Part 1

THE PANAMA CANAL

BY

HARRY CLOW BOARDMAN

THESIS

FOR THE

DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE

IN

CIVIL ENGINEERING

COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

PRESENTED JUNE, 1910

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING.

June 1, 1910

This is to certify that the thesis of HARRY CLOW BOARDMAN entitled The Panama Canal is approved by me as meeting this part of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering.

F. O. Dufour Instructor in Charge.

Approved:

Ira O. Baker. Professor of Civil Engineering.

OUTLINE OF THESIS ON THE PANAMA CANAL

Page

I. INTRODUCTION v

II. INTEROCEANIC CANALS 1

III. HISTORY OF THE PANAMA CANAL 6

IV. TYPE OF CANAL, (Lock or Sea-level) 13

V. LOCATION, SIZE AND PLAN 20

VI. ORGANIZATION OF FORCES 21

VII. CONSTRUCTION OF THE CANAL PRISM 26

VIII. CONSTRUCTION OF THE LOCKS 29

IX. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DAMS 33

X. SANITATION 38

XI. SOCIAL LIFE 40

XII. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE 43

I. INTRODUCTION

The building of a canal across the American Isthmus has occupied the attention of the world for four hundred years. While yet the sailors who crossed the sea with Columbus were living in all the vigor of mature manhood, a Spanish engineer drew the plans for an artificial waterway across the Isthmus and submitted them to the King of Spain. From that time to this the building of an Isthmian Canal has been a fascinating project in the minds of progressive men. Attempts to build it have resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and the squandering of millions of treasure; and this “dream of the centuries” is still unrealized.

II. INTEROCEANIC CANALS

There are at least five routes which at one time or another have been chosen and seriously considered as possible locations for the Isthmian Canal. They are: the Atrato-Napipi, the San Blas, the Tehuantepec, the Nicaragua, and the Panama routes.

The Atrato-Napipi route follows the river Atrato, which empties into the Gulf of Darien, as far as the mouth of its tributary, the Napipi, thence up that river through the mountains and empties in Capica Bay. See Fig. 1, No. 1.

The San Blas route runs from the bay of the same name on the Atlantic side to the river Chipo which empties in the Gulf of Panama. It is only forty or fifty miles southeast of the Panama route. See Fig. 1, No. 2.

The Tehuantepec route begins at the bay of Coatzacoalcos in the Bay of Campeche and ends at the harbor of Salina Cruz in the Gulf of Tehuantepec. See Fig. 1, No. 3.

All modern engineers thrust these aside as impracticable, the first two because of the necessity for tunnels and the last because of its great length and number of locks. They will, therefore, receive no further attention.

The choice of the location for an Interoceanic canal has long been conceded by practical engineers to lie between the Nicaragua and Panama routes. A consideration of the natural advantages and disadvantages of these rival lines follows.

Since the Nicaragua route has been abandoned the features of the proposed construction will receive no attention. It is highly probable that this route would never have been seriously considered by the United States had it not been for the fact that the Panama line was for many years under the control of France and apparently was destined to continue so for a considerable period.

Logically the question of harbors first suggests itself. Natural harbors do not exist in Nicaragua nor could one be excavated and maintained on the Atlantic side without a continual battle with forces which, in the last fifty years, have transformed what was once an excellent harbor at Greytown into a lagoon partially enclosed by an ever advancing line of sand brought down by the river San Juan. Experience on the South Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States has given abundant evidence of the results of a fight with such forces. In his “The American Isthmus and Interoceanic Canal” W. Henry Hunter says, “The policy which fights against the forces of nature is a mistaken one; it is foredoomed to failure. Nature may be aided in her operations; her more gigantic forces may to some extent be curbed and controlled; but an almost certain Nemesis pursues any effort which may be made to arrest and to determine in an absolute way a process so continuous as that of the filling up of the Greytown bight.”

Brito, the Pacific terminus, is little better than Greytown since “even in the calmest weather there is a nearly constant surf, with breakers from four to ten feet high.” Therefore, the terminus at Greytown would always be in danger of being filled up by the Atlantic waves and the one at Brito would constantly be liable to destruction by the Pacific breakers.

On the other hand the natural harbors of the Panama route have successfully met the demands of commerce for the last four hundred years. On the Pacific end practically no harbor improvements will be necessary. On the Atlantic the present needs are satisfied, but the large steamers of the future may require deepening which can be done and the resulting channel easily maintained since there is no persistent filling in process such as characterizes the Greytown harbor.

Volcanoes have long been plentiful in Central America, especially near the proposed Nicaragua canal. Nicaragua Lake, so geologists say, owes its separation from the Pacific to a great upheaval. There is now an active volcano near which ships would have to pass. From January 1, 1901 to April 30, 1904, a period of forty consecutive months, the instruments of the Instituto-Fisico Geografico, located 60 miles from the locks of the proposed canal, recorded 43 tremors, 91 slight shocks and 35 strong shocks, some of which lasted 16 minutes. Similar observations at Panama for the same period revealed only 6 tremors and 4 slight shocks, the longest being for a period of only 10 seconds. The lock gates of a canal might very easily be injured by earthquakes; and common sense would dictate that other things being equal, the canal should be placed where the shocks are fewest.

Strong trade winds rush through the San Juan gorge at all seasons. The rainfall near the Atlantic is enormous, averaging from 260 to 270 inches per year, and rain may be expected any day. In the western part the fall is only 65 inches, and there is also a well defined dry season. Clear vision is essential to safe passage through the canal and it is extremely doubtful if it could be obtained under the above conditions. Still more serious perhaps is the excessive curvature of the channel for 50 miles of its course. It is impossible to reduce the curvature to the limit which experience on the Suez canal has proved necessary for safety and speed. Furthermore the channel must carry off to the sea the drainage from 12,000 square miles of territory. This cannot do otherwise than create currents and eddies unfavorable to navigation.

The Panama route has no continued strong winds; the curvature is comparatively favorable; the annual rainfall is from 140 inches on the Atlantic coast to about 60 inches on the Pacific, with a definite dry season of three months; and the concensus of expert engineering opinion is that there need be no objectionable currents if proper provision is made for the regulation of the Chagres river. This phase will be discussed later as will also the question of curvature.

Much has been said about the advantages furnished by Lake Nicaragua which covers about 70 miles of the Canal route. However, for 29 miles of that distance, an artificial channel through soft mud would be necessary, and dredging would probably be practically continuous for maintenance.

From a purely engineering standpoint the most serious objection to this route is the liability to interruption for lack of water in seasons of extreme drought which are not at all uncommon in that region. Upon first thought it seems that a lake 3,000 square miles in extent cannot be other than an ideal source of supply, but such is not the case. By the proposed dam on the lower San Juan river the channel of the stream would become an arm of the lake through which all shipping would have to pass, the depth of water being, of course, dependent upon the lake level. This level has a natural variation of 13 feet. Under the projected conditions the whole outflow would pass over the dam about 50 miles away from the lake proper. The present high water mark cannot be exceeded without flooding valuable lands, nor, on the other hand, can the channel depth be made as great as desirable because the river bed is crossed by many rock ledges, and the cost of excavation fixes a limit to the depth economically practicable. The Isthmian Canal Commission of 1899–’01 concluded that the variation would have to be reduced to 7 feet. This means that the level would be held between 104 and 111 feet above tide water and the river bed excavated enough to give a minimum sailing depth of 40 feet. Records show no regular succession of high and low lake years; and as it is plainly impossible to keep a reserve sufficient to control such an enormous expanse of water, the regulation of this most important matter would be left to the judgment of the operator controlling the overflow at the dam. Carelessness or bad judgment on his part might therefore easily stop traffic for an indefinite period.

There is a similar question in regard to Gatun Lake of the Panama line although the majority of authorities anticipate no trouble from that source. A more complete discussion of this danger will be given later.

Concerning the actual difficulties of construction at Nicaragua, little need be said inasmuch as no work is now contemplated there. The San Juan dam of the Nicaragua and the Gatun dam of the Panama route both present conditions which have never been met before. Also the deep cuts of the Culebra find their counterpart in portions of the longer route.

The time-saving element is of more apparent than real importance because the time lost on the longer sea-voyage for the Panama route would be practically balanced by the gain of time in actual passage through the canal, the Nicaragua route being about four times as long as the Panama route. Henry L. Abbot, in his “Problems of the Panama Canal”, estimates that 34 hours more time would be required for passage by way of the Nicaragua than by way of the Panama route.

An excellent reason for the adoption of the Panama rather than the Nicaragua route was the existence of a good railroad and the fact that the French had actually completed about two fifths of the work required.

SUMMARY OF COMPARISON

Below is given a summary of the comparisons which have just been discussed.

_Panama Route_ _Nicaragua Route_

There are two good harbors. There are no good harbors.

There is a good railroad. There is a very poor railroad.

Two-fifths of the work is completed. No work is completed.

The projected construction, according A dam without precedent in to the majority of canal work is projected. engineers, is justified by good engineering practice.

Except at Bohio, the annual rainfall The most difficult works are nowhere exceeds 93 inches. where the rainfall is nearly 256 inches.

The length is 50 miles. The length is 176 miles.

There are no active volcanoes. There is one active volcano near the route.

The time of transit is 14 hours. The time of transit is 44 hours.

The curvature is comparatively The curvature is sharp. gentle.

No troublesome winds and Heavy trade winds and strong cross-currents are expected. currents would be troublesome.

III. HISTORY OF THE PANAMA ROUTE

The Panama route as a line of transit was first established between the years 1517 and 1520. The first settlement on the site of old Panama, six or seven miles east of the present city, was made in 1517. The Atlantic end, called Nombre de Dios, was built in 1519. Here Balboa was tried and executed. It grew rapidly in importance and in 1521 became a city by royal decree.

Even at that early date a road was established across the Isthmus. It, however, did not enter the city of Panama, but at the Pacific end passed through a small town called Cruces on the Chagres river about 17 miles distant, and at the Atlantic end passed through Nombre de Dios. The latter terminus did not prove satisfactory so the town of Porto Bello was made the Atlantic Port in 1597. This also was subsequently abandoned. At least part of this road was paved, and bridges were built over the streams. Even today its course is well defined.

As early as 1534 boats began to pass up and down the Chagres river between Cruces and its mouth on the Caribbean shore and thence along the coast to Nombre de Dios, and later to Porto Bello. The commerce thus begun increased rapidly during the sixteenth century and Panama became a very important commercial center with a trade extending to the Spice Islands and the Asiatic coast. It was at the height of its power in 1585 and was called the “toll-gate between western Europe and Eastern Asia.”

In time this commercial prosperity, which enriched Spain, called the attention of her rulers and others to the possibility of constructing an interoceanic ship-canal. Tradition says that Charles V ordered a survey in 1520 to determine the feasibility of a canal, but that the governor reported such an undertaking absolutely impossible for any monarch.

From that time the prosperity of Panama increased rapidly. Lines of trade were established with the west coast of South America and the Pacific ports of Central America. Its glory came to a sudden end when, on the sixth of February, 1671, it was sacked and burned by Morgan’s buccaneers. A new city, the present Panama, was founded in 1673, but the old one was never rebuilt.

The project of a canal on this route, because of its romantic and commercial interest, was kept alive for more than three centuries without definite action being taken. Finally, in 1876, a French Company was organized at Paris to make surveys preparatory to building a ship canal across the Isthmus.

Lieutenant L. N. E. Wyse, a French naval officer, had immediate charge of the work. He obtained a concession, known as the Wyse Concession, from Colombia giving France the necessary rights for the construction of a canal.

In May, 1879, an international congress was convened in Paris under the auspices of Ferdinand de Lesseps, to consider the question of the best location and plan for the canal. This congress, after a two weeks session, decided in favor of a sea-level canal without locks to be located on the Panama route.

Immediately after this action the Panama Canal Company was organized under the general laws of France with Ferdinand de Lesseps as its president. The Wyse concession was purchased by the company, and after two attempts the stock was successfully floated in December, 1880. Two years were then devoted to surveys and preliminary work. In the plan first adopted the canal was to be 29.5 feet deep and 72 feet wide at the bottom. Leaving Colon, the canal passed through low ground to the valley of the Chagres river at Gatun; thence through the valley to Obispo where it left the river and crossed the continental divide by means of a tunnel and reached the Pacific through the valley of the Rio Grande. The tides on the Pacific were to be overcome by sloping the bottom of the Pacific end of the canal. No provision was made for controlling the Chagres.

Early in the eighties a tidal lock near the Pacific was added to the plan, and various schemes for the control of the Chagres were proposed, the one most favored being the construction of the dam at Gamboa. The tunnel idea was soon abandoned.

The French engineers estimated that the excavation would be about 157,000,000 cubic yards, that eight years would be required for completion, and that the cost would be $127,600,000. Work proceeded continuously until 1887, when a change to the lock type was made in order to secure the use of the canal as soon as possible, it being understood that the construction of a sea-level canal was not to be abandoned but merely deferred until financial conditions would allow its completion. This new plan placed the summit level above the Chagres river, and proposed to supply this summit level with water pumped from that stream. Work went on until 1889 when the company became bankrupt; and on February 4, a liquidator was appointed to take charge of its affairs. Work was stopped on May 15, 1889.

The liquidator appointed a commission of eleven engineers to give him technical advice as to the condition of the work and the best methods for its completion. Five of these commissioners visited the Isthmus and reported on May 5, 1890. The report contained plans for the completion of a lock canal and emphasized the necessity for more complete examinations before beginning work. This advice was followed by the liquidator who at once took steps for the formation of a new company, and at the same time continued to take careful observations on the Isthmus, and these observations have been of great value since then.

The New Panama Canal Company was organized in October, 1894. It proposed to construct a sea-level canal from the Atlantic as far as Bohio (See Map, pp 45), where a dam was to form a lake as far as Bas Obispo, the difference in elevation being overcome by two locks. The summit level extended from Bas Obispo to Paraiso, and was reached by two more locks and received water from an artificial reservoir formed by a dam at Alhajuela in the upper Chagres valley. Four dams were located on the Pacific side, the two middle ones at Pedro Miguel combined in a flight.

Work continued on this plan up to the time of the Spanish-American War in 1898. About that time a “Comite Technique”, as it was called, composed of seven French and seven foreign engineers who had been appointed by the Board of Directors of the New Company, submitted its final report upon the canal. It was estimated that, at a cost of $100,000,000 a canal suitable for all commercial needs could be completed in 10 years.

Had matters continued as before it is probable that the New Canal Company would have completed the canal as it had planned. But the Spanish-American War developed wholly new conditions. The trip of the Oregon around Cape Horn drew the attention of the American people to the importance of an interoceanic canal. Prior to this time the Board of Directors of the New Company, although aware that the Maratime Canal Company was actively engaged in securing funds from the United States Congress for the Nicaragua route, were so confident that a canal by that route could never seriously compete with their own that they gave little attention to the efforts of their rival. Now, however, if the newly awakened popular demand for a canal should induce the American government to undertake the work, the New Company would face two formidable conditions, namely, the difficulty of raising funds for the completion of the Panama Canal would be greatly increased if the parallel route were supported by the United States and the question of labor would become greatly complicated.

Knowing that the favorable conditions created by the French at Panama were unknown in the United States and certain that if known the United States would assist rather than retard the work the Board of Directors, on December 2, 1898, sent a complete copy of the report of the “Comite Technique” to President McKinley and offered to explain the exact conditions to any body of men appointed for the purpose. This offer came at the proper time since Congress was then ready to pass a bill to aid the Maratime Company in the construction of a canal on the Nicaragua route. On February 27, 1899 the representatives of the New Company were granted a hearing in the House of Representatives. They presented a technical exhibit, and stated that their company was authorized to reincorporate as an American company under American laws. So ably did they present their case that ultimately on March 3, 1899, by act of Congress a commission, known as the “Isthmian Canal Commission” was appointed by the President to determine the “most practicable and feasible route for an Isthmian canal, with the cost of constructing the same and placing it under the control, management, and ownership of the United States.”

The original intention of the New Panama Canal Company in bringing the subject before the United States was not to sell its rights on the Isthmus but to reincorporate and receive the support of American wealth. However, it was evident that the United States desired absolute control, and accordingly the consent of Colombia to a transfer was obtained and the Company prepared a classified list of its properties which it placed before the Isthmian Canal Commission on October 2, 1901 with the statement that the sums given were not to be considered as final but were merely presented as a basis for discussion. The Commission, however, refused to take this view of the matter and persisted in considering the prices offered as constituting, when summed up, a definite lump sum for which the Company would sell its property. This lump sum was $109,141,500. The Commission’s valuation was $40,000,000. Consequently when the Commission made its final report it closed with these words, “Having in view the terms offered by the New Panama Canal Company this Commission is of the opinion that the most practicable and feasible route for an Isthmian Canal to be under the control, management, and ownership of the United States is that known as the Nicaragua route.”

When the French Company heard this report it immediately offered to sell its property for $40,000,000. Accordingly the Commission made a supplementary report on January 18, 1902 stating that “After considering the changed conditions that now exist, the Commission is of the opinion that the most practicable and feasible route for an Isthmian canal to be under the control, management, and ownership of the United States is that known as the Panama route.”

Thus it came about that the United States was authorized to obtain permanent possession of the concessions and properties of the New Panama Canal Company at a very low price.