Chapter 2

We come now to the first Consequence, which we draw, from what we have Establish'd, and shall endeavour to prove, that our Laws, and what pleases, can never be opposite, since the Rules were made only for what pleases, and tend only to show the way you must walk in, to do so. By this we shall destroy the false Maxim, That, _all that pleases is good_, and assert that we ought on the contrary to say, That, _all that is good pleases, or ought to please_. For the goodness of any Work whatsoever, does not proceed from this, that it gives us pleasure, but the pleasure that we have proceeds from its goodness, unless our deluded Eyes and corrupt Imaginations mislead us, for that which causes our mistakes, is not, where is, but what is not.

If the Rules, and what pleased, were things opposite, you would never arrive at the giving pleasure, but by meer chance, which is absurd: There must for that reason be a certain way, which leads thither, and that way is the Rule which we ought to learn; but what is that Rule? 'Tis a Precept, which being drawn from the _Pleasant_ and _Profitable_, leads us to their source. Now what is the _Pleasant_ and _Profitable_? 'Tis that which pleases naturally, in all Arts 'tis this we consult, 'tis the most sure and perfect Model we can Imitate; in it we find perfect Unity and Order, for it self is Order, or to speak more properly, the effect of Order, and the Rule which conducts us thither; there is but one way to find Order, but a great many to fall into Confusion.

There would be nothing bad in the World, if all that pleas'd were good; for there is nothing so ridiculous, but what will have its Admirers. You may say indeed, 'tis no truer, that what is good pleases, because we see ev'ry day Disputes about the Good and Pleasant, that the same Thing pleases some, and displeases others; nay, it pleases and displeases the very same Persons at different times: from whence then proceeds this difference? It comes either from an absolute Ignorance of the Rule, or that the Passions alter it. Rightly to clear this Truth, I believe I may lay down this Maxim, that all sensible Objects are of two sorts; some may be judged of, by Sense independantly from Reason. I can Sense that Impression which the animal Spirits make on the Soul, others can't be judged of but by Reason exercised in Science, Things simply agreeable, or disagreeable, are of the first Sort, all the World may judge alike of these, for example the most Ignorant in Musick, perceives very well, when a Player on the Lute strikes one String for another, because he judges by his Sense, and that Sense is the Rule; in such occasions, we may therefore very well say, that all that pleases is good, because that which is Good doth please, or that which is Evil never fails to displease; for neither the Passions, nor Ignorance dull the Senses, on the contrary they sharpen them. 'Tis not so in Things which spring from Reason; Passion and Ignorance act very strongly on it, and oftentimes choak it, this is the Reason, why we ordinarily judge so ill, and differently concerning those Things, of which, that is the Rule and the Cause. Why, what is Bad often pleases, and that which is Good doth not always so, 'tis not the fault of the Object, 'tis the fault of him who judges; but what is Good will infallibly please those who can judge, and that's sufficient. By this we may see, that a Play, that shall bring those Things which are to be judg'd of by Reason, within the Rules, as also what is to be judg'd of by the Sense, shall never fail to please, for it will please both the Learned, and Ignorant: Now this Conformity of suffrages is the most sure,[19] or according to _Aristotle_ the only Mark of the Good, and Pleasant, as he proves in the following part of his Discourse. Now these Suffrages are not obtained, but by the observation of the Rules, and consequently, these Rules are the only Cause of the Good, and Pleasant, whether they are follow'd Methodically and with Design, or by Hazard only; for 'tis certain, there are many Persons who are entirely Ignorant of these Rules, and yet don't fail to succeed in several Affairs: This is far from destroying the Rules, and serves to shew their Beauty, and proves how far they are conformable to Nature, since those often follow them, who know nothing of 'em. In the Remarks you shall find many Examples of the vast difference, the observance or neglect of the Rules make in the same Subject, and by that be throughly convinc'd that they are the two only Causes of Good, or Bad Works, and that there can never be any occasion, where the perfect Harmony which is between the Rules, and what pleases, shou'd be broken.

'Tis true to come to the last Consequence, that Poetry is an Art, invented for the Instruction of Mankind, and consequently must be profitable: 'Tis a general Truth that ev'ry Art is a good Thing, because there is none whose End is not Good: But, as it is not less true, that Men ordinarily abuse the best Things, that which was design'd for an wholsome Remedy, may in time become a very dangerous Poison. I declare then that I don't speak of corrupted _Tragedy_, for 'tis not in vitious and depraved Works, that we must look for Reason, and the intent of Nature, but in those which are sound and perfect; I speak of Ancient _Tragedy_, that which is conform to _Aristotle's_ Rules, and I dare say, 'tis the most profitable, and necessary of all Diversions.

If 'twas possible to oblige Men to follow the Precepts of the Gospel, nothing could be more happy, they would find there true Peace, solid Pleasure, and a Remedy for all their Infirmities, and would look on _Tragedy_ as useless and below them. How could they do otherwise than have this opinion? since those _Pagans_ who apply'd themselves to the Study of Wisdome, consider'd it with the same Genius. They themselves own, that could the People be always brought up in the solid Truths of Philosophy, the Philosophers need have no recourse to Fables, to give their Instructions: But as so much Corruption was inconsistent with such Wisdom, they were forc'd to seek for a Remedy to the Disorders of their Pleasures; they then invented _Tragedy_, and inspir'd them with it, not as the best Employment Men could take up, but as a means, which was able to correct the excess, into which they plung'd themselves at their Feasts, and to render those amusements profitable, which Custom and their Infirmities had made necessary, and their Corruption very dangerous.

Men are the same now, they were then, they have the same Passions, and run with the same Eagerness after Pleasures. To endeavour to reclaim them from that State, by the severity of Precepts, is attempting to put a Bridle on an unruly Horse in the middle of his carrier, in the mean while, there is no Medium, they run into the most criminal excess, unless you afford them regular and sober Pleasures. 'Tis a great Happiness that their remaining Reason inclines them to love Diversions, where there is Order, and Shows, where Truth is to be found, and I am perswaded, that Charity obliges us, to take advantage of this, and not to allow too much time for Debauches, which would extinguish that Spark of Reason, which yet shines in them. Those People are distemper'd, and _Tragedy_ is all the Remedy they are capable of receiving any advantage from; for it is the only Recreation in which they can find the agreeable and Profitable.

_Tragedy_ does not only represent the Punishments, which voluntary Crimes always draw on their Authors, these are too common, and well known Truths, and leave too much liberty to our Passions; this is the meanest sort of _Tragedy_: But it sets forth the misfortunes which even in voluntary Crimes, and those committed by Imprudence, draw on such as we are, and this is perfect _Tragedy_. It instructs us to stand on our guard, to refine and moderate our Passions, which alone occasion'd the loss of those unfortunate ones. Thus the aspiring may learn to give bounds to his Ambition; the Prophane to fear God; the Malicious to forget his Wrongs; the Passionate to restrain his Anger; the Tyrant to forsake his Violence and Injustice, _&c._ Those idle and infirm Men, who are not able to bear the Yoak of Religion, and have need of a grosser sort of Instruction, which falls under the Senses, can never have more profitable amusements; 'twere to be wish'd, that they would renounce all other Pleasures, and love this only. If any shall now condemn _Tragedy_, he must also condemn the use of Fables, which the most Holy Men have employ'd, and God himself has vouchsaf't to make use of: For _Tragedy_ is only a Fable, and was invented as a Fable, to form the Manners, by Instructions, disguis'd under the Allegory of an Action. He must also condemn History; for History is much less Grave and Moral than Fable, insomuch as 'tis particular, when a Fable is more general, and universal, and by consequence more profitable.

We may say too, that the only Aim of true Politicks, is to procure to the People Virtue, Peace and Pleasure, this Design cannot be contrary to Religion, because we chuse none of those Pleasures which destroy Virtue, or Peace. _Tragedy_ is far from it, and endeavours only their preservation; for 'tis the only Pleasure, which disposes Men to endure their Passions, to a perfect Mediocrity, which contributes more to the maintaining of Peace, and acquisition of Virtue, than any thing else; I also believe that from this Truth, we might draw a sure Rule to judge of those Pleasures which might be permitted, and those which ought to be forbidden.

You may say, _Tragedy_ is dangerous, by reason of the abuses which creep into it. Every Thing is dangerous, and may be condemn'd at this rate, for there is nothing so excellent where Abuses may not be committed, and of which a bad, or good use may not be made. We must remember this Truth, that all Arts and Sciences, by the Ignorance and Corruption of Men, ordinarily produce false Arts, and false Sciences; but these false Arts and false Sciences, are more opposite to what they Counterfeit than any thing besides; for there is nothing more opposite to what is good, than what is bad in the same Kind. If that which is false, engages us to condemn what is true, it has gain'd its point, that's what it would have, and having thus Triumph'd over Truth, soon puts its self into its place, than which nothing can be more Pernicious.

Since _Tragedy_ has no defect, but what is external, it follows from thence, that 'tis good in its self, and consequently profitable; this cannot be contested, and those who condemn it, condemn, not only the most noble Diversion, but the most capable to raise the Courage, and form the Genius, and the only one, which can refine the Passions, and touch the most vicious and obdurate Souls. I could give many examples; but shall content my self with relating the Story of _Alexander_ of[20] _Pherea_: This barbarous Man, having order'd the _Hecuba_ of _Euripides_ to be Acted before him, found himself so affected, that he went out before the end of the first Act, saying, _That he was asham'd to be seen to weep, at the Misfortunes of_ Hecuba _and_ Polyxena, _when he daily imbrud his Hands in the Blood of his Citizens_; he was affraid that his Heart should be truly mollify'd, that the Spirit of Tyranny would now leave the possession of his Breast, and that he should come a private person out of that Theatre into which he enter'd Master. The Actor who so sensibly touch'd him, difficultly escaped with his Life, but was secur'd by some remains of that pity, which was the cause of his Crime.

A very grave Historian, makes reflection much to this purpose, and which seems to me no indifferent one in Politicks; in speaking of the People of _Arcadia_, he says, _That their Humanity, sweetness of Temper, respect for Religion, in a word, the Purity of their Manners, and all their Virtues proceeded chiefly from the Love they had to Musick, which by its Melody, corrected those ill Impressions, a thick and unwholesome Air, joyn'd to a hard, and laborious way of living, made on their Bodies and Minds._ He says on the contrary, _That the_ Cynethians _fell into all sorts of Crimes and Impieties, because they despised the wise Institutions of their Ancestors; and neglected this Art, which was so much the more necessary for them, as they liv'd in the coldest and worst place of_ Arcadia: _There was scarcely any City in_ Greece, _where wickedness was so great and frequent as here_. If _Polybius_ speaks thus of Musick, and accuses _Ephorus_, for having spoken a thing unworthy of himself, when he said, _That 'twas invented to deceive Mankind_: what ought we then to say of _Tragedy_, of which Musick is only a small part; and which is as much above it, as a Word is above an inarticulate Sound, which signifies nothing.

This is what, according to my Opinion, may be truly said of _Tragedy_, and the Mean we ought to keep. But to the end this may be justly said, the Parts must conform themselves entirely to the Rules of Ancient _Tragedy_, that is to say, which endeavours rather to Instruct than Please, and regard the Agreeable, as a means only to make the Profitable more taking; they must paint the Disorders of the Passions, and the inevitable Mischiefs which arise from thence. 'Twas for this the _Greek Tragedians_ were so much Honour'd in their own Age, and esteemed in those which follow'd. Their Theatre was a School, where Virtue was generally better Taught, than in the Schools of their Philosophers, and at this very Day, the reading their Pieces will Inspire an Hatred to Vice, and a Love to Virtue. To Imitate them profitably, we should re-establish the _Chorus_, which establishing the _veri-Similitude_ of the _Tragedy_, gives an Opportunity to set forth to the People, those particular Sentiments, you would inspire them with, and to let them know, what is Vicious or Laudable, in the Characters which are Introduc'd. _Mr. Racine_ saw the necessity of this, and cannot be sufficiently praised, for having brought it, into his two last Pieces, which have happily reconcil'd _Tragedy_ to its greatest Enemies. Those who have seen the effects of these _Chorus's_, cannot but be sensible of their Advantage, and by Consequence, must Consent to what I say in my Remarks. After Examples, and Authorities of this Nature, I have no Reason to fear my Arguments. But enough of this Matter, tis time to come to what respects my self, and to give some Account of this Work.

I have endeavour'd to make the Translation as literal as possible, being perswaded, that I could not do better, than to stick close to the Words of a Man, who wrote with wonderful Exactness, and puts in nothing, but what is to the purpose. I have nevertheless taken the Liberty sometimes, to enlarge his Thoughts, for what was understood in his time, by half a Word, would hardly be Intelligible now, unless some Pains was taken to explain it.

A simple Translation of _Aristotle_, would be clear enough, and there would be no need of Commentaries, if we were well Instructed in those Poets, from whom he takes his Rules, but as almost all the World is Ignorant of them, and 'tis necessary to explain by Example, what is Obscure in the Rule. This is what I have endeavour'd to do in my Remarks, which will seem short, if you consider the many large Volumes which have been wrote on this little Treatise.

Of all the _Latin_ Commentators, _Victorius_ seems to me the most Wise, Knowing, and Exact, but his Assistance is not sufficient, to give us an Understanding of Poesie. The _Italian Castelvetro_, has a great deal of Wit, and Knowledge, if we may call that Wit, which is only Fancy, and bestow on much Reading the name of Knowledge. If we recollect all the Qualities of a good Interpreter, we shall have an Idea just contrary to that of _Castelvetro_. He knew neither the Theatre, the Passions, nor the Characters; he understood neither _Aristotle's_ Reasons, nor his Method, and strove rather to contradict, than explain him. On the other hand, he is so Infatuated with the Author's of his own Country, that he forgot how to Criticise well; he talks without Measure, like _Homer's Thersites_, and declares War to all that is fine. Indeed he has some good things, but 'tis not worth while to spend our time in looking after them. The _French_ Art of Poetry by _Mesnardiere_, may pass for a Commentary on some Chapters of _Aristotle_, but that Work is of little value; for besides that Author's being no good Critick, and perpetually deceiv'd, he did not penetrate into the Meaning of the Philosopher. The Practice of the Theatre by the Abbot _D'Aubignac_, is infinitely better, but is rather a Sequel and Supplement, than an Explication of _Aristotle_; on which, a perfect Instruction in the Ancient Rules, will enable you to pass a Judgment. The Treatise of Epick Poem by Father _Bossu_, is above all the Moderns have done in that Kind, and is the best Commentary Extant, on what _Aristotle_ has wrote concerning that sort of Poem; none ever penetrated deeper into the bottom of that Art, and set in a better Light (according to _Aristotle's_ Rules) _Homer's_, and _Virgil's_ Beauties, or the Solidity, and Beauty of _Aristotle's_ Rules, by the marvellous Conduct of those two great Poets. If he had Treated of _Tragedy_, as throughly, as he has done of the _Epopoeia_, he had left almost nothing for me to have done after him; but unfortunately, he omitted the most difficult, which he could have Explain'd much better than my self, had he had spare time. His Work however has done me great Service. I have profited by the good, which others have Wrote, and must confess, that their Faults have been useful to me. But after all, the most excellent Commentators on the Poetick Art, are the Ancient Poems, and as they gave the hint to make Rules, 'tis by them, that these ought to be Explain'd. I hope, I have not followed such good Guides in vain. If I have wander'd, by following them, without a true Understanding, I should be very well pleased to be put in the right way, by any, who would advise me of my Faults, or make them publickly known.

Perhaps some may Reproach me, as Mr. _Corneille_ did all the precedent Commentators. _They have Explain'd_ Aristotle (says that great Man) _as Grammarians, or Philosophers, and not as Poets; because they had more of the Study, and Speculation, than Experience of the Theatre. The Reading them may make us more Learned, but can give us no further Insight, how we may succeed._ This Reproach is founded on this general Maxim, _That every one ought to be believ'd in his own Art._ It seems then, that those should not pretend to explain the Rules of Poesie, who never yet made Poems. The Principle is true, but the Consequence is not so, for before that is drawn, we must see to whom the Art of Poetry, and what it produc'd, does property belong. 'Tis not Poesie it self which is produced, for then it would have been, before it was. 'Tis Philosophy that brought it first into play, and consequently, it belongs to Philosophy, to give, and explain its Rules. This is so true, that _Aristotle_ made not these Rules as a Poet, but as a Philosopher: And if he made them as such, why may they not be explain'd that way too? And as it was not necessary to make _Dramatick_ Poems, to give Rules to that Art, so 'tis no more necessary that they should be made, to Explain those Rules.

I don't know indeed, whether he who has made Pieces for the Theatre, is so proper to explain the Rules of this Art, as he that never did, for 'twould be a Miracle if one was not biass'd by self-Love, when the other is a dis-interested Judge, who has no other Aim, than discovering the Truth, and making it known. Mr. _Corneille_ himself may be an Example of this. All that he would Establish in his new Discourse of _Dramatick Poetry_, is less founded on Nature, than his own proper Interest. It appears by his own Words, that the design he had of defending what he had ventured on the Stage, obliged him to forsake _Aristotle's_ Rules, and to Establish new ones, which should be more favourable to himself; we shall see in the Remarks, whether they can bear the Test. 'Tis therefore no ways necessary to have made Poems, to prescribe Rules for Poesie, and yet much less to explain them. If it was so, I would say there were none, for of all those which have given any, I knew but one that was a Poet; _Horace_ himself never made an Epick Poem or a Tragedy, but to prescribe Rules for Poesie, as also to explain them; it is sufficient to know the Origine, and Scope of the Art Treated of; to have examin'd those Poems, which are the Basis and Foundation, to have made Reflections on what is agreeable, and disagreeable, and rightly to discover the Causes; this is the only necessary Knowledge I have endeavour'd to acquire, and Philosophy alone can lead me thither.

I shall add once more, that if we make a Man more Learned, by explaining the Rules as a Philosopher, 'tis Impossible, but he must attain a surer Knowledge, to succeed in this Art. 'Tis true, we can't give a _Genius_, that's not done by Art, but we can shew the Path a _Genius_ ought to Tread in, and that is the only Design of all Rules.

I have not made the Apology of Commentators, to praise my self, for although I am no Poet, it does not follow that I cannot be a good Philosopher; I leave it to the Publick, and time, to Judge of my Work, for I will neither Court, nor slight their Favours.

I have spoken very freely, in what I have pass'd my Judgment on, and in so doing, Imitated the ancient Criticks, who spared neither _Demosthenes_, nor _Thucidides_, nor _Plato_, nor any that was Great, or Venerable in Antiquity. A flattering Criticism would be a pleasant sort of one, when we should seek to Applaud, and the Respect due to the Name, should check the Censure due to the Fault. I am not so scrupulous, and if any one be offended, I shall Answer him as _Dionysius Halicarnassæus_ answered _Pompey_ the Great, who wrote to him, to complain, that he had tax'd _Plato_ with some Faults. _The Veneration you have for_ Plato _is Just_, (says that excellent Critick,) _but the Blame you lay on me, is not so. When any one writes on a Subject, to shew what is Good or Bad in it, he ought to discover, and mark very exactly all its Virtues, and Vices, for that is a sure way to find out the Truth, which is more valuable than all things else whatever. If I had written against_ Plato _with a Design to Decry his Works, I should be as Impious as_[21] Zoilus, _but on the contrary, I would praise him, and if in doing so I have Improved any of his Defects, I have done nothing worthy of Complaint, and which was not necessary for my Design._ Notwithstanding this, I have put some Bounds to this Liberty, and if I have discovered some Faults, I have conceal'd some others, that seem'd to me not so considerable. I had respect in them, to the Approbation of many Persons of Merit, for I would not run Counter to an almost Universal Consent, which always is of great Weight, and ought at least to oblige us to be cautious. But that I might give to those Persons, an Opportunity of recollecting themselves, I have endeavoured to explain the Rule, in such a manner, that they may perceive those very Faults, if they will Read the Remarks with attention. As for the rest, I had no design to offend any Body; if there are some things which make them uneasie, 'tis impossible to write any Work of this nature, without disgusting some. 'Tis also the Mark of good Criticism, as well as good Philosophy. From hence it proceeded, that _Plato_ was blamed for having taught his Philosophy a long time, without displeasing any one Person; and they pretended by that, to say that either his Doctrine was not good, or his Method defective, since none had by Hearing him been made sensible of that Uneasiness, which People naturally have, when they perceive themselves to be Vitious.