vii. 142, 137 (see above p. 158, 1); Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1; Plut. Com. Not. 36 (see p. 153, 2); Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 25, p. 53; Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 119; N. D. ii. 46, 118; Sen. Consol. ad Polyb. i. 2; Alex. Aphr. in Meteor. 90, a. In the last-named passage, it is urged by the Stoics, in support of their view, that even now large tracts of water are dried up or else take the place of dry land. Simpl. Phys. iii. b; De Cœlo; Schol. in Arist. 487, b, 35 and 489, a, 13; Justin. Apol. i. 20; ii. 7; Orig. c. Cels. iii. 75, 497, a; vi. 71. Since at the ἐκπύρωσις everything is resolved into deity, Plut. C. Not. 17, 3, p. 1067, says: ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δ’ ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τηνικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν.

[344] Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1: ἀρέσκει δὲ τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης, ἐξαεροῦσθαι πάντα κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰς μεγίστας, εἰς πῦρ αἰθερῶδες ἀναλυομένων πάντων. According to Philo, Incorrupt. M. 954, E, Cleanthes called this fire φλόξ, Chrysippus αὐγή. Respecting ἄνθραξ, φλόξ, αὐγή, see ibid. 953, E. The observations on p. 151 respecting the identity of πῦρ, πνεῦμα, αἰθὴρ apply here.

[345] This is, at least, the import of the general principle (assigned to Chrysippus by Stob. Ecl. i. 314) expressed by Heraclitus, that, in the resolution of earth and water into fire, the same steps intervene, in a retrograde order, as in their generation.

[346] See p. 147, 1.

[347] Plut. Com. Not. 31, 10: ἐπαγωνιζόμενος ὁ Κλεάνθης τῇ ἐκπυρώσει λέγει τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα τὸν ἥλιον ἐξομοιῶσαι [leg. -ειν] πάντα ἑαυτῷ καὶ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς ἑαυτόν.

[348] It is expressly asserted that everything, without exception, is liable to this destiny; neither the soul nor the Gods are exempt. Conf. Sen. Cons. ad Marc. 26, 7: Nos quoque felices animæ et æterna sortitæ (the words are put in the mouth of a dead man) cum Deo visum sit iterum ista moliri, labentibus cunctis, et ipsæ parva ruinæ ingentis accessio, in antiqua elementa vertemur. Chrysippus says of the Gods, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 38, 5: Some of the Gods have come into being and are perishable, others are eternal: Helios and Selene, and other similar deities, have come into being; Zeus is eternal. In Philo, Incorrupt. M. 950, A, Orig. c. Cels. iv. 68, Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420, Com. Not. 31, 5, p. 1075, it is objected that, at the general conflagration, the Gods will melt away, as though they were made of wax or tin. According to Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, Tab. i. 1, Vol. Hercul. vi. 1, even Zeno restricted the happy life of the Gods to certain lengthy periods of time.

[349] Arius, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 19: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο δὲ προελθὼν ὁ κοινὸς λόγος καὶ κοινὴ φύσις μείζων καὶ πλείων γενομένη τέλος ἀναξηράνασα πάντα καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀναλαβοῦσα ἐν τῇ πάσῃ οὐσίᾳ γίνεται (it occupies the room of the whole substance) ἐπανελθοῦσα εἰς τὸν πρῶτον ῥηθέντα λόγον καὶ εἰς ἀνάστασιν [? κατάστασιν] ἐκείνην τὴν ποιοῦσαν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν μέγιστον, καθ’ ὃν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς μόνης εἰς αὐτὴν πάλιν γίνεται ἡ ἀποκατάστασις (the same in Philop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70), ἐπανελθοῦσα δὲ διὰ τάξιν ἀφ’ οἵας διακοσμεῖν ὡσαύτως ἤρξατο κατὰ λόγον πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν διεξαγωγὴν ποιεῖται. See p. 161. According to Nemes. Nat. Hom. c, 38, p. 147, conf. Censorin. Di. Nat. 18, 11, the ἐκπύρωσις takes place when all the planets have got back to the identical places which they occupied at the beginning of the world, or, in other words, when a periodic year is complete. The length of a periodic year was estimated by Diogenes (Plut. Pl. i. 32, 2; Stob. Ecl. i. 264) at 365 periods, or 365 × 18,000 ordinary years. Plut. De Ei ap. D. 9, g, E, p. 389 mentions the opinion, ὅπερ τρία πρὸς ἓν, τοῦτο τὴν διακόσμησιν χρόνῳ πρὸς τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν εἶναι. Inasmuch as it had been previously said that the duration of κόρος (i.e. ἐκπύρωσις) was longer, and that therefore Apollo, who represents the state of perfect unity, was honoured nine months with the pæan, whilst Dionysus, torn to pieces by the Titans, the emblem of the present world of contraries, was only honoured for three with the dithyramb, some mistake seems to have crept in. Probably we ought either to read ὅπερ πρὸς τρία ἕν, or to transpose the passage from διακόσμησιν to ἐκπύρωσιν.

[350] The belief in changing cycles is a common one in the older Greek philosophy. In particular, the Stoics found it in Heraclitus. The belief, however, that each new world exactly represents the preceding one is first met with among the Pythagoreans, and is closely connected with the theory of the migration of souls and a periodic year. Eudemus, in a passage which has generally been lost sight of in describing Pythagorean teaching, had taught (in Simpl. Phys. 173): εἰ δέ τις πιστεύσειε τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὡς πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμῷ κἀγὼ μυθολογήσω τὸ ῥαβδίον ἔχων ὑμῖν καθημένοις οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὁμοίως ἕξει, καὶ τὸν χρόνον εὔλογόν ἐστι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι (in that case the time must be the same as the present time). The Stoics appear to have borrowed this view from the Pythagoreans (unless with other Orphic-Pythagorean views it was known to Heraclitus), and it commended itself to them as being in harmony with their theory of necessity. Hence they taught: μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν πάλιν πάντα ταὐτὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γενέσθαι κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, ὡς καὶ τὸν ἰδίως ποιὸν πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναί τε καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐκείνῳ τῷ κόσμῳ (Alex. Anal. Pr. 58, b). τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος, δῆλον, ὡς οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον, καὶ ἡμᾶς μετὰ τὸ τελευτῆσαι πάλιν περιόδων τινῶν εἰλημμένων χρόνον εἰς ὃν νῦν ἐσμεν καταστήσεσθαι σχῆμα (Chrysippus, περὶ Προνοίας, in Lactant. Inst. vii. 23. Conf. Seneca, Ep. 36, 10: Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies). This applies to every fact and to every occurrence in the new world, at the παλιγγενεσία or ἀποκατάστασις (as the return of a former age is called): thus there will be another Socrates, who will marry another Xanthippe, and be accused by another Anytus and Meletus. Hence M. Aurel. vii. 19, xi. 1, deduces his adage, that nothing new happens under the sun. Simpl. Phys. 207, b; Philop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70; Tatian. c. Græc. c, 3, 245, d; Clemens, Strom. v. 549, D; Orig. c. Cels. iv. 68; v. 20 and 23; Nemes. l.c.; Plut. Def. Or. 29, p. 425. Amongst other things, the Stoics raised the question, Whether the Socrates who would appear in the future world would be numerically identical (εἷς ἀριθμῷ) with the present Socrates or not? (Simpl. l.c.)—the answer being, that they could not be numerically identical, since this would involve uninterrupted existence, but that they would be alike without a difference (ἀπαράλλακτοι). Others, however, chiefly among the younger Stoics, appear to have held that there might be noticeable differences between the two. (Orig. v. 20, 592, c.) This remark appears to have given rise to the false notion (Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21; Epiphan. Hær. v. p. 12, b) that the Stoics believed in the transmigration of souls. The remark made by Nemes., that the Gods know the whole course of the present world, from having survived the end of the former one, can only apply to one highest God, who, however, does not require such empirical knowledge. The other deities will not have survived the general conflagration.

[351] Ar. Didym. l.c. continues: τῶν τοιούτων περιόδων ἐξ ἀϊδίου γινομένων ἀκαταπαύστως. οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ἀρχῆς αἰτίαν καὶ [del.] πᾶσιν οἷόν τε γινέσθαι, οὔτε τοῦ διοικοῦντος αὐτά. οὐσίαν τε γὰρ τοῖς γινομένοις ὑφεστάναι δεῖ πεφυκυῖαν ἀναδέχεσθαι τὰς μεταβολὰς πάσας καὶ τὸ δημιουργῆσον ἐξ αὐτῆς, κ.τ.λ. Conf. Philop.: ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις, ὥς φησιν Ἀλέξανδρος, πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἡ αὐτὴ ἀεὶ διαμένει, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ, διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν οὐχὶ κατὰ περίοδόν τινα πλείονος χρόνου ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὕλης τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔσται; ὅπερ τινές φασι κατὰ τὴν παλιγγενέσιαν καὶ τὸν μέγαν ἐνιαυτὸν συμβαίνειν, ἐν ᾧ πάντων τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποκατάστασις γίνεται. See M. Aurel. v. 32.

[352] According to Philo (Incorrupt. M. 947, C), besides Posidonius and Panætius, his instructor (Diog. vii. 142; Stob. Ecl. i. 414), Boëthus asserted, in opposition to the ordinary Stoic teaching, the eternity of the world. Philo adds that this was also the view of Diogenes of Seleucia in his later years. Moreover, Zeno of Tarsus, on the authority of Numenius (in Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 19, 2), considered that the destruction of the world by fire could not be proved (φασὶν ἐπισχεῖν περὶ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως τῶν ὅλων). But these statements are elsewhere contradicted. Diogenes mentions Posidonius as one who held the destruction of the world by fire. The testimony of Diogenes is confirmed by Plut. Pl. Phil. ii. 9, 3 (Stob. Ecl. i. 380; Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 40. See Achill. Tatian, Isag. 131, C), who says that Posidonius only allowed so much empty space outside the world as was necessary for the world to be dissolved in at the ἐκπύρωσις. The difference between his view and the older Stoical view which Bake (Posidon. Rel. 58) deduces from Stob. i. 432, is purely imaginary. Antipater, according to Diogenes, also believed in a future conflagration. Little importance can be attached to the statement in Cic. N. D. ii. 46, 118, respecting Panætius, addubitare dicebant; whereas the words of Stob. are: πιθανωτέραν νομίζει τὴν ἀϊδιότητα τοῦ κόσμου; and those of Diog.: ἄφθαρτον ἀπεφήνατο τὸν κόσμον.

Boëthus emphatically denied the destruction of the world, his chief reasons (in Philo, l.c. 952, C) being the following:—(1) If the world were destroyed, it would be a destruction without a cause, for there is no cause, either within or without, which could produce such an effect. (2) Of the three modes of destruction, those κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατὰ ἀναίρεσιν τῆς ἐπεχούσης ποιότητος (as in the crushing of a statue), κατὰ σύγχυσιν (as in chemical resolution), not one can apply to the world. (3) If the world ceased to exist, the action of God on the world, in fact, His activity would altogether cease. (4) If everything were consumed by fire, the fire must go out for want of fuel. With that, the possibility of a new world is at an end.

The resolution of the world into indefinite vacuum, attributed by Plut. Plac. ii. 9, 2, to the Stoics in general, is no doubt the same as the condensation and expansion of matter. Ritter, iii. 599 and 703, supposes it to be a misapprehension of the real Stoic teaching. How Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 391, and Schleiermacher, Gesch. d. Philos. p. 129, in view of the passages quoted, can absolutely deny that the Stoics held a periodic destruction of the world, is hard to comprehend.

[353] The flood and its causes are fully discussed by Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 27–30. Rain, inroads of the sea, earthquakes, are all supposed to contribute. The chief thing, however, is, that such a destruction has been ordained in the course of the world. It comes cum fatalis dies venerit, cum adfuerit illa necessitas temporum (27, 1), cum Deo visum ordiri meliora, vetera finiri (28, 7); it has been fore-ordained from the beginning (29, 2; 30, 1), and is due, not only to the pressure of the existing waters, but also to their increase, and to a changing of earth into water (29, 4). The object of this flood is to purge away the sins of mankind, ut de integro totæ rudes innoxiæque generentur [res humanæ] nec supersit in deteriora præceptor (29, 5); peracto judicio generis humani exstructisque pariter feris ... antiquus ordo revocabitur. Omne ex integro animal generabitur dabiturque terris, homo inscius scelerum: but this state of innocence will not last long. Seneca (29, 1) appeals to Berosus, according to whom the destruction of the world by fire will take place when all the planets are in the sign of the Crab, its destruction by water when they are in the sign of the Capricorn. Since these signs correspond with the summer and winter turns of the sun, the language of Seneca agrees with that of Censorin. Di. Nat. 18, 11, evidently quoted from Varro, conf. Jahn, p. viii: Cujus anni hiems summa est cataclysmus ... æstas autem ecpyrosis. Conf. Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c, 25, p. 53: When one element gains the supremacy over the others, the course of the world will come to an end, by ἐκπύρωσις, if the element is fire; εἰ δ’ ἄθρουν ὕδωρ ἐκραγείη, κατακλυσμῷ τὸν κόσμον ἀπολεῖσθαι.

[354] For the former view, the language of Heraclitus and Censorinus tells, for the latter that of Seneca.

[355] Diog. vii. 149: καθ’ εἱμαρμένην δέ φασι τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι Χρύσιππος, κ.τ.λ. ἔστι δ’ εἱμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν ὁ κόσμος διεξάγεται. A. Gell. vi. 2, 3: (Chrysippus) in libro περὶ προνοίας quarto εἱμαρμένην esse dicit φυσικήν τινα σύνταξιν τῶν ὅλων ἐξ ἀϊδίου τῶν ἑτέρων τοῖς ἑτέροις ἐπακολουθούντων καὶ μετὰ πολὺ μὲν οὖν ἀπαραβάτου οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης συμπλοκῆς. Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125 (according to Posidonius): Fatum, or εἱμαρμένη, was called ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causa causæ nexa rem ex se gignat. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 36: Quid enim intelligis fatum? existimo necessitatem rerum omnium actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat. De Prov. 5, 8: Irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor et rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret, semper jussit.

[356] Conf. p. 152 and Stob. Ecl. i. 180 (Plut. Plac. i. 28), Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικήν.

[357] Hence Chrysippus’ definition (Plut. and Stob.): εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ἢ λόγος (Plut. νόμος) τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων· ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται. Instead of λόγος, Chrysippus also used ἀλήθεια, αἰτία, φύσις, ἀνάγκη. Theodoret. Cur. Gr. Aff. vi. 14, p. 87: Chrysippus assigns the same meaning to εἱμαρμένον and κατηναγκασμένον, explaining εἱμαρμένη to be κίνησις ἀΐδιος συνεχὴς καὶ τεταγμένη; Zeno defines it (as Stob. i. 178, also says) as δύναμις κινητικὴ τῆς ὕλης; also as φύσις or πρόνοια; his successors as λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων, or as εἱρμὸς αἰτίων. (The same in Plut. Plac. i. 28, 4. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 36, p. 143.) Even τύχη, he continues, is explained as a deity (or as Simpl. Phys. 74, b, has it as a θεῖον καὶ δαιμόνιον); but this supposes it to be essentially identical with εἱμαρμένη. Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 34, 8, p. 1050: τῆς γὰρ κοινῆς φύσεως εἰς πάντα διατεινούσης, δεήσει πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν γινόμενον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τῶν μορίων ὁτῳοῦν, κατ’ ἐκείνην γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον, κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀκωλύτως· διὰ τὸ μήτ’ ἔξωθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐνστησόμενον τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ μήτε τῶν μερῶν μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅπως κινηθήσεται ἢ σχήσει ἄλλως [ἢ] κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν. Cleanthes, Hymn. (in Stob. Ecl. i. 30) v. 12, 18; M. Aurel. ii. 3. See p. 151, 1.

[358] It has been already demonstrated that all these ideas pass into one another.

[359] Plut. Com. Not. 34, 5, p. 1076: εἰ δὲ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστόν ἐστι τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν ἄλλως ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν Διὸς βούλησιν, κ.τ.λ. Conf. Sto. Rep. 34, 2: οὕτω δὲ τῆς τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίας προαγούσης, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ ταύτην, ὡς ἄν ποτ’ ἔχωμεν, ἔχειν ἡμᾶς, εἴτε παρὰ φύσιν τὴν ἰδίαν νοσοῦντες, εἴτε πεπηρωμένοι, εἴτε γραμματικοὶ γεγονότες ἢ μουσικοὶ ... κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλήσια ἐροῦμεν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀτεχνιῶν, ὡς ἔφην ... οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλως τῶν κατὰ μέρος γενέσθαι, οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον, ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον. Ibid. 47, 4 and 8. Cleanth. Hymn. v. 15:

οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαῖμον, οὔτε κατ’ αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον οὔτ’ ἐνὶ πόντῳ, πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις.

[360] See the quotations on p. 161, 1; 161, 2; 164, 2; 144, 1; 148; 145, 2, from Diog. vii. 136; Stob. Ecl. i. 372 and 414; Cic. N. D. ii. 10, 28; 22, 58; Sext. Math. ix. 101: M. Aurel. iv. 14: ἐναφανισθήσῃ τῷ γεννήσαντι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν κατὰ μεταβολήν. Ibid. 21: αἱ ψυχαὶ ... εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων σπερματικὸν λόγον ἀναλαμβανόμεναι.

[361] See on p. 151, 1, the definition of deity from Stob.; Plut. Athenag.; M. Aurel. ix. 1: ὥρμησεν [ἡ φύσις] ἐπὶ τήνδε τὴν διακόσμησιν συλλαβοῦσά τινας λόγους τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ δυνάμεις γονίμους ἀφωρίσασα, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. vi. 24: Alexander and his groom ἐλήφθησαν εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῦ κόσμου σπερματικοὺς λόγους. Diog. vii. 148: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ αὑτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. 157: μέρη δὲ ψυχῆς λέγουσιν ὀκτὼ, τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν σπερματικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ λογιστικόν.

[362] As the primary fire or ether is called the seed of the world (p. 161, 1), so, according to Chrysippus (in Diog. 159), the σπέρμα in the seed of plants and animals is a πνεῦμα κατ’ οὐσίαν.

[363] σπερματικὸς λόγος is also used to express the seed or the egg itself. Thus, in Plut. Quæst. Conviv. ii. 3, 3 and 4, it is defined as λόγος ἐνδεὴς γενέσεως.

[364] See p. 101, 2.

[365] This is particularly manifest, not only in the history of the world, but also in the doctrine of the constant change of the elements.

[366] Heine, Stoicorum de Fato Doctrina (Naumb. 1859), p. 29.

[367] Compare what the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7) and Stob. (Ecl. i. 180) observe on the derivations of εἱμαρμένη, πεπρωμένη, Χρεὼν (Heine, p. 32, 1, suggests on the strength of Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Affect. vi. 11, p. 87, 4, who transcribes the quotation from Eusebius, τὸν χρόνον κατὰ τὸ χρεών. We ought rather to read, according to Theod. Gaisf., τὸ χρεὼν κατὰ τὸ χρέος), Μοῖραι, Κλωθώ: and the quotations p. 170, 1; 171, 1; also Ps. Arist. De Mundo, c. 7. The argument for Providence, drawn from the consensus gentium in Sen. Benef. iv. 4, follows another tack.

[368] Homeric passages, which he was in the habit of quoting in Eus. l.c. 8, 1.

[369] See Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 76.

[370] The two are generally taken together. Compare the quotations on p. 145, 4.

[371] See p. 83, 2; 110, 3; Aristotle and the Peripatetics thought differently. See Simpl. Cat. 103, β.

[372] Cic. De Fato, 10, 20.

[373] Alex. De Fato, p. 92, Orel.: τὸ δὲ λέγειν εὔλογον εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ ἐσόμενα προειδέναι ... καὶ τοῦτο λαμβάνοντας κατασκευάζειν πειρᾶσθαι δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε γίνεσθαι καὶ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε εὔλογον.

[374] Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 162; De Fato, 3, 5 (unfortunately the previous exposition is wanting); Diogenian (in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 1): Chrysippus proves, by the existence of divination, that all things happen καθ’ εἱμαρμένην; for divination would be impossible, unless things were foreordained. Alex. De Fato, c. 21, p. 96: οἱ δὲ ὑμνοῦντες τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὑτῶν λόγον μόνον σώζεσθαι λέγοντες αὐτὴν καὶ ταύτῃ πίστει τοῦ πάντα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην γίνεσθαι χρώμενοι, κ.τ.λ.

[375] Plut. De Fato, 11, p. 374: κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἐναντίον [λόγον] μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρῶτον εἶναι δόξειε τὸ μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ προηγουμένας αἰτίας· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φύσει διοικεῖσθαι τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, σύμπνουν καὶ συμπαθῆ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ ὄντα. Then come the considerations confirmatory of that view—divination, the wise man’s acquiescence in the course of the world, the maxim that every judgment is either true or false. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 35, p. 139: εἰ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτίων περιεστηκότων, ὥς φασιν αὐτοὶ, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι.

[376] Alex. De Fato, c. 22, p. 72: ὅμοιόν τε εἶναί φασι καὶ ὁμοίως ἀδύνατον τὸ ἀναιτίως τῷ γίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος.

[377] Alex. l.c. p. 70: φασὶ δὴ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε ἕνα ὄντα ... καὶ ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικούμενον ζωτικῆς τε καὶ λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς ἔχειν τὴν τῶν ὄντων διοίκησιν ἀΐδιον κατὰ εἱρμόν τινα καὶ τάξιν προϊοῦσαν; so that everything is connected as cause and effect, ἀλλὰ παντί τε τῷ γινομένῳ ἕτερόν τι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἠρτημένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀπ’ ἀνάγκης ὡς αἰτίου, καὶ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἔχειν τι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ᾧ ὡς αἰτίῳ συνήρτηται· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀναιτίως μήτε εἶναι μήτε γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ ἀπολελυμένον τε καὶ κεχωρισμένον τῶν προγεγονότων ἁπάντων· διασπᾶσθαι γὰρ καὶ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μηκέτι τὸν κόσμον ἕνα μένειν ἀεὶ, κατὰ μίαν τάξιν τε καὶ οἰκονομίαν διοικούμενον, εἰ ἀναίτιός τις εἰσάγοιτο κίνησις. See Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125; De Fato, 4, 7; M. Aurel. x. 5.

[378] In Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 164, the Stoic says: Nec vero universo generi hominum solum, sed etiam singulis a Diis immortalibus consuli et provideri solet.

[379] Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 46: Singulis non adest [Jupiter], et tamen vim et causam et manum omnibus dedit. Cic. N. D. 66, 167: Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt. Ibid. iii. 35, 86: At tamen minora Dii negligunt ... ne in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant. Sic enim dicitis.

[380] Cicero uses the following argument to show that the providential care of God extends to individuals:—If the Gods care for all men, they must care for those in our hemisphere, and, consequently, for the cities in our hemisphere, and for the men in each city. The argument may be superfluous, but it serves to show that the care of individuals was the result of God’s care of the whole world. M. Aurel. vi. 44: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐβουλεύσαντο περὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐμοὶ συμβῆναι ὀφειλόντων οἱ θεοὶ, καλῶς ἐβουλεύσαντο ... εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐβουλεύσαντο κατ’ ἰδίαν περὶ ἐμοῦ, περί γε τῶν κοινῶν πάντως ἐβουλεύσαντο, οἷς κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν καὶ ταῦτα συμβαίνοντα ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ στέργειν ὀφείλω. Similarly, iv. 28. It will be seen that the Stoics consider that the existence of divination, which served as a proof of special providence, was caused by the connection of nature.

[381] As Alex. c. 28, p. 88, fitly observes.

[382] The great majority of the Stoic answers to πολλὰ ζητήματα φυσικά τε καὶ ἠθικὰ καὶ διαλεκτικά, which (according to Plut. De Fato, c. 3) were called forth by the theory of destiny, in all probability belong to him.

[383] See p. 171, 3, Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 23, 2, p. 1045. He assigned as a general reason τὸ γὰρ ἀναίτιον ὅλως ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον. Hence the Stoic definition of τύχη is αἰτία ἀπρονόητος καὶ ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ in Plut. De Fato. c. 7, p. 572; Plac. i. 29, 3 (Stob. Ecl. i. 218); Alex. De Fato, p. 24; Simpl. Phys. 74, 6. See p. 171, 1.

[384] Alex. l.c. The Stoics assert that things are possible which do not take place, if in themselves they can take place, and διὰ τοῦτο φασὶ μηδὲ τὰ γενόμενα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, καίτοι ἀπαραβάτως γινόμενα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι, ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῖς δυνατὸν γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. Cic. Top. 15, 59: Ex hoc genere causarum ex æternitate pendentium fatum a Stoicis nectitur.

[385] Alex. De Fato, c. 10, p. 32; Cic. De Fato, 17, 39); 18, 41, and above, p. 115, 2. Hence Plut. Plac. (similarly Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 39, p. 149): ἃ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι κατ’ ἀνάγκην, ἃ δὲ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τύχην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον, which is evidently more explicit than the language used by Stob. Ecl. i. 176, and the statement of Theodoret on p. 171, 1.

[386] See p. 115, 2. Opponents such as Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 46, and Alex., pointed out how illusory this attempt was. According to the latter, he fell back on the simple result, maintaining that, in the case of things happening καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, there is nothing to prevent the opposite from coming about, so far as the causes which prevent this from happening are unknown to us.

[387] See above, p. 171, 3.

[388] Chrysipp. in Gell. N. A. vii. 2, 6; Alex. De Fato, c. 36, p. 112.

[389] Gell. l.c.; Alex. c. 13; Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 35, p. 138, 140. Alex. c. 33 (on which see Heine, p. 43) gives a long argument, concluding with the words: πᾶν τὸ καθ’ ὁρμὴν γινόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς οὕτως ἐνεργοῦσιν εἶναι. Nemes. appeals to Chrysippus, and also to Philopator, a Stoic of the second century A.D. Of him he remarks, that he has consistently attributed τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν to lifeless objects.

[390] Cic. De Fato, 18, 41: In order to avoid necessitas, or to uphold fate, Chrysippus distinguishes causæ principales et perfectæ from causæ adjuvantes, his meaning being that everything happens according to fate, not causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adjuvantibus. Conf. Cic. Top. 15, 59. Although these causes may not be in our power, still it is our will which assents to the impressions received. Œnomaus (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 3, and 10) charges Chrysippus with making a ἡμίδουλον of the will, because he laid so great a stress on its freedom.

[391] Gell. vii. 2, 13: Cic. l.c.

[392] Alex. c. 34, p. 106, puts in the mouth of the Stoics: τὰ μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἐνεργήσει μόνον, τὰ δὲ πράξει τὰ λογικὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἁμαρτήσεται, τὰ δὲ κατορθώσει. ταῦτα γὰρ τούτοις κατὰ φύσιν μὲν, ὄντων δὲ καὶ ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ κατορθωμάτων, καὶ τῶν τοιαύτων φύσεων καὶ ποιοτήτων μὴ ἀγνοουμένων, καὶ ἔπαινοι μὲν καὶ ψόγοι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ κολάσεις.

[393] Alex. c. 26, p. 82.

[394] Alex. c. 32, p. 102.

[395] The arguments usual among the Stoics in after times may, with great probability, be referred to Chrysippus.

[396] Alex. c. 35: λέγουσι γάρ· οὐκ ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ πεπρωμένη· (It never happens that there is a εἱμαρμένη but not a πεπρωμένη) οὐδὲ ἔστι πεπρωμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ αἶσα· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν αἶσα, οὐκ [οὐδὲ] ἔστι δὲ νέμεσις· οὐκ ἔστι μὲν νέμεσις, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ νόμος· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν νόμος, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν ποιητέον ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον· ἀλλὰ ἀπαγορεύεται μὲν τὰ ἁμαρτανόμενα, προστάττεται δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι μὲν τοιαύτη ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα· ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστιν ἁμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα, ἔστιν ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἔστι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐπαινετὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰσχρὸν ψεκτόν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ ψεκτόν. What is praiseworthy deserves τιμὴ or γέρως ἀξίωσις, and what is blameworthy merits κόλασις or ἐπανόρθωσις.

[397] Alex. c. 37, p. 118: A second argument ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς παλαίστρας is the following:—οὐ πάντα μὲν ἔστι καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἀκώλυτος καὶ ἀπαρεμπόδιστος ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κόσμος· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν κόσμος, οὐκ εἰσὶ δὲ θεοί· (for κόσμος, according to the definitions of Chrysippus, is the whole, including gods and men. See p. 158, 1) εἰ δέ εἰσι θεοὶ, εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ οἱ θεοί· ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔστιν ἀρετή· ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, ἔστι φρόνησις· ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ποιητέων τε καὶ οὐ ποιητέων· ἀλλὰ ποιητέα μὲν ἔστι τὰ κατορθώματα, οὐ ποιητέα δὲ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, κ.τ.λ. οὐκ ἄρα πάντα μὲν γίνεται καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ γεραίρειν καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν.

[398] Cic. De Fato, 12, 28; Diogenian. (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 16); Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37. Things which were determined by the co-operation of destiny alone Chrysippus called συγκαθειμαρμένα (confatalia). The argument by which he was confuted, which Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 489, erroneously attributes to the Stoics themselves, went by the name of ἀργὸς λόγος (ignava ratio). Besides the ἀργὸς λόγος, Plut. De Fato, c. 11, p. 574, mentions the θερίζων and the λόγος παρὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην as fallacies which could only be refuted on the ground of the freedom of the will. The last-named one, perhaps, turned on the idea (Œnomaus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 12) that man might frustrate destiny if he neglected to do what was necessary to produce the foreordained results. According to Ammon. De Inter. 106, a, Lucian, Vit. Auct. 22, the θερίζων was as follows:—Either you will reap or you will not reap: it is therefore incorrect to say, perhaps you will reap.

[399] Sen. (after Cleanthes, whose verses in Epictet. Man. 52) Ep. 107, 11: Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt. Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21, has put it very plainly: τὸ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην εἶναι πάντη διεβεβαιώσαντο παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτῳ, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀχήματος ἐὰν ᾖ ἐξηρτημένος κύων, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται ἕπεσθαι, καὶ ἕλκεται καὶ ἕπεται ἑκὼν ... ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βούληται ἕπεσθαι, πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται, τὸ αὐτὸ δήπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν. The same idea is expanded by M. Aurel. vi. 42: All must work for the whole, ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ καὶ ὁ μεμφόμενος καὶ ὁ ἀντιβαίνειν πειρώμενος καὶ ἀναιρεῖν τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἔχρῃζεν ὁ κόσμος. It is man’s business to take care that he acts a dignified part in the common labour.

[400] After all that has been said, this needs no further confirmation. Conversely, the unity of the forming power is concluded from the unity of the world. See p. 143, 1, 2. Conf. Plut. Def. Orac. 29, p. 425. M. Aurel. vi. 38: πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐπιπέπλεκται καὶ πάντα κατὰ τοῦτο φίλα ἀλλήλοις ἐστί ... τοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὴν τονικὴν κίνησιν καὶ σύμπνοιαν καὶ τὴν ἕνωσιν τῆς οὐσίας. Ibid. vii. 9.

[401] Sext. Math. ix. 78: τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων ... ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡνωμένον ἐστι σῶμα ἢ ἐκ συναπτομένων, ἢ ἐκ διεστώτων· οὔτε δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων οὔτε ἐκ διεστώτων, ὡς δείκνυμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν συμπαθειῶν· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῆς σελήνης αὐξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις πολλὰ τῶν τε ἐπιγείων ζῴων καὶ θαλασσίων φθίνει τε καὶ αὔξεται, ἀμπώτεις τε καὶ πλημμυρίδες (ebb and flood), περί τινα μέρη τῆς θαλάσσης γίνονται. In the same way, atmospheric changes coincide with the setting and rising of the stars: ἐξ ὧν συμφανὲς, ὅτι ἡνωμένον τι σῶμα καθέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος, ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ διεστώτων οὐ συμπάσχει τὰ μέρη ἀλλήλοις. Diog. vii. 140: ἐν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν ἀλλ’ ἡνῶσθαι αὐτὸν, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀναγκάζειν τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια σύμπνοιαν καὶ συντονίαν. Ibid. 143: ὅτι θ’ εἷς ἐστι Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ... καὶ Ποσειδώνιος. Alex. De Mixt. 142, a, see p. 127, 5; Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19; Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 2: οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡνῶσθαι τὰ πάντα; Δοκεῖ, ἔφη· τί δέ; συμπαθεῖν τὰ ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανίοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; Δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Cicero mentions the changes in animals and plants corresponding with the changes of seasons, the phases of the moon, and the greater or less nearness of the sun. M. Aurel. iv. 40. From all these passages we gather what the question really was. It was not only whether other worlds were possible, besides the one which we know from observation, but whether the heavenly bodies visible were in any essential way connected with the earth, so as to form an organic whole (ζῷον, Diog. vii. 143).

The Stoic conception of συμπάθεια was not used to denote the magic connection which it expresses in ordinary parlance, but the natural coincidence between phenomena belonging to the different parts of the world, the consensus, concentus, cognatio, conjunctio, or continuatio naturæ (Cic. N. D. iii. 11, 28; Divin. ii. 15, 34; 69, 142). In this sense, M. Aurel. ix. 9, observes that like is attracted by like; fire is attracted upwards, earth downwards; beasts and men seek out each other’s society; even amongst the highest existences, the stars, there exists a ἕνωσις ἐκ διεστηκότων, a συμπάθεια ἐν διεστῶσι. Even the last remark does not go beyond the conception of a natural connection; nevertheless, it paves the way for the later Neoplatonic idea of sympathy, as no longer a physical connection, but as an influence felt at a distance by virtue of a connection of soul.

[402] M. Aurel. vi. 1: ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία (the matter of the world) εὐπειθὴς καὶ εὐτρεπής· ὁ δὲ ταύτην διοικῶν λόγος οὐδεμίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ κακοποιεῖν· κακίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδέ τι κακῶς ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ βλάπτεταί τι ὑπ’ ἐκείνου. πάντα δὲ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον γίνεται καὶ περαίνεται.

[403] Diog. 149: ταύτην δὲ [τὴν φύσιν] καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἡδονῆς, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δημιουργίας.

[404] Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 3, p. 1044: εἰπὼν [Χρύσιππος] ὅτι ... φιλοκαλεῖν ... τὴν φύσιν τῇ ποικιλίᾳ χαίρουσαν εἰκός ἐστι, ταῦτα κακὰ λέξιν εἴρηκε· γένοιτο δ’ ἂν μάλιστα τούτου ἔμφασις ἐπὶ τῆς κέρκου τοῦ ταώ. Conf. the Stoic in Cic. Fin. ii. 5, 18: Jam membrorum ... alia videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata ... alia autem nullam ob utilitatem, quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plumæ versicolores columbis, viris mammæ atque barba.

[405] M. Aurel. iii. 2: It is there proved by examples, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἐπιγινόμενα τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἔχει τι εὔχαρι καὶ ἐπαγωγὸν ... σχεδὸν οὐδὲν οὐχὶ καὶ τῶν κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν συμβαινόντων ἡδέως πως διασυνίστασθαι.

[406] Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 85; Sen. Ep. 113, 16. The latter includes this variety of natural objects among the facts, which must fill us with admiration for the divine artificer.

[407] Plut. Plac. i. 6, 2: καλὸς δὲ ὁ κόσμος· δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ χρώματος καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν κόσμον τῶν ἀστέρων ποικιλίας; the world has the most perfect form, that of a globe, with a sky the most perfect in colour, &c.

[408] See the passages quoted p. 145, 4, particularly Cic. N. D. ii. 32.

[409] Plut. (in Porphyr. De Abstin. iii. 32): ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο νὴ Δία τοῦ Χρυσίππου πιθανὸν ἦν, ὡς ἡμᾶς αὐτῶν καὶ ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοὶ χάριν ἐποιήσαντο, ἡμῶν δὲ τὰ ζῷα, συμπολεμεῖν μὲν ἵππους καὶ συνθηρεύειν κύνας, ἀνδρείας δὲ γυμνάσια παρδάλεις καὶ ἄρκτους καὶ λέοντας, κ.τ.λ. Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37: Scite enim Chrysippus: ut clypei causa involucrum, vaginam autem gladii, sic præter mundum cetera omnia aliorum causa esse generata, ut eas fruges et fructus, quas terra gignit, animantium causa, animantes autem hominum, ut equum vehendi causa, arandi bovem, venandi et custodiendi canem. Id. Off. i. 7, 22: Placet Stoicis, quæ in terris gignantur ad usum hominum omnia creari.

[410] Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67: Præclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse hominum causa et Deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suæ. N. D. ii. 53, 133, in describing the Stoic teaching: Why has the universe been made? Not for the sake of plants or animals, but for the sake of rational beings, Gods and men. It is then shown (c. 54–61), by an appeal to the structure of man’s body, and his mental qualities, how God has provided for the wants of man; and the argument concludes with the words, Omnia, quæ sint in hoc mundo, quibus utantur homines, hominum causa facta esse et parata. Just as a city, and what is therein, exists for the use of the inhabitants, so the world is intended for the use of Gods and men. Even the stars quanquam etiam ad mundi cohærentiam pertinent, tamen et spectaculum hominibus præbent. The earth with its plants and animals was created for the service of man. In Orig. c. Cels. iv. 74, p. 559, the Stoics assert that Providence created all things for the sake of rational beings; M. Aurel. v. 16 and 30; Gell. vii. 1, 1. Hence the definition of κόσμος quoted on p. 158, 1.

[411] Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 32, 1, p. 1049) shows how useful fowls are; the horse is intended for riding, the ox for ploughing, the dog for hunting. The pig, Cleanthes thought (Clemens, Strom. vii. 718, B), was made to sustain man, and endowed with a soul, in place of salt, to prevent its corrupting (Cic. N. D. ii, 64, 160; Fin. v. 13, 38; Plut. Qu. Conviv. v. 10, 3 and 6, p. 685; Porphyr. De Abstin. iii. 20); oysters and birds for the same purpose also (Porphyr. l.c.). In the same way, he spoke of the value of mice and bugs, see p. 189, 1. The Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 63, 158, following in the same track, declares that sheep only exist for the purpose of clothing, dogs for guarding and helping man, fishes for eating, and birds of prey for divers uses. Epictet. Diss. ii. 8, 7, in the same spirit, speaks of asses being intended to carry burdens; for this purpose they must be able to walk, and, in order to walk, must possess the power of imagination.

[412] See p. 186, 1.

[413] Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37: Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum, nullo modo perfectus, sed est quædam particula perfecti. Sed mundus quoniam omnia complexus est, nec est quidquam, quod non insit in eo, perfectus undique est.

[414] We gather this from the comparatively full accounts of the Stoic theory of the moral government of the world. Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 1, p. 1051, says that Chrysippus wrote several treatises περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν ἐγκλητὸν εἶναι μηδὲ μεμπτὸν κόσμῳ.

[415] See p. 187, 2, and Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 6): τέλεον μὲν ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, οὐ τέλεα δὲ τὰ κόσμου μέρη τῷ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πως ἔχειν καὶ μὴ καθ’ αὑτὰ εἶναι. Compare also the statement in Plut. Solert. An. c. 2, 9, p. 960, that animals must be irrational, because the irrational must be contrasted with the rational.

[416] Gell. vii. [vi.] 1, 7: Chrysippus in his treatise περὶ προνοίας, discussed, amongst other things, the question, εἰ αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόσοι κατὰ φύσιν γίνονται. Existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale naturæ consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios ... sed cum multa inquit atque magna gigneret pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque simul agnata sunt incommoda iis ipsis, quæ faciebat cohærentia: eaque non per naturam sed per sequelas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat κατὰ παρακολούθησιν.... Proinde morbi quoque et ægritudines partæ sunt dum salus paritur. M. Aurel. vi. 36: All evils are ἐπιγεννήματα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν. Plut. An. Procr. c. 6 and 9, p. 1015: αὐτοὶ δὲ (the Stoics) κακίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν τοσαύτην ... κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν γεγονέναι λέγουσιν. Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 3, 1.

[417] Sen. Nat. Qu. v. 18, 4 and 13: Non ideo non sunt ista natura bona, si vitio male utentium nocent.... Si beneficia naturæ utentium pravitate perpendimus, nihil non nostro malo accepimus.

[418] Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 4) remarks that bugs do us good service by preventing us from sleeping too long, and mice warn us not to leave things about. He also observes (Ibid. 32, 2) that wars are as useful as colonies, by preventing over-population. See the quotations, p. 185, 4; 186, 2. M. Aurel. viii. 50, makes a similar remark in regard to weeds. In the house of nature all the waste has its uses.

[419] A circumstance which Plut. Com. Not. 19, p. 1067, dexterously uses against the Stoics.

[420] Cleanthes, Hymn. v. 17 (see p. 171, 3); Plut. Sto. Rep. 33, 2: Chrysippus affirms, ὡς τῶν αἰσχρῶν τὸ θεῖον παραίτιον γίνεσθαι οὐκ εὔλογόν ἐστιν, law is innocent of crime, God of impiety. Id. (in Gell.