Part I, pars. 99–101, for a summary of the argument.

¹⁸⁷ The distribution of Indian trade during this period was as follows:—

_Distribution of Indian Trade_

Annual Average for each Quinquennium in Millions of Rupees.

────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1875–76 to 1879–80. 1880–81 to 1884–85. Countries ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Imports. Exports. Total. Imports. Exports. Total ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── United 323·68 278·15 601·83 434·45 344·22 778·67 Kingdom ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── China 14·05 132·27 146·32 19·23 134·94 154·17 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Japan ·02 ·33 ·35 ·19 2·09 2·28 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Ceylon 5·74 22·97 28·71 5·35 16·37 21·72 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Straits 10·83 26·11 36·94 15·88 33·65 49·53 Settlements ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

Annual Average for each Quinquennium in Millions of Rupees.

────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1885–86 to 1889–90. 1890–91 to 1894–95. Countries ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Imports. Exports. Total. Imports. Exports. Total ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── United 510·47 360·59 871·06 526·24 338·40 864·64 Kingdom ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── China 21·64 134·54 156·18 28·69 133·30 161·90 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Japan ·25 7·27 7·52 1·51 14·44 15·95 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Ceylon 5·86 20·56 26·42 6·42 31·18 37·60 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Straits 20·09 42·54 62·63 23·32 52·66 75·88 Settlements ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

TABLE XX

_Exports of Cotton Goods to Eastern Markets_

───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Yarn, lb., 000 omitted. Piece-goods, yds., 000 Years. omitted. ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── From India. From U.K. From India. From U.K. ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1877 7,927 33,086 15,544 394,489 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1878 15,600 36,467 17,545 382,330 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1879 21,332 38,951 22,517 523,921 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1880 25,862 46,426 25,800 509,099 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1881 26,901 47,479 30,424 587,177 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1882 30,786 34,370 29,911 454,948 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1883 45,378 33,499 41,534 415,956 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1884 49,877 38,856 55,565 439,937 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1885 65,897 33,061 47,909 562,339 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1886 78,242 26,924 51,578 490,451 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1887 91,804 35,354 53,406 618,146 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1888 113,451 44,643 69,486 652,404 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1889 128,907 35,720 70,265 557,004 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1890 141,950 37,869 59,496 633,606 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1891 169,253 27,971 67,666 595,258 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

The causes which effected such trade disturbances formed the subject of a heated controversy.¹⁸⁸ The point in dispute was whether the changes in international trade such as they were, were attributable to the monetary disturbances of the time. Those who held to the affirmative explained their position by arguing that the falling exchange gave a bounty to the Indian producer and imposed a penalty on the English producer. The existence of this bounty, which was said to be responsible for the shifting of the position of established competitors in the field of international commerce, was based on a simple calculation. It was said that if the gold value of silver fell the Indian exporter got more rupees for his produce and was therefore better off, while by reason of the same fact the English producer got fewer sovereigns and was therefore worse off. Put in [pg 107] this naïve form the argument that the falling exchange gave a bounty to the Indian exporters and imposed a penalty on the English exporters had all the finality of a rule of arithmetic. Indeed, so axiomatic was the formula regarded by its authors that some important inferences as to its bearing on the trade and industrial situation of the time were drawn from it. One such inference was that it stimulated exports from and hindered imports into the silver using countries. The second inference was that the fall of exchange exposed some English producers more than others to competition from their rivals in silver-using countries. Now, can such results be said to follow from the fall of exchange? If we go behind the bald statement of a fall of exchange and inquire as to what determined the gold price of silver the above inferences appear quite untenable. That the ratio between gold and silver was simply the inverse of the ratio between gold prices and silver prices must be taken to be an unquestionable proposition. If therefore the gold price of silver was falling it was a counterpart of the more general phenomenon of the fall of the English prices which were measured in gold, and the rise of the Indian prices which were measured in silver. Given such an interpretation of the event of the falling exchange, it is difficult to understand how it can help to increase exports and diminish imports. International trade is governed by the relative advantages which one country has over another, and the terms on which it is carried on are regulated by the comparative cost of articles that enter into it. It is, therefore, obvious that there cannot be a change in the real terms of trade between countries except as a result of changes in the comparative cost of these goods. Given a fall in gold prices _all round_, accompanied by a rise in silver prices _all round_, there was hardly anything in the monetary disturbance that could be said to have enabled India to increase her exportation of anything except by diminishing her exportation or increasing her importation of something else. From the same view of the question of the falling exchange it follows that such a monetary disturbance could not depress one trade more than another. If the falling or rising exchange was simply [pg 108] an expression of the level of _general_ prices, then the producers of all articles were equally affected. There was no reason why the cotton trade or the wheat trade should have been more affected by the fall of exchange than the cutlery trade.

¹⁸⁸ _See_ the evidence and memoranda by Profs. Marshall and Nicholson before the Royal Commission on Gold and Silver (1886); also Prof. Lexis, “The Agio on Gold and International Trade,” in the _Economic Journal_, Vol. V, 1895.

Not only was there nothing in the exchange disturbance to disestablish existing trade relations in general or in respect of particular commodities, but there was nothing in it to cause benefit to the Indian producer and injury to the English producer. Given the fact that the exchange was a ratio of the two price-levels, it is difficult to see in what sense the English producer, who got fewer sovereigns but of high purchasing power, was worse off than the Indian producer, who got more rupees but of low purchasing power. The analogy of Prof. Marshall was very apt. To suppose that a fall of exchange resulted in a loss to the former and a gain to the latter was to suppose that, if a man was in the cabin of a ship only ten feet high, his head would be broken if the ship sank down twelve feet into a trough. The fallacy consisted in isolating the man from the ship when, as a matter of fact, the same force, acting upon the ship and the passenger at one and the same time, produced like movements in both. In like manner the same force acted upon the Indian producer and the English producer together, for the change in the exchange was itself a part of the more sweeping change in the general price-levels of the two countries. Thus stated, the position of the English and Indian producer was equally good or equally bad, and the only difference was that the former used fewer counters and the latter a larger number in their respective dealings.

A bounty to the Indian producer and a penalty to the English producer, it is obvious, could have arisen only if the fall of silver in England in terms of gold was greater than the fall of silver in terms of commodities in India. In that case the Indian producer would have obtained a clear benefit by exchanging his wares for silver in England and thus securing a medium which had a greater command over goods and services in India. But _à priori_ there could be no justification for such an assumption. There was no reason why gold price of silver should have fallen at a different [pg 109] rate from the gold price of commodities in general, or that there should have been a great difference between the silver prices in England and in India. Statistics show that such _à priori_ assumptions were not groundless.

It is obvious that if silver was falling faster than commodities, and if silver prices in India were lower than silver prices in England, we should have found it evidenced by an inflow of silver from England to India. What were the facts? Not only was there no extraordinary flow of silver to India, but the imports of silver during 1871–93 were much smaller than in the twenty years previous to that period.¹⁸⁹ This is as complete a demonstration as could be had of the fact that the silver prices in India were the same as they were outside, and consequently the Indian producer had very little chance of a bounty on his trade.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. figures for imports of silver in Chap. I. It will, however, be noted how closely the flow of silver into India between 1872 and 1893 followed the fall in gold price of silver.

Although such must be said to be the _à priori_ view of the question, the Indian producer was convinced that his prosperity was due to the bounty he received. Holding such a position he was naturally opposed to any reform of the Indian currency, for the falling exchange which the Government regarded a curse he considered a boon. But however plausible was the view of the Indian producer, much sympathy would not have been felt for it had it not been coupled with a notion, most commonly held, that the bounty arose from the _export trade_, so that it became an article of popular faith that the fall of exchange was a source of gain to the _nation as a whole_. Now was it true that the bounty arose from the export trade? If it were so, then every fall of exchange ought to give a bounty. But supposing that the depreciation of silver had taken place in India _before_ it had taken place in Europe, could the fall of exchange thus brought about have given a bounty to the Indian exporter? As was explained above, the Indian exporter stood a chance of getting a bounty only if with the silver he obtained for his produce he was able to buy more goods and [pg 110]

TABLE XXI

_Movements of Prices, Wages and Silver Between India and England_¹⁹⁰

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Net Imports of Index Index Index Silver into No. No. for Index No. for Index India. for Silver No. Gold No. ────────────────────── Gold Years. Prices for Prices for Years. Amount. Price of Wages of Wages Rs. of Commodities in Commodities in Silver. in India. in England India. England. ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1871–72 6,587,296 99·7 1871 100 — 100 100 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1872–73 739,244 99·2 1872 105 — 109 105·8 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1873–74 2,530,824 97·4 1873 107 100 111 112 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1874–75 4,674,791 95·8 1874 116 101 102 113 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1875–76 1,640,445 93·3 1875 103 97 96 111·6 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1876–77 7,286,188 86·4 1876 107 98 95 110 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1877–78 14,732,194 90·2 1877 138 97 94 109·8 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1878–79 4,057,377 86·4 1878 148 99 87 107 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1879–80 7,976,063 84·2 1879 135 100 83 105·8 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1880–81 3,923,612 85·9 1880 117 99 88 106·5 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1881–82 5,381,410 85·0 1881 106 99 85 106·5 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1882–83 7,541,427 84·9 1882 105 100 84 106·5 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1883–84 6,433,886 83·1 1883 106 102 82 108 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1884–85 7,319,581 83·3 1884 114 101 76 109 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1885–86 11,627,028 79·9 1885 113 106 72 108 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1886–87 7,191,743 74·6 1886 110 105 69 107 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1887–88 9,319,421 73·3 1887 111 114 68 108 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1888–89 9,327,529 70·4 1888 119 112 70 109·8 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1889–90 11,002,078 70·2 1889 125 112 72 113 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1890–91 14,211,408 78·4 1890 125 113 72 118 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1891–92 9,165,684 74·3 1891 128 118 72 118 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1892–93 12,893,499 65·5 1892 141 110 68 117·4 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1893–94 13,759,273 58·5 1893 138 119 68 117·4 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

¹⁹⁰ Col. (2) is from Appendix II, Table No. 2 of the I.C.C. of 1898. Cols (3), (5), (6), and (7) are from Atkinson’s “Silver Prices in India,” in the _Journal of the Statistical Society_, March, 1897. Col. (8) is based on the figures given by W. T. Layton in his _Introduction to the Study of Prices_ (1912), Table I, Col. 1, p. 150, re-scaled to 1871 as 100.

[pg 111] services in India. To put the same in simpler language, his bounty was the difference between the price of his product and the price of his outlay. Bearing this in mind, we can confidently assert that in the supposed case of depreciation of silver having taken place in India first, such a fall in the Indian exchange would have been accompanied by a penalty instead of a bounty on his trade. In that case the exporter from India would have found that though the Indian exchange, i.e. the gold price of silver, had fallen, yet the ratio which gold prices in England bore to silver prices in India had fallen more, i.e. the price he received for his product was smaller than the outlay he had incurred. It is not quite established whether silver had fallen in Europe before it had fallen in India.¹⁹¹ But even if that were so the possibility of a penalty through the fall of exchange proves that the bounty, if there was any, was not a bounty on the export trade as such, but was an outcome of the disharmony between the general level of prices and the prices of particular goods and services within the country, and _would have existed even if the country had no export trade_.

¹⁹¹ _See infra_, Chap. IV.

Thus the bounty was but an incident of the general depreciation of the currency. Its existence was felt because prices of _all_ goods and services in India did not move in the same uniform manner. It is well known that at any one time prices of certain commodities will be rising, while the general price level is falling. On the other hand, certain goods will decline in price at the same time that the general price level is rising. But such opposite movements are rare. What most often happens is that prices of some goods and services, though they move in the same direction, yet do not move at the same pace as the general price level. It is notorious that when general prices fall wages and other fixed incomes which form the largest item in the total outlay of every employer do not fall in the same proportion; and when general prices rise they do not rise as fast as general prices, but generally lag behind. And this was just what was happening in a silver-standard country like India and a gold-standard [pg 112] country like England during the period of 1873–93 (_see_ Chart IV). Prices had fallen in England, but wages had not fallen to the same extent. Prices had risen in India, but wages had not risen to the same extent. The English manufacturer was penalized, if at all, not by any act on the part of his Indian rival, but by reason of the wages of the former’s employees having remained the same, although the price of his products had fallen. The Indian producer got a bounty, if any, not because he had an English rival to feed upon, but because he did not have to pay higher wages, although the price of his product had risen.

The conclusion, therefore, is that the falling exchange could not have disturbed established trade relations or displaced the commodities that entered into international trade. The utmost that could be attributed to it is its incidence in economic incentive. But in so far as it supplied a motive force or took away the incentive, it did so by bringing about changes in the social distribution of wealth. In the case of England, where prices were falling, it was the employer who suffered; in the case of India, where prices were rising, it was the wage-earner who suffered. In both cases there was an injustice done to a part of the community and an easy case for the reform of currency was made out. The need for a currency reform was recognized in England; but in India many people seemed averse to it. To some the stability of the silver standard had made a powerful appeal, for they failed to find any evidence of Indian prices having risen above the level of 1873. To others the bounty of the falling exchange was too great a boon to be easily given away by stabilizing the exchange. The falsity of both the views is patent. Prices in India did rise, and that, too, considerably. Bounty perhaps there was, but it was a penalty on the wage-earner. Thus viewed, the need for the reform of Indian currency was far more urgent than could have been said of the English currency. From a purely psychological point of view there is probably much to choose between rising prices and falling prices. But from the point of view of their incidence on the distribution of wealth, very little can be said in favour of a standard which changes in its [pg 113] value and which becomes the _via media_ of transferring wealth from the relatively poor to the relatively rich. Scrope said: “Without stability of value money is a fraud.” Surely, having regard to the magnitude of the interests affected, depreciated money must be regarded as a greater fraud. That being so, the prosperity of Indian trade and industry, far from being evidence of a sound currency, was sustained by reason of the fact that the currency was a diseased currency. The fall of exchange, in so far as it was a gain, registered a loss to a large section of the Indian people with fixed incomes who suffered from the instability of the silver standard equally with the Government and its European officers.

So much for the fall of silver. But the financial difficulties and social injustices it caused did not sum up the evil effects produced by it. Far more disturbing than the fall were the fluctuations which accompanied the fall (_see_ Chart V).

The fluctuations greatly aggravated the embarrassment of the Government of India caused by the fall in the exchange value of the rupee. In the opinion of the Hon. Mr. Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer),¹⁹²

¹⁹² _Financial Statement_, 1883–84, p. 26.

“It is not the fact that the value of the rupee is, comparatively speaking, low that causes inconvenience. It would be possible, although it might be exceedingly troublesome, to adjust the Indian fiscal system to a rupee of any value. What causes inconvenience alike to Government and to trade is that the value of the rupee is unstable. It is impossible to state accurately in Indian currency what the annual liabilities of the Government of India are. These liabilities have to be calculated afresh every year according to the variations which take place in the relative value of gold and silver, and a calculation which will hold good for even one year is exceedingly difficult to make.”

Owing to such fluctuations, no rate could be assumed in the Budget which was likely to turn out to be the true market rate. As matters stood, the rate realized on an average during a particular year differed so widely from the Budget rate that the finances of the Government became, to [pg 114] employ the phraseology of a finance minister, a “veritable gamble.” How greatly the annual Budget must have been deranged by the sudden and unprovided-for changes in the rupee cost of the sterling payments the table on opposite page may help to give some idea.

If Government finance was subjected to such uncertainties as a result of exchange fluctuations, private trade also became more or less a matter of speculation. Fluctuations in exchange are, of course, a common incident of international trade. But if they are not to produce discontinuity in trade and industry there must be definite limits to such fluctuations. If the limits are ascertainable, trade would be reasonably certain in its calculation, and speculation in exchange would be limited within the known limits of deviations from an established par. Where, on the other hand, the limits are unknown all calculations of trade are frustrated and speculation in exchange takes the place of legitimate trading. Now, it is obvious that fluctuations in the exchange between two countries will be limited in extent if the two countries have the same standard of value. Where there is no such common standard of value the limits, though they exist, are too indefinite to be of much practical use. The rupture of the fixed par of exchange, having destroyed a common standard of value between gold and silver countries, removed the limits on the exchange fluctuations between such countries. As a result of such variations in the value of the standard measure, trade advanced by “rushes and pauses,” and speculation became feverishly active.¹⁹³

¹⁹³ Evid. I.C.C., 1898, Q. 6,290, 9,808–10.

That progress of trade depends on stability is a truism which seldom comes home until it is denied in fact. It is difficult to appreciate its importance to healthy enterprise when government is stable, credit secure, and conditions are uniform. And yet so great is the handicap of instability that everywhere business men have been led by a variety of devices to produce stability in domains enveloped by uncertainty. Everywhere there have grown up business barometers forewarning business men of impending changes and so enabling them to forearm against them by timely [pg 115]

TABLE XXII

_Fluctuations of Exchange and Fluctuations in the Rupee Cost of Gold Payments_¹⁹⁴

───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Estimated Rate of Changes in the Rupee Rate of Exchange Cost of Sterling Exchange on actually Payments consequent Financial which the realized on upon Changes between Year. Budget of the the Average the Estimated and the Year was during the Realized rates of framed. Year. Exchange. ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── s. d. s. d. Rs. Rs. ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1874–75 1 10·375 1 10·156 15,91,764 — ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1875–76 1 9·875 1 9·626 19,57,917 — ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1876–77 1 8·5 1 8·508 — 76,736 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1877–78 1 9·23 1 8·791 38,43,050 — ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1878–79 1 8·4 1 7·794 56,87,129 — ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1879–80 1 7 1 7·961 — 84,40,737 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1880–81 1 8 1 7·956 4,24,722 — ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1881–82 1 8 1 7·895 10,17,482 — ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1882–83 1 8 1 7·525 37,46,890 — ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1883–84 1 7·5 1 7·536 — 3,62,902 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1884–85 1 7·5 1 7·308 18,97,307 — ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1885–86 1 7 1 6·254 56,82,638 — ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1886–87 1 6 1 5·441 65,17,721 — ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1887–88 1 5·5 1 4·898 71,90,097 — ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1888–89 1 4·9 1 4·379 77,98,400 — ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1889–90 1 4·38 1 4·566 — 27,31,892 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1890–91 1 4·552 1 6·09 — 2,35,51,744 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 1891–92 1 5·25 1 4·733 80,09,366 — ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

¹⁹⁴ Compiled from figures given in the _Final Report of the Gold and Silver Commission_, p. 40, and in App. II, p. 270, to the _Report of the Indian Currency Committee_, 1893.

[pg 116] changes in their operations. The whole of insurance business is aimed at giving stability to economic life. The necessity which compelled all regularly established Governments to maintain standard measures by which the true proportion between things as to their quantities might be ascertained and dealings in them regulated with certainty was motivated by the same purpose, and the meticulous precision with which every civilized country defines its standard measures, and the large machinery it maintains to preserve them from deviation, are only evidences of the great importance that an economic society must continue to attach to the matter of providing precision of expression and assurance of fulfilment with regard to the contracts entered into by its members in their individual or corporate capacities. Important as are the standard measures of a community, its measure of value is by far the most important of them all.¹⁹⁵ The measures of weight, extension, or volume enter only into particular transactions. If the pound, the bushel, or the yard were altered the evils would be comparatively restricted in scope. But the measure of value is all-pervading.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Harris, _An Essay upon Money and Coins_ (reprinted by J. R. McCulloch in his volume of _Scarce Tracts on Money_, Part I, Chap. IT, par. 21; Part II, Chap. II, pars. 11, 13, and 20).

“There is no contract,” Peel declared,”¹⁹⁶ public or private, no engagement national or individual, which is unaffected by it. The enterprises of commerce, the profits of trade, the arrangements made in all domestic relations of society, the wages of labour, pecuniary transactions of the highest amount and of the lowest, the payment of national debt, the provision for national expenditure, the command which the coin of the smallest denomination has over the necessaries of life, are all affected”

¹⁹⁶ Cf. his speech dated May 6, 1844, delivered during the Commons debates on the Bank Charter Act. Hansard, Vol. XXXIV, p. 720.

by changes in the measure of value. This is because every contract, though ultimately a contract in goods, is primarily a contract in value. It is, therefore, not enough to maintain constancy in the measures of weight, capacity, or volume. A contract as one of goods may remain exact to the measure [pg 117] stipulated, but may nevertheless be vitiated as a contract in values by reason of changes in the measure of values. The necessity of preserving stability in its measure of value falls on the shoulders of every Government of an orderly society. But its importance grows beyond dispute as society advances from status to contract. The conservation of the contractual basis of society then becomes tantamount to the conservation of an invariable measure of value.

The work of reconstituting a common measure of value in some form or other which those misguided legislators of the seventies helped to destroy, it was found, could not be long delayed with impunity. The consequences that followed in the wake of that legislation, as recounted before, were too severe to allow the situation to remain unrectified. That efforts for reconstruction should have been launched before much mischief was done only shows that a world linked by ties of trade will insist, if it can, that its currency systems must be laid on a common gauge. [pg 118]