Chapter 2

Nothing is more instructive than the rapid change in the position which the Constitutional Democratic party occupied in the eyes of the people after the revolution. Before the outbreak of hostilities all parties were against war. But soon, under the influence of the German methods of warfare in Belgium, France, and Russia, the feeling changed. Even the Mensheviki among the Social-Democrats declared themselves in favor of war and the only party remaining firm in condemning all war was that of the Bolsheviki. The entrance of the Turks into the war was almost considered a godsend by the Constitutional Democrats, Octoberists, and Conservatives in the Duma because it cleared the way for a final settlement of the Balkan problem and promised the elimination of Turkey from Europe. Long after Sazonov was removed, when the consent of England and France to give Russia free hand in Constantinople and the Straits was read in a telegram before the Duma, a general outburst of enthusiasm took place, the members demanding to know why Sazonov, who was justly credited with this achievement, was in retirement and not in charge of the foreign office which he should have held by right. Miliukov's speeches and writings on the future settlement of the Balkan problem were jokingly spoken of as his dissertation for the degree of foreign secretary. At home the party was pursuing a policy of patient endurance, postponing strife for the future until the crimes of the tsar's government made further silence impossible. At that time the whole tissue of treason was not yet known, but enough was in evidence to demand vigorous protest. Not being a revolutionary party the Constitutional Democrats abstained from any action not strictly within the law and merely condemned the activity of the Government. They desired amelioration of the fundamental laws, but even that they would have preferred to accomplish by persuasion rather than by force. In fact they considered socialist demands unreasonable, socialization of Russia premature, and any violent overthrow unwise and hazardous. For the latter opinion they found support in the failure of the uprising of the working class in 1905-06, when the punitive expeditions proved the loyalty of the army to the throne. Consequently the attitude of the army in the memorable days of the March revolution was a great surprise to them. At the same time they attributed to themselves the lion share in the overthrow, presumably on the ground that masses follow leaders and the Constitutional \ Democrats were the only ones who had a chance for open protest in the Duma and made use of it. This delusion led to a series of tactical errors and cost them dearly. In all elections they polled a comparatively small vote. Trying to save Russia for the Allies they failed to meet the Russian Socialists on their own ground and were forced to explain away differences of opinion much too thoroughgoing to be explained away. In a country which is in the throes of the most remarkable revolution ever witnessed, they tried to apply non-revolutionary methods and drew on themselves the suspicion of the masses of being counter-revolutionists. From the very moment when Miliukov announced the passing of the supreme power from the Tsar to Grand Duke Michail, when his words were answered by angry shouts in favor of a democratic republic, the position of the party became precarious. They had either to revise their own program and to catch up with the rush of the progressive current, or else to find themselves in the role of inundated rocks over which the waters flow. The announcement that the party would support a demand for a republic was too late to change the first impression, while the proposition to accept unconditional expropriation of land in place of the compensation plan was defeated in heated debate at the party convention. Under normal circumstances the party would have probably been steadily losing support, but the arrest and imprisonment of the best and highly honored leaders by the Bolsheviki is bound to put fresh vigor into their efforts and give new life to their cause.

The leaders of the Bolsheviki themselves have fallen into error of a different kind. Being primarily a party of the wage earning day laborers, the program of the Bolsheviki puts the interest of the proletariat above everything else. From insufficient observation of peasant life and the fact that peasants want socialization of land, they jump to the conclusion that the country is ready for complete socialization. Only the more educated leaders among them realize that such a conclusion is premature. But to bring about the necessary change in as near a future as possible, the leaders of the Bolsheviki have fanned hatred of the proletariat toward the "bourgeois" classes. One must give them credit in this respect. They know the value of simple language when they put this hatred into words. Listen to the Russian Marseillaise: "Rise, brothers, all at once against the thieves, the curs--the rich ones! Against the vampire Tsar! Beat them, kill them--the cursed evil-doers! Glow, dawn of better life!" The simple ideology, the easy catch phrases in which the language of this ideology is couched, the primeval character of the passion aroused, contribute to the success which the party enjoys among working people and homeless paupers. Therein lies the power of the Bolsheviki. But reaction is bound to come and here again the peasants will play the chief role. All accounts of conversations with peasants tend to show that they have very vague ideas of socialism. In fact the Social-Democrats have not taken the trouble to acquaint the peasants with the principles of their teaching, leaving that field almost entirely to the influence of socialist-revolutionists.

Among the intellectuals none have come nearer to the understanding of peasant psychology than those men and women who from the first espoused the cause of the peasant. Realizing the space separating educated men from their less fortunate brothers, they gave up their life as intellectuals and "went among the people." They donned peasant garb and acquired peasant tongue. From this group of workers for freedom later the Socialist-revolutionary party developed. "All land for the peasant" is their slogan, while their promise to expropriate all land without any compensation naturally meets with approval on the part of the land-hungry peasants. Moreover, their program does not demand immediate complete socialization of Russia, leaving that to a gradual process of evolution and change of existing conditions. In the ten years preceding the first revolution thousands of young intellectuals joined the party and fought the tsar's regime. They showed a degree of self-abnegation found only in people whose heart is kindled with the true spirit of devotion to a great cause. The revolution of 1905 would never have taken place but for their organized "terror from below." The high regard held for them by the widest circles has caused their rise in power during the first two months of the revolution of 1917. But tactical errors committed by the leaders of the party as well as dissensions within the party itself contributed to a rather rapid change of sentiment toward them on all sides. In a measure as the Constitutional Democrats vigorously objected to their policy to put into life as soon as possible the agrarian reforms promised by them, the Social-Democrats on their part attacked them for their moderation in other demands. For some reason not yet clear, Kerensky was slighted in the very beginning of his political career when his nomination to the executive council of the Socialist-revolutionist party was opposed by a large majority. Just as the Constitutional Democrats made a series of tactical errors due to the fact that they thought themselves representative of the spirit of the Russian people, whereas in reality they stood sponsors only for a relatively small minority, even so the Socialist-revolutionists misjudged the attitude of other parties toward themselves. They overrated the ability of the masses to distinguish between their attitude toward war in general and the necessity to continue the present war. They overrated the ability of the soldiers to distinguish between slavish obedience and military discipline. They tried to play the role of a center. They tried to mediate between Social-Democrats and Constitutional Democrats and naturally failed in this attempt. Some of their leaders, notably Mr. Tschernov, were accused by Constitutional Democrats of being pro-German if not actual German agents. Others, including Kerensky himself and even Mme. Breshkovsky, were accused by the Bolsheviki of having been almost bribed by the capitalistic interests of America, England, and France. Needless to say that the accusations had no basis whatever in actual facts and represent simply an ugly outgrowth of misguided jealousy of the masses to guard their dearly won right to a social revolution against those whom they consider the worst enemies of socialism, and the desire of unscrupulous leaders to profit by it. Thus the Socialist-revolutionists were gradually relegated in the mind of the extremists to the great body of the hated "bourgeois." Only in their rightful element, among the peasants, they continue to enjoy a great deal of popularity, and the returns to the Constituent Assembly show that theirs will be the absolute majority even though they lost some of their popularity.

The progress of the Russian Revolution presents a sad spectacle of an almost complete failure on the part of the majority of intellectuals to understand the spirit of the times and to guide the masses through the labyrinth of errors. In days past the Russian intellectuals were the forefighters for freedom and the Russian people will ever be indebted to them for this. They prepared the soil for the revolution by spreading ideas of freedom by all means at their disposal. They weakened the tsar's power and thus contributed to its overthrow by persistent attacks upon the system of autocratic government. They helped to awaken the spirit of self-consciousness in the masses. But they did not evolve new principles. They did not open wide avenues for the development of a new order of social organization. They misunderstood the masses and consequently were unable to control the forces set loose. And if Russia is going to be saved from utter ruin amidst the clamor and strife of party leaders and to evolve a new democratic system, it will be due not to the intellectuals, but to the great spirit of the dark masses of the Russian peasants.

FORCES BEHIND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION FORCES BEHIND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

By Samuel N. Harper

One was struck by the remarkable unity that characterized the short first period of the Russian Revolution of last March. One knew, however, that there were two distinct sets of forces behind the movement, operating through two kinds of organizations. There were first the already existing and parliamentary institutions which had become revolutionary in spirit and methods of action. On the other hand there were the institutions produced by the revolution itself, emerging from the chaos in the midst of which the other, already functioning bodies, were trying to take a new and directing line. The most prominent of the first type of institution was the Duma, the legislative parliament of the old regime, and of the second type, the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.

The Duma, however, was only one of several legal institutions that had developed under the old regime, and represented the first stages of parliamentary, popular government. There were the local provincial and municipal councils, and also the officially recognized war-industry committees, which had come to have semi-governmental functions. Finally one could bring under this category, with a little forcing, the cooperative societies, which had assumed enormous importance during the two and a half years of war.

In these institutions we had self-government, and participation in public affairs, and also the idea of cooperation between the various classes and political tendencies--the idea of coalition. The election law of the Duma provided for the representation of all group interests of the community, and representation by an actual member of the group, by a _bona fide_ peasant in the case of the peasantry. The seats in the assembly were distributed specifically to landlords, manufacturers, the smaller bourgeoisie, workmen, and peasants. The election law of the local government bodies made similar provision for group representation. On the war-industry committees, the workmen had elected representatives, sitting with the representatives of the manufacturers and owners. In the cooeperative movement the bourgeois-intellectual element had taken the initiative, but had always emphasized the direct participation of the workmen and peasants in the actual management of the societies, as the theory of the movement demanded.

Thus the broader democratic classes of the country, the workmen and peasants, were represented in the somewhat popular institutions that had developed under the old regime. But the actual control was in the hands of the less democratic elements--the landlords, the manufacturers, men of the liberal professions, and of the so-called Intelligentsia class. Most of these men were of liberal and democratic tendencies, but they were in actual fact, as compared with the broader masses, of the privileged classes. They had emphasized always the essentially democratic character of the activity of the institutions in which they were the leaders. They put particular stress on the fact that the activities of the local provincial councils, for example, were directed mainly toward the amelioration of conditions of life among the peasantry. But the fact that the control over these institutions, even in the cooperative movement (so far as independent control was allowed by the bureaucracy of the old regime), was secured to the less democratic elements of the community, did contradict the idea of coalition, of the bringing together of all interests and forces. These institutions had been permitted to exist and develop only because they were controlled by the more conservative groups. The cooperative societies represented more truly the idea of coalition. Here in the cooperative movement the leaders of political liberalism had always noted with relief that one was gradually attaining the end toward which they knew they must work--the organic union between the so-called Intelligentsia, and the "people," meaning the broader, democratic classes.

When the anarchy resulting from the incompetence, stupidity and perhaps treason of the old bureaucracy reached such an acute stage in the first weeks of March that the leaders of the Russian public saw that some action must be taken by some one, it was the Duma that assumed the initiative, acting in a revolutionary manner, through an executive committee. The municipal and provincial councils, organized in unions for war-work, and the war-industry committees, turned without delay to the revolutionary parliament, in which many of their leading workers were members. The leaders of the cooeperative movement could not act with such rapidity and precision. They had not been permitted to organize a central committee, to coordinate the work of the thousands of small and scattered societies. These first leaders of the revolution felt justified in taking the initiative because they alone were organized. Also they thought they could speak in the name of all classes, including the most democratic, because the institutions through which they acted did include representatives of all classes. To emphasize its special anxiety that the more democratic groups feel their direct participation in the movement of which it had taken the leadership, the Executive Committee of the Duma not only accepted but encouraged the development of the revolutionary institutions of the second category, of which the first to emerge was the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.

This Council was organized during the very first days of the revolution; it was in fact the resurrection of a revolutionary body of the 1905 revolution. The Duma invited the Council to share its own convenient quarters. Perhaps the invitation was an afterthought, for the workmen and soldiers of Petrograd in revolt had gravitated toward the Duma, had calmly entered and taken possession of the large corridors of the palace. The Council was a strictly revolutionary, and a very democratic body, composed of directly elected delegates from the factories and garrison regiments of Petrograd. It immediately became the organizing center for what came to be called the "revolutionary democracy," as opposed to the "bourgeoisie."

The Executive Committee of the Duma consulted with the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies on the composition of the proposed Provisional Government, and on the political program to be announced. For as we saw, it was the first thought of these leaders to secure unity of action. They recognized that the Council did in fact represent "revolutionary democracy," at least of Petrograd. As the workmen and soldiers of Petrograd were completely out of hand, armed and fighting on the streets, arresting officers, ministers and police, and showing a tendency to start general and anarchic pillaging, the Duma leaders saw a restraining authority in the Council of these same workmen and soldiers. They therefore either did not wish, or did not dare, to object at the time to the famous order No. 1 to the garrison of Petrograd, issued by the Council, and not by the Executive Committee of the Duma. Many have claimed that this particular order, which was extended to the front, was responsible for the later demoralization of the whole Russian army. Others, the leaders of revolutionary democracy, have insisted that this order prevented the immediate and complete collapse of the whole army.

In preparing the slate for the new government, the Executive Committee of the Duma selected one of the presiding officers of the Council, Kerensky. When Miliukov, the Duma leader, announced the composition of the new provisional government to the crowd, composed largely of workmen and soldiers gathered in the main corridors of the Duma, he emphasized the cooperation between Duma and Council, the consent of Kerensky to enter the government, and also the fact that most of the members of the new government had worked in and through institutions, in which peasants and workmen also had been represented.

Though the word "coalition" was not used during the first weeks of the revolution, one had constantly in mind the idea of "bringing together all the vital forces of the country." In this last expression I quote one of the first and most emphasized slogans of the revolution. But the problem proved most difficult, complicated by the fact that one had to solve at one and the same time two most stupendous tasks. One had to consolidate the conquests of the revolution, and also prosecute the war. The prosecution of the war required the acceptance of a strong authority, vested in the Provisional Government. But naturally the first aim of the revolution was to extend its ideas to the rest of the country, for the actual overthrow of the old order had been largely the work of Petrograd. The two tasks were closely associated with one another, because one could not reorganize the country for the war until the new ideas had taken root.

The first parliamentary leaders wished to use as the basis for carrying out both tasks the old institutions, the municipal and provincial councils, and the cooeperative societies, at the same time taking steps gradually to democratize them. But the strictly revolutionary leaders wished to democratize immediately, and put this forward as the first object to be accomplished. So they demanded and promoted the organizing of revolutionary democracy all over the country, through councils of workmen, soldiers, and peasants, through army committees, land committees, professional unions, and so forth. The champions of this immediate democratization policy were almost exclusively members of the various socialist parties, some of them representing the most extreme views. The majority of them were not consciously striving to undermine the authority of the Provisional Government. They recognized and in fact advocated the compromise represented in the first group of leaders. They trusted most of them, but wished at the same time to organize revolutionary democracy, for self-protection for the moment, and perhaps for self-assertion at a later date. But a minority of the socialist leaders did not take this constructive line. From the very start they professed to distrust the first Provisional Government, for they did not believe in "coalition"--the co-operation between the various group interests of the community. Their theory was that of class struggle; they proclaimed this to be their aim, and worked to give to the revolution this character. Though a minority, they were a very active and energetic group, and tended to give the tone in the meetings and resolutions of revolutionary democracy, thus dulling the spirit of cooperation, which characterized the first period of the revolution.

The extremists wished a social revolution, "permanent revolution," class struggle, and they agitated openly and with energy. The workmen and soldiers of Petrograd had borne the brunt of the physical side of the revolution. Only workmen and soldiers had been killed fighting for the revolution during that first week. These particular groups were therefore proclaimed the "pride and flower of the revolution," and told that they must establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, thus consolidating the conquests of the revolution, which should not be allowed to remain a mere bourgeois affair.

The moderate, constructive socialists did not accept this extreme view, but they nevertheless recognized the need for an effective organization of revolutionary democracy all over the country, to ensure the adoption of truly democratic policies. So they also set about to strengthen and extend the councils and committees that had emerged with the revolution, coordinating them in conferences and formal congresses. Much of the activity along these lines was in fact of a constructive character. But class and party considerations were always in the foreground at all these congresses. Also the constructive socialists did not accept the idea of a formal coalition at the beginning. They did not participate as organizations in the first government. Kerensky was a socialist, but he entered the first government as a member of the Duma, and not as the representative of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.

The resolution of a conference of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, called during the fourth week of the revolution, summarizes the attitude of revolutionary democracy toward the problem of the moment. The full text of the resolution, given in a literal translation to preserve as far as possible the style of the original, is an interesting document: