Part 9

But, to this, I answer, that this new establishment would not encrease the number of our capital settlements in India: on the contrary, it would diminish it, from four to three: for it would suppress, in the first place, Bombay; which is in every respect a truly useless settlement; and would therefore be exchanged for this new settlement; which would serve to connect the whole strength of this dominion; as well as to promote a variety of other very important purposes. In the second place, Bencolen would be reduced to the degree of a subordinate, immediately under the direction of the resident at this new settlement; and completely secure under its protection.

As to the drain of native strength, this establishment would, instead of adding, considerably decrease it: for the garrison, together with the artillery, &c. of Bombay, would be transported thither; as likewise would the better part of the garrison at Bencolen: and these two garrisons, being placed there, would form an army of observation, for all our valuable possessions, as hath been described; consequently the territorial governments would not demand that degree of force, which is requisite at present, when each stands on its own bottom.

And with regard to the expence of treasure, I shall only observe that, it is most unaccountably absurd in Britain to send out to India, a squadron of 17 ships of the line, besides frigates, (as she did in last war,) for the protection of her dominion and commerce in that country; which squadrons become evidently unprofitable to that purpose, through the circumstance of wanting a properly situated naval port; when less than a single year’s charge, of such squadron, would suffice to completely fit up a naval port, so situated as that, from thence, her naval force would completely effect its intended purpose. For I affirm, that the port which I propose would be completely fitted up, in every respect, as a naval port, for less expence than one year’s charge of such squadron; seeing that I do not propose docks, but platforms for careening, as at Batavia; and these are prepared, in infinitely less time, and at much less charge than docks; whilst they are far more convenient and expeditious for repairing large ships, than these docks at Bombay. And, as to the fortification immediately requisite, it would be but little expensive, and would demand but little time to rear it: because it would be perfectly accessible to the ships; and so, whilst it protected them, would be protected by them.

Moreover no part of the treasure, expended on originally fitting this naval port, would come immediately out of Britain’s proper treasury; for the whole would be defrayed by the dependent dominion in India. And this new establishment would, in a very little time, not only support its own charge, but would richly reimburse Britain for her original cost. Seeing it would, in the first place, as a colony or settlement, yield her immediate treasure, together with sundry commodities peculiar to itself; and, in a little time, it would, under proper conduct, produce rich manufactures. In the second place, it would, as an Emporium, (for which purpose it is perfectly adapted by its situation,) greatly improve the commerce of Britain in India: and as a centrical magazine or warehouse, for the commodities of China as well as India, it would reduce the term of the Company’s voyages to one year; and, thereby, reducing the expence of her carriage nearly one third, it would enable her to sell cheaper; and consequently advance her commerce in Europe. Likewise the Company’s ships rendezvousing and departing from this port for Europe, under proper convoy, this would secure her trade from that imminent danger to which it is exposed, from her ships rendezvousing singly, at that button of an island, St. Helena: a circumstance that may, in the very first year of a French war, completely ruin this Company; as that enemy is now perfectly acquainted with her route. Now Bombay is perfectly useless to all these, and indeed to every other purpose; as can be readily demonstrated: and the whole benefit derived from it, as a colony or settlement, in the year, doth not suffice to defray one month’s expence.

But this new establishment, being once fitted up as a naval port, from whence the squadrons of Britain can, in either monsoon, command all her valuable possessions; this same establishment would, at same time, completely suit for the residence of that supreme intermediately superintending power. For this port is situated, at such a distance from all the territorial governments, as would suffice to effectually prevent the controuling power, from interfering in the immediate execution of government. And, having said that it is perfectly well situated for a naval port, it follows that the communication, betwixt it and all the parts of the British dominion in India, must be speedy and easy, in either monsoon: and consequently that, from this residence, this supreme power can effectually superintend, enforce, and controul the measures of political, as well as of military, government, in this whole dominion. And, being the center of naval defence, it must be the only proper center of land defence: seeing the squadron will be ever at hand, to transport its land force, to any part of this dominion, that may be in danger.

And thus have I accomplished that which I proposed: having planned the design of an intermediate power which, in such a situation as hath been described, would establish a completely regular system of government, civil as well as military, in the whole present or future dominion of Britain in India: nay which would, in the hands of national government, render the task of governing this Indian dominion, as facil and easy, as it is to govern the small Isle of Man. And, the seat of its residence being at same time the center of naval and land defence, it would completely connect the, otherwise, divided strength of the several governments: and would establish the general defence, upon a footing so secure, that no enemy, either European or native, would dare to attack British dominion in India. It likewise appears that the drain of native strength, requisite to maintain this whole dominion, would but little exceed that which Britain expends on maintaining the two barren fortresses, of Gibraltar and St. Philips’s. Whilst no part of the pecuniary charge, of either establishing or afterwards supporting this system of government, nor yet of the land and even naval defence, would come out of the treasury of Britain; but would all be defrayed by the dependent dominion.

I have farther demonstrated the moral impossibility of governing and maintaining this Indian dominion, by means of the Company; upon any other terms, than these, of constituting her sovereign at home as well as abroad; and of conferring, upon her Directors, the sovereign execution of government in Britain, as well as in that dependent dominion.

And I have endeavoured to rouze and awake the nation, to some sense of, and regard to, the interest she holds in this Indian dominion; by a slight descriptive sketch of the nature, and degree, of benefit received by her from it, for some years past. And, as the sensation received from fact and experience makes ever a stronger impression on the mind, than that which is conveyed by speculative argument, I shall here again apply to the experience of the public, on this topic; which cannot be too much inculcated, nor presented in too many different points of view; at this truly critical juncture, when nothing less than the most speedy application, of the most vigorous measures, can prevent the total loss, of this most important object to Britain; either through the final ruin of the countries themselves; or, otherwise, by the assault of enemies.

Britain feels a general failure of credit, not only in the East India Company, but in individuals: and this failure of credit she can ascribe to no other cause, than to some extraordinary defect of numerical circulation, or a deficiency of numerical specie, sufficient to support the wonted credit of paper. How happens this want of numerical specie to be so severely felt, all of a sudden; or from whence should such defect arise? Assuredly from a decrease of her wonted influx of numerical specie; whilst her drain of that specie continues to be at least the same as formerly. But what channel or source, of Britain’s influx, hath been dried up so suddenly, as to create this surprizing failure of numerical circulation? We have shown it to originate in Indian dominion; which being, through misgovernment, reduced to a ruinous state, the consequent wonderful decrease of revenue, hath obliged the Company, to absorb and dry up that channel of Indian private fortunes; which, till within these two years, used to convey into Britain, by foreign Company’s bills, &c. at least 700,000 l. _per annum_, in numerical specie, or what is equivalent. And as Britain hath, during the two years that this channel was dried up, been continuing that drain, which she could barely support, when aided by that private fortune influx, it is plain that, within these two years, she must have diminished the standing stock of her numerical circulation, at least, 1,400,000 l. And one year, more of only an equally decreased degree of influx, will diminish her circulating stock 2,100,000 l. and so on. But a total deprivation of the influx received, for some years past, from Indian dominion, will, annually, double the diminution of circulating stock.

And, from this view, the nation may draw the following just inferences: first, the mighty value and importance, of this Indian dominion, to Britain; in point of financial aid; as well as in other weighty respects. Second, the mighty alteration of circumstances, in these Indian countries, since the time they became subjected to the dominion of the Company; as also, the present ruinous state of that dominion. And from these two inferences she may deduce, that conclusion which hath been just mentioned, that nothing less than the most speedy application of the most vigorous and effectual measures, can possibly save those countries from final ruin; and Britain from consequent bankruptcy, poverty, loss of credit, of commerce, navigation, naval power, &c.

I have, in this hasty production, sketched out the nature of the necessary measures; but the application of these measures depends entirely upon the nation’s exerting her own attention. I am far from meaning to work upon the passions, I apply only to the reason and understanding of men; for had not respect to decorum, and to the dignity of government, restrained me, I might, on this subject, have thrown out many things, that must have excited discontent and indignation. Nevertheless the importance and urgency of the case obliges me to add, (and, without this, all I have said can avail nothing,) that unless the nation shall exert herself most vigorously in this her own dearest concern, she must not look for any such effectual measures, as will suffice to prevent these disasters.

For the nation must consider, that her present administration consists of the very men who transacted, and (by their truly reverberating eccho) confirmed, to the Company, the second[2] grant of the Dewanny: knowing that this Dewanny was nothing other than the sovereignty of a mighty dominion, dependent upon the Crown, and Nation, of Britain: and, consequently that, by subjecting the numerous inhabitants of those countries to the dominion of a few merchants, incapable of administring any sort of government, they were consigning over to tyranny and anarchy, intolerable oppression and ruin, many millions of men, who were, to all intents and purposes, subjects of Britain. And they are the men who, during the four years that elapsed since that grant, have furnished the force to support this tyranny and anarchy: and, in spite of——enacting a farce, wherein the Directors were compelled to perform the same part in Europe, that the native Nabobs have exhibited in India. It cannot, therefore, be expected that they will, willingly, change their plan of conduct: seeing that, besides their former motives, they have the additional one of obstinacy; or shame of standing self-condemned, for past mismanagement, should they now alter their measures. It is rather to be supposed that they will continue the cloke of the Company; together with the Directorial farce: and that, to support the broken credit of the Company, (broken by collusive management,) they will, through eccho, grant her a power, to force her paper upon the public, for its money. As also that, under the pretext of honouring the nation with some share in the charge of this sovereignty, (under the Company, but no share in the profits,) they will gradually thrust her shoulders under that whole load, which, as the Company must manage it, will soon become intolerable. And, by the aid of these fresh reinforcements, they will juggle it and bungle it, and bungle it and juggle it on, for one, or possibly two, years longer: and then Nation and Company will both tumble together, into the pit of bankruptcy, perdition, and despair.

But shall the nation, with eyes open, suffer the pilot to crowd stemlings on the rocks, which have already grazed the ship’s bottom? No, we must about ship, and call another hand to the helm. Matters, it is to be hoped, are not yet past remedy; the channel is obvious; if the nation will but put to her hand. His Majesty can have no real interest but what is common with that of his people: and, however the views of the Crown may, in some cases, differ a little from these of the people; in this particular case they must both exactly concur. He will, here, hearken to the voice of his people: and a little popular heat will force into administration something of that patriotic ambition, fire, spirit, and enterprize, which alone can save this nation from dreadful impending misfortunes.

But if the nation, sunk in the bed of slavish sloth, inebriated with the transforming Circean cap, enervated and emasculated by the lewd embraces of sensual pleasure, shall slight and disregard her own dearest concerns: like the prodigal debauchee, who chides from him the faithful friend that attempts recalling him to sober reflection; and implicitly confides in the management of a steward, who hath already wasted the better part of his fair patrimony: then let the nation, some two or three years hence, recollect, that she was advised of her danger, by a hasty production, issued about the middle of January, 1773: though not thought of, until that most disinterested of all possible ministers had, by way of remedying all evils, dispatched _his Secret Committee_ to the India House: there to inspect the Company’s private œconomy: a thing, with which neither law, justice, government, nor nation hath any thing to do; and which, unless in cases of bankruptcy, is sacred to the meanest individual. As if, from the Company’s books of accounts, it was possible to discover the cause of abuse in the government of those Indian dominions: or, as if schemes of saving to the Company, one shilling _per_ ton, freight of her cargoes: or, three pence _per_ pound, in warehouse room, would retrieve the, almost ruined, Interest of Britain in India.

Footnote 2:

We must make a wide difference betwixt the first and second grants of this Dewanny, (as it is termed.) The first grant was made for only two years, at a time when the then ministry were in a great measure unacquainted with the nature of the thing which they granted: having been deceived by base art: nor did this ministry, in the course of their administration, exert any manner of ministerial influence over the Directors. But far different were the lights, as well as the conduct of that ministry which, on the expiration of the first two years, renewed that grant for the long term of five years.

FINIS.

Transcriber’s Notes:

Missing or obscured punctuation was corrected.

Typographical errors were silently corrected.

Spelling and hyphenation were made consistent when a predominant form was found in this book; otherwise it was not changed.