Part 2

Before 1807 the country had come to be divided into three sections: the commercial, shipbuilding East, the cotton and tobacco exporting South, and the isolated grain growing interior, linked with which was a languishing manufacturing interest on or near the seaboard. Beyond a limited range the producing proportion of our population could not participate in the profits of the European trade. The grain growers demanded a market, and the manufacturers saw their profits swept away by an influx of foreign goods. These were the interests which suffered from the diversion of capital to shipbuilding and foreign trade. Both looked to internal improvements as a solution of their troubles; their only hope was in a _home market_--in better roads, and in the development of the resources about them.

In the United States agriculturist and manufacturer turned to the national government for relief. But so long as the administration remained in the hands of the foreign trade party, the way was blocked to internal improvements. During the first three administrations after the adoption of the constitution, the individualistic republicans had been unable to gain control of the government; but with the admission of Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio and the settlement of the parts of the sea coast states remote from transportation facilities, the anti-commercial constituency gained the balance of power. It was to the voters of these new regions that Jefferson owed his success. It was to satisfy the demands of the West for an outlet to the gulf that Louisiana was purchased. To satisfy the insistent demand for internal improvements the national government also built the Cumberland road, and contributed to many other transportation projects. It was the open hostility of the West and South toward the commercial East which forced the embargo, and broke down the domination of the seaboard interests in national affairs.

RIVER TRAFFIC DEVELOPED BY PRIVATE CAPITAL.

The inland routes which required the least capital to utilize in a primitive way were the rivers. Here the chief obstacle was the current. In the early nineteenth century long lines of rafts, flat-boats and "arks" might be seen floating down the Connecticut, the Hudson, the Susquehanna and the Potomac. There were 2,800 miles of rivers tributary to the Atlantic seaboard which were navigable, or which needed only to be cleared of snags and rocks to render them available for use by small craft. It was estimated that on the eastern slope there were about 25,000 miles of streams which might be utilized by the construction of locks and canals. In the Mississippi valley there were 14,000 miles of navigable rivers, and about 75,000 more which were considered possibilities. But with a three or four-mile current it was impracticable to row, pole or warp a boat and cargo upstream for a long distance. The result was that along those streams which nature had provided as highways the producer first built his boat out of the timbers of the forest, then loaded it with the produce of his farm or mill, and floated down stream to market. Upon reaching his destination, he abandoned his craft and returned by stage or on foot. This was indeed an expensive process--expensive in time, expensive in funds and expensive in human effort. It was an expense of production, however, and one which did not require capitalization.

It was not until 1807 that the steamboat became a commercial success. At this time New York was becoming well settled, and as the Hudson was a natural highway a boat which could drive against wind and stream had every promise of success. Robert Fulton, who had been interested in the problem of steam navigation since 1802, returned from Europe after several years of investigation, and brought back one of Watt's engines. He obtained the financial co-operation of Chancellor Livingston, and together they obtained a monopoly of steam navigation in New York waters. A boat was fitted with the Watt engine, and a successful trip was made from New York to Albany and return. The route yielded large profits from the start, and other boats were built. By 1813 six boats were doing a profitable business on the Hudson. The success of Fulton and Livingston proved attractive to others. Crowded out of New York's waters by the monopoly, John Stevens, in 1809, took a steamboat around from Hoboken into the Delaware. The Phoenix now found business so good in those waters where Fitch had failed that it was soon followed by two other boats. Soon the whole Atlantic seaboard, including the St. Lawrence, was supplied with steam craft.

But enterprise in steamboat navigation was not confined to the coast. Business opportunities in the Mississippi valley attracted the attention of one Nicholas Roosevelt, who proposed to Fulton and Livingston that he would make a trip to New Orleans to survey the prospects for an inland water route, with the understanding that they should finance a steamboat line if his report was favorable. So favorable was it that he was placed in charge of the construction of a river boat at Pittsburg, and in 1811 the _New Orleans_ made her maiden trip down the Mississippi. Thereafter Roosevelt's boat took a regular route between New Orleans and Natchez. Other boats were added, but it was not until 1815 that a voyage was made upstream from New Orleans to Louisville and Cincinnati. After assisting Jackson in the campaign about New Orleans, the _Enterprise_, taking advantage of high water, steamed to Louisville in _twenty-five days_. In 1817 the _Washington_ accomplished the same feat while the river was within her banks, and the public became convinced of the practicability of upstream navigation. The same year the _Shelby_ reduced the time to twenty days, and by 1823 _fifteen days sufficed_. With the success of the steamboat, the Middle West was opened to rapid communication with the gulf.

WAGON ROADS INTO THE INTERIOR.

From 1807 to 1815 two changes had a marked effect upon the national attitude toward internal improvements. Before the outbreak of the European wars manufactures had made some progress in New England and in Pennsylvania. During the first struggle, and before the peace of Amiens, the only serious obstacle to American industry was the tendency to divert capital to wheat raising, shipbuilding and foreign trade. Prices were high, and the makers of goods found encouragement in large profits. With the cessation of hostilities American manufacturers looked to Congress for protection, for foreign goods poured into the country in such quantities and at such prices as to threaten the destruction of domestic production.

At the most, however, the manufacturing population was relatively small, but the disturbances to industry from 1815 to 1818 were such as to throw many out of employment, and to bring to the verge of bankruptcy and starvation those who had been engaged in shipbuilding and foreign trade. A great exodus to the interior was the result. In wagons, on horseback, or on foot--sometimes using handcarts, sleds and wheelbarrows to carry their provisions and light luggage--emigrants crowded the wooded paths that led to the West, where they might find conditions more favorable to independent livelihood.

All these conditions conspired to increase the depression in the East, and drive her people into agriculture and the development of the interior; while the opening of the Mississippi by the steamboat added to the attractions of the rich valleys in the Middle West. But upon his arrival in the West the newcomer found himself beyond the range of any market except New Orleans. To reach this market he "would produce or get together a quantity of corn, flour, bacon and such articles. He would build a flat-bottomed boat on the shore of some river or large creek, load his wares into it, and, awaiting the rise, with a few of his negroes to assist him, would float down to New Orleans. The voyage was long, tedious and expensive. When he arrived there he found himself in a strange city, filled with sharpers ready to take advantage of his necessities. Everybody combined against him to profit by his ignorance of business, want of friends or commercial connections, and nine times out of ten he returned a broken merchant. His journey home was performed on foot, through three or four nations of Indians inhabiting the western parts of Mississippi, Tennessee and Kentucky. He returned to a desolate farm, which had been neglected whilst he had been gone. One crop was lost by absence and another by taking it to market. This kind of business was persevered in astonishingly for several years, to the great injury and utter ruin of a great many people." It was the demand for safe transportation arising out of this situation which made Roosevelt's steamboat enterprise a success.

DEVELOPMENT OF COASTWISE COMMERCE.

The British blockade of our coast during the war of 1812 had a marked effect upon the development of inland routes of transportation, as may be seen from the following: "The interruption of the coasting trade was indeed a very serious affair. For years past that trade had given occupation to thousands of coasters and tens of thousands of sailors. The shoes made at Lynn, the Yankee notions of Connecticut, the cotton cards, the domestic cottons, the playing cards produced in New England, the flour of the Middle States, the East India goods brought in from abroad had found a ready market at Charleston, Savannah and Augusta, whence great quantities of rice and cotton were brought North. On the arrival of the British fleet this trade, no longer to be carried on in safety by water, began of necessity to be carried on by land. At first some merchants at Boston, having chartered a few wagons, despatched them with loads to Philadelphia, and even to Baltimore. This was enough. The hint was taken. A new industry sprang up, and by early summer the roads leading southward exhibited one continuous stream of huge canvas-covered wagons tugged along by double or triple teams of horses or of oxen. No distance was then too great, and hundreds of them would make their way from Salem and Boston to Augusta and Savannah. An estimate made towards the close of the year (1814) places the number of wagons thus employed at four thousand, and the number of cattle, horses and oxen at twenty thousand; nor does this seem excessive, for a traveler who drove from New York to Richmond declares that he passed two hundred and sixty wagons on the way."

THE CAPITALIZATION OF TURNPIKES.

Both overland trade and westward migration drew attention to the importance of good roads, both swelled the receipts of turnpike companies, and gave encouragement to investment of local capital in transportation improvement. By 1804 the Lancaster road had been extended to Pittsburg, and a regular stage line established which made a trip each way once a week. State governments lent every encouragement to the building of turnpike roads, _even to the extent of subscribing to their stock_. From contemporary writings and charter grants, it is estimated that nearly eight hundred turnpike companies were organized before the end of the war of 1812. Pennsylvania was pre-eminent in granting liberal charters, and toll rights, thereby encouraging the people of the more thickly settled districts to make such improvements for themselves. The corporations thus formed had little difficulty in obtaining capital subscriptions, whether for the construction of turnpikes or bridges, or for the operation of ferries. To the stock of these corporations several of the states subscribed in varying amounts. Although a few toll roads were constructed before that time, the turnpike movement may be said to date from the opening of the nineteenth century. Turnpikes (so called from the revolving, or turning bar, or pike which, when set across a toll road, prevented passage until charges were paid) were macadamized or otherwise improved at a cost varying from $500 to $10,000 per mile. Almost without exception they followed in a general way the old lines which had been worked out when travel on foot or on horseback was the chief method of communication, but wherever possible they were made straight, going over and not around hills and other obstacles. When the Boston and Salem turnpike was built a small but deep pond was encountered, but instead of going around the road crossed on a floating bridge. The construction of bridges and the operation of ferries were parts of this larger turnpike movement, and like the turnpikes themselves, they were usually disappointing to those who had invested with the hope of large dividends. At best, this movement did but little to supply the great need for improved transportation. To passenger service it was a great boon, in that it added much to personal comfort, though the time and cost of travel were little reduced. _It required five dollars and fifty cents to pay tolls from Philadelphia to New York, besides the hotel bills and other expenses of the road._ It took a week to go from Philadelphia to Pittsburg. What the country most needed--a cheap method of handling the bulky products of the interior--was not supplied. Freight was carried upon the turnpike with great difficulty and expense, and heavy goods were compelled to remain untouched on account of the high tolls.

REVIVAL OF CANAL CONSTRUCTION.

To meet this situation, canals had been proposed long before the period of turnpike building, and some surveys had been made, but because of lack of capital, construction was deferred. The earliest projects were for short cuts around rapids or falls, or between neighboring waters, but bolder plans followed. The first canal of any importance actually begun in the United States was the two-mile cut through the rocks about the South Hadley falls of the Connecticut. The Massachusetts legislature passed an act in 1792 incorporating the "Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Connecticut River." Work was begun at once with Dutch capital, and in two years the canal was completed.

The Santee canal in South Carolina was the first large work of this kind constructed in the United States. It connected the Santee river with the Cooper river at Charleston, and it was opened in 1800. Its length was twenty-two miles, and its cost $600,000.

A much more important project was the Middlesex canal in Massachusetts, a charter for which was obtained in 1793. This canal extended from the Charles river to the Merrimac, twenty-seven miles, and was designed to attract to Boston the trade normally tributary to Portsmouth. Work was begun in 1794, and ten years later the canal was opened for traffic, though it was not entirely completed until 1808.

The successful completion of the Erie canal, which became an assured fact long before its actual accomplishment in 1825, stimulated similar projects all over the country. The local strife between trade centers, combined with the local demand for outlet, set a number of private projects in motion. Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Georgetown were successfully appealed to for support for transportation routes which would enable them to compete with New York for the trade of the West. The Blackstone Canal Company, chartered by Rhode Island and Massachusetts in 1823, began the construction of a canal along the Blackstone river to connect Providence and Worcester, and this route was opened for traffic in 1828. Another New England project started at about the same time was for a canal to extend from New Haven northwards to Northampton, and on up the Connecticut valley into Vermont. Two companies were chartered for this purpose, the Farmington canal in Connecticut in 1822 and the Hampshire and Hampden canal in Massachusetts in 1823. The Farmington canal was completed in 1830; but the work on the Hampshire and Hampden project was for a time abandoned for want of funds, and the canal was not cut through to Northampton until 1835. While carrying a large traffic this canal, like the Blackstone canal, was more beneficial to the general business of the section traversed than to those who held its stock. Other private works of this period upon which large sums were expended were: The Delaware and Raritan canal, connecting Philadelphia with New York; the James River and Kanawha, an unfinished canal project in Virginia; and the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, which was not extended further west than Cumberland.

SCARCITY OF CAPITAL FOR CANALS.

On account of local needs, few canal or navigation companies had difficulty in obtaining their first subscriptions, but most of them experienced trouble in collecting assessments and in obtaining additional subscriptions. This timidity of investors, it now appears, was not without ground, for few of the private canal companies were able to bring their construction work to completion, and fewer still paid any dividends to their stockholders. The Middlesex canal was profitable until the building of a parallel line of railroad; the Montague canal, also in Massachusetts, yielded a fair return during the first twenty years that followed its completion in 1800. The Delaware and Schuylkill canal may be cited as a third exception. But it early became evident that public works of the number and magnitude required could be constructed only at national expense. As the constitution contains no direct provision for internal improvements, the subject became a party question.

From the first Congress had appropriated money for lighthouses, public piers, buoys and other aids to navigation, and about such action there had been no dispute, for it was agreed that these matters lay strictly within federal jurisdiction. From the first, also, Congress had been petitioned for appropriations for internal improvements. Most of these demands were local in character, and so were easily disposed of; but when the directors of the Chesapeake and Delaware canal asked Congress to supply the funds which they had been unable to obtain from sales of shares, the question was forced to an issue. Two facts were incontestable, the general importance of the work, and the ability of the national government to carry it on in view of the revenue surplus in the treasury.

In another way Congress had already committed itself to the support of public works. So long as the country was made up of states bordering on the Atlantic seaboard, improvements were matters of interest to all alike, but with the admission of new states in the interior, and the prospect of future accessions to the westward as the country expanded, an element of injustice seemed to enter these appropriations, which benefited the seaboard states at the expense of all. The feeling of discontent was intensified by the fact that the favored states were more thickly settled, and therefore better able to incur the expense. With the admission of Ohio, however, this was remedied by the establishment of the five per cent. land fund, and the self-interest of the seaboard was appealed to by the argument that the building of roads into the West would so stimulate sales of the public lands as to increase the national revenues.

The matter of national aid to internal improvements was again brought before Congress in 1816 by Calhoun, who presented a bill providing for the direct construction of roads and canals and the improvement of waterways out of a fund to be created by setting apart the bonus and dividends received by the government from the United States bank. This bill, which was drawn up by Clay, passed through Congress in 1817, but it was vetoed by Madison, who, though favorably disposed toward public works, had inherited from Jefferson a doubt as to the rights of Congress to participate in their construction without a constitutional amendment specifically granting the authority. And Monroe, holding the same opinion, vetoed a bill for the repair of the Cumberland road, and submitted to Congress a long statement of the principles involved in his decision. In the meantime, weary of waiting, New York had succeeded in building the Erie canal. Its success shifted the whole plan of promotion. With credit established abroad, internal improvements were taken up by the states, and for the next two decades transportation interest centers in state funding.

It was during this period of struggle for means of transportation facilities adequate to meet the demands of those whose fortunes had been cast in the remote interior that the railroad became the subject of serious economic interest.

* * * * *

(In subsequent chapters, Messrs. Cleveland & Powell trace the beginnings of the railroad, the physical and financial difficulties that beset them at every turn; the indomitable spirit with which they were projected, promoted and built into every quarter of the Union, until through the investment of billions of private capital the United States has been furnished with the best system of internal transportation in the world. To their pages the reader is referred for the continuation of this most interesting narrative.)

FIRST ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER OF THE

PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY

June 12, 1848.

By J. EDGAR THOMSON. Chief Engineer.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, PENNSYLVANIA R. R. CO.

_Philadelphia, June 12, 1848._

To the President and Directors of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company:

GENTLEMEN--I have the honor to communicate to you the following Report of the operations of this Department since it was committed to my charge, now something more than a year.

Under the organization of the Engineer Department, as adopted previous to my acceptance of the office you have conferred upon me, the Road was to be divided into three divisions, Eastern, Western and Middle: Edward Miller, Esq., as associate engineer, was assigned to the Western, and W. B. Foster, Jr., to the Eastern division. These gentlemen had entered upon the survey of their respective lines, previous to my arrival, under instructions from the president, each with two full corps of assistants. The middle, or mountain division, not having been provided for, I concluded after a full consideration of the subject that the interest of the Company would be best promoted by so altering the organization as to abolish it altogether, and extend the eastern and western divisions to the summit of the Allegheny mountains, the natural boundary between them. Under this arrangement, the surveys have since been prosecuted.

The Board having directed me to cause a location of the whole line, from Harrisburg to Pittsburg, to be made at the earliest practicable period, I at once commenced a reconnoissance of that portion of the intervening country, over which it seemed--from an inspection of a map of the State--that the Road would probably pass, for the purpose of determining the best plan of operations to carry out their views.

The Legislature, in their grant to the Company, wisely left the choice of a route for the Road, between its termini, entirely free, throwing upon the Board the responsibility of selecting, upon the wide field that was opened to them, a line for their great work, which would offer the cheapest railroad conveyance for the transportation of freight and the most expeditious for travel that could be selected between the west and the northern Atlantic cities.

Such a route, it was believed from previous surveys, lay within the borders of Pennsylvania, an expectation which has been fully justified by the results obtained from our examinations.