Part 1

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THE PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH INTEREST IN INDIA

Transcriber’s Note:

This version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects. Italics are delimited with the ‘_’ character as _italic_.

Footnotes have been moved to follow the chapters in which they are referenced.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH INTEREST IN INDIA:

WITH A PLAN FOR ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN THAT COUNTRY.

LONDON: Printed for J. ALMON, opposite Burlington House, in Piccadilly.

MDCCLXXIII.

[Price Three Shillings.]

CONTENTS.

I. The present State of the British Interest in 5 India, &c.

II. The Nature and Effects of the Company’s 17 Government in Bengal

III. The true Causes of Evil and Abuse in the 46 Government of Bengal, and the Means to remedy them

IV. A Plan, for establishing a regular System of 106 political Government in India

V. A Plan, for establishing a regular System of 156 military Government, and of secure Defence, in India

Chapter I

No nation nor state ever acquired an accession of dominion so truly valuable and beneficial, as are the acquisitions lately made by Britain in India. But the particular situation of her circumstances at the time when these acquisitions fell into her hands, enhanced the real and intrinsic value of them to Britain. Oppressed by a grievous debt, the annual interest of which, exceeding four millions and a half sterling, was levied by taxes, which raised the price of each manufacture, her commerce labouring under such disadvantages was daily sinking into decay; whilst a considerable part of this annual interest being paid to foreigners, created such a drain of specie, as the balance of her trade could not supply; so that, in proportion as her expence increased, the means of defraying it diminished; and she was every year approaching towards a state of national poverty and bankruptcy.

In such circumstances did Britain acquire the sovereign dominion of Bengal, and of other rich manufacturing and trading countries in India; which, at the time they fell to her, were capable of not only defraying every charge of their own government and defence, but over and above that, of yielding annually to the sovereign a sum equal to 1,300,000 l. sterling, as can be readily demonstrated. Nor do we include in this sum the benefit which Britain had been accustomed to receive, in her commercial capacity, by her trade with those countries: the sum here specified would have arisen purely in consequence of dominion: and, whether transmitted from those countries in merchandize or in money, would at last have arrived at the public treasury in specie: and would thus have served to alleviate the burden of those taxes, that are pressing every branch of her domestic commerce to ruin. And, if Britain had bestowed the smallest attention on the political government of those countries, she might have continued to draw from them the abovementioned tribute sum _in perpetuum_, without any danger of draining or impoverishing them: nay it is certain, that under a just, equitable and well ordered government, their commerce and agriculture might have been extended to a degree, that would have enabled them to afford a still larger annual tribute to the sovereign. The possession of this Indian dominion is likewise so particularly secured from domestic and foreign danger, by the extraordinary submissive disposition of the natives, the singularly defensible situation of the country, and the naval superiority of Britain, that, by a very trifling expence of men, and no pecuniary charge, she might have maintained it against all enemies. So that Britain might have derived from this dependent dominion resources sufficient to relieve her from all her difficulties and distresses.

This is what Britain might have done: and this was not simply possible, it was easy of execution. But if we enquire what Britain hath done, we shall find that, instead of applying these resources by a proper care and attention to the purpose, for which it would seem the all-wise dispensation of Providence had at this critical conjuncture bestowed them upon her, she hath indolently and desperately thrown them from her, and left them to the will of blind chance. For surely it may with propriety be said, that the government of Britain consigned all these resources to the guidance of blind chance, or rather to certain destruction, when it scrupulously withheld its own care, and implicitly confided the sovereign charge of governing and defending this foreign dominion to a Company of Merchants, so evidently unequal to such a charge, that, instead of being surprized that these countries should now at last be impoverished and ruined, we have reason to be astonished, that they have supported, for such a length of time, the complicated evils of tyranny and anarchy.

The consequences of committing this sovereign charge to the Company have been long foreseen, and likewise foretold, by some who were acquainted with the nature of their government: but the power and influence of those who were sharing amongst them the plunder of those wretched countries, blasted the credit of their representations: until at last, the effects being felt at home, it hath become impossible to totally suppress the truth. Nay even now, that these men are forced to partly acknowledge the ruinous situation of this foreign dominion, yet have they still the assurance to mislead the public judgment, by representing the Company as the only party concerned in the consequence: though it is certain, that this Indian concern, which hath been leased or farmed out by Government to the Company, is of the very highest importance to the public interest, as having been for many years the principal support of national opulence and credit, as well as of commerce and revenue. For, in the article of opulence, the private fortunes acquired in those countries by the servants of the Company, ever since the time that their power prevailed over the native government, that is ever since 1757, hath created an annual influx of specie to Britain of about 700,000 l. and the dedomagement paid to Government by the Company, since the assumption of the dewanny in 1765, is a farther influx of 400,000 l. the drawback on teas is reckoned about 200,000 l. and the Company hath increased her dividend since the last mentioned period 200,000 l. though only one half of this last sum may be reckoned to remain in the country, the other half being paid to foreign proprietors. These four sums, making together 1,400,000 l. have been yearly drawn from India in consequence of dominion: and, whether sent from thence in merchandize, in bills, or in specie, have produced so much money to Britain: and notwithstanding the private fortunes have been acquired by means that have exhausted these sources of wealth, that might otherwise have flowed perpetually into Britain; and the dedomagement may be considered as a base composition, received for alienating the sovereign rights of the British crown and nation, and for furnishing a force to support the most detestable tyranny of a few individuals over fifteen millions of men, who are to all intents and purposes British subjects; yet did the opportune importation of so much wealth, serve to support the credit of the nation under the grievous accumulation of debt contracted in the last war; and to prevent her feeling the drain of specie made by her foreign creditors, which otherwise would by this time have completely exhausted her. By her commerce with those countries, Britain hath exported yearly 5 or 600,000 l. worth of her own manufactures and merchandize, and for these she received the commodities of India; which commodities, being re-exported, formed the most essential article of her traffic with Africa, on which her West India colonies do entirely depend; they are likewise the most valuable article of her trade with America. And the duties levied by Government, on such part of these Indian commodities as is expended at home, create a very considerable, and by far the most equitable and convenient branch of revenue.

But the value and importance of this Indian concern will appear in a still stronger light, if we shall look forward to the consequences that must naturally and unavoidably ensue to the public interest from the loss of it. The first and most immediate of these consequences will be national bankruptcy; or, which is the same thing, a stop to the payment of interest on the national debt; for a deprivation of that annual influx of specie from India will quickly produce national poverty; and an incapacity of paying in specie the interest of the foreign creditors. But the loss of our Indian commerce will operate this effect still more speedily; for, on the supposition that the nation shall be deprived of this branch of commerce, it must necessarily follow, that Government will lose that branch of revenue which arises from the home consumption of Indian commodities; and it is plain, that Government cannot then continue to pay the usual expence, without making good this deficiency of revenue by additional taxes on land, and the necessaries of life: but as this additional load, falling on our little remaining commerce, would by one year’s experience be found insupportable, Government would be forced to retrench its expence, in that only article that can be dispensed with, the payment of interest on the national debt; and when this happens, what advantage will the public creditor hold above the India proprietor? The only difference will be, that the latter will have felt his loss a little earlier than the former. But national bankruptcy, though it may be the first, is not the only, nor even the greatest, public damage, accruing from a deprivation of this Indian concern: loss of future credit, of trade and navigation, and consequently of naval power and defence, will soon follow; and, in this general calamity, everyone individual of the community will come in for his share, in proportion to his rank or situation.

Such are the consequences that must ensue to the public interest from a deprivation of the benefit hitherto derived from this Indian concern: and if the nation is to suffer so grievously by the loss of this object, can she allow herself to be persuaded, that she hath no interest in its preservation. Now this object stands in danger of being lost to the nation by two different causes; the first being, the neglect or incapacity of the Company to maintain and defend it from the assault of enemies: and the other danger arises from the oppression and misconduct of this Company’s political government; tending to despoil those countries of their circulating specie, their arts, manufactures, commerce, and inhabitants, which were the only means that enabled them to afford this benefit to Britain. The first of these dangers is scarcely dreamt of, and yet it is perhaps immediately imminent; at present however we are treating of the danger to be apprehended from the political cause.

How far the interest of this foreign dominion hath been injured by the Company’s political misgovernment; or how near it may be reduced to a state of utter inability to afford any farther benefit to Britain, is but little known by the public. For though people have heard in the gross, that affairs in those countries are rather in a bad situation, yet do not they either understand or believe it to be so very bad as it really is; or rather they do not comprehend how it should be so bad; as not being acquainted with the full power of the cause that hath produced the evil; and every one will form his notion of effects that he neither feels nor sees, from his knowledge or opinion of the nature and power of the causes that produced them. In the case before us, people have been taught to consider the oppression and extortion of its government, (of which certain instances are quoted) as the sole cause of evil to Bengal: of consequence it is supposed that Bengal hath suffered no farther damage from its government, than what may have been caused by some private acts of extortion, exercised by the few persons vested with the powers of governing: and, besides that the authenticity of these acts is denied or disputed, and men who are to judge only from report are apt to make allowance for the prejudice or passion of the accuser who brings a charge against individuals; still if all these acts of oppression that have been narrated should be fully credited; nay, if the hearer should suppose still more than is represented, yet cannot he conceive or allow himself to believe that such acts of extortion, exercised by a small number of individuals, could suffice to reduce the lately rich commercial kingdom of Bengal to such a deplorable state of misery, poverty, and distress: the cause assigned will appear too trivial for the effect; and of course the effect, at least the degree of it, will be discredited.

But he who means to acquire a just notion of the present state of those countries, and the extent of damage they have sustained from their present Government, must fully inform himself of the true nature and condition of that Government, and the manner of its operation on the general interest of the people governed; he must learn, not only that which it hath done, but likewise that which it hath not done; for the interest of a community may suffer far more detriment from the nonaction, than from the oppression, of its government. To the end, therefore, that every one may be enabled to form a proper judgment on these matters, we mean to present a general view of the nature, and effects, of the Company’s Government in Bengal.

THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE COMPANY’S GOVERNMENT IN BENGAL.

The English East India company is, under the title of Dewan, the real and actual sovereign of Bengal, Behar, and Orixa: a dominion equal to almost any one state in Europe, in respect of either extent and fertility of country, or numbers of ingenious and industrious subjects; and exceeding most of them in the internal materials of commerce, or resources of wealth. The Company executes the government of this dominion by a deputation, consisting of a Governor and Council; who reside at Calcutta, the Company’s original presidency, or chief factory in Bengal. And the Directors, who, as possessing the executive authority of the Company, may be termed the supreme sovereigns of this Indian dominion, have preserved to themselves the sole power of immediately ordering, directing and controuling the government; for this deputed government communicates its purposes, receives its orders, and accounts for its conduct to none but the Directors.

But it is evident, that the distance of situation must render the immediate controul of the Directors perfectly impotent, ineffectual, and nugatory; for it would be absurd to suppose, that the government of Bengal should defer the execution of any one purpose until it shall have communicated with, and received the opinion of the Directors, which cannot be effected in the space of a whole year; consequently the directors cannot interfere in the direction, or ordering of this government, farther than in some few cases of the most general or invariable nature: but the execution of even these general orders depends upon the will and discretion of the deputed government; seeing the Directors cannot, at that distance, enforce it themselves: and the same cause puts it out of their power to prevent or restrain abuse; so that they hold neither positive nor negative authority in the immediate execution of this government. And the condition or situation of these directorial sovereigns at home, renders their retrospective controul equally impotent and ineffectual; for they have no power in themselves to inflict other punishment on their deputies, for the most audacious disobedience, or for maladministration, than dismission from their service; and this becomes no punishment, because the delinquents are previously prepared for it, being ready to set out of their own accord with a princely fortune for the mother country; where they set the authority of the Directors at defiance; for there these sovereigns of India are themselves subjects, and cannot call their quondam ministers to account, except in an ordinary court of justice; and the difficulty of obtaining evidence requisite to convict in these courts; the dread of bringing to light, in the course of a legal process, some abstruse mysteries of government; and the apprehension of danger arising to the interest of the present direction from a powerful combination at the next election, will ever deter the Directors from seriously prosecuting a lawsuit against their deputies, even in cases of peculation from the sovereign; but if it respects only the interest of the subject, they will be more apt to palliate and defend the offence. We must therefore perceive, that this deputed government acts perfectly independent of either the immediate controul, or future awe of the sovereign: whilst the sovereign is compelled to blindly support, with its whole power, the authority of this government; and, without choice, to enforce all its measures; seeing that to oppose the will of the deputy, is opposing the authority of the sovereign.

And, as to the native subjects, the power of this deputed government over them is perfectly absolute and complete. For the inhabitants of those countries, being disposed by nature or climate to passive obedience, and by long custom habituated to despotic authority, and being farther impressed with a particular awe of Europeans, from a notion of their natural superiority, implicitly submit to the will of their present government, without once daring to either examine its right, dispute its authority, or question its conduct. The subject therefore holds not the smallest voice in the administration of government; the jurisdiction, the police, the finances, the military government and defence, are all incontroulably directed by the Company’s deputation: and the entire interests of those countries, the lives and property of the inhabitants, are subjected to its discretion, and depend on its will.

So that this deputation of the Company executes the government of Bengal with a power perfectly unlimited by any exterior controul; and if we consider that it is at the same time foreign to the country governed, mutable, and of very short duration, we shall find that it is equally unrestrained by any internal check. It is therefore the most unlimited government on earth; or rather it is the only government that can, with propriety, be termed arbitrary and despotic.

For all other deputed governments are sufficiently restrained by the authority of the sovereign; and we have no idea of despotism, except in governments that are supreme or sovereign. But the idea of actual despotism in a supreme government is merely imaginary; seeing that, in one and all of these governments, the power of governing is conditional, limited by rule, and subjected to controul both external and internal. For it is evident, that, in all supreme governments, the power of governing, and the means that support this power, must needs be derived from the people governed; and therefore cannot exist in despight of their consent; and though, in some of these governments, the condition, upon which this power and these means are granted, is not specially expressed, yet is it perfectly understood, and invariably enforced in all of them; inasmuch as there are examples in each, of sovereigns who have suffered the utmost punishment, for attempting to transgress the limits of this condition; nay, there is scarce one instance where the prince, thus transgressing, escaped the resentment of the people; and examples of this nature are most frequent in these governments that are falsely termed despotic. These examples must therefore convince all sovereigns, that there is a power in the people, superior to, and capable of controuling them; and the sense of this must ever prove an effectual external controul on the conduct of a supreme government. But self-interest, that _primum_ and _perpetuum mobile_ of human action, which we may term an internal check, operates still more forcibly, constantly, and immediately on the will of a supreme government; not simply restraining it from doing or permitting injury, but impelling it to promote the good of the people governed. For a government that is sovereign, and perpetual (or _durante vita_ and hereditary) cannot possibly separate its own private interest from that of the community which it governs; being indeed itself a part of that community: and this is so evident, that no prince ever attempted to advance a distinct interest of his own, at the expence of the general weal, who was not a fool, before he became a tyrant. But a wise sovereign considers his people as the channel through which alone he can receive substantial good or evil; and, acting upon this principle, he will, however absolute and disposed by nature to tyranny, abstain from injuring the general interest, because he is sensible that such injury will recoil upon himself; and he will exert himself to promote the prosperity of his people, as the only means of advancing his own power, grandeur, or wealth. So that a sovereign prince, who understands his own real interest, though otherwise void of virtue, will ever study to govern well; nay, the private vices of such a prince do often operate public good; a striking instance of which we meet with in our Henry the Seventh; whose extreme and sordid avarice was the source of English commerce and wealth; and his mean self-love, and jealousy of power, established universal liberty.

But the nature of this Bengal government differs, in every circumstance, from that of a supreme government; being deputed, foreign, mutable, and temporary, it is no way interested in the lasting prosperity of the community which it governs; on the contrary, this government holds an interest which is not only distinct from, but diametrically opposite to that of the subject. For these Governors return to Europe immediately on the expiration of their office, which seldom dures above three years, often less; therefore their sole aim is to amass all the wealth they can, during the short term of their power, in order to transport it along with their persons to their own country. But the wealth which a government amasses, must needs be extorted from the people governed; consequently self-interest leads this government to pillage and plunder the subject: and we have seen that it is not restrained, by any external controul, from advancing its own distinct interest at the expence of the community which it governs, seeing it is perfectly exempted from all awe of either the sovereign or the subject; and it cannot be restrained by any internal check, because it holds no concern in the lasting welfare of the people.