CHAPTER IV.

POLAND AND BOHEMIA.

I. The Contrast—National Character of the Poles—Our Lady of Csenstochova—Dancing Peasants—Galician Poles—Selfish Policy—Austria a Slav State.

II. The Poles in Russia—Russia’s Repressive Measures—The Slav Ideal—A Better Understanding—The Poles in Prussia—The Iron Heel—Law of Expropriation.

III. Csech Characteristics—Professor Masaryk—Jan Huss—Slav Puritans—The Hradćin—Modern Politics.

I.

Roughly speaking the Group of the Northern Slavs includes twenty million Poles and eight million Csechs. Numerically, therefore, they are the greatest of the unliberated Slav peoples. Bohemia and her sister-country Moravia are under Austrian rule, while Poland has been dismembered and partitioned between Russia, Germany and Austria. At one time both countries were great and flourishing, and played a prominent part in history. In 1526 the Csechs acknowledged the Hapsburgs as their ruler,[6] and Bohemia’s political decay and gradual loss of independence date both from this point. The first partition of Poland in 1772 deprived the Republic of liberty. Her dismemberment was finally completed and sealed by the third partition in 1795, and henceforth the Poles were even deprived of the possibility of co-operating as a nation.

The Csechs and Poles have both passed through a national tragedy, but of the two the Polish tragedy makes a stronger appeal to the imagination, because of the contrast between their former greatness and their present position, the high level of their culture, and the lofty principles at stake in the Great Polish Revolution. The Poles fell victims to the foreign yoke just as their civilization, their culture, and their _esprit_ were on the fairway to rival the intellectual splendours of France under Louis XIV. They were a brilliant people—mentally and intellectually refined, but physically decadent, and quite incapable of surviving their political freedom. They yielded to listless sentimentality and bewailed their lost greatness instead of fighting to retrieve it. You may love the Poles with your _heart_ but never with your reason! In this they are the very antithesis to the Csechs whom you cannot love except with your reason. You may admire them for the culture they have so laboriously won, but you cannot love them for it.

To the German and Austrian the Csech presents a comic type. But no one looks upon the Pole as comic; you hate him or you love him, but you cannot ridicule him—there is something great and tragic about him. The Russians who hate him for _political_ reasons are fired by religious fanaticism. They hate the Jesuitical principles of the Pole. The Germans hate the Polish want of management, and “Polnische Wirtschaft” (“Polish management”) is a German idiom. But no one would insult Polish idealism and the innate nobility of the Pole. He compares with the Csech as Don Quixote with Sancho Panza. He is a dreamer and visionary who prostrates himself before an invisible shrine and awaits the miracle of salvation and liberation. This life of dreams has endowed the modern Pole with hyper-sensitive nerves, dogmatic onesidedness, and extreme passivity. Lost in the contemplation of their royal past, the Polish people wait in breathless silence for the first bird-note to herald the dawn of freedom that shall dispel the night of tribulation.

But, while the conscience of the nation languishes, crucified in the bitter suffering of a Messianic ideal, the Masses—the common people—are sane and sturdy; they live and multiply far removed from the griefs of the Classes. Their hard life has made them dull and unfeeling; caught in a world of factories, mines, and social democracy, they are only interested in their own immediate concerns and personal pleasures. Anything beyond that they expect from the mediation of “Bogarodjitza” (Mother of God).

Wijspianski, a fine Polish dramatist, has strikingly sketched the national character in one single scene in his play “Wesele” (The Wedding). The people are dancing their Polonaise and Mazurka, with gay cockades and ribands on their shoulders. The pretty bride leads off with her herculean bridegroom. Suddenly Yasiek rushes in upon the dancers and cries, “To arms! rise and rebel, for Poland!” But the couples—as if bewitched—continue to dance the _national_ measure. Yasiek, bitterly disappointed, sees his hopes blighted and, choked with despair, he sinks to the ground. But the couples go on dancing, and he is _trampled to death_ by the feet of those whom he came to lead to freedom. This scene epitomises the position of affairs in modern Poland—the despair of the great lord with his pedigree, broad acres, and capital, who has absolutely no hold over the plain people because they have turned away from him. They have lost their rights, their land and their traditions; the only link between the two is the Catholic ideal, the ideal of _Polish_ Catholicism, which is hallowed in the image of Our Lady of Csenstochova, whose brow is encircled with the crown of the ancient Queens of Poland.

The younger generation in Poland has realized that this link between the Classes and Masses must rest on a surer foundation.

Between the aristocracy and the masses has arisen the class of the _educated poor_. These people are mainly of Russian descent, but the sons of Polish Jews form an important proportion and have acquired considerable influence, chiefly in the journalistic world. This young Poland saw itself confronted by a great vanished Polish age of romanticists and poets, with pronounced aristocratic and Catholic sentiments. The whole intellectual struggle of the modern democratic generation consists in an attempt to find contact with this past. Science also is endeavouring to reconcile the spirit of the present with the spirit of the past, and hopes to prepare the future development of an individualistic Polish culture on this foundation.

The contrast between German and Polish culture is the contrast between the culture of the masses and the culture of the individual. The principal social feature in mediæval Germany was _feudalism_. Germany was ruled by a number of feudal _princes_, Poland by a number of aristocratic _families_. But this _régime_ proved disastrous to Poland. A state where individuals rule by mutual consent is bound to develop differently from one where families rule without any mutual consent. In the expansive Western monarchies the power of the State increased, while the aristocratic republic of Poland steadily declined. The main reason for this difference probably lies in the geographical position of Poland. It lay too far from the West—too far from Rome and its culture.

* * * * *

The province of Galicia, which fell to Austria’s share by the partition of Poland, undoubtedly fared better than the rest of the country. It is inhabited by 4,252,483 Poles and 3,381,570 Ruthenes (including Bukovina). As geographical and racial neighbours of the Csechs, who were already displaying the greatest determination in their national struggle, the great population bade fair to become a danger to Austrian policy. Vienna was quick to realize this, and arranged her tactics towards the Poles accordingly. As soon as the Russian and German Poles began to be down-trodden, it was an easy matter to dispose of any separatist tendency among the Austrian Poles by reminding them of the position of their brothers. At home the Government began by fomenting the national discord between the Poles and the Ruthenes. It neglected the latter in favour of the Poles, and absolutely disregarded their reasonable claims. The Poles were not only granted great national and political concessions; they became the Slav favourite of the Viennese ministry. Not only were they represented by their own “_Landmannsminister_” (“the Secretary for Galicia,” so to say), but one other important portfolio (usually that of Finance) was always entrusted to a Pole.

The Poles were quite content with this position and supported Austrian policy accordingly. As this policy is above all things anti-Slav, this meant that the most chivalrous of all the Slav nations became a tool in the hands of Slavdom’s chief oppressor. This was partly due to the fact that this staunchly Catholic people is surrounded by non-Catholic enemies—by Protestant Germans on the one hand and Orthodox Russians on the other. Moreover, they look upon Catholicism as the one safe harbor—hence their attachment to Roman Catholic Austria. Here also lies the clue to Polish views, their sympathies and antipathies. But there is no justification for this position. Catholicism is not a Slav national religion, and can never become part of the soul of a Slav people. Strictly speaking, it is responsible for the decline of part of the Slav race. _All_ Catholic Slav countries up to date have been in captivity, whereas _all_ such Slavs as have retained their national orthodox religion are _free_. It is quite natural that the Poles should cling to Catholicism as an acquired religion which appeals to them, but they should not have used it as a national and traditional basis for their attitude towards the rest of the Slavs. It is a mistake which has done little good to their own national aspirations, and incalculable harm to the Slav cause.

In many Slav circles there is a tendency to ascribe this attitude of the Poles, not to their Messianic ideal, but to a purely individual egotism. This view is at least partially true, were it only because Polish politics are not the politics of the nation, but of the ruling class. The Polish aristocracy, who were unable to forget their past glories, saw in the feudal and aristocratic principles of the Austrian Government a possibility of retaining their position in the Dual Monarchy. They made full use of their opportunities even while (in theory) they were careful to guard Polish national interests. This aristocracy had no feeling for the common Slav cause, and whenever they had a chance of authority (Goluchowski, Bilinski) they have proved themselves a positive danger to the cause. That this aristocracy has cast its spell over the greater part of the educated classes and formed political parties as it chose is due to the inherent moral dependence of the Pole upon his aristocracy;—snobbery is as much a disease with him as Roman Catholicism. Not however among the common people are they always the heedless dancers of Wijspianski’s drama. They allow everything to pass _over_ them, and only trample upon that which happens to lie beneath their feet. Moreover, their inmost soul is rich in the true Slav qualities; but this wealth is hidden as in a fast-locked casket, and there it will lie until the radiant smile of the “Mother of God” of Csenstochova shall miraculously reveal it.

For a long time Polish politics have disturbed the Slav balance in the Dual Monarchy. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy is properly a Slav State in the fullest sense of the word. According to official statistics 22,821,864 out of 51,351,531 souls are Slavs. The ruling races, Germans and Hungarians, number 21,259,644 between them, and the remainder are accounted for by Roumanians, Italians and other nationalities. It must be pointed out that Slavs living in Hungary (especially in Baczka and in the Banat) are—much against their will—simply entered in the census as Hungarians, and that in like manner hundreds of thousands of Slavs in Bohemia, Carinthia, Styria and Carniola are put down as Germans. Protests against these proceedings pass unheeded, and Slav National Census Unions were formed to check the Governmental statistics; according to these more than 50 per cent. of the entire population are Slavs. This percentage is proportionately increased if we further include the Slav emigrants in Australia and America. These number about five million, and would doubtless return to their homes if more tolerable conditions could be procured.

And yet this Monarchy aspires to be anything but a Slav State. German and Magyar rule has sought to swamp the Slav element in every possible way. Following Metternich’s principle “_divide et impera_” the Slavs were divided into two “spheres.” The Northern Slavs were handed over to Austrian autocracy, and the Southern Slavs to Magyar plutocracy. Thus it came to pass that _9 million Germans_ rule _15 million Slavs_, and 10 million Magyars, Jews, or spurious Magyars rule 7-1/2 million Slavs.

Even if theoretically the balance of power seems more rational in the Hungarian sphere, in the Austrian it is plainly absurdly disproportionate. And here the Poles were the straw in the balance which decided in favour of German hegemony. If the Poles had recognized their duty to their own race the Slav question would long ago have been on a better footing. A just understanding with the Ruthenes and a joint national struggle with the Csechs would certainly have broken German supremacy, or forced it to accord more tolerable conditions to all the Slavs. But the Galician Poles have never done anything for the Slav cause in the Monarchy, but rather sought to curry favour with the Government in Vienna, and, by repudiating their kinship, to obtain concessions for their own negative national ideals, and for their intellectual and economic development. Austria had no objection to this platonic nationalism so long as the Poles by their pro-German policy supported her in oppressing the other Slavs.

The Csechs and Ruthenes have been specially handicapped in their national struggle by the attitude of the Poles. And the result was an implacable enmity between the Poles and the Ruthenes, which was, if anything, encouraged by the Government. In this struggle the Ruthenes undoubtedly fared the worse. They are in a national minority in Galicia, and unmercifully oppressed by the Poles, who hate them all the more for being the descendants of the hated Russians (Little Russians) and because they refused to conceal their sympathy with Russia. The Ruthenes fought hard for the right to speak their own tongue and have their own school system. But the Poles were ruthlessly opposed to these demands, which were in consequence also denied by the Government. The struggle finally degenerated into wholesale denunciations of the Ruthenes by the Poles, who accused their enemies of high treason and conspiracy with Russia.

It must, however, be admitted that even among the Poles there were many who deeply deplored this fratricidal struggle, and did their utmost to induce the Northern Slavs of the Monarchy to combine in the common cause. Time and again the Csech patriots urged the desirability of a union, and, as similar appeals came from other Slav countries also, the realization of a true _Pan-Slav_ and _democratic_ ideal often seemed imminent. The spectre of _Pan-Germanism_, waiting like some ravenous monster to devour the Slav nations limb by limb, appeared even to the Poles, but unscrupulous politicians, bureaucratic upstarts, and slippery diplomats from Vienna conjured up the bogey of _Russification_ to alarm them, and all patriotic efforts were in vain.

Still it is psychologically interesting that a Slav race through fear of Russification should have thrown itself into the arms of—Germanism.

* * * * *

II.

The favoured position of the Poles in Austria contrasts sharply with that of their brothers in Russia and Germany. They were oppressed in every way;—Russian _official_ policy towards the Poles bears all the stamp of autocratic tyranny. Their political rights are restricted to a minimum, and as regards civil rights they are nearly as badly off as the Russian Jews. Still it is characteristic that the reason for this oppression lay, not in the national, but in the religious element. Roman Catholicism, which was an advantage to the Austrian, proved a misfortune to the Russian Poles. For the Russian looks upon Catholicism as the very antithesis to his conception of the Slav ideal. Pravo-Slav Russia, with her ancient, wondrously pure Slavo-religious traditions, and all the warmth of her faith, could not take kindly to the haughty, frigidly cold Catholic Poles. The great political power of the Holy Synod, the supreme (unfortunately too clerical) representative body of this faith, exercised an influence adverse to the Polish people, and the Russian Government, which only too often has been the mere executive of the will of the Holy Synod, established an autocratic _régime_ with far-reaching national and personal restrictions. The first result of this policy was unmitigated hatred on the part of the Poles, and a craving for vengeance and freedom. The Russian Poles intrigued with their Austrian brothers, and envied them their favoured position. But the only support the Austrian Poles vouchsafed their brothers was that they applied the Russian methods of oppression to the Ruthenes.

Whoever knows anything of Russia’s repressive measures, will realize that the Poles were in a hard case. Owing to the passive character of the Poles their struggles were never sufficiently organized to assume the proportions of a well organized revolution. But oppression has strengthened their national self-reliance, their ideals have burned more brightly, and a longing for freedom has entirely dominated them. Still, even now, they are far more inclined to wait for the miracle than to bestir themselves on their own behalf; and if in recent years their position has somewhat improved, it is not so much due to their own efforts as to the wave of modern thought among the Russians themselves.

The _Russian Governmental_ policy made no distinction between the Poles and her Russian subjects who were thirsting for social regeneration. So the Russians discovered for themselves that they had to seek the friendship and collaboration of the Poles. The wide horizon of the modern Russian movement will not permit the exclusion of a single capable member of the Tsar’s great realm from the benefits of the future. Not only the Russian people, but the whole of Russia had to be won over to the cause of the great ideal. The regeneration of Russia was to herald the regeneration of the whole of the Slav race, and the Poles as Slavs had a right to help in this work. The Russians have always said that they are very fond of the Poles, but that they are not sufficiently _Slav_—they ought to be Slavicized. The Russian Government sought to accomplish this by violence, whereas the _Russian people_, represented by the Russian revolutionaries, chose the better path of mutual understanding and respect. Of course, the official policy of the Holy Synod is still in force, and although the constitutional manifesto and the Duma have brought about certain changes, these are at present quite unimportant. The Poles, however, are winning an increasing number of friends and advocates among the Russians, who are pleading for equal rights and a constitution for Poland. Moreover, the times have changed, and when Russia was confronted by the present great European crisis the Poles displayed a marvellous loyalty, which has, perhaps, unintentionally brought them nearer the realization of their dreams than they have ever been before. The Manifesto of the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievitch is the greatest event in Polish history since the partition.

The hardest lot of all has befallen those Poles who have been most loyal to their race. I mean those who came under Prussian rule. For whereas Polish Slavdom is tolerated in Austria, and actually encouraged in Russia, in Prussia it is remorselessly ground down under the iron heel of Germanism. Germanization is carried out by Prussian rule, aggressively, in a strictly military sense. It is not a question of political tactics—no opinion at home or abroad is considered; there is nothing but frank coercion. Germany’s ambitions are only too well known—they have been advertised loudly enough, and they have been expounded again quite recently in General von Bernhardi’s notorious book, “Germany and the Next War”—a book written with all the brusque insolence of which only a German is capable. If Germany’s future programme includes the Germanizing of the whole of Europe, it is surely superfluous to relate in detail how she strove to Germanize a people under her own rule—it is one of the blackest chapters in the histories of oppression.

By the constitution of Germany the Prussian Poles cannot forfeit their rights as citizens of the realm. This circumstance afforded them a chance of laying their grievances before the legislative assemblies. But in spite of their gallant courage, the struggle brought them no particular advantage except the moral satisfaction of knowing that their pleading could reach the ear of Europe. But whenever their voice grew too loud, the mailed fist fell on their lips and struck them dumb. When the German Reichstag passed the Polish Expropriation Law (1886)[7] all Europe was scandalized; but from the point of view of Germanization it was highly successful. Germany disregarded foreign opinion and the law was put in force.

It is to be hoped that the conclusion of the present European war will also put an end to the sufferings of these martyrs, and that the whole Polish nation will be granted an opportunity of applying its many admirable qualities for its own welfare and for the union of the Slav race.

* * * * *

III.

The Csechs have always been a strong, tenacious, energetic people, and no sooner did they begin to feel the iron fist of their oppressors than they opened a determined campaign against them and pitted their strength against their tyrants. They have won their present civilization inch by inch from their oppressors.

The eminent Csech political economist, Professor Masaryk, admirably forecasts the future of his people. He says—“The humanistic ideal, the ideal of regeneration, bears a deep national and historical significance for us Csechs. A full and sincere grasp of the human ideal will bridge over the spiritual and ethical dreams of centuries, and enable us to advance with the vanguard of human progress. The Csech humanitarian ideal is no romantic fallacy. Without work and effort the humanitarian ideal is but dead; it demands that we shall everywhere and systematically oppose ourselves to all that is bad, to all social _un_humanity—both at home and abroad—with all its clerical, political and national organs. The humanitarian ideal is not sentimentality—it means work, work, and yet again work!”

Now all this is by no means a characteristic of the Csech people, but only a forecast of what they shall be. Political tactics must always correspond to the principles of decency and humanity. Masaryk further says—“Our fame, our wars, and our intervention in the past have borne a religious, not a national stamp. Our _national_ ideal is of more recent birth—it only belongs to the last, and more especially to the present century. The history of Bohemia must not be judged from this standpoint.”

Perhaps this programme will prove too historical and too unpractical for the present day. The small commercial and industrial Csech nation is too far removed from the age of Jan Huss, and the Csech reformation has lost its significance for them. But deep down in the soul of the Csech people there still dwells a spark of the Hussite spirit. Of course, the battle-cry is nationalist, the phrasing that of the twentieth century, but the underlying spirit differs in no way from the righteous indignation of Huss, when he preached against high-handed oppression and violence. The physical inferior is never anxious to see his affairs settled by physical force. For this reason it is not a matter of indifference to the Csechs, whether they fight for a higher principle or merely for material advantage. At present they are principally fighting for their language, for the right to speak their own tongue—they are fighting against Germanization. Their strongest weapon in this fight is their striving for economic prosperity—a physical power through which they may hope to obtain a spiritual victory.

The principal trait in the Csech character is _initiative_. The very name points to this, for “Csech” is derived from the old-Slav word “Chenti,” meaning “to will” or “to begin.”

History finds the Csechs in the vanguard of all the Slav tribes in their wanderings westward. Their legendary leader was Csech, one of three brothers, and his tribe penetrated the farthest. In the Middle Ages the Csechs were the first to challenge the power of Rome, and to this day they send numbers of enterprising emigrants to all parts of the world. But the Csechs have one great fault—they are fickle. Their enthusiasm flashes up quickly and then as quickly dies down. This is the reason of the failure of the Hussite Reformation. The Germans finished what the Csechs began—Luther was the successor of Huss and completed his work.

The Csechs are not by nature a commercial and industrial people. Their business capacity is born of necessity—it is a weapon, not a means of gain. It is kept going by an unwearied agitation on the part of the national leaders, and if the Csech national ideal should suffer shipwreck, then Csech finance, ambition, and industry will likewise perish.

Sundry Slavophil thinkers would exclude the Csechs from the group of Slav peoples, just because of their initiative and business capacity. The Russian ethnologist Danilevski calls the Csech people a monstrosity, a German people with a Slav tongue. But these men have overlooked the fact that the foundation of modern Csech prosperity was laid by the religion of the Csech Brethren. During the Catholic reaction the Csech Protestants were driven from their possessions and treated as aliens in their own country. Being thus compelled to evolve a new means of gaining a livelihood, they turned to industry. Trade and the towns were closed to them, and the Csech Brethren had to seek refuge in the Bohemian and Moravian hills, and the Orlic mountains. They became weavers, wood-carvers and miners, and laid the foundation of the great modern Bohemian textile, glass and earthenware industries. Religious considerations and nothing else have made the Csechs into a mercantile nation. England’s wealth also springs from a religious movement—the rise of Puritanism. Thrift and industry led to the accumulation of capital. Only a religious man understands work and thrift, and he alone knows how to utilise capital as a moral lever. For this reason it would be wrong to adopt the views of the Russian ethnologist. The Csech people _as they are_ have a right to their future and to freedom.

* * * * *

In the centre of Prague, on the summit of the Hradčin, stands the old Csech Royal Castle, a splendid monument of past greatness. Proud and lofty, visible from afar, it speaks to the Csech people of the days when it sheltered—not the foreign invader, but flesh of their flesh, Csech kings and princes of their own blood. And even as it is a monument of the past, it is also a beacon for the present and the future. When the setting sun sheds his crimson glory upon Castle and Hradčin, it seems as though the very stones were aglow with the reflection of all the Csech blood that has been shed in the defence of right and liberty. But—the royal splendour vanishes with the sun, and the shadow of night descends on Castle and height like a symbol of the present age of gloom. Day by day, with burning eyes, the Csech reads the wordless message. Yet he does not give way to dreams, or sink into deep melancholy, nor does he wait for a miracle. He clenches his fist and smiles the grim smile of the tireless warrior. His fickleness at the time of the Reformation weighs like a sin on his conscience, but its ideals have set their mark upon him and quickened the seed of _political_ reformation in his soul. In this matter the Csechs take the lead among all the Slavs in Austria-Hungary.

I have already mentioned that in certain Slav circles the Csechs are looked upon as Germans with a Slav tongue. But, if their industrial and mercantile prosperity and certain individual characteristics lend some colour to this view, it is quite refuted by the Csech activity in the Slav national and political cause. In their sturdy and _progressive_ struggle against Germanization the Csechs have set the other Austrian Slavs a tactical and practical example as to how the struggle should be fought—_tactically_ on constitutional lines, and, _practically_, with indomitable courage and perseverance.

In spite of their long subjection to an absolute autocracy, the Csechs developed into so strong a political factor, that even Vienna began to fear the weight of their hand. They achieved this not only from a sense of self-preservation or separatist selfishness like the Poles, but the Slav ideal runs like a gold thread through all they have done; it is their motto, task and goal. They were beset from three sides, by the Austrian Germans in all their power, by Polish opposition, and by Magyar agitations and hostile influences in Vienna. The Southern Slav deputies in the Reichstag were their only helpers in the unequal struggle. But they never relaxed their energy and they never yielded a position they had won.

The national struggle in Bohemia took on its present form in the first half of the nineteenth century, and it first centred round “cultural” interests as in other Slav countries. The love of the people for their own language had to be established and even rekindled to a pitch of fiery enthusiasm, and national education had also to be fostered by the foundation of Csech national schools. The State was by no means anxious to enlighten the people, and the number of schools maintained in the country was quite inadequate. The fiscal schools were all German and served to spread the German propaganda. But the Csech educated classes founded schools at their own expense, as well as the “Matica Školska” (School Union), which undertook the organization of these schools. This was an effective counter-stroke to Germanization as well as a good foundation for further success. Palacky, Kollar and Havliček were leaders of the National movement of the time.

Palacky was the source from whom the others drew their inspiration. He was a great thinker, a brilliant author, and a cautious, liberal-minded politician who may be considered the founder of modern Csech national life. And through him radiated the light that pointed the way which these people must take. Kollar, the poet and publicist, and Havliček, as politician and political economist, shared the Csech leadership with Palacky, and paved the way for a great national intellectual movement which kept pace with the national political movement. They founded a strong nationalist party in Bohemia (The Old Csechs) in opposition to the Viennese Government. With their majority in the Landtag, and their appearance in the Viennese Parliament, the Csech people became a factor with whom the Government had to reckon for good or for evil—a people who refused to be ousted. Bohemia, which official Austria loves to consider a German country, had to be divided into “spheres.” The State had to pay for the upkeep of Csech schools and the administration became bi-lingual! Of course, in accordance with the usual Government policy, many Csech localities were included in German spheres and promptly became bones of contention. The “Matica Školska” founded more schools in these spheres to prevent the Germanization of Csech children, whilst the German schools pursued their system of an unofficial propaganda with the tacit support of the Government. This state of affairs led to constant disturbances, which frequently degenerated into riot and bloodshed. With the rise of the “Young Csechs” the struggle assumed a more drastic and determined character, for this party aimed at nothing less than a purely Csech government for Bohemia, and a proportionate share in the management of Imperial affairs. They repeatedly succeeded in wrecking the Austrian Government, and under Prince Hohenlohe they were so strongly represented in the Cabinet that they succeeded in making their power felt. The “Young Csechs” have greatly helped the national cause in Bohemia, and also furthered the Slav cause by their enthusiastic championship of the All-Slav Ideal.

One of their leaders, Dr. Kramarz, who was very friendly with Russia, has been specially active in this cause. Though the “Young Csechs” are still the leading party, recent years have seen the rise of parties even more radical in their demands. The Social-Nationals and the Csech Radicals desire to see Bohemia an absolutely autonomous State, whereas the followers of Professor Masaryk aim at the regeneration of the Csech race on a different basis (see opening of this article).

Events have moved rapidly in Bohemia since the last Balkan war, which made a profound impression on all the Austrian Slavs. Owing to the uncompromising attitude taken up by the various parties, the Government dissolved the Bohemian Landtag, suspended the constitution and placed the administration in the hands of a Commission appointed by the Government and responsible to none. The Csechs retorted by a violent obstruction in the Viennese Parliament and so paralyzed the House, that it had to be prorogued indefinitely. The Csechs demanded the immediate convocation of the Landtag. “No Landtag, no Austrian Parliament,” was their watchword, and they stood firm. When the crisis with Serbia and the outbreak of the war occurred, the Parliament was unable to adopt any attitude towards these events, and the only _constitutional body_ in the Monarchy able to deal with them was the Hungarian Parliament.

_PART II._

YOUGOSLAVIA.

(THE SOUTHERN SLAVS.)