CHAPTER XXVII

THROUGH FOREIGN EYES

Praise enough To fill the ambition of a private man, That Chatham’s language was his mother tongue And Wolfe’s great name compatriot with his own. COWPER.

TRAVELLING about the world before the Great War, no one could fail to notice that the name of Mr. Lloyd George had already become an ensign. Men had begun to apply it to that particular type of statesman, becoming happily less rare, who take risks on behalf of the “common people.” It had become a way of classifying a statesman to speak of him as “Our Lloyd George.” This was especially the case with little nations. In Norway, for instance, during the winter of 1913-14, I found that that remarkable social reformer, Mr. Castberg, was generally spoken of as the “Norwegian Lloyd George”; and on meeting him I was surprised to find how closely he was modelling his policy on that of the British statesman. His chief aspiration was to meet Mr. Lloyd George and discuss with him his own schemes for simplifying and enlarging Norwegian social insurance and reforming their land system.

This was but one example of a very general tendency. There was another remarkable fact. Those who met and talked with Socialists either in France or in Germany during 1912-14, must have been astonished to discover that, in speaking of Great Britain, their thoughts were concerned not with any British Socialist leader, but almost always with Mr. Lloyd George. The reason of this was simple, but illuminating. European Socialism had for half a century been hand-cuffed to an impracticable idealism. Here was a man who achieved things. He might be an opportunist and a compromiser. Well, then, there was something to be said for opportunism and compromise. For the great thing was that, while all the idealists were still dreaming, this man was awake and doing.[146]

Apart from the Socialists, there was one European statesman who, long before the war, already realised Mr. Lloyd George as a possible European force. That was the great Cretan Greek, M. Venizelos. The instinctive mutual regard and respect of these two men is one of the most remarkable things in latter-day politics. There was telepathy in it. Across the length of Europe they seemed to have caught some message from one another even before they were acquainted. It was Mr. Lloyd George who especially urged on the Greek Government that M. Venizelos should come to the London Conference of 1912. It was on that visit that they met at the house of a friend and had a long conversation. They found much in common—a common hope for the little nations, a common belief in the unity and federation of the Balkan States as the one hope of the Near East.

It was after this that M. Venizelos said to a friend—“Mr. Lloyd George will save Europe.”

It was only gradually that Mr. Lloyd George emerged in Western Europe as a commanding figure in the world war. It was the French who first among European nations discovered him as a European. This was partly, no doubt, from some instinctive sympathy between the Gaul and the Celt; for very large numbers of Frenchmen—the Bretons—are actually still Celtic—even Welsh—both in thought and language.

It was also that Mr. Lloyd George, in his great munitions campaign, took so many ideas from the French and realised in a moment, across the gulf of language, the extraordinary swiftness and power of the French mind, their amazing courage and capacity in enterprise and organisation. We have seen how, early in the war, he sat at the feet of the French Socialist Minister, M. Albert Thomas; and how, at the Boulogne Conference of June, 1915, he learned from the French gunners. It would be foolish to pretend that Mr. Lloyd George talks French very well. But he has learnt to understand their spoken language when it is uttered by masters like M. Briand and M. Thomas.

But it was not till 1916 that Mr. Lloyd George stood out to the French with a bright, particular light of his own. Amid the doubts and hesitations of their own politicians they caught a glimpse of a man across the Channel who dared to lead—who ventured to tell the people the unpleasant truths, and to direct them to unpleasant duties.

“A speaker full of free and generous inspiration,” says M. Georges Leygues in the _Evènement_ of July 7th, 1916, greeting his appointment to the Ministry of War, “he never fails in his perception of realities, and he goes straight to the fact. Passionate interpreter of the soul of his people, which he knows so well in all its phases—living incarnation of the ardent Welsh race, he enjoys a real ascendency over the masses. He can make them understand and accept the length of the effort necessary to shake that which most offends the proud people of the West—that boastful and brutal barrack-yard spirit under which the German military caste designed to bring the free mind of the world.”

In December, 1916, during the great ministerial crisis which led to the Lloyd George Premiership, these French writers saw far more clearly than the journalists of London what was at stake. In London, on both sides, the writers and politicians were too much absorbed in the personal and party issue—they regarded it too much as a conflict of newspaper “combines.” In France, on the other hand, the journalists all realised that the difference turned round great issues—great questions of method in the conduct of the war. Here is what that great journal, _Le Temps_, wrote on December 7th, 1917:

“The English ministerial crisis is just a conflict, at an acute stage, of two principles and methods of government. One represents the normal maintenance of traditions, or rather of conventions, which have stood the proof of long administration—the ordinary march of the governmental machine. According to this view, that machine can give us its full value, if only all its wheels are strengthened without being modified. The other view holds that there must be new simplifications of the machinery. The driving power must be organised and concentrated in one control—and that a control of energy. The time of good intentions has passed. This is no longer an affair of ‘Wait and see.’ Mr. Lloyd George takes his stand clearly and simply on the side of decisive action.”

The _Temps_ was not alone. Philippe Millet, writing in _L’Œuvre_ on the same day, showed that he had a glimpse of the same issue:

“It is necessary to look beyond the conflict of persons. Then one discovers a practically unanimous desire to constitute at last a true War Government. What England has in her mind is the formation of a sort of Committee of Public Safety.”

England, he perceived, had become more revolutionary than France.

“Conscription had made a greater change in England because it was in itself a revolution. Beginning later than ourselves, the English have taken on the habit of changing their political organisation at great speed and as fast as the war compels them; and their acquired pace is probably in this stage superior to ours. It is in England rather than in France that one sees at this moment the spirit of Carnot reviving.”

Here surely was a very profound political observation. With the same keenness of insight M. Clemenceau, writing on July 1st, 1917, in _L’Homme Enchaîné_, saw in Mr. Lloyd George a great political experimentalist adapting his course always to the actual events of the war:

“The English Prime Minister is, above all things, a man of action—one of those who, under the active impulse of living thought, apply themselves to one task only—and that is to bring order and method into the plans and resolves which come to them from a rigorous scrutiny of realities.”

Other French journalists, still seeing these incidents more clearly from across the water, rejoiced at the change on the broadest possible lines. “The state of war,” wrote M. Gustave Téry, “demands that all deliberations should be brief and decisions prompt. Now how can they possibly be so, if all power is exercised by two dozen Ministers who pass half their time in discussion and the other half in deploring their impotence?” Gustave Hervé was even more outspoken in _La Victoire_ (December 7th, 1916):

“Roughly the veils are torn aside in all the allied countries; and from Petrograd to Paris, from London to Rome, the whole world turns anxiously towards their Governments, crying, ‘We want leaders!’

“Lloyd George has been the first in our great countries of the West to hear the cry of the people.”

M. Fitzmaurice, in the _Figaro_, foresaw how the crisis would end:

“Perhaps he will not have the support of all his colleagues of to-day, some of whom are precisely those whose delays and decisions he was arraigning, and from whose hands he wished to take the War Council; but he will have with him all the men of action of all the parties who recognise in him a true leader because they have seen him at work and they know that they can count on him. He will have with him all the English people and all the Allies.”

The _Matin_ on the same day (December 7th) analysed the position as follows:

“In reality the conflict which divides the English political world is nothing new in the history of peoples. In moments of great gravity, even of less gravity than the present time, there has often been felt this imperious necessity to trust the management of affairs to men of energy. Even revolutions have arisen, in England itself, and several times, from the discontent created by Ministers who were excellent in moments of calm but feeble in serious crises.”

The _Journal_ wrote thus:

“One element dominates the situation. It Is the preponderating position of Mr. Lloyd George. No Prime Minister could govern to-day without asking not so much for his collaboration as for his directions. Lloyd George is the soul of England at war, and the principal combative arm of Great Britain. Why keep him then in the second political place? The brain that conceives ought also to be the will that directs.”

It is, indeed, a remarkable proof of the interest taken by Frenchmen to-day in the personality of Mr. Lloyd George that perhaps the best of all the shorter sketches of his career has been written by M. Paul Louis Hervier and published by that enterprising magazine, _Je Sais Tout_, in its issue of April 15th, 1917.

To-day, indeed, it is scarcely too much to say that in France Mr. Lloyd George is the best known and loved of all European statesmen—not even excluding the statesmen of France itself.

Or turn to another splendid European Ally—Italy. There, too, Mr. Lloyd George is well appreciated as a leader in the Entente Alliance. Here is a passage from the _Secolo_ in December, 1916:

Once more we see Lloyd George, the watchful, the innovator, the inaugurator of new ideas. He has known how, in the country classic for its individualism, to strengthen and enlarge the sphere of State action. His first political experiments from 1906 to 1914 were all directed to destroy the _laissez-faire_ system, and to substitute for it the direct and co-ordinated action of the State, especially when the action of the State attacked the privileges of the rich classes. To-day Lloyd George seeks to bring into being a veritable “War Socialism.”

The _Giornale d’Italia_ took the same line:

In comparison with the preceding administration, the new Government is distinguished for its firmness of decision. England takes another step along the path of warlike evolution. . . . Lloyd George’s power is the power of a warrior, who is determined to subordinate every private interest, that the interest of the whole nation may prevail. . . . He voices the conscience of the whole British Empire, which fully realises that every barrier must be overturned, every obstacle overcome, that stands in the way of the development of those resources for war without which it is impossible to beat the enemy.

The _Idea Nazionale_ echoed the same view:

There is a new feeling among the Governments of the Entente—a new determination to conquer “without the aid of time.” The old Governments were characterised by their conviction that time was a substantial ally. This constituted an element of weakness. The speech of Lloyd George, however, is an authentic interpretation of the signs of the times. . . .

In an interview with the _Morning Post_ in December, 1916, that remarkable Italian, Signor Bissolato, expressed these views:

“You ask me what I think of Lloyd George? That is tantamount to asking me what I think of England. It is rare in history that a nation has found itself as perfectly identified with one man as England is to-day with Lloyd George. The world, enemies and friends included, stands amazed by the energy Lloyd George displays in dealing with the huge difficulties that the war has raised. But few know that in the energy of this one man is apparent the energy of the whole English nation. What is particularly fortunate is his decisive arrival to power at this juncture. I say this because if a nation at such critical times as these does not find the man who is destined to lead it, it runs the danger of remaining like the giant who cannot find a weapon to fight with in a conflict which is to decide his fate. . . . England’s good fortune in having found Lloyd George is the good fortune of the whole Entente.”

Let us cross from Europe to our new and splendid Ally, the United States. There the career of Mr. Lloyd George has always been followed with the closest interest. There was a touch of enterprise—a salt savour—about his Budget that took the fancy of a country always in love with daring. The quick and observant journalists who watch affairs in England on behalf of the American democracy were already warning their people that Mr. Lloyd George was putting them out of date. In a very remarkable sketch of Mr. Lloyd George’s land proposals sent to the American Press in April of 1912 by Mr. James Creelman, he told them that England was on the verge of a revolution that would make America look old-fashioned.

“These are stirring and epoch-making times in Old England.

“The old and powerful order of things is about to pass away.”

And in his bright American way he depicted the English aristocracy crying out:

“Oh! for a way to get rid of the grey-eyed, smiling little Welsh demon who sits at the Imperial Treasury planning new taxes on wealth and land; who puts evil ideas of social justice into the head of the calm, keen, adroit Prime Minister and all the rest of the Cabinet, and who has bewitched the once humble and contented British people until they no longer reverence or respect orthodoxy or the nobility and upper classes!”

Mr. Lloyd George has always been fully as interesting to the leading men of America. When they visit England, it is he whom they most desire to see and to meet. President Wilson looks at the world with a slower, calmer gaze, and arrives at his conclusions very much more gradually.

But President Roosevelt always held Mr. Lloyd George in a fierce admiration, not unmingled with envy for his success in carrying with him a militant democracy. Mr. Roosevelt wrote shortly before his death as follows to a public man in his country:

“Give my heartiest regards to Lloyd George. Do tell him I admire him immensely. I have always fundamentally agreed with his social programme, but I wish it supplemented by Lord Roberts’s external programme. Nevertheless, my agreement with him in programme is small compared with the fact that I so greatly admire the character he is now showing in this great crisis. It is often true that the only way to render great services is by willingness on the part of the statesman to lose his future, or, at any rate, his present position in political life, just exactly as the soldier may have to pay with his physical life in order to render service in battle.”

As to our own far-flung Empire, there never has been much doubt about their views in regard to Mr. Lloyd George.

There are enough Welshmen in Canada to see to that Dominion. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, in a letter of introduction written a year before his death, wrote:

“Mr. M. is one of your most ardent admirers; and if you do not know it let me tell you that their number in this country is legion.”

There he certainly spoke the truth.

Sir Richard Flavelle, the famous Canadian financier, was present in London during the great financial crisis. On returning to Canada, in a speech at Ottawa on September 26th, 1916, he spoke as follows:

“During those days the men who met the Chancellor (Mr. Lloyd George) in Committee were struck with one or two personal characteristics. One of the noted ones was the man’s self-effacement. He sought for no glory for himself. He sought for no recognition for himself. One of the early evidences of the measure which he had taken of the situation was found, by the gentlemen who waited upon him, that Mr. Austen Chamberlain sat by his side. He crossed over to the other side of the House, and he said—‘I need your assistance.’”

Less expected than the praise of Canada is the admiration of India. Mr. Lloyd George has never visited India, and he would not claim any special knowledge of India. But India is the country of the poor man; and the poor man all over the world has heard in his speeches a new call of hope. To him Mr. Lloyd George seems a light in great darkness, the glimmering of a new dawn. Writing before the war, the _Indian Patriot_ said:

“Of all the statesmen at the head of affairs in England to-day no one exercises the imagination of India so much as Mr. Lloyd George. He is not known as ‘Mr.’ here, but has gone over to the ranks of greatness, and is called simply ‘Lloyd George.’ His force and his earnestness always appeal to the imagination. His speech is carefully read and treasured up. The cry of India is—‘When shall we have a Lloyd George over here?’ and the story of his pensions for the old, his insurance for the sick has become a legend from the West.

“When will he come as our Viceroy?” is what a poor man asked the writer. And he was disappointed to be told that he may not come at all. ‘But then Mr. Lloyd George has many followers, and any one of them, trained as he is, may come!’ And here was consolation!”

“They all love him, and are ready to lay down life for him; and all because he has done so much for the poor.” That is the verdict of India, where kindness to the poor is a first call on all religions, and not a pious aspiration controlled by the Poor Law.

Then there are the little “Neutrals.” They ought, by all the rules, to have seen the best of the game. There is a remarkable article in the _Journal de Genève_ of May 15th, 1917, which seems to embody the judgment of the most cautious and level-headed of all the neutral observers of the war:

“Mr. Lloyd George has been called ‘the Prime Minister of Europe.’ There is truth in that utterance. Of all the statesmen who exercise to-day an influence over the destinies of the world, Mr. Lloyd George is the most attractive, the most personal, the most wilful, the most audacious. More than all the others, he sees the future and prepares for it.

“He has two talents which complete his outfit. He knows how to will, and he knows how to speak.”

Finally, there is one tribute that comes from abroad to Mr. Lloyd George which certainly ought not to be omitted from this survey:

Of all British statesmen, he was, during the war, the best abused in the enemy Press.

[146] A remarkable instance of this comes to hand. Prince Kropotkin, in addressing the Moscow Conference (August 1917), told the Russian Socialists that there was more Socialism in Mr. Lloyd George’s speeches than in all their dreams.

APPENDIX A

PRINCIPAL DATES IN MR. LLOYD GEORGE’S LIFE

Birth of David Lloyd George January 17, 1863. Death of his father June 7, 1864. Is taken to Llanystundwy August, 1864. Enters the village school 1869. Passes Law Preliminary 1877. Enters solicitor’s office at Portmadoc 1878. Family moves to Criccieth May 1880. Visits Houses of Parliament November 1881. Speech on Egyptian War at Portmadoc November 1882. Passes Law Finals 1884. Starts practice at Criccieth 1884. Starts practice at Portmadoc 1885. Speaks at Michael Davitt’s meeting 1886. Llanfrothen case 1888. Marries Miss Maggie Owen January 24, 1888. Adopted as Liberal candidate in Carnarvon Boroughs December 1888. Elected Alderman for Carnarvonshire County Council 1889. Returned M.P. at By-election (majority, 18) April 10, 1890. Fight over Clergy Discipline Bill 1892. Second election (majority, 196) July 8, 1892. Revolt over Welsh Disestablishment Bill 1895. Third election (General Election—majority, 194) 1895. Opposes Agricultural Rating Bill 1896. Opposes Voluntary Schools Bill 1897. Opposes Tithes Bill 1899. Speaks against South African War October 27, 1899. Opposes South African War 1900. Fourth election at Carnarvon Boroughs (majority, 296) October 6, 1900. Mobbed at Birmingham December 18, 1901. Fights Education Bill 1902. Welsh Education Revolt 1903. Defies Schools Coercion Act 1904. President of the Board of Trade 1905. Fifth election at Carnarvon Boroughs (majority, 1224) 1906. Settles Railway Strike 1907. Becomes Chancellor of the Exchequer April 12, 1908. Passes Old Age Pensions Act July 1908. Visits Germany August 1908. Introduces Budget April 29, 1909. Thrown out by Lords November, 1909. Sixth election at Carnarvon Boroughs (majority, 1,078) January 1910. Passes Budget April 28, 1910. Becomes member of Party Conference June-November 1910. Seventh election at Carnarvon Boroughs (majority, 1,208) December 1910. Introduces Insurance Bill May 4, 1911. Carries Insurance Bill December 1911. Land Campaign 1912-1913. Great War opens August 4, 1914. Becomes Premier December 1916. Armistice November 11, 1918. General Election December 14, 1918. Peace Conference opens January 18, 1919. Peace ratified by Parliament July 21st, 1919. Peace ratified at Versailles January 10, 1920.

APPENDIX B THE CRISIS OF DECEMBER, 1916

THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MR. ASQUITH AND MR. LLOYD GEORGE

_Memorandum of Mr. Lloyd George to Prime Minister, December 1st, 1916._ WAR OFFICE, WHITEHALL, S.W.

1. That the War Committee consist of three members—two of whom must be the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War, who should have in their offices deputies capable of attending to and deciding all departmental business—and a third Minister without portfolio. One of the three to be Chairman.

2. That the War Committee shall have full powers, subject to the supreme control of the Prime Minister, to direct all questions connected with the war.

3. The Prime Minister, in his discretion, to have the power to refer any question to the Cabinet.

4. Unless the Cabinet, in reference by the Prime Minister, reverses decision of the War Cabinet, that decision to be carried out by the Department concerned.

5. The War Committee to have the power to invite any Minister and to summon the expert advisers and officers of any Department to its meetings.

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, S.W. _January 1st, 1916._

_Secret_ MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,

I have now had time to reflect on our conversation this morning, and to study your memorandum.

Though I do not altogether share your dark estimate and forecast of the situation, actual and perspective, I am in complete agreement that we have reached a critical situation in the war, and that our methods of procedure, with the experience which we have gained during the last few months, call for reconsideration and revision.

The two main defects of the War Committee, which has done excellent work, are:

(1) That its numbers are too large.

(2) That there is delay, evasion, and often obstruction on the part of the Departments in giving effect to its decisions.

I might with good reason add (3) that it is often kept in ignorance by the Departments of information, essential and even vital, of a technical kind, upon the problems that come before it: and (4) that it is overcharged with duties, many of which might well be relegated to subordinate bodies.

The result is that I am clearly of opinion that the War Committee should be reconstituted, and its relation to and authority over the Departments be more clearly defined and more effectively asserted.

I come now to your specific proposals.

In my opinion, whatever changes are made in the composition and functions of the War Committee, the Prime Minister must be its Chairman. He cannot be relegated to the position of an arbiter in the background or a referee to the Cabinet.

In regard to its composition, I agree that the War Secretary and the First Lord of the Admiralty are necessary members. I am inclined to add to the same category the Minister of Munitions. There should be another member, either without portfolio or charged only with comparatively light departmental duties. One of the members should be appointed Vice-Chairman.

I purposely do not in this letter discuss the delicate and difficult question of personnel.

The Committee should, as far as possible, sit _de die diem_, and have full power to see that its decisions (subject to appeal to the Cabinet) are carried out promptly and effectively by the Departments.

The reconstitution of the War Committee should be accompanied by the setting up of a Committee of National Organisation, to deal with the purely domestic side of war problems. It should have executive powers within its own domain.

The Cabinet would in all cases have ultimate authority.

Yours very sincerely, (Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.

10 DOWNING STREET, S.W. _December 4th, 1916._

_Secret_ MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,

Such productions as the first leading article in to-day’s _Times_, showing the infinite possibilities for misunderstanding and misrepresentation of such an arrangement as we considered yesterday, make me at least doubtful as to its feasibility. Unless the impression is at once corrected that I am being relegated to the position of an irresponsible spectator of the war, I cannot possibly go on.

The suggested arrangement was to the following effect. The Prime Minister to have supreme and effective control of War Policy.

The agenda of the War Committee will be submitted to him; its Chairman will report to him daily; he can direct it to consider particular topics or proposals; and all its conclusions will be subject to his approval or veto. He can, of course, at his own discretion attend meetings of the Committee.

Yours sincerely, (Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.

WAR OFFICE, WHITEHALL, S.W. _December 4th, 1916._

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I have not seen the _Times’_ article. But I hope you will not attach undue importance to these effusions. I have had these misrepresentations to put up with for months. Northcliffe frankly wants a smash. Derby and I do not. Northcliffe would like to make this and any other rearrangement under your Premiership impossible. Derby and I attach great importance to your retaining your present position—effectively. I cannot restrain, or, I fear, influence Northcliffe. I fully accept in letter and in spirit your summary of the suggested arrangement—subject, of course, to personnel.

Ever sincerely, (Sd.) D. LLOYD GEORGE.

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, S.W. _December 4th, 1916_

_Secret_ MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,

Thank you for your letter of this morning.

The King gave me to-day authority to ask and accept the resignation of all my colleagues, and to form a new Government on such lines as I should submit to him. I start therefore with a clean slate.

The first question which I have to consider is the constitution of the new War Committee.

After full consideration of the matter in all its aspects, I have come decidedly to the conclusion that it is not possible that such a Committee could be made workable and effective without the Prime Minister as its Chairman. I quite agree that it will be necessary for him, in view of the other calls upon his time and energy, to delegate from time to time the Chairmanship to another Minister as representative and _locum tenens_; but (if he is to retain the authority, which corresponds to his responsibility as Prime Minister) he must continue to be, as he always has been, its permanent President. I am satisfied, on reflection, that any other arrangement (such as, for instance, the one which I indicated to you in my letter of to-day) would be found in experience impracticable and incompatible with the retention of the Prime Minister’s final and supreme control.

The other question, which you have raised, relates to the personnel of the Committee. Here again, after deliberate consideration, I find myself unable to agree with some of your suggestions. I think we both agree that the First Lord of the Admiralty must, of necessity, be a member of the Committee.

I cannot (as I told you yesterday) be a party to any suggestion that Mr. Balfour should be displaced. The technical side of the Board of Admiralty has been reconstituted, with Sir John Jellicoe as First Sea Lord. I believe Mr. Balfour to be, under existing conditions, the necessary head of the Board.

I must add that Sir Edward Carson (for whom personally and in every other way I have the greatest regard) is not, from the only point of view which is significant to me (namely, the most effective prosecution of the war) the man best qualified among my colleagues present or past to be a member of the War Committee.

I have only to say, in conclusion, that I am strongly of opinion that the War Committee (without any disparagement of the existing Committee, which in my judgment is a most efficient body, and has done and is doing invaluable work) ought to be reduced in number: so that it can sit more frequently, and overtake more easily the daily problems with which it has to deal. But in any reconstruction of the Committee, such as I have, and have for some time past had in view, the governing consideration to my mind is the special capacity of the men who are to sit on it for the work which it has to do.

That is a question which I must reserve for myself to decide.

Yours very sincerely, (Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH. _December 5th, 1916._

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I received your letter with some surprise.

On Friday I made proposals which involved not merely your retention of the Premiership, but the supreme control of the war, whilst the executive functions, subject to that supreme control, were left to others. I thought you then received these suggestions favourably. In fact, you yourself proposed that I should be the Chairman of this Executive Committee, although, as you know, I never put forward that demand. On Saturday you wrote me a letter in which you completely went back on that proposition. You sent for me on Sunday, and put before me other proposals; these proposals you embodied in a letter written on Monday:

“The Prime Minister to have supreme and effective control of war policy.

“The agenda of the War Committee will be submitted to him; its Chairman will report to him daily; he can direct it to consider particular topics or proposals; and all its conclusions will be subject to his approval or veto. He can, of course, at his own discretion, attend meetings of the Committee.”

These proposals safeguarded your position and power as Prime Minister in every particular. I immediately wrote you accepting them “in letter and in spirit.” It is true that on Sunday I expressed views as to the constitution of the Committee, but these were for discussion. To-day you have gone back on your own proposals.

I have striven my utmost to cure the obvious defects of the War Committee without overthrowing the Government. As you are aware, on several occasions during the last two years I have deemed it my duty to express profound dissatisfaction with the Government’s method of conducting the war. Many a time, with the road to victory open in front of us, we have delayed and hesitated whilst the enemy were erecting barriers that finally checked the approach. There has been delay, hesitation, lack of forethought and vision. I have endeavoured repeatedly to warn the Government of the dangers, both verbally and in written memoranda and letters, which I crave your leave now to publish if my action is challenged; but I have either failed to secure decisions or I have secured them when it is too late to avert the evils. The latest illustration is our lamentable failure to give timely support to Roumania.

I have more than once asked to be released from my responsibility for a policy with which I was in thorough disagreement, but at your urgent personal request, I remained in the Government. I realise that when the country is in the peril of a great war, Ministers have not the same freedom to resign on disagreement. At the same time I have always felt—and felt deeply—that I was in a false position, inasmuch as I could never defend in a whole-hearted manner the action of a Government of which I was a member. We have thrown away opportunity after opportunity, and I am convinced, after deep and anxious reflection, that it is my duty to leave the Government in order to inform the people of the real condition of affairs, and to give them an opportunity, before it is too late, to save their native land from a disaster which is inevitable if the present methods are longer persisted in. As all delay is fatal in war, I place my office without further parley at your disposal.

It is with great personal regret that I have come to this conclusion. In spite of mean and unworthy insinuations to the contrary—insinuations which I fear are always inevitable in the case of men who hold prominent but not primary positions in any administration—I have felt a strong personal attachment to you as my Chief. As you yourself said on Sunday, we have acted together for ten years and never a quarrel, although we have had many a grave difference on questions of policy. You have treated me with great courtesy and kindness: for all that I thank you. Nothing would have induced me to part now except an overwhelming sense that the course of action which has been pursued has put the country—and not merely the country, but throughout the world, the principles for which you and I have always stood throughout our political lives—in the greatest peril that has ever overtaken them.

As I am fully conscious of the importance of preserving national unity, I propose to give your Government complete support in the vigorous prosecution of the war; but unity without action is nothing but futile carnage, and I cannot be responsible for that. Vigour and vision are the supreme need of this hour.

Yours sincerely, (Sd.) D. LLOYD GEORGE.

10 DOWNING STREET, S.W. _December 5th, 1916._

_Private_ MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,

I need not tell you that I have read your letter of to-day with much regret.

I do not comment upon it for the moment, except to say that I cannot wholly accept your account of what passed between us in regard to my connection with the War Committee.

In particular, you have omitted to quote the first and most material part of my letter of yesterday.

Yours very sincerely, (Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.

In the meantime, I feel sure that you will see the obvious necessity, in the public interest, of not publishing, at this moment, any part of our correspondence.

WAR OFFICE, S.W. _December 5th, 1916._

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I cannot announce my resignation without assigning the reason. Your request that I should not publish the correspondence that led up to and necessitated it places me therefore in an embarrassing and unfair position. I must give reasons for the grave step I have taken. If you forbid publication of the correspondence, do you object to my stating in another form my version of the causes that led to my resigning?

Yours sincerely, (Sd.) D. LLOYD GEORGE.

As to the first part of your letter, the publication of the letter would cover the whole ground.

10 DOWNING STREET, S.W. _December 5th, 1916._

MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,

It may make a difference to you (in reply to your last letter) if I tell you at once that I have tendered my resignation to the King. In any case, I should deprecate in the public interest the publication in its present form at this moment of your letter to me of this morning.

Of course, I have neither the power nor the wish to prevent your stating in some other form the causes which led you to take the step which you have taken.

Yours very sincerely, (Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.

APPENDIX C THE PEACE CONFERENCE

THE CRITICAL RUSSIAN DEBATE OF JANUARY, 1919

_Bullitt Exhibit No. 14_

McD. I.C. 114. Secretaries’ notes of a conversation held in M. Pichon’s room, at the Quai D’Orsay, on Tuesday, January 21st, 1919, at 15 hours (3 p.m.).

_Present:_

_United States of America._—President Wilson, Mr. R. Lansing, Mr. A. H. Frazier, Colonel U. S. Grant, Mr. L. Harrison.

_British Empire._—The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lieut.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B., Major A. M. Caccia, M.V.O., Mr. E. Phipps.

_France._—M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, M. Dutasta, H. Berthelot, Captain A. Potier.

_Italy._—Signor Orlando, H. E. Baron Sonnino, Count Aldrovandi, Major A. Jones.

_Japan._—Baron Makino, H. E. M. Matsui, M. Saburi.

_Interpreter._—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

_Situation in Russia_

M. Clemenceau said they had met together to decide what could be done in Russia under present circumstances.

President Wilson said that, in order to have something definite to discuss, he wished to take advantage of a suggestion made by Mr. Lloyd George, and to propose a modification of the British proposal. He wished to suggest that the various organised groups in Russia should be asked to send representatives, not to Paris, but to some other place, such as Salonika, convenient of approach, there to meet such representatives as might be appointed by the Allies, in order to see if they could draw up a programme upon which agreement could be reached.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the advantage of this would be that they could be brought there from Russia through the Black Sea without passing through other countries.

M. Sonnino said that some of the representatives of the various Governments were already here in Paris, for example, M. Sazonoff. Why should not these be heard?

President Wilson expressed the view that the various parties should not be heard separately. It would be very desirable to get all these representatives in one place, and still better, all in one room, in order to obtain a close comparison of views.

Mr. Balfour said that a further objection to M. Sonnino’s plan was that if M. Sazonoff was heard in Paris it would be difficult to hear the others in Paris also, and M. Clemenceau objected strongly to having some of these representatives in Paris.

M. Sonnino explained that all the Russian parties had some representatives here, except the Soviets, whom they did not wish to hear.

Mr. Lloyd George remarked that the Bolshevists were the very people some of them wished to hear.

M. Sonnino continuing, said that they had heard M. Litvinoff’s statements that morning.

(That was the statement that Litvinoff had made to Buckler, which the President had read to the council of ten that morning.)

The Allies were now fighting against the Bolshevists, who were their enemies, and therefore they were not obliged to hear them with the others.

Mr. Balfour remarked that the essence of President Wilson’s proposal was that the parties must all be heard at one and the same time.

Mr. Lloyd George expressed the view that the acceptance of M. Sonnino’s proposals would amount to their hearing a string of people, all of whom held the same opinion, and all of whom would strike the same note. But they would not hear the people who at the present moment were actually controlling European Russia. In deference to M. Clemenceau’s views they had put forward this new proposal. He thought it would be quite safe to bring the Bolshevist representatives to Salonika, or perhaps to Lemnos. It was absolutely necessary to endeavour to make peace. The report read by President Wilson that morning went to show that the Bolshevists were not convinced of the error of their ways, but they apparently realised the folly of their present methods. Therefore they were endeavouring to come to terms.

President Wilson asked to be permitted to urge one aspect of the case. As M. Sonnino had implied, they were all repelled by Bolshevism, and for that reason they had placed armed men in opposition to them. One of the things that was clear in the Russian situation was that, by opposing Bolshevism with arms, they were in reality serving the cause of Bolshevism. The Allies were making it possible for the Bolsheviks to argue that Imperialistic and Capitalistic Governments were endeavouring to exploit the country and to give the land back to the landlords, and so bring about a reaction. If it could be shown that this was not true, and that the Allies were prepared to deal with the rulers of Russia, much of the moral force of this argument would disappear. The allegations that the Allies were against the people, and wanted to control their affairs, provided the argument which enabled them to raise armies. If, on the other hand, the Allies could swallow their pride and the natural repulsion which they felt for the Bolshevists, and see the representatives of all organised groups in one place, he thought it would bring about a marked reaction against Bolshevism.

M. Clemenceau said that in principle he did not favour conversation with the Bolshevists, not because they were criminals, but because we would be raising them to our level by saying that they were worthy of entering into conversation with us. The Bolshevist danger was very great at the present moment. It had invaded the Baltic provinces and Poland, and that very morning they received bad news regarding its spread to Buda-Pesth and Vienna. Italy, also, was in danger. The danger was probably greater there than in France. If Bolshevism, after spreading to Germany, were to traverse Austria and Hungary, and so reach Italy, Europe would be faced with a very great danger. Therefore, something must be done against Bolshevism. When listening to the document presented by President Wilson that morning, he had been struck by the cleverness with which the Bolshevists were attempting to lay a trap for the Allies. When the Bolshevists first came into power, a breach was made with the Capitalist Government on questions of principle, but now they offered funds and concessions as a basis for treating with them. He need not say how valueless their promises were, but, if they were listened to, the Bolshevists would go back to their people and say, “We offered them great principles of justice, and the Allies would have nothing to do with us. Now we offer money, and they are ready to make peace.”

He admitted his remarks did not offer a solution. The great misfortune was that the Allies were in need of a speedy solution. After four years of war, and the losses and sufferings they had incurred, their populations could stand no more. Russia also was in need of immediate peace. But its necessary evolution must take time. The signing of the world’s peace could not await Russia’s final avatar. Had time been available, he would suggest waiting, for eventually sound men representing common sense would come to the top. But when would that be? He could make no forecast. Therefore they must press for an early solution.

To sum up, had he been acting by himself, he would temporise and erect barriers to prevent Bolshevism from spreading. But he was not alone, and in the presence of his colleagues he felt compelled to make some concession, as it was essential that there should not be even the appearance of disagreement amongst them. The concession came easier after hearing President Wilson’s suggestions. He thought they should make a very clear and convincing appeal to all reasonable peoples, emphatically stating that they did not wish in any way to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, and especially that they had no intention of restoring Czardom. The object of the Allies being to hasten the creation of a strong Government, they proposed to call together representatives of all parties to a conference. He would beg President Wilson to draft a paper, fully explaining the position of the Allies to the whole world, including the Russians and the Germans.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed, and gave notice that he wished to withdraw his own motion in favour of President Wilson’s.

Mr. Balfour said that he understood that all these people were to be asked on an equality. On these terms he thought the Bolshevists would refuse, and by their refusal they would put themselves in a very bad position.

M. Sonnino said that he did not agree that the Bolshevists would not come. He thought they would be the first to come, because they would be eager to put themselves on an equality with the others. He would remind his colleagues that, before the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed, the Bolshevists promised all sorts of things, such as to refrain from propaganda, but since that peace had been concluded they had broken all their promises, their one idea being to spread revolution in all other countries. His idea was to collect together all the anti-Bolshevist parties, and help them to make a strong Government, provided they pledged themselves not to serve the forces of reaction, and especially not to touch the land question, thereby depriving the Bolshevists of their strongest argument. Should they take these pledges, he would be prepared to help them.

Mr. Lloyd George enquired how this help would be given.

M. Sonnino replied that help would be given with soldiers to a reasonable degree or by supplying arms, food and money. For instance, Poland asked for weapons, and munitions; the Ukraine asked for weapons. All the Allies wanted was to establish a strong Government. The reason that no strong Government at present existed was that no party could risk taking the offensive against Bolshevism without the assistance of the Allies. He would enquire how the parties of order could possibly succeed without the assistance of the Allies. President Wilson had said that they should put aside all pride in the matter. He would point out that for Italy, and probably for France also, as M. Clemenceau had stated, it was in reality a question of self-defence. He thought that even a partial recognition of the Bolshevists would strengthen their position, and, speaking for himself, he thought that Bolshevism was already a serious danger in his country.

Mr. Lloyd George said he wished to put one or two practical questions to M. Sonnino. The British Empire now had some 15,000 to 20,000 men in Russia. M. de Scavenius had estimated that some 150,000 additional men would be required, in order to keep the anti-Bolshevist Governments from dissolution. And General Franchet d’Esperey also insisted on the necessity of Allied assistance. Now Canada had decided to withdraw her troops, because the Canadian soldiers would not agree to stay and fight against the Russians. Similar trouble had also occurred amongst the other Allied troops. And he felt certain that, if the British tried to send any more troops there, there would be mutiny.

M. Sonnino suggested that volunteers might be called for.

Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said that it would be impossible to raise 150,000 in that way. He asked, however, what contributions America, Italy, and France would make towards the raising of this army.

President Wilson and M. Clemenceau each said none.

M. Orlando agreed that Italy could make no further contributions.

Mr. Lloyd George said that the Bolshevists had an army of 300,000 men, who would, before long, be good soldiers, and to fight them at least 400,000 Russian soldiers would be required. Who would feed, equip, and pay them? Would Italy, or America, or France do so? If they were unable to do that, what would be the good of fighting Bolshevism? It could not be crushed by speeches. He sincerely trusted that they would accept President Wilson’s proposal as it now stood.

M. Orlando agreed that the question was a very difficult one for the reasons that had been fully given. He agreed that Bolshevism constituted a grave danger to all Europe. To prevent a contagious epidemic from spreading, the sanitarians set up a _cordon sanitaire_. If similar measures could be taken against Bolshevism, in order to prevent its spreading, it might be overcome, since to isolate it meant vanquishing it. Italy was now passing through a period of depression, due to war weariness. But Bolshevists could never triumph there, unless they found a favourable medium, such as might be produced either by a profound patriotic disappointment in their expectations as to the rewards of the war, or by an economic crisis. Either might lead to revolution, which was equivalent to Bolshevism. Therefore, he would insist that all possible measures should be taken to set up this cordon. Next, he suggested the consideration of repressive measures. He thought two methods were possible: either the use of physical force or the use of moral force. He thought Mr. Lloyd George’s objection to the use of physical force unanswerable. The occupation of Russia meant the employment of troops for an indefinite period of time. This meant an apparent prolongation of the war. There remained the use of moral force. He agreed with M. Clemenceau that no country could continue in anarchy, and that an end must eventually come; but they could not wait—they could not proceed to make peace and ignore Russia. Therefore, Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal, with the modifications introduced after careful consideration by President Wilson and M. Clemenceau, gave a possible solution. It did not involve entering into negotiations with the Bolshevists; the proposal was merely an attempt to bring together all the parties in Russia with a view to finding a way out of the present difficulty. He was prepared, therefore, to support it.

President Wilson asked for the views of his Japanese colleagues.

Baron Makino said that after carefully considering the various points of view put forward, he had no objections to make regarding the conclusions reached. He thought that was the best solution under the circumstances. He wished, however, to enquire what attitude would be taken by the representatives of the Allied Powers if the Bolshevists accepted the invitation to the meeting, and there insisted upon their principles. He thought they should under no circumstances countenance Bolshevist ideas. The conditions in Siberia east of the Baikal had greatly improved. The objects which had necessitated the despatch of troops to that region had been attained. Bolshevism was no longer aggressive, though it might still persist in a latent form. In conclusion, he wished to support the proposal before the meeting.

President Wilson expressed the view that the emissaries of the Allied Powers should not be authorised to adopt any definite attitude towards Bolshevism. They should merely report back to their Governments the conditions found.

Mr. Lloyd George asked that that question be further considered. He thought the emissaries of the Allied Powers should be able to establish an agreement if they were able to find a solution. For instance, if they succeeded in reaching an agreement on the subject of the organisation of a Constituent Assembly, they should be authorised to accept such a compromise without the delay of a reference to the Governments.

President Wilson suggested that the emissaries might be furnished with a body of instructions.

Mr. Balfour expressed the view that abstention from hostile action against their neighbours should be made a condition of their sending representatives to this meeting.

President Wilson agreed.

M. Clemenceau suggested that the manifesto to the Russian parties should be based solely on humanitarian grounds. They should say to the Russians, “You are threatened by famine; we are prompted by humanitarian feelings, we are making peace; we do not want people to die. We are prepared to see what can be done to remove the menace of starvation.” He thought the Russians would at once prick up their ears, and be prepared to hear what the Allies had to say. They would add that food cannot be sent unless peace and order were re-established. It should, in fact, be made quite clear that the representatives of all parties would merely be brought together for purely humane reasons.

Mr. Lloyd George said that in this connection he wished to invite attention to a doubt expressed by certain of the delegates of the British Dominions, namely, whether there would be enough food and credit to go round, should an attempt be made to feed all Allied countries, and enemy countries, and Russia also. The export of so much food would inevitably have the effect of raising food prices in Allied countries, and so create discontent and Bolshevism. As regards grain, Russia had always been an exporting country, and there was evidence to show that plenty of food at present existed in the Ukraine.

President Wilson said that his information was that enough food existed in Russia, but either on account of its being hoarded or on account of difficulties of transportation, it could not be made available.

It was agreed that President Wilson should draft a proclamation, for consideration at the next meeting, inviting all organised parties in Russia to attend a meeting to be held at some selected place such as Salonika or Lemnos, in order to discuss with the representatives of the Allied and Associated Great Powers the means of restoring order and peace in Russia. Participation in the meeting should be conditional on a cessation of hostilities.

APPENDIX D

THE “FOURTEEN POINTS”

IN view of the fact that the Armistice negotiations started from the acceptance of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points by the Germans, and that the Peace Conference pivoted round those points as modified by the Allies at the Versailles Council of October, 1918, it is of interest to attach a full and complete version of the original Fourteen Points, as set forth by President Wilson in his great speech of January 8th, 1918:

I. OPEN COVENANTS of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. ABSOLUTE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION upon the seas outside the territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. THE REMOVAL, SO FAR AS POSSIBLE, of all economic barriers, and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that NATIONAL ARMAMENTS WILL BE REDUCED TO THE LOWEST POINT consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely IMPARTIAL ADJUSTMENT OF ALL COLONIAL CLAIMS, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

VI. =The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations= of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and more than a welcome assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. =Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored= without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act, the whole structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired.

VIII. ALL FRENCH TERRITORY SHOULD BE FREED, and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of ALSACE-LORRAINE, which has unsettled the peace of the world for fifty years, SHOULD BE RIGHTED in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interests of all.

IX. A READJUSTMENT OF THE FRONTIERS OF ITALY should be effected along clearly recognisable lines of nationality.

X. THE PEOPLES OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first opportunity of AUTONOMOUS DEVELOPMENT.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

XII. THE TURKISH PORTIONS of the present Ottoman Empire should be ASSURED A SECURE SOVEREIGNTY, but the OTHER NATIONALITIES which are under Turkish rule should be ASSURED AN UNDOUBTED SECURITY OF LIFE, and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the DARDANELLES should be PERMANENTLY OPENED as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. =An Independent Polish State should be erected=, which should include the territories inhabited by INDISPUTABLY POLISH POPULATIONS, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF NATIONS must be formed under specific covenant for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

NOTE.—Point II was practically cut out of the terms by the Versailles Council. Note the comprehensiveness of Point XIII, which explains the largeness of the Polish claims. Point XIV is the germ of the League of Nations idea, and is carried out in the famous clause 10 of the Covenant since rejected by the Senate of the United States.

Note that there is no mention of indemnities; but the Council of Versailles opened the door by insisting on compensation to civilian populations. The £5,000,000,000 claimed in the Treaty represents an instalment of that claim which is estimated as likely to amount to £8,000,000,000.

INDEX

Acland, Sir Arthur, 81, 168 Addison, Dr., speech on Munitions, 218; Introduces Housing Bill, 314 Agadir Speech at Mansion House, 159 Agricultural Rates Bill (1896), 108 Aisne, the, 280 Albert, 274 American Army reinforcements, 1918, 276 Amiens, 151; German attempt to capture, 277, 281 Arabi Pasha, 48 Armentières, 278 Armistice, conditions of, 283; declared, 284 Arnold, Matthew, 50, 147 Asquith, Mr., and Welsh Disestablishment, 105; successor to Campbell-Bannerman, 112; and South African War, 115; in opposition (1902), 129, 134; and Tariff Reform, 136; Premier, 149; evidence on Bulgaria, 191; munition speech, Newcastle, 213; reconstruction of Government (1915), 214; interview of December 1916, 236; negotiations with Mr. Lloyd George, 237; downfall of Government, 242; refuses Woolsack, 242; and Maurice incident, 267 Athens, 184 Aubers Ridge, attack on, 214 Austria, strength in 1915, 198; Italy declares war on, 200; surrenders, 283

Bailleul 278 Balfour, Mr., weakening of his Government, 130, 133; Budget (1910), 164; and conference of 1910, 165; attends Peace Conference, 287, 299 Balkans, the, proposal to combine, 179, 181; German intrigue in, 184; suggestion to send Mr. Lloyd George, 196; attempt to bring together, 192 Bangor, part of constituency, 78; speech during South African War, 117, 123 Bar le Duc, 151 Barnes, Mr. G., attends Peace Conference, 287; remains in Government, 308 Berlin, 154; visit to Central Insurance Office, 158 Bethmann-Hollweg, Herr, entertained by, 154, 155 Birmingham, speech on South African War, 117, 322 Bissolati, Signor, _Morning Post_ interview, 353 Blunt, Mr. Wilfrid, 48 Board of Education, 134 Board of Trade, Mr. Lloyd George appointed President, 138; work at, 139 Bolshevists, _coup d’état_ (1917), 272; peace with Germany, 272; proposed Conference, 295 Bonar Law, Mr., unable to form Government, 242; attends Peace Conference, 287; acts as leader of Government, 313 Booth, Mr. Charles, 167 Borden, Sir R., and Peace Conference, 287 Botha, General, 118, 119, 180; conquers South-West Africa, 200; and Peace Conference, 287 Brace, Mr. W., leaves Coalition, 316 Brecon, 133 Breese, Jones and Casson, Messrs., solicitors, 41, 43, 54, 95 Brest-Litovsk, 200; peace negotiations, 272 Briand, M., 347 British Columbia, visit to, 114 Brockdorff-Rantzau, Herr, Treaty presented, 302 “Brutus,” pen-name (1880), 46 Budget (1890), compensation for licences, 88; Conference of Party Leaders, 165; (1909), 162; thrown out by Lords, 164, 337 Budget League, 163 Bukovina, invasion by Russians, 176; Russians driven from, 197 Bulgaria, divided in counsel, 179; Greek conditions of joining war, 186; refuges promise of neutrality, 189; pledged to Central Powers, 190; offers to lend troops, 191; President Wilson leans towards, 300 Bullitt, Mr. W. C., evidence before American Senate, 296; Mission to Russia, 296 Burial Act (1880), case at Llanfrothen, 66 Burke, Edmund, 124; Mr. Lloyd George’s opinion of, 342 Butler, Sir Wm., 115 Buxton, the Brothers, journey to Sofia, 184; proposals from Sofia, 187 Byron, Mr. Lloyd George’s admiration of, 339

Cadbury, Mr. George, 121 Cadorna, General, Conference July (1917), 262 Caine, Mr. W. S., 53 Camber-Williams, Canon, 25 Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H., Premier, 112; self-government for South Africa, 118; in opposition, 129; Premier (1905), 138; resignation, 149 Cannes, 328 Carnarvon Boroughs, first aspirations to Parliament, 75; adopted candidate, 78; first election, 84 _Carnarvon and Denbigh Herald_, 50, 72, 80, 84 Carpathians, German advance in, 197 Castberg, Mr., Norwegian Prime Minister, 345 Castlereagh, Lord, 300 Casson, Mr., solicitor, 42, 95 Catechism, revolt against, 271 Cecil, Lord Robert, League of Nations Committee, 298 Central Powers, division amongst, 223 Châlons-sur-Marne, 151 Chamberlain, Mr. Joseph, Radical programme of, 53; defence of, 56; liquor compensation, 90; Kynoch debate, 125; Tariff Reform, 136; admiration of, 232; party machine and, 336 Champagne, attack in, 252 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George appointed, 149 Churchill, Lord Randolph, 53, 90 Churchill, Mr. Winston, 163; Minister of Munitions, 226 City Temple, speech at, 202 Cividale, 253 Clemenceau, M., 270, 275; discussion of Armistice terms, 282; and Peace Conference, 288; leanings to Turkey, 300; after-war problems, 304; in _L’Homme Enchaîné_, 350 Clergy Discipline Bill, opposition to, 102 Clynes, Mr. J. R., leaves Coalition, 308 Coalition Government formed, 308 Coleridge, Chief Justice, Llanfrothen case, 68 Compiègne, 151 Conferences, Allied (1915), 186; Rome (1917), 248; Allied Generals (1916), 251; Rapallo (1917), 254 Congress of Vienna, 300 Conscription, conversion to, 200 Constantine, King, frustration of Entente, 184; unfriendly to British, 190; attempt to build up absolute monarchy, 193; exiled, 194 Cook, Sir Edward, 121 County Councils, creation of, 80 Courland, invaded by Russians, 196 Creelman, Mr. J., 354 Criccieth, 11, 41, 73, 95, 98, 123 Cromer, Lord, 48

_Daily News_, 85; transfer of, 121; attacks on Government, 309 Daniel, D. R., 76 Danube, proposed diversion along line of, 179 Dardanelles Report of Commission, 178; campaign opens, 190; in progress, 195; composition of committee, 196; failure of naval attack, 202; meetings of committee, 203 Davitt, Michael, 52-53 Derby Scheme, 202 Denikin, General, 297 De Wet, General, 116, 119 Dillon, John, 110 Disciples of Christ, religious sect 17, 340 Disestablishment, Welsh, resolution at meeting of National Council (1889), speech at Met. Tabernacle, 93; production of Bill (1893), 82; speech at Cardiff (1907), 146, 104; Defaulting Authorities Act (1904), 133 Downing Street, speech on Armistice Day, 285 Du Cane, Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. P., Munitions Conference (1915), 219 Dunajec, 199 Durazzo, 180

Eastern Prussia, Russian invasion of, 176 Eastern Galicia, Russian invasion of, 176 Ebert, Herr, appointed German Chancellor, 284 Education Bill (1902), opposition to, 129 Edwards, Sir Frank, 98, 132 Elections, parliamentary, (1885), 56; financial arrangements for, 94; (1900), 127; (1910), 164; (2nd 1910), 166; (1918), 286, 306, 309; figures, 328 Ellis, “Tom,” 60, 77, 98 Estimates, criticism of (1890), 92 European War, menace of, 170; declared, 171 Evans, David, schoolmaster of Llanystumdwy, 23, 38 Evans, Sir Samuel, 65, 97 Explosives Committee, formation of, 208 Extension of Rents Act, passed, 316

Fairbairn, Principal, 341 Falkenhayn, General, 269 Finland, surrendered to Germany, 292 Fitzmaurice, M., in _Figaro_, 351 Fiume, question at Peace Conference, 292 Flavelle, Sir Richard, 356 Foch, Marshal, Conference (July, 1917), 262; appointed Generalissimo, 268; exercises powers of disposition, 275; conditions of Armistice, 282 Fontainebleau, 302 Fourteen Points, President Wilson declares them, 282 Franchise, extension of, 307 French, Viscount, and shell crisis (1915), 213

Galicia, German preparations, 193; fighting in, 196 Gallipoli, 179; evacuation of, 205 Geddes, Sir Eric, appointed Director of Transport, France, 233; defends Transport Bill, 323 Gee, Thomas, and Anti-Tithe Campaign, 62, 83 George, Right Hon. D. Lloyd, for principal dates in life _see_ Appendix I. 359 George, Gwilym Lloyd (son), 302 George, Mair Lloyd (daughter), 98; death of, 149 George, Mary (sister), 13, 18 George, Megan Lloyd (daughter), 302 George, Olwen Lloyd (daughter), 98 George, Richard Lloyd (son), 94, 100, 122 George, William (father), 13, 16 George, Mrs. William (mother), 13, 16, 18, 21, 36 George, William (brother), 18, 29, 55, 56, 94 German Navy League, 156 Germany, tour in, 150; relations with England (1908-14), 160; strength (in 1915), 197; advance (in March, 1918), 274; mutiny of Fleet, 284 Gladstone, Mr., Government of 1880, 51; in debate (1884), 53; letter at by-election (1890), 84; at Hawarden, 90; and Clergy Discipline Bill, 102; resignation of (1894), 104 Glasgow, speech at, during South African War, 117 Glyndwr, Owen, 69 Goffey, Thomas, 37 Gorizia, 246, 253 Gray’s Inn, first London home, 95 Greece, as neutral, 179; Entente frustrated by King, 184; agrees to join in war, 186; refuses, 197; offers troops and fleet for Dardanelles, 189; offers again to enter war, 192 Grey, Lord, and South African War, 115; evidence on Dardanelles, 200

Haig, F.-M. Lord, agreement with Foch, 275 Hamburg, visit to, 156 Handel, 339 Hankey, Sir M., at Peace Conference, 289 Harcourt, Sir Wm., approval of maiden speech, 91; leader of House of Commons, 105 Health Ministry Bill, introduced and passed 315 Henry, Sir Charles, 150 Henry of Prussia, Prince, criticism of estimates providing for and expenditure on, 92 Hertling, Count, resignation of, 273 Hervier, Paul Louis, in _Je Sais Tout_, 352 “Highgate,” 18, 36, 40 Hobhouse Miss E. and South African Concentration Camps, 120 Home Rule (1885-6), 52, 84, 103; speech to exclude Ulster (1910), 351; for Wales, 82, 101, 106 House, Colonel, 287; and Bullitt Mission, 296 House of Commons, suspension from, 111; scene over Defaulting Authorities Bill, 133 Housing Bill introduced and passed, 314 Hughes, Mr., at Peace Conference, 288

Indemnities, telegram from M.P.’s, 300 India, extension of self-government, 316 _Indian Patriot_, article in, 357 Industrial Courts Act passed, 316 Insurance, National, investigation of German system, 150; preparation of Bill, 167; passing of Bill, 168; inspiration of, 332 Ireland, conscription extended to, 279; outline of new proposals, 316 Isonzo, 246, 253 Italian Press, opinions of, 352 Italy, declares war on Austria, 200; situation (in 1917), 245; German advance (1917), 252; British reinforcements for, 255 Ivangorod, 200

Johnson, Dr., 50 Jones, “Bobby,” 20 Jones, J. R., of Ramoth, 17 Jones, Miss, niece of Richard Lloyd, 21 Jones, Michael of Bala, 59 Jones, Rev. Richard, Llanfrothen, 68 _Journal de Genève_, 358

Kaiser, the, part played in politics by (1908), 156; abdication of, 284 Kavalla, fear of Bulgarians seizing, 189 Kemmel, 278 Kerensky, M., destroyed by Lenin, 272 Kieff, 272 King Edward VII, 149; visit to Czar, 154; death of, 164 King George V, Conference of Party Leaders (1910), 164; formation of Government of Mr. Lloyd George, 242; friendship of, 343 Kitchener, Lord, view of length of war, 172, 178; troops for Greece, 185; at the War Office, 210; Munition Committee, 213; shell crisis (1915), 214; death, 232, 262, 265 Koltchak, Admiral, 297 Kovno, 200 Kropotkin, Prince, 346 Kruger, President, 114

Labour Conference, Central Hall, 309 Labour Party, joins Government, 243; leaves Coalition, 307; in opposition, 309 Land Acquisition Act passed, 316 Land, appointment of Committee of Inquiry, 168; preparation of Bills (1914), 170 Lansdowne, Lord, 163 Lansing, Mr., and Committee of League of Nations, 298 Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, 356 League of Nations, conception of scheme, 298 Lemnos, 295 Lenin, destroys Kerensky Government, 272, 279 Lens, 252 _Le Journal_, 351 _L’Œuvre_, 349 _Le Temps_, 349 Lewis, Mr. Herbert, 98, 110, 111 Leygues, Georges, in _Evènement_, 347 Licensing Act (1905), 136 Lithuania, surrendered to Germany, 272 Llanystumdwy, 11, 20, 23, 39, 42, 169 Llanfrothen, 66 Lloyd, Richard (uncle), 24, 31, 35, 39, 45, 72, 93, 101 Lloyd, David (grandfather), 20 Local Veto, resolution at meeting of National Liberal Federation, 81 London, first visit, 49; commencement of practice, 97 Loucheur, M., 287 Lowther, Right Hon. J. W., 133 Ludendorff, General, attack on Italy, 252, 270; waning of hopes of, 278; suggestion for armistice by, 281

Macedonia, Allies to occupy, 192 Maddocks, A., 41 Manchester, birthplace, 14; meeting of National Liberal Federation, 81; speech (1918), 281 _Manchester Guardian_, Mr. Lloyd George writes for, 98 Manisty, Mr. Justice, and Llanfrothen, 68 Marconi Controversy, 169 Markham, Sir Arthur, 166 Marlborough, the Duke of, 163 Marne, the, 280 Martineau, Henry, 14 Maurice, Major-General Sir F., Letter to Press and retirement, 267 Max of Baden, Prince, overtures to President Wilson, 282; resignation of, 284 Merchant Shipping Act (1906), 142 Meredith, George, admiration of, 339 Merionethshire, 133 Messines, 278 Metropolitan Tabernacle, speech on Welsh Disestablishment at, 26 Mezières, 274 Milan, 247, 253 Military control, effect of divided, 249; need for unification, 250; unity of command decided on, 254; speech at Paris on (1917), 258 Military Service Acts (1916), effect of, 231; (1917) introduced, 272; raising of age, 278 Millet, Philippe, 349 Milner, Lord, 114; attends Peace Conference, 287 Miners’ crisis, Sankey Commission appointed, 311 Minsk, 272 Mons, 175, 284 Montagu, Mr. E., Munition Statement (1916), 221, 224, 229; joins Government (1916), 243; attends Peace Conference, 287 Morley, Lord, 112, 149, 197 _Morning Post_, attacks on Government, 309; interview with Signor Bissolati, 353 Morvin House, Criccieth, 45, 55 Moulton, Lord, and Committee on Munitions, 230 Munitions, need for, 206; committee appointed, 213; Mr. Lloyd George becomes Minister of, 216; formation of Department, 218; trades unions and “leaving certificates,” 225; organisation of volunteer workers, 228 Mynydd Ednyfed, home of Mrs. Lloyd George, 69, 72

Nancy, 151 Nanney, Sir Ellis Hugh, opponent at election (1890), 83, 87, 105 Nantlle, Lake, prosecution of quarrymen for fishing, 64 Nansen, Dr., proposed Russian expedition, 297 Neuve Chapelle, 199 Nevin, speech on South African War, 123 Newcastle Programme (1891), 103 Newman, Cardinal, 50 Nivelle, General, 245; Champagne attack, 252; replaced by Pétain, 252 Norman, Sir Henry, 163 Northcliffe, Lord, and communications on, the Eastern Front, 240 _North Wales Observer_, article on Mr. Chamberlain, 51 Novo-Georgievsk, 200

Old Age Pensions, passing of Act, 150, 161; increase in, 316 Orlando, Signor, and question of Fiume, 294 Owen, D. Lloyd, 42 Owen, Rev. John, 72 Owen, Miss Maggie (Mrs. Lloyd George), 59; marriage of, 71 Owen, Mrs., of Dolgelly (Llanfrothen), 66 Owens, Rev. Owen, 25 Oxford, impressions of, 326

Palace Mansions, Kensington, second London home, 95 Paris, speech on unity of control at, 258; German attack towards, (1918), 280; social life during Peace Conference in, 300 Parry, John, and Anti-tithe Campaign, 62, 83 Passchendaele, 252 Patents Act, 144 Peace Conference, preliminaries, 286; first meeting, 288; correspondents at, 289; proposed Bolshevist Conference, 295 Peace Treaty, presented and ratified, 303 Pedigree of Mr. Lloyd George, 13 Pencaenewydd, place of marriage, 72 Penrhyn, 55 Pétain, General, 245 Phillimore Report, basis of League of Nations, 298 Philippi, Philippo, 246 Pichon, M., 287 Platt, Colonel, opponent at election (1900), 95 Poisoned arrow incident, 324 Portmadoc, 11, 41, 46, 55, 94, 96, 122; Debating Society, 47 Poland, surrendered to Germany, 273; question of Peace Conference, 292, 303 Port of London Act, 145 Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George sent for by the King, 242 Prinkipo, 295 Puleston, Sir John, opponent at second election, 105 Pwllheli, 14, 123

Queen Victoria, 80

Railway strikes, threat of (1907), 146; (1919), 311 Rapallo Conference, 254 Reinforcements, situation, March (1918), 276 Religious tendencies, 340 Rendel, Lord, 337 Repington, Lieut.-Colonel C. A’C., _Times_ shell despatch, 214 Rheims, 151 Ritchie, Lord, and creation of County Councils, 80 Roberts, A. Rhys, professional partner in London, 97, 122 Roberts, Mr. G. H., remains in Government, 308 Robertson, Sir Wm., Allied Conference (1917), 262; opposition to Versailles Council, 264; refuses position on Versailles Council, 267 Rome, Allied Conference (1917), 248 Roosevelt, President, 336, 355 Rosebery Government, fall of, 105; resignation, 112 “Rose Cottage,” boyhood home, 18 Rothschild Pensions Committee, 138 Routh Road, Wandsworth, London home, 119 Rue Nitot, residence in Paris during Peace Conference, 301 Rumania, 179, 184; Greek conditions of joining war, 186; less friendly, 188; success of Germans, 196; declares war, 235 Russia, situation, opening of (1915), 178; fearful of Greece, 191; diverts Germans from Serbia, 192; collapse, 272; proposed Bolshevist Conference, 295

Saar Valley, 292, 303 St. Asaph, Bishop of, 132 St. Quentin, 268, 275 Salisbury, Lord, 248 Salonika, 179, 180, 295 Samsonoff, General 175 Samuel, Mr. Herbert, refuses office, 243 Sanitorium benefit, creation, 333 Sankey Commission, inquiry into condition of miners, 311 Sarn Melltcyrn, debate with curate (1887), 62 _Sartor Resartus_, 46 Schools Act (1904-6), 136 Scotland Yard, 319 Scott, Sir Walter, 50 Serbia, question of saving, 187; Bosnia and Herzegovina to be given to, 192; plan to assist, 202 Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 41 Shortt, Mr., Transport Bill, 313 Sidebotham, Herbert, 120 Siedlce, 200 Silesia, Plébiscite, 293, 303 Smuts General, 119; Memo. on League of Nations, 298 Sofia, 187 Soissons, 151 Somerset House, investigation of system of working, 329 Sorel, M., 312 South African War, outbreak, 114; opposition to, 116, 117 Strassburg, 151 Stavridi, Sir John, suggests Mr. Lloyd George should go to the Balkans, 190 Stuttgart, 153; conversation at, 327 Suffragettes, in favour of leniency, 325 Sullivan, Donald, 110 Swetenham, Mr. Q.C., M.P., Carnarvon Boroughs (1886), 77; death, 82

Tagliamento, 253 Tannenberg, 175 Tariff Reform, fight against (1903-6), 137 Tariff Reform League, 164 Tardieu, M., 287 Temple, The, London home, 95 Tennant, Mr. H. J., and shell crisis (1915), 214 Téry, Gustave, in _La Victoire_, 350 Thomas, M. Albert, friendship with, 187; rearming of France, 211; Munitions Conference, 220, 347 Thomas, Mr. D. A. (Lord Rhondda), 107 Thomas, Mr. J. H., and railway strike, 313 Thomasson, Mr. F., Transfer of _Daily News_, 121 Ticino, 246 _Times, The_, attack on Asquith Government (1916), 240 Tithes Bill (1899), 112 Transport Bill, introduced and passed, 313 Treasury, habits of work at, 329 Trevelyan, Sir George, 53 Trotsky, M., attempts to declare peace, 272 _Trumpet of Freedom_ (1888), 76 Tube strike, 309 Turkey, strength (in 1915), 198; surrenders, 283; forfeited right to rule over Christians, 300 Turnin, 247, 253

Udine, 253 Ukraine, surrendered to Germans, 273 Ulster, crisis (1914), 170; speech to exclude (1910), 337

Valenciennes, 284 Venice, 253 Venizelos, M., Greece agrees to join Allies, 186; refuses, 188; Bulgaria pledged to Central Powers, 190; resignation of, 193; resumes office, 194; mainstay of alliance in Near East, 300, 346 Verdun, 302 Versailles Council, set up, 255; functions, and opposition to, 258; defence in House of Commons, 262; meetings of, 280 Vienna, 248 Villa Murat, Parisian residence of President Wilson, 301 Villers Bretonneux, 278 Vitry, 151 Voluntary Schools Bill (1897), 109-111 Voluntary system of recruiting, doubts as to, 199 Von Below, General, attack on Italy, 252 Von Tirpitz, Admiral, 269 Vosges, The, 151

War, Secretary of State for, Mr. Lloyd George appointed (1916), 233 War Cabinet, formation (1916), 244 War Committee, suggested daily sittings, 178 Warsaw, 176, 200 Watkins, Sir Edward, 100 White, Mr. Henry, 287 Williams, Llewellyn, 98 Williams, William, boyhood friend, 24, 29 Wilson, President, 158; organises reinforcements (1918), 276; overtures from Prince Max, 282; arrives at Paris, 286; at Peace Conference, 290; League of Nations scheme, 298, 299; return from America of, 303; contrast, 355

Ypres, 199, 252

Zeppelin, Count, 153

TRANSCRIBER NOTES

Misspelled words and printer errors have been corrected. Where multiple spellings occur, majority use has been employed.

Punctuation has been maintained except where obvious printer errors occur.

Some illustrations were moved to facilitate page layout.