CHAPTER XIII

INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSION TO VOLUME III.[63]

When war seemed likely, the following scheme for the strategical distribution of the troops in the Far East in the event of hostilities was agreed to by the Viceroy, Alexeieff:

1. The major portion of the troops, consisting of 60 infantry battalions, 65 squadrons, 2 sapper battalions, and 160 guns (total, 65,000 rifles and sabres), were to be sent into Southern Manchuria. The main body was to be concentrated in the area Hai-cheng–Liao-yang, and the advance guard[64] moved forward to the Ya-lu.

2. The garrison of Port Arthur was to consist of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division (12 battalions), 2 battalions of fortress artillery, and 1 company of sappers. The 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, consisting of 4 battalions with 6 guns, was also detailed for the defence of the Kuan-tung district, to augment the strength of the garrison if necessary.

3. The garrison of Vladivostok was to consist of the 8th East Siberian Rifle Division (8 battalions of infantry), with 2 battalions of fortress artillery, 2 sapper companies, and 1 mining company.

4. That of Nikolaievsk was to be 1 fortress infantry battalion, 1 fortress artillery company, and 1 mining company.

This scheme, by which the force detailed for the defence of Port Arthur and the whole Kuan-tung Peninsula was limited to sixteen battalions, was due to our exaggerated idea of the strength and invincibility of our Pacific Ocean Fleet. According to the Viceroy, it was founded on the following opinion, expressed by Admiral Witgeft, Chief of Alexeieff’s temporary naval staff:

“According to the present relative strengths of the two fleets, the possibility of ours being defeated is a contingency that need not be considered, and until it has been destroyed it is inconceivable that the Japanese can land at Newchuang or any other spot on the Gulf of Korea.”

But such an attenuation of our force in this quarter was contrary to the opinion of a committee—attended by me in my capacity of War Minister—which sat in Port Arthur in June, 1903. The Viceroy and senior commanders of the garrison were present at the meeting when it was resolved and recorded as “essential” that the 3rd Siberian Corps should be formed for the defence of Kuan-tung, in addition to the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division, its permanent garrison, and that this corps should be composed of the 3rd and 4th East Siberian Rifle Divisions, each of twelve battalions. In fact, it was considered necessary to have thirty-six battalions of infantry, exclusive of reserve battalions, for the defence of Port Arthur and the Peninsula. This formation of a special army corps for Kuan-tung was thought to be necessitated by the existence so close to Port Arthur of Dalny, a magnificently equipped port, connected by railway to the fortress, and a most convenient base for operations against it.

Feeling that the force allotted to the defence of the Peninsula was inadequate, on February 11 I telegraphed as War Minister to Alexeieff that I considered it imperative that the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division—then under formation—should be sent there in place of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, ordered to the Ya-lu. The Viceroy did not concur in this view, but he temporarily retained the 13th and 14th East Siberian Rifle Regiments.

On February 20, 1904, I was appointed to the command of the Manchurian Army. In my first communication to the Viceroy (No. 1 of February 24) I again expressed the opinion that, in view of the possibility of it being besieged by four or five Japanese divisions, our first efforts should be directed to strengthening Port Arthur. And I further stated:

“If Port Arthur is weakly garrisoned, and should be besieged, I might be tempted by that fact to assume the offensive before there has been sufficient time to concentrate our forces. It is for this reason that I have already advised the concentration of the 9th Division in Kuan-tung to replace the 3rd.”

However, the Viceroy again disagreed with me, and wrote in a despatch of March 1:

“Separate operations against the fortress would only be really worth undertaking if the enemy could make certain of seizing it by a _coup de main_, and the moment for this has passed. The land front is becoming more formidable every day, and, though not complete, the works are now well advanced; 200 additional guns have been mounted in Port Arthur itself, and more than forty at Chin-chou; the strength of the garrison is being brought up by the reservists arriving from Trans-Baikalia, and the stocks of supplies are being increased. All the bays nearest the fortress, as well as the port of Dalny, have been mined, and for the rest—the oft-proved stubbornness of the Russian soldier in defence can be relied on.”

He had already reported to the Tsar that—

“Although separate operations against Port Arthur would threaten the fortress itself with all the hardships of a siege or blockade, they would be rather advantageous to our arms as a whole, for they would entail a division of the enemy’s forces.”

As regards my own recommendations upon the plan of operations to be followed against Japan, I drew up two memoranda, which I submitted to the Tsar on February 15 and March 4. In the former I stated:

“In the first phase of the campaign our main object should be to prevent the destruction of our forces in detail. The apparent importance of any single locality or position (fortresses excepted) should not lead us into the great error of holding it in insufficient force, which would bring about the very result we are so anxious to prevent. While gradually growing in numbers and preparing to take the offensive, we should only move forward when sufficiently strong, and when supplied with everything necessary for an uninterrupted advance lasting over a fairly long period.”

Against this the Tsar was pleased to note in his own handwriting the words “Quite so.”

I left St. Petersburg on March 12, and arrived at Liao-yang on the 28th. On this date there were collected in the concentration area in Southern Manchuria 59 battalions,[65] 39 squadrons and _sotnias_, and 140 guns. The distribution was as follows:

The _Southern Force_ (under General Sakharoff) of the 1st and 9th East Siberian Rifle Divisions—20 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 54 guns—was in the area Hai-cheng—Ta-shih-chiao—Newchuang—Kai-ping.

The _Eastern (Advance) Force_ (under General Kashtalinski) of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division—8 battalions, 24 guns, 8 mountain and 8 machine-guns—was moved to the Ya-lu.

The _Mounted Force_ (under General Mischenko) of 18 squadrons and 6 guns was operating in Northern Korea.

The _Main Body_ was divided into two groups:

At An-shan-chan: 5th East Siberian Rifle Division of 8 battalions and 24 guns.

At Liao-yang: 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Infantry Divisions, 22nd and 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiments—21 battalions, 10 squadrons, and 24 guns.

In addition to these, the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment—3 battalions and 4 guns—was allotted to the protection of the Viceroy’s Headquarters.

In _Port Arthur_ were the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division—12 battalions, 2 reserve battalions, 3-1/2 battalions of fortress artillery, and a sapper and mining company.

In _Kuan-tung_ were the 5th, 13th, 14th, and 15th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, 1 battalion of the 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 2 battalions of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and 1 reserve battalion—12 battalions, 20 guns, and 1 _sotnia_ of Cossacks.

On my arrival I approved the following scheme of engineering works: The fortification of the positions on the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), and at Liao-yang, Mukden, and Tieh-ling; the construction of roads across the passes to the Ya-lu, and of three parallel roads from Kai-ping to Mukden; the construction of crossings over the Liao River, and the hutting of three army corps. I at once took steps also to strengthen our advance guard on the Ya-lu, which was some 133 miles distant. Two regiments of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division were sent there, in addition to the third battalions for the regiments of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division. By the time, therefore, that the enemy began crossing the Ya-lu, the Eastern (Advance) Force had been increased to eighteen battalions, besides which the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment had been moved towards Ta-shih-chiao. The advance guard was under General Zasulitch. Meanwhile the units of the 1st Siberian Division were detained by Alexeieff in Harbin, so that, from the middle of March to the middle of April, the Manchurian Army did not receive a single battalion from the rear.

Notwithstanding the orders Zasulitch had received to avoid a decisive engagement with the enemy, who had the superiority in numbers, on May 1 part of his force became hotly engaged in what developed into a serious fight at the Ya-lu, and after a disastrous finish his eastern force was withdrawn to the passes of the greater Fen-shui-ling range, which they reached on May 7. In this action only nine of our eighteen battalions took any active part, those of the 11th and 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiments showing great gallantry and determination. When asked why he had disobeyed the orders repeatedly given to him not to become entangled in a serious engagement, but to fall back on Feng-huang-cheng, Zasulitch gave as his reason that he had hoped to defeat the enemy. On May 5 the Japanese began debarking at Pi-tzu-wo, and a small force of all arms under General Zikoff was detached from the southern force in order to reconnoitre and ascertain the importance of this landing. The advance of this column incidentally enabled us to repair temporarily the portion of the line which the enemy had destroyed, and so to run a train-load of mélinite shells, machine-guns, and ammunition through to Port Arthur. The Emperor was fully alive to the danger of the situation caused by the dispersion of the Manchurian Army, and on May 11 telegraphed his orders for an immediate concentration. This was completed by the 14th, and the force was grouped on two points—Hai-cheng and Liao-yang. The former group consisted of twenty-seven battalions, twelve squadrons and _sotnias_, and eighty guns; the latter of twenty-eight battalions, six _sotnias_, and eighty-eight guns. The passes over the Fen-shui-ling range were guarded by small columns of infantry with guns, and advance and flank guards were thrown out. The independent cavalry, operating on our flanks east of the passes, was divided in two bodies, under Mischenko and Rennenkampf. West of Liao-yang was a small force under General Kossagovski, while five and a half battalions of the 1st Siberian Division lay at Mukden. At this time also, when the Viceroy returned to Port Arthur (after Admiral Makharoff’s death of April 13), the weakness of the place began to be shown up, and Alexeieff’s apprehensions as to its safety became acute. In a despatch of May 16 he questioned whether the place “would be able to hold out for more than two or three months, in spite of all the steps taken to strengthen its defences.” On April 25 the Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff telegraphed to me that, owing to the inadequacy of the garrison, Alexeieff considered it essential that if the fortress were attacked, the field army should support it as energetically and rapidly as possible. Alexeieff was not singular in his pessimistic views, for Stössel also gave up hope of a successful defence of Port Arthur directly after he had so unnecessarily abandoned the Chin-chou position on May 27. On the 28th I received a telegram from him urging me to support him speedily and in strength. This opinion was again endorsed by Alexeieff, who telegraphed on June 5 that “Port Arthur cannot strictly be called a storm-proof fortress, and it is a question whether it can even stand a siege of the length indicated in my telegram of May 16.”

The result of this _volte-face_ on the part of Alexeieff as to the powers of resistance of the place was that he pressed me to send part of the army at once to assist it, though we were by no means ready for such an enterprise. On May 21 he wrote that he considered the moment in every way favourable for the army to assume the offensive in one of two directions—either towards the Ya-lu, with the object of defeating and throwing Kuroki back across the river, detaching a force to contain him there, and then moving on to relieve Port Arthur, or else direct on that place.

It should be borne in mind that these instructions were given at a time when the position of only two of the hostile armies had been fixed. Of these, one—of three divisions and three reserve brigades—had forced the crossing of the Ya-lu, and the other—of three divisions—had landed near Pi-tzu-wo. Moreover, a landing, of the extent of which we had no information, was then being carried out at Ta-ku-shan. Consequently we did not know the destination of one-half of the enemy’s army, and were thus not in possession of two important pieces of knowledge which were necessary before any operations of a decisive character could be undertaken—namely, the position of the enemy’s main forces and their probable plan of operations. It was incumbent on us, therefore, to exercise great caution, and to keep our forces as far as possible concentrated, so as to be ready to meet the attack of two or even three armies. Concerning the two directions in which the Viceroy advocated an advance, the following few points suggest themselves. For any operations towards the Ya-lu—bearing in mind the necessity for guarding our flank and rear against one hostile force landing at Pi-tzu-wo, and possibly others landing near Kai-ping or Newchuang—not more than sixty to seventy battalions were available of the ninety-four which in the middle of May constituted the army; the whole of the food for these troops had to be brought up by rail, owing to the exhaustion of the local resources—never very plentiful—in the hilly country between Liao-yang and Feng-huang-cheng: we had not got the transport to do this, for our ten transport trains could only have carried a three or four days’ supply for a force of this size; the usual May and June rains would have made the movement of our guns and baggage at first difficult, and then impossible, and we had at that time no mountain artillery or pack transport; we were by no means well placed in the matter of artillery parks: the horses for those of the 5th, 6th, and 9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Divisions were still _en route_ to Harbin, while the 1st and 2nd Siberian Divisions had arrived without any. Finally, if Kuroki should fall back behind the Ya-lu without accepting battle, we should have been obliged to retire and leave at least an army corps to contain him. When the rainy season came on, this corps itself would have been obliged to withdraw, as with interrupted communications it would have been seriously threatened by Kuroki’s far larger force, well provided with both mountain artillery and pack transport. For these reasons an offensive towards the Ya-lu was impracticable.

Under the conditions laid down by the Viceroy as to keeping screens on the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), and leaving a reserve at Hai-cheng[66] until such time as fresh reinforcements had been received, a direct advance on Port Arthur could only be made with one corps of twenty-four battalions. In view of the possibility of Kuroki taking the offensive in superior force (after reinforcement by the troops already beginning to land at Ta-ku-shan) against our cordon, which extended along the Fen-shui-ling range for more than sixty-six miles, and in view of the possibility of the Japanese cutting off any detachment moving on Port Arthur by landing somewhere in its rear, the despatch of this corps 130 miles to the south could not but be considered a most risky and difficult operation.

As our numerical weakness absolutely precluded a general assumption of the offensive on our part, I pointed out that by such a movement for the relief of Port Arthur we risked disorganizing the whole army. I also drew attention to the fact that, according to the report of Captain Gurko, who had just arrived from the fortress, its combatant strength amounted to at least 45,000 men (including sailors), and that the enemy could not therefore have any very overwhelming superiority. My views upon the inexpediency of any movement towards Port Arthur were communicated to the War Minister in my telegrams (Nos. 692 and 701) of May 28 and 30. But in a telegram of the 31st the Viceroy urgently requested me to advance to the relief of the fortress, and expressed the wish that four divisions should be detailed for the operation; while on June 6 he quoted to me a message from St. Petersburg in which it was stated that the time was “ripe for the Manchurian Army to assume the offensive.”

At the end of May the first reinforcements—the 3rd Siberian Division—began to arrive in the concentration area. This enabled me to increase the force detailed for the advance into Kuan-tung up to 32 battalions,[67] 22 squadrons and _sotnias_, and 100 guns. As a reserve to this force, the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Division was placed in the area Kai-ping—Hsiung-yao-cheng, and to a brigade of the 3rd Siberians was allotted the duty of watching the coast from Newchuang to the latter place. To hold Kuroki and the troops under Nodzu that had landed at Ta-ku-shan in check, 40 battalions, 52 _sotnias_, and 94 guns were left on the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), distributed over a length of more than sixty-six miles. The general reserve consisted of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division at Liao-yang, and a brigade of the 3rd Siberian Division at Hai-cheng. Early in June the force detailed under General Shtakelberg for the operations towards Port Arthur began to concentrate at Te-li-ssu, with its advance guard at Wa-fang-tien. On the 13th the Japanese themselves began to advance from Pu-lan-tien, and by the evening of that day we had been able to rail two regiments of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division into Te-li-ssu. On the 14th the enemy’s attack of our position there was repulsed, and on the following day Shtakelberg proposed to make a counter attack, having been reinforced at noon by the Tobolsk Regiment. However, the battle ended in our defeat, and we were forced to fall back. General Gerngross, who was in command of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, was wounded, but remained in action. Shtakelberg’s orders gave him freedom of action, but he was instructed not to accept decisive battle if the enemy were in superior numbers. Simultaneously with the enemy’s advance from the south, Kuroki moved forward on the 14th to the Ta Ling[68] (Pass) from Hsiu-yen, where three (according to some reports four) Japanese divisions were concentrated. Their 12th Division and three reserve brigades were left to watch our eastern force, and a further movement on Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, or Hai-cheng was quite likely.

In order to be in a position to check the combined advance of the two Japanese groups, I thought it advisable to strengthen our southern force, and therefore so rearranged our dispositions that 87 out of 110 battalions were massed on the southern front, in the area Kai-ping—Hai-cheng, against Oku and Nogi. Fortunately for us, the critical position of our eastern front during the operations at Te-li-ssu was not appreciated by Kuroki, which fact favoured Count Keller’s demonstration towards Feng-huang-cheng in the middle of June. Otherwise Kuroki might have seized Liao-yang. On the 25th the enemy’s advance against our eastern force was commenced. On the 27th Keller withdrew some of his troops from the Fen-shui Ling (Passes) without opposition, and by July 1 the main body was concentrated seven miles east of Lang-tzu-shan and twenty-seven from Liao-yang. On June 27, without any serious engagement, but under pressure from the enemy, we abandoned the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), which they at once occupied. A few days previously—on June 23—about a division of the enemy had been located by Rennenkampf to the east of Sai-ma-chi. Believing that Hai-cheng constituted our greatest danger, as the enemy might, if they gained a success there, cut off Shtakelberg’s force close by, on the 29th I concentrated forty-one battalions and eighteen _sotnias_ under Zasulitch at Hsi-mu-cheng, intending with them to hurl back the enemy on to their Hai-cheng line of advance. However, on the same day we discovered that those of the enemy who had moved at first from the Ta Ling (Pass) along the Hsi-mu-cheng road had again retired to it.

This danger being temporarily averted, I ordered the 31st Infantry Division back to Hai-cheng. As the defence of Liao-yang from the east was the next most urgent matter, a brigade of the 9th Division, which had just arrived from Russia, was moved to Lang-tzu-shan to act as a reserve to the eastern force, which had been previously augmented by the return to it of two regiments of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division. The other brigade was sent, under General Hershelman, who commanded the division, to Hsi-kei-an village [at the junction of the Liao-yang and Mukden roads], so as to cover the left flank of the eastern force and guard the road to Mukden. Taking into consideration the considerable increase of the eastern force, I ordered Count Keller to take the offensive, so as again to get possession of the passes. He did so, but although he had forty battalions under his command, he advanced with only twenty-four. Though our troops were successful in the early hours of July 17, thanks to the gallant conduct of the 24th East Siberian Rifles under Colonel Lechitski, the result of the day’s action was not favourable. Keller stopped the advance before even bringing into action his strong reserves, with the result that at nightfall the eastern force was once more on its former positions on the Yang-tzu Ling (Pass). On the 19th the brigade of the 9th Division was driven from its position at Chiao-tou, and fell back towards Hu-chia-tzu.[69]

By the middle of July the disposition of the enemy’s forces was approximately as follows: Kuroki, with three field divisions and reserves, had captured the three Fen-shui Ling and Mo-Tien Ling (Passes), and, with his outposts thrown out on the roads to Liao-yang, had reached the valley of the Tang Ho, a tributary of the Tai-tzu Ho. Nodzu, with an army of approximately the same strength, had captured the passes on the Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, and Hai-cheng roads, and had two divisions and a brigade in reserve on the Hai-cheng line of advance and one on the Ta-shih-chiao line. Oku, having moved up from Kuan-tung with his army of some four divisions, had driven back our outposts and occupied Kai-ping. Two brigades were left in reserve on the line Feng-huang-cheng—Kuan-tien-chang. Thus, according to our information, two armies of about 90 to 100 battalions had advanced against us from the east, and one of about 50 to 60 battalions from the south, whilst Nogi’s army of 3 divisions and 2 reserve brigades had been left to operate against Port Arthur. Our dispositions were briefly: 44 battalions against Kuroki’s army; 28 battalions on the line Fen-shui-ling—Hai-cheng against 2 divisions and 1 reserve brigade of Nodzu’s army; 48 battalions against Oku’s army, and 1 division of Nodzu’s; 16 battalions were in the general reserve at Hai-cheng, and four in garrison at Liao-yang. It must, however, be borne in mind that the effective strength of our battalions was very far short of the prescribed establishment.[70] From the beginning of the war up to July only 3,600 men were received in the way of drafts.

With the above dispositions of the opposing forces, we should, according to the theory of the art of war, have been able to operate on “interior lines.” But for us this was extremely difficult, as, in the first place, we had not enough men to attain the necessary superiority over any one of the hostile groups without laying ourselves open to defeat by the other two; and, in the second, the rains had so seriously damaged the roads as to prevent the rapid movement (as we had heavy guns and baggage) necessary for successful action even on interior lines. Finally, as their bases (Korea, Ta-ku-shan, Pi-tzu-wo) were enveloping it was possible for each of their groups to refuse an unequal battle, and fall back without exposing its communications. Still, notwithstanding these unfavourable conditions, it was proposed to attack Kuroki, who menaced our communications most, at the earliest favourable moment. The troops which could be employed to strike him were distributed in two directions: twenty-four battalions of the eastern force on the main road from Liao-yang to Lang-tzu-shan, with its outposts on the Yang-tzu-ling heights; and twenty-four battalions of the 10th Army Corps on the line Liao-yang—Sai-ma-chi, with its outposts five miles short of Chiao-tou. Twenty-four battalions of the 17th Corps were told off to remain as a reserve to these two groups at Liao-yang, while to prevent our left flank being turned, and to cover the Mukden road, the 11th Pskoff and 2nd Dagestan Regiments, which had just arrived from Russia, were ordered to Pen-hsi-hu. But on July 23, when I inspected the 10th Corps, I found that it was absolutely incapable of operating in the hills, as it had no pack-animals. In fact, those companies on outpost duty on steep or high ground had actually to remain all day without food or water. As the units of the 17th Corps were in a similar condition, it was impossible even to think of at once assuming the offensive.

Meanwhile, on the 23rd and 24th, the enemy themselves took the initiative by attacking the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps south of Ta-shih-chiao. In spite of the fact that the position held by these corps was very extended (eleven miles), and was divided in the centre by a rocky ridge, and that its left flank could have been easily turned, all the enemy’s efforts were repulsed. The regiments of the 4th Siberians, who bore the heat and burden of the day, behaved splendidly, but “in view of the great superiority of the enemy and the development of an attack from the direction of Ta-ling,” Zarubaeff, who was given general instructions but allowed freedom of action, decided early on the morning of the 25th to withdraw his force towards Hai-cheng. On learning of this, I ordered General Sluchevski to make immediate preparations for offensive operations, and, if Kuroki should cross the Tai-tzu Ho and move towards Mukden, at once to advance, whether his troops were prepared for operating in the hills or not, and endeavour to strike Kuroki’s communications. However painful the abandonment of the port of Newchuang was for us after our tactical success at Ta-shih-chiao—for the enemy could now make use of it as a new base—the strategical position of our army was improved. With the departure of the southern force towards Hai-cheng, our greatly extended front was diminished by twenty miles.

On July 31 the enemy advanced all along the line. As far as our southern group was concerned, their blow was directed against Zasulitch, who was holding a position west of Hsi-mu-cheng, especially against his right flank, which was driven back in spite of the devoted efforts of the Voronej and Kozloff Regiments. As any further success on their part threatened to cut off the 2nd Siberians from the main body of the southern group, I withdrew Zasulitch’s force to Hai-cheng. On the same day, the enemy’s operations on the eastern front were directed against both our groups. In the action on the Yang-tzu Ling (Pass) General Count Keller was killed, and the unexpected death of this gallant commander, together with the abandonment without orders by the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment[71] of the position which protected his left flank, greatly influenced Kashtalinski (Keller’s successor) in coming to his too hasty decision to withdraw the force to Lang-tzu-shan. At the same time the 10th Corps was taken partly by surprise,[72] and driven from its advanced posts towards Hu-chia-tzu. Sluchevski, learning of the retirement of the eastern force towards Lang-tzu-shan, and fearing for his right flank, then withdrew his corps to An-ping. In these operations the corps commander displayed a lack of energy, and several regiments showed great unsteadiness, especially the reservists, many of whom actually left the ranks during the progress of the fight.

The complicated nature of the situation now necessitated extreme caution on our part, lest anything should prevent our concentration in strength at Liao-yang, and there fighting a decisive battle against all three Japanese armies with some hope of success. From Liao-yang to our position on the eastern front, An-ping–Lang-tzu-shan, was twenty miles, and to Hai-cheng forty miles. In order to insure the movement of the troops on the southern front to their positions at Liao-yang in good time, it was necessary to move them from Hai-cheng to the position at An-shan-chan—fifteen miles from Liao-yang—which was fortified at the beginning of the war. The retirement began early on August 2, and on the following day the troops were concentrated on the position. In my report to the Tsar of August 4, I gave the following general reasons for withdrawing to the line An-shan-chan–Lang-tzu-shan–An-ping after the July fighting:

1. The Japanese superiority in numbers.

2. They were accustomed to hills and hot weather; they were younger, carried lighter loads, and had numerous mountain artillery and pack transport.

3. Their energetic and intelligent leadership.

4. The extraordinary patriotism and military spirit of their troops; and

5. The lack of such a spirit on our side (caused by general ignorance of what we were fighting for).

Every moment gained at the beginning of August was of great importance to us, as the units of the 5th Siberians, which the Viceroy agreed to send to the front—instead of into the Pri-Amur district, as was proposed earlier—should have been beginning to arrive in Liao-yang. Orders were therefore issued to fortify an advanced position half a march from Liao-yang in addition to the main position at that place, and for this time was required. Still, in spite of the obvious and immense importance of every day we gained by delaying the enemy’s advance, General Bilderling, who had taken over the command of our eastern front from July 31, wrote that it was necessary to withdraw his troops immediately without fighting to Liao-yang itself, while Sluchevski urged that the army should be concentrated still further north—in the area Liao-yang–Mukden. These officers reiterated the same opinions still more forcibly early in August, when the difficulty of moving their troops towards Liao-yang became greatly increased by the heavy rains. The Viceroy, who was much perturbed about the fate of Port Arthur by the news of the unfortunate result of the naval operations on August 10, and whose fears were increased by Stössel’s highly alarmist reports, was at the same time urging me (August 15) to assist the fortress and make an advance of some sort—though it were only a demonstration—towards Hai-cheng.

On August 25 the enemy again advanced, and on the 26th attacked us on the eastern front, but their onslaught on the 3rd Siberians at Lang-tzu-shan and the attempt made to turn our right flank failed. Ivanoff (who was in command of the corps) handled his artillery most skilfully, and all units of this corps behaved well. The reserves sent up by Bilderling arrived in good time, but the enemy obtained a position on the left of the 10th Corps which enabled them to menace the retirement of this corps along the Tang Ho. In the hot fight on the 26th again several units of the 10th Corps did splendidly. At this time a strong turning movement was discovered being developed against the left flank of our An-shan-chan position; but by delaying and inflicting heavy loss on the enemy on the Lang-tzu-shan and An-ping positions, all the corps were able to fall back on the advanced positions at Liao-yang, where the army was concentrated on August 29. At the beginning of the action there the army was short of its prescribed strength by 350 officers and 14,800 men. Excluding the men detailed for extra duty (on the communications, etc.), the average strength of our companies was only 140 to 150 rifles, and those companies that lost most heavily in the previous fights could muster less than 100.

The detailed account of the battle of Liao-yang has long ago been submitted to Headquarters. The following is a general description of it: On August 30 and 31 the enemy attacked our advanced positions with great determination, especially that of the 1st and 3rd Siberians, but were repulsed everywhere with heavy loss. In this fight the regiments of the 1st, 9th, 3rd, 6th, and 5th East Siberian Rifle Divisions rivalled each other in steadiness and gallantry, while the dispositions made by Shtakelberg and Ivanoff were good. Our success, however, was by no means lightly gained. Our artillery expended as much as 100,000 rounds of ammunition, leaving us with only 10,000 rounds in the army reserve. Moreover, excluding eight battalions furnishing guards and holding the works of the main Liao-yang position, on September 1 only sixteen battalions were left in the general reserve. During the 31st we observed that large bodies of Kuroki’s army were crossing on to the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. And, as the position held by the 10th Corps (against which Kuroki should have been operating in full strength) had not for two days been subjected to any such determined attacks as that held by the 1st and 3rd Siberians, there was every reason to suppose that Kuroki’s main body was moving round to operate against our communications. Accordingly a decision had to be made of one of two alternatives: either—

1. To contain Kuroki with a small force and advance to the south against Oku and Nodzu; or—

2. To fall back on the main Liao-yang position, leave as few troops as possible to defend it, and then attack in force that portion of Kuroki’s army which was moving round our left, and endeavour to crush it by driving it back on the Tai-tzu Ho, which at that time of the year was unfordable except at a few points.

As regards the first, even if we were successful against Oku and Nodzu, they could always fall back on their communications if in difficulties, and so draw us away from Liao-yang, while any success by Kuroki which might lead to an attack by him on our communications would threaten us with catastrophe.[73] In order to collect sufficient force to move against the two armies, it would have been necessary to have contained Kuroki with only such troops as were on the right bank of the river—namely, the 17th Corps and two regiments of the 54th Division (total, forty battalions) under Bilderling. But as these troops were not yet seasoned, it was impossible to rely on their performing such an extremely difficult task as that of holding in check Kuroki’s superior numbers on the necessarily extended position they would have to occupy [this fear was justified by subsequent events]. These considerations led to the adoption of the second alternative.

On the 31st, under cover of darkness and without being pressed, we began the evacuation of the advanced positions, which had already been of value to us, inasmuch as the enemy had been weakened by the losses incurred in attacking them. By the following morning as many as 100 battalions, with artillery and cavalry, had crossed on to the right bank of the river. The Japanese did not occupy our abandoned positions till the evening of that date, when they began to shell Liao-yang. The general disposition of the army was as follows: 56 battalions, 10 _sotnias_, and 144 guns (under Zarubaeff) were still on the left bank; 30 battalions, 5 _sotnias_, and 84 guns were on the right for the defence of Liao-yang itself. In addition to the small columns detailed to guard our flanks and rear, the remainder of the army, totalling 93 battalions, 73 squadrons and _sotnias_, and 352 guns, were told off to attack Kuroki. But in making this calculation as to the number of battalions available, it is essential to explain a very important factor. During the whole period of the war from its commencement till August only 6,000 men had been received at the front as drafts to repair wastage, and, as I have said, we began the fighting round Liao-yang with a shortage of 15,000 men. The result of this, taken in connection with the great number of men that had to be detached for various non-combatant duties, and also our losses in the fighting that had already taken place in the neighbourhood, was that the actual strength of the ninety-three battalions was, on September 1, only from 50,000 to 55,000 rifles. For instance, the twenty-one battalions comprising the 10th Corps (which took part in the affair of September 2) only numbered 12,000 rifles, and the total of the twenty-four battalions of the 1st Siberians only amounted to 10,000. Kuroki’s army, on the other hand, was calculated to number approximately from 65,000 to 70,000 men. The plan of operations for the troops crossing on to the right bank was as follows: The force was to deploy between the position held by the 17th Corps near the village of Hsi-kuan-tun and the heights near the Yen-tai mines, which were to have been held by Orloff’s force of thirteen battalions. Using the Hsi-kuan-tun position as a pivot, the army was to throw its left forward so as to strike the Japanese in flank. The position for the 17th Corps near this village was chosen by Bilderling in preference to that which had been prepared for defence beforehand on the right bank on the line San-chia-tzu–Ta-tzu-pu, and sufficient attention was not paid to its fortification. All that was done was to dig a few trenches, and no field of fire had even been cleared in the _kao-liang_ crops. The consequence was that, in the early morning of September 2, the enemy drove the 137th Niejinsk Regiment from the peak north-east of this place, which constituted the left flank position of the 17th Corps, and to regain this hill became the first thing we had to do. For this Bilderling was given forty-four battalions, with the 3rd Siberians in reserve, while the 1st Siberians and Orloff’s column were to assist by threatening the Japanese right. Both Bilderling and Shtakelberg had been instructed as to what was expected of them, but they were given an absolutely free hand as to their dispositions. Notwithstanding the large force under Bilderling’s command, the operations failed in their object. Although the peak was recaptured on the evening of the 2nd, we were again driven off during the night, and had to fall back some two miles, only halting on the Erh-ta-ho heights.

Orloff, on the other hand, moved from his position on the heights south of the Yen-tai mines before he ought to have done, without waiting for the arrival of the 1st Siberians. His troops became at once immersed in a perfect sea of _kao-liang_, and were fired on from front and flank; parts of the column were seized with panic, and the whole force retreated in disorder towards Yen-tai station. A large portion even went as far as the station itself. This sudden and unexpected departure from the field of 12,000 men had a disastrous result on this flank. We lost an excellent position, which should have served as the support for our advance from the left, and the enemy, spreading away to the north, had by 5 p.m., in spite of the gallant efforts of Samsonoff and his Siberian Cossacks, occupied the whole range of heights and the Yen-tai mines. With the occupation of these heights the whole of our left was endangered. At midnight Shtakelberg reported that, owing to his heavy losses in the preceding battles, he would not be able to take the offensive, or even to accept battle on the following day.

Meanwhile the armies of Oku and Nodzu had advanced in force against Liao-yang, but had been driven back by Zarubaeff. Here the main burden of the fighting fell on the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, which behaved extremely well, as did the regiments of the 4th Siberians. On the night of the 3rd, however, Zarubaeff reported that, though the enemy had been repulsed, he had only three battalions left in reserve, and needed reinforcements and gun ammunition. At the same time a message came in from Lubavin, who was covering the Pen-hsi-hu–Mukden line, informing me of his retirement to the Tung-chia-fen Ling (Pass), sixteen miles from Mukden. From this it is evident that if, choosing the first alternative, we had marched against Oku and Nodzu, Kuroki could most certainly have driven back the 17th Corps and 54th Division, and have seized the railway in rear of our troops moving southwards. As we knew, however, that Kuroki was not operating against us with his main body during the battle of the 2nd, we realized it might have been sent to turn our left. Such being the situation, we had to decide whether to maintain our hold on the river, or to abandon Liao-yang and retire to the position on the left bank of the Hun Ho in front of Mukden, which had been already fortified.

As regards the first alternative, it seemed possible that we might, by an immense effort and skilful manœuvring, be able to hold on to Liao-yang and throw Kuroki behind the Tai-tzu Ho. But for this it was essential to draw in the force that had crossed to the right bank, and to deploy it on a fresh line farther to the north, so that we might be able to attack the enemy’s position on the heights near the Yen-tai mines from the north as well as from the west. Such a movement would have exposed our right, and would have isolated the position still held by the 17th Corps on the right bank of the river. The Japanese might drive it in and issue in rear of the troops at Liao-yang, for that place was only eleven miles distant from the position to which the 17th Corps would have had to retire if it were driven back. The defenders of Liao-yang, being then attacked by Oku and Nodzu combined, would be in a critical situation. As regards the second alternative, a retirement on Mukden presented great disadvantages and dangers. It increased the distance to Port Arthur; it would have to be carried out under pressure from the enemy in front and on the left, and the roads had been so much damaged by rain that it was doubtful whether we should succeed in getting our transport or even artillery to Mukden. The abandonment of Liao-yang could not fail both to depress the troops who had so gallantly defended it and encourage the enemy. But, on the other hand, we should be extricated by such a retirement from a situation in which we were threatened in front and flank. A successful withdrawal would also give time for the 1st Army Corps to come up, and, what was not less important, for us to replenish artillery ammunition, of which we were very short. Besides this, the banks of the Tai-tzu Ho were specially unsuited for our troops, as they were almost entirely covered with _kao-liang_. Our men were unused to this, lost their heads whenever they got into it, and were very liable to panic.

On the whole, our past experiences of the offensive did not inspire any confidence that we should be able to cope with the difficult situation implied by a retention of Liao-yang. I decided, therefore, on the retirement towards Mukden, which was carried out by September 7. The most difficult work, especially on the early morning of the 5th, fell to the lot of the 1st Siberians, who had to beat off Kuroki’s force attacking from the east; this they did with success, and without losing a single trophy, in spite of the difficulties in which we were placed.

A general account of the operations round Liao-yang, and a statement of all the considerations which led to our retirement, were telegraphed to the Emperor on September 11. On the 14th the army was made happy by the following gracious message, which I received from His Majesty:

“From your reports of the fighting at Liao-yang, I appreciate that it was impossible for you to have held that position longer without risk of being completely cut off from your communications. Under such conditions, and in face of the existing difficulties, the retirement of the whole force across country without the loss of guns or baggage was a brilliant feat of arms. I thank you and the gallant troops under your command for their heroic conduct and enduring self-sacrifice. May God help you all!”

Upon retirement, our troops were grouped in two principal bodies—

1. The defence of the main position on the left bank of the Hun Ho was entrusted to the 10th and 17th Corps under Bilderling, to whom was subordinated Dembovski’s force of 10 battalions of the 5th Siberians, which was guarding the near right flank of the main position. Altogether, the troops under Bilderling’s command amounted to 75 battalions, 53 squadrons and _sotnias_, 190 guns, 24 mortars, and 3 sapper battalions.

2. The protection of the left flank from Fu-shun to the west was entrusted to Ivanoff’s force, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the 4th and some units of the 5th Siberians (total, 62 battalions, 26 _sotnias_, 128 guns, and 2 sapper battalions).

3. To keep touch between these two main groups were the 1st Siberians under Shtakelberg (total, 24 battalions, 10 squadrons and _sotnias_, 56 guns, and 1 sapper battalion). To his force was entrusted the defence of the portion of the Hun Ho from Chiu-tien to Pu-ling.

4. The general reserve was disposed in two groups—

(_a_) 4th Siberians (24 battalions, 6 squadrons, 96 guns, 12 mortars, and 1 sapper battalion) on the line Erh-tai-tzu–Khou-kha.[74]

(_b_) 1st Army Corps, which concentrated in Mukden early in September[75] (32 battalions, 6 squadrons, 96 guns, 1 sapper battalion), along the Mandarin road on the line Pu-ho–Ta-wa.

5. The protection of the extreme right was entrusted to Kossagovski (6-1/2 battalions, 9 squadrons, 14 guns), the main body of which was at Kao-li-tun on the Liao.

6. A brigade of the 6th Siberians (8 battalions and 1-1/2 _sotnias_) was concentrated at Tieh-ling to protect our communications.

7. The Trans-Baikal and Ural Cossack Brigades which did not belong to any corps were joined together under the command of Mischenko (21 _sotnias_ and 8 guns).

Besides putting the finishing touches to the main position at Mukden, which had already been fortified, the defensive work consisted of strengthening the Fu-liang and Fu-shun positions, and throwing up some works on the right bank of the Hun Ho between Mukden and Fu-liang. The object of these was to check the enemy crossing until our reserves could come up. In addition to this, much was done to improve the communications towards Tieh-ling. On September 20 I learned by telegram from the Viceroy of the formation of the 2nd Manchurian Army. This was to comprise the 6th Siberians and 8th Army Corps, five Rifle brigades from Russia, a Cossack infantry brigade, the 4th Don and 2nd Caucasian Cossack Divisions, and three dragoon regiments of the 10th Cavalry Division. General Grippenberg was appointed to the command of this force on September 24.

Our position at Mukden had some very grave defects.

1. Its left flank (Fu-liang–Fu-shun) was, owing to the bend in the Hun Ho to the north-east of Mukden, thrown much too far back. If the enemy were successful on this flank, and came out on to our communications, we should be compelled to abandon the main position prematurely.

2. Almost immediately in rear of the position was the River Hun, which was at the time unfordable, and could only be crossed by bridges. Behind the river was the town itself.

3. The Fu-shun coal-mines, which were most necessary to us (for railway fuel), were right in front of the position.

These drawbacks, as well as our great desire to prevent any of the enemy’s forces being detached for the reinforcement of Nogi’s besieging army, drove us to try and take the offensive as soon as possible.

Meanwhile the drafts whereby to replace our losses were still arriving at the front very slowly; during July and August only 4,200 men were received. On September 29 the eight corps composing the Manchurian Army could only muster 151,000 rifles, the deficit in officers being 670. Besides these corps, the Viceroy put the 6th Siberian Corps[76] under my command, with the proviso that it should not be included in the army, and should not be split up.[77] It was concentrated at Mukden on October 8. My requests that the units of the 1st Siberian Division—some ten battalions—which were not included in the army, might be made over to me were not acceded to. But although we were really too weak, an advance seemed more advantageous than waiting for the enemy to attack, for there seemed little chance of our being able to hold our ground on the Mukden positions.

According to our information, the Japanese main forces had crossed on to the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, between Liao-yang and Pen-hsi-hu, and were disposed approximately as follows: In the centre, behind the line Yen-tai station–Yen-tai mines, six divisions with brigades in reserve; on the right, écheloned along the line Pan-chia-pu-tzu–Pen-hsi-hu, two divisions with brigades in reserve; on the left, more or less along the line San-de-pu–Sha-tai-tzu, two divisions with their reserves. The enemy had fortified their positions on the Yen-tai heights and at Pan-chia-pu-tzu. It was decided, therefore, that the first object of our advance was to hurl the Japanese back on to the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. To do this we were to deliver a frontal attack, and at the same time endeavour to turn their right, so that, if successful, we should dislodge them from the hills. Orders were issued for the forward movement to commence on October 5. The following was the plan of advance decided upon by me:

1. _Western Force._—This force, under Bilderling, consisting of the 10th and 17th Corps (total, 64 battalions, 40 squadrons and _sotnias_, 196 guns, and 2 sapper battalions), was to make a demonstration in front against the enemy’s main force.

2. _Eastern Force._—This force, under Shtakelberg, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Siberians (total, 73 battalions, 29 squadrons and _sotnias_, 142 guns, 6 mortars, 32 machine-guns, and 3 sapper battalions), was to attack the right flank of the enemy, moving round it from the east. The first objective of this force was the enemy’s positions at Pan-chia-pu-tzu.[78]

3. _The General Reserve._—This, consisting of the 1st Army Corps and 4th Siberians, with Mischenko’s brigade (total, 56 battalions, 20 _sotnias_, 208 guns, 30 mortars, and 2 sapper battalions), was to move up in rear of the interval between the western and eastern forces.

4. _The 6th Siberians_ (32 battalions, 6 _sotnias_, 96 guns, and 1 sapper battalion) was to remain temporarily in Mukden (with a brigade at Tieh-ling), so that it might either be moved to a flank or added to the reserve, according as the operations developed.

5. _Flank Guards._—A force of 30-1/2 battalions, 39 _sotnias_, 82 guns, and 1 sapper battalion was told off to protect the flanks. Of this, 19-1/2 battalions, 25 _sotnias_, 64 guns, and the sapper battalion were to take part in the attack of the enemy’s position while keeping touch with Dembovski’s and Rennenkampf’s columns of the eastern and western forces respectively.

6. Should the enemy concentrate towards their right, an endeavour was to be made to break through their centre in the direction of the Yen-tai mines by the 6th Siberians, with Bilderling’s force and the general reserve.

The advance began on October 5, and meeting with no determined opposition, we on the 9th occupied the following positions:

_Western Force._—The line Shih-li-ho–Ta-pu.

_Eastern Force._—The line San-chia-tzu–Shang-shan-tzu–Ununin.

_In the Centre._—By the range of hills south of Khaamatan (with the assistance of a portion of the general reserve).

The 4th Siberians, especially the Tomsk, Barnaul, and Irkutsk Regiments, did excellent work, as did Mischenko’s mounted force, reinforced by the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. Rennenkampf’s column moved out into the Tai-tzu Ho Valley, and worked along both banks of the river towards Pen-hsi-hu. Though the independent regiments of the 1st and 3rd Siberians suffered heavily, overcame the difficulties of the locality, and made altogether a gallant bid for success, they failed in their object, mainly owing to the lack of co-ordination in the plan of operations, and of cohesion in its execution. On the evening of the 10th the Japanese themselves took the offensive, having concentrated their main forces opposite our right and centre. Bilderling’s western force, after fighting desperately against heavy odds and losing forty-six guns, fell back on the 12th on to the main position on the Sha Ho. Our centre, augmented by the 1st Corps, found itself, in consequence, too far forward, and was obliged on the evening of the 13th to commence a retirement on to the high ground near the position of the western force, and occupied the heights south of Erh-ta-ho. From the 10th to the 12th Shtakelberg’s eastern force made a gallant but vain endeavour to get possession of the almost inaccessible ridges to the north of the road from Pen-hsi-hu to the Yen-tai mines. His dangerous position, thirteen miles in advance, and the necessity for collecting enough troops in our centre to repulse the further attacks of the enemy’s main body, compelled me on the 12th to order him to withdraw to the high ground of the position occupied by the rest of the army, and to move a portion of his force in support of our centre. The enemy’s further attempts to drive us from the ground we were holding were unsuccessful, though we were hard pressed on the Sha Ho, and the general desire to retire on our Mukden positions became very great. In a night attack on the 15th the enemy succeeded in dislodging two regiments of the 22nd Division from the “One Tree Peak,” which they were holding on the left bank of the Sha Ho between the villages of Sha-ho-pu and Sha-ho-tung. The loss of this height, which commanded us on the right bank of the river, and constituted, so to speak, the key of our position, by no means improved the situation. On the evening of the 16th, therefore, I concentrated a force of twenty-five battalions under Putiloff, whom I ordered to attack the enemy in front and flank. After desperate hand-to-hand fighting, he succeeded on the morning of the 17th in driving them off the heights, and captured eleven guns, one machine-gun, many limbers and waggons. This episode put the finishing touch to the major operations of both sides, and we now proceeded to pass the winter in our respective positions in close touch with one another.

The reasons of the indecisive issue to the battle were:

1. Shtakelberg’s unskilful disposition of the large force put under his command, which was (as we discovered later) almost three times the size of that opposed to him.

2. The absence of proper control and generalship among senior commanders of the western force.

3. The abortive operations of, and lack of energy displayed by the officer commanding the 10th Corps. (Among other things, he not only retired quite unnecessarily on October 12 from his position on the left bank of the Sha Ho, but also neglected to warn his neighbour in command of the 1st Corps, who was in consequence placed in a critical position.)

4. The useless manœuvres of the officer commanding the 31st Division, who several times ordered one of his brigades to retire without due cause.

5. The unsteadiness of many units.[79]

6. The lack of cohesion in the operations of the 6th Siberians (on the right of the western force).

During this battle of the Sha Ho the senior commanders—Generals Bilderling and Shtakelberg—were given instructions as to what was required of them generally, but were left to make their dispositions independently.

As will be seen from the above brief sketch of events, the September fighting had no decisive results. The two sides suffered equally, and lost about 50,000 men each. Still, our assumption of the offensive, even with inadequate numbers, greatly improved our strategical position by moving our general front thirteen miles forward in front of Mukden, and afforded us a matter of four and a half months of time. As soon as we occupied the positions on the Sha Ho from Shou-lin-tzu on the right flank to Kao-tu-ling on the left, we set to work fortifying them. Besides ten battalions of the 1st Corps, the whole of the 1st Siberians and twenty-four battalions of the 6th Corps were moved into the general reserve in rear of the centre, and we were confident that we would be able to hold our ground. We still had, however, a very small number of men—indeed, in some units the shortage was alarming. The total strength of the 252 battalions comprising our army on October 25 was only 140,000 rifles, which works out at an average strength of 550 per battalion, while many battalions could not even muster 400 men. Not less disquieting was the lack of officers, which now amounted in the infantry alone to over 2,700, or an average deficiency per battalion of eleven. Meanwhile the drafts to repair wastage were still coming up in driblets. In October and November we only received some 13,000 men. It was not till December 8 that they began to reach us in any quantity; during that month and the first half of January 72,000 arrived. I reported upon this vital question in my letters to the Tsar of October 26 and November 5.

In his despatches of October 23 and 26 His Majesty was pleased to inform me that I had been appointed to the supreme command of all the forces in the Far East, that General Linievitch was appointed to the command of the 1st, and General Baron Kaulbars to the command of the 3rd Army.[80] My first act was to augment the army by adding to it the whole of the 1st Siberian and 61st Divisions, the latter of which was intended by Alexeieff for the Pri-Amur district. This at once added 20,000 rifles to the field army; the leading units also of the 8th Corps began to arrive at the beginning of November, and at the end of the month were concentrated at Mukden. But the main thing which still remained to be done was the improvement of our railway communication with Russia, which became more than ever necessary on account of the increased army to be supplied.

On November 28 the effective strength of all three armies, including the 8th Corps, amounted to 210,000 men. Our information as to the enemy put their strength at this date at about 200,000. Although we were rather superior in numbers, our superiority was too slight to insure a successful offensive under the particularly difficult conditions offered by the intense cold weather, and the fact that the enemy’s positions were strongly fortified. The low temperature rendered the lightest trench work practically impossible, and made the provision of a large amount of warm clothing an absolute necessity. Our preparations for the offensive, as regards making Mukden an intermediate base and our engineering work, began in November. In addition to the branch railway to the Fu-shun mines, which was completed that month, a branch was laid to the right flank of our dispositions,[81] and a field line to Rennenkampf’s force on the left.[82] But still, when December came we were not ready to advance, mainly owing to the delay in railway construction, largely caused by the weather. Although I was informed by the War Minister, in a communication dated November 8, that the running capacity of the Siberian and Trans-Baikal lines would from October 28 be brought up to twelve pairs of military trains, we never received as many right up to the end of the war. The result of this was that the expected drafts, as well as the three Rifle brigades, arrived about ten days later than we had calculated on receiving them, and there was great delay in the distribution of warm clothing to the men, particularly felt boots. Very great difficulty also was experienced in collecting the food-supplies necessary for the forward movement, and in organizing new transport units.

When, in the middle of December, I summoned a meeting of the three army commanders and consulted them as to the possible date of an advance, in view of the critical state of affairs at Port Arthur, they unanimously stated that it was essential to await the arrival of the whole of the 16th Corps. On receiving the news of the surrender of the fortress, I again asked their opinions as to whether—in view of Oyama’s armies being probably augmented by that of Nogi—they did not consider it desirable to commence an advance at an earlier date. But they still adhered to their former opinion, modifying it only to the extent that we should begin our advance while this corps was arriving, and not wait until its concentration was completed. As regards the actual plan of the offensive operations, the opinions of the three army commanders were the same—namely, that we should deliver the main blow with as large a force as possible at the enemy’s left, and envelop it. The only difference of opinion was as to the depth of this envelopment. The boldest and most original plan was that proposed by Grippenberg—namely, that he should undertake, with the 2nd Army, a wide turning movement—almost an envelopment—of the enemy’s left in the direction of Yen-tai station, and cut himself free from the 3rd Army. He considered it necessary to have seven corps under his command for this operation. This, however, was impracticable, as, even without leaving any troops as a general reserve, besides the 16th Corps then arriving, only four corps could be given him—namely, the 8th, 10th, 1st Siberian, and the Composite Rifle Corps. General Linievitch, who was apprehensive that the enemy might attack the 1st Army, thought it dangerous to give Grippenberg the 1st Siberians. Kaulbars, in his turn, thought it impossible, without grave risk of the 3rd Army being driven from its positions, to detach any portion of it to the 2nd Army. Finally, Grippenberg’s plan, though it promised great advantages in the event of success, seemed very risky, for it extended our already long front still more, and made it so attenuated that it would be liable to be broken by a determined attack at any point. Moreover, no general reserve would be left at my disposal with which to deal with any unforeseen emergency.

After proposing the above bold plan, Grippenberg suddenly went to the other extreme, and became pessimistic. For instance, on January 13, he informed me that the campaign was as good as lost, that we ought to retire to Harbin, hold on to that point and Vladivostok, and from thence move with two armies “in other directions.” On my asking him which were the directions in which we should move, he gave no clear explanation. The same idea was expressed also in a report received on the same day (dated January 12) from General Ruzski, the Chief of the Staff of the 2nd Army. In it was contained Grippenberg’s opinion that it was impossible for us to dream of being successful after Nogi’s arrival, and that—

“The officer commanding the Army accordingly inclines to the conclusion that, under the circumstances, the best solution of the question would be to fall back to Mukden, or further if necessary, and there to await a favourable opportunity to take the offensive.”

However, it was finally decided, in accordance with the opinions of Linievitch and Kaulbars, and with the consent of Grippenberg, to take the offensive in January, on the condition that complete and direct touch was maintained between all three armies.

According to our information, the strength of the Japanese armies was approximately as follows:

Kuroki’s Army 68 battalions, 21 squadrons, and 204 guns Nodzu’s Army 50 battalions, 11 squadrons, and 168 guns Oku’s Army 60 battalions, 29 squadrons, and 234 guns

or a total in all three armies under Oyama of 178 battalions, 61 squadrons, and 606 guns. It was calculated that they could put 200,000 rifles in the field against us on January 14, 1905. As a matter of fact, we underestimated the number. From the prisoners we took we knew accurately what was going on in their 1st Army, but we were unable to ascertain with sufficient accuracy and in good time what was happening in the rear, or what reinforcements were being received. Their fortified positions were as follows: The left flank up to the village of Hsiao-tung-kou was held by Oku. In the centre was Nodzu’s army. On the right was Kuroki. Opposite Rennenkampf, on our extreme left, was a force under Kavamura amounting to about 15,000 to 20,000 men. Nogi’s army was estimated at 72 battalions, 5 squadrons, and 156 guns; but which units had reached Oyama, and how they were grouped, we did not know.

In order to induce the enemy to detach as many men as possible for their line of communications, and so weaken their front, to handicap their supply arrangements, and to stop the rail transport of Nogi’s units to the front, a raid by a mounted force[83] was organized against their line of communications. The objects of this raid, which was under Mischenko, were:

1. To seize Newchuang station, and destroy the large stocks of food-supplies collected there; and—

2. To blow up the railway-bridges and destroy the track on the portion of the line from Ta-shih-chiao to Kai-ping.

Neither object was fully attained, chiefly owing to the slowness with which the force moved. Individual episodes that occurred are, however, very instructive, and show that our cavalry is quite fitted to perform the most self-sacrificing duties.

The plan agreed upon for the main advance was explained in my orders of January 19. Just as it had been in September, our primary object was to drive the enemy behind the Tai-tzu Ho, and to inflict on him as much damage as possible. The force selected for our first attentions was Oku’s left-flank army, the left wing of which was to be enveloped. The advance of the 1st and 3rd Armies against the positions held by Nodzu and Kuroki were to be started and developed in accordance with, and depending upon, the measure of success attending the efforts of the 2nd and 3rd Armies to capture the enemy’s left-flank positions on the Sha Ho. The armies were given the following tasks:

1. The 2nd Army was to gain possession of the line of Japanese works San-de-pu–Lita-jen-tun–Ta-tai–San-chia-tzu, and then the line Tsun-lun-ian-tun–Ta-ta-san-pu along the Sha Ho. And, conformably to the enemy’s action and the success attained by the 3rd Army, it was, while throwing a strong containing force to the south, to develop its operations towards the line San-tia-tzu–Shih-li-ho, and on the heights south of the last village.

2. The 3rd Army was to capture the line of works Chang-ling-pu–Ling- shen-pu, and then the line along the Sha Ho from the latter point to Hun-ling-pu inclusive. And, conformably to the enemy’s action and the successes attained by the 2nd Army, it was to develop its operations towards the line Hei-te-kai Peak–Hung-pao Shan Peak.

3. The 1st Army was to co-operate in the capture of Hou-te-kai Peak, and seize the heights near the villages of Cheng-san-lin-tzu and Shih-shan-tzu. And according to the action of the enemy and the successes attained by the 2nd and 3rd Armies, it was, with the assistance of the 3rd Army, to develop its operations towards the positions near the villages Ta-pu, San-chia-tzu, Shan-lu-ho-tzu, which we had occupied on the 10th to 12th October.

In my orders of January 21 it was clearly defined that the above scheme would require modification dependent on the line of action adopted by the Japanese.

If, contrary to our calculations, the enemy preferred to contain our 2nd and 3rd Armies, and to fall with the rest of their forces on the 1st, or on the interval between the 1st and 3rd Armies, the position would call for a very energetic advance against their flank by the 2nd and 3rd Armies.

If they should at once fall back on their second line of positions without holding on to their first line, we should endeavour to turn their retirement into a disordered retreat.

January 25 was the day fixed for the commencement of our advance, but, owing to the action of Grippenberg, who should have started the movement, the arrangements had to be altered. Almost a fortnight before our operations began our chances of success had been unfortunately reduced by certain dispositions made by him. The corps to be attached to his army were disposed as follows:

8th Corps South of the River Hun on both sides of the railway. 10th Corps At Bai-ta-pu village on the Mandarin road. 1st Siberians Behind the right flank of the 1st Army.

The right of the 2nd Army between the 5th Siberians and the River Hun was only protected by cavalry, while a separate column of five battalions and two cavalry regiments under Kossagovski was on the right bank of the river. Notwithstanding the instructions issued that these dispositions were to hold good as long as possible, in order that we might conceal our intentions from the enemy, and also that the 10th Corps—intended to act as a reserve in the event of their striking at our centre—was not to be moved from its place without my knowledge, on January 14 Grippenberg transferred the 14th Division over on to the left bank of the Hun, and on the 16th, without letting me know, moved the 10th Corps closer to the right of the 3rd Army. These movements, of course, at once disclosed our intentions, and information soon came in that the enemy had, in their turn, commenced moving their troops westwards and fortifying opposite our new dispositions.

The strength of the army was:

+--------+-------+----------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-------+ | | Bat- |Squadrons |Field|Mortars|Siege|Machine| Sapper| | |talions| and |-Guns| |-Guns| -Guns | Bat- | | | | Sotnias | | | | |talions| +--------+-------+----------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-------+ |2nd Army| 120 | 92 | 412| 24 | 4 | 20 | 3 | |3rd Army| 72 | 18 | 294| 54 | 56 | 12 | 3 | |1st Army| 127 | 43 | 360| 12 | -- | 8 | 5 | |General | | | | | | | | | Reserve| 42 | -- | 120| -- | -- | 4 | -- | | +-------+----------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-------+ | Total| 361 | 153 |1,186| 90[84]| 60 | 44 | 11 | +--------+-------+----------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-------+

By the middle of January our numbers were, as regards rank and file, almost up to the authorized war strength, except in the Composite Rifle, 8th and 16th Corps, which had arrived short, so that the total of our forces was about 300,000 rifles. Although the establishment in officers was not fully complete, we now had some 5,600 in the infantry, which gave us on the average 15 per battalion.

The advance began on January 25, as ordered, the 1st Siberians first seizing the village of Huan-lo-to-tzu, and later, after a hot fight lasting all day, the village of Hei-kou-tai;[85] Kossagovski’s column gained possession of Chi-tai-tzu and Ma-ma-kai without much difficulty. San-de-pu was not attacked that day. Of the 14th Division, which was intended for this attack, three regiments were sent on the 22nd to join Mischenko’s force, in order to strike a separate blow at a small Japanese force of all arms, which, according to spies, was in occupation of A-shih-niu. Mischenko moved against this place with his infantry, but found no enemy there, and so the 14th Division was marched forty miles on a fool’s errand, and only arrived at Chang-tan on the morning of the 26th, thoroughly exhausted. The action of the 25th for the village of Hei-kou-tai, which we only seized with great difficulty and after heavy loss, in spite of our overwhelming superiority, indicated that such strongly fortified points as San-de-pu and Lita-jen-tun could not be attacked without proper previous preparation, for we could not afford to waste men. I particularly underlined the necessity for this in my directions—“For the operations of the 2nd Army in capturing the enemy’s fortified line San-de-pu–Lita-jen-tun–Ta-tai,” dated January 15, and also in my instructions with regard to the 2nd Army’s operations against the Lita-jen-tun portion, dated January 16. Notwithstanding this, in the orders for the dispositions of the 2nd Army on January 26, it was to operate on the line from Hou-leng-tai to the Hun—over a distance of ten miles against a fortified position—and to capture the two strongly defended points, San-de-pu and Lita-jen-tun. Grippenberg, moreover, came to no understanding with Kaulbars as to co-operation, and it was only upon a request made by the commander of the 10th Corps that the commander of the 3rd Army arranged to co-operate with his artillery, and so prepare the assault of the 5th Siberians. Being by chance in Hsui-tun just at the time when the 10th Corps was making ready to carry out its allotted task, I was able to avert a dispersed attack (over a stretch of thirteen miles), and to prevent the employment of troops in an unprepared assault on strongly fortified positions. The attack to be made by the left flank of the 2nd Army on the morning of January 26 was countermanded by Grippenberg himself, but the order was delayed in transmission, and if I had not been in Hsui-tun it would have taken place.

The attack of the village of San-de-pu by the 14th Division alone failed, and it could hardly have done otherwise in the absence of any artillery preparation. Neither the ground round it nor the fortifications of the place itself had been studied, and no sketch-plan of it had been made or issued to the troops. The result was that our guns shelled a village called Pei-tai-tzu, north-east of San-de-pu, all day instead of the place itself, which they did not touch, while the 14th Division attacked and captured Pao-tai-tzu (to the west of San-de-pu), and reported to me they had taken San-de-pu. The outer enclosure of San-de-pu village was mistaken by this division for that of a _reduit_ inside the village, and acting upon the assumption that they were not strong enough to seize this _reduit_, they were ordered back to their former positions, and abandoned Pao-tai-tzu. Meanwhile, having received the report that San-de-pu had been taken, Grippenberg gave orders for the heavy guns and mortars with the 8th Corps to be sent at once to the 10th Corps, in order to prepare the assault of Lita-jen-tun next day. At the same time, as his men, who had had no sleep for three nights, were utterly exhausted, he asked permission to rest his army on the 27th. Accordingly, the 1st Siberians were ordered to halt in the area south-east of Hei-kou-tai; but as we had not yet taken this area, the order led to this corps having to fight a separate action on the 27th for the possession of Su-ma-pu and Piao-tsao. When it became known on the morning of the 27th that San-de-pu had not been taken, Grippenberg was obliged to give up all idea of repeating the attack on the 27th, as he had sent his heavy guns to the 10th Corps. The decision was also necessitated by the fact that the Japanese had sent up strong reinforcements. When Shtakelberg was informed that San-de-pu had not been taken, he did not consider it possible to carry out Grippenberg’s twice repeated order to cease his attack, and late in the evening, after a hot fight, he seized the greater part of Su-ma-pu by a disconnected attack with four regiments. But being counter-attacked at dawn on the 28th by superior numbers both in front and on the left, he was forced to fall back with great loss (6,000 men). By that evening the 1st Siberians were holding a position on the line Tou-pao–Chu-san-ho-tzu, which the Japanese continued to assault with great fury till the early morning. The despatch of troops towards Su-ma-pu in no way met the circumstances: it led to a needless digression from the main objective of the whole operations—_i.e._, San-de-pu—and generally to a still greater extension of the already too long front occupied by the 2nd Army. In order to divert the enemy’s attention from our right flank by a demonstration, the villages of Hsia-tai-tzu and La-pa-tai were attacked and seized on January 27 by part of the 10th Corps under Tserpitski; but as we were not ready to storm San-de-pu, these places were abandoned.

The cavalry of the 2nd Army, under Mischenko, made a bold dash at the enemy’s rear, and succeeded in killing and capturing a good many; but their success would have been far greater had the Don regiments under Teleshoff not been late in arriving. Mischenko, who was at the head of the advanced _sotnias_, was severely wounded, and Teleshoff, who succeeded in the command, failed to carry out the task entrusted to him. He neither sent word that the Japanese were receiving reinforcements, nor helped the Siberians when they were fighting for Su-ma-pu.

By evening on the 28th the situation in the 2nd Army was roughly as follows: The positions north of San-de-pu, along a front of eight miles—from the positions occupied by the 3rd Army up to the River Hun—were held by the 10th Corps and 15th Division; sixteen battalions of the former had been brought closer to the river, and behind them was the reserve of the 3rd Army, a brigade of the 17th Corps. The Composite Rifle Corps and 1st Siberians were distributed along a front west of San-de-pu, on the line Chan-chua-tzu–Tou-pao. Kossagovski’s force was at San-chia-tzu. The reserve of the 2nd Army consisted of only one regiment of the 14th Division,[86] and Grippenberg had (26th to 28th) three times asked for reinforcements to be sent him from the general reserve. The front of the 2nd Army was spread over twenty miles. Thus, by the evening of the 28th the greater part of that army was separated from the 3rd Army by San-de-pu village, which was still in the enemy’s hands, and was dispersed over a long line fronting south-east. Whilst so distributed, not only was it difficult to assist it with troops from the 3rd Army in the event of its being attacked, but there was the danger, if the enemy reinforced heavily, of their being in a position to employ San-de-pu as a pivot, force back the Rifle Corps, and break through on to the communications of the 1st Siberians. Meanwhile reports came in which showed that only a portion of the enemy’s available forces were operating against Grippenberg, while the movement of Kuroki’s and Nodzu’s troops to the west showed that the enemy could still throw another six divisions into the fight. They might be moved against the weakened and extended front of the 3rd Army, thrust into the interval between the 3rd Army and the Hun Ho, or used as reinforcements to the troops operating against our positions west of San-de-pu.

About 7 p.m. Kaulbars reported to me that the enemy had at 4 p.m. begun a movement in great strength towards their advanced positions. At the same time this movement became disclosed, and we opened artillery and rifle fire. As the reserve of the 3rd Army had already been given to the 2nd, I was obliged, as a temporary measure, to give Kaulbars the 72nd Division from my reserve. This left me with only thirty battalions of the 16th Corps, which had just arrived. Although the positions held by the Composite Rifle Corps and 1st Siberians had behind them an ice-covered river with steep frozen banks that hindered the crossing of all three arms, and were therefore inconvenient, yet the situation of the 2nd Army—enveloping San-de-pu, as it did—offered us certain advantages if we could only drive back the troops attacking the 1st Siberians and succeed in storming that place on the 29th. When, therefore, the above report came in from Kaulbars, the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army was asked on the telephone when it was proposed to start the assault on San-de-pu. To this Ruzski replied that it certainly could not take place next day, as it had not been properly prepared by artillery, and that it was impossible then to fix a time for it. On account of the vagueness of this reply, he was instructed to report to Grippenberg the information sent in by Kaulbars, and also the orders in which the 2nd Army was instructed to take up a more concentrated position in the early hours of the 29th, assuming as their first task the defence of the line Ssu-fang-tai—Chang-tan—Ta-man-ta-pu. Grippenberg, who was in a neighbouring apartment with a telephone, did not say a single word to this message,[87] and these orders were carried out. All the enemy’s attacks on the positions Tou-pao–Chu-san-ho-tzu were repulsed by the 1st Siberians before retiring.

Thus ended our first attempt at the offensive, and it cost us 10,000 men. The chief cause of our failure was, of course, our neglect to prepare properly the assault on San-de-pu, which again was a sign that we did not yet sufficiently respect our foe. Though a contempt of the enemy was all through the war evinced by the senior officers when they first arrived at the front, yet after our first actions it was generally, and perhaps unfortunately, replaced by an exaggerated idea of their merits. The absence of proper touch between Grippenberg and the corps under him was also responsible for much, as, owing to it, the transmission of orders and of information was greatly delayed. The whole of the 8th and Composite Rifle Corps, again, did not shine in action. For instance, on the 28th, certain units of the 15th Division, though not at all pressed, began to retire without permission. By doing so they exposed the siege battery they were covering, which was preparing to destroy its guns and blow up its ammunition preparatory to retiring itself.

On January 30 Grippenberg reported himself sick by letter, and by the Tsar’s permission left on February 3 for St. Petersburg. This action of his set a fatal example both to those under him and to the rest of the army, and was most harmful to all discipline. The opinions, also, that he had expressed, to the effect that the campaign was virtually over, and that we should retire to Mukden and Harbin, had a dangerously disturbing effect on our weaker members. It was in the long-run more harmful than any single defeat of a portion of our force would have been.

When the right flank of the 2nd Army fell back, the army held a line from Fu-cha-chuang-tzu to Ssu-fang-tai. The enemy made several unsuccessful attempts to drive us from those of their advanced positions that we had captured, their main efforts being directed towards the recapture of Pei-tai-tzu and Chang-tan-ho-nan. We, on our side, made energetic preparation to continue the advance we had begun so unluckily. Fresh siege batteries were brought up, the approaches to the enemy’s defended posts were carefully reconnoitred, and detailed plans were made. On February 16 we received some drafts, which were used to make good the casualties in the 1st Siberians and the Composite Rifle Corps, both of which had suffered so heavily at Hei-kou-tai.

On February 10 General Kaulbars assumed command of the 2nd Army, and Bilderling temporarily took over command of the 3rd. Meanwhile, early in this month, information kept coming in that large bodies of Japanese cavalry with guns, together with bands of Hun-huses, were collecting in Mongolia, especially near the portion of the railway between Kung-chu-ling and Kuang-cheng-tzu, and early on the morning of the 12th the enemy raided the line north of the station of the former name and blew up a railway-bridge. The same day a reconnoitring party of the Frontier Guards suddenly came on a Japanese force of two cavalry regiments, a battalion, and some 2,000 Hun-huses near the Mongolian frontier. In the ensuing action we lost a number of men and one gun. General Chichagoff continued to report with great insistence that large bodies of the enemy—over 10,000 strong—were collecting in Mongolia for the purpose of cutting our communications. Believing these reports, I detailed a brigade of the 41st Division and the whole of the Don Cossack Division to reinforce our protective troops on the railway itself, upon which, of course, we were dependent for supplies, drafts, and reinforcements. In addition to this, I also put some 15,000 reservists[88] under the command of General Nadaroff, to strengthen the Frontier Guards and the line-of-communication troops generally.

The rumours that we heard at this same time also of the landing of a large Japanese force in Northern Korea (assumed to be in connection with the liberation of Nogi’s army by the surrender of Port Arthur), part of which might be detailed for operations against Vladivostok, compelled me to take in hand the strengthening of our forces in the Primorsk district, and of the Vladivostok garrison in particular. With this end in view, a mixed brigade of six battalions, formed from men of the 1st Army, was sent to the fortress. In order to enable this brigade to be expanded into a division, and each of the Rifle regiments in the Primorsk district into regiments of four battalions, it was necessary, first of all, to divide the drafts which had come up for the army between the field army and the troops in the Primorsk district. Although forced to reduce the strength of the field army to the above extent, I made a mistake in not insisting upon a sufficiently strong general reserve being formed. To do this I should have taken the whole of the 17th Corps into my reserve, though such a course would have been against the opinion of General Bilderling (who considered it dangerous to weaken the 3rd Army, as he had no reliance in the steadiness of the reserve troops of that army, the 5th and 6th Siberians). Instead of the thirty-two battalions, which would have been thus obtained, only one division, the 6th Siberians,[89] was added to the general reserve.

In my orders issued after our disastrous action at Hei-kou-tai, it was laid down that as many units as possible should be taken out of the firing-line, so that strong army reserves might be formed. In order to render this possible, it was pointed out that defensive positions should not be held in equal strength along the whole front; that it was sufficient to prepare and hold the most important portions of a line as strongly as possible; and that, by holding on to these at all costs, time would be gained in which reserves could be pushed up to any threatened section. Unfortunately, I left too much to the experience and discretion of the army commanders, and did not sufficiently insist on exact compliance with my instructions.

Adhering to the original plan of offensive operations decided upon in accordance with the opinions of all the army commanders, I requested Kaulbars to fix the first day for the advance. He first chose February 23, but owing to the troops of the 2nd Army being worn out with the very heavy work they had done in connection with the fortification of the positions, the advance was, at his own request, postponed till the 25th. On the 24th, however, Kaulbars heard that the date for the assault of San-de-pu was known to the enemy. He therefore lost hope of success, and asked that the assault might be indefinitely postponed. Meanwhile, on the 23rd, the enemy advanced in force against the Ching-ho-cheng column, and this body fell back from its fortified position next day after fighting an unsuccessful engagement.

At the commencement of the Japanese advance our armies were distributed as follows:

_Right Flank._—2nd Army, consisting of the 1st Siberians, Composite Rifle, 8th and 10th Corps, a brigade of the 3rd and a mixed brigade of the 5th Siberians (total, 126 battalions), occupying the line Ssu-fang-tai–Chang-tan–Hou-lien-tai, a length of sixteen miles.

_Centre._—3rd Army, consisting of the 5th Siberians (less two regiments), 17th Corps, and one division of the 6th Siberians (total, 72 battalions), occupying the line Hou-lien-tai–Ling- shen-pu–Sha-ho-pu–Shan-lan-tzu, a length of eleven miles.

_Left Flank._—Here were the 1st Army (less one regiment), 4th, 2nd, and 3rd Siberians (the latter less one brigade), 71st Division, Independent Siberian Reserve Brigade, and two Trans-Baikal infantry battalions (total, 128 battalions), occupying the line Shan-lan-tzu–Lu-chiang-tun–Erh-ta-kou–Lia-cheng-wu-tun, and further along the right bank of the Sha Ho, having its left flank three miles east of the Kao-tai Ling (Pass), a length of thirty miles. The 1st Army also had independent columns at Ching-ho-cheng and Hsin-tsin-tin.

_The General Reserve_ consisted of forty-four battalions—namely, the 16th Corps (less one brigade) on the railway six miles south of Mukden station, 72nd Division, and 146th Tsaritsin Regiment, behind the right flank of the 1st Army at Huang-shan.

On February 23 the shortage in the infantry (rank and file) of all three armies was 49,000.

A “Short Account of the Operations round Mukden in February, 1905,” was submitted to His Majesty the Tsar with a letter from me dated May 13, 1905. A detailed description of these operations has been completed, and has now also been submitted to His Majesty. The whole of the Mukden operations can be divided into three phases:

1. From February 23 to 28, till the turning movement against our right flank developed.

2. From February 28 to March 9—the period of our concentration on the right bank of the Hun Ho, and our attempts to drive back the enemy who were enveloping us.

3. From March 9 to 16—our final attempt to hold on to Mukden, and our forced abandonment of it.

FIRST PHASE.

During this the enemy directed their attention exclusively to the left flank of the 1st Army—to Rennenkampf’s force, the 3rd, and (partly) the 2nd Siberians. Amongst the troops operating against Rennenkampf was the 11th Japanese Division from Port Arthur, and from this it was surmised that other portions of Nogi’s army were also acting on that flank. The widely extended position of the 1st Army, bearing in mind the absence of an adequate army reserve; the concentration of large bodies of the enemy against the 2nd and 3rd Siberians, disclosed on February 24; the retirement of the Ching-ho-cheng force; the possibility of a turning movement against it; and, finally, the decision of the officer commanding the 2nd Army to postpone the attack indefinitely—all these made me decide to reinforce the 1st Army quickly from my general reserve, not only in order to check the enemy, but also in order to operate actively ourselves. The first reinforcements despatched were: a brigade of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division on February 24 to protect the left flank of the Ching-ho-cheng force, and the 146th Regiment and 2nd Brigade of the 72nd Division on February 25 to reinforce the left flank of the 1st Army. Finally, when it was discovered that the enemy were operating in great strength against the left flank of the Kao-tai Ling position, the 1st Siberians and 1st Brigade of the 72nd Division were sent on February 27 to assist the 1st Army in its projected advance. On this day, also, the 85th Viborg Regiment was sent to reinforce Daniloff’s force. When the 1st Army received these additions, amounting in all to fifty-four battalions, the advance of Kuroki’s army and of the right flank force of Kavamura was checked; but still our intended advance did not take place (owing to the exaggerated reports as to the enemy’s strength), and the 1st Siberians were sent back to the right flank to rejoin the general reserve.

SECOND PHASE.

The first report of large bodies of Japanese infantry appearing near Ka-liao-ma, on the left bank of the Liao, was received on February 28. News came in also of the enemy moving along the right bank, and of the appearance of their columns at Hsin-min-tun. It was essential to take immediate steps to meet them on the way to Mukden in their turning movement. I thought it was possible, by using the positions of the 3rd Army as a pivot of manœuvre, and withdrawing its right flank on to the line Ling-shen-pu–Shua-lin-tzu–Lan-shan-pu, to leave[90] for the defence of the section between the 3rd Army and the Hun Ho, and of that on the right bank, a total of forty-eight battalions, and to transfer on to the right bank the remainder of the 2nd Army (forty-eight battalions), and, after reinforcing them with twenty-four battalions of the 16th Corps and thirty-two battalions collected from the 3rd and 1st Armies, to detail them for operations against Nogi. The command of the troops collected on the right bank of the Hun was entrusted to Kaulbars, and I pointed out to him several times the particular importance of rapid and energetic action against the turning movement which threatened Mukden and our communications.

The first units sent from the main reserve at Mukden to the west were:

1. Towards Kao-li-tun, on the river, to operate against the wide turning movement along the River Liao, a brigade of the 41st Division under Birger.

2. To Sha-ling-pu, the 25th Division, under General Topornin, commanding the 16th Corps.

3. Simultaneously the 2nd Brigades of the 9th and 31st Divisions were concentrated under the command of Topornin, south of the 25th Division, on March 2.

The successive arrangements made by Kaulbars, in view of the enemy’s advance—already commenced on the right of the 2nd Army; the abandonment of Ssu-fang-tai; the withdrawal of troops from the right bank; the relief of corps that had been engaged, and the retention of troops which had already started towards Mukden, not only disclosed to the Japanese the possibility of free movement along the right bank of the river, but delayed the arrival on the western front of reinforcements from the 2nd Army. General Topornin therefore received no support either on March 2 or 3; still, he successfully continued on March 3 the attack commenced the day before on the village of Sha-ling-pu. However, in view of the turning movement that had now become quite clear against our right flank, Kaulbars ordered a retirement—though the enemy were in no way pressing us—to the western Mukden fortifications. The troops took up a line fronting on Ma-tuan-tzu–Wu-kuan-tun, and, in spite of the orders given, did not occupy either the old railway embankment or the fortified position west of Lin-min-shan-tzu. This direct withdrawal towards Mukden placed our troops in a very disadvantageous position, and enabled the enemy both to continue their turning movement, and make it wider and more dangerous. Immediately after our retirement from Sha-ling-pu, they moved forward quickly and enveloped our western front, and, moving on March 3 across on to the main Hsin-min-tun road, began to threaten Mukden from the north. Birger’s brigade, which had now returned from Kao-li-tun, fell back on Hu-shih-tai station.

The protection of Mukden on the west and north was placed under Kaulbars, and was undertaken by units joining the general reserve.

1. The composite divisions of three regiments of the 17th Corps under De Witte took up the fortified position at Khou-kha[91] on the morning of March 3.

2. A force of seven battalions under Colonel Zapolski was sent to Hu-shih-tai station.

3. The 10th Rifle Regiment was concentrated at siding No. 97.

4. Eighteen battalions of the 1st Siberians came up as a reserve to these on March 3.

The concentration which I had ordered of the units of the 2nd Army on the right bank of the Hun was taking place extremely slowly. Indeed, some regiments which had already assembled had been sent back to the left bank. When I reached Mukden on the 3rd, I impressed on Kaulbars the necessity of not losing any time, and told him to attack the following day, but gave him a free hand as to the direction of attack. He did not carry out the order, owing to the concentration of his army on the right bank not having been completed. Meanwhile, in the early hours of March 4, the important hamlet of Ssu-hu-chia-pu was evacuated by the 2nd Army, and at the same time Ivanoff withdrew the 15th Division from the position behind the Hun and the right flank of the 3rd Army, which he had been told to defend, without fighting. The latter thus became exposed. A brigade of the 5th Siberians and nine _sotnias_ of cavalry, which had remained on the right bank near Tung-chen-tzu, were moved across to the left.

During March 4, which was thus lost to us for offensive operations, Nogi continued his turning movement, which was now becoming enveloping and dangerous. Accordingly, after discussing the matter with Kaulbars, I ordered him on the 5th to concentrate sufficient troops for the purpose, and to attack the enemy’s left, and I again emphasized the fact that our main chance of success lay in the rapidity and energy with which he struck. In an order of the 2nd Army of March 5, a force of forty-nine battalions was organized to make the attack under the command of Gerngross. Here again the concentration was too slow, and the right column only moved out from the line Sha-ho-tzu–Khou-kha about 2 p.m. Its right flank might have been strengthened by a brigade of the 41st Division with Zapolski’s column, and the left flank by sixteen battalions of the 25th Division. We therefore might have contained the enemy on the Yang-hsin-tun–Hsiao-sha-ho-tzu line with a force under Tserpitski, and have attacked with a mass of seventy-seven battalions.

Kaulbars, alarmed at Tserpitski’s exaggerated reports as to the nature of the attacks made on his left by some three divisions, moved a brigade from Gerngross’s force behind the left flank, sent another on to the left bank of the river, and stopped Gerngross’s attack till such time as the result of Tserpitski’s action should be known. The net result of these proceedings, of the late commencement of the operations, and of their half-hearted nature, was that, although we met with no opposition, on the 5th we moved our right only on to the line Pao-ta-tun–Fang-hsin-tun–San-chia-fen; and so another day was lost. In accordance with my orders for energetic action, the advance of the right was continued on the 6th, but it was carried out with less men than on the previous day (thirty-three battalions), without energy or cohesion, and met with determined opposition at the village of Liu-chia-kan. Then, before the whole of Gerngross’s force had become engaged, Kaulbars stopped the advance, and gave orders to take up the defensive. That day we got possession only of Tsuang-fang-chih. In short, notwithstanding the great strength of the 2nd Army, with its reinforcements of more than fifty battalions, on March 4, 5, and 6—the three most important days—we moved our right only a few miles forward, and took to defensive measures even on the western front.

Owing to the ill success of the operations of the 2nd Army on March 5, I issued orders to all the armies to send back their divisional baggage along their respective lines of communication towards the north of Mukden. On the 5th the Japanese began a series of attacks on our northern and western fronts. On the left flank of our west front they were everywhere repulsed by Tserpitski and Hershelman, whose forces amounted to forty-nine battalions. In the centre of the western front they won a partial success, on March 7 compelling units of the 25th Division to retire temporarily from Wu-kuan-tun. But on the northern front, which was the most dangerous for us, they won great successes, on the 7th and 8th getting possession of several villages. From there they repeatedly attacked our northern force of twenty-five battalions under Launits, which was holding the line Ta-heng-tun–San-tai-tzu–Kung-chia-tun. At the same time their columns moved still farther to the north, and threatened Hu-shih-tai station. To protect this, I despatched a force of six battalions of the 4th Siberians to Tsu-erh-tun under Colonel Borisoff. To secure our retirement to Tieh-ling, in case we should not succeed in beating off Nogi’s army, on the evening of March 7 I gave orders to the 1st and 3rd Armies, who were too far forward, to retire early on the 8th to our fortified positions south of Mukden—at Fu-liang and Fu-shun. With their retirement and the concentration of the whole of the 2nd Army on the right bank it became possible to allot forty-eight battalions from the 1st and 3rd Armies to operate against Nogi, and to collect seventeen battalions into the reserve of the 2nd Army. Of these reinforcements, General Artamonoff’s force of ten battalions alone arrived under my command on the 8th.

THIRD PHASE.

Having failed in our attempts to stop Nogi’s army, which was moving round our right flank, first on the line from Sha-ling-pu to the old railway embankment, and then on the line of the Hsin-min-tun main road, I decided to try once more to block it on the line Ku-san-tun–Tsu-erh-tun, and, if a favourable opportunity occurred, to assume the offensive from this line. On the 9th we had the following troops available for the purpose:

1. Borisoff’s column of 6 battalions holding the villages of Tung-chan-tzu, Ku-san-tun, and Hsia-hsin-tun.

2. Artamonoff’s column of 9 battalions[92] at Tsu-erh-tun.

3. Hershelman’s column of 14 battalions, sent from the reserve of the 2nd Army to that place. Total, 29 battalions.

On March 9 I ordered Lieutenant-General Muiloff, to whom was given the command of these troops, to co-operate with Launits’ force in an attack on the village of Hei-ni-tun. The operation was carried out in a disjointed manner, without careful reconnaissance, and without any arrangement for co-operation having been made with Launits; a bad storm and clouds of sand also impeded us, and the attack failed. The Japanese continued their advance to the north-west. Thus, by the 9th, the enemy was still not driven back on the side where they were most dangerous; part of the village of San-tai-tzu, taken from us in the early hours of that day, remained in their hands. The situation, indeed, appeared critical, for we received news on the same evening of the Japanese advance to the Hun Ho against the section Fu-liang–Hsiao-fang-shen, which was held by weak units of the 1st Army, 4th and 2nd Siberians. Indeed, if we delayed the withdrawal on Tieh-ling longer there was great danger that some of our most advanced forces in the south and south-west might be cut off. Therefore orders were given that same evening for a retirement to Tieh-ling early on the 10th, and for this operation roads were allotted as follows: The 2nd Army was to proceed along both sides of the railway and west of the Mandarin road; the 3rd Army along the Mandarin road and others to the east of it, as far as the Fu-liang–Hsi-chui-chen–Hui-san–Shu-lin-tzu road; the 1st Army along the latter, and the roads to the east of it.

Meanwhile the enemy had on the 9th broken through the 1st Army near Chiu-tien, driving back part of the 4th Siberians from this point to Leng-hua-chi. The officer commanding the 2nd Siberians (next to them) did nothing but merely hold his position on the River Hun at Hsiao-fang-chen, and the enemy spread out along the valley Hsiao-hsi-chua–Hu-shan-pu. The attempt made to drive them back at night by the Tsaritsin Regiment failed.

During the early morning of the 10th our position became yet worse; on the right flank the Japanese drove back Borisoff’s force to Hsiao-kou-tzu and opposite San-tai-tzu, and penetrated as far as the grove of the Imperial tombs. On the east large bodies of them appeared in sight of the Mandarin road. One was opposite Levestam’s force, while another began shelling the Mandarin road near Ta-wa from the heights near Hsin-chia-kou. The orders given on March 5 for the baggage to be sent back in good time had not been carried out, and part of the impedimenta of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, which was stretching along the road near Mukden early on the 10th, blocked the passage of the 5th and 6th Siberians and 17th Corps. On this morning also the Japanese, who had broken through near Chiu-tien on the 9th, began to press our left flank under Meyendorff. The troops sent as reinforcements did not act together, and were driven back north-west. By 10 a.m. Meyendorff was in full retreat—not north-east, but north-west towards the Mandarin road, which he crossed between Ta-wa and Pu-ho. The 6th Siberians now began to retire prematurely, and by so doing exposed the right of the 1st Corps and the left of the 17th. This unnecessarily sudden retirement of more than forty battalions under Meyendorff and Soboleff placed the 17th Corps and the 5th Siberians in a difficult position. Instead of fronting south, they had to front south-east. After a hot fight this force, consisting of thirty battalions, was also obliged to move to the rear prematurely. They did not go to Ta-wa, but west and south of the Mandarin road. This opened out a way for the enemy to that road, and also to the railway north—further on the portion between Mukden and Wen-ken-tun. By seizing this section about 2 p.m., before the rearguards or even the tail of the main body had passed Wa-tzu, they took our troops in flank. We had evacuated the village of San-tai-tzu prematurely, and it was quickly occupied by the Japanese. Between Wa-tzu and this village there is a defile, less than three miles long, through which a large part of the 2nd Army had to force its way under attack from both sides. Portions of the rearguards under Hanenfeld and Sollogub, which tried to get round to the east of it, were captured or destroyed.

I instructed General Dembovski to organize the defence of the Mandarin road at Ta-wa, and for that purpose to utilize the troops retiring along it. By 10 a.m. the distance between the portions of the enemy on the west and east of the railway was only seven miles. It was vital to stop any further contraction of the area of retirement of the 2nd Army. This might be done by blocking the Japanese advance to the railway from the west and north-west. As I was more anxious about the latter direction than any other, I moved out the eighteen battalions under Zarubaeff, which had joined my reserve from the 1st Army, on to the line Ma-kou-chia-tzu–Yang-tzu-tun, and ten battalions of the 72nd Division on the front Tung-shan-tzu–Hsiao-hsin-tun. The first force covered the railway between Hu-shih-tai and San-tai-tzu, and the second barred the enemy’s advance and supported the right flank of Artamonoff’s column. As a reserve to these troops, in case of pressure from the east, a brigade of the 1st Siberian Division was left near Hu-shih-tai station. By 4 p.m. the state of affairs on the Mandarin road became worse, as, immediately after General Levestam’s force had retired behind Pu-ho, Dembovski also abandoned his positions near Ta-wa, and moved off to the west. The fighting ceased as darkness came on. The last of the 2nd Army to fall back were portions of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Rifle Regiments under Lieutenant-Colonel Korniloff; they broke through near Wa-tzu in the pitch dark, though hemmed in by the enemy on three sides.

We continued to retire during the night, covered by the rearguard under Muiloff and that of Zarubaeff’s column. On the 11th several units of the 1st and 3rd Armies collected at the village of Yi-lu; but the greater part of the 3rd Army fell back direct on Tieh-ling. Bilderling was unable to carry out his proposal of remaining on the River Yi-lu till the 12th, and, having taken command of Shileiko’s force, after slight opposition retired northwards from Yi-lu village. By doing this he placed the rearguards of the 2nd Army that were still south of this point in a very precarious position. The main bodies of all the armies began on the 11th to occupy a position eight miles south of Tieh-ling on the Fan Ho. The 2nd Army took up a line to the west and the first one to the east of the Mandarin road, the 3rd remaining in reserve. Everything possible was done to restore order amongst the troops, transport, and parks. On the 13th the enemy’s advanced troops reached our positions, and on the 14th they attacked, directing their main effort on the line between the sections held by the 2nd Siberians and 72nd Division. All their attacks were repulsed with great loss, and many hundreds of dead were left in front of our position. Our losses were 900.

The two-weeks battle had badly disorganized several units, especially those of the 2nd and 3rd Armies. The men who had got separated from their own units and attached to others had to be sorted out and restored, baggage, transport, and parks had to be separated, and ammunition replenished. To carry this out made it essential that we should not be in direct touch with the enemy—that there should be some space between us. For this reason, and on account of the turning movement against our right flank along the River Liao, discovered by the cavalry, I decided not to accept battle at Tieh-ling, but to order a general retirement of all the armies on the 14th to the Hsi-ping-kai position, which was the best one between Tieh-ling and the River Sungari. The 1st and 2nd Armies began to move out of Tieh-ling on March 16, and by the 22nd were on the heights of Hsi-ping-kai.

CONCLUSIONS UPON THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN[93]

Both the nearness of the events related above and our ignorance about the enemy make it impossible for any detailed and absolutely impartial judgment to be formed upon the reasons for our defeat in this great battle. The records that have been collected so far, however, are sufficient to throw light upon a few facts—upon certain of our dispositions that did not correspond to the requirements of the case. Those made by the commander of the 2nd Army, to which force was entrusted the duty of stopping Nogi’s turning movement towards our rear, are of particular interest, and certain of them which had a very important bearing on the issue of the operations are now described.

General Kaulbars made neither a sufficient nor a clever use of his cavalry. This fact, coupled with the unfortunate selection of its leaders, was the reason why the mounted branch did such bad work,[94] and behaved in a manner that can hardly be called “devoted” during the Mukden operations. In the instructions given on March 1 to Grekoff’s cavalry to operate against Nogi, the object to be attained was plainly set forth, but how it was to be attained was not clearly defined. The execution of its most important task was also made the more difficult by the fact that Grekoff’s force was, on the same day as the orders were issued, split up into two almost equal groups, of which the eastern was found to be fighting Oku instead of Nogi. To rectify this, the cavalry under Pavloff was ordered on the same day by Kaulbars to undertake a special task against the turning columns, but on the 2nd the order was changed, and eight of Pavloff’s _sotnias_ were put under the command of Launits, who was operating against Oku. No touch was maintained between their different groups, and the greater part of the mounted forces clung to the infantry, and did practically no fighting (the losses suffered by this Arm during the twenty-three days’ operations in February and March were quite insignificant). Yet most of our regiments were quite capable of performing the most difficult tasks of war. The action of the infantry of the 2nd Army on the positions which they had taken up was completely passive. They did not try to get into touch with the enemy to ascertain their strength and dispositions (by taking prisoners), or to occupy advanced posts where these would be advantageous. The reconnoitring patrols of this army also did but little work. The consequence of such unsatisfactory performance of their duties by the cavalry and advanced infantry units of the 2nd Army was that information of the enemy was so meagre that the appearance of a great mass of Nogi’s army on and to the east of the Hsin-min-tun road came as a complete surprise to Kaulbars.

Owing to the appearance of large hostile bodies near Ka-liao-ma, I had on February 28 already ordered him[95] to take immediate steps to ascertain their exact strength, the direction in which they were moving, and their intentions. I repeated this order[96] on March 2, instructing him to find out their strength and dispositions more accurately if possible, and to frame some plan of action. I pointed out the necessity for energetic steps to ascertain the whereabouts of Nogi’s main body—whether it was opposite Sha-ling-pu, or whether it was executing a wider turning movement. On the morning of March 5 I for the third time[97] asked Kaulbars to find out where Nogi’s left flank was. Not one of these orders was carried out, with the result that I had inadequate and incorrect information upon which to form a decision as to the strength and whereabouts of the enemy operating on the right bank of the Hun. Tserpitski’s alarmist reports to the effect that more than three divisions were opposed to him made the fog worse. Kaulbars, who had been ordered to stop Nogi’s flanking movement, on the strength of incorrect information, all the time turned his chief attention towards the western front to Oku, whom he took for Nogi. The latter, owing to the 2nd Army’s inaction on March 3, 4, 5 and 6, was made a present of four days in which to complete his sweeping movement to the north-east,[98] and Kaulbars continued to see danger only on the west, paying insufficient attention to what was happening on the Hsin-min-tun road, north-west of Mukden. On March 1 he conceived a most complicated “castling” manœuvre, which he endeavoured to carry out when in direct touch with the enemy. The Composite Rifle Corps was ordered to cross from the right bank of the Hun on to the left, and the 8th Corps from the left to the right. The Rifle regiments crossed over the river, and by so doing evacuated the most important section near Chang-tan, but the 8th Corps was unable to get across. The enemy at once took advantage of this, and, rapidly throwing their 8th Division forward along the right bank of the river, drove back the relatively weak force of ours still on that side. Kaulbars, moreover, stopped the movement on Sha-ling-pu (of the Composite Division under Golembatovski), which had already been started, and by so doing deprived us of the possibility of checking the heads of the enemy’s columns on March 2. Finally, the 5th Rifle Brigade under Churin—which was moving by my orders to operate against Nogi—was stopped on March 3 by Kaulbars in the valley on the right bank of the Hun, and found itself among the troops opposing Oku.

After weakening Topornin by sixteen battalions, Kaulbars, on reaching his force, countermanded the advance on Sha-ling-pu, which had been begun on the morning of the 3rd, and suddenly withdrew thirty-two battalions to Mukden without fighting. This made our position distinctly worse. He took no steps to establish and maintain touch with Birger’s brigade on the Hsin-min-tun road, and never informed the latter of the order to retire he had given to Topornin on the 3rd. In telling Launits on the morning of March 3 of his decision (to withdraw Topornin’s force to Mukden), he stated that “Grekoff’s column and Birger’s brigade are probably cut off from Mukden,” but he made no attempt to help Birger. And yet up to 2 p.m. on the 3rd Birger’s brigade was not even engaged. Our attempt to retake Ssu-hu-chia-pu on March 4 was stopped by Launits, owing to the receipt of orders from Kaulbars not to attack if it was likely to be a costly operation. Kaulbars did nothing that day, although he had under his command 119 battalions[99] on the right bank of the Hun, and although I had ordered him to assume the offensive. Moreover, he did not even know the whereabouts of the troops under him. Although he had 113 battalions under his command on the right bank on March 5, he again did nothing. He did not carry out my orders to attack the enemy’s left energetically, and permitted these troops, which were at Khou-kha—next to Gerngross’s force—to deploy very slowly, and stopped their advance before they had got in touch with the enemy. Moreover, yielding to the preconceived idea of the main danger lying in the west, he moved sixteen splendid battalions of the 10th Corps from Gerngross’s force, operating towards Hsin-min-tun, on to the left flank of the army. Yet again on the 6th, although he had 116 battalions on the right bank, he effected scarcely anything, for our active operations towards Hsin-min-tun were conducted with an insufficient force, and therefore failed.

The result of his dispositions from March 2 to 5 was that on the 6th we did not have a single battalion of the 2nd Army operating against Nogi, whereas we should have had forty.[100] All ninety-six battalions of the 2nd Army were on that day distributed on the defensive against Oku. This distribution of troops, which in no way met either the general requirements or the definite task given to Kaulbars—to stop Nogi’s army—constituted one of the main reasons of the failure of our operations at Mukden.

On the 2nd and 3rd the following troops were given to Kaulbars from my reserve for his operations against Nogi:

Battalions. 16th Corps 24 1st Siberians 18 De Witte’s column (3rd Army) 15 Zapolski’s column 4 ―― Total 61

Moreover, sixteen battalions of the 10th Corps (2nd Army) were by my orders concentrated opposite Sha-ling-pu on the 2nd, and on the 7th the 10th Rifle Regiment and two battalions of the 4th Siberians were sent from my reserve to join Kaulbars’ army—_i.e._, he was given in all eighty-one battalions, of which sixty-five had not previously belonged to the 2nd Army. Of these, as transpired later, as many as thirty-five battalions did not take part, or only took very little part, in any fighting up to the 10th—_i.e._:

Battalions. 1st Siberians 13 De Witte’s column 13 2nd Brigade, 9th Division 8 10th Rifle Brigade 2 ―― Total 35

These units either occupied defensive positions, and merely watched the Japanese making a flank march past them,[101] or were moved for no reason from one place to another (2nd Brigade of the 9th Division). Their losses from the 3rd to 9th were trifling.

On the 4th, when I ordered Kaulbars to “move every available man on to the right flank near the Hsin-min-tun road,” the reverse was done. Two regiments (Tambov and Zamost) were moved from the right bank of the river on to the left; the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Division was ordered to move away from the Hsin-min-tun road, and crossed from Huang-ku-tun to Liu-kou-tun, and the Primorsk Dragoons from an important position on this road were sent to the rear to Hu-shih-tai.[102] On March 5 we were able to collect more than 100 battalions for operations against Nogi, 70 being concentrated by my instructions. But although Kaulbars had received orders to send an army corps on to the right bank of the Hun to engage Nogi, he not only did not carry out the order, but lost five days (March 2 to 6), and thus allowed the turning movement to develop so far that part of the force I had collected (25th Division) was on the 7th operating, not against Nogi, but against Oku’s left flank. Moreover, as he had on the 5th also weakened the force collected by me to act against Nogi by sending 16 battalions to the left flank of the 2nd Army, the result of these dispositions and our inaction during these five days was that on the 7th only 37 battalions operated against Nogi instead of 100. The loss of time, and the weakness of the force that actually opposed Nogi, were largely contributory to our failure.

Having so far employed only a very small part of the troops entrusted to him for offensive operations, on the 7th Kaulbars definitely and finally assumed the defensive. He did not even seize the opportunity of the repulses suffered by the enemy at Wu-kuan-tun and against Tserpitski’s force to attack. On the 7th, 8th, and 9th, with 140 battalions at his disposal, he assumed a passive rôle everywhere. While allowing a great confusion of units, he did not take proper steps, which he was quite able to do, to re-establish the corps, divisional and brigade organization, and on the 8th he did not take advantage of the possibility of forming a reserve from the entire 10th Corps, which would have enabled him to re-establish the organization of the other corps. On the 4th he removed Generals Muiloff, Topornin, and Kutnevich from the command of their corps for no reason, and as he did not replace them by other officers, the staffs of these corps were headless. The employment of the reserves in the 2nd Army was neither carried out by arrangement, nor in accordance with the actual necessities of the situation, so that there were instances of reserves being sent up when not required (Gerngross on March 8). In spite of my order, which he received on the 5th, to send back the baggage and transport to the north, Kaulbars only obeyed this instruction in regard to Tserpitski’s and Gerngross’s columns on the 9th, and thus made our retirement, especially that of our rearguards, most difficult. He failed to observe the appearance or concentration of the enemy on the northern front, and took no steps to avert this danger. The concentration of our forces on this side was carried out under my own orders. Had it not been for this, the enemy would have seized the village of San-tai-tzu and the grove of the Imperial tombs on the 7th.

One occasion when Kaulbars did issue orders that met the case was when he ordered Launits to attack the enemy on March 10 at Hei-ni-tun so as to assist the retirement, and he got together a strong force for this purpose. But then, when these troops were on the point of commencing the attack, he went to Launits and countermanded it, without even informing me of this most important change in his previous dispositions. Yet, had this attack been only partially successful, it would have greatly relieved the situation. Right up to March 13 not one of the arrangements made by him was fully carried out, and it is clear that he did not even then in the least appreciate the conditions. In addition to wasting time, extending his front, and acting only on the defensive, he did not realize the danger of Nogi’s appearance at such a moment north of Mukden, nor of his movement round our flank. In a letter to me of August 11, he wrote that on March 8 and 9, “although we had been retiring for a week, circumstances were going very well for us, as, the further the enemy moved northwards, the nearer they were getting to their Poltava.”

From the above it can be seen that Kaulbars’ dispositions, his inaction, and his misunderstanding of the whole situation, could not lead the 2nd Army to Poltava. On the contrary, on March 8 and 9, 1905, it was nearly a case of Tsushima.

It only remains for me to conclude with a few pages out of the short report on the war which I submitted to His Majesty the Emperor.

“Of the many causes contributing to the disastrous issue to the Battle of Mukden, I will only mention the following:

“1. The fall of Port Arthur liberated Nogi’s army, the whole of which took part in the battle. The formation of the new divisions in Japan was completed at the same time, and, judging by the prisoners we captured, two of these also took part in the battle. The immediate making good of wastage in their ranks presented no particular difficulty to the enemy, owing to the relative proximity of Japan to the theatre of war, and the resultant ease with which she was able to transport her troops by sea. Judging by the muster rolls found on the dead and wounded, the effective strength of their companies was between 200 and 250 rifles, and all casualties were at once replaced.

“The liberation of Nogi’s army and the landing of troops in Northern Korea compelled us to increase the force detailed for the defence of the Primorsk district and Vladivostok, and the appearance of bodies of Japanese cavalry, together with artillery and numerous bands of Hun-huses in Mongolia, coupled with the raids on the railway, which were becoming more frequent, necessitated steps being taken to increase the railway guard along its 1,350 miles’ length in Manchuria.

“These two measures took fourteen battalions and twenty-four _sotnias_ from the field army, and also a large number of the 80,000 reservists then being sent to the front as drafts.

“All these things combined enabled the Japanese at the battle of Mukden to be as strong as, if not stronger than, we were in the number of rifles.

“2. The tardy discovery by our cavalry of the enemy’s movement round our right flank, when ‘strong columns of Japanese infantry’ had already appeared at Ka-liao-ma.

“3. The complete lack of energy displayed by the officer in command of the 2nd Army in repulsing Nogi’s force which was moving round us, with the result that we lost seven most important days (March 1 to 8).

“4. His complete ignorance of the strength and whereabouts of the enemy moving round his right. The lack of information and the inaccuracy of what was received rendered some of my own dispositions not only unnecessary, but wrong. As a particular instance, I may mention that I only knew for certain when it was too late that the enemy were not making (as had been reported) a wider turning movement on both banks of the Liao towards Tieh-ling.

“5. The lack of energy displayed by senior officers of the 3rd Army on March 10 in overcoming the difficulties of the retirement. Their passive attitude with regard to the enemy’s movements towards the Mandarin road—illustrated by the diversion of the various columns (on encountering the enemy) towards the west on to the line of retirement of the 2nd Army, instead of forcing back the enemy away from the Mandarin road.

“The inaction of the 55th Division of the 6th Siberians was remarkable. The commander of this unit, who only had this one division under his command, decided to place it directly under the officer in command of the 1st Corps. Having done so, he rode away from his division to Ta-wa village. When he reached the railway on the morning of the 11th, he was unable to inform me where his division[103] was!

“6. The failure of the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Armies to carry out the orders I had given some days before the retirement began to send back the baggage and transport northwards. It was the disorder and panic which occurred amongst these auxiliary services on the retirement that caused the loss of so many guns and limbers, and ammunition and baggage waggons.

“7. The inertia displayed by the officers commanding the 2nd Siberian Division and the 2nd Siberians, when an attempt was made to prevent the enemy breaking through near Chiu-tien, and when later they spread north of the Mandarin road. Besides the twenty-four battalions of the 1st Corps and the 4th Siberians, which did remain on the right flank of the 1st Army, the 55th Division might have been used in this operation. But the officer commanding the 2nd Siberians received the enemy’s advance passively, merely throwing back his right flank, and thus presenting the enemy with an opening for their advance on to the Mandarin road.

“8. Nevertheless, I consider that I myself am the person principally responsible for our defeat, for the following reasons:

“(_a_) I did not sufficiently insist on the concentration of as large a general reserve as possible before the operations commenced.

“(_b_) I weakened myself just before an important battle by a brigade of infantry and a Cossack division (believing General Chichagoff’s reports). If I had not sent one brigade of the 16th Corps for duty on the communications, and had insisted on the 1st Siberians being sent back from the 1st Army at full strength, I should have had two full corps available for operations against Nogi’s turning movement.

“(_c_) I did not take adequate measures to prevent the confusion of units. Indeed, during the battle I was myself compelled to contribute to the disintegration of corps.

“(_d_) I should have made a better appreciation of the respective spirit of both sides, as well as of the characteristics and qualifications of the commanders, and I should have exercised more caution in my decisions. Although the operations of the 2nd Army from March 2 to 7 failed in their object, my firm belief in ultimate victory resulted in my ordering a general retirement later than I ought to have done. I should have abandoned all hope of the 2nd Army defeating the enemy a day sooner than I did; the retirement would then have been effected in complete order.

“(_e_) When convinced of Kaulbars’ inertia and passive tactics, I should have taken command of the troops on the right bank of the Hun personally. On March 9 I should similarly have taken command of Muiloff’s force, and acted as a corps commander.”

In my letters of March 31 and May 13, 1905, to His Majesty the Emperor, I reviewed generally the factors which made the war extraordinarily difficult for us.[104]

Has the army survived its Tsushima? No; it went through nothing nearly so bad as that. We fought hard everywhere, and we inflicted greater losses on the enemy than they on us. We were weaker in numbers than they were, and we retired. Even the Mukden reverse owes its reputation as a decisive Japanese victory to the impressions of our own correspondents, who were with the baggage and in rear. Can one say that the Russian land forces were defeated, when in the first important battles (at Liao-yang and on the Sha Ho) we only put into action a fourteenth part of our armed forces, and at Mukden, at a time when the Japanese had already put forth their greatest efforts, we had less than a sixth of our force? Nor must it be forgotten that we fought against a nation of 50,000,000 martial and ardent souls, who, hand in hand with their Emperor, were able to grasp victory by fearing no sacrifice. To defeat such a foe in such a distant theatre of war, great and continued efforts were required of the whole of our country as well as of the army. In the beginning of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries we waged great wars with such leaders as Charles XII. and Napoleon. In these we also experienced defeat, but in the end we issued absolute victors. In the eighteenth century, between defeat at Narva and victory at Poltava nine years elapsed; in the nineteenth, between defeat at Austerlitz and our entry into Paris there was also nine years’ interval.

The events which happened in the Far East in 1904–05 can, owing to their historical importance and their significance for Russia and the whole world, be placed alongside those through which Russia passed in the early years of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the struggle with Charles XII. and Napoleon the Russian people was at one with the Tsar, and bravely bore all trials and sacrifices, strengthening and improving the army, treating it with kindness, believing in it, wishing it well, and profoundly respecting it for its gallant deeds. The people realized the necessity for success, hesitated at no sacrifice, and were not troubled by the time required to gain it, and the harmonious efforts of Tsar and people gave us complete victory. The way to victory is in the present day by the same road which our ancestors followed in the early years of the last two centuries.

If mighty Russia, headed by the Tsar, had been permeated by a brave and single-minded desire to defeat the Japanese, and had not stinted the sacrifices and time necessary to preserve Russia’s integrity and dignity, our glorious army, supported by the trust of its ruler and a united people, would have fought until the enemy had been vanquished.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

THE ROYAL TIMBER COMPANY[105]

Among the first questions suggested by General Kuropatkin’s narrative and the editorials, reports, and official proceedings that he quotes, are: Who was State Councillor Bezobrazoff? How did he acquire the extraordinary power that he evidently exercised in the Far East? Why was “everybody”—including the Minister of War—“afraid of him”? Why did even the Viceroy respond to his calls for troops? and why was his Korean timber company allowed to drag Russia into a war with Japan, apparently against the opposition and resistance of the Tsar, the Viceroy, the Minister of War, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Port Arthur Council, and the diplomatic representatives of Russia in Peking, Tokio, and Seoul?

No replies to these questions can be found in General Kuropatkin’s record of the events that preceded the rupture with Japan, but convincing answers are furnished by certain confidential documents found in the archives of Port Arthur, and published at Stuttgart,[106] just after the close of the war, in the Liberal Russian review _Osvobojdenie_. Whether General Kuropatkin was aware of the existence of these documents or not I am unable to say; but as they throw a strong sidelight on his narrative, I shall append them thereto, and tell briefly, in connection with them, the story of the Ya-lu timber enterprise as it is related in St. Petersburg.

In the year 1898, a Vladivostok merchant named Briner obtained from the Korean Government, upon extremely favourable terms, a concession for a timber company that should have authority to exploit the great forest wealth of the upper Ya-lu River.[107] As Briner was a promoter and speculator who had little means and less influence, he was unable to organize a company, and in 1902 he sold his concession to Alexander Mikhailovich Bezobrazoff, another Russian promoter and speculator, who had held the rank of State Councillor in the Tsar’s Civil Service, and who was high in the favour of some of the Grand Dukes in St. Petersburg.

Bezobrazoff, who seems to have been a most fluent and persuasive talker, as well as a man of fine presence, soon interested his Grand Ducal friends in the fabulous wealth of the Far East generally, and in the extraordinary value of the Korean timber concession especially. They all took shares in his enterprise, and one of them, with a view to getting the strongest possible support for it, presented him to the Tsar. Bezobrazoff made an extraordinarily favourable impression upon Nicholas II., and in the course of a few months acquired an influence over him that nothing afterward seemed able to shake. That the Tsar became financially interested in Bezobrazoff’s timber company is certain; and it is currently reported in St. Petersburg that the Emperor and the Empress Dowager together put into the enterprise several million roubles. This report may, or may not, be trustworthy; but the appended telegram (No. 5), sent by Rear-Admiral Abaza, of the Tsar’s suite, to Bezobrazoff in November, 1903, indicates that the Emperor was interested in the Ya-lu enterprise to the extent, at least, of the two million roubles mentioned. Bezobrazoff’s “Company,” in fact, seems to have consisted of the Tsar, the Grand Dukes, certain favoured noblemen of the Court, Viceroy Alexeieff probably, and the Empress Dowager possibly. Bezobrazoff had made them all see golden visions of wealth to be amassed, power to be attained, and glory to be won, in the Far East, for themselves and the Fatherland. It was this known influence of Bezobrazoff with the Tsar that made “everybody” in the Far East “afraid of him”; that enabled him to enlist in the service of the timber company even officers of the Russian General Staff; that caused Alexeieff to respond to his call for troops to garrison Feng-huang-cheng and Sha-ho-tzu; and that finally changed Russia’s policy in the Far East, and stopped the withdrawal of troops from Southern Manchuria.

General Kuropatkin says that the Russian evacuation of the province of Mukden “was suddenly stopped by an order of Admiral Alexeieff, whose reasons for taking such action have not to this day been sufficiently cleared up.” The following telegram from Lieutenant-Colonel Madridoff, of the Russian General Staff, to Rear-Admiral Abaza, the Tsar’s personal representative in St. Petersburg, may throw some light on the subject:

(No. 1.)

TO ADMIRAL ABAZA, HOUSE NO. 50, FIFTH LINE, VASSILI OSTROFF, ST. PETERSBURG.

Our enterprises in East constantly meet with opposition from Dzan-Dzun of Mukden and Taotai of Feng-huang-cheng. Russian officer merchants have been sent East to make reconnaissances and examine places on Ya-lu. They are accompanied by Hun-huses, whom I have hired. The Dzan-Dzun, feeling that he is soon to be freed from guardianship of Russians, has become awfully impudent, and has even gone so far as to order Yuan to begin hostile operations against Russian merchants and Chinese accompanying them, and to put latter under arrest. Thanks to timely measures taken by Admiral, this order has not been carried out; but very fact shows that Chinese rulers of Manchuria are giving themselves free rein, and, of course, after we evacuate Manchuria their impudence and their opposition to Russian interests will have no limit. _Admiral (Alexeieff) took it upon himself to order that Mukden and Yinkow (Newchuang) be not evacuated._[108] To-day it has been decided to hold Yinkow, but, unfortunately, to move the troops out of Mukden. _After evacuation of Mukden, state of affairs, so far as our enterprises are concerned, will be very, very much worse,[108] which, of course, is not desirable._ To-morrow I go to the Ya-lu myself.

(Signed) MADRIDOFF.

Shortly before Lieutenant-Colonel Madridoff sent this telegram to Admiral Abaza, Bezobrazoff, who had been several months in the Far East, started for St. Petersburg with the evident intention of seeing the Tsar and persuading him to order, definitely, a suspension of the evacuation of the province of Mukden, for the reason that “it would inevitably result in the liquidation of the affairs of the timber company.” From a point on the road he sent back to Madridoff the following telegram, which bears date of April 8, 1903, the very day when the evacuation of the province of Mukden should have been completed, in accordance with the Russo-Chinese agreement of April 8, 1902:

(No. 2.)

TO MADRIDOFF, PORT ARTHUR.

There will be an understanding attitude toward the affair after I make my first report. I am only afraid of being too late, as I shall not get there until April 16, and the Chief leaves for Moscow on April 17. I will do all that is possible, and shall insist on manifestation of energy in one form or another. Keep me advised, and don’t get discouraged. There will soon be an end of the misunderstanding.

(Signed) BEZOBRAZOFF.

On April 24, 1903, Bezobrazoff sent Madridoff from St. Petersburg a telegram written, evidently, after he had made his first “report” to “the Chief.” It was as follows:

(No. 3.)

TO MADRIDOFF, PORT ARTHUR.

Everything is all right with me. I hope to get my views adopted in full as conditions imposed by existing situation and force of circumstances. I hope that if they ask the opinion of the Admiral (Alexeieff), he, I am convinced (_sic_), will give me his support. That will enable me to put many things into his hands.

(Signed) BEZOBRAZOFF.

General Kuropatkin says that Admiral Alexeieff gave him “repeated assurances that he was wholly opposed to Bezobrazoff’s schemes, and that he was holding them back with all his strength”; but the Admiral was evidently playing a double part. While pretending to be in full sympathy with Kuropatkin’s hostility to the Ya-lu enterprise, he was supporting Bezobrazoff’s efforts to promote that enterprise. Bezobrazoff rewarded him, and fulfilled his promise to “put many things into his hands” by getting him appointed Viceroy. Kuropatkin says that this appointment was a “complete surprise to him”; and it naturally would be, because the Tsar acted on the advice of Bezobrazoff, Von Plehve, Alexeieff, and Abaza, and not on the advice of Kuropatkin, Witte, and Lamsdorff. It will be noticed that Von Plehve—the powerful Minister of the Interior—is never once mentioned by name in Kuropatkin’s narrative. Everything seems to indicate that Von Plehve formed an alliance with Bezobrazoff, and that together they brought about the dismissal of Witte, who ceased to be Minister of Finance on August 29, 1903. Anticipating this result of his efforts, and filled with triumph at the prospect opening before him, Bezobrazoff wrote to Lieutenant-Colonel Madridoff on August 25, 1903, as follows:

(No. 4.)

“The great saw-mill and the principal trade in timber will be transferred to Dalny, and this in co-partnership with the Ministry of Finance. The Manchurian Steamship Line will have all our ocean freight, amounting to 25,000,000 feet of timber, and the business will become international. From this you will understand how I selected my base and my lines of operation.”

In view of the complete defeat of such clear-sighted statesmen and sane counsellors as Kuropatkin, Witte, and Lamsdorff, there can be no doubt that Bezobrazoff’s “base and lines of operation” were well “selected.”

The document that most clearly shows the interest of the Tsar in the Ya-lu timber enterprise is a telegram sent to Bezobrazoff at Port Arthur in November, 1903, by Rear-Admiral Abaza, who was then Director of the Special Committee on Far Eastern Affairs, over which the Tsar presided, and who acted as the latter’s personal representative in all dealings with Bezobrazoff and the timber company. In the original of this telegram significant words, such as “Witte,” “Emperor,” “millions,” “garrison,” “reinforcement,” etc., were in cipher; but when Bezobrazoff read it he (or possibly his private secretary) interlined the equivalents of the cipher words, and also, in one place, a query as to the significance of _artels_—did it mean mounted riflemen or artillery? The following copy was made from the interlined original:

(No. 5.)

FROM PETERSBURG, _November 14–27, 1903_.

TO BEZOBRAZOFF, PORT ARTHUR.

Witte has told the Emperor that you have already spent the whole of the two millions. Your telegram with regard to expenditure has made it possible for me to report on this disgusting slander, and at the same time contradict it. Remember that the Chief counts on your not touching a rouble more than the three hundred without permission in every case. Yesterday I reported again your ideas with regard to the reinforcement of the garrison, and also with regard to the _artels_ (mounted Rifles or artillery?) in the basin. The Emperor directed me to reply that he takes all that you say into consideration, and that in principle he approves. In connection with this the Emperor again confirmed his order that the Admiral telegraph directly to him. He expects a telegram soon, and immediately upon the receipt of the Admiral’s statement arrangements will be made with regard to the reinforcement of the garrison, and at the same time with regard to the mounted Rifles in the basin. In the course of the conversation the Emperor expressed the fullest confidence in you.

(Signed) ABAZA.

General Kuropatkin refers again and again to the Tsar’s “clearly expressed desire that war should be avoided,” and he regrets that His Imperial Majesty’s subordinates “were unable to execute his will.” It is more than likely that Nicholas II. did wish to avoid war—if he could do so without impairing the value of the family investment in the Korean timber company—but from the above telegram it appears that as late as November 27, 1903, only seventy days before the rupture with Japan, he was still disregarding the sane and judicious advice of Kuropatkin, was still expressing “the fullest confidence” in Bezobrazoff, and was still ordering troops to the valley of the Ya-lu.

APPENDIX II

BREAKDOWN OF THE UNIT ORGANIZATION AND DISTRIBUTION[109]

Amongst the causes which added to our difficulties must be mentioned the frequent breakdown in action of the normal organization of the troops. It began when war was declared, and though efforts were made to rectify things as far as possible, it was not till after the battle of the Sha Ho that we were really able to re-establish our formations. But both the corps and divisional organization again disappeared during the battle of Mukden, and the resulting confusion to a certain extent contributed to our defeat.

When war began the corps organization of the troops stationed in the Far East was not complete, and one corps was formed of the independent Rifle brigades. When the Rifle regiments were brought up to a strength of twelve battalions, the normal composition of the 1st and 3rd Siberian Divisions was twenty-four battalions. The 2nd Siberian Corps was supposed to consist of one Rifle division and one reserve division formed in the Trans-Baikal district. Before hostilities commenced, a division of the 3rd Siberian Corps (the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division) was moved by the Viceroy to the Ya-lu; the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division, with the corps staff, remained in Kuan-tung. The 1st Reserve Division, which constituted part of the 2nd Siberian Corps, I kept at Harbin, and this corps remained with only one division till I was appointed Commander-in-Chief. When the operations began, I endeavoured to reform the dislocated corps organization. I therefore collected on the line Liao-yang–Feng-huang-cheng the 3rd and 6th Siberian Rifle Divisions, and formed with them a corps which I called the 3rd Siberians. At first I did not succeed in sending to this corps the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment—it being stationed in Mukden as a guard on the Viceroy’s Headquarters—and my subsequent request that it might be sent to the Ya-lu to join the corps there was refused; it was only sent forward after the battle of the Ya-lu. The line Liao-yang–Ta-shih-chiao–Port Arthur was guarded by the 1st Siberian Corps, at full strength. The 2nd Siberian Corps, in which was included the 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Divisions, which had arrived in the Far East in 1903, composed my reserve, and was divided between Liao-yang and Hai-cheng.

At first, owing to our paucity of numbers, the 3rd Siberians had to defend a large tract of country. Six regiments of this corps were on the line River Ya-lu–Feng-huang-cheng–Fen-shui-ling–Liao-yang; one regiment was on the line Ta-ku-shan (sea and mouth of Ya-lu)–Hsui-yen–Ta Ling–Hai-cheng. One regiment was on the line Kuan-tien-cheng–Sai-ma-chi–An-ping–Liao-yang. When the 4th Siberians arrived, the line Ta-ku-shan–Ta Ling–Hai-cheng was occupied by one of its brigades, because a considerable number of Japanese had made their appearance in this direction. The remaining three brigades were concentrated near the station of Ta-shih-chiao,[110] as a reserve either for the 1st Siberians to the south or the brigade of the 4th Siberians on the Ta Ling (Pass). All the units of the 10th Army Corps which arrived from Russia were collected on the line Sai-ma-chi–An-ping–Liao-yang, where Kuroki’s army was in force. As soon as the units of the 4th Siberians and 10th Army Corps occupied the above-mentioned lines, the regiments[111] belonging to the 3rd Siberians were moved off to join their own corps. On arriving from European Russia, the units of the 17th Army Corps were concentrated near Liao-yang, and formed my main reserve.

The two brigades of the 10th and 17th Army Corps, which arrived in the Far East in 1903, were organized as independent brigades, and, till the troops concentrated at Liao-yang, operated with the advanced forces. The brigade of the 35th Division fought with the 1st Siberians, to which it was sent up as a reinforcement in the battle of Te-li-ssu. The brigade of the 31st Division sent to reinforce the troops operating on the line Ta-ku-shan–Ta-Ling–Hai-cheng, together with the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, became part of the 2nd Siberians. When the Japanese advanced with all their three armies on July 31, the general disposition of our troops was as follows:

1. To the south, opposite Oku’s army, were the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps, total forty-eight battalions (the 1st Siberians at full strength, the 4th Siberians consisting of three brigades), under the command of General Zarubaeff.

2. On the line Ta-ku-shan–Ta Ling–Hai-cheng, opposite Nodzu’s army, were the 2nd Siberians and a brigade of the 4th Siberians, total twenty-eight battalions, under the command of Lieutenant-General Zasulitch.

3. On the line Ya-lu–Fen-shui-ling–Liao-yang, opposite Kuroki’s army, were the 3rd Siberians, and the 10th and 17th Army Corps, total eighty battalions, under the command of General Bilderling. At this time the 5th Siberians were, by the Viceroy’s orders, detrained at Mukden, and told off to protect the rear and the line Pen-hsi-hu–Mukden, and to act at the same time as a reserve for the advanced corps. When we moved towards Hai-cheng the brigade of the 4th Siberians operating on the line Hai-cheng–Ta Ling–Ta-ku-shan, returned to its own corps. In retiring towards Liao-yang, the two brigades of the 10th and 17th Army Corps, which had been sent out to the Far East in 1903, joined these corps.

During the first days of the battle of Liao-yang the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Siberians and 10th Army Corps took part at their full strength of units. The 2nd Siberians had only one division, and the 17th Army Corps concentrated on the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, and was not at first engaged. When we crossed on to the right bank of the river, in order to operate against Kuroki, the corps organization became in several instances quite dissolved. In addition to the 2nd and 4th Siberians, we had to leave a brigade from both the 3rd Siberians and the 10th Army Corps for the defence of the immense fortified camp at Liao-yang itself. At the time of our advance at the beginning of October, I did everything possible to keep the corps organization intact. The 1st and 3rd Siberians and the 1st, 10th, and 17th Army Corps operated at full strength, while the 4th and 6th Siberians had three brigades each, one brigade of the 4th Siberians being sent to strengthen the 3rd, which had a particularly difficult task allotted to it, and one brigade of the 6th Siberians (which was under me) being left by the Viceroy’s orders to protect our rear. The 2nd Siberians, which consisted of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, was strengthened by five reserve battalions. The 5th Siberians was alone (for good reasons) split up into two groups, one operating under the command of the corps commander on the extreme right flank, the other on the extreme left under General Rennenkampf. The account of the September operations of the Eastern and Western Forces, given in Chapter IX., shows to what an extent the units became mixed by the mere course of the fighting. As soon as I was appointed Commander-in-Chief, I did my best to prevent this in the future. The 61st Reserve Division, which did not belong to an army corps, and had been detailed by the Viceroy to strengthen the Vladivostok District, was sent by me to the field army and incorporated in the 5th Siberians, in place of the 71st Division, which was concentrated on the extreme left flank under the command of General Rennenkampf. All the regiments of the 1st Siberian Division were sent to join the 2nd Siberian Corps, and the 1st Siberian and 10th Army Corps were moved at full strength from the first line to my main reserve. The 3rd, 4th, and 6th Siberian and the 1st and 17th Army Corps were at full strength—distributed along the first lines and in reserve. The 2nd and 5th Siberian Corps had each only three brigades, one brigade of the latter having been left on the right bank of the Hun Ho to protect our extreme right. A brigade of the 5th Division holding Putiloff Hill was left, at the special request of the officer commanding the 1st Manchurian Army, on the positions which had been captured by the splendid regiments of this brigade (19th and 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiments). As soon as the 8th and 16th Army Corps arrived they were posted to my main reserve; the three Rifle Brigades were formed into a Composite Rifle Corps.

Early in January, 1905, I concentrated all three corps of the 2nd Army—_i.e._, the 8th, 10th, and Mixed Rifle Corps in reserve, and I had in my main reserve the 1st Siberians with a division of the 16th Army Corps (the other was still on the railway). We had altogether 128 battalions in reserve, and our position was most favourable. It might, however, have been still better if I had insisted on strong army reserves being formed in the 1st and 3rd Armies. My proposal to move the 17th Army Corps back from the advanced lines met with a strongly worded request that the distribution of the 3rd Army might be left as it was. In the 1st Army I might have insisted on the whole of the 4th Siberian Corps being sent to join the reserve after the transfer of the Rifle Brigade from Putiloff Hill to the strong Erh-ta-ho position. I made a mistake also in forming three Rifle Brigades together into one corps. If I had kept them as independent brigades, it would have been unnecessary to take brigades from army corps whenever independent brigades were required. Although the Japanese had fewer battalions than we had, these were much stronger than ours; they also had more independent units than we had. Their divisions were not organized in corps, their small armies being made up of divisions and independent brigades, and our corps organization was not sufficiently flexible to meet the thirteen to fifteen Japanese divisions, and a similar number of independent brigades. The enemy were able to take divisions and brigades from the advanced positions and transfer them, without upsetting their existing organization, and with far greater ease than we could move our corps. When an independent brigade operated against us—as, for instance, on the line Sai-ma-chi–An-ping—we were obliged to break up our corps organization in order to meet it with one of our brigades; this happened in the 10th Army Corps.

Again, owing to the general course of events and other reasons over which I had no control, our corps organization had to be broken up before the operations at Hei-kou-tai, but was restored as soon as possible. It also occurred during the February fighting round Mukden, where the circumstances, indeed, did not in every case warrant it. After General Grippenberg’s disastrous operations at Hei-kou-tai our strategical position was altered much for the worse. Four army corps, which had until then been standing in reserve, were sent up into the fighting-line, and three of them became hopelessly mixed up in the process. At the time I thought it only possible to keep one corps (the 1st Siberians) in reserve, but the 16th Army corps, the 72nd Division, a brigade of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, and the Tsaritsin Regiment were available, as it turned out. This made a total reserve of eighty-two battalions. With such a strong main reserve I hoped to be able to meet the enemy successfully, if, on being reinforced by Nogi’s army from Port Arthur, they took the offensive.

According to our estimates, the fall of Port Arthur might reinforce the Japanese field army by some fifty battalions altogether, but we thought that the greater portion of Nogi’s army would be sent to operate against Vladivostok, or via Possiet towards Kirin, so as to take us in the rear. The possibility of this made us extremely sensitive, both as to our rear and as regards Vladivostok. The first thing we did, therefore, on Nogi’s army being set free, was to strengthen the garrison of the latter place, which was very weakly held for the extent of the defences. I sent there from all three armies cadres of a strength of six battalions, which were to expand into four regiments so as to form the 10th East Siberian Rifle Division. It was thought that, upon a general assumption of the offensive, the Japanese would simultaneously try to bring about a rising of the local native population, and to destroy the railway bridges behind us. To give colour to our fears, a whole series of reports, each more alarming than the last, were received from General Chichagoff. In these he described the large numbers of the enemy that had appeared behind us with the intention of seizing Harbin as well as of destroying the railway. I mentioned (Vol. III.) how this officer calculated the strength of the enemy in our rear at tens of thousands, and how persistent he was in his demands that the troops guarding the line might be strengthened. As a proof of the urgency of the circumstances, he reported the defeat, with a loss of guns, of some Frontier Guards sent out by him to reconnoitre east of the Kuan-cheng-tzu station. Later information corroborated these reports in so far that parties of the enemy, accompanied by bands of Hun-huses, had penetrated far in rear, broken through our line of posts between Kuan-cheng-tzu and Bei-tu-ne, and were threatening the latter point, which, being our central corn-supply depôt, was of immense importance to us. Large bodies of Japanese and Hun-huses were also reported as moving in the direction of Tsit-si-har with the intention of blowing up the important railway-bridge across the River Nonni, and thus cutting our railway communication. One of the large bridges near the station of Kung-chu-ling was, after a skirmish with our guards, destroyed. In the face of such “circumstantial evidence” as the loss of guns and the destruction of bridges, it was impossible not to credit General Chichagoff’s reports (the extent of their exaggeration we did not find out till later), and to refuse him assistance. The security of our communications was literally vital, for even their temporary disorganization meant catastrophe. Not only the flow of reinforcements to the front, but the collection and distribution of local supplies would have ceased. As we were over 5,300 miles away from our base (Russia), we had been forced to form a local supply base, and the loss of this would have threatened the army with starvation. As, therefore, the actual numbers guarding the railway were small, I increased them by one brigade of the 16th Army Corps and four Cossack regiments. My staff inclined to the opinion, indeed, that six Cossack regiments should have been sent.

In February the Japanese moved forward in strength, carrying out a frontal attack combined with simultaneous turning movements against both our flanks. To carry out such an operation successfully implies great numerical superiority on the side of the attackers, or else great attenuation along their front; and relying, apparently, on the strength of their positions, the Japanese did weaken their front to a very great extent. Our best plan would accordingly have been to have attacked them in the centre in the hope of breaking through there, and then operating afterwards against the outflanking movements. But this might have been disastrous, for if they succeeded in holding their frontal positions with comparatively small numbers stiffened by extra artillery and machine guns and well reinforced by reserves [which were in their case splendidly organized], we might still have been outflanked by the turning movements.

The special difficulty of frontal attacks was amply confirmed during the Mukden battles, for, although our troops there held very extended positions, they repulsed the Japanese whenever the latter made only a frontal attack. When, therefore, the Japanese assumed the offensive, and Kavamura’s movement round our left flank developed, I determined to check it by attacking Kuroki in front and flank. The situation on our left had become very alarming, for by losing the strong Ching-ho-cheng position and retiring towards Ma-chun-tan we had exposed the left flank of the 3rd Siberian Corps on the Kao-tai Ling (Pass). A still wider turning movement threatened to throw the 71st Division back on Fu-shun, but the reinforcements rapidly sent to the 1st Army from the main reserve were able to arrest Kavamura’s movement, largely owing to the behaviour of General Rennenkampf’s and Daniloff’s 71st and 6th East Siberian Rifle Divisions, which fought with great gallantry and stubbornness. If the 1st Army, which had a strength of 175 battalions, had made a successful advance, it ought to have influenced the operation then under way against our right. Being anxious to take the offensive, I gave Linievitch, commanding the 1st Army, the chance of selecting the main point of attack, and he decided to strike the point where Kuroki’s and Kavamura’s armies joined. The orders had been issued, and the movement had actually begun, when certain unconfirmed reports as to the movement of some Japanese divisions round the left flank of the 3rd Siberians unfortunately led him to stop the attack and send back such units of the 1st Siberian Corps as had been lent to the 1st Army for the operation. We had lost several days in collecting troops for this offensive movement, and large bodies of the enemy had meanwhile been moving round our right. I have described in detail (Vol. III.) the steps taken to avert this danger, and the results achieved. Here I will only mention them briefly. Against the 2nd Army, which consisted of ninety-six battalions, and which was mostly located on the left bank of the Hun Ho, Oku was operating with the greater part of his army. His right flank was, according to our information, operating against the 5th Siberians, and part, probably, against the 17th Army Corps of the 3rd Army. Thus, opposed to the troops under General Kaulbars’ command at the time when Nogi’s advance developed, there were, according to our calculations, not more than thirty-six to forty Japanese battalions. As the 2nd Army was reinforced by twenty-four battalions of the 16th Army Corps from the main reserve, theoretically we should have driven Oku’s army south by an energetic offensive, and, having thus cut it off from Nogi’s force, should have fallen on the latter. To do this we should have had to seize the fortified positions with strong defensive points near the village of San-de-pu by frontal attack. Practically, in the much more favourable conditions of a month previous, 120 battalions of the 2nd Army had been unable to drive the enemy southwards and get possession of this village after six days’ continuous fighting. There was every reason to fear, therefore, that even if we gained possession of these points, and succeeded in forcing back Oku’s army, so many men would have been expended in the effort that we should have been in no condition to oppose Nogi, who could then have captured Mukden, and cut off the 2nd and 3rd Armies from their communications.

Whatever course was decided upon, our weakness in power of manœuvre, the strength of the Japanese divisions, and their great powers of defence, had to be borne in mind. On the whole, a consideration of these points rather led to the conclusion that it was probably a distinct advantage to them to engage as many of us as possible in a frontal attack on their positions, so that they might be the more certain of success in their turning movement. After looking at the question from all sides, I decided to stand on the defensive in the front of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, and to move as quickly as possible sufficient troops to the right bank of the Hun Ho to check and then drive back Nogi’s army, which was executing the turning movement. The first troops to be used for this were those of the 2nd Army, whose duty it was to protect the right flank of our whole force. For this purpose I first took one corps from this army, calculating that the sixty-four remaining battalions could without difficulty withstand any onset by Oku (of from thirty to forty battalions). General Baron Kaulbars was ordered to move this corps as quickly as possible towards the village of Sha-ling-pu, where I proposed to concentrate the units to oppose Nogi. To operate against him I then moved up twenty-four battalions of the 16th Corps together, putting them also under the command of General Kaulbars, while as a reserve to these advanced troops I took twelve battalions from the 3rd and the 1st Siberian Corps, which I ordered to move towards Mukden and rejoin my reserve as soon as news was received of the attack being stopped, and of the departure of the 1st Army to Chi-hui-cheng. Thus, arrangements were made for the concentration of ninety-two battalions, which by March 3 should easily have been able to cover our right flank, check Nogi’s army, and drive it back. Unfortunately, our hopes of what was going to be effected on this flank were not fulfilled. In order to move this army corps against Nogi, Kaulbars essayed a most complicated manœuvre—namely, to move the Composite Rifle Corps from the right bank of the Hun Ho on to the left, and to replace it on to the right bank by the 8th Army Corps, which was to move on Sha-ling-pu. The first part of this plan was carried out—the Rifle Corps crossed on to the left bank, but, owing to the Japanese pressure, the 8th Army Corps remained on that side. Thus the units of the two Corps became mixed up. Of the 2nd Army, only two brigades (of the 10th Army Corps), which had been sent there under my orders, together with the 25th Infantry Division, arrived at Sha-ling-pu. Meanwhile the whole of the 10th Army Corps, or at least twenty-four battalions of it, might have been moved there, for it was opposed by very few of the enemy. The transfer from the right—the threatened—flank of the Rifles had, as is now known, very serious consequences, for by it the right flank of the 2nd Army was uncovered too soon, and the units there, being attacked in front and flank, began to retreat, which caused the adjacent troops to do the same.

From the information I received as to the enemy’s movements, I decided to move the 16th Army Corps in two directions—one portion direct on Hsin-min-tun, and the 25th Division on Sha-ling-pu. When it became apparent that the enemy were not advancing behind the Liao Ho, but between it and the Hun Ho, Kaulbars very properly gave orders for a brigade of the 41st Division to be sent up towards the 25th Division at Sha-ling-pu. We should have thus had the 16th Corps, consisting of twenty-four battalions, all together; and to this it was General Kaulbars’ intention to add the 8th Army Corps at full strength. As this force would have been reinforced by me by another Siberian corps, we should have had three army corps against Nogi. Unfortunately, however, Kaulbars countermanded the orders already issued to General Birger (to join the 25th Division), and this brigade continued to act independently, and added to the existing confusion of troops, especially when it split up and retired in two directions—towards Mukden and Hu-shih-tai station. Instead of the 8th Army Corps arriving to reinforce the 25th Division, two brigades of the 10th Army Corps turned up. Finally, Linievitch did not consider it possible to carry out his orders (to send the 1st Siberian Corps to Mukden at full strength), and asked permission to detain two regiments of it, and so the divisions of the 1st Siberian Corps arrived in Mukden with only three regiments each. Fully recognizing the danger of our position on the right flank, the commander of the 3rd Army sent his army reserve of three regiments of the 17th Army Corps to Mukden, and on his own initiative added to them the Samara Regiment (three battalions), which had been sent to him the day before with a view to strengthening his left. Meanwhile the different orders given during the fighting between February 23 and March 4 by the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Armies resulted in an inextricable confusion of lesser units, which added to that caused by the breakdown of the corps organization. As there were insufficient army reserves, Linievitch reinforced the troops that were being attacked from the corps reserves of those corps which had not been attacked. For instance, when the enemy’s advance against the left flank of the 1st Army began, certain units of the 3rd Siberian Corps, by moving eastwards along the front, were able to strengthen Rennenkampf’s force. When the Kao-tai Ling position—defended by the 3rd Siberians—was attacked, this corps was supported by portions of the 2nd and 4th Siberian Corps to the west of them; when the 2nd Siberians were attacked they were reinforced by units of the 4th.

Thus the reinforcements sent up by me only served to heighten the general confusion of units caused by the orders of the officer commanding the 1st Army and of the corps commanders. Against Kavamura on March 1 and 2 there were in the 1st Army the 71st Division, consisting of three regiments, the whole of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, one regiment of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, and one regiment of the 1st Army Corps—total twenty-nine battalions.[112] Against Kuroki were the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, consisting of three regiments, one regiment of the 71st Division, two of the 4th Siberians, and one of the 2nd Siberians—total twenty-five battalions. On the assumption that we should attack, I sent to these troops the 72nd Division and the 1st Siberians at full strength, as well as one regiment of the 1st Army Corps—total forty-four battalions. Thus sixty-nine battalions were concentrated on and behind the positions of the 3rd Siberian Corps. Farther west, on the positions of the 2nd Siberian Corps, there remained of this corps fourteen battalions, which, reinforced by a regiment of the 4th Siberians, successfully repulsed all attacks, including an assault made by the Japanese Guards. Still farther west, on the positions of the 4th Siberians, which were not attacked, there were twenty to twenty-four battalions of this same corps. Finally, against Nodzu’s right twenty-four battalions of the 1st Army Corps not only completely repulsed all attacks, but pressed forward very successfully. Generally speaking, although the units of the 1st Army were considerably mixed up, the corps organization of the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Siberians and the 1st Army Corps was not very much disturbed.

In the 2nd Army matters were worse. The unsuccessful attempt to “castle” two corps (the Composite Rifle and 8th Army Corps) was the start of the break-up of the army corps organization, and in beating off the enemy these two corps, together with the 10th, became still more involved. Throughout the fighting of the night of March 4 no touch was kept between the different units of the 8th Army Corps. The 14th Division (three regiments) and one regiment of the 15th Division crossed on to the right bank of the Hun Ho and moved westwards, while the 15th Division (three regiments) arrived behind the left flank of the 3rd Army after a night march to the north-east. On the morning of the 4th mingled portions of all these corps took up fresh positions on both banks of the Hun Ho.

Sufficient efforts were not made to readjust matters either in the divisions or corps. The commander of the 10th Army Corps maintained under his command only two brigades of the 9th and 31st Divisions (consisting of sixteen battalions), which had been moved by my order towards Sha-ling-pu; the commander of the 16th Army Corps was with the 25th Infantry Division, which had sixteen battalions; while neither the commanders of the 8th or Composite Rifle Corps had got so many troops directly under them. By General Kaulbars’ orders, Tserpitski was appointed to command the left wing of the troops moved on to the right bank of the Hun Ho; among these was only one regiment of the 10th Army Corps, the remainder belonging to the 8th Army, Composite Rifle, and 5th Siberian Corps. At the same time as Kaulbars appointed Tserpitski, he removed the commanders of the 8th, Composite Rifle, and 16th Corps from the direct command of troops. This gave the _coup de grâce_ to the corps organization of this army. It was now completely destroyed. As I have mentioned (Vol. III.), there was an opportunity on March 6 of withdrawing the whole of the 10th Army Corps from the first line, and so reorganizing the 8th Corps and the Composite Rifles properly, but the commander of the 2nd Army did not seize it.

The inaction of the 2nd Army on March 4, its passive and disastrous operations on the 5th and 6th, placed our right flank in a very difficult position. Nogi was moving not only along the flank, but to the rear of the 2nd Army. The commander of this army, continuing to see danger where there was none, paid particular attention to Oku’s operations, and left Nogi to move round to our rear without hindrance. Indeed, had I not interfered on March 7, Nogi’s force would have seized Shan-tai-tzu, the Imperial Tombs, and Mukden, and moved in rear of the 2nd Army. By my orders the defence of the positions near Shan-tai-tzu, Ta-heng-tun, and Wen-ken-tun was organized so as to face to the north and west. The movement of the 3rd Army towards the Hun Ho contracted our position, and enabled me to withdraw to my main reserve portions of the 9th, 15th, and 54th Divisions, and by means of this concentration the danger of Nogi’s movement to our rear was temporarily averted, but in the section held by the 2nd Army we were fighting on three fronts—west, south, and north. Under such conditions I naturally sent into action those units which were nearest. Still, the defence of the northern front was entrusted to a brigade of the 41st Division, the Volinsk Regiment, and to the 9th Rifle Regiment. Near Tsu-erh-tun were concentrated three regiments of the 9th and three of the 54th Divisions.

On the 6th and 7th I made a final attempt to wrest victory from the Japanese. Hoping that Kuroki had suffered heavily on the preceding days, and relying on the splendid material in the 1st Army, I made up my mind, after considerable discussion of the matter with its commander on the telephone, to weaken that army considerably, so as to make certain of having sufficient men at Tsu-erh-tun. I augmented my main reserve by the whole of the 72nd Division, a brigade of the 2nd Siberian, and eighteen battalions from the 1st Army and 4th Siberian Corps. The commander of the 1st Army was of opinion that if we did not soon have a success on the right this weakening of the 1st Army might be a danger, but though fully realizing the force of his contention, I considered it necessary to take the risk for the following reasons:

1. One hundred and five splendid battalions were still left under the command of General Linievitch.

2. The enemy in front of the 1st Army must, according to the reports sent in by its commander, have lost very heavily.

3. The Japanese had transferred almost the whole of Oku’s army to the right bank of the Hun Ho, immediately after Nogi’s, and we had either to break through this disposition or strengthen those of our forces on the right bank of the Hun Ho by a lateral movement. As I have described already (Vol. III.), our hopes were not realized. The movement of the reserves to Tsu-erh-tun was effected very much more slowly than we had counted upon, and, taking advantage of our reduction in strength on the front held by the 1st Army, the enemy broke through there. At the point of our position (Chiu-tien) where the enemy broke through, _there should have been, according to the arrangements of the officer commanding the 1st Army, four regiments of the troops under his command, but as a matter of fact there were only ten companies of the Barnaul Regiment_.[113] Taking all the circumstances into consideration, our retirement was, in my opinion, a day too late, and instead of throwing all the reinforcements which arrived at Tsu-erh-tun into the fight, some of them (General Zarubaeff’s force) had to be kept as a last reserve in case the enemy attempted to close us in with a ring of fire.

In the last fights at Mukden, the 4th Siberian Corps was scattered along the whole front, but the enemy being at that spot in inconsiderable strength, did not attack its strong position at Erh-ta-ho. Thirty-two splendid battalions of this corps might have been used by the commander of the 1st Army for a local counter-attack, or, together with the troops of the 1st Army Corps or those of the 2nd Siberians, for a greater effort at the counter-offensive, for which a very favourable opportunity presented itself when the enemy attacked the 2nd Siberians. By advancing we could have taken the attacking forces in flank and rear, and the Japanese Imperial Guards would have been threatened with disaster. But the opportunity was not seized. Hence the 4th Siberian Corps, having no force opposed to it, only formed, so to speak, a reserve to the 1st and 2nd Armies.

On the whole, the confusion was at its greatest between March 8 and 10 on the northern front of the 2nd Army, but the energetic and gallant General Launits was in command, and he not only beat back all attacks, but rescued the inert units of the 2nd Army, whose rear Nogi was threatening. On March 10 General Muiloff, in command of the rearguard (composed only of the Lublin Regiment), gallantly and successfully carried out the difficult duty of covering the retirement of the 2nd and 3rd Armies.

It must be remembered that, though the corps organization mostly broke down, the regimental organization was preserved, and this gave a cohesion in action which, when taken advantage of, served us right well. The preservation of the regimental organization was also important on account of the rationing of the troops. The first line transport (with field kitchens and two-wheeled ammunition carts) were kept with regiments, and so ammunition and food were in many cases most opportunely forthcoming in spite of the mixing up of units. The nearness of our supplies also at Mukden enabled us easily to refill regimental reserves. Against the 1st Siberian Corps at the bloody action at Su-no-pu (near San-de-pu) on January 27—a fight that was more or less unpremeditated on both sides—units of five different Japanese divisions were engaged, though the enemy had a comparatively small force in the field. The enemy, therefore, must also have suffered from confusion.

I have endeavoured to give some explanation of how it was that units got mixed up; but I consider that it was in many cases quite unnecessary. Consequently, when I reported to the Tsar that I was mainly responsible for our disaster at Mukden, I pointed out that one of my mistakes was that I did not sufficiently legislate to prevent this confusion, and that, as a matter of fact, I was forced by circumstances to add to it.

INDEX

ABAZA, Admiral, his connection with the Royal Timber Company, ii. 309–313

Abdur Rahman, and Afghanistan, i. 84, 85

Adabash, Colonel, his information on Japanese reserve forces, i. 206

Afghanistan: her frontier, i. 62; Britain’s advance, i. 63, 84; and Russia, i. 64–66, 87; a buffer State, i. 85; Boundary Commission, i. 86

Alexander I., Emperor of Russia: more freedom for the army, i. 14; his example, i. 20

Alexander II., Emperor of Russia: the clamour for peace, i. 22; the emancipation of the serfs, i. 23; military economy, i. 87; the Siberian Railway, i. 149

Alexander III., Emperor of Russia, military economy, i. 87

Alexeieff, Admiral: stops work at Port Arthur, i. 126, 128; the Boxer rebellion, i. 154; stops the evacuation of Mukden, i. 169; his connection with Bezobrazoff and the Royal Timber Company, i. 173–185, ii. 306–313; becomes Viceroy of the Far East, i. 187; his negotiations with Japan, i. 188–198; disperses his troops and fleet, i. 225; his opinion of the fleet, i. 237, 238; report on the Eastern Chinese Railway, i. 246; presses for relief, i. 257; strategical distribution of troops, ii. 205–211; the weakness of Port Arthur, ii. 213, 229

Alien population, dangers of an, i. 102

Alma, battle of the, i. 17

America, Russia hands over her possessions in, i. 35

Ammunition: defects in gun, i. 137; average expenditure of rifle, ii. 149, 150

Amur district, Russia’s annexation of, i. 35

Armament (see Army): inferior, i. 15; moral effect of, i. 107, 108; artillery, i. 121, 135; for Port Arthur, i. 129; test of a new field-gun, i. 136; defects in gun ammunition, i. 137

Army, Russian: the Great Northern War, i. 5, 6; reductions in, i. 8; distribution of, i. 9; struggle with France, i. 10; annexation of Finland, i. 12; in the Crimean War, i. 13–21; in the Turkish wars, i. 24–34; casualties in the two main struggles, i. 36; peace and war establishments, i. 38; relative speed of mobilization, i. 88–90, 272–284; losses in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, i. 99; incapacity of generals, i. 101; improvement of, i. 113, 119–124; value of the Siberian Corps, i. 125; want of railway transport, i. 131–134, 156, 242–268; re-armament of the artillery, i. 135, 136; defects in gun ammunition, i. 137; numbers in the Pri-Amur district, i. 144; its distribution, i. 225, ii. 209, 210; its favourable state when peace declared, i. 230–234; defeats at Yalu, Chin-chou, and Te-li-ssu, i. 257, 258; loss at Sha Ho, i. 259; the reservists, i. 278–290; shortage and capabilities of officers, i. 290–294, 300–305; discipline, i. 295, 296; corporal punishment, i. 297–299; want of sappers, i. 305; machine-guns, i. 306–309; criticism of staff work, ii. 2, 3; cavalry at manœuvres, ii. 4; attack and defence, ii. 5; column formation, ii. 6; work of the artillery, ii. 7; work of the sappers, ii. 7, 8; criticism by commanders, ii. 9; tactical instruction, ii. 10–25; relative positions of, ii. 33, 34, 37–40; absence of military spirit and patriotism, ii. 35, 183; adverse conditions, ii. 37, 39; effect of the rainy season and dysentery, ii. 41; difficulties in organization, ii. 44–60; defects in the command, ii. 60–72; in the rank and file, ii. 72–80; Kuropatkin’s final address to, ii. 88–97; suggestions for the improvement of: (1) the senior rank, ii. 98–114; (2) the regulars and reservists, ii. 114–127; (3) reserve organization, ii. 128–131; (4) augmenting the combatant infantry, ii. 131–136; (5) machine-guns, ii. 136; (6) depôt troops, ii. 137–139; (7) communication troops, ii. 139, 140; (8) engineer troops, ii. 141–146; (9) artillery, ii. 146–151; (10) cavalry, ii. 151–155; (11) infantry, ii. 155–161; (12) organization, ii. 161–176; summary of the war, ii. 177–204; gradual improvement in spirit, ii. 183, 188, 189; strategical distribution of, ii. 205, 271; Kuropatkin’s narrative of the war, ii. 205–305; strength of, ii. 258; breakdown of the unit organization and distribution, ii. 314–335

Artamonoff, General, ii. 281, 282

Artillery: rearmament of the, i. 121, 135; machine, i. 306–309, ii. 136, 137; suggested improvements, ii. 146–155, 162

Asia: Russia’s war with Turkey, i. 26; Russia’s position in, i. 34; Russia’s frontiers, i. 40–46; opposition to Russia’s expansion in, i. 147

_Asia for the Asiatics_, ii. 195, 196

Austerlitz, Russia’s heavy loss at, i. 98

Austria: war with Napoleon, i. 10; Crimean War, i. 16; her frontier with Russia, i. 51–54; her strategic railways, i. 55; her speed of mobilization, i. 90; her perfected organization, i. 103

Austro-Hungary: Russian frontiers, i. 44, 50–52; trade with Russia, i. 52; possibility of war with Russia, i. 53, 54

Azov, surrender of, i. 6

Baikal, Lake, great obstacle to the Siberian Railway, i. 149, 248, 254

Balasheff, Acting State Councillor: his warlike despatch, i. 178; investigation of the Royal Timber Company, i. 181

Baltic Sea: Russian aims, i. 5, 9; defence of, i. 114

Batianoff, General, Commander of the 3rd Manchurian Army, ii. 186

Batoum, i. 32

Bayazet, the defence of, i. 26

Berlin: Congress, i. 32; Treaty of, i. 82

Bessarabia, Russian annexation of, i. 13, 24

Bezobrazoff, State Councillor: his connection with the Royal Timber Company, i. 169, ii. 306–313; his propositions, i 172–174; Kuropatkin’s report on, i. 177–179; investigation of the Royal Timber Company, i. 180, 184

Bilderling, General, Commander of the 2nd Manchurian Army: his report, ii. 186; criticism on, ii. 228, 234, 247; his force, ii. 242; withdraws to position on the Sha Ho, ii. 245, 286

Black Sea, the: Russian progress towards, i. 6, 12, 13; Russia deprived of a war fleet in, i. 19, 24, 33; coast defence on, i. 114

Blume, M., theorist in strategy, ii. 69

Borisoff, Colonel, at Mukden, ii. 281, 283

Borodino, Russian loss at, i. 98

Boskey, General, surprises the Russians at the battle of the Alma, i. 17

Bothnia, Gulf of, Russian aims, i. 9, 41, 42

Boxer Rebellion, i. 136, 154, 155

Bulgaria: Turko-Servian War, i. 24, 25; Russian behaviour in, i. 29, 30

Burun, M., on the Russian fleet, i. 236, 237, 240, 241

Caucasus, the: her Russian frontier, i. 5, 8, 33, 34, 57, 58; her troops, i. 26, 114

Cavalry: not sufficiently used, ii. 151, 152; failure of the officers, ii. 153–155, 288; details of units, ii. 162

Censorship, necessity for press, ii. 176

Charles XII., King of Sweden, war with Russia, i. 5

Cherniaeff, General, Geok Tepe, i. 32

Chichagoff, General, his alarmist reports, ii. 302, 321, 322

China: peaceful attitude of, i. 5; Peking Treaty, i. 35; Russian frontier and trade, i. 67, 68; war with Japan, i. 69, 151, 201–204; Russian policy, i. 72, 157; the awakening of, i. 91; Boxer Rebellion and treaty with Russia, i. 154–162; her alarm at Russia’s policy, i. 170; Russian treatment of the Chinese, ii. 190, 191

Chin-chou, battle of, i. 257

Civil disorder, repression of, ii. 125

Constantinople, Russian advance to walls of, i. 30, 82

Cossacks. See Cavalry

Crimean War: strength of Russian army, i. 13; Russia’s unpreparedness, i. 16, 101, 109; Inkerman, i. 18; siege of Sevastopol, i. 19; a premature peace, i. 20–22

Dalny: Russian annexation of, i. 69; Japanese use of, i. 127; its fortifications, i. 172, ii. 207; commerce, i. 190; coal storage at, i. 246

Danube, the, Russian acquisition and loss of the mouths of,