CHAPTER V

THE MARSHALLING OF THE ARMIES

_Now entertain conjecture of a time, When creeping murmur, and the poring dark, Fills the wide vessel of the universe. From camp to camp, through the foul womb of night, The hum of either army stilly sounds,_ * * * * * _..... and from the tents, The armourers, accomplishing the knights, With busy hammers closing rivets up, Give dreadful note of preparation._

A well-known American, it was probably Roosevelt, remarked à propos of the outbreak of the War that Germany's readiness would redound to her eternal dishonour, while Britain's unreadiness would be to her eternal honour.

The term "unready" applies to the nation as a whole. Fortunately for civilisation the British Navy and the little striking Force were, as we have seen, kept trained to an hour. And so it was that, upon a single word, the whole machine moved precisely as the admirable organisation had planned for it.

It must also be remembered that for some years past everybody who had studied international affairs with any intelligence knew precisely how and where Germany would attack; that even in 1908 it was possible to give the approximate date of such attack; and that when the attack came the position of the British Expeditionary Force would be in the post of honour upon the left of the French line in, approximately, the district in which it actually deployed.

Thus, up to a certain point, events fell out as anticipated. But one or two big factors were not foreseen, or, at least, not sufficiently appreciated. These were the amazing speed and mobility with which the German initial attack was destined to develop; the overwhelming numbers of the enemy; and, lastly, the astonishing effect of big gun fire, as instanced at Liége and other fortresses. This lack of foresight came within an ace of losing the war for the Entente Powers.

It was not until Saturday, August 15th, that the gates into Belgium by way of Liége were fully opened for the German armies, although Liége itself had been entered on the 7th.

The immediate effect, apart from the great moral value, of Belgium's heroic and successful resistance of those two or three days was to give to the British Force at least a sporting chance. The Force was late; those three days allowed it to get into position. It needs no great effort to imagine what would otherwise inevitably have happened.

Now let me at this point disclaim any intention of giving details of strategy and tactics, even were I sufficiently competent to do so. So far as I can I shall try to tell the story as simply as possible, omitting everything which may tend to confusion or which may render necessary continuous reference to maps. In a word, I am making this record of facts and impressions for the public, not for the experts. It is the human side and not the military which I would emphasise.

It is, however, necessary at the outset to get a good general idea of numbers, and the disposition of the armies on August 22nd in the particular area, if we wish fully to appreciate the events, and their significance, of the succeeding ten days. For the sake of convenience I will make sub-headings:

_The German Forces_

The total strength, all ranks, of a German _Army Corps_ is, roughly, 45,000; of a _Division_, roughly, 17,500. We may take this as a minimum.

Each Corps and each Division has, respectively, about 160 and 72 field-guns, and 48 and 24 machine-guns. The numbers of the latter arm were materially increased during 1913-14.

The German forces which concentrated on this far Western front, from Namur to about Tournai, consisted of no fewer than 13 Army Corps, _each Corps being augmented by an extra Division_. These Reserve Divisions were, I believe, combined into separate "Reserve Corps."

The Corps were divided up:--

5 under von Kluck (First German Army), attacking British. 4 under von Buelow (Second German Army), attacking 5th French Army. 4 under von Hausen (Third German Army), attacking 4th French Army.

The general lines of advance will be seen in plan A (page 71) and plan B (page 98).

Thus, the total German force concentrated on or about this immediate front must have numbered at least 812,500, with, say, 3,010 field-guns and 936 machine-guns.

It is not unreasonable to add to this total the not inconsiderable number of cavalry which operated, more or less independently, on the extreme flanks, and particularly from Tournai down through Amiens towards Le Havre.

_The French Forces_

The total strength, all ranks, of a French Army Corps is, roughly, 40,000, with, say, 160 field- and 48 machine-guns.

In this area there were present 3 corps under Lanrezac (5th French Army) holding the line Charleroi-Namur, and 3 corps under de Langle de Gary (4th French Army) holding a line west of the River Meuse south-west from Namur.

Away on the left flank of the British was another Corps, of Territorials, under d'Amade; and near Maubeuge, in reserve, were two or three Cavalry Divisions. These last did not, I believe, operate; and the Territorials were also fully occupied in their own area.

Reckoning up, then, we get an approximate total of, say, 240,000 men, 960 field- and 288 machine-guns.

_The British Forces_

A British Army Corps, of two Divisions, contains about 36,145, all ranks, with 152 field- and 48 machine-guns.

A Cavalry Division contains about 9,270, all ranks, with 24 field- and 24 machine-guns; a Cavalry Brigade about 2,285, all ranks, 6 field- and 6 machine-guns.

This is not revealing State secrets, because the numbers may be obtained from any military reference books.

Now it was, I believe, originally intended that the Expeditionary Force should be about 120,000 strong, or half the strength of the army with the colours.

The force actually present at Mons on August 22nd consisted, nominally, of two Army Corps, a Cavalry Division and a Cavalry Brigade. But several authorities, including Mr. Hilaire Belloc, assert that one of these corps was considerably below strength, and that, in round numbers, the strength of the Force was no more than 75,000, with 250 guns.

If we calculate up the _official_ strength the numbers should work out at 83,845 all ranks, 334 field- and 126 machine-guns.

Another Infantry Brigade came up on the 23rd and joined the Second Corps, and another Division (the 4th) also arrived.[1]

Taking everything into account it is, I think, reasonable to put the British strength at about 80,000 men, 300 field- and 100 machine-guns when battle was first joined.

Let me put these figures in tabular form so that we can get a comparison at a glance.

_Machine-_ _All ranks. Field-guns. guns._

_Actual Approximate Numbers on August_ 22_nd_

_British_ . . . 80,000 300 100 _French_ . . . 240,000 960 288 _German_ . . . 812,500 3,016 936

_Excess German strength over Franco-British_ 492,500 1,756 548

It is always rather difficult to grasp the _meaning_ of big numbers like these, so let me put it another way.

Place one German against each man in the Franco-British Force, and one German field-gun against each field-gun on our side. Now take all the German soldiers and guns still remaining over and imagine that you are watching them march past you down Whitehall, the men in fours all doing their "goose" parade step and the guns going by at a trot.

The army, marching night and day, without a moment's halt, would take just about three days to pass you.

Such then was the enemy superiority; about four or five times as great as the most pessimistic prophets had anticipated. We shall see shortly what this superiority developed into against the British Force.

_The Position of the Forces_

British.--The general position of the opposing forces before battle was joined, at least for the British, will be realised from plan A (page 71), and there is little need to add anything by way of explanation.

It will be noted that the British line extended along a front of about 25 miles, with Mons near the centre of the line. On Saturday, August 22nd, Sir John French disposed the Force into its positions. The Second Corps, under Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, held the canal line from Condé, on the west, to Mons, on the east. The First Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, extended from Mons, on the west, to Binche, on the east.

As there were no British reserves, the Cavalry Division, under General Allenby, was detailed to act as such and to be ready to move forward where and as required.

The 5th Cavalry Brigade, under Sir Philip Chetwode, was posted in and around Binche.

French.--I have indicated the composition of the French force, and plan A (page 71) will show how it was disposed on the morning of the 22nd; i.e. 5th French Army from Charleroi to just south of Namur, and 4th Army down the River Meuse to south of Dinant.

Similarly, there is nothing further to add about the German dispositions if the general lines of the enemy advance be noted: an attempted out-flanking movement on the extreme west, and the driving in of a wedge in the neighbourhood of Namur. These, together with heavy frontal attacks.

In all that follows it is necessary to add in, by way of reinforcements on the German side, the very great moral encouragement which the enemy had received by their triumphal passage through Belgium. They were in overwhelming strength; their heavy guns had crushed the fortresses in a few hours like so many egg-shells; they had, for many a long year, believed themselves invincible as against the world; and now they were marching directly upon Paris with the confident hope that within three months France would have ceased to exist as a nation, and that by the end of the year the war would be finished, with terms of peace dictated by their all-highest and supremely-powerful deity, the Kaiser.

It was, too, not merely an army disciplined and trained in the minutest details of war which was thus bludgeoning forward into France; it was, in effect, a nation in arms. A nation which, for many a long year past, had been educated to regard war as the greatest of all earthly things---a supreme issue to which all the sciences and arts of the preliminary years of peace were to be directed.

It was a nation which regarded as fully legitimate any means whatever to the supreme end desired.

I recall a remark made to me during the South African War by a Prussian naval officer.

"You English," he said, "do not know the rudiments of war. When the day comes for us to go to war you shall see how we deal with the men, women and children. With us terror is our greatest weapon."

To-day the world knows how that weapon has been mercilessly wielded; and how impotent it has been.

On her side Britain was equally united, but in a different sense. She had taken up the gauntlet because her people were assured that the cause was a just one. In those early days the Expeditionary Force was not concerned one way or the other with the reasons for its presence in France. The men were, for the most part, quite ignorant of the facts; they were there as a professional army to do their "bit," as they had often had to do it before, and I cannot recall a single instance during the first month where the men spoke of the meaning of the war.

In numbers they were hopelessly insignificant beside the enormous masses ranged against them, but, for its size, the army with the colours has always been recognised the world over as without a peer.

There was, however, one factor which in no small degree tended to level the balance. Discipline in the Germany Army meant discipline in the mass, by regiments or companies, under constant supervision of officers and N.C.O.'s. In the British Army it meant discipline of the individual. In a word, if a British soldier finds himself alone in a tight corner he generally knows how to get out, if it is humanly possible. The German, accustomed from his childhood to be dry-nursed in every trivial detail of his every-day life, would be hopelessly at sea when forced to act on his own initiative. When properly led the German is splendidly courageous, and in this respect, quite apart from numbers and moral, it was an exceedingly tough proposition which French and British were up against at Mons.

As regards the French it is rather more difficult to estimate their outlook in the early days. From their experience in 1870 they knew what war with Germany meant, both in the actual fighting and in the nameless atrocities which the enemy committed on the civil population. Thus they wanted their revenge.

But France had not yet suffered in this war. She had not yet seen her borough officials taken as hostages and murdered in cold blood; her older men sold into slavery; her women raped and mutilated; her infant children impaled upon the bayonet and thrown into the fire; her Cathedral of Rheims tortured and desecrated. All this was yet to come.

At the beginning they fought valiantly but blindly. The shock was too sudden and overwhelming. Mistakes were made in the higher commands.

But within the month France awoke. The Soul of her still lived; and it was the Soul of a nation which was mighty many a generation before ever Germanic tribes had banded together in primitive community.

The Soul of France awoke in every one of her children. Not one, man, woman or child, but saw the way clear before him, but felt the grip of steel-cold determination to follow that path straight to the end.

Such was the France which turned at bay before the very gates of her capital, to show the world that the doom of civilisation's enemy was irrevocably sealed.

[1] Until Wednesday the 26th, the 19th Brigade was acting directly under orders from G.H.Q. On that date, being isolated it was appropriated by the Second Corps. The 4th Division detrained at Le Cateau and took up position in and about Solesmes to cover the retirement.