CHAPTER V.

DESPOTISM RETIRING BEFORE CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1844-DECEMBER, 1847.

The Bandiera insurrection. Its results.--Career of Cesare Balbo, "Le Speranze d'Italia."--Vincenzo Gioberti. "Il Primato degli Italiani."--The insurrection of Rimini. "Ultimi casi di Romagna."--The risings in Galicia.--History of Cracow since 1815.--Causes of the failure of the Galician movement.--The seizure of Cracow. Palmerston's utterances thereon.--Change in Charles Albert's position.--The Ticino treaties.--Mistake of Solaro della Margherita.--"Long live the King of Italy!"--D'Azeglio's policy.--Aurelio Saffi.--Death of Gregory XVI.--State of Roman Government.--Parties in the Conclave.--Election of Pius IX.--His character and career.--The amnesty. Its effect.--Ciceruacchio. His work.--The Congress at Genoa.--Charles Lucien Bonaparte.--Death of Confalonieri.--State of Milan.--Pio Nono's reforms.--The clerical conspiracy.--The occupation of Ferrara. Its effect on Italian feeling.--State of Tuscany.--The Duke of Lucca.--Absorption of Lucca in Tuscany.--The struggle with Modena.--The massacre of Fivizzano.--Occupation of Parma and Modena by Austria.--State of Switzerland.--Position of Bern and Zurich.--The Concordat of Seven.--The refugee question in 1838.--The Aargau monasteries.--The Sonderbund.--The Jesuit question.--Metternich's feelings, real and pretended.--Palmerston's attitude.--Relations between Metternich and Guizot.--The decision of the Swiss Diet.--The Sonderbund war.--Effect of the Federal victory.--The Schleswig-Holstein question.--The official view and the popular view.--Metternich's way out of the difficulty.--Effect of the movement on Germany and Prussia.--State of Europe at outbreak of Sicilian insurrection.

The divisions of opinion, which had been hindering progress in Hungary, had, in the meantime, been growing less prominent in Italy; so that the more active political leaders in the latter country were, for a time at least, aiming at a common programme. Yet this point had only been reached after much suffering and failure. Conspiracies with various objects had been rife in Italy, especially in the Papal States; but, though some passing attention was attracted by the cruelties exercised in their suppression, these risings had left apparently little mark on the country. But an insurrection took place in 1844 which proved a turning-point in Italian politics. The character and circumstances of the leaders excited a sympathy which impressed their memories on the hearts of their countrymen; while the failure of the rising led to a change in the general tactics of the Italian Liberals.

The rising in question was that organized by the brothers Emilio and Attilio Bandiera. These youths were the sons of a Venetian nobleman who was an admiral in the Austrian service, and who had attracted attention in 1831 by violating the terms of the capitulation of Ancona, and attempting to seize the exiles who, under protection of that treaty, were on their way to France. Emilio and Attilio had been compelled, while still boys, to enter the service of Austria; but they soon began to feel a loathing for the foreign rulers of their country; and, while in this state of mind, they came into contact with some of those who were already acting with the Giovine Italia. At last, in 1842, Attilio Bandiera wrote to Mazzini expressing the esteem and love he had learned to feel for him, his desire to co-operate with him, and his belief that the Italian cause was but a part of the cause of humanity.

This correspondence with Mazzini was maintained by means of another naval officer in the Austrian service, Domenico Moro; in the following year a passing struggle in Southern and Central Italy gave new hopes to the brothers. They fled from their ships and met Domenico Moro at Corfu. But a stronger influence than the fear of Austrian tyranny was put forward to hinder the brothers Bandiera from their attempts. Their mother wrote from Venice calling on them to return, and denouncing them as unnatural for their refusal. Even this pressure, however, they resisted, and they prepared to make their first rising in March, 1844.

The desire to free the Neapolitans, already distracted by so many insurrections, gave rise to this attempt, of which Cosenza was the head-quarters. Unfortunately, the plan of the rising had not been understood by some of the insurgents, and a preliminary effort was easily suppressed by the Neapolitan troops. Nothing daunted by this, the Bandiere planned a new march on Calabria. It was, unfortunately, on this occasion that the correspondence of the Bandiere with Mazzini was opened by the British Postmaster-General, and communicated by him to the Austrians. When, then, the brothers, accompanied by many recruits from various parts of Italy, marched upon Cosenza to deliver the prisoners who had been taken in the former unsuccessful attempt, they found guides prepared to deceive them; and in a wood near Cosenza they were met by a large body of gensdarmes, who had been warned of their coming. They repelled the attack, however, and retreated to Corfu to gather new forces; but the authorities had filled the minds of the inhabitants with the belief that the Bandiere and their followers were Turks. The people rose against them; and when they again marched on Cosenza they were easily overpowered and imprisoned, and soon after condemned to death. The brothers received the news of their condemnation with cries of "Long live Italy! Long live Liberty! Long live our country!" And, to the priests who tried to exhort them to repentance, they answered that they had acted in the spirit of Christ in trying to free their brethren.

The effect of their death, and of all the circumstances of their rising, was deep and wide; and their memory seems to have lived longer than that of any previous martyrs for Italian freedom. The bullets with which they were shot were collected as sacred relics; and it was felt that a new impulse had been given to the struggle against Austrian tyranny. But with the indignation at the treachery by which the Bandiera brothers had suffered, and with the reverence for their memories, there arose in Italy a passing wave of suspicion against Mazzini and the leaders of the Giovine Italia, as people who wasted the lives of the heroic youth of Italy in useless and ill-organized attempts.

It was at this period that two books, written in 1843, began to attract attention. These were the "Speranze d'Italia" of Cesare Balbo and the "Primato" of Vincenzo Gioberti.

Cesare Balbo was the son of that Count Prospero Balbo who was supposed, in the reign of Victor Emmanuel I., to have supplied a Liberal element to the Government. There had been, however, little in Count Prospero's career to inspire any reasonable confidence in him. He served under Victor Amadeus till the fall of Piedmont before the French; but after the establishment of Napoleon's power he had returned to Piedmont and become head of the University of Turin. After the restoration of the House of Savoy he had taken office again under Victor Emmanuel, and had played the somewhat doubtful part, described above, in the movement of 1821. Cesare had been presented by his father, when a boy, to Napoleon; and though Count Prospero had considered it a dangerous step, the young man had accepted office in Napoleon's Council of State in Turin, and subsequently had served under the same ruler in Tuscany. Although shocked at the kidnapping of Pius VII., he did not abandon the service of Napoleon until the fall of the French Empire in 1814. Yet, after the restoration of the House of Savoy, he entered the army of the King of Sardinia, and fought, first against Napoleon, and then against Murat. In 1821 he managed to remain on friendly terms with Santa Rosa, while he was at the same time advising Charles Albert to break with the Revolutionists, and was also trying to hinder the proclamation of the Spanish Constitution at Alessandria. Such was the man who now tried to tell Italy of her hopes.

While appealing to Gioberti as his master, and declaring his preference for a moderate party, Balbo dwelt on the want of national independence as the chief source of the evils of Italy, and particularly on the control exercised by the Austrians over the Pope. He urged his countrymen to put aside the old ideas of Dante, and not to go back further than 1814 for their conception of Italian Unity. He then proceeded to examine the different schemes for attaining this unity, and, rejecting alike the schemes of Monarchists and Federalists, as well as the plan for a closer unity put forward by the Republicans of the Giovine Italia, he pointed out as the only real hope for Italy the possibility of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the consequent chance that Italy might be freed in the scramble which would follow.

It is well to dismiss this book of Balbo's first, because its only worth is that it shows what scraps of comfort were caught at eagerly by Italians at this period; but, as a matter of fact, its publication was slightly later than that of the "Primato" of Vincenzo Gioberti, to which Balbo alludes in the preface to his book.

Gioberti has already been mentioned as having been a contributor to the journal of the Giovine Italia. Previously to that time, he had chiefly been known as a writer on ecclesiastical or theological subjects. Before the age of twenty, he had written a philosophical treatise on Man, God, and Natural Religion; and early in life he had also written on the "Wickedness of the Popes," and had tried to prove that that wickedness was due to their temporal power. At the University of Turin, the Professor to whom he looked up with the greatest reverence was driven from his post by the Jesuits, and this event awakened in Gioberti his bitter hostility to that Order. Gioberti's connection with the Giovine Italia brought him under the suspicion of the Piedmontese Government; and he was banished from the country shortly before Mazzini's expedition to Savoy.

In that expedition, however, Gioberti had refused to join; and he remained at Paris, where many of the Italian exiles were gathered. Among these, two of the most prominent were Pellegrino Rossi and Terenzio Mamiani. Both of these writers may have confirmed him in his dislike of the Jesuits; though they may also have exercised some influence in alienating him from the Republicans. He returned, indeed, at this period to those philosophical writings for which he was much better fitted than for the active life of politics; and, in 1842, he was offered a Chair of Philosophy at Pisa. But Solaro della Margherita, the Minister of Charles Albert, succeeded in persuading the Grand Duke of Tuscany to withdraw this appointment. Such had been Gioberti's career up to the time when he brought out the book which, by a curious combination of circumstances, was to make his name famous.

This book, "Il Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani," professes to show why, and how, the Italians should take the lead in the affairs of Europe. The writer begins with a glorification of Italy, though, at the same time, he complains that she has too often neglected her mission; and he maintains, in this connection, the necessity of combining philosophy with political discussion. Very early in the argument he goes back to Romulus; but, not content with the comparative antiquity of that allusion, he thinks it necessary to deduce the origin of civilization from Noah. He then considers the relation between the Papacy and the Empire after the time of Charles the Great, and the attitude of various Italian writers and patriots towards the Papacy. He incidentally notices the fascination of Abelard for Arnold of Brescia as one of the causes of that reformer's hostility to the Papacy, and as a warning to Italians not to yield to the influence of French ideas. It is to the Guelphs that Gioberti looks for the embodiment of the political wisdom of the Italians of the Middle Ages. Without the Papacy, there could be no real political unity for Italy, since through its influence alone could there be produced a union of morality, religion, and civilization. He deprecates all revolution, all encouragement of invasion, all imitations of foreign ideas. Unity, in the complete sense in which it was known in England and France, was, says Gioberti, an impossibility, because of differences in Government and dialect between the different States of Italy. He expresses a belief that Alfieri would have repented of his attacks on Popes and Kings if he had lived to see the dignified resistance of Pius VII. to Napoleon. The Pope would be obliged to act by peaceful means; and while forming an Italian Navy, and developing Italian colonies, he should carry on his work through a Federal Union, of which he would be the President. But, as the Pope must act by pacific means, there would be need of a military leader also for Italy; and he must be found in Piedmont. Literature had been slower in growth in Piedmont than in other parts of Italy; but in proportion to its backwardness in this respect was its superiority in military matters. Further, the House of Savoy had been softened by religion, and had never produced a tyrant. But moderate reforms were necessary in order to make the leadership palatable; especially a modification of the censorship of the Press, and greater encouragement to science and literature. In urging that Italy must take the lead of Europe, not merely in matters of civilization, but in thought, he dwells emphatically on the connection between philosophy and politics. But, above all, Italy should hold this position because she has never fallen into the errors of Protestantism. Passing from the independent States of Italy, he dwells on the necessity of a union between Lombardy and Piedmont; and then, after discussing what qualities the different parts of Italy will contribute to the general character of the whole, and dwelling on the possible union among the literary men of Italy, he concludes by insisting that religion can be the only uniting force; and therefore that the Head of the Christian World must be the Head of the Italian League.

This curious book attracted considerable attention; but although many expressed admiration for the author, few committed themselves definitely to its doctrines. The idea of a Pope as a liberator and uniter of Italy clashed with all the experiences which Italy had had of the Government of Gregory XVI., and Gioberti was forced to modify his words, and to deny that he looked to the Pope then on the throne to carry out his programme. This explanation led him into a controversy with the Jesuits, which must considerably have increased his popularity.

A third writer, who attracted some attention, though far less than Balbo and Gioberti, was Giacomo Durando, already mentioned as one of the conspirators of 1831. He demanded a league between Peoples and Princes, but utterly denied that any initiative of Italian independence could come from the Pope. His idea was a Kingdom of Italy divided into three parts--Northern, and presumably Central, Italy to be under the House of Savoy; the city of Rome and some islands to be left to the Pope; and Southern Italy to the King of Naples. He did not, however, desire that the League should make war upon Austria, but that it should wait, and be ready to resist attacks from that Power.

But while these writers were trying to formulate, in a literary manner, the programme of the Constitutional Liberals, the more fiery members of that party were anxious to show that they too could do something in the way of a political movement of a more determined kind; and it was in the Papal States, again, as the centre of the worst government of Italy, that this new programme of insurrection was put forward. A man named Pietro Renzi undertook to formulate the demands of this section of the party. The petition drawn up by Renzi went back to the time of Pius VII., to show that hopes of reform had once been held out, even in the Papal States. It dwelt on the fact that, from the time of the insurrections of 1821 to the death of Pius VIII. in 1831, there had been a steady growth of tyranny; that in 1831 the Papal Government would have fallen but for the intervention of Austria; that, when Gregory XVI. had been restored to his power, demands had been made for reform in the Papal Government which had been steadily opposed; that the Pope and Cardinal Albani were now encouraging robbers and murderers on the ground of the support which such men gave to the faith. "For eight or ten years past," Renzi declared, "it had not been the Pope or Rome or the Cardinals who had been governing the people of the Legations; but a sanguinary faction of the brutalized populace has been wearing the dress, and performing the functions of government." Many young men had been driven from the universities, or shut out from liberal professions, by the influence of the Jesuits; and the clergy had usurped the control of all education. The leaders of the new party, therefore, demanded twelve concessions.--1. A general amnesty for all political offences from 1821 to that time. 2. Publicity of Debate; trial by jury, and abolition of confiscations and capital punishment for political offences. 3. That laymen should not be subjected either to the Inquisition nor any other ecclesiastical tribunal. 4. That political offences should be tried by the ordinary tribunals. 5. That municipal councils should be freely elected subject to the approval of the Sovereign; that these municipal councils should elect the provincial councils, and the provincial councils the Supreme Council of State. 6. That the Supreme Council should reside in Rome, superintending the public funds, and should have a deliberative power in some matters, a consultative in others. 7. That all offices, civil, military, and judicial, should be held by laymen. 8. That public instruction, other than religious, should be taken away from the clergy. 9. That the censorship of the Press should be only employed in the case of offences against God, the Catholic Religion, and the Sovereign, and the private life of citizens. 10. That foreign troops should be dismissed. 11. That the Civic Guard should be instituted, and entrusted with the maintenance of the laws and of public order. 12. That the Government should enter on all those social reforms which are required by the spirit of the age, and of which all the _civil_ governments of Europe have given an example.

Renzi resolved to enforce this programme by a sudden attack on Rimini, in which he was completely successful; but an ally of his, who had raised a revolt simultaneously in the lower Romagna, was compelled to retire before the Swiss troops of the Pope; and Renzi, apparently panic struck, retreated into Tuscany. Unfortunately, a reaction was then taking place there. Fossombroni had died in 1844, Corsini, the Minister who was most in sympathy with Fossombroni's policy, resigned in 1845; and the chief of the Jesuit party took his place. The Grand Duke Leopold himself was at first disposed to be friendly to Renzi; but, as the best protection to him, he advised his escape to France. Renzi soon returned, and Metternich, alarmed at the intensity of Italian feeling, denounced the Duke for protecting rebels, and, under the influence of Austrians, Jesuits, and of the Pope, Leopold consented to surrender Renzi to Gregory XVI.

The attention of the country was still further directed to this attempt by a pamphlet which came out immediately after, and which was written by a young Piedmontese nobleman, Count Massimo Tapparelli D'Azeglio. In this pamphlet D'Azeglio complained that the Rimini movement had been much misrepresented; but that the action of the insurgents had no doubt been a blunder, because the movement had been purely local, and they had not considered how to use the forces of the whole of Italy. He then proceeded to denounce the corruptions of the Papal Government, and the cruelties which had followed the suppression of this rising; particularly the gross injustice of imprisoning a lawyer because he had defended some of the prisoners. After a denunciation in detail of the evils of the Papal Government, he goes on to repudiate the use of secret societies, as having failed in their purpose; calls on the Italians to unite in peaceable protest against abuses, rather than in insurrection; and points to the Tugendbund of Germany as a model for Italian combinations. The pamphlet had little that was new in it, but attention was fixed upon the author, by the fact that he was immediately banished from Tuscany by the Grand Duke, and was, shortly after, welcomed in Piedmont.

Metternich's protest against this welcome might have been more decided had he not been hampered by the events which were occurring in Galicia. Ever since the insurrection of 1830, there had been a steady feeling of sympathy towards the Poles, not merely as an oppressed nation, but as _the_ nation whose restoration was the chief duty and necessity of the champions of liberty. Kossuth declared, at a somewhat later time, that there was a close connection between the liberties of Hungary and those of Poland. Mazzini had been eager to co-operate, where it was possible, with the exiled Poles. Robert Blum had shown a special enthusiasm for their cause, and was ready to help in a rising in Posen. Every Slavonic race looked on the wrongs of the Poles as the typical instance of the oppression of the Slavs by the Great Powers of Europe; while, at the same time, they honoured them as the most famous fighters in the cause of Slavonic freedom. But it was in France that the greatest enthusiasm was felt for the Poles, and the most complete organization of the exiles existed. There a special military school was founded for them in 1843; and in 1846, after a preparation of three years, the democratic section among the Poles resolved to strike a decisive blow against Austria.

The city of Cracow, on the borders of Galicia, was the one part of Poland which still maintained a nominal freedom. The political independence of Cracow had been secured by the Treaty of Vienna. The Austrian Government even then wished to absorb it into their own dominions; but, under pressure from Russia, Francis consented that Cracow should be a free town, governed by its own elected Chamber of Representatives, and surrounded by a district which was not to be occupied by Austrian troops; and it was also to exercise complete control over its army and police. The usual Austrian interpretation of liberty, however, was soon to be applied to the Republic of Cracow. Although free trade between Cracow and Warsaw had been secured by a regular treaty, the protecting Powers, as they were called (Austria, Russia, and Prussia), began soon to insist on prohibitive duties being introduced on the frontiers of Cracow. Its University, dating from the fourteenth century, had been secured in its properties and liberties by the Treaty of Vienna; but, unfortunately, a large portion of the lands from which the University drew its income lay within the dominions of the three protecting Powers, each of whom refused, under various pretexts, to give up its share of the land. As to the liberties of the University, the Austrian Government, in 1817, had declared that it would inflict a fine of 100 ducats on any parent who sent his sons to the University of Cracow; in 1822, the Russian Government followed this example by a decree forbidding Polish youths to study in any foreign country, under which title they specially included Cracow. In the meantime, the organizing Commission, which had been appointed by the Powers, was gradually destroying the Constitution which had been established by the Treaty of Vienna. The right to modify laws sent from the Senate was first taken from the Chamber of Representatives; while, as to the control of the finances, which had been specially mentioned in the Treaty, the House of Representatives was informed that the accounts were only to be shown to the Chamber in order to convince them that the Senate had spent the money, and that the Treasury was empty; though the Commission graciously allowed the Chamber to examine and make observations on the accounts, and assured them that these observations should be sent to the Senate. The self-government of the University was, in a similar manner, gradually taken from it; and, under the excuse of a riot in 1820, the great Powers, six years later, sent a Russian colonel to act as supreme ruler of the University. The insurrection of 1830 in Warsaw had, of course, given excuse for further interference with the liberties of Cracow; and, in 1831, Russian soldiers, for a time, occupied the city. It is hardly necessary to add that the liberty of the Press, which had been specially guaranteed by the Treaty of Vienna, had been gradually crushed out; and a new Commission, appointed by the three Powers in 1833, revised the Constitution of Cracow, thereby setting aside the claims of England and France to have their opinions considered in any revision of the Treaty. Torture was revived for the purpose of extorting revelations of crimes which had never been committed. The judges had, indeed, retained, for a time, the independence secured them by the Treaty; but in March, 1837, the Conference, as it was called, of the three Powers abolished the offices of Mayors of the Commune and Judges of First Instance, and transferred their duties to officers of police. In December of the same year, the protecting Powers decided that the question of the amount to be expended on the police and militia should not be submitted to the Chamber. Then the Chamber, at last, attempted an appeal to the two Powers whose opinions had been wholly ignored by the other signatories to the Treaty of Vienna; but the appeal was, apparently, in vain, and there seemed no remedy left but insurrection.

The centralizing principles of the Austrian Government, on this as on later occasions, paralyzing their power of action in emergencies, Cracow was seized and occupied by the democratic leader Tyssowski. The Government Boards in Galicia were little able to make head against the movement; and, if Tyssowski had known how to appeal to the popular sympathies, he might have been completely successful. Unfortunately, however, the leaders of the insurrection had not yet been able to establish that sympathy with the peasantry of Galicia which alone would have enabled them to carry out a really popular insurrection; and, instead of trying to enlist the sympathies and interest of the peasants on behalf of the movement, Tyssowski's only idea was to terrorize them into obedience. He issued a proclamation, announcing that the whole Empire, during the time of revolution, is one and common property in the hands of the revolutionary Government. Every priest who opposed the rising was to be deprived of his office; anyone who refused to subscribe to the national cause was to be seized and brought before a Governor chosen by the insurgents; every inhabitant, on pain of death, was to go to the place appointed him, as soon as he knew of the outbreak of the insurrection. The peasantry, alarmed at hearing that many of them had been condemned to death for their unreadiness to assist the revolution, appealed to the officials to defend them; nor could they be conciliated by hearing that the insurgents were about to abolish all feudal dues and titles of rank, and to secure a certain amount of land to every peasant. These offers from unknown people could not induce the peasants to make friends with those who were threatening them with death. From more than seventy districts representatives came from the peasants to the official authorities at Tarnow to ask for military help against the revolutionary leaders; and they were advised to defend themselves and to arrest the agitators. On February 18th, 1846, the insurrection broke out, and one of the first actions of the conspirators was to fire on the peasants who had refused to join them. Then the peasants, stirred to desperation, rose; and a general massacre of the nobles began. The dark and underground methods of the Austrian Government, and the centralizing principle which had drained out the strength of the different local governments, had brought a double Nemesis on its founders. For while on the one hand the powerlessness of the local boards caused the early successes of the insurgents, on the other hand the world at large thought that the massacre of the nobles of Galicia must have been organized from Vienna, as a part of the regular Austrian policy.[7] This belief was likely to be further strengthened by the events which followed. While Mieroslawski and some of the leaders of the insurrection surrendered to the Prussian troops, which had been despatched to prevent a rising in Silesia and Posen, Metternich struck the final blow at the independence of Cracow. The account given above shows that there was little independence left to be destroyed in that unfortunate city; but somehow the actual destruction of liberties never excites so general a horror, especially in the diplomatic world, as the final removal of the _forms_ of liberty. And Lord Palmerston, who does not seem to have responded to the previous appeal from the Assembly of Cracow, now addressed indignant remonstrances to Metternich, and uttered the remarkable words, "If the treaties of 1815 are null on the Vistula, they may be null on the Rhine and the Po."

Thus the occupation of Cracow seemed to many to be an abandonment by Metternich of the semi-legal position which till then he had, in the eyes of diplomatists, maintained; while his supposed complicity in the massacre in Galicia roused against him the feelings of those humanitarians who do not understand the wickedness of choking out the moral and intellectual life of a nation, but who shrink with horror from any physical cruelty. It is, therefore, no unnatural inference that the delay which Metternich showed in making any stern protest against Charles Albert's new position in Italy may have been due to the paralysis caused by the storm of indignation roused against Austria by the Galician massacres and the annexation of Cracow. Charles Albert profited by this weakness. He had been shifting as usual in his policy, encouraged on the one side in moderate reforms by the Liberal minister, Villamarina, and dragged, on the other side, into extreme clericalism by Solaro della Margherita. But, just about the time when D'Azeglio arrived in Piedmont, events were occurring which riveted on Charles Albert the hopes of many who had not hitherto believed in the sincerity of his desire for reform; and the same circumstances gave him that position of champion of Italian independence which, in the eyes of perhaps a majority of Italians, he continued to maintain till the fall of Milan in 1848. The chief cause of this change of feeling is to be found in the following circumstance.

In the year 1751 a treaty had been made between Austria and Piedmont by which the former granted to the latter the right of sending through Lombardy the salt which they were selling to the Republic of Venice. In consideration of this boon the King of Sardinia renounced his trade with the Swiss cantons; and the treaty was renewed in 1815, after Venice had passed under the Austrian rule. In 1846 Ticino, desiring to open a trade in salt with Marseilles, asked the Piedmontese Government to allow them to transmit their salt through Piedmont, and Charles Albert consented.

The Austrian Government had for some time past looked with suspicion on Charles Albert. Metternich had never forgotten his passing outburst of Liberalism in 1821; and the continual search of the Italian Liberals for some leader in the War of Independence was naturally drawing people's eyes to Piedmont. Few, and comparatively unimportant, as were the reforms that he introduced, they were enough to increase the suspicions of Metternich; and, reformer or not, the King of Sardinia was necessarily an enemy to the House of Austria. Moreover, Charles Albert had recently given a tolerably clear hint of his own feelings; for he had struck a medal representing a lion (the well-known badge of the House of Savoy) trampling on an eagle; and on the reverse side of the medal appeared, "_J'attends mon astre_."

The concession to the Canton Ticino lighted the spark which had been smouldering in the breasts of the Austrian rulers. For of all the States of Europe, this little canton had become specially obnoxious to Austria in the last few years; and not long before this Metternich and Charles Albert had worked together to stamp out its freedom, and deprive it of the right of sheltering those Italian exiles who were dear to the Italian-Swiss from similarity in race and language. Metternich had failed in that effort, and the Liberals had risen in the canton and overthrown the Conservative Government and Austrian influence together. Any sign, therefore, of friendliness shown by Charles Albert to the Ticinese was a special cause of alarm to the Austrians. They declared at once that the treaty of 1751 had been violated; in April, 1846, they increased the custom duties on the wine sent from Piedmont to Lombardy; and in order to mark the hostility of the Act more plainly the same decree declared that there would be no change with regard to the wines coming from several of the other Italian States.

Solaro della Margherita, though his Conservatism naturally inclined him to sympathize with the Austrian Government, was a man who valued the independence and dignity of Piedmont; and he therefore consented to Charles Albert's proposal at once to lower the duties between Piedmont and France, in order to facilitate the commerce between those countries. The meaning of this act could not be misunderstood; and the Austrian ambassador, alarmed at the sudden defiance, made a proposal to recall the duty on Piedmontese wines, on condition that Charles Albert would consent to withdraw his concession to Ticino. Solaro della Margherita, in his anxiety for a friendly understanding with Austria, did not perceive that such a concession would give up the whole principle at stake, since it would admit the right of Austria to forbid Charles Albert to make what terms he pleased with the canton; so Solaro actually urged the King to agree to the proposal. But Charles Albert stood firm, and, greatly to Margherita's horror, D'Azeglio succeeded in persuading the people to get up a demonstration in Turin, at which cries were heard of "Long live the King of Italy!"

Charles Albert, however, though showing some signs of his usual irresolution, did not draw back from his policy of hostility to Austria; and he set himself to promote a railway which should connect Lombardy and Venetia more closely with Piedmont. The Austrians made some difficulty with regard to this railway, and it was on this occasion apparently that the point was carried against the rulers of Lombardy, to a great extent, by the energies of a Venetian lawyer, Daniele Manin, a name afterwards memorable in the records of Venice. In the meantime D'Azeglio had been working hard to convince the rest of Italy that Charles Albert was preparing to put himself at the head of an Italian movement and to attack Lombardy. In Tuscany Professor Montanelli had already formed a Society for promoting the unity of Italy. Demonstrations were being made against the Jesuits, and petitions for changes in taxation and education were drawn up.

But it was in the Papal States that D'Azeglio most hoped to gain ground; and in Forli he came in contact with Aurelio Saffi, who, with D'Azeglio's encouragement, prepared an address from the people of Forli to one of the clerical rulers, calling attention to the growth of Italian feeling and the desire for action against the foreigner. The authorities became alarmed and Saffi's arrest and imprisonment were determined on, when the death of Gregory XVI. suddenly changed the whole position of affairs; and Charles Albert's newly-won fame was for a time dimmed by that of another hero of the popular imagination; while Gioberti's teaching, hitherto admired only in a small circle, and laughed at by many, was suddenly accepted as the utterance of an inspired prophet, and as embodying the conception of a profound statesman.

The state of Roman government at the death of Gregory XVI. was as follows:--The management of affairs was entirely in the hands of cardinals, or of laymen appointed by the Pope. The nobles and the rich were indeed conciliated to some extent by appointments which seemed a concession to lay feeling. The provincial councils, nominated by the Pope, laid taxes partly on property and partly on articles of consumption. The study of political economy was prohibited in the schools; and the study of law and medicine was but little provided for. The press was under a triple censorship, that of the Inquisition, of the Bishop, and of the Governor of the province. The police, though vigorous in repressing political conspirators, were utterly unable to check highway robbery. In the tribunals which were administered by the clergy, the grossest corruptions prevailed. As a natural result of all this, the ablest and best men of the States were to be found, not in Rome, but some in France, some in Tuscany, and some in Piedmont. The government of Rome and its immediate neighbourhood was corrupt; and the government of the Legations in some cases became so cruel as to excite shame even in the Pope himself. And Monsignore Savelli, one of the worst of these tyrants, had been guilty of such a combination of corruption and cruelty that Gregory had been compelled to remove him from office.

Such was the state of affairs when Gregory XVI. died. Tremendous expectation was roused in the different provinces of the Papal States; an insurrection broke out in Ancona; and a colonel, who had distinguished himself for cruelty in that town, was killed. The cardinals at once despatched Savelli to suppress the rising. In the meantime the Conclave met, and the ambassadors of the different Powers began to intrigue for their respective candidates. Cardinal Lambruschini was one of the most powerful members of the sacred college; but he was hated for his injustice and partisan distribution of offices; and no sooner had the Conclave opened than attacks were made on him by Cardinal Micara, on this very ground. Lambruschini had been appointed by the influence of the Austrian Court, and might have been supposed to be their candidate. But whether it were that even the Austrians desired certain concessions to the policy of reform, which they had themselves supported after the rising of 1831, or whether it were that their influence was weakened by the events which had recently occurred in Galicia, they do not seem to have used very great pressure on behalf of Lambruschini.

On the other hand, there had recently arrived in Rome, as French ambassador, that same Pellegrino Rossi who had formerly been driven into exile by the success of the Austrians in 1815, who had contributed to the Conciliatore of Confalonieri, and who had played so important and influential a part among the Italian exiles in Paris. Rossi declared in favour of reform in the church, and demanded the election of someone who both wished and knew how to reform prudently and efficiently. The person naturally marked out as the candidate of the Liberals was Cardinal Gizzi, who had been known for milder government than that of any of the other Cardinals, and who had been singled out for exceptional praise by Massimo D'Azeglio. But where a bitter conflict of interests arises between the leading candidates, it is only natural that some unknown man should slip in; and, as the reformers were probably more in earnest and more united than the majority of the opponents of reform, other Liberal candidates were withdrawn; Giovanni Mastai Ferretti was elected Pope on June 16th, 1846, and, out of respect for Pius VII., took the name of Pius IX.

He was then fifty-four years old and had been originally intended for the Papal guard; but, being liable to epileptic fits, he had been refused admission. He had thereupon become a priest, and had, as already mentioned, distinguished himself in 1831 by the honesty with which he had carried out the terms of the surrender of Imola. He was so little known, however, to the general public that a rumour arose, after his election, that it was really Cardinal Gizzi who had been chosen. Nor were his future opponents startled at the choice. Princess Metternich wrote of him in her diary that he was a man of exemplary piety, "_toute fois sans être exalté_." Nor was it till a month later that Pio Nono took the step which was the foundation of his future popularity. It was then that he issued a general amnesty in favour of all those who had been condemned for political offences. The amnesty, indeed, was carefully guarded; for only those were admitted to it who would sign a declaration confessing their previous offences, and promising future improvement. Mamiani and others refused to sign this declaration, and it would have been obvious to anyone who had thought over the question that this was a demand which could not be accepted by any men of spirit and consistency. But men's minds had been excited by previous events; and the teaching of Gioberti led, not only the Romans, but Italians in all parts of the peninsula, to place a meaning upon this amnesty which was certainly not intended by the Pope himself. This belief in the reforming intentions of the Pope was further increased by the bitter hostility that he excited in that extreme party which had thriven under Gregory XVI., and which was urged on by Lambruschini, who, in his disappointed ambition, began to throw discredit on the election of his rival and to plot against his authority.

The appointment of Cardinal Gizzi as Secretary of State roused the hopes of the Liberals still further, and commissions were appointed to examine into the question of reforms. Yet Gizzi, who was the only cardinal with the most remote claims to the confidence of the Liberals, does not seem to have desired anything more than some slight administrative reforms. And it may be doubted whether the enthusiasm for Pius IX. would long have been sustained, had it not been fostered and directed by a man of a very different type from any of the philosophical writers on the politics of Italy.

This was Angelo Brunetti, better known by his nick-name of Ciceruacchio. He was a man of poor birth, and simple habits, who by hard work had made a certain amount of money, while, by personal beauty, a peculiar kind of eloquence, and a thorough honesty of character, he had gained a special influence among the poorer classes in Rome. A kind of imaginative enthusiasm had evidently possessed his whole mind; and this was kindled to the highest degree by the idea of a reforming Pope. It was to Ciceruacchio, then, rather than to any utterance of the Pope himself, that the popular conception of Pius IX. was due. A kindly priest, wishing to do more justice than his predecessors, was reflected in Ciceruacchio's mirror as the liberator and reformer of Italy. The myth quickly grew. Demonstrations in honour of the Pope were organized by Ciceruacchio; and, as each new difficulty or hindrance arose in the path of progress, he was ready to assure his countrymen that these hindrances were all due to the wicked cardinals, and that Pius IX. was eager to remove them. And so, while the other princes of Italy were being asked to concede various limitations on their power, in Rome was heard continually the cry of "Viva Pio Nono Solo."

Thus it came about that this quiet and unpretending priest found himself magnified in the popular imagination into a leader of heroic proportions, half saint, half crusader. It was impossible for him to resist altogether the fervour of popular enthusiasm, and it soon spread far beyond the limits of the Roman State. In December, 1846, a Congress, nominally intended for scientific discussion, met at Genoa. These congresses had already begun to give opportunity for the expression of political opinion, and two circumstances tended to increase the importance of this particular meeting. One was, that 1846 was the centenary of the expulsion of the Austrians from Genoa, at the close of their temporary occupation during the Austrian War of Succession. The other was the presence in this Congress of Charles Lucien Buonaparte, Prince of Canino. He had already gained some reputation as a student of physical science, but his interest in politics was even greater than his zeal for learning; and he now came to the Congress to invite the men of science to carry on their discussions in the Papal States. From this he naturally passed to the praise of Pius IX. and of Charles Albert, and to the denunciation of Austria and Metternich.

Such an oration, especially when delivered on a non-political occasion, naturally excited the alarm of the Austrian Government; and that alarm was still further increased by the reappearance in Lombardy of the old feeling of irritation against Austrian rule. An attempt on the part of the Austrian Government to seize upon the funds of the Benevolent Societies of Lombardy, in order to appropriate them for their own purposes, had caused such a storm of indignation in the provincial Lombard Councils, that the Government had been compelled to withdraw the proposal. And as if this awakening of life had not been sufficiently significant, it was followed in December, 1846, by a still more alarming sign of popular feeling.

Count Confalonieri had been released from the prison at Spielberg by Ferdinand on his accession to the throne in 1835, but had been deprived of his civil rights, and sent to America. The news now reached Milan that, hearing of the new hopes aroused by the accession of Pius IX., Confalonieri had set sail for Italy, but had died on the way. Instantly a demonstration was organized in his honour, and Count Gabrio Casati, Podestà of Milan, took part in the funeral procession. Bolza, one of the group of Austrian officials who ruled Milan, took note of all who attended the ceremony; and when it was followed by a proposal to form a committee for erecting a statue to Confalonieri, Bolza threatened to prohibit the committee altogether. He was not, however, able to hinder the growing popular feeling in Milan, and early in the following year, 1847, the bitterness was increased by a famine. Grain riots followed; and the Governor of Milan, as the only method for relieving the distress, prohibited the export of grain to foreign parts, except to the German provinces of Austria. Again that terrible canton of the Ticino protested against this infringement of a commercial treaty, made between herself and Austria; and again the Austrian Government was compelled to yield, and to re-open the grain trade with the Ticinese. Hymns to Pio Nono were answered with cheers in the Milanese theatre; while the Viceroy and his family were received, in the same theatre, in dead silence.

In the meantime, Pio Nono's reforms, if not important, were numerous. On March 12th, 1847, came out a modification of the censorship of the press, of which the most important point was that the censorship was to be administered in future by four laymen and one ecclesiastic. On April 14th, a Council of State was formed, to be chosen by the Pope from delegates elected by the provinces; and this Council was to be allowed to propound opinions on certain questions of State. Finally, on July 5th, the Pope granted a civic guard to Rome, and promised one to the provinces.

Metternich had now become thoroughly alarmed, and, whether he sanctioned or not the attempt which was now made in Rome, there seems to be little doubt that the friends of Lambruschini did actually organize a conspiracy against the Pope. The anniversary of the amnesty of 1846 was the occasion of the discovery of this conspiracy. A popular demonstration had been prepared in honour of the day; but when the organizers of this demonstration appeared, their first act was to call out the civic guard to arrest the conspirators. Ciceruacchio paraded the streets, attended by a great number of people. Several of the conspirators were seized and imprisoned, others fled, and none attempted any resistance.

How far Metternich had sympathized with this conspiracy can never be known; but its failure seemed to decide him to strike the blow which he had been meditating. It has already been mentioned that the Austrians had succeeded in introducing into the Treaty of Vienna a clause, permitting them to occupy some part of Ferrara. Pius VII. had protested against this, as an injury to the Holy See. Cardinal Consalvi had expressed this protest in the following words:--"This clause," he said, "is an unprovoked aggression, deprived of all that could make a war legitimate under the rights of nations; an aggression against a weak and innocent State, which had solemnly proclaimed its neutrality in the war that agitates other States; an act outside every human right; and a treaty that is the consequence of an aggression of such a kind is essentially null and void."

Such a protest, and the fact that it was disregarded, emphasized the important truth that treaty rights, as understood in Europe, are simply the rights of the strong to divide the territories of the weak. Pius IX. had committed no act of aggression against Austria; and nothing new had arisen to justify the enforcement of a clause which had been allowed to remain in abeyance so long. When the Powers of Europe had desired to compel Gregory XVI. to reform his dominions after the insurrection of 1831, Metternich had shrunk, with holy horror, from the idea of putting pressure on an independent Prince; but now that Pius IX. had introduced reforms far short of those recommended by the Powers in 1833, Metternich seized the opportunity to despatch Austrian forces to Ferrara.

A cry of indignation arose from all parts of Italy. The Milanese seized the opportunity of the appointment of an Italian Archbishop of Milan to organize an Italian demonstration. A league was formed for commercial purposes between Rome, Sardinia, and Tuscany; and it was supposed that Pius IX. and Charles Albert would declare war upon Austria. Neither of those Princes, however, were ready for the emergency. Pius IX. hardly knew yet what attitude he should take up towards the Italian movement. Charles Albert was as usual hesitating between different policies. But fortunately, besides the moral objections to the occupation of Ferrara, it appeared that there were diplomatic doubts about the interpretation of the clause which excused it. And, while the mere cowardice and injustice of an insult to a weak State might have passed unavenged, the wrong interpretation of the word "_place_" in the clause of a treaty could not be permitted without a protest.

Lord Palmerston, however, had shown on more than one occasion his loathing of the policy of Metternich; and he was doubtless glad enough of this diplomatic excuse for forwarding the cause of Constitutional Liberty. Lord Minto was despatched to Italy to encourage the various princes to stand firm in the cause of reform; and in December, 1847, the Austrian troops consented to withdraw from Ferrara, after having succeeded, by their occupation of it, in consolidating against them an amount of Italian feeling such as they had hardly aroused till then.

The first and most startling expression of this feeling, and of the consequent determination of the Italians to break loose from Austrian influence, came from a prince whom Metternich had probably hardly recognized as an opponent. Leopold of Tuscany, however much disposed to avoid collision with his kinsman, the Emperor of Austria, could not altogether free himself from the rush of reforming zeal which was spreading through Italy. That triumph of Austrian and Papal policy in Tuscany, which had been signalized by the surrender of Renzi and the expulsion of Massimo d'Azeglio, had lasted a comparatively short period, and even during that period the reaction had not been complete. The influence of the Jesuits had increased in Tuscany after the fall of Corsini, and that influence has always excited an hostility which no other form of tyranny has produced; and the University of Pisa, under the influence of Cosimo Ridolfi, was specially zealous in protesting against their influence. As Ridolfi gained ground in Leopold's Council, Metternich had become alarmed, and tried to counteract his influence and to drive him from office. Leopold, however, refused to yield to this pressure, and, as the reforming movement spread, he advanced further and further in his sympathies with Italian freedom. Freedom of the press was granted; many new journals were started; and when the civic guard was conceded, great demonstrations were held in Florence, and an attempt was made to revive the memories of Francesco Ferruccio and other heroes of the past. Professor Montanelli, already known as a writer, now took a prominent part in the political movement, organized a deputation to Pius IX. to entreat him to grant liberty of the press, to expel the Jesuits, and to declare war upon Austria. Domenico Guerrazzi, who had assisted at the foundation of Young Italy, seconded the efforts of Montanelli, and Leopold became, almost against his will, marked out as a reforming sovereign.

The movement now spread beyond Tuscany and affected the dominions of the Duke of Lucca. This Duke was one of those eccentric princes who combined despotism and a reliance on Austria with a certain love of playing at Liberalism with foreign exiles. This game was not carried on with any of those ambitious objects which had led Francis of Modena to play with rebellion in 1831; but it rather arose from a love of clever literary lions, coupled with those tendencies to eccentricity which might be natural to a prince with no great responsibilities and a certain amount of cleverness. When, however, the Liberal movement spread to Lucca, he dropped his dilettantism and proposed to suppress Liberalism by force. Finding that the people rose against him, he consented to yield all which Leopold of Tuscany had granted; but his subjects were unwilling to trust a prince who was the ruler of so small a State under the influence of Austria, and who had only yielded to reform under sudden pressure; so they continued to make further demands. The Duke, weary of the struggle, and very likely desirous to avoid bloodshed, took advantage of a clause in the Treaty of Vienna which constituted the Grand Duke of Tuscany his heir, and resigned his dominions forthwith to Leopold. At the same time, he desired to exempt from this surrender the two towns of Pontremoli and Bagnone and to hand them over to the Duke of Modena. Leopold accepted the territory of Lucca; but, by the same clause which had constituted him the heir to the Duke of Lucca, he was bound, on acquiring the territory, to surrender to the Duke of Modena the district of Fivizzano. Now, of all the princes of Italy, none had been more utterly subservient to Austria than the Duke of Modena, and the people of Fivizzano therefore resented the proposal to annex them to Modena. The Duke of Modena thereupon called on the Austrian Marshal Radetzky to help him to enforce his demands; and, while Leopold of Tuscany was preparing to fix a day for the surrender of Fivizzano, the Duke of Modena marched his troops into the town and massacred the unarmed inhabitants.

Both the Pope and the Grand Duke protested against this cruelty; and Leopold, wishing to keep Fivizzano in consequence of the people's preference for his rule, offered to make Charles Albert and the Pope arbiters between him and the Duke of Modena. In the meantime the citizens of Pontremoli and Bagnone sprang to arms in order to resist the entrance of the Duke of Modena. The Austrians had by this time sent forces to assist the Duke; but though they were able to secure the submission of Fivizzano, the Duke of Modena was forced to surrender Pontremoli and Bagnone. Less than a fortnight after this treaty the Duchess of Parma died, and the Duke of Lucca succeeded to her territory. Here he immediately found himself confronted by a new insurrection; but, unwilling to trouble himself further, he fled to Milan, leaving the Austrian troops to occupy Parma. This occupation and the despatch of forces to Modena tended to strengthen the bitterness which had already been roused by the occupation of Ferrara, so that, when the Austrians consented to the evacuation of that town, they merely incurred the shame of a diplomatic defeat without lessening the causes of Italian bitterness against them.

But the evacuation of Ferrara was not the only diplomatic defeat which the year 1847 brought to Metternich. The blow which was to be recognized by all Europe as one of the most fatal which the cause of despotism had yet sustained was to come from a little State which seemed to stand outside the ordinary politics of Europe.

The territory of the Swiss Confederation had been increased by the Treaty of 1815; but this had by no means led to such a complete strengthening of Switzerland as the most patriotic Swiss would have desired. The aristocratic party had been restored in several of the cantons, and the customs duties on the frontiers of the separate cantons had been renewed. But what specially alarmed the Liberals of Switzerland was a clause, which the Papal Nuncio had introduced into the Treaty of Vienna, giving the monasteries of Switzerland an independent position. It must be remembered that the early struggles of the Swiss cantons against the House of Austria had been connected with the throwing off of the influence of the monks, who had been patronized by the Hapsburgs; and in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the combination of the Roman Catholic cantons had tended to strengthen the influence of foreign Powers in Switzerland, and in some cases had even endangered the unity of the Confederation. The extreme Roman Catholic party in Switzerland were, therefore, naturally inclined to oppose reform, and to weaken the Confederation. And after the July Monarchy of France had begun to show its Conservative tendencies, the Liberals of Switzerland began to fear that their reforms might be checked by outside influence. As early as the year 1831, Metternich, already alarmed at the Polish and Belgian risings, as well as at the movements in Italy and Germany, remarked that there was still another question to which the Cabinets must devote their attention, "the moral anarchy which reigns in Switzerland." And the expedition of Mazzini in 1833-4 increased the alarm of the Austrian Government. In the steady-going canton of Bern there was always an element of moderate Conservatism, which led the Government to shrink from sympathy with the insurrectionary plans of other parts of Europe; and they even called upon the other cantons to assist them in suppressing the revolutionary movement. But the sturdier Liberals of Zurich protested against this circular, and led the way in internal democratic changes, in which they were followed by several other cantons. Utterances like those of Metternich tended to draw the reformers together; and in March, 1832, while Metternich was no doubt meditating the Frankfort Decrees, which he carried out a few months later, the seven Liberal cantons formed a league in which they bound themselves to stand by each other in case of an attack on their freedom.

The cantons which entered into this concordat were Bern, Zurich, Luzern, Solothurn, St. Gallen, Aargau, and Thurgau. This league was considered by its opponents to be a violation of the Swiss Confederation, though the champions of it would probably have pleaded its purely defensive character. But the Roman Catholic party felt themselves justified in retaliation; and they formed, in November, 1832, an opposition league called the Sarnerbund. This Bund steadily set itself to oppose reform; but the men of Schwytz, who were at that time its leading spirits, did not confine themselves to argument, but invaded Luzern in 1833. Thereupon the Diet interfered, occupied Schwytz, and dissolved the Sarnerbund. The reforming party now began to spread their ideas, and the new University of Zurich, which was founded at this time, became a fresh centre of intellectual life. The fugitives from other countries gathered more and more to Switzerland, and the excitement roused in that country by Mazzini's expedition to Savoy led to the foundation of a society called Young Europe.

The great object to which the reforming party in Switzerland now devoted its attention was the breaking down of the authority of the clergy, and the placing education and marriage under the State instead of under the Church. Their scheme was embodied in fourteen articles which excited the indignation of the Roman Catholic cantons; on the appeal of the Roman Catholics to Gregory XVI., he declared these articles heretical; and a little later Louis Philippe intervened to prevent the canton of Bern from enforcing them in the Roman Catholic district of the Jura.

The struggle had now risen to great bitterness; and, at this period, the bitterness was much intensified by the domestic character of the quarrel. The Radical party and the Roman Catholic party struggled fiercely against each other in several of the cantons; and there were changes in the government, backwards and forwards, which temporarily affected the contest. The two changes, however, which were of a permanent character, and which had a vital effect on the destinies of Switzerland, were that which took place in 1838 in Bern and that in Luzern in 1841. Bern, though reckoned, on the whole, among the Liberal cantons, in consequence of its undoubted Protestantism, was yet under the control of a timid and moderate party. This may have arisen from the fact of its important position in the Confederation; for though Bern divided at this time with Luzern and Zurich the honour of being the meeting-place of the Diet, yet it seems to have assumed, even at this period, a certain superior and initiative tone.

Whether it was due to the sense of responsibility inspired by this position, or to some other cause, certain it is that the tone adopted by the Government of Bern in matters of foreign policy by no means satisfied the sterner Radicals of Switzerland. The proposal of Bern for an anti-revolutionary proclamation in 1830 had been defeated by the protest of Zurich; but when in 1838 Bern considered, not unfavourably, the demand for the expulsion of a refugee, the Radicals became furious.

This was one among many instances of that curious irony of history by which great principles have to be asserted in defence of persons who are in themselves unworthy of protection; for the exile, whose surrender was now demanded by Louis Philippe, was Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, who had recently made his attempt on Strasburg. But the Radicals of Bern rightly felt that the principle of asylum was more important than the character of any particular refugee; and when Louis Napoleon left Switzerland to avoid being surrendered, the reforming party rose in indignation, and Bern became the centre of determined Radicalism from that time. The change in Luzern seems to have been due to an extension of the suffrage which threw the power more distinctly into the hands of the Roman Catholics, who were a majority in the canton; and thus Luzern became the centre of the Roman Catholic movement.

But before that change had taken place, new elements of bitterness had been introduced into the discussion. Neuhaus, the new leader of the Bern Government, had been chosen president of the Confederation; and he had used the troops of the Confederation to help the Aargau Protestants in suppressing the monasteries in that canton. The majority of the Swiss Diet had, however, been unwilling to support Neuhaus in this action, and had even condemned the suppression of the Aargau monasteries. The Aargau Protestants, however, had refused to yield, except as to the restoration of two very small monasteries. The feeling on both sides had now risen to its highest point, and on September 13th, 1843, the six cantons of Luzern, Uri, Schwytz, Unterwalden, Zug, and Freyburg formed the alliance known as the Sonderbund. They appealed to the old treaties on which the Confederation was founded, and maintained that even the terms of the Confederation fixed by the Treaty of Vienna had not been observed in the matter of the protection of the rights of the Roman Catholics.

The compromise to which the Diet had assented in the Aargau question, and their non-interference on behalf of some monasteries at Thurgau, excited a special protest from the Sonderbund, and they demanded that the Diet should set these things to rights. So far the Sonderbund could scarcely be logically condemned by those who had joined the Protestant Concordat of Seven in 1832. But the Roman Catholic cantons went on to say that, if their demands were rejected, they would consider that the principles of the Confederation were so completely violated that they would secede from it.

The formation of the Sonderbund excited their opponents; and it was declared that France, Austria, and the Pope were intriguing against Switzerland. The Jesuits, as usual, were supposed to be the centre of the intrigues; and the cry was raised that they ought to be expelled from the Confederation. Hitherto they had chiefly settled in Schwytz and Freyburg; but it was believed that if a cry rose against them they would become less safe in those cantons; and Luzern, as one of the three chief towns of the Confederation, was supposed to be a safer resting-place; therefore, on September 12th, 1844, the Assembly of Luzern passed a resolution inviting the Jesuits to settle in Luzern.

Strange to say, Bern and Zurich had somewhat changed places during this period; for while the indignation against the former Government of Bern, caused by their abandonment of the right of asylum, had produced a strong and permanent Radical feeling in that canton, the bitter hostility to Christianity shown by some of the leading Radicals of Zurich had, on the other hand, scandalized the more moderate Liberals, and produced a Government less keenly Radical than that which now ruled in Bern. At this crisis, unfortunately, the Government of Bern took a step which could scarcely have tended to the order and unity of Switzerland. They appointed a committee to attack the Jesuits, and organized volunteer regiments, which they despatched against Luzern. And the want of confidence in the central power, which had been proclaimed by the Sonderbund, seemed to be almost justified by the action of the Diet at their next meeting; for that body, while condemning the Bernese volunteers, refused to take any steps to hinder their march. The attack of the volunteers was, however, successfully repelled by Luzern; and the Sonderbund soon after proceeded to form a council of war for its own protection.

In the meantime, Metternich had become more and more alarmed at the progress of affairs in Switzerland. The defeat of the efforts of Austria and Sardinia to defend the Conservative cause in the Ticino, and the subsequent alliance between the Ticinese and Charles Albert, had strengthened the fears which had been previously aroused in the Austrian Government by the shelter given by the Swiss to the European Revolutionists. Even in 1845 Metternich had despatched troops to the frontier of Switzerland; he looked upon the struggle of the Catholic cantons as a means for carrying out his policy of weakening the union of Switzerland; and, through the help of Solaro della Margherita, he succeeded in rousing Charles Albert's sympathies for the cause of the Sonderbund. But to others he frankly said that he was not fighting in the least for the Jesuits--"They do not make us hot or cold;" and instead of resting his appeal to the Diet on so doubtful a ground, he earnestly entreated Louis Philippe to prevent the violent substitution of a unitary and propagandist government "for the cantonal government of Switzerland."

To say the truth, it was for the stability of Austrian government in Italy that Metternich was now alarmed; and Mentz had warned him that a strong and united government in Switzerland would be dangerous to Austria in Lombardy. When, then, the election of a Radical government by the canton of St. Gallen made the character of the coming Swiss Diet tolerably certain, Metternich thought that the time had come for decided action; and he desired that before the meeting of the Diet, Austria, France, Russia, and Prussia should declare that they would not suffer cantonal authority to be violated. England, however, Metternich well knew would be opposed to him. Ever since the recognition of Greek independence in 1830 Metternich had become aware that a statesman had arisen in England who, though inferior to Canning in width of sympathy and capacity for sudden and ready action, yet was Canning's equal in strength of will, and in the thorough grasp of the two convictions that Constitutionalism was better than Despotism, and that Metternich was a dangerous politician who should always be opposed.

Palmerston, indeed, had not accomplished any such brilliant stroke of foreign policy as the breaking up of the Holy Alliance, or the defeat of Absolutism in Portugal, and had only played a late and subordinate part in the Greek question. But he had helped to save Belgium from the clutches both of France and Holland. He had uttered as decided a protest as was, perhaps, possible to him, against the Frankfort Decrees. And he had recently intimated plainly his opinion about the annexation of Cracow. The occupation of Ferrara had not at that time taken place; but Palmerston's utterance about the Treaty of Vienna on the Po had sufficiently indicated to Metternich the line which English feeling was taking with regard to Italian policy. But, though certain of the hostility of Palmerston, Metternich fully hoped to counterbalance that danger by securing France to his side. With Guizot he had long been on terms of cordial friendship; and each had sympathized with the other in various points of their political career. But, unfortunately for Metternich, in the Italian question Guizot had not seemed entirely sympathetic with Austria; for the Lombard exile, Pellegrino Rossi, who was now French ambassador at Rome, was the special friend and _protegé_ of Guizot; and as it was primarily for the sake of Austrian rule in Italy that Metternich cared about the Swiss question, he might find that here, too, French opinion did not coincide with Austrian.

It soon appeared that Louis Philippe shrank from an alliance with Austria. He declared that any declaration by the four Powers, instead of hindering any outburst in Switzerland might hasten it; and Guizot was directed to propose that, instead of a common action by the four Powers, Austria should undertake alone the defence of the Sonderbund, France merely occupying some position in the territory of the Confederation. Metternich, however, remembered that during the intervention in the Papal States, in 1831-2, a French general had seized on Ancona, and had attempted a demonstration there, at first of a Republican character, and throughout entirely anti-Austrian. And he feared that, if he consented to Guizot's proposal, the French Radicals might turn the occupation of Swiss territory to their advantage.

While France and Austria were thus wasting their time in wrangling, the Swiss Diet met. Ochsenbein, an even more energetic man than Neuhaus, had been chosen President of the Confederation; and on the 20th July, 1847, the Diet had declared that the Sonderbund was incompatible with the Treaty of Confederation. This was speedily followed by the dismissal from the service of the Confederation of all those who held office in the cantons of the Sonderbund; and finally, in September, the Diet decreed that the Assemblies of Luzern, Schwytz, Freyburg, and Valais should be invited to expel the Jesuits from their territory. The Sonderbund probably felt that a direct military resistance to the whole forces of the Diet would be hopeless, and therefore they resolved to make a separate attack on some of the smaller cantons. With this view they prepared to march their troops from Luzern against Aargau, which they considered one of the centres of Protestant tyranny; and about the same time the canton of Uri resolved to invade the Ticino. In both these cases the Sonderbund hoped to rouse a popular insurrection on their side, but in this they were singularly mistaken.

Previously to 1815 Uri had exercised a special authority over Ticino, and had used it to thrust in German officials in place of Italian. The Treaty of Vienna had secured Ticino from these tyrannies; but the Ticinese remembered them, and resented this new invasion. The troops of Uri were indeed able to gain one or two successes; but the people of Ticino rose against them, and, after a short, sharp struggle, succeeded in driving them out of the canton. The expedition to Aargau proved equally unsuccessful, and, in the meantime, the Federal Diet was organizing its forces under the command of General Dufour, a Genevese. They resolved that Freyburg, as the nearest of the Sonderbund cantons to Bern, and as geographically separated off from its allies, should be the first object of attack; and on November 7, Rilliet, the commander of the first division of the Federal forces, issued the following order of the day to his troops:--

"You are the first Federal troops who have entered the Freyburg territory. Your bearing at this moment will give the tone to the whole division. Consider that you are entering on a Federal territory, that you are marching against members of the Federation, who for centuries have been your friends, and will be so again. Consider that they are rather misled than guilty. Consider that they are neighbours, and that you ought to be fighting under the same flag. Therefore be moderate; refute the slanders of those who are driving them on. Listen not to false rumours, nor to foolish provocations to violence. Listen only to your leaders, and leave to your opponents the responsibility of having fired the first shot against the Federal flag. Soldiers! I rely on you as on myself; and do you trust in God, who marches before the flag of good, right, and honour."

To the Freyburger Rilliet appealed to receive the Federal troops as brothers and friends, and as obeying the God whom Protestants and Catholics alike worship. "Lay down your arms," he said, "not before us, but before our flag, which is yours also."

These appeals were not without result. At one of the first towns at which the Federal troops arrived in the canton of Freyburg, the townsfolk threw off the authority of the Cantonal Boards, raised the Federal flag, and admitted the Federal troops. Two slight skirmishes took place after this between the Federal forces and those of the canton; but the former were easily victorious. On November 12 the Federal troops appeared before the town of Freyburg; and on the 14th it was surrendered to them. Large numbers of the citizens received them with cries of "Long live the Confederates! Down with the Sonderbund! Down with the Jesuits!"

The leaders of the Sonderbund at Luzern were startled at this sudden collapse, and resolved to apply for foreign help; and it was on November 15, 1847, that the descendants of Reding and Winkelried appealed to the descendants of Leopold of Hapsburg for help against their fellow-confederates.

Metternich would gladly have intervened; and he hastened to assure the Sonderbund that the Emperor of Austria considered their cause a just one. Still, however, he desired the co-operation of France; but Guizot hesitated, and when Palmerston announced that any demonstration in favour of the Sonderbund would be met by a counter-demonstration by England on the side of the Federal Diet, the French Government distinctly refused to have any share in intervention.

In the meantime the Sonderbund was rapidly breaking down. The Protestant party had gained the upper hand in the little canton of Zug, and persuaded the Government to surrender to the Diet even before the Federal troops had appeared in the canton. The occupation of Zug was speedily followed by a march to Luzern. On November 23 the Federal troops encountered the forces of Luzern and drove them back after a sharp fight. On the following day the War Council of the Sonderbund fled from Luzern and the Federal troops entered it. After this defeat there was no further serious resistance; by November 29 the last canton of the Sonderbund had surrendered to the Diet, and on December 7 the Diet passed a formal resolution refusing to admit any mediation from the Great Powers. So ended the Sonderbund war; and whatever harshness the Diet and the Protestant cantons may have shown in the earlier part of the struggle towards their Catholic neighbours, they had at least consistently upheld the principle of national independence, and by their vigour and determination they had saved the unity of Switzerland and defeated Metternich.

Nor were these the only defeats which the ruler of Europe sustained in the year 1847. In Germany, too, there were signs that the old system was giving way. Metternich, indeed, had hoped that the King of Prussia had been about to abandon the policy which he had followed from 1840 to 1843; for in 1846 a meeting had taken place between Metternich and the King in which Frederick William had shown signs of alarm at the popular movement. But this change of feeling had been only temporary, for an event had occurred soon after which had given a new impulse to German national feeling, and re-awakened thereby the popular sympathies of the King of Prussia.

On July 8, 1846, the King of Denmark, Christian VIII., issued a proclamation in which he declared that he should consider the provinces of his Crown as forming one sole and same State. This was felt to be undoubtedly aimed at the independence of Schleswig-Holstein. That Duchy had, since the middle of the fifteenth century, been recognized as a separate province, of which the King of Denmark was duke (till that time Schleswig had been a fief of Denmark and Holstein of Germany). In the seventeenth century a practically absolute Government had been established in Denmark; but in 1830 the liberties of that country had been restored, and soon after a cry had arisen from some of the Radical party at Copenhagen in favour of the conquest of Schleswig.

But the object of the popular party and that of the King were entirely unlike; the Democratic party desiring to assert what they considered a national principle by the separation of Schleswig from Holstein and its absorption in Denmark; the King wishing to absorb Schleswig-Holstein whole into the Danish dominions, without consideration for anything but selfish aggrandizement. As a compromise between his own aims and those of the people of Copenhagen, Christian, in 1831, conceded separate assemblies to Holstein and Schleswig; but he had followed this up by steadily trying to Danize the Duchies. Danish officers were introduced into their army and navy, even into their private ships; Danish teachers were appointed in the University of Kiel; the liberty of the Press was continually interfered with, and arms were removed from the forts of Schleswig-Holstein to Copenhagen. Thus it became evident that the proclamation of July, 1846, was merely another step towards the complete denationalization of the Duchies.

Metternich was in a difficult position. On the one hand he was bound by the Treaty of Vienna to assert the rights of Austria to protect Holstein as a member of the German Confederation; on the other hand he knew that by so doing he was strengthening that German national feeling which he so much dreaded. "In the University of Heidelberg," wrote Metternich, "in the municipal councils of German towns, in the gatherings of professors and of choral societies, the cry is being raised for the Fatherland." The professors of Heidelberg had sent a special address to the Holsteiners, and it was clear on every side that German sentiment was rising to boiling point. Under these circumstances Metternich tried to steer between the dangers of encouraging popular feeling and that of neglecting to assert the legal influence of Austria. Finally, he persuaded the Federal Diet, on September 17, 1846, to pass two resolutions--First, that, apart from his letter of July 8, the King of Denmark should respect all the rights which he had promised to respect in a private letter of August 22; but, secondly, that, "while the Confederation pays just honour to the patriotic sentiments shown on this occasion by the Confederated German States, it regrets the passionate accusations and irritations which were produced by this circumstance."

So for the moment Metternich hoped to stave off the natural results of this outburst of popular feeling. But he could not prevent the effect which that outburst would produce on the more impressionable character of the King of Prussia. One of those who had had much opportunity of observing that king remarked that whoever was a favourite with him for the time and managed to indulge his fancies had the game in his own hands; and the Ministers who then enjoyed the confidence of Frederick William were eager to encourage him in complying with the popular feeling. So, in spite of Metternich's warnings, the King of Prussia, in January, 1847, had summoned to Berlin the representatives of all the Provincial Estates to discuss affairs. "The King," said Princess Metternich, "has promulgated this Constitution without force and without virtue, which is nothing to-day, but which to-morrow may change into thunder and destroy the Kingdom."

But the concessions which the King of Prussia was making only embodied a feeling which was stirring in various parts of Germany. A terrible famine in Silesia was quickening the desire of the poorer classes for some change in their condition; the booksellers and literary men were uttering various demands for freedom of the Press; and when a meeting of the Baden Liberals at Offenburg tried to formulate these demands, the organizers of the meeting were threatened with a prosecution which never took place.

Such, then, was Metternich's position towards the close of 1847; discredited as a champion of legality by the annexation of Cracow, looked on with suspicion by many orthodox Catholics in consequence of his attempt on Ferrara, his power as a ruler and his reputation as a diplomatist alike weakened by the result of the Sonderbund war. The result of these various failures was seen in the attitude both of kings and peoples. The King of Prussia was breaking loose from Metternich's control; France was suspicious and England hostile; Charles Albert was assuming more and more an attitude of defiance to Austria; the Pope was drifting gradually into the position of a champion of Italian Liberty; German national feeling, which Metternich had hoped to stamp out in 1834, was bubbling up into new life under the triple influence of the Schleswig-Holstein question, the King of Prussia's reforms, and the growing Liberalism of Saxony and Baden; while Hungary, which had seemed hopelessly divided, was gradually solidifying into opposition to Austrian rule. Such were the chief points in the spectacle which presented itself to Metternich as he looked upon Europe. Yet he was far indeed from thinking of yielding in the struggle, or of abandoning in the slightest degree his faith in his great system. He was still prepared to crush Switzerland and Charles Albert, to lead back the Pope and the King of Prussia into wiser courses, to quench the spirit of German enthusiasm, to wear out Hungarian opposition, to recover the friendship of France, and to defy the enmity of England. Such results seemed still possible when, in an Italian island to which Metternich had not recently given much attention, there first broke out that revolutionary fire which, under judicious guidance, was to spread over Europe and overthrow the system of Metternich.

FOOTNOTE:

[7] I feel that some explanation is needed for the rejection of what was once one of the most deeply-rooted traditions among all Liberals who interested themselves in the politics of this period. I must, therefore, state that my chief authority for my account of the paralysis of the Austrian Government in the Galician insurrection, and their consequent innocence of any organized massacre, is Dr. Herbst, the well-known leader of the German Liberals in the Austrian Reichstag, who was in Galicia at the time of the insurrection.