Part 13

┌───────────────┬─────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────────────────┐ │ │ Number of │Gross Receipts in│Average Cost per │ │ DATE. │ Messages. │ Francs. │ Message in │ │ │ │ │ Francs. │ ├───────────────┼─────────────────┼─────────────────┼─────────────────┤ │ 1852│ 2,876│ 3,541.95│ │ │ 1853│ 82,586│ 127,870.04│ 1.55│ │ 1854│ 129,167│ 208,887.36│ 1.62│ │ 1855│ 162,851│ 251,391.27│ 1.53│ │ 1856│ 227,072│ 319,947.22│ 1.44│ │ 1857│ 260,164│ 369,226.01│ 1.42│ │ 1858│ 247,102│ 343,597.38│ 1.35│ │ 1859│ 286,876│ 425,587.57│ 1.48│ │ 1860│ 303,930│ 408,429.04│ 1.34│ │ 1861│ 331,933│ 448,056.05│ 1.35│ │ 1862│ 373,452│ 530,417.50│ 1.42│ │ 1863│ 456,871│ 630,748.26│ 1.38│ │ 1864│ 514,952│ 615,317.00│ 1.20│ │ 1865│ 591,214│ 726,564.16│ 1.23│ │ 1866│ 668,916│ 684,319.89│ 1.03│ │ 1867│ 708,974│ 775,024.00│ 1.09│ └───────────────┴─────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────────────────┘

It will be observed that the increase in the number of messages transmitted in Switzerland was from 2,876 in 1852 to 668,916 in 1866, or more than 230,000 per cent in fourteen years, although the tariff had only been reduced 33 per cent.

SPAIN.

Spain, with a population of over 16,000,000 souls, and possessing the advantages of forming the pathway between France and her African possessions, as well as between Portugal and the rest of Europe, transmits a less number of telegrams per annum than the Dominion of Canada, with her 3,000,000 inhabitants. That this insignificant amount of business for so great a country is owing to government control is evident from the following royal decree, issued in conformity with the request of the Minister of State, who says: “The petitions presented to your Majesty from different towns, companies, and private individuals are so numerous and repeated, praying that the advantages of telegraphic communications should be granted to them, that the minister who now humbly addresses your Majesty has lamented more than once that the care of the government has not extended that satisfaction to legitimate wishes so deserving of attention.”

ROYAL DECREE RELATING TO TELEGRAPHS IN SPAIN.

In conformity with what the Minister of State for Home Affairs has proposed to me, for the concession of telegraph lines and stations.

_I have decreed as follows:_—

The districts, towns, and public establishments, who wish to form new lines or stations, _can solicit them from the government_, which will inquire into the influence of the establishment of the said lines or stations upon the state telegraphic system.

_The necessary cost of the lines and service must be paid by the petitioners, and they must also give sufficient guaranty for the cost of repairs and service._

The petitioners will be obliged to pay to the state the difference that may result between the annual income and the cost of the service.

If at the expiration of five years the expenses exceed the returns, the line or station will be considered as property of the state. No line or station can be formed without the consent of the ministers in council.

Service in all kinds of stations and lines can only be performed by a staff from the government telegraph corps.

All despatches passing through Spain (including the Balearic Islands) and France (including Corsica) will pay the rate of five francs per message of 20 words, no matter from what telegraph office they proceed or to what station they are addressed. Each ten words or part of ten words, beyond 20, will pay half the amount of a single message.

The cost of a single message transmitted from France to Algeria, or _vice versa_, passing through the Spanish or submarine lines, as also of the messages between Spain and Algeria, transmitted either by land or French cables, will always be eight francs. The messages received or forwarded to Tunis will pay two francs more.

The messages exceeding 20 words will pay an extra charge, in accordance with the rule already established.

_No despatch whatever will be delivered out of the radius of the locality wherein the station addressed to is situated, through any other means than by post._

Telegrams addressed to localities where there is no station will be delivered by the last telegraphic office to the post, which will undertake to convey them to their destination as certified parcels.

When one despatch is addressed to several persons in the same locality, as many telegrams will be charged for as there are individuals to receive it.

The acknowledgment of the receipt of a telegram will be charged for as a new despatch.

_Prepayment of despatches can be made, but if no answer is returned, or if it should contain less words than those paid for, no return of any kind will be made._ If the answer contains more words than paid for, the station which sends it will charge the difference between the amount paid and the corresponding one to this new despatch.

The claims for delay or irregularity of telegrams will only give occasion for future inquiry into the causes which have produced the irregularity in the service, for the knowledge of the interested party, and to punish the functionary who should prove to be culpable.

Given at Aranjuez, on the 22d May, 1864.

If there is any special benefit accruing to the people of Spain by having the telegraph under government control, we fail to discover it.

TURKEY.

Turkey contains twenty-eight telegraph stations, of which twelve are open for night service, nine during the whole of the day, and seven for a part only. Constantinople has two stations open for international correspondence,—one at Stamboul, the other at Pera; the first is principally confined to the transmission of messages for the Ottoman government, and the second for that of ambassadors and private persons. In the case of an interruption of the cable which crosses the Hellespont, the Dardanelles station is removed to Kaled-Bahas, and the despatches are subjected to an additional rate of 90 cents for their conveyance, by boat, from Kaled-Bahas to the Dardanelles. The tariff, upon messages between Paris to any Turkish station, varies from $2.80 to $6.00, according to the distance.

The construction of lines in Turkey is of the most defective description, and the materials used very inferior. The lines pass over the steepest and most inaccessible hills; and this state of things is made worse by a very inadequate inspection, by men who are both too few in number, wretchedly paid, and generally incompetent. Repairers are compelled to provide and keep a horse out of their pay of 300 piastres ($13.04) per month. The chiefs of stations, and all other employees, are Turks, whose lazy habits and incompetency cannot be wondered at, when the smallness of their pay is considered. Added to these difficulties, the service has to endure very frequent and arbitrary occupation of the wires by the government, interrupting, on many occasions, business of the most pressing nature, for the transmission of some trivial communication, which would lose nothing by a short delay. It may be imagined that as the service is in the hands of government, much depends upon the director-general of the department. Unfortunately, this official is in the unenviable position of holding office on such a poor tenure that it may be said he has a daily apprehension of being turned out, and replaced by one of those numerous intriguers who swarm about the cabinets of the ministers, or work through the more effectual influence of the harem,—the great bane of the country. It has been proposed to the Turkish government to employ a large staff of English inspectors and operators, but the natural jealousy of employing foreigners stands in the way. The Turks insist upon having all messages sent through in Turkish, so that frequently, when retranslated, they bear very slight resemblance to the original.

All the important telegraphic intercourse between Europe and India passes through the Turkish dominions. The effect of the control of the Turkish government over the telegraph is most disastrous, and renders this important connection with India almost worthless.

Repeated efforts have been made by the English telegraph companies, who have so great an interest in the successful operation of these lines, to induce the Turkish government to relinquish its management of them, but thus far without success.

REASONS WHY GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT ENTER INTO COMPETITION WITH THE PEOPLE IN THE OPERATION OF THE TELEGRAPH.

The foregoing presentation of facts has shown that there are no sufficient grounds for destroying the value of the investments of the people in existing telegraph companies by governmental competition, the telegraph system of this country being unrivalled in its extent, unequalled in its administration, and unparalleled for the low rates which it has always maintained.

In this country the people have not been accustomed to rely upon the government to provide those things for them which they are able to secure by their own exertions. If this principle is right in regard to one enterprise, it is also in relation to all others; and if infringed upon in the case of the telegraph companies, what pursuit will be safe from governmental interference?

It is undoubtedly true that, were tariffs designed simply to provide a revenue to support the lines, they are capable of reduction, provided present arrangements with railroad companies and others could be maintained, by which the labor of the one is utilized in the service of the other. But for this the country makes no demand. It recognizes the telegraph as a legitimate enterprise for the investment of the capital and labor of its citizens. If false counsels guide its development, public reprobation is ready with its remedy. Its absorption by government would not only be a public calamity, but a breach of the theory and spirit of our institutions, and would soon result in its necessary return to individual control.

POLITICAL REASONS WHY GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT CONTROL THE TELEGRAPH.

One of the most serious objections to the government of the United States assuming the control of the telegraph is the political one. In monarchical countries, where the sovereignty is a patrimony of a particular family, and where no change is made except by revolution, everything which tends towards the permanence of the reigning dynasty is looked upon as in the interest of law and order, and for these reasons the absorption of the telegraphs by the government is regarded as a proper and legitimate act, and consistent with the public weal; but in a republic, where the rulers are changed periodically, and where the purity of the elections is of the first importance, the placing of so great a power in the hands of the government would be a public calamity. It might be supposed that rulers could be elected who would not take advantage of the control of the telegraph for selfish purposes, but the temptation to do so would be great, and, even if not yielded to, the suspicions of the people would be constantly aroused, and confidence in its impartial administration would be destroyed. In every election the whole army of postmasters and the machinery of the department is enlisted in the service of the party in power. Shall we give it the telegraph also? What would be the influence on election returns?

The censorship of telegraphic correspondence, always a subject of public disapprobation, is generally exercised by all governments which have its management. In France the control of the telegraph by government is loudly complained of, in consequence of notorious abuses which result from it. Amongst other things, it is well known that the authorities of the Bourse, in Paris, have opportunities of seeing every telegram which reaches or leaves that city on matters relating to the stock exchange operations.

THE POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT NOT COMPETENT TO MANAGE THE TELEGRAPHS.

If it should ever appear to be for the public good that this agency, so capable of use as a political power, should pass into the hands of government, it seems proper to await such a demonstration of the self-sustaining capacity of the department under whose control it is proposed to be placed, and such efficiency in that service, as will furnish reasonable assurance of ability for the united control without burden to the state, or lessened convenience to the people. A department which is still confessedly imperfect, which cannot even tell the number of letters which it transmits per annum, whose receipts are unequal to the cost of service by over $6,000,000,[28] which could not secure skilled labor in this new field except by foraging from existing enterprises, and which could not avoid heavy losses at the rates proposed, is not at present a fit recipient of so important a trust.

Footnote 28:

The postal revenue for the year ending June 30th, 1868, was $16,292,600.80, and the expenditures during the same period $22,730,592.65, showing an excess of expenditures of $6,337,991.85. From the report of the Postmaster-General.

The Post-Office Department, which already has more duties than it is able to perform, instead of seeking to absorb the telegraphs, had better apply itself to its proper task of developing the correspondence of the country, and endeavor to make itself financially profitable to the nation, instead of a serious burden.

That the post-office undertakes more than it can perform is shown by the delays and irregularities of the service, and the enormous and constantly increasing number of its dead letters, which amounted, in 1867, to over 4,500,000! Were the telegraph companies to deal with the messages committed to them for transmission as the post-office deals with the letters committed to its care, there would be good grounds for governmental interference; but there are very few complaints of non-delivery of telegrams.

It should be borne in mind that electric telegraphy is a science, and its successful operation requires a thorough knowledge of electricity, skill in manipulating the apparatus, and many years of constant training in the practical duties of the business. Many of the employees of this company have been constantly in the service for more than a score of years, and still consider themselves students in this new field of practical science: without wishing to be invidious in our comparisons, we may fairly say that the intelligence and skill which are ample for the duties of filling a bag with letters and despatching them by horse or steam power, would not be competent to the duties of successfully transmitting an important despatch through the invisible agency of the electric current.

GOVERNMENT ASSUMES NO RESPONSIBILITY.

Another serious drawback to the value of the telegraph under government management is its failure to make reparation to private individuals for losses caused by the errors or imperfection of its service. In no country where the telegraph exists under government control is there any assumption of accountability for errors or delays in the transmission of messages. In some countries they will not even inquire into the cause of delay or errors, and in others, as in Spain, they will only do so for the purpose of punishing the delinquent employee, but in no case to reimburse the patron of the telegraph for his loss. This failure to assume any responsibility in the matter is of great importance to the public. The amount paid by the Western Union Telegraph Company per annum, on account of these unavoidable errors and delays, is very considerable. The public would be reluctant to leave the correct transmission and delivery of their important messages to the chances of a government system which is notoriously defective, and which would in no case reimburse them for losses occasioned by errors in the transmission of their telegrams, or failure to send them at all. The scheme proposed by Mr. Hubbard, owing to the divided responsibility of the service, would be even worse than the absorption of the lines by the government. Public opinion could not reach the contractor, because he is the servant of the government, and not of the public, and it would fail to influence the Post-Office Department, as it does not itself perform the service, and, because being a department, it is practically irresponsible. How much influence, for example, has public opinion on the collectors of internal revenue or customs, or even the postmasters of this country?

If despatches were left at the post-offices, or dropped in the street boxes, as provided for in Mr. Hubbard’s bill, they would have to take their chances of transmission and delivery, with no recourse, in case of failure, for redress from any source. If a despatch should fail to reach its destination, and complaint was made to the postmaster, he would reply that he was not responsible for its transmission, and would refer the aggrieved person to the telegraph contractor; while the latter would answer that he was a servant of the government, and not responsible to the public for the imperfections of his service. And the result would be, that while the sender of the despatch obtained no redress, he would not have even the satisfaction of knowing which service was at fault, the post-office or the telegraph.

THE PROPOSITION TO ERECT COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTAL TELEGRAPHS UNFOUNDED IN PUBLIC NECESSITY, UNJUST AND DELUSIVE.

The proposition to erect a competitive governmental telegraph line between Washington and New York, as described in the paper of Mr. Washburne, and the bill designed to authorize it, is a scheme founded upon no public necessity, unjust and delusive.

It is easily demonstrable that the tariff proposed by the bill, if adopted by the government, could only be maintained by large drafts upon the national treasury. It is well known that the active hours of telegraph service are about five, and the ordinary average of transmission not over fifty messages per hour, the general allowance being forty. Thus each of the four wires proposed to be erected under the bill would be capable of earning, at the maximum, five dollars per hour, or a total daily income of one hundred dollars, an amount unequal to the provision of the most ordinary indoor service, to say nothing of the cost of management, repairs of lines, battery power, stationery, and many other necessary expenses. The annual cost to our company of repairs and inspection on this route alone is $20,000.

This company denies the exorbitance of the rates it has adopted, and which it is now actively engaged in modifying so as to secure the fairest correspondence to other branches of labor, and the utmost development of the system. It therefore deprecates as illusory, as well as unjust, the proposal to establish rates lower than those which in Belgium have caused a loss of one third of the tariff on each message sent, and which, under the management of a department now showing an enormous annual deficit, cannot fail to prove perplexing and disastrous. It deprecates also, as utterly illusory, the idea that under such tariffs a product would be realized that would provide for the extension of the government lines to other regions. This delusion, which makes it possible for an intelligent public man to predicate so absurd a result, has for a basis that which is ever used to allure men into schemes of promised wealth. The insane speculation which, thirty years ago, ruined tens of thousands of our people, by counting the leaves of the _Morus multicaulis_ as the products of veritable mulberry-trees, on which delighted caterpillars would feed, and enrich their owners with untold webs of native silk, was not more illusory than that which to-day, by showing the possibilities of each hour by day and night, crams the wires with possible messages which will never be sent, and estimates balances which cannot be earned.

This scheme would be unjust to government, by undermining and perilling a business which pays $300,000 per annum to its revenues, besides casting upon a nation, great because of the energy which has characterized its private enterprises, the odium of initiating competition with one of the most useful products of the national brain, before time has been given to complete the design of those who direct it, and to fully illustrate its capacity.

The policy and practice of the Western Union Telegraph Company favor a reduction of the rates on despatches as rapidly as the necessary expenses of the service will admit; _and if the government will abolish its tax on the receipts for transmitting telegrams, this company will immediately lower its rates until the reduction upon the gross amount of business done shall be twice as much as the tax remitted_.

This would lessen the rates for telegraphing nearly ten per cent, and would be a far better plan for furnishing cheaper telegraphic facilities to the people than the construction and operation of government lines at the expense of the national treasury.

THE TELEGRAPH BILL PROPOSED TO BE ENACTED BY CONGRESS WITHOUT NATIONAL EXAMPLE.

It must be borne in mind that the remunerativeness of telegraph lines depends largely upon the revenues of a few important cities, without which the enterprise would not have an income sufficient to support it. To take away the receipts of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, with Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and a few others of like importance, would make it impossible for any company to maintain itself, far less to meet the constant demand of an enlarging population and new settlements for the extension of its lines. This is not peculiar to America. In Great Britain, where there are 2,151 stations, seventy-six per cent of the entire receipts are received at 18 stations, fifteen per cent at 81 stations, and only nine per cent at the residue. Even of the seventy-six per cent received at the 18 stations, one half of that whole percentage was received in London, and one quarter from two other cities.

In France, three departments collect 4,178,332, out of a total of 7,707,590 francs per annum; and of this amount, Paris (Départment de la Seine) collects 2,794,768.40 francs, being more than one third of the total receipts of the whole empire.

The Western Union Telegraph Company’s revenues come to it in a similar manner. From its 3,331 offices it derives its receipts as follows:—

From 136 offices, 75 per cent. „ 3195 „ 25 per cent.

Of these 136 offices, a large proportion of their receipts is derived from twelve chief cities, of which four are on the route proposed by this bill.

Government, by thus operating lines of telegraph over the choicest and most productive route, at rates below the cost of the service, and which could only be maintained by large drafts upon the national treasury, would assume an attitude towards private telegraph enterprises of the most unjust and unexampled hostility.