Part 15

That such a form and direction of thought belongs naturally to man has been further shown by the ready assent of the young to the law of benevolence, and their unhesitating test of their seniors by reference to it. If their irritability and resentment have been stirred, it may be difficult to gain their assent to the special application of the law of benevolence in the circumstances. This, however, is only an example in early life, of what we find in more advanced years, that it is hard to do the right, and easy to excuse the wrong we do, while resenting the wrong done to us. But, apart from exciting causes, and simply in the exercise of a quiet reflection, the child recognizes the duty of benevolence; and, notwithstanding the disadvantages of weakness and inexperience, proceeds to test others by this standard, and is felt by others to be powerful by reason of the force belonging to the law, however superior in years, and in authority may be the persons of whom the child expects that he be kindly treated. These are in very condensed form the facts of human life, which are as outstanding as the contrary facts insisted upon as characteristic of animal life. We need an explanation which shall put the nature of man as truly in contrast with the nature of the animal, while it is at the same time allowed that man has an animal nature which may operate to the influence of his conduct, in neglect of this higher law of intelligence.

Now the most advanced results of physiological science carry no explanation of this simple, ordinary fact, man's recognition of a law of benevolence as authoritative. After we have assigned full value to the _sensibilities_ of a physical nature overspread with a sensitive nerve-system; after we have made account of the motor activity possible to an animal possessed of a complicated muscular system controlled by motor nerves, we have not come near a region in which the reflective process takes place which applies the law of benevolence for the regulation of conduct. We discover within the range of physiological possibility, sensitiveness to impression from without, and to the influence of the cravings and appetites of a nature requiring support and satisfaction, and impelling power which urges to action for the sake of present satisfaction. All these things we find easily explained under the teaching of physiology; but we have no explanation of the act of intelligence in perceiving a law of benevolence and owning submission to it. We do not even find a scientific account of the subordinate intellectual exercises involved in the application of the law of benevolence when recognized. There is a form of discrimination here, including the distinction of men as persons, the claims involved in personal rights, and the phase of individual duty ascertained while contemplating the circumstances in the midst of which it is needful to act. All this is outside the range of the formulated results of physiological research. There can be no hesitation in accepting all that has been established as to nerve-sensibility,--the subjection of human life to the interaction of external influences,--and the inevitable forms of experience which result in individual history. But we see in these, only conditions in the midst of which man by exercise of his intelligence is to undertake the management of life on a higher level than that of animal life. We clearly recognize the laws of motor activity, including the full bearing of outward influences, and inward tendencies upon human action. But with these things we see what is meant when it is recognized that intellect must govern passion: while we see physiological science laying open to us only the laws of passion, and not the law for its government. We admit the convincing nature of the evidence by which it is shown that our nature with all the special phases of individuality, often involving strange perils and perplexities, has been inherited by us, gathering within the boundaries of our life a task which we would willingly have shunned. We perceive in this a science of the specialities of individual nature, standing alongside the science explaining the common characteristics of man which come within the range of physiological research. But it is beyond this, that the problem arises concerning the moral government of life, so that equally what is common, and what is peculiar to man shall be regulated according to rational law. For this all see to be true, excepting always cases of manifest infirmity and disorder, that equally the common and the special powers of the individual are to be regulated by the law of benevolence. There are no exemptions for special temperament, whatever diversities there may be in the task which application of the law may involve for some. The _ought_ has ascendency over human life;[DI] the bare perception of this grand reality, taken with all the distinctions involved in its application to personal conduct, and all the forms of personal control exercised for its fulfilment, lies apart from the discoveries of physiology. In these things we see most clearly what mind is, and what mind does in the management of human life. We discover clearly thus what it is which makes human life superior to the life of the animals around us; what it is which makes the best in human life stand essentially connected with the subordination of the animal nature to a higher nature within; and in what respect it stands true that physiology is a science of only a part of our nature, and that the lower, because the subject part. In this man knows, apart from all science, and quite independently of philosophy too, that he has a higher life, working, rejoicing, and advancing to nobler excellence, just as he governs his body, keeping it in subjection, while revering an ideal of moral and spiritual excellence towards the attainment of which it is the duty and honor of humanity to strive.

FOOTNOTES:

[CX] Hæckel's _Evolution of Man_, vol. i. p. 129.

[CY] _Human Anatomy_, i. p. 198.

[CZ] _Human Anatomy_, i. p. 199.

[DA] From which motor nerves emerge.

[DB] _Human Anat._, i. p. 200.

[DC] _Human Anat._, i. p. 201.

[DD] _Ib._ p. 282.

[DE] See Appendix XII.

[DF] _Evolution of Man_, i. p. 129.

[DG] _Origin of Species_, 6th ed. p. 208.

[DH] Whether some of the animals may possess an inferior order of mind, is a question which need not be here discussed.

[DI] See Appendix XIII.

LECTURE VIII.

RELATION OF SCIENCE TO OUR CONCEPTIONS OF DIVINE INTERPOSITION FOR MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD.

The view given in previous lectures of the most prominent features of the recent advances in scientific knowledge most intimately concerning our religious conceptions of the origin and government of the world, may afford some aid towards forming a judgment of the points of contact and apparent conflict. A brief summary will afford the best introduction to the lines of inquiry with which the present discussion may be brought to a close.

First, as to the inorganic in the universe, recent investigations favor the conclusion that neither the matter in the world, nor the energy, can be increased or diminished by operation of any laws known to apply to such existence. The laws under which these two forms of being hold their place in the world involve only change of distribution and relation. Both matter and energy are, however, perpetually undergoing change or transformation, and whether the change be for the better or for the worse in the history of the universe as a whole, the fact of unceasing change in subordination to fixed law, is clear evidence that matter and energy are not eternal or self-subsisting, but are dependent on some transcendent existence imposing the laws determining their relations.

Second, as to organized existence, recent researches go to prove that there is in all animals a measure of adaptability to surrounding conditions of life, providing for "adaptive changes" in the organism, which become fixed, and are transmitted to succeeding generations of the same order under the law of heredity. On warrant of the evidence for this, it is to be taken as certain that the various orders of animals now familiar to us did not at first come into being with all the characteristics now pertaining to them. The law of their life has provided for a progression in development, in accordance with which we have distinct orders of the pigeon, the dog, and the horse, with variations in animals of every class. This law of development, applicable to all animal life, admits of greater or less diversity of result in the history of distinct races, according to the complexity of the organism.

Third, as to the relations of different orders in the scale of animal life, it is proved that all vital organism has been modelled on a common plan as appears in the arrangement and functions of the nerve system, providing for sensibility and motor activity. In accordance with this, we find in different orders of animal life not merely analogies or resemblances in structure, but homologies or examples of complete identity of structure and function. Thus the brain, and the two sets of nerve lines, namely sensory and motor, are the same in nature and functions in all animals, from the frog to man inclusive, and they differ only in complexity of arrangement within the central organ, and extent of ramification of the nerve lines. Diversity of nature thus far appears in the relative complexity of organism. This is a conclusion which assigns to man his place in the scale of animal life; that is, in so far as we regard man exclusively by reference to his animal nature, he stands highest in the scale of organism,--first in rank, judged simply by complexity of brain structure, and minuteness of nerve system.

Fourth, in respect of moral life, that is, ability to contemplate a law of life absolutely authoritative as well as universally applicable amongst intelligent beings,--such for example as the law of benevolence; ability to control the whole animal nature so as to subject it to this higher law of benevolence; ability to strive after the harmonizing of all dispositions and actions in accordance with the law of benevolence,--man occupies a distinct place in the order of beings existing in the world, no other living being standing associated with him. There are innumerable forms of organized being in the world; but only a single representative of moral life in it. No being save man contemplates a general law of life, making its fulfilment a deliberate end of action; no being save man possesses a conception of duty or oughtness, which, if it be regarded simply as an intellectual exercise, can be apprehended only under application of a law of conduct such as benevolence. That man stands entirely alone in these respects, and is, therefore, to be ranked as a distinct order of being, appears from the following definite lines of evidence: no animal contemplates a general law of conduct, or intelligible rule of life applicable for the government of the order to which it belongs; no animal subordinates physical impulse at the bidding of such a law; no animal aims at the perfecting of its nature under a general conception of the excellence of its own nature, as dog, horse, or ape. Therefore we conclude that man alone of all living beings known to us in this world is a moral being.

Taking now these four aspects of existence as known to us in this world,--without advancing to deal directly with the phases and conditions of religious life,--the whole four can be freely accepted by religious men in strict harmony with all the requirements of religious thought. The three first named are distinct advances in the history of physical science, and will be generally admitted to include the most important accessions to our knowledge of the physical universe having any bearing on the conceptions lying at the basis of religious thought. The fourth is the product of philosophical inquiry, proceeding in accordance with direct observation of personal experience, and by means of simple analysis of our intelligent activity as that is concerned with the government of personal life, especially in view of the relations subsisting in society. This last as a philosophic conclusion, not attained by physiological research, not properly any part of physical science, but reached only by distinguishing properly certain contents of our every-day thought, may be liable to rejection from those who rely only on the methods peculiar to physical science. But such treatment of the propositions has no bearing on their truth; as denial of them will not deliver any man from the obligations of benevolence, or exempt him from the demands of his fellowmen, requiring that in seeking his own satisfaction he shall not be selfish, and certainly not harsh, as if the strongest might have all they desire, and the weakest must be content to wait on their pleasure. Denial of the recognition of a law of benevolence will not exempt him from the experience consequent on the expectations of his fellowmen as they seek help for the suffering, or sympathy for the sorrowful, or rescue for the perishing. Though what has been said as to the law of benevolence implies that it is universally authoritative, there is no express philosophic theory here introduced as to the mode by which this knowledge is attained, or the grounds on which its universality is asserted. The bare fact that each man expects his fellowman to be benevolent is enough for the present purpose. The simple declaration that the man who seeks only his own gratification, setting at defiance all the rights of his fellowmen, is unworthy the name of man and acts a brute's part, is all that any one needs who would make good the argument that human nature is distinct from that of the brutes. No man can escape the obligation to benevolent disposition; no man except the man of gross character attempts to live as if he regarded the violation of it as capable of vindication. These two things being so, the testimony is as strong as that establishing the elementary truths of science, which demonstrates that man owns a universal moral law, and so distinguishes himself from the animals. The conditions of human life are too clearly recognized, and too constantly insisted upon in ordinary society, to allow cover for ambiguities, and denials which would favor the position of those who accept only what is ascertained by the methods of physiological investigation. Hence it happens that popular favor runs deeply and strongly for the kind and good; and science itself must yield when the testimony of the race is uniform.

Before closing this inquiry, it is desirable to pass over from the outstanding conceptions of science and philosophy, to distinctive and prominent conceptions belonging to religious thought, with the view of considering whether these can be held in harmony with the teaching of science. Of these, reference may be made specially to two which encounter opposition on professedly scientific grounds:--Miracle as an evidence of the Messiahship of our Lord Jesus Christ; and the efficacy of Prayer in the economy of spiritual life. These two conceptions have encountered strong opposition on the allegation of inconsistency with the unchangeableness of the laws of nature. It becomes, therefore, an important part of the present investigation, to ascertain how far these two articles of Christian faith, miraculous testimony to the divinity of our Saviour, and habitual answer to the prayer offered to God by those who approach Him in the merit of the Redeemer, are consistent with the teaching of science. These two conceptions are naturally included in the one question as to the compatibility with the laws of nature of the interposition of supernatural agency for attainment of moral and spiritual ends in the history of the world.

First in order stands the question of MIRACLE as involved in the evidence of divine power and authority given by our Lord, during His sojourn in this world to accomplish the great work of redemption.[DJ] The testimony of miracle as presented in the historical narrative of Christ's life is frequent and abundant in variety; and its connection with His work for the redemption of sinful men is everywhere proclaimed. It is impossible to contemplate the scriptural testimony to the glory of Christ's nature without including miracle as a conspicuous part of it; and it is equally impossible to detach this testimony from relation to the mediatorial work of the Redeemer as concerned with the pardon of sin, and restoration of man to holiness of character. It thus becomes an essential test of the validity of Christian evidence to settle the compatibility of miracle with the knowledge now possessed of the laws of nature.

It is not necessary here to discuss the credibility of miracles, as affected by the question whether there can be sufficiency of testimony to support the occurrence of a miracle,--a question which has engaged an amount of attention disproportionate to its intellectual worth. The suggestion of the question was nothing better than an example of misleading ingenuity, allowed to stand on the page on which it was indited in manifest violation of the laws of evidence and the essential conditions of human knowledge. The value of testimony does not depend on the nature of the thing to which it applies, but on the character of the witness, and the opportunity for observing and testing the facts described. There are, for example, a series of surgical operations being performed in Edinburgh for removal of tumors (Ovariotomy), and being repeated at intervals of two or three weeks, which have hitherto been declared by the profession to be impossible without sacrifice of life; and yet they are successfully accomplished, leaving only an exceedingly small percentage of death. The whole combined testimony of preceding ages has been against the possibility of such operations; but this is a consideration of no value whatever in view of the testimony of the surgeons who take part in the hazardous and responsible, but most beneficent work, and of those professional men who have come from France, and Russia, and other lands, to witness the operation, and of citizens well acquainted with patients who have been delivered from a burdened life, overshadowed with prospect of early death. The laws of evidence are too well understood to call for abstract reasoning as to the credibility of the witnesses who are at present giving their testimony to the scientific world, of the successful repetition of an operation hitherto believed to be impossible. The bearing of such an illustration on the discussions raised concerning the credibility of the evidence of our Lord's disciples to the miracles He performed is obvious. Nor is there need for occupying time in trampling out the beaten straw by lingering over the argument that no evidence can be sufficient to establish a miracle, _because_ a miracle is contrary to common experience; for, it is obvious that a miracle must be contrary to common experience, since that which is matter of common experience can not be a miracle, but must be an event determined by some law of nature. The uniformity of the laws of nature is even a necessary condition for the evidential value of miracles.

We pass to the real merits of the question in discussing the possibility of the miracles of Christ without violation of any of the laws of nature as ascertained by the most recent advances of science.

The miracles of Jesus Christ profess to be supernatural interpositions for accomplishment of an immediate benevolent purpose, while in combination they afford a body of evidence testifying to the power and benevolent mission of a divine Saviour of the sinful. Their directly benevolent aim is conspicuous throughout. Jesus never performs any wonderful work for display of power; when a desire is indicated for signs in the heavens, these are refused; when His own wants are concerned, there is no exercise of power to deliver Himself from suffering; but when a poor sufferer appeals for deliverance, He is ready to act; or when the feeble, oppressed condition of one who has been a long time in this case comes under His eye, He is moved to compassion and gives unexpected deliverance even without intervention of a request. All this is done, not as if it were any part of the divine purpose to keep men exempt from suffering, nor as if it were inconsistent with the divine benevolence to allow its return and continuance, for He is at pains to warn that even a worse thing may come; but as if deliverance from suffering were in harmony with His mission, and peculiarly appropriate as illustrative of a Saviour's design as well as of His divine power. By way of sign He would rescue from disease, in order thereby to point to a grander deliverance, even from sin which causes all the world's sorrow.

The question here calling for attention is, How do these miracles stand related to the laws of nature which we now recognize as fixed and unchangeable? The _first_ portion of the answer must be that they are incapable of explanation under these laws. They are veritable examples,--referring for the present exclusively to their nature, not to the evidence on which we acknowledge that they occurred,--they are veritable examples of results incapable of being attained under the operation of natural law. The effects secured were indeed only such as would have been attained had medical science been able to accomplish the result, for the great majority of them belong to the region in which the grand healing art works out its beneficent contribution to human well being. But in respect of the mode of their execution they were in _no sense analogous_ to what is achieved by unexpected advance in scientific knowledge and skill. There was nothing in the whole course of our Lord's life, bearing resemblance to the work of him who laboriously ponders the varied aspects of some selected form of disease, and ultimately attains to skill in a new mode of treatment, or a dangerous and difficult form of operation. The word spoken to the leper or the paralytic; the anointing of the eyes with clay and sending the blind man with his clay-covered eyelids to wash in a pool; the command to Jairus's daughter, "Maid, arise;" and the call to the man of Bethany, "Lazarus, come forth,"--present no likeness to the conduct of one merely exercising a deeper knowledge of the remedial measures which are constantly being employed in some mode or other for relief of suffering. What we witness in the varied forms of His works is supernatural intervention, exercise of divine authority and power. There is no competent vindication of the sacred narrative by reduction of our Lord's works to the level of those forms of knowledge and skill which are within the reach of human discovery. The sacred writings offer no suggestion pointing in this direction; Christian faith, in the defence it offers for its recognition of the miraculous in Christ's life, does not shelter itself behind such a poor breastwork, as that which is gained by eliminating the supernatural,--seeking to defend itself by surrendering all that is distinctive of the God-man, who not only spake as man never spake, but who with profuse liberality performed works of healing which made the ears of the nation to tingle, compelling reluctant witnesses to testify, that it was never so seen in Israel. The supernatural works of Jesus belong to the same place in history, as that which records the supernatural attributes belonging to His personality.