CHAPTER IX

REASONS FOR OUR REVERSES (_continued_)

The insufficient tactical preparation of our troops—Measures taken to improve it.

I have touched upon the fact of how our want of tactical training was shown up in the Crimean and second Turkish Wars. Especially conspicuous was the inability of our senior commanders—relying as they usually did upon quite inadequate information as to the enemy’s strength and dispositions—to co-ordinate the operations of the different arms towards one end, and their ignorance of where to deliver the main attack. The minor part played by our cavalry and our comparatively great power of defence were also remarked. Finally, attention was drawn to the fact that our lack of the power of manœuvre compelled us to place superior numbers in the field against the Turks, a course which had not formerly been necessary.

After the war of 1877–78 we set to work to study our weak points, in order to eliminate our faults. Much must have been accomplished since then, for the tactical training of the army at the beginning of the recent war was undoubtedly of a higher standard than it was twenty-five years ago. Still, in some matters we had not progressed, while in others we had actually gone back. The duty of training the troops rests with commanding officers of all ranks, and the responsibility for this extends right up to those in command of military districts. Although the same drill-books and manuals are used by the whole army, there is considerable variety in the way that the tactical instruction is imparted, owing to the diverse views held by the district commanders. I have taken part in many manœuvres, and was in command of the army at the grand manœuvres at Kursk in 1902, and I noted down what I considered to be our principal failings in this respect. In October, 1903, I submitted a report on the subject to the Tsar, in which my conclusions on certain points were as follows:

“1. _Staff Work with the Main Army and with Detached Columns at the Grand Manœuvres._

“Generally speaking, the staff work cannot be characterized as entirely satisfactory. The principal reasons for this were the somewhat unhappy selection of the officers appointed to be chiefs of the different staffs, the poor organization of the staffs themselves, due to a limited personnel and to an insufficient supply of the means of communication [telegraph and telephone equipment] for both the troops and staffs, and the neglect to arrange proper intercommunication between units by making use of mounted orderlies, automobiles, or cyclists. Intelligence of the enemy as well as of the disposition of other units was always received late by those whom it concerned, because the cavalry was badly organized, and could not carry out its orders properly.

“The amount of writing done by the various staff-officers was colossal. They worked the whole evening and all night; their effusions were lithographed or printed, and were sent off in all directions; but the orders were rarely received by the troops in proper time. At the manœuvres of the Warsaw Military District in 1899, cases came under my notice of general officers commanding divisions receiving the order to move in the morning two hours after the time appointed for them to start.

“In many instances staff-officers with troops seemed ignorant of how a reconnaissance should be carried out, and consequently did not gauge the dispositions of the enemy’s forces with sufficient accuracy. This reacted in turn on the dispositions made by the chief commanders, more particularly in their employment of the reserves (Kursk manœuvres and those at Pskoff and Vlodava). Similarly, they did not know how to arrange for the maintenance of touch along the front and to the rear, a defect which caused a delay in the receipt of orders and information which was quite avoidable.

“2. _Work of the Cavalry at Manœuvres._

“The increased importance now attached to the strategic or independent duties of cavalry has, in my opinion, acted detrimentally upon the cavalry work with the troops. The spirit of the strategic rôle was in most cases not properly grasped, and the chief idea of the masses of mounted troops of both sides appeared to be to meet each other. They therefore neglected to furnish the commanders of their sides with the information of the enemy, so necessary before an action, and left the infantry without their co-operation during the actual combat; this was the same whether they were acting in attack or defence. Long-distance patrols often did useful work, but owing to the lack of proper means for the quick transmission of the information collected, it reached the troops to whom it might be useful after the enemy’s dispositions had been changed. The near patrols did not work in with the long-distance ones. Our mounted troops were frequently allowed to lose touch with the enemy at night under the pretext that the men and horses required rest, and the employment of a dozen troopers was grudged after dark, when by day whole divisions and corps were futilely marched and countermarched, and sent upon duties which were not always in accordance with the general idea of the operations.

“The cavalry work should be more strictly in co-operation with that of the other arms than it is at present, and all officers in command of mounted units should remember that their rôle is auxiliary, and largely consists in assisting the General in command to come to a proper decision by the completeness and accuracy of the information they send back; that the cavalry should help the commanders, firstly, to frame a plan of action, then to crush the enemy on the field of battle.

“3. _Attack and the Defence._

“Here again information was wanting. When commanders made up their minds either to attack or to stand on the defensive, they were never able to feel, from their information of the enemy and the locality, that they thoroughly knew what they were doing, or that it really was in accordance with the spirit of the general idea. We were strong in the defence, but we rarely delivered a soundly conceived or executed attack. In the attack column commanders did not always take pains to obtain enough accurate information as to the dispositions and strength of the enemy, so as to be able to appreciate the situation properly and draw up a reasoned plan of battle, to select the direction of the main attack, to allot the troops for it, and take steps to deceive the enemy as to its precise direction. When they had massed sufficient first-line troops for the main attack, they did not also move up the reserves of all arms.

“In particular, we did not know how to conduct the advance, and then deliver the assault with proper preparation by artillery and rifle fire. Many commanders seem, unfortunately, to be wedded to the idea of carrying out a continuous advance without making any use of the rifle. If we ever encounter an enemy, such as the Germans, who systematically train their troops to advance under cover of their own heavy rifle-fire, we shall be worsted, for in peace we often advance almost without firing a rifle to a range of 1,000 or even 800 paces of the position.

“The guns also frequently ceased fire at the same critical period—_i.e._, when their attacking infantry are nearing the enemy. My inquiries as to the reason for this were usually met with the reply that their ammunition was expended. If the absolute necessity for keeping in hand a considerable number of rounds for the assistance of the decisive infantry attack is not realized now that we have quick-firing guns, our artillery will in war become useless at the very moment when its co-operation is most vital.

“In defence we are better than in the attack, and we know how to make the most of the fire effect of both guns and rifles. The ranges in front of a position are usually measured and clearly marked. But proper use is not made of reserves. We do not, as we should, throw them into the firing-line, so as to increase the volume of fire after the enemy’s main attack has developed, nor do we launch them in a fierce counter-attack after he has come within decisive range. The reserves are often kept in mass, and thrown against the attack without any supporting rifle-fire. Many regiments and brigades told off as reserves to a defensive position go through the whole manœuvres without firing a single round.

“4. _The Revival of the Column Formation in the Attack._

“Other European armies are now doing everything possible to minimize the murderous effect of modern rifle and artillery fire on themselves, and are, at the same time, endeavouring to develop their own fire to the utmost, both in the attack and defence; indeed, the Germans, in their efforts to this end, have gone the extreme length of deploying all their troops—sometimes even to the sacrifice of their reserves—in long thin lines. We, on the other hand, judging by the last manœuvres, are going to the other extreme, for our decisive attack is delivered almost without any fire preparation, and with men massed in quarter column!

“If a stop is not put to the increasing density of our attack formations, we shall suffer for it heavily. It is all the more dangerous for us, as we do not assist our assaulting infantry properly with supporting gun and rifle fire.

“5. _The Work of the Artillery._

“Artillery positions were in most cases skilfully chosen, but the fire discipline was often bad. As batteries can only carry a limited number of rounds in the field, it is vital that the gunners should be taught to economize every round; this is, of course, particularly important with quick-firing guns. But we often fired more rounds than were necessary: fire was opened too hurriedly, at quite unimportant targets, with the result that, at the critical moment of the attack, batteries had to signal that they were in action, for all their ammunition had been expended.[1]

“6. _The Work of the Sappers._

“The bloody lessons of Plevna and Gora Dubniak put fresh life into our military engineering, which lasted for a certain time after the Turkish War. Our sappers became skilful at constructing trenches and redoubts, and the other troops were also trained in field-works, and began to like entrenching themselves. But a reaction soon set in. This was largely due to General Dragomiroff, who did much to bring about a return to the old order of things, when it was held that everything was decided by the bayonet. He was quite opposed to the use of cover, and carried his orders on this subject to the height of absurdity, even forbidding his men to lie down while advancing to attack!

“To dig oneself into the ground means labour, and takes much time. Moreover, instructions used to be issued that all trenches dug had to be filled in again, and all redoubts dismantled. This at once limited the scope of trench-work in the army. The entrenching tool, which after the Turkish War had been valued next to cartridges and biscuits, was relegated to the mobilization store, and never brought out for use or even for inspection. At many manœuvres the men were not practised at all in the fortification of positions; at others the alignment of trenches was traced only. While giving the sapper units full credit for their excellent training, I cannot but express my fear that they specialize far too much in a mass of detail, and ignore the fact that their main duty in war is to co-operate in every way with the infantry, both in strengthening defensive positions and in the attack of them.

“7. _Criticism by Commanders._

“It is gradually becoming the custom to omit all criticisms[2] at grand manœuvres. Mistakes, therefore, pass unnoticed, are repeated, and tend to become chronic. I remember some very instructive manœuvre criticisms made by General Gurko, and I have listened with interest and advantage to others made by General Roop. Discussions after the operations are always held in the Kieff and St. Petersburg Military Districts, but nowadays some officers in command of districts neither make any remarks themselves when present at manœuvres, nor expect them to be made by the officers commanding sides or the other seniors. Orders issued after a long period—though they may enumerate the various points noticed—and the reports eventually printed of large concentrations and manœuvres, are comparatively useless for instruction. To be of use, criticisms must be made by the commanders, and made on the spot.

“It is, however, important to realize how rare the power of good criticism is. The remarks usually made are either quite colourless or too highly pitched. Some of our most capable general officers also seem peculiarly ‘unlucky’ in the way they manage unnecessarily to hurt the feelings of commanding officers by their harsh way of putting things. They forget that to lower the prestige of a senior in the presence of his juniors always produces a bitter harvest, especially in war. They forget the infinite variety of the conditions of different tactical situations, and that at peace manœuvres there is no need for one side to win or lose. Again, independent action, though certainly not wrong in itself, is often put down as a mistake and adjudged to be wrong because the senior commander has his own opinion in the matter. Such narrow-minded criticism deprives officers in command of units of the spirit of independence, of initiative, and of the desire for responsibility. Instead, they try to discover the fads of the officer in command, in order to ‘play up’ to them.

“8. _Conclusion as to the Tactical Instruction of our Troops._

“Although the opinion of the generals in command of military districts in all matters pertaining to military training should, and do, carry great weight, yet there must be some limit to individual action. It is impossible, for instance, to permit each of them to train the troops in his command entirely in accordance with his own views as to what is most important in war; for the instruction of attack and defence should not be carried out on entirely different lines in the different districts. Yet this is more or less what has been done. We at headquarters are partly to blame, owing to the delay in the publication of the field-service manuals and the instructions for the combined training of all arms. As an example of what I refer to: General Dragomiroff has trained the troops under him in the Kieff Military District to attack according to a system of his own, of which the soundness is open to doubt. If some of his theories are carried out in war, they will result in heavy loss, and therefore their inculcation in peace seems entirely wrong. His order that the skirmishers escorting artillery should be on a line with the guns themselves would only cause the premature silencing of the latter; and another, that the lines of skirmishers advancing to attack should not lie down when halted, is simply impossible of execution. When bullets are flying, a line lies down of its own accord as soon as it halts, and quite rightly so, as men get cover more easily when lying than standing. And now, following General Dragomiroff’s example, in the Vilna Military District General Grippenberg has begun to act according to his own theories, and depart from the textbook. In his District Orders this year,[3] in which were published his criticisms on the work done at manœuvres, he recommends that infantry in close order should receive cavalry with independent fire[4] instead of with volleys. He insists, also, that when a line is advancing by short rushes, these rushes should begin from the flanks.

“Unfortunately, much that I saw when inspecting the troops in the different districts and on grand manœuvres led me to the conclusion that the tactical training, especially in command, of officers commanding units, from regiments upwards, is neither sound nor uniform.”

My strictures on the peace tactical training of the army were, unfortunately, only too well confirmed during the war.

The theatre of war in Manchuria presented many peculiarities of climate, topography, and inhabitants. It was unlike any of the “probable” theatres of operations we had studied, and was, therefore, quite new to the troops who came from European Russia. The Japanese were not only new and practically unknown foes, but the nature of the information that we did possess about them tended to show our great superiority, and therefore incited us to contempt. The existing edition of our “Field Service Regulations” was obsolete, and the revised edition was still in the Press. Special instructions, therefore, had to be issued, in order to assist our troops to grapple with the entirely strange conditions under which they were placed. These were compiled and printed under my direction, and distributed to officers in command of all units, from companies and squadrons upwards, and to all chief staff-officers. In them I emphasized the necessity of getting to know something about the enemy, enumerated their strong and weak points, and drew attention to their patriotism and traditional indifference to death. I stated that their strong points predominated, and that in the Japanese we should find a very powerful opponent, even when reckoned by European standards. I continued:

“It is most important that in the first engagements, in which they will certainly be in superior strength, we should not give the Japanese the satisfaction of victory, for that will only still further elevate their spirit.

“No particular or new tactics need be adopted against our present enemy, but we must not repeat the mistakes in manœuvring which cost us so dear in the Turkish War of 1877–78.”

I then mentioned the causes of our reverses at Plevna, and commented in detail on the most important. After capturing Nicopolis, our troops moved on Plevna in ignorance of the strength and dispositions of the enemy. As far as obtaining this information was concerned, our cavalry was not well handled. In the first fight at Plevna (July 20, 1877) we attacked with too few men and in detail. We did the same in the fights of July 31 and September 12, but to an even greater extent, and the attacks were carried out in too dense a formation, were not sufficiently prepared by fire-effect, and our own numerous cavalry and that of the Roumanians did practically nothing. The attacks on September 10 and 11, 1877, failed because our troops were badly distributed and untrained. I attached an appreciation of the work of our troops in the Turkish War as follows:

“In this war the staff work was not always successful. The troops often received orders too late, and time was wasted waiting for their receipt before commencing a move. Units arriving at night on the positions allotted to them did not always find the officers who should have been waiting their arrival to guide them. Officers in command of troops were often not informed by the staff as to the enemy’s strength and dispositions, or as to our own neighbouring columns. Lack of information was the principal cause of our disasters; we sometimes attacked in entire ignorance of the enemy’s strength and dispositions, and even partially so of our own.

“As an example of what our troops can do in an attack may be quoted the capture of Kars; it is a very instructive case. Though the weak field-works of Plevna resisted our efforts for five months, at Kars neither strong parapets nor deep ditches could check our onslaught. Our gallant Caucasians advanced on the fortress by night; they were well led, and always had a body of scouts skilfully thrown out in front, and they captured strongholds that had been termed ‘impregnable’ with great bravery.

“In the defence our troops have always fought well. Let us remember the defence of the Shipka Pass, and imitate it.”

After a short review of our errors in the Turkish War, I enumerated those which were still noticeable in our peace manœuvres.

As operations developed the enemy’s peculiarities became as well known as our own, so I was able in August, September, October, and December, 1904, to issue supplementary instructions.

Notwithstanding the number of our cavalry, and what our scouts had been able to do, we had not ascertained the general dispositions and strength of the enemy. The information brought in by spies was exaggerated and unreliable. The result was that, when we had carried out any offensive operations, we had advanced without knowing anything of the enemy. My instructions ran:

_Instructions issued in August._

“In our attacks we have started the advance too rapidly, without strengthening positions already occupied, and without full artillery co-operation, and we have stopped the action at a period when we still had large numbers both in the general and regimental reserves. In retirements we have withdrawn to positions previously occupied by us without having taken steps to hold our ground on any of them, which preparation would not only have greatly assisted the retirement itself, but, what was far more important, would have enabled us to renew the attack.

“Another point is, that many of our defensive positions have not corresponded to the numbers, when extended, told off to defend them. Nevertheless, the enemy’s frontal attacks, even if we hold quite chance positions, usually fail, and we have been obliged to abandon our ground owing to the turning movements which their superior numbers have made possible.

“In attacking, especially among hills, the infantry must wait so that the assault may be prepared by fire, in order to get breath or to give time for the co-operation of a turning movement. There is also another and involuntary reason for halting—namely, the enemy’s fire. Owing to this, units halt, or, what is worse, begin to retire without orders; what then usually happens is this: A few men begin to trickle back from some company that has come under a particularly hot fire; they are followed by their own company, which is in turn followed by the companies on either side, even though the latter may perhaps be holding strong ground. Such a moment is, indeed, critical, and unless some brilliant officer appears who possesses the secret of rallying retreating men and succeeds in making the company hold its ground, the action is lost. But besides setting a personal example to the men, a commanding officer must at once push forward some of his reserves to stop the rot among those retreating. The most important thing at such a crisis is the example set by the officers or the steadiest men, particularly by Cavaliers of the Order of St. George.[5] A company commander’s example is everything to his company. Therefore, however deserving he may be in peace, a company commander who does not display personal gallantry in action should be instantly removed from his command.

“The most effective method of guarding against a sudden emergency either in attack or defence—and this is particularly true in hilly country—is to have in hand a strong reserve, and not to make use of it too lightly. This we have not done in recent actions; we have told off weak reserves, and used them up too quickly. Whole regiments have sometimes been sent in support where two companies or a battalion would have been ample.[6]

“In all kinds of operations officers in command must keep the forces on either flank, as well as their seniors, informed of everything that happens. We are, unfortunately, not accustomed to do this. Before an action the smallest details are reported, but as soon as an action begins we become so preoccupied with the fight that the most obvious duties are forgotten. Chief staff-officers of all grades will in future be held responsible for the frequent transmission of reports during an action.”

The special attention of commanding officers was also called to the necessity for providing their men with hot food during action, and to the excessive expenditure of ammunition in our fights.

_Instructions issued during September._

The following were the main instructions given by me while preparing for an advance after the fighting in August:

“It is a regrettable fact that so far, whenever we have taken the offensive, we have met with reverse. Owing to our lack of information, to which I have already drawn attention, instead of delivering a confident attack according to a clearly-thought-out plan, we have acted in a half-hearted manner. We often deliver our main attack too soon, and regardless of the enemy’s intentions. Instances have occurred where we have detailed attacking columns as small as a battalion; in others we have operated without any definite plan of action. Finally, there have been cases where not enough determination has been shown in pressing forward to the objective.”

The importance of gaining even slight successes over the enemy’s advanced troops at the beginning of a forward movement, the fact that in the attack of positions turning movements should always be made in combination with frontal attacks, and the advantage of pushing on energetically when once an advance had commenced, were all points specially noted. The necessity of holding on determinedly to every yard of ground gained was accentuated, and leading units in a frontal attack were warned not to deliver the assault until the synchronous turning movement had been fully developed. Every use was to be made of fire-effect of every sort. I wrote:

“A glaring case of that lack of co-operation from which we suffer so much was the fight of September 2,[7] when the left column began the action far too soon, and therefore finished by retiring in disorder. This had the worst results on the success of the whole operation.

“I must again remind all ranks of the great necessity for economizing ammunition, especially gun ammunition. At Liao-yang we used up in two days our special artillery reserve of more than 100,000 rounds. The conveyance of gun ammunition to the front is very difficult, and batteries which have expended theirs become mere dead-weight to the army.”

The peculiarities attendant on operations in a country covered with such crops as _kao-liang_ were also reviewed in detail:

“Any men leaving the ranks in action under pretext of accompanying or carrying away wounded men will be severely punished.

“Companies and squadrons must be as strong as possible for an attack. To this end the most strict precautions must be taken to limit the number of men employed on extraneous duties and for transport work. The Cossacks are not to be employed as orderlies and escorts by the officers under whom they may be temporarily serving. Sound horses in possession of sick Cossacks should be taken from them, and made over to those who are horseless, but fit for duty.

“It is to be regretted—and I have more than once commented on it—that commanding officers do not pay proper attention to the order that the soldier’s emergency biscuit ration, carried on the person, should remain untouched. This reserve ration is constantly being eaten, and no steps are taken immediately to replace it. Many commanding officers calmly allow the whole of the men’s portable reserve to be consumed under the pleasing conviction that it is the duty of someone else to bring up fresh supplies to the regimental commissariat.

“The above instructions only touch on a few details of field-work. The main guide for action is the ‘Field Service Regulations,’ but these cannot, of course, meet every case which may arise in the entirely new circumstances under which we are now operating. I expect commanding officers of all ranks, therefore, to show greater initiative in the performance of their duties.”

My instructions issued in October included remarks on our offensive operations during the end of September. Amongst other things, I said:

“I still notice faults in the method of conducting attacks. Thick lines of skirmishers are too closely followed by the supports and reserves. The formations have generally been ill adapted to the ground, and have been such as to form an excellent target. If this close-order formation had been assumed in these cases just before a bayonet charge, then, despite the heavy sacrifices entailed, there would have been some point in it, because of the additional force and impetus given to the assault; but it was adopted when the attack was still at long range, and so caused useless and heavy loss. We should in such cases imitate the Japanese, and do what we used to in the Caucasus—make every use of cover. Every effort must be made to reconnoitre well, in order that advantage may be taken of every fold of the ground, and of every stick and stone, and the attack may be enabled to advance as close as possible to the enemy with the least possible loss. The way to do this is for individual men, or groups of men, to advance by short rushes till the attacking units are able to collect. On open ground, if the attacking infantry has to wait for the artillery preparation, it should entrench itself as rapidly as possible.

“In retreating, the movement to the rear of large masses together afforded the enemy a splendid target, for which we suffered. Again, to avoid unnecessary loss in retirement, portions of a position have often been stubbornly held until a withdrawal could be effected under cover of darkness. If the portion of ground on either side happens to have been already abandoned, and the Japanese are sufficiently mobile to make use of it, such isolated defence of any one section of a position might cost very dear. We must learn how to retire by day—by the same methods as laid down above for the attack (by rushes), and avoid close formations in doing it.

“I and other senior officers have noticed during an action hundreds and thousands of unwounded men leaving the ranks, carrying wounded to the rear. In the fights of October 12 to 15[8] I personally saw wounded men being carried to the rear by as many as nine others. This abuse must be put down with the utmost rigour, and until an action is over only the stretcher-bearers should take wounded to the rear.

“The Japanese are fortifying the positions along our front, converting villages, knolls, and hill-tops into strong, defensible points, and strengthening their positions with obstacles. These positions should be carefully studied, their strong points noted, and in every section of our line a plan of possible operations against the corresponding portions of the enemy’s position should be made. The early organization of the artillery preparation of any attack on these selected points is important.

“Detachments of sappers and scouts should be sent ahead of the assault to destroy the obstacles round fortified villages, which should be well shelled. Till the assault is made the advance should be under cover, and if the leading troops find they are not strong enough to capture the point on which they have been directed, they must hold on to a point as near to the enemy as possible, in order to press forward again when reinforced.”

Finally, in my instructions issued in December, 1904, I recapitulated the most important points brought out by our recent experiences, such as—

“1. The necessity, in order to avoid loss, for our attack formations to be better adapted to the ground.

“2. Economy in artillery ammunition.

“3. The more intelligent employment of rifle-fire, and the necessity for volley-firing at night.

“4. The great value of night operations.

“5. Proper communication between all senior commanders.

“6. The necessity for the mutual co-operation of all arms, and the maintenance of touch in battle.

“The surest road to success is the determination to continue fighting, even when the last reserve has been exhausted, for the enemy may be in the same, if not in worse plight, and what is not possible in daylight may be accomplished at night. Unfortunately, in recent fights, some commanders even of large forces have confessed themselves unable to carry out the operation entrusted to them, at a moment when they still had in hand big reserves which had not fired a shot.”

Of course, as soon as our disasters began, the papers started to accuse our troops of insufficient training, and they were not far wrong. In the first place, most of the men were reservists who had forgotten a great deal. In the second, this war was our first experience of smokeless powder, of quick-firing artillery, of machine-guns, and of all the recent developments in means of destruction, and much was strange and unexpected. Our preconceived notions were upset, and we were baffled by the deadly nature of indirect artillery-fire, by the new attack formations—when advancing infantry is rarely visible, and one man at a time crawls up almost unseen, taking advantage of every inch of cover. Our troops had been instructed, but what they had learned varied according to the personal idiosyncrasies of this or that district commander. The stronger the officer commanding a district, the less did he feel bound to abide by the authorized method of instruction and training laid down in the existing drill-books. General Grippenberg was no exception to this. In spite of the regulation as to the use of volleys for repulsing night attacks; in spite of war experience which in every way confirmed the necessity and value of volley-firing; in spite of the Commander-in-Chief’s instructions on this point, he made up his mind some days before a battle to re-teach the force under his command. He ordered the employment of independent fire at night. His “Instructions for the Operations of Infantry in Battle” [signed by him on January 4, 1905], printed and issued to the troops, aroused consternation and amusement throughout the army. In this book it was actually laid down that volleys were only to be resorted to if the enemy suddenly appeared at close quarters, and that immediately after a volley a bayonet attack should be made. While condemning the method in which our troops operated at the Ya-lu, he, in the above “Instructions,” gives a recipe for action whereby two of our battalions might destroy a Japanese division. After a summary of the amount of small-arm ammunition expended, he said:

“If our two battalions had been deployed and had opened rapid independent fire, the Japanese division would have been destroyed, and we should have won the day.”

Such a simple matter did General Grippenberg consider the annihilation of a Japanese division! But a few days later, when he moved against the Hei-kou-tai position with a strong force of 120 battalions, his own prescription proved to be valueless. In the first few days, when he was opposed by not more than two divisions, he was unable to take San-de-pu, got his troops into confusion, gave the enemy time to bring up strong reinforcements, and retired—to St. Petersburg.

As to the attack formation adopted by the troops arriving from Russia, the 41st Division had in particular been taught to work in very close formation, and not taught to make use of the ground. It came from the Vilna district, which was commanded before the war by General Grippenberg. Our gunners also arrived at the front with only one idea of artillery tactics—to place their batteries in the open and make use of direct fire. For this we paid dearly in our very first fight.