Part 25

[Sidenote: _Extrinsic union of Ethic and of economic Science, from antiquity to the nineteenth century._]

VI. Certainly economic science, owing to its empirico-quantitative character, already noted, was not made to fill the void and to furnish a more positive and exact concept of the useful. The contact between Economy and Philosophy remained for a time extrinsic, since economic Science appeared in treatises upon the Philosophy of the practical, together with the other juridical and historical matter, which it was customary to include with it. The precedent for such a union could be found even in Aristotle's _Nichomachean Ethic,_ which supplies certain notions as to the concept of price and value. Considerations on the same argument abound in the Scholastics, especially in St. Thomas, whose _Oeconomica_ always forms part of his Ethic, as the doctrine for the government of the family. Finally, there is an ample discussion of the subject in the treatises of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which took the name of _natural Rights._ It happened that the English moralists of the eighteenth century were also led to occupy themselves with Economy and the economists with Ethic, owing to the juxtaposition of the two concepts for didascalic reasons and for University convenience. Thus Hutcheson developed Economy, in his _Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy_ (1747); and the _Essays_ of Hume are occupied with moral and economic questions; and Adam Smith is the author, not only of _The Wealth of Nations,_ but also of _The Theory of the Moral Feelings,_ almost two parts of a Philosophy of the practical. The importance of economic studies had become so palpable at that time, that toward the end of the century, Buhle was led to include them in the history of philosophy (and we believe that he was the first). He exposes at length in his work the ideas of Hume, of Smith, of Stewart, attributing it as a merit to the English writers to have reduced that material to philosophy by a method of treatment without example (he said) in previous centuries.[24] Finally, Hegel dedicated certain important paragraphs of his _Philosophy of Law,_ in the section dealing with civil society,[25] to the "system of wants," or Economy. The cult of Economy has rather increased than diminished in the nineteenth century and the much-discussed social problem (especially capitalism and socialism) has not been without a certain influence upon treatises of Ethic, where, if we rarely find statements that are strictly economic, there is always plenty of chatter about property and production and the relations between the working and capitalistic class.

[Sidenote: _Philosophical questions arising from a more intimate contact between the two._]

But a more intimate bond could not take place, save when attempts to understand the material of science and to place it in the system of the spirit were united with economic Science, properly so called. For since that science is occupied with human actions and appears to give advice as to conduct, in what relation can it possibly stand to Ethic, which is also occupied with actions and also gives advice?--Such a question was in a certain way already implied in the mediæval idea of a _justum pretium,_ to be placed beside the effective price, which is realized according to the knowledge and convenience of each; it forms the kernel of the debate between the _subjective and the objective_ concept of value, that is, between the purely economic consideration and another resulting from moral exigencies, between the value that is, and that which in a certain way should be. It began to wax ardent, with the accusation, of being theoreticians of egoism, hurled at the great English economists, Smith and Ricardo; this accusation, taken up and modified by others, became accepted as the true and proper designation of the function of Economy, which should accordingly be that of studying human actions in their exclusively abstract, egoistic aspect. But, since abstraction is not full reality, the false task assigned to Economy called for the aid of the doctors. Such were the French economists, seized with the mania of teaching generosity to the cold Britons (Blanqui, etc.); such too were the Germans, who wished to induce Economy to mend its ways and to become conscious of its lofty duties towards the human race (Knies); such, finally, were the Christians and Catholics, who thought to purify or to exorcise that worldly and diabolical science by mingling with it ethical and economical considerations. It was rarely suspected that economic facts, as such, are neither egoistic nor altruistic, neither moral nor immoral; and when it was desired to philosophize the subject, some one got out of the difficulty by enumerating five groups of human actions, four egoistic and only one moral: the search for the satisfaction of one's own conscience, with the fear of blame attached (Wagner). The problem, especially in Austria, passed from the hands of the mathematicians into those of the psychologists. These have undertaken to seek out the resemblance and the difference between economic and ethical values. But on the psychological ground (as we have already remarked when discussing intuitionistic solutions), far from solving the antithesis, philosophy is dissolved. The mathematicians on the other hand, that is to say the economists, who employ the quantitative method, fascinated with the evidence of this procedure and failing to realize that it is empty evidence, instead of limiting themselves to the construction of their most useful formulæ, increase the confusion by beginning to philosophize in the strangest manner; as is to be observed in the case of Pareto, one of the most acute and learned of contemporary economists. In one of his recent writings he exposes the method of economic science with a string of propositions such as these: "_Il faut faire une opération de séparation.... Cette première opération accomplie, ... il est nécessaire de substituer par abstraction, des conceptions simples, au moins relativement, aux objets réels extrêmement complexes.... Mais la science n'est réellement liée à une abstraction plutôt qu'à une autre.... Pour peu qu'on y trouve un avantage.... Cela ne suffit pas encore: il faut continuer à séparer et à abstraire...._"

And after having thus advised us to treat facts without pity, mutilating them, grinding them down, substituting for them names or abstractions, Pareto continues undisturbed, as though all this were nothing: these theories, "_telles, au moins que nous les concevons, se séparant des anciens en ce qu'elles s'attachent aux faits et non aux mots_"![26] If such be the facts, what will be the words?

[Sidenote: _The theories of the hedonistic calculus: from Maupertuis to Hartmann._]

VII. It is all the more necessary to understand the diversity between economic Science and the Philosophy of economy, between the quantitative and the qualitative processes, owing to the fact that since economic studies first flourished, in the eighteenth century, absurd ideas were introduced into the books of philosophers, as to the calculus of pleasures and the balance of life. Maupertuis' book, _Essai de philosophie morale_ (1749), had a great influence in this direction. Here, a balance is presented, showing a deficit on the side of pleasures; and, following this lead, many Italian philosopher-economists of the same period occupied themselves with such calculations and balances (Ortes, Verri, Briganti, etc.), arriving at results, now optimistic, now pessimistic.[27] Galluppi, too, accepted the method as a good one,[28] and it is no marvel that the poet Leopardi made it his, steeped as he was in the sensualistic philosophy of the preceding century. But not only are the trivial optimistic sophisms of the utilitarians founded upon it, but likewise many of the pessimistic arguments of Schopenhauer and especially of Hartmann, the latter quite unconscious (being in other respects closely connected with the German idealist tradition) that he was accepting an element of an altogether anti-idealistic, that is, of a mechanistic origin.

For all these reasons, it is important to oppose the concept of the useful (which is not indeed a concept, but an abstraction), given by economic Science, with its philosophic concept. This we have attempted to do in the preceding theory of Economy, as at once distinct from and united with Ethic. In that theory, we have especially striven to collect stray threads of aphorisms and observations of good sense as to the value of the will, even when amoral; as to the doctrines of happiness and of pleasure, of the inferior appetitive faculty, of others dealing with politics and the arts of prudence, of the new conception of the passions, considered as the spirit in its individuality;--we have striven to attach to these that which is as it were the philosophical result drawn from economic Science, that is to say, the idea of a form of value that would be neither the intellectual, the æsthetic, nor the ethical, and cannot by any means be resolved into an ethical anti-value or egoism;--and finally, we have attempted to unite all these threads into one, in order to form the bond that ethical rigorism has hitherto been unable to place between itself and reality, between the universal and the practical individual, at the same time justifying utilitarian, activity in its autonomy. We believe that this historical sketch will have contributed to make clear the necessity of our attempt.

[1] _De cive,_ c. i. § 10.

[2] E. Albee, _A History of English Utilitarianism,_ London, 1902, pp. 26-27.

[3] _De cive,_ c. iii. § 33.

[4] _Essay on Human Understanding,_ Book II. c. 28, § 7 _sqq._

[5] _Gründl. d. Metaphys. d. Sitten,_ p. 70.

[6] _Gründl,_ p. 36 _sq.; Kr. d. prakt. Vernft._ pp. 15, 21-28, 43, 145; cf. _Metaph. d. Sitt._ pp. 208-209.

[7] _Metaph. d. Sitt._ pp. 22, 23, 246.

[8] _Gesch. d. Phil._ iii. p. 535.

[9] La Rochefoucauld, _Maximes_ (ed. Gamier), nn. 159, 185, 224.

[10] Wolf, _Psych, emp.,_ Frankfort and Leipzig, 1738, §§ 584, 880.

[11] Croce, _Estetica,_ pp. 324-328.

[12] _Kr. d. prakt. Vern._ pp. 79, 108.

[13] _Tract. theol._ c. iv. § 7.

[14] Cf. Croce, in De Sanctis, _Scritti vari_ (Napoli, 1898), i. pp. xiv-xvi, pref.

[15] _Zum ewigen Friede,_ in _Werke_ (ed. Rosenkranz-Schubert), vol. vii. pt. i. p. 370.

[16] _De uno univ. juris principio,_ § 46.

[17] _Encykl._ § 474, and cf. other passages: _Phän. d. Geistes,_ pp. 484-486; _Encykl._ § 474; _Phil. d. Rechtes,_ § 124; _Phil. d. Gesch._ pp. 39-41.

[18] _Gesch. d. Phil._ ii. pp. 405-6.

[19] _System der Sittenlehre,_ p. 180 _sq._; cf. p. 15.

[20] _Einleitung,_ § 82 (Italian transl. p. 102).

[21] _Op. cit._ § 128 (It. tr. p. 172).

[22] _Allg. prakt. Phil._ p. 35.

[23] _Grundzüge der Ethik,_ §§ 12, 14.

[24] _Gesch. d. neueren Philos._ (1796-1804), sect. iv. cap. 18 (Fr. tr., Paris, 1816, v. 432-753)

[25] _Phil. d. Rechts,_ § 189 _sqq._

[26] "L'Économie et la sociologie au point de vue scientifique" in _Rivistetele Scienza,_ i. (1907) 293, 312.

[27] See M. Losacco, _Le dottrine edonistiche italiane del secolo XVIII_ (Napoli, 1902).

[28] Galluppi, _Elementi di filosofia_ (Napoli, 1846), ii. 265-266, 406 _sqq._

SECOND SECTION

THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE

I

CRITIQUE OF MATERIAL AND OF FORMALISTIC ETHIC

[Sidenote: _Various meanings of "formal" and "material."_]

It is a much-disputed question whether the Principle of Ethic should be conceived as _formal_ or _material._ The question, already difficult in itself, has become yet more difficult, so as almost to cause despair of its solution, owing to the fact that those terms, "formal" and "material," are understood (as often happens in philosophy) in a double sense. Hence, those who win assent to their thesis as to the formality of the ethical principle are afterwards wont to avail themselves of this assent, in order stealthily to introduce another thesis, which, although it be also beneath the banner of the "formal," yet has nothing to do with the first and is as false as that is true. And since those who maintain the material principle do the same thing, both alike come to expose their flanks to one another's blows. In the process of unravelling this tangled skein, we shall begin by giving to those two words the meaning that they usually bear in philosophical terminology, meaning by "formal" the universal and by "material" the contingent. And in this signification we affirm, above all, that the principle of Ethic is _formal_ and certainly not _material._

[Sidenote: _The ethical principle as formal (universal) and not material (contingent)._]

Were it material, it would express itself by means of propositions indicating a single volition or a group of single volitions as the true and proper essence of the moral volition; and the moral activity would consist of a determinate action or of a determinate group of actions. But the moral act is always that which surpasses the single or the groups of singles: to will and to effect the single and the series of singles as such, does not appertain to the ethical, but to the merely economic form. He who loves things for things' sake (be they such, and as many as you will, of this or that kind, one, many, infinite) does not yet love the universal, which is everywhere, and is not exhausted in any particular thing, nor in any number of things, however immense.

[Sidenote: _Reduction of material to utilitarian Ethic._]

If we posit a material principle for Ethic, we relapse as a consequence into _utilitarianism,_ from which we thought we had escaped; because, after having asserted the universal, it is now determined, either as a single or (which amounts to the same thing) as a feigned universal, a simply general concept of group or series. This vicissitude, however, presents itself in every sphere of philosophy: when the universal and formal principle of that sphere is materialized, we return to the sphere immediately, below it. For example, an esthetic that posits as its principle certain single forms of art, thus substituting matter for form, relapses from art to life lived, which is the condition that precedes art and upon which art raises itself in order to intuite and to dominate life. Material Ethic has therefore been with reason discredited as heteronomous and utilitarian. Not indeed that it is so directly and admits itself so to be: on the contrary, it professes to be anti-utilitarian and does nothing directly, save to point to a given object as the true content of morality. But that object, being single, implies a merely utilitarian volition; and material Ethic is utilitarian, because, whatever it may do or say, it is logically reducible to utilitarianism.

[Sidenote: _Rejection of material principles._]

The rejection of all material character from the ethical principle is of the greatest importance, for it frees Ethic from a long series of concepts, each one of which has been proposed in turn as the true ethical principle, and several still find many supporters, both in ordinary thought and in treatises called scientific. For us, those concepts should not be examined comparatively, so as to arrive at preferring the one to the other, or a new one of the same type to all the concepts previously enunciated; but they are all false, for one and the same reason, as any other that may in future be excogitated will be false, if it contain in it anything material.

[Sidenote: _Benevolence, love, altruism, etc.; and critique of them._]

A first group of such material principles is found in relation to the general concept of an action, directed toward the welfare of individuals, other than the individual acting. Morality (they say) is _sacrifice of self, benevolence, love, altruism, compassion, humanitarianism,_ or simply _naturalism_ of the Franciscan sort, which commands us to respect, protect, and love the animals also, since they too are God's creatures (brother Wolf, sister Fox). Such formulæ, especially those of _benevolence and altruism,_ have been and continue to be successful; and hardly a doubt is harboured but that they determine in the most complete and satisfactory manner the proper principle of morality. But in truth _others,_ as individuals, have no rights that I too do not possess as an individual: I am another for the other, and he is an I for himself; and if each one provided for the good of others, neglecting and trampling upon his own good, the result would be perfectly identical to what would happen, were each one to provide for himself without concern for others. Morality demands the sacrifice of me for the universal end, but of me only in my merely individual ends; and, therefore, in this case, of me as of others. It has no particular animosity against me, so as to wish to sacrifice me at all costs to others. We must be severe, not only with ourselves, but with others also; exigent, not only with ourselves, but with others also; and so, on the contrary, benevolent not only toward others, but also toward ourselves; compassionate, not only toward others, but also towards this instrument of labour that we carry about with us and of which we sometimes demand too much; that is, our empirical individuality. Reality is neither democratic nor aristocratic, but both together; it abhors the privilege of some over others as much as that equality, according to which each one must have the same value as the other at every moment. All are in turn masters and servants; worthy of respect as bearers and representatives of good, worthy of punishment and reprehension as clouding and impeding the good. Morality never considers individuals in themselves, but always in their relation to the universal; and in this respect there is no one who does not deserve to be saved or to be suppressed; there is no animal or other being of any kind that should not now be favoured in its existence, now annihilated. No individual is treated as an _end,_ but all as _means_ for universal morality; and they only obtain the dignity of ends, in so far as they are means for universal morality. The rights of animals have been written for and against; but in truth, a lamb has now the duty of being slaughtered, now the right of being left in peace, according to circumstances; in the same way that a man has now the right to go for a walk with his friends and to sing serenades beneath the windows of fair ladies, now the duty of putting on a uniform and of betaking himself beneath the walls of a citadel, where he will be blown in pieces by the enemy's grape-shot. Altruism is as insipid as egoism, and is reducible at bottom to egoism; in much the same way as sensual love, which has justly been called "egoism for two." Indeed, why should we be ready to sacrifice ourselves for others, and to promote their desire in every case and in spite of everything? For what reason, save for the blind and irrational attachment to them which makes a man throw away his life or descend to abjection for a wicked woman furiously loved, suffer every shame and torment for an unworthy son, or yield to the impulses of sympathy inspired by an individual? This blind and irrational attachment to others is at bottom attachment to ourselves, to our nerves, to our fancies, to our convenience, to our habits. It is utility, not morality; for morality wills us to be ready to separate ourselves from others as from ourselves, when the occasion arises, to leave wives and sons and brothers, and follow duty which transcends them all. "Thou only, O ideal, art true,..." or rather, by means of the ideal and of the universal, all things are true; without the ideal, there is not one of them that does not become false, as there is not an organism that does not become vile clay, when abandoned by life.

[Sidenote: _Social organism, State, interest of the race, etc. Critique of them._]

There is another group of material principles which seems to surpass individuals, because it makes morality to consist of promoting either so-called _laws of nature_ or so-called _institutions._ Of such kind are those that place morality in the service of the _social organism and of the State, or of the interest of the Species and of Life_ (this being understood as animal life or very near to animality). But if it seem that contingent facts are thus escaped, that is not really so. For none of these concepts expresses the universality of the real, but this or that group of its particular manifestations: the life called social or political, this or that animal species, this or that vital manifestation. And none of these facts can be ethically willed without exceptions. The moral man sacrifices the State to the Church, or the Church to the State, atrophies certain organs and suppresses certain vital functions for universal ends, or for the ends of what is called civilization; he defends, preserves and increases certain aptitudes of the human race, but lets others disappear or modifies them, always adapting the interest of the species to that of the ideal. Were he to do otherwise, he would again be substituting utility for morality, his immediate affection for certain things or for certain single and individual facts, to the affection for them that should always be _mediated,_ that is to say, mediated by the universal.

[Sidenote: _Material religious principles. Critique of them._]

A third group of material principles, called religious, which make morality to consist of conforming to the will of God and of the gods, is not intrinsically different from these. Where the idea of the transcendental and of religious mystery is introduced, there is darkness; and anything can be put into darkness. In the first place, nothing but darkness itself can be put there, and in this case the religious solution is agnosticism, confession of ignorance, such as we have hitherto treated, in criticizing theological utilitarianism or abstract ethical rigorism, which, by means of its insoluble contradictions, also leads to the idea of God and of mystery. But one's own will, caprice and individual interests can also be put there; and then religion becomes attachment to a being or to an order of beings, which, though they be imaginary, are not for that reason less individual; attachment to them is love or fear, sympathy or fear of the evil they can do, and tendency to avoid it by propitiation with prayers, adulation, gifts, services, worship. Religious principles, then, understood as material principles, also become converted, as all know, and we may add, know all too well, into utilitarian principles; because, through intently fixing the gaze upon this aspect of religion, they have forgotten to look at others more important and certainly more noble.

[Sidenote: _Formal principle as affirmation of a merely logical exigency._]