Part 1

The Sixth Marine Division

THE SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

_Prepared By_

James R. Stockman Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

HISTORICAL DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS

1. ORIGIN

Last of the famous Marine divisions of World War II, the Sixth was activated on 7 September 1944 on Guadalcanal, the same island that the First Marine Division had landed on exactly twenty five months before. Although the Sixth Marine Division was new in name, the elements that composed it were, for the most part, as old as the war itself. From the First Provisional Brigade that had fought so notably on Guam came two regiments: the Fourth Marines and the Twenty Second Marines. The other regiment of the new division came from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, where it was organized, with the exception of its First Battalion, by Colonel Victor F. Bleasdale from handpicked officers and men.

In command of the new division was Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, USMC, who had had a varied and colorful career in this war. He had trained the Ninth Marines, afterwards a part of the Third Marine Division, and was later Assistant Division Commander of the First Marine Division during the Gloucester operation in New Britain. When the landings on Guam were made in July of 1944, General Shepherd (then a Brigadier) was in command of the First Provisional Marine Brigade. His Brigade, consisting of the Fourth and Twenty Second Marines plus reinforcing elements, fought notably on Guam and received the Navy Unit Commendation for its excellent record.

The Assistant Division Commander was Brigadier General William T. Clement, USMC, another colorful figure. On the staff of Admiral Thomas Hart in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war, General Clement (then a Colonel) left Corregidor on a submarine. Later he served in London, and for a while was Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico before returning to the Pacific.

Of the three regiments the Twenty Second Marines was the oldest. It was formed at San Diego in June, 1942, and the following month left for Samoa where it remained as a part of the defense force until the fall of 1943. After an extensive training period the regiment left Samoa and sailed to the island of Hawaii to prepare for the Marshalls Campaign. During the Kwajalein phase it acted as a reserve and after the rapid capture of Roi and Namur by the Fourth Marine Division, the Twenty Second Marines, in accordance with the resulting speed-up in the Central Pacific timetable, went on to assault Eniwetok in the Western Marshalls. After a brief but bloody fight for Eniwetok, the regiment seized and occupied numerous adjoining islands. From Eniwetok the Twenty Second Marines went to Guadalcanal and trained there for the Guam Campaign. On 21 July 1944, the regiment landed on Guam on W-Day as a part of the First Provisional Brigade. It drove inland against heavy resistance and then turned to seal off Orote Peninsula. In conjunction with the Fourth Marines, the Twenty Second drove the length of the peninsula and destroyed the enemy emplaced there.

Activated on 8 January 1944, the Fourth Marines was formed from veteran units—the four Marine Raider Battalions. It took its name from the famous Marine regiment that had been lost on Bataan. Its officers and men had seen action at Tulagi, Guadalcanal, Makin, New Georgia, Bougainville; later at Guam, and abreast of the Twenty Second Marines the new regiment received as such, its baptism of fire, when it landed on 21 July 1944. After fighting its way inland and seizing Mt. Alifan, the regiment joined the Twenty Second to reduce heavily defended Orote Peninsula. The Fourth Marines had been on one operation previous to Guam; it had seized the island of Emirau in the St. Matthias Group, and although the operation was bloodless, it was a triumph in planning and execution.

On 1 May 1944, the major part of the Twenty Ninth Marines was activated at Camp Lejeune, New River, North Carolina. Two battalions were formed from the pick of officers and men in the eastern part of the United States at that time. These battalions were composed of some veterans but the greater part had no previous combat experience. With reinforcing elements, the regiment (less its First Battalion) crossed the United States by rail and sailed to Guadalcanal in August. The First Battalion joined the regiment on Guadalcanal in early October. It had been activated from Second Marine Division troops on Hawaii in February, 1944. First called the Second Separate Infantry Battalion, it trained for a brief time on Hawaii and then went to Saipan for that operation, attached to the Second Division. Landing on D-Day the battalion, now called the First Battalion, Twenty Ninth Marines, was attached to the Eighth Marines and to it fell the task of capturing Mt. Tapotchau, the commanding terrain on Saipan. Its losses were heavy—over 60%—and the battalion therefore was not used in the Tinian operation, which followed.

From the reinforcing elements of the First Provisional Brigade were formed, in large part, the Sixth Tank Battalion, Sixth Pioneer Battalion, the Sixth Engineer Battalion, and the division’s artillery regiment, the Fifteenth Marines.

2. TRAINING AND PREPARATIONS

When the Sixth Marine Division began its training program for its first—and only—operation, it had several initial advantages: Over two thirds of its officers and men were veterans, well schooled in the ways of the wily Japanese; it started off with the experience gained from nearly four years of war; the structure of the entire division was organized to benefit from this experience. Through October, 1944, and on into February, 1945, the division trained vigorously. Special emphasis was placed on individual marksmanship, combat firing exercises employing all weapons and arms, night problems, flame-thrower-demolition teams, tank-infantry problems, and air-ground problems. Training was concluded with an eight day division problem illustrating tactical principles for large unit employment. All through the training period General Shepherd strove to indoctrinate his division with the spirit of attack; that it was cheaper to drive ahead in unrelenting assault than to hesitate trying to find easier ways of achieving the objective while troops remained in contact with the enemy. This indoctrination was to pay dividends on Okinawa when forward progress seemed impossible.

3. MOVEMENT TO TARGET

During the period 1-6 March 1945, the Sixth Marine Division was aboard ship engaged in amphibious landing rehearsals for the Okinawa operation. On the first day troops practiced debarkation and deployment of landing craft; on the next two days the two assault regiments, the Fourth and Twenty Second, landed on the beaches of Guadalcanal and practiced limited maneuvers ashore. Then followed a critique and on the next day there was a full-scale dress rehearsal. Although limited in their extent, the rehearsals were quite satisfactory.

After breaking camp ashore, the division re-embarked to sail for the staging area, Ulithi, on 15 March. At Ulithi, a little atoll in the Caroline Islands, the division joined the enormous task force assembling there for the invasion of Okinawa. Training was carried out aboard ship and final preparations made for the target. By now the troops were aware of their destination and the force designated to land there. They were told that the Sixth Marine Division would land simultaneously with, and on the left of, the First Marine Division, as a part of the III Amphibious Corps. South of the Marines a corps of Army, the XXIV, would land. Both of the corps were components of a larger force—the new Tenth Army.

On the way to Ulithi, while there, and on the way to the target the men were given a thorough briefing. General Shepherd made it plain that every man should know not only his assigned task, but that of his own unit, and of adjacent units, as well as the general scheme of maneuver. In the briefing aboard ship the men learned that Okinawa had a population of some 450,000 civilians; that there were roughly 70,000 Japanese soldiers on the island. They also learned something about its geography, its towns, roads, rivers and terrain.

While at Ulithi the troops were taken ashore on the little island of Mog Mog for rest and rehabilitation. During the staging period assault troops were transferred to LST’s for the last part of the journey. On 27 March the Sixth Marine Division left Ulithi, loaded in 13 APA’s, 24 LST’s and one LSD, and encountered heavy rains and cooler weather as the convoy moved north.

4. OKINAWA

Easter Sunday, 1 April 1945, was Love-Day for the Okinawa operation. With the bright clear dawn came enemy planes but the invading armada—over 1400 ships—drove off or destroyed the attacking planes. From the transports the troops could only see small portions of the island; the preliminary bombardment from the naval task force and the bombs from our planes, diving through the clouds, raised a haze of smoke and dust that covered most of the area behind the landing beaches.

Forming into long waves, the Fourth and Twenty Second Marines, loaded in amphibious tractors, churned toward the beaches, over the coral reef, and landed at 0837. Every man went in with the expectation that this beachhead, like Tarawa, Saipan, and Iwo, would be a bloody one; they were surprised but not entirely relieved to find virtually no enemy opposition to the landing. Rapidly, units organized and moved inland and up across the terraced fields that led to Yontan Airfield. By noon the Fourth Marines had seized Yontan and the Twenty Second Marines were advancing as rapidly on the left. By late afternoon the two regiments had reached a line tentatively set to be reached on the second day and as yet had not found the enemy. To the left of the Twenty Second Marines lay a little peninsula jutting out to the northwest, named Zampa Misaki. It seemed likely that an enemy force might be there; General Shepherd requested III Amphibious Corps to release from its reserve one battalion of the Twenty Ninth Marines. The First Battalion was released to division and placed to protect the division’s left flank. Troops dug in for the night with mixed emotions. Everyone was extremely grateful that the landing had not been a bloody one; still there was a certain apprehension felt: Where was the enemy? When would he attack?

Love-Day had been successful beyond the wildest hopes; the division was ashore safely, in a good position, and had already secured its first objective. Yontan Airfield was firmly in our hands and had not been badly damaged. The enemy defensive positions constructed to guard the field were strangely empty. Casualties were negligible; the landing had been easy.

Now the Sixth Marine Division moved rapidly to cut the island in two. In conjunction with the First Marine Division which was making the main effort, the Fourth and Twenty Second Marines drove quickly to the east and, despite some opposition from small isolated enemy pockets, reached the east coast on 4 April. Turning to the north, the division began to seize the Ishikawa Isthmus. Averaging nearly 7000 yards each day the troops pushed up the isthmus and by 7 April had reached Nago at the base of Motobu Peninsula.

5. BATTLE FOR MOTOBU

It was General Shepherd’s plan to have the Twenty Second and Fourth continue the drive up the mainland of Okinawa until Hedo Misaki was seized. To destroy the enemy known to be on Motobu, the General committed the Twenty Ninth Marines, which had been in Corps reserve during the first four days of the operation. For the time being, the Fourth Marines was held as a reserve near the base of the peninsula. Patrolling continued.

Many captured enemy soldiers and civilians had stated that the main Japanese defensive force was in southern Okinawa but that a force of about 3000 men, commanded by a Colonel Udo, was somewhere up north, probably on Motobu. Aerial observation and photo terrain studies confirmed indications that there was a sizeable enemy force on the peninsula. On 8 April the Twenty Ninth Marines moved out in three columns, one along the south coast, one along the north coast and one up the center toward the town of Itomi. At first progress was rapid and there were few contacts made; it was noted, however, that all inland trails were mined or blocked. The coast roads had numerous roadblocks and tank traps. By 10 April the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, was at Toguchi and had been hit by enemy artillery fire near Awa. Near Toguchi, on the Manna road, it had contacted Udo’s force. West of Itomi the First Battalion was also in contact with what was apparently the same force. Meanwhile the Second Battalion had captured the enemy midget submarine base at Unten Ko but had encountered no appreciable resistance.

During the next three days the battalions were in almost constant contact with Udo’s forces. Ambushes were frequent but the enemy could not be engaged in any decisive action. It was clear that he was engaged in guerrilla-type warfare and wanted to harass our troops but was trying to avoid a meeting engagement. By 13 April the enemy position was definitely fixed as being in the Mt. Yaetake area; it was known that he had considerable artillery, mortars, and a few naval guns emplaced in hidden positions in the wild and rugged mountain mass.

Mt. Yaetake provided Colonel Udo with ideal ground for defensive positions. Here he had unlimited observation in every direction; it was impossible to attack him without warning. The rugged character of the terrain prohibited the use of mechanized support in the reduction of his positions.

While the Twenty Ninth Marines were fixing the enemy position and determining its character and strength, General Shepherd saw that he would need additional troops to destroy Udo’s force. His tactical decision was to move the Fourth Marines, less the Third Battalion, to Sakimotobu on the western side of the peninsula and attach to it the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth Marines which was near by. Then he ordered a coordinated attack for 14 April with the Fourth Marines driving into Yaetake in an easterly direction while the Twenty Ninth Marines, with two battalions, near Itomi, attacked to the west and southwest. Udo would be hit from front and rear.

On 14 April the Fourth Marines, commanded by Colonel Alan Shapley with the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, attached, moved rapidly inland to seize the first high ground from which to launch the attack on Mt. Yaetake. The Twenty Ninth Marines found enemy dispositions to its front in such strength and on such unfavorable ground, that it was virtually impossible to attack in a southwesterly direction.

Resuming the attack on 15 April the Fourth Marines drove up the approaches to Mt. Yaetake; fighting was bitter with one battalion commander killed and several company commanders casualties. The First Battalion, Fourth Marines, seized a key hill mass southwest of the Yaetake peak against heavy resistance. Over rugged terrain the Twenty Ninth Marines continued to advance into the rear of Udo’s position against intermittent resistance.

Next day, 16 April, the Sixth Marine Division prepared to attack the enemy from three sides. The First Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, which had been in immediate reserve near Awa, was ordered to advance to the north to close the gap between the two attacking regiments. After a day of extremely hard fighting the Fourth Marines seized Mt. Yaetake and held it despite an all-out Banzai charge. Meanwhile, the Twenty Ninth Marines, now under Colonel William J. Whaling, USMC, had swung its front to the west and north, destroying fixed emplacements and enemy groups as it moved.

With Udo’s force caught in the jaws of a giant nutcracker, and driven from the commanding ground in its position, the Fourth Marines changed its tactics. Colonel Shapley ordered his two left battalions, facing east, to initiate a holding attack on 17 April, while the two right battalions drove down from Mt. Yaetake to the north with the mission of seizing the Manna Road. The situation on this day then, was for the two battalions to sweep down a corridor formed by the First and Second Battalions, Twenty Ninth, on the east and the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, and Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, on the west. Down from Yaetake and through the corridor swept the First and Third Battalions, Fourth Marines, mopping up enemy remnants as they went. Nightfall saw both regiments on the first hills south of the Toguchi-Itomi road, the road that ran through Manna.

On 19 April the Sixth Marine Division began a coordinated drive to secure the high ground remaining between the Toguchi-Itomi road and the north coast of the peninsula. On the left was the Fourth Marines; next to it, the First and Second Battalions, Twenty Ninth Marines. From Toguchi, the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth moved by truck to Itomi and struck out through the hills toward the highest hill mass in the northern part of Motobu, which was seized next morning. On 20 April, the drive continued and both regiments reached the north coast without difficulty. Little opposition had been found in this last sweep, but it was known that several hundred enemy troops had escaped from Motobu and were somewhere in northern Okinawa.

The battle for Motobu had challenged the Sixth Division with mountain warfare of the most rugged sort. It was costly: the Sixth Marine Division lost 207 men killed, 757 wounded and 6 missing in action. In contrast, the enemy lost 2,014 men killed. Captured enemy material included 11 field pieces of 75 and 150-mm. calibre, two six-inch naval cannon and large numbers of mortars, machine guns and 20-mm. dual purpose guns.

While the other two regiments were fighting on Motobu, the Twenty Second Marines, commanded by Colonel Merlin F. Schneider, USMC, continued its march up the northern part of the mainland. On 13 April the Second Battalion moved by forced march to seize Hedo Misaki, the northern tip of the island. Scattered resistance was encountered during the march. Upon occupying Hedo Misaki, the regiment sent patrols down the east coast and on 19 April, patrols from the north and south met on the east coast at Aha. By 20 April all of Okinawa north of the original landing beaches had been secured by the Sixth Marine Division; it was known, however, that several small enemy groups still remained at large.

The first of these isolated enemy groups to be located was one consisting of about 200 men. It was contacted by the First Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, near Taniyo-take, a hill mass southeast of Motobu Peninsula. After two days of heavy fighting most of the enemy band was destroyed although a few escaped to join another remnant of the Motobu action. By 27 April this group had been located and from Hentona two battalions of the Twenty Second Marines advanced toward the suspected area in a forced night march. Meanwhile from Kawada the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines hurried inland and made contact by noon. After considerable maneuvering, the battalion outflanked the enemy and forced him to fight on unfavorable ground. Most of the group was destroyed; a handful escaped.

6. BATTLE FOR NAHA

During the latter part of April the Tenth Army had found its XXIV Corps heavily engaged in southern Okinawa. It was decided that the III Amphibious Corps would be assigned the western half of the southern line on about 7 May. It was further decided that on 1 May the First Marine Division would be attached to the XXIV Corps and committed in the vicinity of Machinato Airfield. Its mission was clear out the Jichaku plateau area and then strike toward Shuri, the core of the Japanese defensive position. The Sixth Marine Division would then be committed on the right of the First Division.

All through the last week in April, the Sixth Division patrolled and garrisoned northern Okinawa. Preparations were made for the move to the south. The regiments rested, re-equipped themselves and received replacements. During the month of April the division had traveled over 84 miles, seized 436 square miles of enemy territory, captured 46 prisoners and killed nearly 2,500 of the enemy. In the same period the division had lost 236 men killed and 1,061 wounded in action.

On 2 May the division began to move southward to assembly areas near Chibana, east of the original landing beaches. The responsibility for the defense of northern Okinawa passed from the Sixth Marine Division to the Twenty Seventh Infantry Division on 4 May.

According to Tenth Army order, the III Amphibious Corps was to assume responsibility for the western portion of the southern front on 7 May. The First Marine Division was already committed and was fighting to secure the high ground north and northeast of the Asa River. The Sixth Marine Division was ordered to commit one regimental combat team on the right of the First Division on 8 May. General Shepherd chose the Twenty Second Marines to be committed first. Its mission was to cross the Asa and seize the first high ground to the south. From here, the division could attack to carry out its mission, which was: To seize Naha and the line of the Kokuba River in its zone of action, to assist the First Marine Division by fire and maneuver, and to protect the Corps’ right (west) flank.

All during the fighting on Motobu, the men of the Sixth Marine Division had heard stories of the fighting down south. They knew that the Tenth Army had uncovered the main Japanese defensive positions; that the enemy had chosen rough hilly ground across a narrow part of the island. The enemy was well dug in on a high and broken hill mass which took its name from its geographical center—Shuri. The line, or series of lines really, ran from north of Naha through Shuri to Yonabaru on the east coast. They had heard that the XXIV Corps had run into a virtual stalemate; that some sixty thousand of the enemy were offering fierce resistance from concealed positions; that the enemy was using mortars and artillery on an unprecedented scale; and that the enemy troops in southern Okinawa were excellent soldiers, well disciplined, and well prepared to fight a long and costly campaign. Before the second week in May had passed the men were certain that none of the stories were exaggerated.

In the new zone of action, the Sixth Marine Division launched its first attack when it sent the Twenty Second Marines across the Asa River in the early morning hours of 10 May. Patrols had crossed the river on the previous day and reconnoitered the ground to its immediate south. The only bridge across the river in this sector had been totally destroyed. Through the night of 9-10 May, the Sixth Engineer Battalion worked to construct a footbridge. Although the little bridge was finally completed in time for the pre-dawn attack, a group of the enemy carrying demolitions packs succeeded in destroying themselves and a section of the bridge before many of the Marines got across.