The Preacher's Complete Homiletic Commentary on the Books of the Bible, Volume 13 (of 32) The Preacher's Complete Homiletic Commentary on the Book of the Proverbs

xxii. 13), but men who have not possessed the light of revelation

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have denounced bribery as a crime.

+IV. Its effect.+ It "perverts the ways of justice." Its effect is to bring about that abomination mentioned in verse 15--the justification of the wicked and the condemnation of the just. (See Homiletics on that verse.)

_OUTLINES AND SUGGESTIVE COMMENTS._

An honest man would rather lose his cause, however just, than gain it by such a base thing as a bribe. It must have been a great bondage for Paul to have been confined in a prison, when he loved the pulpit so well, had not his will been sunk in the Will of God; yet he would not offer the least bribe to his covetous judge, who detained him in prison, expecting that money would be offered for his freedom (Acts xxiv. 6).--_Lawson._

Is not the child of God often pressed with this temptation? Does the influence of a gift, the sense of obligation, never repress the bold consistency of godliness? Does no bias of friendship, no plausible advantage, entice into a crooked path?--_Bridges._

There is a gift of thankfulness, there is a gift of reconciliation, there is a gift of goodwill, all these are lawful. Besides these there is a gift of corruption; this is unlawful.--_Muffet._

Bribery is an officious fellow, and a special bidder to the fatal banquet, (Prov. ix. 17, 18). He invites both forward and froward: the forward and yielding by promises of good cheer, _secunda dies,_ that they shall have a fair day of it; the backward, honest man, by terrors and menaces that his cause shall else go westward (indeed, it goes to Westminster!). Yea, with pretence of commiseration and pity, as if the conscience of their right did animate him to their cause. Thus with a show of sanctimony they get a saint's money; but indeed, _argentum fæcundum, argumentum facundum,_--there is no persuasion more pathethical than the purse's. Bribery stands at the stairfoot in the robes of an officer, and helps up injury to the place of audience; thus Judas's bag is drawn with two strings, made of silk and silver, favour and reward. All officers belong not to one court; their conditions alter with their places. There are some that seem so good that they lament the vices, whereupon they yet inflict but pecuniary punishments. Some of them are like the Israelites, with a sword in one hand and a trowel in the other, with the motto of that old emblem, _In utrumque paratus;_ as the one daubs up justice, so the other cuts breaches of division. They mourn for truth and equity, as the sons of Jacob for Joseph, when themselves sold it; they exclaim against penal transgressions. . . . If the party be innocent, let his cause be sentenced for his innocence's sake; if guilty, let not gold buy out his punishment. If the cause be doubtful, the judge shall see it worse when he hath blinded his eyes with bribes. But the will of the giver doth transfer right of the gift to the receiver. No; for it is not a voluntary will. But as a man is willing to give his purse to the thief rather than venture life or limb, so the poor man gives his bribes rather than hazard his cause. Thou sayest the thief has no right to the purse so given; God saith, Nor thou to the bribe. . . . Far be from our souls this wickedness, that the ear which should be open to complaints is thus stopped with the ear-wax of partiality. Alas! poor Truth, that she must now be put to the charges of a golden ear-pick, or she cannot be heard.--_T. Adams._

_MAIN HOMILETICS OF VERSE_ 24 _IN CONNECTION WITH THE FIRST CLAUSE OF VERSE_ 22.

THE EYES OF A FOOL AND THOSE OF A WISE MAN.

+I. Even a fool is conscious that there is good to be found.+ If we meet a traveller in search of a certain city, even although he is journeying in the very opposite direction to that in which the city lies, yet the fact that he is journeying at all shows that he is conscious of its existence. His eyes may be turned away from it instead of towards it, his feet may be carrying him every moment farther from it, yet he would not be seeking it in any direction if he had not a persuasion that it was in existence. A man may be digging for gold in a soil in which gold has never been found, nor ever will be, but the fact that he is digging anywhere proves that he is alive to the fact that there is gold in the world. So the fool is here represented as seeking--which shows that he is persuaded that there is a certain good and desirable thing which is attainable. Most men are seeking--_"There be many which say, Who will show us any good?"_ (Psalms iv. 6). They are in one direction and another looking for that which will satisfy and ennoble them, and this universal quest proves a universal sense of the existence of some desirable good.

+II. But the fool looks afar for what he needs while it is close at hand.+ An idle, unpractical man of business spends his time in fancies that he could make his fortune if he were in some far-off land, and all the time misses the opportunities of doing so which are within his reach at home. The idle youth dreams of the grand things he would do if he were a man, and neglects to do that which would ennoble and bless his present life. It is a very common characteristic of moral fools to imagine that they would be blest if they possessed something which is entirely beyond their reach, whereas means of obtaining the only real and lasting good are scattered around them so abundantly that they trample them every day under their feet. Every sinful man feels that it would be good for him to stand in a different relation to God, but he does not always seek that good in the direction in which it is to be found. He feels his need of a different disposition and character, but he does not go in quest of them where they may be found. In verse 22 the wise man traces this habit of the moral fool to the source. He finds "no good" because he "is froward in heart." The fruitlessness of his search is due to nothing else but to his own perversity. He would rather demand external evidence for the truth of revelation than test it by compliance with its precepts. He excuses his neglect of the plain commands of God, by dwelling upon mysteries connected with His Gospel, which finite minds cannot solve. Israel of old was warned of this error. _"For this commandment which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it and do it? Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go over the sea for us, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it and do it? But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it"_ (Deut. xxx. 11-14). And Paul convicts them of the same sin after the coming of the Messiah. The Scribes and Pharisees in the days of Christ perversely looked everywhere for light, except to the moral sun which was shining in their midst.

+III. The man whose understanding is enlightened not only knows what he needs, but he knows where to find it.+ It is a mark of practical sagacity in human affairs to know what is wanted, and to know also where to look for a supply of the want. A traveller ought not only to know the name of the city which he wants to find, but he ought to know upon which road to travel to find it. The physician ought not only to know what his patient needs, but he ought to know where to find the remedy. The statesman ought to be able to detect the nation's needs, and he ought also to know where to look for a supply of the need. And so in every department of social life. A man's life will be a failure if he can only discern that something is wanting in himself, in his family, or in his business, but does not know where to turn to supply the want. So it is in spiritual things. But he who is morally wise knows what is the real good to be aimed at, and knows where to seek it. He knows that _"happy is the man that findeth wisdom, and the man that getteth understanding,"_ that _"the merchandise of it is better than the merchandise of silver, and the gain thereof than fine gold"_ (chap. iii. 13, 14). And he knows that it is "before him"--that the _"fear of the Lord that is wisdom, and to depart from evil is understanding"_ (Job. xxviii. 28); and that he need not go "to the ends of the earth" in quest of this, but that it is within the reach of every sincere and earnest seeker. (Many expositors give this verse a different rendering. See Critical Notes. It would then express a truth similar to that contained in Homiletics on chap. xiii. 14, page 313.)

_OUTLINES AND SUGGESTIVE COMMENTS._

Heaven is able to know so much more plainly than hell. The very thing which is the best enlightener, the minds of hell will be entirely without. "The depth saith, It is not in me; and the sea saith, It is not in me. Destruction and death say, We have heard the fame thereof with our ears." Hell, therefore, will always cavil. If saints judge better than sinners, how much better God than saints. _"Wisdom is before_ (His) _very face,"_ while the _"eyes,"_ not of the _"stupid"_ only, but of Gabriel himself, must be in the respect of contrast, _"at the end of the earth." "At the end,"_ not in the middle, where the thing can be best judged, but at the dark extremity.--_Miller._

The countenance is the glass of the mind, and the star of the countenance is the eye. "In the face of the prudent wisdom is present." In the whole countenance of the discreet person, and in every part thereof, there is a wise moderation; for in his brows he carrieth calmness, in his eyes modesty, in his cheeks cheerfulness, in his lips comeliness, in his whole face a certain grace and staidness. "But the eyes of the fool are in the ends of the earth." On the contrary, he who is simple or vain governeth not his very eyes aright, but letteth loose unto them the bridle in such sort as that they roll or rove after every vanity, or pry into every corner.--_Muffet._

We must not only learn wisdom, but keep it in our eyes, that it may be a light to our feet; for a man that has wisdom in his mind, and forgets to use it, is like one that has money in his chest, but forgets to carry some of it with him when he is going a long journey, to bear his necessary expenses. He will be at a great loss, on many occasions, that has money in his house, but none in his pocket.--_Lawson._

_"But the eyes of a fool are in the ends of the earth."_ He has no fixed and steady principle or rule; nothing on which he fixes his eye for his guidance. His thoughts are incessantly wandering after matters he has nothing to do with,--anything and everything but that which he should at the time be minding;--roving after every vanity, and keeping steadily no pursuit. It is specially true of "things pertaining to salvation." Wisdom, in this matter above all others, is "before him that hath understanding." He looks to one point. He sees _one thing to be needful._ He sees the wisdom of God providing for it. There he fixes. And this is wisdom. It is ever before him. _One_ end--_one_ means. Whereas "the fool's eyes are in the ends of the earth." He has examined nothing. He roves at random, with no determinate ideas about the most interesting, by infinite degrees, of all concerns. Ask him _how he hopes to be saved,_ and you immediately discover his thoughtless unsettledness. He is "in the ends of the earth." His answer is to seek. It is here, it is there, it is nowhere. He hesitates, he supposes, he guesses, he is at a stand--he cannot tell. . . . There is another character that may here be meant, namely, the _schemer,_ the _visionary projector._ The truly intelligent man applies the plain and obvious dictates of common sense to the attainment of his end; but the scheming visionary fool is ever after out-of-the-way plans, new and far-fetched expedients.--_Wardlaw._

Wisdom is full in the sight of the man of understanding, he beholdeth the beauty and perfection of it, he looketh into the worth and happiness of it. He sets it before him as a pattern, by which he frameth and ordereth all his ways, all his doings. His eye is never from it. It is the glass by which he espieth out the blemishes and defects of his life, and if he see in it a true resemblance of himself, it is not the glass that must be said to be true for that cannot be false, but it is himself that is a man of true worth; the glass approving his goodness, not he the goodness of the glass. But a fool beholds wisdom as a thing afar from him; he discerneth not what it is, nor what is the glory and excellency of it: he perceiveth nothing whereby either to take direction from it, or liking to it. He thinketh that he must go to the ends of the earth to get it, and if ever, it is in the end of his life, that he hath any sight of it. . . . Or else we may understand the latter part of the verse thus: That a fool's eyes are in the ends of the earth, because in any trouble or distress he looketh all up and down the earth, from one end of it to the other for help and succour, and in the end as a fool remaineth helpless. But wisdom is before him that hath understanding, and stopping his eyes from looking too much that way, turneth them and directeth them up to heaven, where help ought to be sought and is sure to be found.--_Jermin._

Verse 25 is a repetition of the thought in verse 21. For Homiletics and Comments see on chap. x. 1.

_MAIN HOMILETICS OF VERSE_ 26.

SMITING THE JUST.

This verse has been variously rendered and explained. (See Critical Notes and the comments of different expositors.) It suggests, however--

+I. That punishment in itself is sometimes necessary and desirable.+ When the laws of the family are wise and good, it is a great misfortune for the children, and a great sin against them, not to visit their transgressions with a suitable punishment. And it is absolutely essential to the existence of a well-ordered state, that there should be punishment for those who rebel against righteous laws. Civil rule is of Divine ordination--"the powers that be are ordained of God" (Rom. xiii. 1). When, therefore, there is no just cause for civil rebellion, it is a sin not only against the state but against the Ruler of all the kingdoms of the earth, to break the established laws. Punishment forms a necessary part of the government of the universe. God has, both by example and precept, shown its necessity. When there was rebellion in heaven against a perfect government, punishment followed, which was proportioned to the greatness of the transgression--the sentence passed upon the first rebel in the universe and upon those who were confederate with him was a terrible one, but it was only commensurate to the exceeding magnitude of the offence. If rebellion against a government had been allowed to go unpunished, it would have made way for universal anarchy. And a community of any kind without punishment for transgressors, is lacking in a most essential element of its peace and stability.

+II. But those whose moral character fits them to be the awarders of punishment are often the victims of it.+ The natural and right order of things in this respect is often exactly the reverse of what it ought to be, and just and noble men are treated as transgressors and suffer the punishment which ought to fall upon their persecutors. Might is very far from being right in this world, and even in this country Richard Baxter stood at the bar while Judge Jeffries sat upon the bench. The apostles of the Lord suffered scourging at the hands of the council at Jerusalem (Acts v. 40); Paul was condemned to death by Nero, and Incarnate Righteousness was crucified between two thieves at the instigation of some of the worst men that the world has ever seen. In all these cases, and in ten thousand others, the just were smitten, and as a rule they have suffered, not merely _although_ they were righteous, but _because_ they were so--it was their integrity that aroused the enmity of their persecutors--these moral _"princes"_ were _"stricken for equity."_

+III. Such an abuse of power will in its turn be visited with punishment.+ Those who have thus unjustly condemned the righteous, have found in their own personal experience that "to punish the just is _not good_"--"not good" for their own peace of mind--not good for their future reputation--not good for the nation who instigated them or permitted them to do the deed. Haman found that it was not good for him to aim a blow at the upright Mordecai when he was himself hanged upon his own gallows; the Persian princes found it was not good to strike a prince for equity when they were themselves cast into the den of lions; Judge Jeffries found it out when he lay face to face with death in the Tower. And among all the nations whose history has confirmed the truth of the text, none stands out so prominently as that one whose king was the author of the proverb. The punishment of the _just_--the striking of _moral princes_ for equity--was one of the most prominent of their national crimes, and He whose death at their hands filled up the measure of their iniquity, declared that it was the great cause of their national ruin. _"Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because ye build the tombs of the prophets, and garnish the sepulchres of the righteous, and say if we had been in the days of our fathers we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets. Wherefore ye be witnesses unto yourselves that ye are the children of them that killed the prophets. . . . Wherefore, behold, I send unto you prophets, and wise men, and Scribes; and some of them ye shall kill and crucify; and some of them ye shall scourge in your synagogues, and persecute them from city to city; that upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar"_ (Matt. xxiii. 29-35). The Jewish nation has been for nearly nineteen centuries a witness that "to punish the just is not good, nor to strike princes for equity."

_OUTLINES AND SUGGESTIVE COMMENTS._

_Even deserved punishment to the righteous does not seem good when designed to chasten the willing with a view to holiness. "Even."_ This seems to have been treated as a word _de trop._ King James' men made it _also;_ as though Solomon grew tired of sameness, and broke the monotone by a new opening vocable. But with the above rendering it takes its usual sense. _"Righteous."_ This word and _"punishment"_ bear the weight of the word _"even." Even the righteous,_ who ought to know better; and _"even punishment,"_ which the righteous, at last, ought to be willing to bear.--_Miller._

Often is the wise man's meaning much beyond his words. _To punish the just_ not only _is not good,_ but it is "the abomination" (verse 15)--"an evident token of perdition" (Philip. i. 28). If rulers are "a terror to good works," they are ministers of God in authority, but ministers of Satan in administration. And how will such injustice "abide the day of His coming," when He shall "lay judgment to the line, and righteousness to the plummet!"--_Bridges._

The word _prince_ signifies _noble,_ and is differently understood. It may be applied to the nobility of _station,_ or to that of _mind._ Some give preference to the latter; and by interpreting it of the _noble-minded,_ and the _"just"_ in the former clause, of _the righteous_ or the _people of God,_ make the two clauses thus to correspond, and to have much the same import. It seems, however, both more natural and more comprehensive to consider _two_ ideas to be expressed; the one relating to the duty of the _ruler,_ and the other to that of the _ruled._ It is the incumbent duty of the ruler, on the one part, to administer justice with strict impartiality. It is the duty, on the other part, of subjects to countenance, encourage, and support the ruler in the equitable administration of his trust. To _"strike"_ is evidently to be understood, not literally alone of actual striking, but of "smiting with the tongue" as well as with the fist or the rod,--of all kinds of vituperation and abuse, and attempts to bring the throne into disrepute and odium, and unsettle its stability, by shaking the confidence and attachment of the community. There are many occasions in which a man may be tempted to this. He may, in particular cases, have his mind biassed by pride, by self-interest, by partiality towards a friend, by political predilections; so that even when all has been done with impartial investigation, and the judgment pronounced according to legitimate rules of evidence and demands of equity, there may be unfair, unreasonable and angry dissatisfaction; and the prince may be smitten for justice. Every man ought to be on his guard against this. The higher the responsibility,--the more burdensome and difficult the trust,--and the more serious the results of bringing authorities and the laws into disesteem, and unsettling public confidence in them,--ought to be the amount of our reluctant caution in pronouncing censure. Another remark may be ventured. One of the great difficulties with which governments of great nations have to contend, arises from the variety of crossing and contending interests with which they have to deal. How anxious soever they may honestly be, to allow no undue bias to draw them from the line of impartial justice, yet there is hardly a measure they can adopt that does not affect differently different classes of the community; so that, from their various predisposing circumstances, that shall appear to one class--to those in one particular department of trade or commerce--the very essence of injustice, which by another is lauded as a most unexceptionable exemplification of impartial equity. This ought surely to have the effect--I do not by any means say of forbidding the most vigilant observance and the freest and most searching scrutiny and discussion of every measure, and the exposure of its evil or questionable character and tendency--but assuredly of procuring some allowance for the difficulty of the task of pleasing all parties, and some moderation in the tone of censure even where to us the grounds for it are clear and palpable. No man who knows himself will affirm, in almost any case, that, placed, in other circumstances, he might not see with other eyes. I speak in general. There are cases in which the interests of a suffering country are, to a vast extent, involved, in which it becomes every man's paramount duty to speak out and to speak plainly, and to make the ears of the rulers to tingle with the outcry of humanity and justice. I would further apply the spirit of this verse to the case of _arbitrators._ We have ourselves, it may be, consented to submit a litigated point to arbitration. We do so with a full persuasion of our being in the right--of our claim being the just one. But the arbiters unite in giving it against us. It would be most unreasonable on our part to retain a grudge, especially at the one appointed by ourselves, on this account. Our reference implied confidence in his impartiality and honour, and implied a pledge of cheerful acquiescence. To grumble, to censure, and to withdraw our friendship, would be indeed to _"strike him for equity."_ He would have proved himself unworthy of his trust, if his disposition to please and serve us had been too strong for principle, conscience, and oath. There is _one_ government, in which "the just" are never "punished"--all whose laws and all whose sanctions are the perfection of equity. But alas! it is under that very government that the spirit expressed by the phrase "striking princes for equity" is most fearfully manifested. All the murmurings of sinners against either the law of God or its revealed and threatened penalty, are the very essence, in its deepest malignity, of this spirit.--_Wardlaw._

Righteous men are princes in all lands (Psa. xlv. 16); yea, they are kings in righteousness as Melchisedec. Indeed they are somewhat obscure kings as he was, but kings they appear to be, by comparing Matt. xiii. 17 with Luke x. 24; "many righteous," saith Matthew, "many kings," saith Luke. Now, to strike a king is high treason; and although princes have put up blows, as when one struck our Henry VI., he only said, "Forsooth, you do wrong yourself more than me, to strike the Lord's anointed."--_Trapp._

_MAIN HOMILETICS OF VERSES_ 27, 28.

TWO BADGES OF A WISE MAN.

+I. Reticence of speech.+ This subject has been dwelt on before. See on chap. x. 19-21. The verses before us suggest further that a man who is sparing of words is not necessarily a man of abundant wisdom, for even a fool may hold his peace sometimes. Solomon elsewhere tells us that "a fool uttereth all his mind" (Prov. xxix. 11); but the fool of this text is not so foolish as to do that. It has been remarked that "by silence a fool abates something of his senselessness, and since he gets the opportunity to collect himself and to reflect, a beginning of wisdom is developed in him" (_Von Gerlach_). It argues some amount of wisdom in a man if he is silent when he has nothing to say which is worth the saying. But the false conclusion must not be drawn, that every man who is not given to much speech is a man of great understanding and of vast mental resources. It is much better that the stone should remain upon the mouth of a well of impure water, but it must not be taken for granted, because the well is kept closed, that there is a supply of life-giving water within.

+II. Calmness of temper.+ It is a mark of wisdom to strive after a "cool" (excellent) "spirit." 1. _It makes life more pleasant._ A man who allows himself to be vexed and irritated by all the annoyances of every-day life has no enjoyment of his existence. A fretful and hasty temper makes every bitter draught more bitter, and takes the sweetness out of the cup that would otherwise be a pleasant one. 2. _It makes a man more respected and more useful._ A man who cannot curb his temper is a despicable object, and will certainly be despised. A passionate man may be pitied and excused, but he cannot be respected. Hence he cannot have much influence for good upon others. This subject also has been treated before. See Homiletics on chap. xiv. 17 and 29, pages 363 and 386.

_OUTLINES AND SUGGESTIVE COMMENTS._

_"He that retains his words knows knowledge."_ The words are precise. It is the fact that he "knows knowledge" that impels a man to restrain his words. If he did not _"know knowledge,"_ if he had not _light,_ and did not know it when he saw it; if he did not see light in God, and know it when he has seen it, and really see enough of it to convince him that "God is light," he could not stand the darkness. The unfortunates in hell have no light to enable them to endure the dark. But the saint, _knowing knowledge,_ and seeing that it exists in God, is balanced enough against the mysteries to enable him to restrain his words. . . . The wise man asserts that this silence is a chief mark of piety. . . . If a man do shut his lips he is wise. . . . The fool is a wise man when he is silent, and when, in meek submission, he bows to what he cannot understand.--_Miller._

He cannot be known for a fool who says nothing. He is a fool, not who hath unwise thoughts, but who utters them. Even concealed folly is wisdom.--_Bp. Hall._

He that hath knowledge hath not many words: the fulness of the one causeth in him a scarcity of the other. And there is nothing that he spendeth idly more unwillingly than his words. But yet, _having knowledge,_ he knoweth both when to spare and when to spend. . . . The original words here are _knowing knowledge,_ for many know much, but it is not knowledge that they know. Some labour hard and waste their time to know needless vanities, which, being better unknown, have not true knowledge in them. . . . Right knowledge is the knowledge of the Lord, and he that knoweth this spareth his words to spend them to God's glory. And as it is in many the penury of their knowledge that causeth the superfluity of their words, so chiefly is the lack of this knowledge. For it is by this knowledge we learn that an account must be given for every idle word. . . . Silence being so rare a virtue, where wisdom doth command it, it is accounted a virtue where folly doth impose it. He that fails of this first help, and is so far gone in folly as that his tongue outgoes his understanding, yet hath a second help, and that is to stop, and shut his lips before they go too far, which, though not the first, yet is a second praise; and he hath the repute of some understanding who either seeth, or is thought to see, his want of understanding.--_Jermin._

It has been safely enough alleged that of two men equally successful in the business of life, the man who is silent will be generally deemed to have more in him than the man who talks; the latter "shows his hand;" everybody can tell the exact length of his tether; he has trotted himself out so often that all his points and paces are a matter of notoriety. But of the taciturn man, little or nothing is known. "The shallow murmur but the deep are dumb." Friends and acquaintances shake their heads knowingly, and exclaim with an air of authority, that "So and so" has a great deal more in him than people imagine. They are as often wrong as right, but what need that signify to the silent man? . . . To follow out one of the Caxtonian essayist's illustrations,--When we see a dumb strong-box, with its lid braced down by iron clasps and secured by a jealous padlock, involuntarily we supposed that its contents must be infinitely more precious than the gauds and nicknacks which are unguardedly scattered about a lady's dressing-room. "Who could believe that a box so rigidly locked had nothing in it but odds and ends, which would be just as safe in a bandbox?"--_Jacox._

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