Chapter 5

Aeschines alleged against Ctesiphon (1) that it was illegal to propose to crown any one who had not passed his examination before the Board of Auditors at the end of his term of office; and that Demosthenes, who had been Commissioner of Fortifications and Controller of the Festival Fund, was still in this position: (2) that it was illegal to proclaim the grant of a crown at the Dionysia, except in the case of crowns conferred by foreign states: (3) that it was illegal to insert untrue statements in the public records, and that the language in which Ctesiphon's decree described the political career of Demosthenes was untrue. On the first point Aeschines was almost certainly right: Demosthenes' defence is sophistical, and all that could really be said was that the rule had often been broken before. On the second point, certainty is impossible: the most probable view (though it also has its difficulties) is that there were two inconsistent laws, and that one of them permitted the proclamation in the theatre, if expressly voted by the people; but the alleged illegality had certainly been often committed. The third point, which raised the question of the value to Athens of Demosthenes' whole political life, was that upon which the case really turned; and it is to this that Demosthenes devotes the greater part of his speech, breaking up his reply into convenient stages by discussions (of a far less happy description) of the other counts of the indictment, and of the character and career of Aeschines. As in the Speech on the Embassy, certain facts are misrepresented, and there are passages which are in bad taste; but Demosthenes proves beyond doubt his unswerving loyalty to the high ideal of policy which he had formed for his country, and it is with good reason that parts of this speech have always been felt to reach a height of eloquence which has never been surpassed.

The jury acquitted Ctesiphon: and Aeschines, failing to obtain a fifth part of the votes, and thus incurring a heavy fine and the loss of some of the rights of a citizen, left Athens, and lived most of the remainder of his life at Rhodes.

The following is an analysis of the speech in outline:--

I. Introduction (§§ 1-8). II. Defence against charges irrelevant to the indictment (§§ 9-52). (1) Introduction (§ 9). (2) Postponement of reply to charges against his private life (§§ 10, 11). (3) Reply to charges against his public life (§§ 12-52). (a) Criticism of Aeschines' method of attack (§§ 12-16). (b) Reply in reference to the Peace of Philocrates (§§ 17-52). III. Defence against the indictment itself (§§ 53-125). (1) Introduction (§§ 53-9). (2) Defence of his policy B.C. 346-340 (§§ 60-109). (3) The alleged illegality of crowning him before he had passed his audit (§§ 110-19). (4) The alleged illegality of the proclamation in the theatre (§§ 120, 121). (5) Conclusion, including criticism of Aeschines' method of attack (§§ 122-5).

IV. Aeschines' life and character (§§ 126-59). (1) Introduction (§§ 126-8). (2) Parentage and early life of Aeschines (§§ 129-31). (3) Aeschines' connexion with Antiphon, Python, Anaxinus, and others (§§ 132-8). (4) Aeschines' part in stirring up the war against Amphissa in 339 (§§ 139-59).

V. Demosthenes' own policy in 339 and 338 (§§ 160-226). (1) Narrative and defence of the alliance with Thebes (§§ 160-95). (2) Why did not Aeschines protest at the time? (§§ 196-8). (3) Defence of his policy as true to the spirit of Athenian history (§§ 199-210). (4) Narrative and defence, continued (§§ 211-22). (5) Further criticism of Aeschines' method of attack (§§ 223-6).

VI. Replies to various arguments of Aeschines (§§ 227-96). (1) Aeschines' comparison of the inquiry to the examination of a balance-sheet (§§ 227-31). (2) A proper inquiry would show that Demosthenes had increased the resources of Athens (§§ 232-7). (3) Reply to the charge of saddling Athens with an undue share of the expense of the war (§§ 238-43). (4) Reply to the charge of responsibility for the defeat of Chaeroneia (§§ 244-7). (5) Vindication of his policy after the battle of Chaeroneia (§§ 248-51). (6) Reply to Aeschines' remarks about the harm done to Athens by Demosthenes' bad fortune (§§ 252-75). (a) General remarks (§§ 252-5). (b) The fortune of Demosthenes (§§ 257, 258). (c) The fortune of Aeschines (§§ 259-64). (d) Comparison of the two (§§ 265, 266). (e) Demosthenes' use of his fortune for purposes of public and private munificence (§§ 267-9). (f) Demosthenes not responsible for the misfortunes of Athens (§§ 270-5). (7) Reply to Aeschines' warning against Demosthenes' cleverness (§§ 276-90). (a) Comparison of the use made of their talents by the two orators (§§ 276-84). (b) The choice of Demosthenes, not Aeschines, to deliver the Funeral Oration (§§ 285-90). (8) Aeschines' feelings about the defeat of Chaeroneia (§§ 291-3). (9) The part played by traitors in recent history (§§ 294-6).

VII. Epilogue (§§ 297-324). (1) Demosthenes' incorruptibility (§§ 297, 298). (2) Demosthenes' measures for the protection of Athens (§§ 299-305). (3) Comparison of the services of the two orators to Athens (§§ 306-13). (4) Reply to the comparison of Demosthenes with the men of old, by a final comparison of the two orators (§§ 314-23). (5) Peroration (§ 324).]

{1} I pray first, men of Athens, to every god and goddess, that the goodwill, which I ever feel towards this city and towards all of you, may in equal measure be vouchsafed to me by you at this present trial: and secondly--a prayer which especially touches yourselves, your consciences, and your reputation--that the gods may put it into your minds not to take counsel of my adversary[n] in regard to the spirit in which you ought to hear me (for that would surely be a cruel thing), {2} but of the laws and of your oath; wherein besides all other precepts of justice, this also is written--that you shall listen to both sides with a like mind. And this means, not only that you should have formed no prejudice, and should accord equal goodwill to each, but also that you should give leave to every man who pleads before you to adopt that order, and make that defence, upon which he has resolved and fixed his choice.

{3} I am in many respects at a disadvantage in the present controversy, as compared with Aeschines; and particularly, men of Athens, in two points of importance. The first is that I am not contending for the same stake as he. It is not the same thing for me to lose your goodwill now, as it is for him to fail to win his case; since for me--but I would say nothing unpleasant [n]* at the opening of my address--I say only that Aeschines can well afford to risk this attack upon me. The second disadvantage lies in the natural and universal tendency of mankind to hear invective and denunciation with pleasure, and to be offended with those who praise themselves. {4} And of the two courses in question, that which contributes to men's pleasure has been given to Aeschines, and that which annoys (I may say) every one is left for me. If, to avoid giving such annoyance, I say nothing of all that I myself have done, it will be thought that I am unable to clear myself of the charges against me, or to show the grounds upon which I claim to deserve distinction. If, on the other hand, I proceed to speak of my past acts and my political life, I shall often be compelled to speak of myself. I will endeavour, then, to do this as modestly as possible; and for all that the necessities of the case compel me to say, the blame must in fairness be borne by the prosecutor, who initiated a trial of such a kind as this.

{5} I think, men of Athens, that you would all admit that this present trial equally concerns myself and Ctesiphon, and demands no less earnest attention from me than from him. For while it is a painful and a grievous thing for a man to be robbed of anything, particularly if it is at the hands of an enemy that this befalls him, it is especially so, when he is robbed of your goodwill and kindness, just in proportion as to win these is the greatest possible gain. {6} And because such is the issue at stake in the present trial, I request and entreat you all alike to give me, while I make my defence upon the charges that have been brought against me, a fair hearing, as you are commanded to do by the laws--those laws to which their original maker, your well-wisher and the People's friend, Solon, thought fit to give the sanction not of enactment only, but also of an oath on the part of those who act as judges: {7} not because he distrusted you (so at least it seems to me), but because he saw that a defendant cannot escape from the imputations and the slanders which fall with special force from the prosecutor, because he is the first to speak, unless each of you who sit in judgement, keeping his conscience pure in the sight of God, will receive the pleadings of the later speaker also with the same favour, and will thus, because his attention has been given equally and impartially to both sides, form his decision upon the case in its entirety.

{8} And now, when I am about, as it seems, to render an account of my whole private life and public career, I would once more invoke the aid of the gods; and in the presence of you all I pray, first, that the goodwill which I ever feel towards this city and towards all of you, may in equal measure be vouchsafed to me by you at this trial; and secondly, that whatsoever judgement upon this present suit will conduce to your public reputation, and the purity of each man's conscience, that judgement they may put it into all your minds to give.

{9} Now if Aeschines had confined his charges to the subject of the indictment, I too, in making my defence, would have dealt at once with the actual resolution of the Council. But since he has devoted no less a portion of his speech to the relation of other matters, and for the most part has spoken against me falsely, I think it is necessary, and at the same time just, that I should deal briefly, men of Athens, with these, in order that none of you may be led by irrelevant arguments to listen less favourably to my pleas in answer to the indictment itself.

{10} As for his slanderous vituperation of my private life, mark how straightforward and how just is the reply that I make. If you know me as the man that he charged me with being (for my life has been spent nowhere but in your own midst), do not even suffer me to speak--no, not though my whole public career has been one of transcendent merit--but rise and condemn me without delay. But if, in your judgement and belief, I am a better man than Aeschines, and come of better men; if I and mine are no worse than any other respectable persons (to use no offensive expression); then do not trust him even in regard to other points, for it is plain that all that he said was equally fictitious; but once more accord to me to-day the goodwill which throughout the past you have so often displayed towards me in previous trials. {11} Knave as you are,[n] Aeschines, you were assuredly more fool than knave, when you thought that I should dismiss all that I had to say with regard to my past acts and political life, and should turn to meet the abuse that fell from you. I shall not do so; I am not so brain-sick; but I will review the falsehoods and the calumnies which you uttered against my political career; and then, if the court desires it, I will afterwards refer to the ribald language that has been so incontinently used.

{12} The offences charged against me are many; and for some of them the laws assign heavy and even the most extreme penalties. But I will tell you what is the motive which animates the present suit. It gives play to the malice of a personal enemy, to his insolence, his abuse, his contumelies, and every expression of his hostility: and yet, assuming that the charges and the imputations which have been made are true, it does not enable the State[n] to exact a penalty that is adequate, or nearly adequate, to the offences. {13} For it is not right to seek to debar another from coming before the people[n] and receiving a hearing, nor to do so in a spirit of malice and envy. Heaven knows, it is neither straightforward, nor citizen-like, nor just, men of Athens! If the crimes by which he saw me injuring the city were of such a magnitude as he just now so theatrically set forth, he should have had recourse to the punishments enjoined by the laws at the time of the crimes themselves. If he saw me so acting as to deserve impeachment, he should have impeached me, and so brought me to trial before you; if he saw me proposing illegal measures, he should have indicted me for their illegality. For surely, if he can prosecute Ctesiphon on my account, he would not have failed to indict me in person, had he thought that he could convict me. {14} And further, if he saw me committing any of those other crimes against you, which he just now slanderously enumerated, or any other crimes whatsoever, there are laws which deal with each, and punishments, and lawsuits and judgements involving penalties that are harsh and severe: to all of these he could have had recourse; and from the moment when it was seen that he had acted so, and had conducted his hostilities against me on that plan, his present accusation of me would have been in line with his past conduct. {15} But as it is, he has forsaken the straight path of justice; he has shrunk from all attempts to convict me at the time; and after all these years, with the imputations, the jests, the invectives, that he has accumulated, he appears to play his part. So it is, that though his accusations are against me, it is Ctesiphon that he prosecutes; and though he sets his quarrel with me in the forefront of the whole suit, he has never faced me in person to settle the quarrel, and it is another whom we see him trying to deprive of his civil rights. {16} Yet surely, besides everything else that may be pleaded on behalf of Ctesiphon, this, I think, may surely be most reasonably urged--that we ought in justice to have brought our own quarrel to the test by ourselves, instead of avoiding all conflict with one another, and looking for a third party to whom we could do harm. Such iniquity really passes all bounds.

{17} From this one may see the nature of all his charges alike, uttered, as they have been, without justice or regard for truth. Yet I desire also to examine them severally, and more particularly the false statements which he made against me in regard to the Peace and the Embassy, when he ascribed to me[n] the things which he himself had done in conjunction with Philocrates. And here it is necessary, men of Athens, and perhaps appropriate,[n] that I should remind you of the state of affairs subsisting during that period, so that you may view each group of actions in the light of the circumstances of the time.

{18} When the Phocian war had broken out[n] (not through any action of mine, for I had not yet entered public life), your own attitude, in the first place, was such, that you wished for the preservation of the Phocians, although you saw that their actions were unjustifiable; while you would have been delighted at anything that might happen to the Thebans, against whom you felt an indignation that was neither unreasonable nor unfair; for they had not used their good fortune at Leuctra with moderation. And, in the second place, the Peloponnese was all disunited: those who detested the Spartans [n] were not strong enough to annihilate them, and those who had previously governed with the support of Sparta [n] were no longer able to maintain their control over their cities; but both these and all the other states were in a condition of indeterminate strife and confusion. {19} When Philip saw this (for it was not hard to see), he tried, by dispensing money to the traitors whom each state contained, to throw them all into collision and stir up one against another; and thus, amid the blunders and perversity of others, he was making his own preparations, and growing great to the danger of all. And when it became clear to all that the then overbearing (but now unhappy) Thebans, distressed by the length of the war, would be forced to fly to you for aid,[n] Philip, to prevent this--to prevent the formation of any union between the cities--made offers of peace to you, and of assistance to them. {20} Now what was it that helped him, and enabled him to find in you his almost willing dupes? It was the baseness (if that is the right name to use), or the ignorance, or both, of the rest of the Hellenes, who, though you were engaged in a long and continuous war, and that on behalf of the interests of all, as has been proved by the event, never assisted you either with money or with men, or in any other way whatsoever. And in your just and proper indignation with them, you listened readily to Philip. It was for these reasons, therefore, and not through any action of mine, that the Peace which we then conceded was negotiated; and any one who investigates the matter honestly will find that it is the crimes and the corrupt practices of these men, in the course of the negotiations, that are responsible for our position to-day. {21} It is in the interests of truth that I enter into all these events with this exactitude and thoroughness; for however strong the appearance of criminality in these proceedings may be, it has, I imagine, nothing to do with me. The first man to suggest or mention the Peace was Aristodemus[n] the actor; and the person who took the matter up and moved the motion, and sold his services for the purpose, along with Aeschines, was Philocrates of Hagnus--your partner, Aeschines, not mine, even if you split your sides with lying; while those who supported him, from whatever motive (for of that I say nothing at present), were Eubulus and Cephisophon. I had no part in the matter anywhere. {22} And yet, although the facts are such as with absolute truth I am representing them to be, he carried his effrontery so far as to dare to assert that I was not only responsible for the Peace, but had also prevented the city from acting in conjunction with a general assembly of the Hellenes in making it. What? and you--oh! how can one find a name that can be applied to you?--when you saw me (for you were there) preventing the city from taking this great step and forming so grand an alliance as you just now described, did you once raise a protest or come forward to give information and to set forth the crimes with which you now charge me? {23} If I had covenanted with Philip for money that I would prevent the coalition of the Hellenes, your only course was to refuse to keep silence--to cry aloud, to protest, to reveal the fact to your fellow countrymen. On no occasion did you do this: no such utterance of yours was ever heard by any one. In fact there was no embassy away at the time on a mission to any Hellenic state; the Hellenes had all long ago been tried and found wanting;[n] and in all that he has said upon this matter there is not a single sound word. {24} And, apart from that, his falsehoods involve the greatest calumnies upon this city. For if you were at one and the same time convoking the Hellenes with a view to war, and sending ambassadors yourselves to Philip to discuss peace, it was a deed for a Eurybatus,[n] not a task for a state or for honest men, that you were carrying out. But that is not the case; indeed it is not. For what could possibly have been your object in summoning them at that moment? Was it with a view to peace? But they all had peace already. Or with a view to war? But you were yourselves discussing peace. It is therefore evident that neither was it I that introduced or was responsible for the Peace in its original shape, nor is one of all the other falsehoods which he told of me shown to be true.

{25} Again, consider the course of action which, when the city had concluded the Peace, each of us now chose to adopt. For from this you will know who it was that co-operated with Philip throughout, and who it was that acted in your interest and sought the good of the city. As for me, I proposed, as a member of the Council, that the ambassadors should sail as quickly as possible to any district in which they should ascertain Philip to be, and receive his oath from him. {26} But even when I had carried this resolution, they would not act upon it. What did this mean, men of Athens? I will inform you. Philip's interest required that the interval before he took the oath should be as long as possible; yours, that it should be as short as possible. And why? Because you broke off all your preparations for the war, not merely from the day when he took the oath, but from the day when you first hoped that Peace would be made; and for his part, this was what he was all along working for; for he thought (and with truth) that whatever places he could snatch from Athens before he took the oath, would remain securely his, since no one would break the Peace for their sake. {27} Foreseeing and calculating upon this, men of Athens, I proposed this decree--that we should sail to any district in which Philip might be, and receive his oath as soon as possible, in order that the oaths might be taken while the Thracians, your allies, were still in possession of those strongholds[n] of which Aeschines just now spoke with contempt--Serrhium, Myrtenum, and Ergiske; and that Philip might not snatch from us the keys of the country and make himself master of Thrace, nor obtain an abundant supply of money and of soldiers, and so proceed without difficulty to the prosecution of his further designs. {28} And now, instead of citing or reading this decree he slanders me on the ground that I thought fit, as a member of the Council, to introduce the envoys. But what should I have done? Was I to propose _not_ to introduce those who had come for the express purpose of speaking with you? or to order the lessee of the theatre not to assign them seats? But they would have watched the play from the threepenny seats,[n] if this decree had not been proposed. Should I have guarded the interests of the city in petty details, and sold them wholesale, as my opponents did? Surely not. (_To the clerk_.) Now take this decree, which the prosecutor passed over, though he knew it well, and read it.

{29} [_The decree of Demosthenes is read_.]

{30} Though I had carried this decree, and was seeking the good not of Philip, but of the city, these worthy ambassadors paid little heed to it, but sat idle in Macedonia for three whole months,[n] until Philip arrived from Thrace, after subduing the whole country; when they might, within ten days, or equally well[n] within three or four, have reached the Hellespont, and saved the strongholds, by receiving his oath before he could seize them. For he would not have touched them when we were present; or else, if he had done so, we should have refused to administer the oath to him; and in that case he would have failed to obtain the Peace: he would not have had both the Peace and the strongholds as well.