Part 11
Now, then, it seems very advisable, for the above reasons, immediately to drive out the Dutch from the island of Hermosa, if there is any possibility and power therefor, uniting the forces of Filipinas, if necessary, with those of Macan--to whom the question is so vital, both because of the said reason of the commerce (which is of prime importance), and because the island of Hermosa lies in the path of the voyage from Macan to Japon; and also, I do not deny, because it is possible that the Dutch have taken a port in the island of Hermosa in order to conquer Macan therefrom, to which they are very near, as they attempted to do in the year 622. Therefore, it will be more expedient and convenient to drive out the Dutch from this island of Hermosa as soon as it is attempted; and that will be very gratifying to the Chinese, who are much offended at the Dutch because of the many robberies of their ships in the Filipinas trade that the Dutch have committed for the last seventeen years, and are bitterly hostile to them. But although it seems that that hostility will be sufficient, for the present, for the Chinese not to make any beginning in commerce in the island of Hermosa with the Dutch, that disinclination will disappear in a short time--both because of the kind reception that the Chinese will experience from the Dutch, and because the Chinese are so notably covetous that, although they are prohibited under penalty of losing life and property from trading with Japon, some ships laden with silks have gone to that kingdom during the last few years, pretending in Chinese ports that they are going to the Filipinas.
The above is what occurs to me in regard to the first part. In regard to the second, namely, that it is not advisable for us to have a port in the island of Hermosa, whether the Dutch are there or not, my opinion is the following.
Since the Dutch are there, one would think it advisable to prevent them by force of arms from the commerce of China. But for that one must attack either the Chinese or the Dutch. Since the Chinese are our friends, and since we cannot live in the Filipinas without their trade, I do not see how it can be done justifiably, as they are free to trade with all. Even should we attempt it, they will oblige us to permit them [to trade as they choose] by taking the trade from the Filipinas. But if it should have to be by attacking the ships of the Dutch, new and very long and costly wars would be renewed which would complete the exhaustion of the Filipinas, as has been done in those of Terrenate. Then, too, we would not have greater advantages in this war in the island of Hermosa than in those of Terrenate; for it also is a war to be carried on with ships, and the Dutch have their factories of Japon very near by. They are not inferior to us in accommodations, although the island of Hermosa is near the Filipinas.
But if the Dutch were expelled from it, neither do I find any advantage in the Spaniards having a fort and settlement in that island at present, considering the condition of the Filipinas, unless it be to prevent the return of the enemy to refortify it. For first we must determine for that purpose, whether we can prevent that, by the nature of the island and by other circumstances that would render it very difficult--as was seen in Terrenate, when, although we had five hundred or more Spaniards there, the Dutch built another fort almost in sight of ours (which they still hold), as soon as we gained that small island. Now, too, although the Dutch were fortified first in the island of Hermosa, they have not prevented us from effecting a settlement there. For among other things, for such purposes, more men are necessary, and the cost of those men with whom a fortress in a kingdom not one's own is generally maintained.
But, as this object is not involved in the other considerations which present themselves to my mind for keeping up a Spanish settlement in that island, I do not see that, for the present, the Spaniards are obliged to do that. For that island is not of importance to us, either for its own products or for the commerce of China--on the former ground, because it is a poor and barren land, of which it is now always said in the Filipinas that it only produces fruits and timber; nor is it for the second, for if it be made a way-station, wherein to invest in the silks of China, that means to add a new voyage from the Filipinas, which on account of its expenses cannot make up for the convenience of purchasing in Filipinas those same products, which the Chinese carry to Manila. If one tries to say that, by this means, the Chinese ships would not be stopped by the Dutch ships that await them on the coasts of Filipinas; and that if that voyage be made from the island of Hermosa in Spanish ships, they will sail more secure: I answer that there is less danger for the ships as they sail now. For, since the Chinese do not understand latitude and the directions of the compass perfectly, they do not know enough to go [by direct routes] to sight land in the Filipinas, thus making safe the coast where the Dutch await them; [41] but in that case [i.e., if they go only to Formosa] the Dutch, changing their position, would go to await the Chinese and our ships near our port or the island of Hermosa. Since those ships would have to sail so well equipped that they could defend themselves, it would be so costly an undertaking that it could not be maintained--especially at the present time, when the Filipinas are so exhausted and so in need of men, by reason of the reënforcements to Maluco, the entrances into Mindanao, and the insurrections in certain provinces of the natives. Besides, there is the so great danger to Manila from the swarms of abandoned heathen Sangleys who live there, besides other Chinese residents who are married and Christians, but lazy, and the great number of non-producing Japanese there also; and for security and defense from all these, the Spaniards do not even possess what is necessary.
Neither has that island of Hermosa such a location that it can be desirable for the ships of Filipinas that sail both to Japon and to Macan, to put in or to seek shelter there; and even less so for those returning from a port where they have taken refuge when they sail to Nueva España, or when, in sailing from Nueva España to Filipinas, by arriving late, the vendavals overtake them; or for ships on any other of the courses that we sail today.
But if one would say that it is a matter of importance for greater attempts that could be offered in time, by reason of the entrance into or conversion of China, that is not approved now. On the contrary, I fear from the caution and mistrust of the Chinese, that if we maintain a settlement in the island of Hermosa, and it is not clear to them that it is strictly necessary for that conservation, [they will act] without heeding other ends which they must obtain by way of diverting the trade with the Filipinas (since we see that they forced the Portuguese to tear down the fortification that they permitted them to erect in Macan, in view of the risk of its being captured by the Dutch in the year 622, who threatened to return to attempt it with a greater fleet the following year, although they had not returned up to the year 625). They are not unaware that Castilians and Portuguese are vassals of one and the same king. Neither have the Dutch failed to publish (as they did in Japon), that it is the custom of the king of España to conquer kingdoms under pretext of religion. That report, according to the religious of Japon themselves, has been one of the chief causes for the instigation of so terrible a persecution against Christians. Very true is it that the success in conversion in which his Majesty has so disinterested and holy an end, can neither be assured nor guided only by human reason. Consequently, what I judge to be an unsuitable thing might be the best method to attain it. In this argument one ought also to consider the heathen natives themselves in the island of Hermosa; but, admitting this, even for them at present I conclude that his Majesty is under no obligations whatever, because he has in the Filipinas not a few Indians who pay tribute, but who do not have sufficient ministers to instruct them. Also there are many heathen, who, because their country is not yet conquered, are without any knowledge at all of the holy gospel. But I shall not go into greater detail on this point, for it may, perhaps, seem to be outside the question.
Neither do I imagine that all that has occurred to me concerning this matter, and much more, has been left unconsidered by Don Fernando de Silva, governor of Filipinas, at whose order a site was occupied on Hermosa Island; for he is a very prudent gentleman and a gallant soldier, and one who will not have permitted the desire for glory and honor, of which the discoverers and conquerors of new lands are justly worthy, to carry him away. Yet I do not, on that account, regard myself as under no obligations to advise you of my opinion. Madrid, December 20, 1627.
_Doctor Don Juan Cevicos_
DOCUMENTS OF 1628-1629
Relation of 1627-28. [Unsigned]; July, 1628. Report of appointments made by the governor. Juan Niño de Tavora; August 2, 1628. Letters to Felipe IV. Juan Niño de Tavora; August 4, 1628. Economic reasons for suppressing the silk trade of China in Spain and its colonies. Juan Velazquez Madrco; October 7, 1628. Decrees regarding the Chinese. Felipe IV; June, 1628-March, 1629. Relations of 1628-29. Hernando Estrado, and others; 1628-29.
_Sources_: Most of these documents are from MSS. in the Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla, The first one is from the Ventura del Arco MSS. (Ayer library); the fifth, from the Archivo Historico Nacional, Madrid; and the last, from MSS. in the Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid.
_Translations_: The second of these documents is translated by Robert W. Haight; the second part of the last, by Arthur B. Myrick; all the rest, by James A. Robertson.
RELATION OF 1627-28
_Copy of a relation-written by a father of this residence of Manila on the condition of these Filipinas Islands, and other surrounding kingdoms and provinces, from the month of July, 1627, until that of 1628._
In the port of Cavite, which lies three leguas away from and opposite the city of Manila, four very fine galleons were being equipped, that in size and strength could compare with the best in the world. For the flagship was the "Concepción;" for almiranta, the "Santa Teresa;" while the other two were called "San Yldefonso" and the "Peña de Francia." Besides these there was another smaller ship called the "Rosario," and two other pataches and two galleys. The work was progressing rapidly; for as soon as the merchant ships that sail to Nueva España were despatched, our people had to begin their voyage to the island of Hermosa near China, in order to dislodge the Dutch who were fortifying themselves there. [42] That might result in notable damage to this city of Manila, and to Macao, by obstructing their trade with China, Japon, and other kingdoms. The food, ammunition, and artillery were already embarked, and many implements of war, in order to carry on the war by sea and land. On July 7. they began to lade the flagship with quantities of tiling which it was also necessary to take. But, burdened with the great weight, the flagship showed that it was not to make the voyage; for it commenced to leak so badly that it could not be kept pumped out. Consequently, it was necessary to unlade it, and they had to resolve to leave it behind in the port, to their great sorrow.
The galleon "San Yldefonso" became the flagship. The season was already advanced, and especially for the galleys, which need more calm weather to enable them to navigate. Accordingly, the galleys were despatched ahead July 26, under command of Don Pedro Alcarazo. On August 17, the chief part of the fleet, namely, the galleons and pataches, left port. Governor Don Juan Niño de Tabora was in the flagship; master-of-camp Don Lorenzo de Olaso in the almiranta; in the "Peña de Francia," Sargento-mayor Alonso Martin Quirante, an old and well-tried soldier; in the ship "Rosario," Captain Lazaro de Torres, a daring man in war; and in the other two pataches, two other captains. Each vessel carried a quantity of artillery, each galleon having more than forty very large pieces. There were many and very courageous men; although when they saw that contrary weather was setting in it did not fail to dishearten them, as was immediately seen. For scarcely had they left the port of Cavite (even before emerging from that bay), when so fierce a storm overtook them that the fleet was in danger of being wrecked. One patache sprang a leak, and commenced to take in water so badly that it was forced to make port and remain there. The governor--seeing that as the season was so late, it was quite possible that he could not get to the island of Hermosa and return to port with the fleet; and as quite a long period had passed since any reënforcement had been sent to our fort on the same island of Hermosa; and since he imagined that they were suffering very great need of everything necessary--in the probability of what might happen, determined to send Captain Lázaro de Torres ahead with his little vessel the "Rosario," which was carrying a large quantity of food. As it was a small, swift-sailing ship, he hoped that it would surely arrive, which was not looked for in regard to the rest of the fleet. We shall relate the experience of this vessel later.
Our fleet proceeded on its course, but with so contrary winds from the north that they [as it were,] consumed the vessels; and the seas ran mountain high toward the heavens, so that one would believe that they were trying to engulf them. They reached Cape Bojeador, although after considerable danger. That is the end of the island of Manila, where one crosses to the island of Hermosa. At that point the storms increased so violently that, a council of the pilots having been called, all thought that they should put in to port; for it was impossible to go any farther until the next year, when the expedition could be undertaken at a better season. They put back, and the fleet reentered Cavite on September 6. That was considered as not a little [good fortune by the Dutch]; for, as was afterward learned from some Dutchmen, whom the Portuguese of Macan captured, the enemy on the island of Hermosa were very weak and determined not to fight, but to leave their fort at the arrival of our fleet. Now the Dutch will be in a state of readiness, so that it will cost a triumph to capture the fort; and, even, may it please God that we can gain such a result.
Some fathers of St. Dominic and of our Society were going in the fleet with the intention of remaining in the island of Hermosa, in order to engage in the conversion of its natives who are heathen. As servants of our fathers were also going two disguised Japanese fathers, in order to see whether they might go to Japon by way of the island of Hermosa. Their provincial had sent them for that purpose from Macan; for, as the door of Japon is so tightly closed, Ours seek extraordinary means to enter there, to aid that afflicted Christian people.
But let us return to follow our galleys. One can well guess how they would fare, when so large galleons suffered from the storm. They were struck very severely, but they made their voyage nevertheless, until they sighted the fort of the Dutch enemy on the island of Hermosa. From there, they put back to this island of Manila, in the province of Ylocos, because of the violence of the weather. While in port there, they had so fierce a storm that, having been hardly used by the past storm, their seams opened and they went to the bottom. Twenty convicts were drowned, and three Spaniards. The other men, even the commander himself, got away by swimming, and, as the land was near, they were able to reach it without much difficulty. That disastrous news reached this city October 20.
We come now to the ship "Rosario" in which Captain Lazaro de Torres was sailing. It made its voyage, although not without trouble. It reached our fort on the island of Hermosa, and its arrival gladdened and rejoiced our men greatly, for they were in great need of food. It had been more than a year since aid had been sent to them from Manila. At the ship's arrival, it was found that a disaster had overtaken our men. It happened that there was a chief on the river of Tanchuy, not far from our fort, who professed great friendship for our men for his reasons of state, which are not wanting even among barbarians. Those reasons were that that chief had wars of long standing with another chief whose domain was on the other side of the river; and he wished to have our men on his side, for whatever might happen. Our men trusting to his friendship, and forced by the necessity that they were suffering, the commander sent Captain Don Antonio de Vera with twenty Spaniards to the said river of Tanchuy to bring back rice to our men; for that is the ordinary bread, and that country abounds plentifully with it. Captain Antonio de Vera and his twenty Spaniards remained one or two months with the chief of Tanchuy, who, although he feasted them, did not conclude by giving them the provisions to return. The captain began to fear some detention, and sent to our fort for more men, in order to negotiate with arquebuses what they were unable to compass by kindness; but these were not sent. The chief concerted secretly with his opponent, and made peace with him. One day he took Captain Don Antonio and the other Spaniards out hunting; and suddenly attacked them, and killed the said captain and seven others. They first sold their lives, and with greed for death itself, killed some of their false friends, really their enemies--among them the very chief who contrived that treachery. The other Spaniards sought shelter in a small boat which they had there, left the river, and went to our fort, giving news of the disaster just as Captain Lazaro de Torres arrived. With the help that had just come to them, they determined to take vengeance for that perfidy. The commandant sent the said captain, Lazaro de Torres, with one of the galleys which they had there, accompanied by one hundred infantrymen. They entered the river of Tanchuy, which is very beautiful, and densely inhabited by the natives. The latter immediately deserted their settlements, and our men went to the rice granaries, and filled their galley and four large champans, which are used as freight ships in these seas. They could have filled fifty if they had had them, so great is the abundance in that country. They captured I know not how many persons; then without doing any more evil or burning their villages, they retired with plenty of food, which was the most important thing. This feat having been performed, the said Lazaro de Torres returned with his ship to Manila, where he entered February 21, 1628.
On the same day that our fleet reached the port of Cavite, which was, as aforesaid, September 6, 1627, a _cho_ (a craft which is used in these waters, whose sails are made of rushes) came from Macan. It warned the Portuguese galliots which had come from that city to this with great wealth of merchandise, and which were about to return with about one million in silver, that they should take note that the Dutch enemy were stationed in the passage of Macan, awaiting them with four ships in order to capture them, and that they should change their direction and course. Thereupon, Governor Don Juan Niño de Tabora, seeing that our fleet was ready, and that it would be a fine thing to effect some stroke with the Dutch, as well as for other ends which will be told later, resolved to send two galleons, to act as escort to the Macan galliots. The Portuguese gave twenty thousand pesos to help the soldiers. On October 13 the said galliots, five in number, left with the flagship "San Yldefonse," in which Don Juan de Alcarazo went as commander; in the other galleon, the "Peña de Francia," Don Pedro de Mendiola went as commander. Each galleon carried about six hundred persons. They were so well equipped that they could fight with any Dutch ships whatever. Father Ygnacio de Muxica of our Society, and a brother, were in the flagship, and a father of St. Francis in the other galleon. Both galleons suffered great troubles from whirlwinds, seas, and storms all the way to Macan. One day our flagship snapped the topmast of its mainmast and it fell down. Another day the mast sprang, and knocked the rudder out of place, and it had to be repaired. Another day they were all but wrecked on the reefs of La Plata. On another occasion they lost their rudder completely, and they had to steer the ship with the sheets of the mizzenmast; on another, they lost their anchors while quite near Macan. They grounded in two and one-half brazas of water, and had not the bottom been sandy they would have been smashed into a thousand pieces. They cut down the mainmast and lightened the ship, and got it out of the sand after the greatest of toil, for it was almost buried. The other galleon had its troubles too, but it was fortunate in making port at Sanchuan on the Chinese coast, where our father St. Francis Javier died, about thirty leguas from Macan. The galliots entered the latter place safely, for the Dutch ships were no longer in the strait, as I shall recount later in order not to interrupt at present the thread of our history of our galleons and their adventures. The latter were very ill received by the Portuguese because of the twenty thousand pesos which they cost, and because it was seen that the Dutch had deserted the strait. They judged the matter by the effect and not by what might have happened had the enemy captured their galliots with so great a sum of silver. Our galleons stayed more than three months at that place refitting, stepping a mast and replacing the rudder, and getting food in Macan. They bought a patache, of which they had great need. On the eighteenth of February the two galleons and patache sailed out to pursue their voyage. The latter was sent by the commander, Don Juan Alcarazo, to take its station in the bay of the kingdom of Tonquin and Cochinchina, in order to await a ship from Siam of which it should make a prize; and then to go with it in search of the two galleons. The fact is that they had an order from Governor Don Juan Niño de Tabora to capture all the Siamese vessels for reprisal, inasmuch as five years ago a ship was taken from us in that kingdom, although it was friendly to us. The ship was said to be valued at one million in merchandise, and was on its way from Macan to Manila. Several Spaniards were killed. An embassy having been sent under Father Pedro de Morejon, as I wrote in another relation, the Siamese returned to us only the value of ten thousand pesos.