Chapter 2, is the least convincing chapter of his work.

Strategically, the argument is stronger. It always seems to me that we must remember that Clausewitz had taken part in the defensive-offensive in its strongest, most absolute and unlimited form, on the greatest possible scale--the Moscow campaign and the ruin (consummated before a single flake of snow fell) of the Grand Army. If he had lived to complete the revision of his works, it always seems to me that he would have made his theory undeniable by stating that the defensive is the strongest form of war, _if unlimited by space_. What, for instance, would have happened if the Japanese had tried to march through Siberia on to St. Petersburg?

But, after all, which of the two is absolutely the stronger form of war, attack or defence, is merely a theoretical abstraction, for, practically, the choice is always settled for us by the pressing necessity of circumstances. And, in this connection, let us always bear in mind Clausewitz's dictum: "A swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive--the flashing sword of vengeance--is the most brilliant point in the defensive."

THE INNER LINE

A second disputed point is Clausewitz's alleged preference, as a rule, for the Inner Line in strategy. But it is necessary to remember that that was only due to the conditions of his time, before railways and telegraphs, when it was difficult to communicate between columns acting on concentric lines. And he is not in any way wedded to the Inner Line, like Jomini, but _only_ when circumstances are favourable. He has many sentences from which we may infer that, had he lived in railway and telegraph days, his strategy, like Moltke's, his most distinguished pupil, would have aimed at envelopment as a rule. For to bring up troops rapidly by several railways necessitates a broad strategic front, and Clausewitz especially lays down rapidity as his second great principle, and says--

"If the concentration of the forces would occasion detours and loss of time, and the danger of advancing by separate lines is not too great, then the same may be justifiable on these grounds; for _to effect an unnecessary concentration of the forces_ would be contrary to the second principle we have laid down (_i.e._ 'to act as swiftly as possible')."[69] Also: "Such separation into several columns as is absolutely necessary must be made use of for the disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form, _for that form is natural to the attack, and must not be disregarded without good reason_."[70] Also: "_It is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the action._" So that while the conditions of his time led Clausewitz to prefer close concentration and the Inner Line, like Napoleon, yet his reflections led him to propound the germ of the strategy of Moltke. Substitute for Clausewitz's close concentration this: "As close concentration, the combined movements regulated by telegraph, as is compatible with the utmost use of the railways and the greatest rapidity" (as he would certainly have said), and we arrive at Moltke's strategy.

FRONTAL ATTACKS

A third disputed point is his belief in the superior tactical efficiency, under favourable circumstances, of the Napoleonic method of breaking the enemy's line in the centre. Breaking the line by a frontal attack was, of course, much easier in Clausewitz's Napoleonic day than it is with the long-ranging arms of our day, and it is only natural that Clausewitz in his writings should give it the full tactical importance which it then deserved. His book would not be true to the tactical conditions of his day had he not done so, with Rivoli, Austerlitz, Salamanca, Eckmuhl, etc., before his mind. But it seems hardly correct to accuse him of over-partiality to frontal attacks, for he has examined both frontal and enveloping attacks most fairly, giving to each their relative advantages and disadvantages, and concluding: "The envelopment may lead directly to the _destruction_ of the enemy's army, if it is made with very superior numbers and succeeds. If it leads to victory the early results are _in every case_ greater than by breaking the enemy's line. Breaking the enemy's line can only lead indirectly to the destruction of the enemy's army, and its effects are hardly shown so much on the first day, but rather strategically afterwards,"[71] by forcing apart on different lines of retreat the separated fragments of the beaten army.

"The breaking through the hostile army by massing our principal force against one point, _supposes an excessive length of front on the part of the enemy_; for in this form of attack the difficulty of occupying the remainder of the enemy's force with few troops is greater, because the enemy's forces nearer to the principal point of attack can easily join in opposing it. Now in an attack upon the centre there are such forces on both sides of the attack; in an attack upon a flank, only on one side. The consequence of this is that such a central attack may easily end in a very disadvantageous form of combat, _through a convergent counter-attack_." Which is exactly our modern difficulty. "The choice between these two forms of attack must therefore be made according to the existing conditions of the moment. Length of front, the nature and direction of the line of retreat, the military qualities of the enemy's troops, and the characteristics of their general, lastly the ground must determine the choice."

Speaking generally he regards the _concentric_ enveloping form of tactical attack aiming at the enemy's line of retreat as the most efficacious and natural. "On the field of battle itself ... the enveloping form must always be considered the most effectual."[72] And the _eccentric_ or frontal counter-attack at the extended enveloping attack as the most efficacious and natural form of the defence, such as Napoleon's counter-attacks at Austerlitz or Dresden, or Wellington's at Salamanca. "And we think that one means is at least as good as the other."[73]

* * * * *

Now I think that these extracts sufficiently defend Clausewitz from the imputation of too great a belief in frontal attacks, and considering the frequent success of such Napoleonic attacks in his day, he gives a very fair summing up of the relative advantages and disadvantages thereof, and indeed such as might be written in the present day. Indeed the quite abnormal conditions of the Boer war produced such a feeling against frontal attacks, and so much loose talk of their being extinct, that it is very useful to turn to Clausewitz for a reminder that breaking the centre, whenever the condition he postulates, namely _over-extension of front_ on the enemy's part, is present, will always remain one of the two great forms of decisive attack open to a commander.

And as in our day the forces are so enormous that to reach the hostile flank becomes more difficult, and the extension of front becomes so gigantic (a front of several armies on a line of forty to seventy miles perhaps), it is well to consider whether breaking the enemy's centre will not again offer the most advantageous form for the final decisive act, coupled of course, as Clausewitz says it ALWAYS MUST be, with a strong flank attack. And in these gigantic battles of the future, such as Liao-yang and Mukden, which we must consider typical of the future, battles which must take several days, during which the troops in the first line become utterly exhausted and used up,--a decisive attack on the centre can well be imagined after the hostile reserves have been decoyed away over a day's march by a strong flank attack. As, for example, Nogi's flank attack round Mukden followed by Nodzu's decisive breaking the centre and capture of Mukden itself.

So that far from thinking Clausewitz's remarks about frontal attacks and breaking the line to be obsolete, it rather appears from the great Russo-Japanese battles that they are worthy of close study in view of the future.

TACTICAL VERSUS STRATEGICAL ENVELOPMENT

A fourth disputed point is the preference of Clausewitz, owing to his insistence on the greatest concentration possible with proper regard for the circumstances, for the tactical envelopment arranged on or near the field to strategical envelopment with divided forces arranged beforehand. In this matter I will again quote General v. Caemmerer, who disagrees with him, and says: "Clausewitz proclaims the oblique front as the most effective strategic form of attack, ... that is to say, when the whole army with one united front falls upon the strategic _flank_ of the enemy, and, if victorious, cuts him from his line of retreat. But where such a situation cannot be brought about, where our advance has brought us before the strategic _front_ of the enemy, then he sees in the tactical envelopment, in the formation of an offensive flank, the proper means of effectively preparing to push the enemy from his line of retreat, and he distinctly explains that tactical envelopment need not at all be the _consequence_ of strategical envelopment, and need not at all be prepared long beforehand by a corresponding advance of divided forces."

Clausewitz says, "The consequence of this is that battles fought with enveloping lines, or even with an oblique front, which should properly result from an advantageous relation of the lines of communication, are commonly the result of a moral and physical preponderance."[74] Also "he should therefore only advance with his columns on such a width of front as will admit of their all coming into action together." "Such separation into several columns should be made use of for the disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form" (_i.e._ by troops within a day's march of each other). "But it must be only of a tactical nature, for a strategic envelopment, when a great blow is to be struck, is a complete waste of power."

General v. Caemmerer comments: "He is thus of opinion that the lateral movement of part of the army against the flank of the enemy could without any difficulty still be carried out as initiated by the plan of battle; and in order to understand this idea we must again bear in mind the difference between the fire-effect of then and now. In those days a comparatively short movement made it still possible for a considerable portion of the army to gain the defenders' flank; to-day a lengthy and troublesome operation would be necessary for the same object, and its successful execution would only be counted upon if the defender remained entirely passive, and would neither think of a counter-stroke nor of a corresponding movement of his forces to the threatened flank."

Without going into this controversy I will, however, quote the excellent reason given by Clausewitz for his preference for tactical as opposed to strategical envelopment: "One peculiarity of the offensive battle is the uncertainty, in most cases, as to the position (note, and strength) of the enemy; it is a complete groping about amongst things that are unknown (Austerlitz, Wagram, Hohenlinden, Jena, Katzbach). The more this is the case the more concentration of forces becomes paramount, and turning a flank to be preferred to surrounding."[75]

It is also well to recollect how many famous generals had been ruined in Clausewitz's experience through over-extension or dispersion of their forces. The crushing defeats of Napoleon's marshals in the winter of 1813, Macdonald at the Katzbach, Oudinot at Gros Beeren, Ney at Dennewitz, which neutralized Napoleon's great victory at Dresden and began his ruin, were all chiefly owing to this cause.

And the weather may, again, have as great influence in shortening resistance and allowing troops to be overwhelmed before the too-distant reinforcements arrive, as it had in those battles. If the weather then prevented the old muskets going off, and enabled the attack to rush the defence, so now a fog, rain, mist, or snow, by restricting the field of view and fire, may produce the same results. When one thinks of the number of great battles fought in such weather, as they may well be again, one sees an additional reason for carefully considering Clausewitz's warning. Far from relegating his preference for the tactical as opposed to the strategical envelopment to the region of the obsolete, because of our improved armament, it seems right to give it full weight as a corrective to a perceivable tendency to elevate strategical envelopment (after Königgrätz) into a formula for victory. If in the past many great generals have been ruined by over-extension, so may they be again. Against this tendency Clausewitz will for ever lift his voice.

Also it remains to be considered, with the huge armies of to-day and the future, such armies as at Liao-yang and Mukden, such armies as may possibly one day join issue in Afghanistan, whether strategical envelopment will be practicable, or whether tactical envelopment, such as General Kuroki's tactical enveloping movement on Yentai, and the Russian line of retreat at Liao-yang, or General Nogi's tactical enveloping dash northward on Hsinminting and the railway at Mukden, will not be preferable.

Perhaps, as a compromise, one might call such a movement strategical-tactical, and so avoid the dispute by jugglery of words.

I have not attempted to do more than roughly indicate that the solution of these four disputed tactical questions in Clausewitz is to be sought in a study of the latest campaign, as he would have said himself; that is, the campaign in Manchuria. For, as the _Times_ correspondent in the XLVth Chapter, "Clausewitz in Manchuria," of his book "The War in the Far East," observes, "It will be abundantly clear to any one who has followed the great battles in Manchuria that the spirit of Clausewitz has presided over Japanese victories and wept over Russian defeats."