The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative
Chapter 20
THE BULLITT AFFAIR
The foregoing chapters have related to subjects which were known to President Wilson to be matters of difference between us while we were together in Paris and which are presumably referred to in his letter of February 11, 1920, extracts from which are quoted in the opening chapter. The narration might be concluded with our difference of opinion as to the Shantung Settlement, but in view of subsequent information which the President received I am convinced that he felt that my objections to his decisions in regard to the terms of the peace with Germany extended further than he knew at the time, and that he resented the fact that my mind did not go along with his as to these decisions. This undoubtedly added to the reasons for his letter and possibly influenced him to write as he did in February, 1920, even more than our known divergence of judgment during the negotiations.
I do not feel, therefore, that the story is complete without at least a brief reference to my views concerning the Treaty of Versailles at the time of its delivery to the German delegates, which were imperfectly disclosed in a statement made by William C. Bullitt on September 12, 1919, at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. As to the conduct of Mr. Bullitt, who had held a responsible position with the American Commission at Paris, in voluntarily repeating a conversation which was from its nature highly confidential, I make no comment.
The portion of the statement, which I have no doubt deeply incensed the President because it was published while he was in the West making his appeals to the people in behalf of the Treaty and especially of the League of Nations, is as follows:
"Mr. Lansing said that he, too, considered many parts of the Treaty thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with Shantung and the League of Nations. He said: 'I consider that the League of Nations at present is entirely useless. The Great Powers have simply gone ahead and arranged the world to suit themselves. England and France have gotten out of the Treaty everything that they wanted, and the League of Nations can do nothing to alter any of the unjust clauses of the Treaty except by unanimous consent of the members of the League, and the Great Powers will never give their consent to changes in the interests of weaker peoples.'
"We then talked about the possibility of ratification by the Senate. Mr. Lansing said: 'I believe that if the Senate could only understand what this Treaty means, and if the American people could really understand, it would unquestionably be defeated, but I wonder if they will ever understand what it lets them in for.'" (Senate Doc. 106, 66th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1276.)
It does not seem an unwarranted conjecture that the President believed that this statement, which was asserted by Mr. Bullitt to be from a memorandum made at the time, indicated that I had been unfaithful to him. He may even have concluded that I had been working against the League of Nations with the intention of bringing about the rejection of the Covenant by the Senate. If he did believe this, I cannot feel that it was other than natural in the circumstances, especially if I did not at once publicly deny the truth of the Bullitt statement. That I could not do because there was sufficient truth in it to compel me to show how, by slight variations and by omissions in the conversation, my words were misunderstood or misinterpreted.
In view of the fact that I found it impossible to make an absolute denial, I telegraphed the President stating the facts and offering to make them public if he considered it wise to do so. The important part of the telegram, which was dated September 16, 1919, is as follows:
"On May 17th Bullitt resigned by letter giving his reasons, with which you are familiar. I replied by letter on the 18th without any comment on his reasons. Bullitt on the 19th asked to see me to say good-bye and I saw him. He elaborated on the reasons for his resignation and said that he could not conscientiously give countenance to a treaty which was based on injustice. I told him that I would say nothing against his resigning since he put it on conscientious grounds, and that I recognized that certain features of the Treaty were bad, as I presumed most every one did, but that was probably unavoidable in view of conflicting claims and that nothing ought to be done to prevent the speedy restoration of peace by signing the Treaty. Bullitt then discussed the numerous European commissions provided for by the Treaty on which the United States was to be represented. I told him that I was disturbed by this fact because I was afraid the Senate and possibly the people, if they understood this, would refuse ratification, and that anything which was an obstacle to ratification was unfortunate because we ought to have peace as soon as possible."
It is very easy to see how by making a record of one side of this conversation without reference to the other side and by an omission here and there, possibly unintentionally, the sense was altered. Thus Mr. Bullitt, by repeating only a part of my words and by omitting the context, entirely changed the meaning of what was said. My attitude was, and I intended to show it at the time, that the Treaty should be signed and ratified at the earliest possible moment because the restoration of peace was paramount and that any provision in the Treaty which might delay the peace, by making uncertain senatorial consent to ratification, was to be deplored.
Having submitted to the President the question of making a public explanation of my interview with Mr. Bullitt which would in a measure at least correct the impression caused by his statement, I could not do so until I received the President's approval. That was never received. The telegram, which was sent to Mr. Wilson, through the Department of State, was never answered. It was not even acknowledged. The consequence was that the version of the conversation given by Mr. Bullitt was the only one that up to the present time has been published.
The almost unavoidable conclusion from the President's silence is that he considered my explanation was insufficient to destroy or even to weaken materially the effect of Mr. Bullitt's account of what had taken place, and that the public would believe in spite of it that I was opposed to the Treaty and hostile to the League of Nations. I am not disposed to blame the President for holding this opinion considering what had taken place at Paris. From his point of view a statement, such as I was willing to make, would in no way help the situation. I would still be on record as opposed to certain provisions of the Treaty, provisions which he was so earnestly defending in his addresses. While Mr. Bullitt had given an incomplete report of our conversation, there was sufficient truth in it to make anything but a flat denial seem of little value to the President; and, as I could not make such a denial, his point of view seemed to be that the damage was done and could not be undone. I am inclined to think that he was right.
My views concerning the Treaty at the time of the conversation with Mr. Bullitt are expressed in a memorandum of May 8, 1919, which is as follows:
"The terms of peace were yesterday delivered to the German plenipotentiaries, and for the first time in these days of feverish rush of preparation there is time to consider the Treaty as a complete document.
"The impression made by it is one of disappointment, of regret, and of depression. The terms of peace appear immeasurably harsh and humiliating, while many of them seem to me impossible of performance.
"The League of Nations created by the Treaty is relied upon to preserve the artificial structure which has been erected by compromise of the conflicting interests of the Great Powers and to prevent the germination of the seeds of war which are sown in so many articles and which under normal conditions would soon bear fruit. The League might as well attempt to prevent the growth of plant life in a tropical jungle. Wars will come sooner or later.
"It must be admitted in honesty that the League is an instrument of the mighty to check the normal growth of national power and national aspirations among those who have been rendered impotent by defeat. Examine the Treaty and you will find peoples delivered against their wills into the hands of those whom they hate, while their economic resources are torn from them and given to others. Resentment and bitterness, if not desperation, are bound to be the consequences of such provisions. It may be years before these oppressed peoples are able to throw off the yoke, but as sure as day follows night the time will come when they will make the effort.
"This war was fought by the United States to destroy forever the conditions which produced it. Those conditions have not been destroyed. They have been supplanted by other conditions equally productive of hatred, jealousy, and suspicion. In place of the Triple Alliance and the Entente has arisen the Quintuple Alliance which is to rule the world. The victors in this war intend to impose their combined will upon the vanquished and to subordinate all interests to their own.
"It is true that to please the aroused public opinion of mankind and to respond to the idealism of the moralist they have surrounded the new alliance with a halo and called it 'The League of Nations,' but whatever it may be called or however it may be disguised it is an alliance of the Five Great Military Powers.
"It is useless to close our eyes to the fact that the power to compel obedience by the exercise of the united strength of 'The Five' is the fundamental principle of the League. Justice is secondary. Might is primary.
"The League as now constituted will be the prey of greed and intrigue; and the law of unanimity in the Council, which may offer a restraint, will be broken or render the organization powerless. It is called upon to stamp as just what is unjust.
"We have a treaty of peace, but it will not bring permanent peace because it is founded on the shifting sands of self-interest."
In the views thus expressed I was not alone. A few days after they were written I was in London where I discussed the Treaty with several of the leading British statesmen. I noted their opinions thus: "The consensus was that the Treaty was unwise and unworkable, that it was conceived in intrigue and fashioned in cupidity, and that it would produce rather than prevent wars." One of these leaders of political thought in Great Britain said that "the only apparent purpose of the League of Nations seems to be to perpetuate the series of unjust provisions which were being imposed."
The day following my return from London, which was on May 17, I received Mr. Bullitt's letter of resignation and also letters from five of our principal experts protesting against the terms of peace and stating that they considered them to be an abandonment of the principles for which Americans had fought. One of the officials, whose relations with the President were of a most intimate nature, said that he was in a quandary about resigning; that he did not think that the conditions in the Treaty would make for peace because they were too oppressive; that the obnoxious things in the Treaty were due to secret diplomacy; and that the President should have stuck rigidly to his principles, which he had not. This official was evidently deeply incensed, but in the end he did not resign, nor did the five experts who sent letters, because they were told that it would seriously cripple the American Commission in the preparation of the Austrian Treaty if they did not continue to serve. Another and more prominent adviser of the President felt very bitterly over the terms of peace. In speaking of his disapproval of them he told me that he had found the same feeling among the British in Paris, who were disposed to blame the President since "they had counted upon him to stand firmly by his principles and face down the intriguers."
It is needless to cite other instances indicating the general state of mind among the Americans and British at Paris to show the views that were being exchanged and the frank comments that were being made at the time of my interview with Mr. Bullitt. In truth I said less to him in criticism of the Treaty than I did to some others, but they have seen fit to respect the confidential nature of our conversations.
It is not pertinent to the present subject to recite the events between the delivery of the Treaty to the Germans on May 7 and its signature on June 28. In spite of the dissatisfaction, which even went so far that some of the delegates of the Great Powers threatened to decline to sign the Treaty unless certain of its terms were modified, the supreme necessity of restoring peace as soon as possible overcame all obstacles. It was the appreciation of this supreme necessity which caused many Americans to urge consent to ratification when the Treaty was laid before the Senate.
My own position was paradoxical. I was opposed to the Treaty, but signed it and favored its ratification. The explanation is this: Convinced after conversations with the President in July and August, 1919, that he would not consent to any effective reservations, the politic course seemed to be to endeavor to secure ratification without reservations. It appeared to be the only possible way of obtaining that for which all the world longed and which in the months succeeding the signature appeared absolutely essential to prevent the widespread disaster resulting from political and economic chaos which seemed to threaten many nations if not civilization itself. Even if the Treaty was bad in certain provisions, so long as the President remained inflexible and insistent, its ratification without change seemed a duty to humanity. At least that was my conviction in the summer and autumn of 1919, and I am not yet satisfied that it was erroneous. My views after January, 1920, are not pertinent to the subject under consideration. The consequences of the failure to ratify promptly the Treaty of Versailles are still uncertain. They may be more serious or they may be less serious than they appeared in 1919. Time alone will disclose the truth and fix the responsibility for what occurred after the Treaty of Versailles was laid before the Senate of the United States.
CONCLUSION
The narration of my relations to the peace negotiations as one of the American Commissioners to the Paris Conference, which has been confined within the limits laid down in the opening chapter of this volume, concludes with the recital of the views which I held concerning the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and which were brought to the attention of Mr. Wilson through the press reports of William C. Bullitt's statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on September 12, 1919.
The endeavor has been to present, as fully as possible in the circumstances, a review of my association with President Wilson in connection with the negotiations at Paris setting forth our differences of opinion and divergence of judgment upon the subjects coming before the Peace Conference, the conduct of the proceedings, and the terms of peace imposed upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles.
It is evident from this review that, from a time prior to Mr. Wilson's departure from the United States on December 4, 1918, to attend the Peace Conference up to the delivery of the text of the Treaty to the German plenipotentiaries on May 7, 1919, there were many subjects of disagreement between the President and myself; that he was disposed to reject or ignore the advice and suggestions which I volunteered; and that in consequence of my convictions I followed his guidance and obeyed his instructions unwillingly.
While there were other matters of friction between us they were of a personal nature and of minor importance. Though they may have contributed to the formality of our relations they played no real part in the increasing difficulty of the situation. The matters narrated were, in my opinion, the principal causes for the letters written by President Wilson in February, 1920; at least they seem sufficient to explain the origin of the correspondence, while the causes specifically stated by him--my calling together of the heads of the executive departments for consultation during his illness and my attempts to anticipate his judgment--are insufficient.
The reasons given in the President's letter of February 11, the essential portions of which have been quoted, for stating that my resignation as Secretary of State would be acceptable to him, are the embarrassment caused him by my "reluctance and divergence of judgment" and the implication that my mind did not "willingly go along" with his. As neither of these reasons applies to the calling of Cabinet meetings or to the anticipation of his judgment in regard to foreign affairs, the unavoidable conclusion is that these grounds of complaint were not the real causes leading up to the severance of our official association.
The real causes--which are the only ones worthy of consideration--are to be found in the record of the relations between President Wilson and myself in connection with the peace negotiations. Upon that record must rest the justification or the refutation of Mr. Wilson's implied charge that I was not entirely loyal to him as President and that I failed to perform my full duty to my country as Secretary of State and as a Commissioner to Negotiate Peace by opposing the way in which he exercised his constitutional authority to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States.
THE END
APPENDIX I
THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, LAID BEFORE THE AMERICAN COMMISSION ON JANUARY 10, 1919
PREAMBLE
In order to secure peace, security, and orderly government by the prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, the Powers signatory to this covenant and agreement jointly and severally adopt this constitution of the League of Nations.
ARTICLE I
The action of the Signatory Powers under the terms of this agreement shall be effected through the instrumentality of a Body of Delegates which shall consist of the ambassadors and ministers of the contracting Powers accredited to H. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. The meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held at the seat of government of H. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. shall be the presiding officer of the Body.
Whenever the Delegates deem it necessary or advisable, they may meet temporarily at the seat of government of B. or of S., in which case the Ambassador or Minister to H. of the country in which the meeting is held shall be the presiding officer _pro tempore_.
It shall be the privilege of any of the contracting Powers to assist its representative in the Body of Delegates by any method of conference, counsel, or advice that may seem best to it, and also to substitute upon occasion a special representative for its regular diplomatic representative accredited to H.
ARTICLE II
The Body of Delegates shall regulate their own procedure and shall have power to appoint such committees as they may deem necessary to inquire into and report upon any matters that lie within the field of their action.
It shall be the right of the Body of Delegates, upon the initiative of any member, to discuss, either publicly or privately as it may deem best, any matter lying within the jurisdiction of the League of Nations as defined in this Covenant, or any matter likely to affect the peace of the world; but all actions of the Body of Delegates taken in the exercise of the functions and powers granted to them under this Covenant shall be first formulated and agreed upon by an Executive Council, which shall act either by reference or upon its own initiative and which shall consist of the representatives of the Great Powers together with representatives drawn in annual rotation from two panels, one of which shall be made up of the representatives of the States ranking next after the Great Powers and the other of the representatives of the minor States (a classification which the Body of Delegates shall itself establish and may from time to time alter), such a number being drawn from these panels as will be but one less than the representatives of the Great Powers; and three or more negative votes in the Council shall operate as a veto upon any action or resolution proposed.
All resolutions passed or actions taken by the Body of Delegates upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, except those adopted in execution of any direct powers herein granted to the Body of Delegates themselves, shall have the effect of recommendations to the several governments of the League.
The Executive Council shall appoint a permanent Secretariat and staff and may appoint joint committees chosen from the Body of Delegates or consisting of specially qualified persons outside of that Body, for the study and systematic consideration of the international questions with which the Council may have to deal, or of questions likely to lead to international complications or disputes. It shall also take the necessary steps to establish and maintain proper liaison both with the foreign offices of the signatory powers and with any governments or agencies which may be acting as mandatories of the League of Nations in any part of the world.
ARTICLE III
The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected if agreeable to those peoples; and that territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary.
ARTICLE IV
The Contracting Powers recognize the principle that the establishment and maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations; and the Delegates are directed to formulate at once plans by which such a reduction may be brought about. The plan so formulated shall be binding when, and only when, unanimously approved by the Governments signatory to this Covenant.
As the basis for such a reduction of armaments, all the Powers subscribing to the Treaty of Peace of which this Covenant constitutes a part hereby agree to abolish conscription and all other forms of compulsory military service, and also agree that their future forces of defence and of international action shall consist of militia or volunteers, whose numbers and methods of training shall be fixed, after expert inquiry, by the agreements with regard to the reduction of armaments referred to in the last preceding paragraph.
The Body of Delegates shall also determine for the consideration and action of the several governments what direct military equipment and armament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces laid down in the programme of disarmament; and these limits, when adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the Body of Delegates.
The Contracting Powers further agree that munitions and implements of war shall not be manufactured by private enterprise or for private profit, and that there shall be full and frank publicity as to all national armaments and military or naval programmes.
ARTICLE V
The Contracting Powers jointly and severally agree that, should disputes or difficulties arise between or among them which cannot be satisfactorily settled or adjusted by the ordinary processes of diplomacy, they will in no case resort to armed force without previously submitting the questions and matters involved either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Executive Council of the Body of Delegates or until there has been an award by the arbitrators or a decision by the Executive Council; and that they will not even then resort to armed force as against a member of the League of Nations who complies with the award of the arbitrators or the decision of the Executive Council.
The Powers signatory to this Covenant undertake and agree that whenever any dispute or difficulty shall arise between or among them with regard to any questions of the law of nations, with regard to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any fact which would, if established, constitute a breach of international obligation, or as to any alleged damage and the nature and measure of the reparation to be made therefor, if such dispute or difficulty cannot be satisfactorily settled by the ordinary processes of negotiation, to submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration and to carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered.
In case of arbitration, the matter or matters at issue shall be referred to three arbitrators, one of the three to be selected by each of the parties to the dispute, when there are but two such parties, and the third by the two thus selected. When there are more than two parties to the dispute, one arbitrator shall be named by each of the several parties, and the arbitrators thus named shall add to their number others of their own choice, the number thus added to be limited to the number which will suffice to give a deciding voice to the arbitrators thus added in case of a tie vote among the arbitrators chosen by the contending parties. In case the arbitrators chosen by the contending parties cannot agree upon an additional arbitrator or arbitrators, the additional arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen by the Body of Delegates.
On the appeal of a party to the dispute the decision of the arbitrators may be set aside by a vote of three-fourths of the Delegates, in case the decision of the arbitrators was unanimous, or by a vote of two-thirds of the Delegates in case the decision of the arbitrators was not unanimous, but unless thus set aside shall be finally binding and conclusive.
When any decision of arbitrators shall have been thus set aside, the dispute shall again be submitted to arbitrators chosen as heretofore provided, none of whom shall, however, have previously acted as arbitrators in the dispute in question, and the decision of the arbitrators rendered in this second arbitration shall be finally binding and conclusive without right of appeal.
If for any reason it should prove impracticable to refer any matter in dispute to arbitration, the parties to the dispute shall apply to the Executive Council to take the matter under consideration for such mediatory action or recommendation as it may deem wise in the circumstances. The Council shall immediately accept the reference and give notice to the other party or parties, and shall make the necessary arrangements for a full hearing, investigation, and consideration. It shall ascertain all the facts involved in the dispute and shall make such recommendations as it may deem wise and practicable based on the merits of the controversy and calculated to secure a just and lasting settlement. Other members of the League shall place at the disposal of the Executive Council any and all information that may be in their possession which in any way bears upon the facts or merits of the controversy; and the Executive Council shall do everything in its power by way of mediation or conciliation to bring about a peaceful settlement. The decisions of the Executive Council shall be addressed to the disputants, and shall not have the force of a binding verdict. Should the Executive Council fail to arrive at any conclusion, it shall be the privilege of the members of the Executive Council to publish their several conclusions or recommendations; and such publications shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by either or any of the disputants.
ARTICLE VI
Should any contracting Power break or disregard its covenants under ARTICLE V, it shall thereby _ipso facto_ commit an act of war with all the members of the League, which shall immediately subject it to a complete economic and financial boycott, including the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their subjects and the subjects of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention, so far as possible, of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the subjects of the covenant-breaking State and the subjects of any other State, whether a member of the League of Nations or not.
It shall be the privilege and duty of the Executive Council of the Body of Delegates in such a case to recommend what effective military or naval force the members of the League of Nations shall severally contribute, and to advise, if it should think best, that the smaller members of the League be excused from making any contribution to the armed forces to be used against the covenant-breaking State.
The covenant-breaking State shall, after the restoration of peace, be subject to perpetual disarmament and to the regulations with regard to a peace establishment provided for new States under the terms of SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE IV.
ARTICLE VII
If any Power shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any hostile step short of war, against another Power before submitting the dispute involved to arbitrators or consideration by the Executive Council as herein provided, or shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any hostile step short of war, in regard to any dispute which has been decided adversely to it by arbitrators chosen and empowered as herein provided, the Contracting Powers hereby bind themselves not only to cease all commerce and intercourse with that Power but also to unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to commerce or intercourse with any part of the world and to use any force that may be necessary to accomplish that object.
ARTICLE VIII
Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Contracting Powers or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the League of Nations and to all the Powers signatory hereto, and those Powers hereby reserve the right to take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.
It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly right of each of the nations signatory or adherent to this Covenant to draw the attention of the Body of Delegates to any circumstances anywhere which threaten to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.
The Delegates shall meet in the interest of peace whenever war is rumored or threatened, and also whenever the Delegate of any Power shall inform the Delegates that a meeting and conference in the interest of peace is advisable.
The Delegates may also meet at such other times and upon such other occasions as they shall from time to time deem best and determine.
ARTICLE IX
In the event of a dispute arising between one of the Contracting Powers and a Power not a party to this Covenant, the Contracting Power involved hereby binds itself to endeavour to obtain the submission of the dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration. If the other Power will not agree to submit the dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration, the Contracting Power shall bring the matter to the attention of the Body of Delegates. The Delegates shall in such a case, in the name of the League of Nations, invite the Power not a party to this Covenant to become _ad hoc_ a party and to submit its case to judicial decision or to arbitration, and if that Power consents it is hereby agreed that the provisions hereinbefore contained and applicable to the submission of disputes to arbitration or discussion shall be in all respects applicable to the dispute both in favour of and against such Power as if it were a party to this Covenant.
In case the Power not a party to this Covenant shall not accept the invitation of the Delegates to become _ad hoc_ a party, it shall be the duty of the Executive Council immediately to institute an inquiry into the circumstances and merits of the dispute involved and to recommend such joint action by the Contracting Powers as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances disclosed.
ARTICLE X
If hostilities should be begun or any hostile action taken against the Contracting Power by the Power not a party to this Covenant before a decision of the dispute by arbitrators or before investigation, report and recommendation by the Executive Council in regard to the dispute, or contrary to such recommendation, the Contracting Powers shall thereupon cease all commerce and communication with that Power and shall also unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to all commerce or intercourse with any part of the world, employing jointly any force that may be necessary to accomplish that object. The Contracting Powers shall also unite in coming to the assistance of the Contracting Power against which hostile action has been taken, combining their armed forces in its behalf.
ARTICLE XI
In case of a dispute between states not parties to this Covenant, any Contracting Power may bring the matter to the attention of the Delegates, who shall thereupon tender the good offices of the League of Nations with a view to the peaceable settlement of the dispute.
If one of the states, a party to the dispute, shall offer and agree to submit its interests and causes of action wholly to the control and decision of the League of Nations, that state shall _ad hoc_ be deemed a Contracting Power. If no one of the states, parties to the dispute, shall so offer and agree, the Delegates shall, through the Executive Council, of their own motion take such action and make such recommendation to their governments as will prevent hostilities and result in the settlement of the dispute.
ARTICLE XII
Any Power not a party to this Covenant, whose government is based upon the principle of popular self-government, may apply to the Body of Delegates for leave to become a party. If the Delegates shall regard the granting thereof as likely to promote the peace, order, and security of the World, they may act favourably on the application, and their favourable action shall operate to constitute the Power so applying in all respects a full signatory party to this Covenant. This action shall require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Delegates.
ARTICLE XIII
The Contracting Powers severally agree that the present Covenant and Convention is accepted as abrogating all treaty obligations _inter se_ which are inconsistent with the terms hereof, and solemnly engage that they will not enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms hereof.
In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subsequently admitted to the League of Nations shall, before becoming a party to this Covenant, have undertaken any treaty obligations which are inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.
_SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS_
I
In respect of the peoples and territories which formerly belonged to Austria-Hungary, and to Turkey, and in respect of the colonies formerly under the dominion of the German Empire, the League of Nations shall be regarded as the residuary trustee with sovereign right of ultimate disposal or of continued administration in accordance with certain fundamental principles hereinafter set forth; and this reversion and control shall exclude all rights or privileges of annexation on the part of any Power.
These principles are, that there shall in no case be any annexation of any of these territories by any State either within the League or outside of it, and that in the future government of these peoples and territories the rule of self-determination, or the consent of the governed to their form of government, shall be fairly and reasonably applied, and all policies of administration or economic development be based primarily upon the well-considered interests of the people themselves.
II
Any authority, control, or administration which may be necessary in respect of these peoples or territories other than their own self-determined and self-organized autonomy shall be the exclusive function of and shall be vested in the League of Nations and exercised or undertaken by or on behalf of it.
It shall be lawful for the League of Nations to delegate its authority, control, or administration of any such people or territory to some single State or organized agency which it may designate and appoint as its agent or mandatory; but whenever or wherever possible or feasible the agent or mandatory so appointed shall be nominated or approved by the autonomous people or territory.
III
The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatary State or agency shall in each case be explicitly defined by the League in a special Act or Charter which shall reserve to the League complete power of supervision and of intimate control, and which shall also reserve to the people of any such territory or governmental unit the right to appeal to the League for the redress or correction of any breach of the mandate by the mandatary State or agency or for the substitution of some other State or agency, as mandatary.
The mandatary State or agency shall in all cases be bound and required to maintain the policy of the open door, or equal opportunity for all the signatories to this Covenant, in respect of the use and development of the economic resources of such people or territory.
The mandatary State or agency shall in no case form or maintain any military or naval force in excess of definite standards laid down by the League itself for the purposes of internal police.
IV
No new State arising or created from the old Empires of Austria-Hungary, or Turkey shall be recognized by the League or admitted into its membership except on condition that its military and naval forces and armaments shall conform to standards prescribed by the League in respect of it from time to time.
As successor to the Empires, the League of Nations is empowered, directly and without right of delegation, to watch over the relations _inter se_ of all new independent States arising or created out of the Empires, and shall assume and fulfill the duty of conciliating and composing differences between them with a view to the maintenance of settled order and the general peace.
V
The Powers signatory or adherent to this Covenant agree that they will themselves seek to establish and maintain fair hours and humane conditions of labour for all those within their several jurisdictions who are engaged in manual labour and that they will exert their influence in favour of the adoption and maintenance of a similar policy and like safeguards wherever their industrial and commercial relations extend.
VI
The League of Nations shall require all new States to bind themselves as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous States, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority of their people.
APPENDIX II
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
(_Plan of Lord Robert Cecil_[1])
I
ORGANIZATION
The general treaty setting up the league of nations will explicitly provide for regular conferences between the responsible representatives of the contracting powers.
These conferences would review the general conditions of international relations and would naturally pay special attention to any difficulty which might seem to threaten the peace of the world. They would also receive and as occasion demanded discuss reports as to the work of any international administrative or investigating bodies working under the League.
These conferences would constitute the pivot of the league. They would be meetings of statesmen responsible to their own sovereign parliaments, and any decisions taken would therefore, as in the case of the various allied conferences during the war, have to be unanimous.
The following form of organization is suggested:
I. _The conference_. Annual meeting of prime ministers and foreign secretaries of British Empire, United States, France, Italy, Japan, and any other States recognized by them as great powers. Quadrennial meeting of representatives of all States included in the league. There should also be provision for the summoning of special conferences on the demand of any one of the great powers or, if there were danger of an outbreak of war, of any member of the league. (The composition of the league will be determined at the peace conference. Definitely untrustworthy and hostile States, e.g., Russia, should the Bolshevist government remain in power, should be excluded. Otherwise it is desirable not to be too rigid in scrutinizing qualifications, since the small powers will in any case not exercise any considerable influence.)
2. For the conduct of its work the interstate conference will require a permanent secretariat. The general secretary should be appointed by the great powers, if possible choosing a national of some other country.
3. _International bodies_. The secretariat would be the responsible channel of communication between the interstate conference and all international bodies functioning under treaties guaranteed by the league. These would fall into three classes:
_(a)_ Judicial; i.e., the existing Hague organization with any additions or modifications made by the league.
_(b)_ International administrative bodies. Such as the suggested transit commission. To these would be added bodies already formed under existing treaties (which are very numerous and deal with very important interests, e.g., postal union, international labor office, etc.).
_(c)_ International commissions of enquiry: e.g., commission on industrial conditions (labor legislation), African commission, armaments commission.
4. In addition to the above arrangements guaranteed by or arising out of the general treaty, there would probably be a periodical congress of delegates of the parliaments of the States belonging to the league, as a development out of the existing Interparliamentary Union. A regular staple of discussion for this body would be afforded by the reports of the interstate conference and of the different international bodies. The congress would thus cover the ground that is at present occupied by the periodical Hague Conference and also the ground claimed by the Socialist International.
For the efficient conduct of all these activities it is essential that there should be a permanent central meeting-place, where the officials and officers of the league would enjoy the privileges of extra-territoriality. Geneva is suggested as the most suitable place.
II
PREVENTION OF WAR
The covenants for the prevention of war which would be embodied in the general treaty would be as follows:
(1) The members of the league would bind themselves not to go to war until they had submitted the questions at issue to an international conference or an arbitral court, and until the conference or court had issued a report or handed down an award.
(2) The members of the league would bind themselves not to go to war with any member of the league complying with the award of a court or with the report of a conference. For the purpose of this clause, the report of the conference must be unanimous, excluding the litigants.
(3) The members of the league would undertake to regard themselves, as _ipso facto_, at war with any one of them acting contrary to the above covenants, and to take, jointly and severally, appropriate military, economic and other measure against the recalcitrant State.
(4) The members of the league would bind themselves to take similar action, in the sense of the above clause, against any State not being a member of the league which is involved in a dispute with a member of the league.
(This is a stronger provision than that proposed in the Phillimore Report.)
The above covenants mark an advance upon the practice of international relations previous to the war in two respects: (i) In insuring a necessary period of delay before war can break out (except between two States which are neither of them members of the league); (2) In securing public discussion and probably a public report upon matters in dispute.
It should be observed that even in cases where the conference report is not unanimous, and therefore in no sense binding, a majority report may be issued and that this would be likely to carry weight with the public opinion of the States in the league.
APPENDIX III
THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES
ARTICLE I
The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League.
Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.
Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.
ARTICLE 2
The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.
ARTICLE 3
The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the League.
The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place as may be decided upon.
The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.
At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one vote, and may have not more than three Representatives.
ARTICLE 4
The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece shall be members of the Council.
With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council.
The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.
The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.
Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League.
At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one Representative.
ARTICLE 5
Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.
All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.
The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.
ARTICLE 6
The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and such secretaries and staff as may be required.
The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the Annex; thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly.
The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the Council.
The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council.
The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.
ARTICLE 7
The Seat of the League is established at Geneva.
The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be established elsewhere.
All positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.
Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.
The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.
ARTICLE 8
The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.
The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.
Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.
After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.
The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.
The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.
ARTICLE 9
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally.
ARTICLE 10
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.
ARTICLE 11
Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.
It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.
ARTICLE 12
The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council.
In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.
ARTICLE 13
The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration.
Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration.
For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the Court agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.
The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.
ARTICLE 14
The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.
ARTICLE 15
If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.
For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.
The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.
If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.
Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.
If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.
If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.
If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.
The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.
In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.
ARTICLE 16
Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall _ipso facto_ be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.
It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.
The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League.
Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.
ARTICLE 17
In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.
Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.
If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.
If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.
ARTICLE 18
Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.
ARTICLE 19
The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.
ARTICLE 20
The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings _inter se_ which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.
In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.
ARTICLE 21
Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.
ARTICLE 22
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.
The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.
There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.
In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.
The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.
ARTICLE 23
Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League:
_(a)_ will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organisations;
_(b)_ undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control;
_(c)_ will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;
_(d)_ will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest;
_(e)_ will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be borne in mind;
_(f)_ will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.
ARTICLE 24
There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.
In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of international bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.
The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League.
ARTICLE 25
The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.
ARTICLE 26
Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly. No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.
APPENDIX IV
THE FOURTEEN POINTS[2]
The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:
I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.
VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.
VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.
VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.
IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.
X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.
XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.
XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.
XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.
XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.
APPENDIX V
PRINCIPLES DECLARED BY PRESIDENT WILSON IN HIS ADDRESS OF FEBRUARY 11, 1918
The principles to be applied are these:
_First_, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent;
_Second_, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that
_Third_, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states; and
_Fourth_, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.
APPENDIX VI
THE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES RELATING TO SHANTUNG
ARTICLE 156
Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and privileges--particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, railways, mines, and submarine cables--which she acquired in virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung.
All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, including its branch lines, together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for the exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto.
The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao to Shanghai and from Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.
ARTICLE 157
The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.
ARTICLE 158
Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or other, of the territory of Kiaochow.
Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles.
[Footnote 1: Reprinted from Senate Doc. No. 106, 66th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1163.]
[Footnote 2: From the address of President Wilson delivered at a Joint Session of Congress on January 8, 1918.]
INDEX
Abrogation of treaties contrary to the League, in Wilson's original draft; in Treaty,
Affirmative guaranty of territory and independence, plan; Wilson adopts, in Fourteen Points; Lansing's opposition; constitutional and political arguments against; Lansing's "self-denying covenant" as substitute; in Wilson's original draft and in Treaty; as continuing balance of power; Wilson adheres to; not in Cecil plan; in Lansing's resolution of principles; other substitute; as reason for rejection of Treaty by Senate; retained in reported Covenant; and dominance of Great Powers. _See also_ Equality of nations; League; Self-denying covenant.
Albania, disposition.
Alliances. _See_ French alliance.
Alsace-Lorraine, to be restored to France.
Amendment of League, provision for.
American Bar Association, Lansing's address.
American Commission, members; ignored in League negotiations; conference of January 10; ignorant of preliminary negotiations; question of resignation over Shantung settlement; shares in Shantung negotiations. _See also_ Bliss; House; Lansing; White; Wilson.
American Peace Society.
American programme, lack of definite, as subject of disagreement; Fourteen Points announced; not worked out; insufficiency of Fourteen Points; Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements; effect of President's attendance at Conference; embarrassment to delegates of lack; _projet_ of treaty prepared for Lansing; President resents it; no system or team-work in American Commission; reason for President's attitude; no instructions during President's absence; results of lack; and Preliminary Treaty; influence of lack on Wilson's leadership; text of Fourteen Points.
Annunzio, Gabriele d', at Fiume.
Arabia, disposition. _See also_ Near East.
Arbitral Tribunal, in Lansing's plan.
Arbitration, as form of peace promotion; in Lansing's plan; in Wilson's original draft; in Cecil plan; in Treaty. _See also_ Diplomatic adjustment; Judicial settlement.
Armenia, mandate for; protectorate. _See also_ Near East.
Armistice, American conference on.
Article X. _See_ Affirmative guaranty.
Assembly (Body of Delegates), in Wilson's original draft; analogous body in Cecil plan; in Treaty.
Auchincloss, Gordon, and drafting of League.
Austria, Archduchy and union with Germany, outlet to sea.
Austria-Hungary, dissolution; Fourteen Points on subject people.
Azerbaidjan, Wilson and.
Baker, Ray Stannard, and Shantung.
Balance of power, Clemenceau advocates; Wilson denounces; and Cecil plan; League and. _See also_ Affirmative guaranty; Equality of nations.
Balfour, Arthur, signs French alliance.
Balkans, Fourteen Points on. _See also_ states by names.
Belgium, and Anglo-Franco-American alliance, full sovereignty,
Bessarabia disposition,
Bliss, Tasker H. American delegate, opposes affirmative guaranty, and Covenant as reported, and proposed French alliance, and Shantung, letter to President, _See also_ American Commission; American programme.
Body of Delegates. _See_ Assembly.
Boers, and self-determination,
Bohemia, disposition,
Bolshevism, peace as check to spread,
Bosnia, disposition,
Boundaries, principles in drawing,
Bowman, Isaiah, Commission of Inquiry
Brest-Litovsk Treaty, to be abrogated,
Bucharest Treaty, to be abrogated,
Buffer state on the Rhine,
Bulgaria, boundaries,
Bullitt, William C., on revision of Covenant, testimony on Lansing interview, Lansing's telegram to President on testimony, no reply received, and Wilson's western speeches,
Canada, Papineau Rebellion and self-determination,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Cecil, Lord Robert, plan for League, Wilson opposes it, text of plan,
Central Powers, Wilson and need of defeat, hope in Wilson's attitude, peace or Bolshevism, _See also_ Mandates, and states by name.
China. _See_ Shantung.
Chinda, Viscount, and Shantung,
Civil War, and self-determination,
Clemenceau, Georges, Supreme War Council, advocates balance of power, and Cecil plan, and Franco-American alliance, _See also_ Council of Four.
Codification of international law, in Lansing's plan,
Colonies, disposition of, in Lansing's plan, Fourteen Points on, _See also_ Mandates.
Commerce. _See_ Non-intercourse; Open Door.
Commission of Inquiry, work,
Commission on the League of Nations, appointed, and Wilson's return to United States, meets, Wilson's draft as groundwork, meetings and report, Wilson's address, character of report and work, secrecy, Wilson's domination,
Constantinople, disposition,
Constitutional objections, to affirmative guaranty, and to Cecil plan,
Council of Foreign Ministers, established, nickname,
Council of Four, self-constituted, secrecy, "Olympians," gives only digest of Treaty to other delegates, Shantung bargain, _See also_ Secret diplomacy.
Council of Ten, and Lansing's substitute resolution on League, during Wilson's absence, self-constituted organization, and Supreme War Council, divided, and secrecy,
Council of the Heads of States. _See_ Council of Four.
Council (Executive Council) of the League, in Wilson's original draft, analogous body in Cecil plan, in Treaty,
Covenant. _See_ League of Nations.
Croatia, disposition,
Czecho-Slovakia, erection,
Dalmatia, in Pact of London,
Danzig, for Poland,
Dardanelles, Fourteen Points on,
Declaration of war, affirmative guaranty and power over,
Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, Heligoland,
Diplomacy. _See_ Secret diplomacy.
Diplomatic adjustment, as basis of Covenant, exalted, Lansing on judicial settlement and, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, _See also_ Judicial settlement.
Disarmament, not touched in Lansing's plan; in Lansing's resolution of principles; in Wilson's original draft; in Treaty.
Dobrudja, disposition.
East Indians, and self-determination.
Economic influence on boundary lines.
Economic interdependence, importance in peace negotiations.
Economic pressure. _See_ Non-intercourse.
Egypt, and self-determination; disposition.
Election of 1918, as rebuke to Wilson.
Entangling alliances. _See_ Isolation.
Equality of nations, sacrifice in Wilson's draft of League; in Lansing's form for League; ignored in Cecil plan; primacy of Great Powers retained in reported Covenant; violation by Treaty; and secret diplomacy at Conference.
Esthonia, Wilson and; autonomy.
Ethnic influence on boundary lines. _See also_ Racial minorities; Self-determination.
Finland, question of independence.
Fiume affair, Lansing's attitude; Pact of London in light of dissolution of Austria-Hungary; resulting increase in Italian claims as basis for compromise; attitude of Italy toward Jugo-Slavia; commercial importance of Fiume to Jugo-Slavia; campaign of Italian delegates for Fiume; Italian public sentiment; character of population, self-determination question; efforts to get Wilson's approval; threat to retire from Conference; Wilson's statement against Italian claim; withdrawal of delegation; Italian resentment against Wilson; as lesson on secret diplomacy; delegation returns; and Shantung.
Fourteen Points, announced; affirmative guaranty in; insufficient as programme; text.
France, Alsace-Lorraine; restoration. _See also_ Clemenceau; French alliance; Great Powers.
Freedom of the seas, in Fourteen Points.
French alliance, as subject of disagreement; provisions of treaty; relation to League; and removal of certain French demands from Treaty of Peace; and French adherence to League; Lansing's opposition; drafted, signed; Lansing and signing; arguments for.
Geographic influence on boundary lines.
Georgia, Wilson and.
Germany, buffer state on the Rhine; and Russian route to the East; Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements; military impotence. _See also_ Central Powers; French alliance; Mandates.
Ginn Peace Foundation.
Great Britain, and clause on self-determination; Egypt. _See also_ French alliance; Great Powers; Lloyd George.
Great Powers, and mandates. _See also_ Balance of power; Council of Four; Equality of nations.
Greece, territory.
Gregory, Thomas W., and Wilson's _modus vivendi_ idea.
Guaranty. _See_ Affirmative; Self-denying.
Hague Conventions, and international peace.
Hague Tribunal, and Lansing's plan; Wilson's contempt; recognition in Cecil plan.
Hands Off, as basis of Lansing's plan.
Health, promotion in Treaty.
Heligoland, dismantlement, disposition.
Herzegovina, disposition.
Historic influence on boundary lines.
Hostilities. _See_ Prevention of war.
House, Edward M., joins Supreme War Council; conference on armistice terms; selection as peace negotiator and President as delegate, Commission of Inquiry, and drafting of League, and international court, and "self-denying covenant," and balance of power, of Commission on the League of Nations, and mandates, and data, ignorant of Wilson's programme, and Preliminary Treaty with detailed Covenant, and private consultations, _See also_ American Commission.
Hungary, separation from Austria.
Immoral traffic, prevention in Treaty,
Immunities of League representatives,
Indemnities, and mandates,
India, German routes to,
International commissions, in Cecil plan, in Treaty,
International court. _See_ Judicial settlement.
International enforcement. _See_ Affirmative guaranty.
International military force, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty,
International military staff, proposal,
Interparliamentary Congress, in Cecil plan,
Inviolability of League property,
Irish, and self-determination,
Isolation, policy, and affirmative guaranty, and mandates, and French alliance,
Italy, and Cecil plan, territory, _See also_ Fiume; Great Powers.
Japan, and Cecil plan, in Council of Ten, _See also_ Great Powers; Shantung.
Judicial settlement of international disputes, Lansing's plan, subordinated in Wilson's draft, Lansing on diplomatic adjustment and, Lansing urges as nucleus of League, in Lansing's resolution of principles, Lansing's appeal for, in Covenant, arbitrators of litigant nations, difficulties in procedure, cost, elimination from Covenant of appeal from arbitral awards, how effected, Lansing's appeal ignored, in Cecil plan, _See also_ Arbitration; Diplomatic adjustment.
Jugo-Slavia, and Anglo-Franco-American alliance, port, erected, _See also_ Fiume.
Kato, Baron, and Shantung,
Kiao-Chau. _See_ Shantung.
Kiel Canal, internationalization,
Koo, V.K. Wellington, argument on Shantung,
Labor article, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty,
Lansing, Robert, resignation asked and given, divergence of judgment from President, reasons for retaining office, reasons for narrative, imputation of faithlessness, personal narrative, subjects of disagreement, attitude toward duty as negotiator, policy as to advice to President, President's attitude towards opinions, method of treatment of subject, conference on armistice terms, selected as a negotiator, opposition to President being a delegate, President's attitude toward this opposition, and Commission of Inquiry, arrival in Paris, and balance of power, and paramount need of speedy peace, opposition to mandates, opposition to French alliance treaty, signs it, personal relations with President, memorandum on American programme (1918), has _projet_ of treaty prepared, Wilson resents it, on lack of organization in American Commission, and lack of programme, and American Commission during President's absence, on Wilson's _modus vivendi_ idea, opposition to secret diplomacy, effect on Wilson, and Fiume, and Shantung, Bullitt affair, views on Treaty when presented to Germans, and ratification of Treaty _See also_ American Commission; League; Wilson.
Latvia Wilson and autonomy
League of Nations principles as subject of disagreement as object of peace negotiations as reason for President's participation in Conference Wilson's belief in necessity American support of idea, earlier plans and associations divergence of opinion on form political and juridical forms of organization Wilson's belief in international force and affirmative guaranty affirmative guaranty in Fourteen Points Phillimore's report preparation of Wilson's original draft, House as author Lansing not consulted, reason Lansing's opposition to affirmative guaranty Lansing and non-intercourse peace plan draft impracticable and equality of nations Lansing's "self-denying covenant" Lansing accepts guaranty as matter of expediency diplomatic adjustment as basis of Wilson's draft guaranty in first draft, later draft, and Treaty Lansing's substitute, his communications not acknowledged, incorporation of detailed Covenant in Treaty irreconcilable differences between Wilson's and Lansing's plans Lansing on diplomatic adjustment versus judicial settlement Lansing urges international court as nucleus three doctrines of Lansing's plan Lansing's first view of Wilson's draft his opinion of its form of its principles Wilson considers affirmative guaranty essential, effect on Treaty American Commission ignored on matters concerning Cecil plan Wilson's opposition to it question of self-determination Lansing's proposed resolution of principles in Treaty and later detailing detailed Covenant or speedy peace Wilson utilizes desire for peace to force acceptance of League Lansing proposes resolution to Wilson and to Council of Ten drafted resolution of principles Commission on the League of Nations appointed, American members resolution and Wilson's return to United States Wilson's draft before Commission Wilson pigeonholes resolution revision of Wilson's draft Lansing's appeal for international court it is ignored elimination of appeal from arbitral awards, how effected report of Commission, Wilson's address character of report and work of Commission, main principles unaltered Wilson and American opposition (Feb.) American Commission and report amendments to placate American opinion reaction in Europe due to American opposition change in character and addition of functions to preserve it summary of Lansing's objections and French alliance in a preliminary treaty as a _modus vivendi_ as subject of Wilson's private consultations secrecy in negotiations and Shantung bargain Bullitt's report of Lansing's attitude and carrying out of the Treaty as merely a name for the Quintuple Alliance text of Wilson's original draft of Cecil plan in Treaty _See also_ Mandates.
League to Enforce Peace Wilson's address
Lithuania Wilson and autonomy
Lloyd George, David, Supreme War Council, 14 and French alliance _See also_ Council of Four.
Log-rolling at Conference
London, Pact of
Makino, Baron and Shantung
Mandates, in Smuts plan, Wilson adopts it Lansing's criticism retained in reported Covenant political difficulties Wilson's attitude legal difficulties usefulness questioned as means of justifying the League and indemnities altruistic, to be share of United States in Wilson's original draft in Treaty.
Meeting-place of League in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty.
Membership in League in Wilson's original draft in Treaty withdrawal.
Mezes, Sidney E., Commission of Inquiry and data.
Miller, David Hunter and drafting of Covenant and _projet_ of a treaty.
_Modus vivendi_, Wilson and a preliminary treaty as
Monroe Doctrine and affirmative covenant preservation in Treaty
Montenegro in Jugo-Slavia Fourteen Points on
Moravia, disposition
Munitions regulation of manufacture and trade in Wilson's original draft in Treaty
National safety, dominance of principle
Near East United States and mandates Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements mandates in Wilson's original draft mandates in Treaty Fourteen points on
Negative guaranty. _See_ Self-denying covenant.
Non-intercourse as form of peace promotion constitutionality in Wilson's original draft in Treaty
Norway, Spitzbergen
Open Door in Lansing's plan in Near East in former German colonies principle in Wilson's original draft and in Treaty in Fourteen Points
Outlet to the sea for each nation
Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele
Palestine autonomy _See also_ Near East.
Pan-America, proposed mutual guaranty treaty
Papineau Rebellion, and self-determination
Peace, Treaty of inclusion of detailed Covenant as subject of disagreement expected preliminary treaty speedy restoration of peace versus detailed Covenant Wilson employs desire for, to force acceptance of League, resulting delay, delay, delay on League causes definitive rather than preliminary treaty subjects for a preliminary treaty influence of lack of American programme Wilson's decision for a definitive treaty Lansing's views of finished treaty British opinion protests of experts and officials of American Commission Lansing and ratification _See also_ League.
Persia, disposition
Phillimore, Lord, report on League of Nations
Poland and Anglo-Franco-American alliance independence Danzig
Postponement of hostilities as form of peace promotion in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty
President as delegate as subject of disagreement Lansing's opposition origin of Wilson's intention influence of belligerency on plan influence of presence on domination of situation personal reasons for attending decision to go to Paris decision to be a delegate attitude of House League as reason for decision
Prevention of war in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty _Sec also_ Arbitration; League.
Publication of treaties in Lansing's plan in Treaty
Publicity as basis of Lansing's plan _See also_ Secret diplomacy.
Quintuple Alliance, League of Nations as name for
Racial equality issue in Shantung bargain
Racial minorities protection, in Wilson's original draft
Ratification of Treaty Lansing's attitude
Red Cross promotion in Treaty
Rhenish Republic as buffer state
Roumania Bucharest Treaty to be abrogated territory Fourteen Points on
Russia Wilson's policy and route for Germany to the East Lansing's notes on territorial settlement Fourteen Points on
Ruthenians and Ukraine
Schleswig-Holstein disposition
Scott, James Brown drafts French alliance treaty and _projet_ of a treaty
Secret diplomacy as subject of disagreement in negotiation of League as evil at Conference Lansing's opposition, its effect on Wilson Wilson's consultations and Wilson's "open diplomacy" in Council of Four public resentment Fiume affair as lesson on perfunctory open plenary sessions of Conference Council of Ten effect on Wilson's prestige responsibility effect on delegates of smaller nations climax, text of Treaty withheld from delegates psychological effect great opportunity for reform missed and Shantung Fourteen Points on _See also_ Publicity
Secretariat of the League in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty
"Self-denying covenant" for guaranty of territory and independence Lansing's advocacy House and Wilson rejects suggested by others to Wilson
Self-determination in Wilson's draft of Covenant why omitted from treaty in theory and in practice Wilson abandons violation in the treaties and Civil War and Fiume colonial, in Fourteen Points Wilson's statement (Feb. 1918)
Senate of United States and affirmative guaranty opposition and Wilson's threat plan to check opposition by a _modus vivendi_
Separation of powers Wilson's attitude
Serbia Jugo-Slavia territory Fourteen Points on
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes _See_ Jugoslavia
Shantung Settlement as subject of disagreement and secret diplomacy bargain injustice, blackmail influence of Japanese bluff not to agree to the League German control Japanese occupation moral effect Chinese agreement to Japanese demands, resulting legal and moral status status after China's declaration of war on Germany attitude of Allied delegates attitude of American Commission, letter to Wilson argument before Council of Ten Japanese threat to American Commission before Council of Four value of Japanese promises questioned and Fiume question of resignation of American Commission over China refuses to sign Treaty Wilson permits American Commission to share in negotiations American public opinion text of Treaty articles on
Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia
Slavonia disposition
Slovakia disposition
Small nations _See_ Equality.
Smuts, General and disarmament plan for mandates
Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes
Sonnino, Baron Sidney _See_ Fiume
Sovereignty question in system of mandates
Spitzbergen disposition
Strategic influence on boundary lines
Straus, Oscar S. favors League as reported
Supreme War Council, American members added, 14; and Cecil plan; and Council of Ten.
Syria, protectorate. _See also_ Near East.
Taft, William H., supports League as reported.
Transylvania, disposition,
Treaty of Peace. _See_ Peace.
Treaty-making power, President's responsibility, duties of negotiators, and affirmative guaranty,
Trieste, disposition; importance,
Turkey, dismemberment and mandates, _See also_ Near East.
Ukraine, Wilson and; autonomy, and Ruthenians.
Unanimity, requirement in League.
Violation of the League, action concerning, in Wilson's original draft, in Cecil plan; in Treaty,
War. _See_ Arbitration; League of Nations; Prevention.
White, Henry, arrival in Paris; opposes affirmative guaranty; and Covenant as reported and later amendments; and proposed French alliance; and Shantung question. _See also_ American programme; American Commission.
Wickersham, George W., supports League as reported.
Williams, E. T., and Shantung question,
Wilson, Woodrow, responsibility for foreign relations; duties of negotiators to, and opposition, presumption of self-assurance, conference on armistice terms; disregard of precedent; and need of defeat of enemy; and Commission of Inquiry; open-mindedness; and advice on personal conduct; positiveness and indecision; and election of 1918; prejudice against legal attitude; prefers written advice, arrives in Paris, reception abroad, on equality of nations, and separation of powers, denounces balance of power, and self-determination, conference of Jan. 10, contempt for Hague Tribunal, fidelity to convictions, return to United States, return to Paris, and mandates, and French alliance, and open rupture with Lansing, and team-work, decides for a definitive treaty only, rigidity of mind, secretive nature, and Fiume, Italian resentment and Shantung, and Bullitt affair, Treaty as abandonment of his principles, Fourteen Points, principles of peace (Feb. 1918), _See also_ American programme; Commission on the League; Council of Four; Lansing; League; Peace; President as delegate; Secret diplomacy.
Withdrawal from League, provision in Treaty, through failure to approve amendments.
World Peace Foundation,
Zionism, and self-determination,
Zone system in mutual guaranty plan,