Part 4

[36] See Mr. Justice Story in Folsom _v._ Marsh, 2 Story, 100, 111 (1841):--

"If he [the recipient of a letter] attempt to publish such letter or letters on other occasions, not justifiable, a court of equity will prevent the publication by an injunction, as a breach of private confidence or contract, or of the rights of the author; and _a fortiori_, if he attempt to publish them for profit; for then it is not a mere breach of confidence or contract, but it is a violation of the exclusive copyright of the writer.... The general property, and the general rights incident to property, belong to the writer, whether the letters are literary compositions, or familiar letters, or details of facts, or letters of business. The general property in the manuscripts remains in the writer and his representatives, as well as the general copyright. _A fortiori_, third persons, standing in no privity with either party, are not entitled to publish them, to subserve their own private purposes of interest, or curiosity, or passion."

[37] "The receiver of a letter is not a bailee, nor does he stand in a character analogous to that of a bailee. There is no right to possession, present or future, in the writer. The only right to be enforced against the holder is a right to prevent publication, not to require the manuscript from the holder in order to a publication of himself." Per Hon. Joel Parker, quoted in Grigsby _v._ Breckenridge, 2 Bush. 480, 489 (1867).

[38] In Morison _v._ Moat, 9 Hare, 241, 255 (1851), a suit for an injunction to restrain the use of a secret medical compound, Sir George James Turner, V. C., said: "That the court has exercised jurisdiction in cases of this nature does not, I think, admit of any question. Different grounds have indeed been assigned for the exercise of that jurisdiction. In some cases it has been referred to property, in others to contract, and in others, again, it has been treated as founded upon trust or confidence,--meaning, as I conceive, that the court fastens the obligation on the conscience of the party, and enforces it against him in the same manner as it enforces against a party to whom a benefit is given, the obligation of performing a promise on the faith of which the benefit has been conferred; but upon whatever grounds the jurisdiction is founded, the authorities leave no doubt as to the exercise of it."

[39] A similar growth of the law showing the development of contractual rights into rights of property is found in the law of goodwill. There are indications, as early as the Year Books, of traders endeavoring to secure to themselves by contract the advantages now designated by the term "goodwill," but it was not until 1743 that goodwill received legal recognition as property apart from the personal covenants of the traders. See Allan on Goodwill, pp. 2, 3.

[40] The application of an existing principle to a new state of facts is not judicial legislation. To call it such is to assert that the existing body of law consists practically of the statutes and decided cases, and to deny that the principles (of which these cases are ordinarily said to be evidence) exist at all. It is not the application of an existing principle to new cases, but the introduction of a new principle, which is properly termed judicial legislation.

But even the fact that a certain decision would involve judicial legislation should not be taken as conclusive against the propriety of making it. This power has been constantly exercised by our judges, when applying to a new subject principles of private justice, moral fitness, and public convenience. Indeed, the elasticity of our law, its adaptability to new conditions, the capacity for growth, which has enabled it to meet the wants of an ever changing society and to apply immediate relief for every recognized wrong, have been its greatest boast.

"I cannot understand how any person who has considered the subject can suppose that society could possibly have gone on if judges had not legislated, or that there is any danger whatever in allowing them that power which they have in fact exercised, to make up for the negligence or the incapacity of the avowed legislator. That part of the law of every country which was made by judges has been far better made than that part which consists of statutes enacted by the legislature." I Austin's Jurisprudence, p. 224.

The cases referred to above show that the common law has for a century and a half protected privacy in certain cases, and to grant the further protection now suggested would be merely another application of an existing rule.

[41] Loi Relative a la Presse. 11 Mai 1868.

"11. Toute publication dans un ecrit periodique relative a un fait de la vie privee constitue une contravention punie d'un amende de cinq cent francs.

"La poursuite ne pourra etre exercee que sur la plainte de la partie interessee." Riviere, Codes Francais et Lois Usuelles. App. Code Pen., p. 20.

[42] See Campbell _v._ Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 769, 776; Henwood _v._ Harrison, L. R. 7 C. P. 606; Gott _v._ Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235.

[43] "Nos moeurs n'admettent pas la pretention d'enlever aux investigations de la publicite les actes qui relevent de la vie publique, et ce dernier mot ne doit pas etre restreint a la vie officielle ou a celle du fonctionnaire. Tout homme qui appelle sur lui l'attention ou les regards du publique, soit par une mission qu'il a recue ou qu'il se donne, soit par le role qu'il s'attribue dans l'industrie, les arts, le theatre, etc., ne peut plus invoquer contre la critique ou l'expose de sa conduite d'autre protection que les lois qui repriment la diffamation et l'injure." Circ. Mins. Just., 4 Juin, 1868. Riviere Codes Francais et Lois Usuelles, App. Code Pen. 20 n (b).

[44] "Celui-la seul a droit au silence absolu qui n'a pas expressement ou indirectment provoque ou authorise l'attention, l'approbation ou le blame." Circ. Mins. Just., 4 Juin, 1868. Riviere Codes Francais et Lois Usuelles, App. Code Pen. 20 n (b). The principle thus expressed evidently is designed to exclude the wholesale investigations into the past of prominent public men with which the American public is too familiar, and also, unhappily, too well pleased; while not entitled to the "silence _absolute_" which less prominent men may claim as their due, they may still demand that all the details of private life in its most limited sense shall not be laid bare for inspection.

[45] Wason _v._ Walters, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73; Smith _v._ Higgins, 16 Gray, 251; Barrows _v._ Bell, 7 Gray, 331.

[46] This limitation upon the right to prevent the publication of private letters was recognized early:--

"But, consistently with this right [of the writer of letters], the persons to whom they are addressed may have, nay, must, by implication, possess the right to publish any letter or letters addressed to them, upon such occasions, as require, or justify, the publication or public use of them; but this right is strictly limited to such occasions. Thus, a person may justifiably use and publish, in a suit at law or in equity, such letter or letters as are necessary and proper, to establish his right to maintain the suit, or defend the same. So, if he be aspersed or misrepresented by the writer, or accused of improper conduct, in a public manner, he may publish such parts of such letter or letters, but no more, as may be necessary to vindicate his character and reputation, or free him from unjust obloquy and reproach." Story, J., in Folsom _v._ Marsh, 2 Story, 100, 110, 111 (1841).

The existence of any right in the recipient of letters to publish the same has been strenuously denied by Mr. Drone; but the reasoning upon which his denial rests does not seem satisfactory. Drone on Copyright, pp. 136-139.

[47] Townshend on Slander and Libel, 4th ed., Sec. 18; Odgers on Libel and Slander, 2d ed., p. 3.

[48] "But as long as gossip was oral, it spread, as regards any one individual, over a very small area, and was confined to the immediate circle of his acquaintances. It did not reach, or but rarely reached, those who knew nothing of him. It did not make his name, or his walk, or his conversation familiar to strangers. And what is more to the purpose, it spared him the pain and mortification of knowing that he was gossipped about. A man seldom heard of oral gossip about him which simply made him ridiculous, or trespassed on his lawful privacy, but made no positive attack upon his reputation. His peace and comfort were, therefore, but slightly affected by it." E. L. Godkin, "The Rights of the Citizen: To his Reputation." Scribner's Magazine, July, 1890, p. 66.

Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce suggested in Prince Albert _v._ Strange, 2 DeGex & Sm. 652, 694, that a distinction would be made as to the right to privacy of works of art between an oral and a written description or catalogue.

[49] See Drone on Copyright, pp. 121, 289, 290.

[50] Compare the French law. "En prohibant l'envahissement de la vie privee, sans qu'il soit necessaire d'etablir l'intention criminelle, la loi a entendue interdire toute discussion de la part de la defense sur verite des faits. Le remede eut ete pire que le mal, si un debat avait pu s'engager sur ce terrain." Circ. Mins. Just., 4 Juin, 1868. Riviere Code Francais et Lois Usuelles, App. Code Penn. 20 n(a).

[51] Comp. Drone on Copyright, p. 107.

[52] Comp. High on Injunctions, 3d ed., Sec. 1015; Townshend on Libel and Slander, 4th ed., Secs. 417a-417d.

[53] The following draft of a bill has been prepared by William H. Dunbar, Esq., of the Boston bar, as a suggestion for possible legislation:--

"SECTION 1. Whoever publishes in any newspaper, journal, magazine, or other periodical publication any statement concerning the private life or affairs of another, after being requested in writing by such other person not to publish such statement or any statement concerning him, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison not exceeding five years, or by imprisonment in the jail not exceeding two years, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars; provided, that no statement concerning the conduct of any person in, or the qualifications of any person for, a public office or position which such person holds, has held, or is seeking to obtain, or for which such person is at the time of such publication a candidate, or for which he or she is then suggested as a candidate, and no statement of or concerning the acts of any person in his or her business, profession, or calling, and no statement concerning any person in relation to a position, profession, business, or calling, bringing such person prominently before the public, or in relation to the qualifications for such a position, business, profession, or calling of any person prominent or seeking prominence before the public, and no statement relating to any act done by any person in a public place, nor any other statement of matter which is of public and general interest, shall be deemed a statement concerning the private life or affairs of such person within the meaning of this act.

"SECT. 2. It shall not be a defence to any criminal prosecution brought under section 1 of this act that the statement complained of is true, or that such statement was published without a malicious intention; but no person shall be liable to punishment for any statement published under such circumstances that if it were defamatory the publication thereof would be privileged."