Part 9

In re-attaining the ideal of the Teuton spokesman, America has made slight progress in theory, however much the American president has stood ready to take such position and however much he may have tried, despite the conservative form of constitution he works under, to perform the duties of such an office. Consequently, the American executive stands apart from the legislative power as the British executive stands near, and is part of, the legislative power. To the American executive and his cabinet, chosen not from Congress but from the country at large, is the explicit duty of administering, not of making, laws, except in so far as the veto power gives the president some share in checking legislation. But the instinct of the race still calls on the president, as though he were the spokesman of his nation, to assist the other representatives in making as well as executing the laws. Signs are not wanting that this same insistence of the voters may bring the American executive back to the executive-legislative functions of the race's early spokesmen. At present the president can interpret the manner in which laws shall be administered, but if his interpretation conflicts with the wishes of Congress, it can pass new enactments not susceptible to such interpretation. Hence, practically the president can influence legislation only by his personal force working on Congress, or by his use of the patronage to induce congressmen to take action in accord with his opinion of the national will. There results a possibility of the use of patronage disastrous to the administrative efficiency of the nation. To meet this disastrous use of the patronage, American {117} public opinion has demanded the "merit system" of appointment of all administrative officials of less station than those political agents who must be in sympathy with the political ideas from time to time in the ascendant, as expressed by political parties. Recognizing this need for efficiency in administrative subordinates, American presidents find it difficult to utilize the merit system of appointment and at the same time forward desired legislation. The personal power of the president backed by popular opinion is, however, still a force to be reckoned with by Congress. Through this power he is able to carry out in part at least the demand made by these political descendants of the Teutons that their spokesman, and all other representatives, shall carry out the legislation the voters require.

Although Alexander Hamilton was unable to obtain a realization of his desires to see the cabinet officers entitled to seats in Congress, the president is called on by the written Constitution to report to Congress on "the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient."[117-1] In reality he does more, and in accordance with the working Constitution actually furthers the legislative programme called for by his party's majority. He may, if the instincts of American public opinion demand it, easily evolve into a responsible spokesman with other administrative officers about him, much after the similitude of a British responsible cabinet ministry. How this may occur by change in either the working or the written Constitution, {118} or both, it is unnecessary here to elaborate. Enough to show that this present difference in the American and British executives is a result of historical conditions working in both branches of the race.

The representatives who carry out the political will of a Pan-Angle nation are called in America the Administration and in the other six nations the Government. This diversity of terminology may produce misunderstanding, as in the case of "constitution"--the more so as "government" has another meaning common to all Pan-Angles, viz. control of peoples.[118-1] A proverbial Irishman landed in America is asked with which party he sympathizes, and retorts that he is "against the Government." He means probably that he is opposed to the ministry of the day in the British Isles--in short, sympathizes with some Opposition ideas. The American hearer, unaccustomed to the word in this specialized sense, may be astonished at what seems an outburst of anarchy. Later our Irishman, become an American, would reply to the same question about his politics, that he was, or was not, in favour of the Administration. But whichever term is used, Administration or Government, it refers alike to those elected representatives who, by the use of their own discretion, or following the instruction of their voters, or by a combination {119} of both methods, conduct the executive business of their nation.

Because the seven Pan-Angle nations are similar in their forms of government they are in a position to establish a common government. All take for granted the same theories and practically the same procedures. Because these theories and procedures work successfully as they are applied to the government of each nation, Pan-Angles will be predisposed to believe that they will work when applied to a government of the whole race.

[94-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15.

[95-1] Quoted in Woodrow Wilson, _Mere Literature_, Boston, 1900, p. 105.

[95-2] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15: "The ideas associated with constitution and constitutionalism are thus, it will be seen, mainly of modern and European origin. They are wholly inapplicable to the primitive and simple societies of the present or of the former times. The discussion of forms of government occupies a large space in the writings of the Greek philosophers,--a fact which is to be explained by the existence among the Greeks of many independent political communities, variously organized, and more or less democratic in character. Between the political problems of the smaller societies and those of the great European nations there is no useful parallel to be drawn, although the predominance of classical learning made it the fashion for a long time to apply Greek speculations on the nature of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy to public questions in modern Europe. Representation . . . the characteristic principle of European constitutions, has, of course, no place in societies which were not too large to admit of every free citizen participating personally in the business of government. Nor is there much in the politics or the political literature of the Romans to compare with the constitutions of modern states. Their political system, almost from the beginning of the empire, was ruled absolutely by a small assembly or by one man."

[97-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15.

[97-2] A. V. Dicey, _The Law of the Constitution_, London, 1885, p.25.

[98-1] H. E. Egerton, _Federations and Unions within the British Empire_, Oxford, 1911, p. 33.

[98-2] Goldwin Smith, "Canada, England, and the States," in _Contemporary Review_, London, March 1907, p. 851.

[98-3] _Ency. Brit._, vol. ii. p. 966.

[99-1] W.B. Worsfold, _The Union of South Africa_, London, 1912, p. 128.

[99-2] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1897, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p.462.

[100-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xvii. p. 858: "Finding themselves without warrant in a region beyond their patent, . . . they drew up and signed before landing a democratic compact of government which is accounted the earliest written constitution in history."

[100-2] _Ibid._, vol. xvii. p. 858.

[101-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 658.

[101-2] _Ibid._

[102-1] J.B. Thayer, _John Marshall_, Boston, 1901, p. 63

[103-1] J.B. Thayer, _John Marshall_, Boston, 1901, p. 61.

[104-1] _Round Table_, London, November 1910, p. 62.

[104-2] _Ibid._, p. 62.

[105-1] _Round Table_, London, November 1910, p. 62.

[105-2] "Pacificus," _Federalism and Home Rule_, London, 1910, p. 2.

[105-3] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15: "Again, as a term of party politics, constitutional has come to mean, in England, not obedience to constitutional rules . . . but adherence to the existing type of the constitution or to some conspicuous portions thereof,--in other words, conservative."

[107-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p. 378.

[107-2] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 14.

[108-1] The fact that so-called "governors" are sent out from the British Isles to the five newer Britannic nations does not affect the statements in this paragraph. Such "governors" do not share in legislation, but acquiesce in legislation formulated by others. Such "governors" are best considered as ambassadors with peculiar local recognition, who act under orders from and in behalf of the government of the British Isles, and act also wherever possible in behalf of all six of the Britannic nations and their dependencies. _Cf. ante_, p. 89.

[109-1] The Seventeenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, initiated by Congress in 1912, requiring the direct election of senators by the voters of each state, came into force May 31, 1913. The practical effects of direct election were, however, previously obtained in some states, the legislatures electing as senators candidates already designated by the voters. This instance, in which the working Constitution violated the spirit of the written Constitution, is interesting as evidence of the flexity of the American Constitution and of the strength of the spirit of local self-government. Cf. _Britannica Year Book_, London, 1913, pp. 744-745.

[110-1] That Australia may change its Constitution regardless of the wishes of the British Isles, _cf._ Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, chapter viii. paragraph 128, and comments thereon in C.P. Lucas, _A Historical Geography of the British Colonies,_ vol. vi., _Australasia_, by A. D. Rogers, Oxford, 1907, pt. i., p. 289.

[111-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p.462.

[111-2] Concerning the alteration in procedure of the American Electoral College whereby presidential electors are pledged before their election, cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 655.

[112-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xx. p. 845.

[113-1] _Cf._ W.H. Moore, _The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia_, 2nd ed., Melbourne, 1910, p. 297: "Further, the Constitution recognizes, if it does not establish, the Cabinet system in the Commonwealth, and the responsibilities of the Executive extend to the consideration of the subjects committed to Parliament, and, if need be, to the initiation of legislation upon them," Also B, R. Wise, _The Commonwealth of Australia_, London, 1909, pp. 193-194: "At the same time, the provisions which enable its [responsible government] continuance are sufficiently wide to allow of other systems, should this one prove unsuited to a Federation. Except that Ministers must sit in Parliament, there seems no limit to the changes which might be made with the acquiescence of the Governor-General, in the method of appointment, tenure of office, or function," _Cf._ Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, chapter i., part i., paragraph 5.

[114-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p. 889, gives this lack of local self-government as one of the causes of the American Revolution.

[115-1] Cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. xx. pp. 845-849; and _Britannica Year Book_, London, 1913, pp. 491-497 and 480-482.

[115-2] F. S. Oliver, _Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union_, London, 1906, p. 447. Students who are mystified by allusions to the "Crown," the "King in Council," and the "King has graciously consented," etc., should find the sentence above quoted a valuable explanation.

[117-1] Constitution of the United States, art. ii. sec. 3.

[118-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p. 572: "Government, in its last analysis, is organized force. . . . The machinery of government necessary to such an organization consists of instrumentalities fitted to enforce in the conduct of the common affairs of the community the will of the sovereign men: the sovereign minority, or the sovereign majority."

{120}

VI

DANGERS

DANGER may arise to menace the Pan-Angle civilization from three sources: from within any of the seven groups; from between any of the groups; or from outside civilizations.

The first of these sources exists in every body politic. Civil discord whenever it becomes active must be cured as it develops--from within. The soundness of a nation lies in its ability to cope with internal disorder and still maintain its integrity before the world. Any interference, however kindly meant, only exasperates those on the spot. No Britisher, for example, can improve the situation in South Africa by sympathizing with "Hindus" that South Africa does not want.[120-1] And especially is it true among Pan-Angles to whom local self-government is instinctive, that {121} each political entity must look to the order of its own household.

The second source of danger is more grave. As long as the seven nations remain in real or hazily defined independence of each other frictions are bound to arise. These frictions may grow from the competitions of commerce. They may cause reprisals of commerce. Commerce affords the quickest attack on a nation's standard of living. Those who abhor war often overlook the fact that trade reprisal may also produce similar inexpressible suffering. The frictions of commerce in the thirteen American nations in the eighteenth century, the similar discords in Australia before 1900, and in South Africa before 1910, point the same lesson--an adequate central government to adjust such differences. While lacking such an adequate central government for the seven Pan-Angle nations, our only recourse when interests conflict is to our mutual forbearance.

Within a nation a government hales offenders before a court empowered to enforce its decisions. Between nations there is no such tribunal. A court is "a body in the government to which the public administration of justice is delegated."[121-1] This presupposes in the court power to bring parties before it; a law governing the case; and power to enforce a decision. The Hague Tribunal or any other existing so-called "international {122} arbitration court" has no one of these three attributes. It is no court at all. Any body of presumably well-intentioned persons anywhere can listen to a dispute and give advice. This is all the Hague Tribunal, for all its name, can do. The contending parties can take the advice or not as they like. No parties can be compelled to appear before this non-governmental body; no one can know beforehand, except by frangible mutual agreement with his opponents and with the "court," what rules are to govern the decision; and on no party can a decision be enforced. "In international affairs the primitive rule, that 'might is right' still holds good, for either side to a quarrel can insist on a resort to force. In the outer void of world politics there is no reign of law, for there is no law-maker; there is no assured justice, for there is no judge; there is no safety for the weak, for there are no police to whom they can appeal.

"Why is this? It is because no nation is willing to submit its destinies to a tribunal over which it has no control, or to surrender its armaments to a world authority which will use them to enforce some international code of its own creation."[122-1]

Inter-Pan-Angle frictions in the past have been numerous, the American Revolution being merely the most disastrous. Troubles that have arisen {123} between the British Isles and Canada and between the British Isles and the United States since the peace of 1814 may be passed over because more happily terminated.[123-1] Other of the nations have likewise had their family quarrels with the British Isles. Three years before the Boer War, a South African wrote: "The most powerful factor which makes for disunion at present is the interference of the British Government in the internal affairs of South Africa. . . . England's periods of active interference in South Africa have always been disastrous to herself and to South Africa--indeed the present troubles may all be traced directly to Lord Carnarvon's attempt to force his policy on South Africa."[123-2] Twelve years later, the Boer War being over, and the union of the four South African provinces being not yet accomplished, another South African wrote: "Directly after [after the Chinese indentured labourers in the Transvaal were 'freed' by the British Isles Government][123-3] came the Zulu rebellion in Natal, and so enraged were the South African colonies, so bitter and so angry with the Home Government, that, had it been possible, they would have broken away. Given another crisis of the kind in more prosperous times, and the British will go solid with the Dutch for independence and a Republic."[123-4] The same dangers lurked in the recent suggestion that the British {124} Isles should interfere in South Africa in reference to Asiatic Indians in Natal.

Nor is it alone in the realms of legislation and administration where partisan politics may be factors that such frictions arise. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the British Isles is still, however rarely used, the supreme appellate court for the five over-seas Britannic nations. Against its fitness for the position, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in 1903 passed formal and deliberate resolutions--reading, in part, as follows: "That the decisions of this Court should continue to be subject to review by a higher Court is of the utmost importance. The knowledge that a decision can be reviewed is good alike for Judges and litigants. Whether, however, they should be reviewed by the Judicial Committee, as at present constituted is a question worthy of consideration. That Court, by its imputations in the present case, by the ignorance it has shown in this and other cases of our history, of our legislation and of our practice, and by its long-delayed judgments, has displayed every characteristic of an alien tribunal. If we have spoken strongly it is because we feel deeply. And we speak under grievous and unexampled provocation."[124-1] It is inevitable that different political groups without {125} more adequate cohesion than sentiment and shifting political desires should have had such family quarrels. It is unnecessary here to quote other instances from the past.

To-day's inter-Pan-Angle frictions are the inevitable results of the international conflicts of local national policies. Some of them are trivial; others, vital. And from even trivial questions improperly handled grow wars. "A White Australia," "No Indians for the Transvaal," "No Hindus for British Columbia,"[125-1] are familiar slogans suggesting all sorts of possible disagreements for the settlement of which there is no court in existence. The questions of Asiatic migrations are not trivial to the six nations exasperated thereby. Yet even if all these questions were removed, there would remain many opportunities for discord still unadjusted. For the six Britannic nations Downing Street is the only medium for adjusting such discords. And the lack of power behind the decrees of Downing Street results in an accumulation of makeshifts that is provocative of future troubles.

Between the United States and the British Isles the Monroe Doctrine has at times bulked large as a possible source of disagreement. The question of Panama Canal tolls has recently rasped these nations' amiability. It is worth while to examine into these trouble breeders and to see how the situations would be altered if the two countries were {126} treating not as independent units but as parties to a huge federation.

The Monroe Doctrine was dictated to American statesmen by the fear of Europe. To the people of the United States its maintenance has meant safety from aggression. It has lived by their sanction alone. "It would have been forgotten within 60 days after President Monroe first formulated it in a presidential message if it had not met with a response in popular feeling. . . . the popular feeling existed long before Monroe was president, for Jefferson stated principles of foreign policy which embodied the ideas associated now for 90 years with Monroe's name. . . . And thus America has always, down to the present crisis with Mexico, followed the national instinct concerning entanglements on its own part in Europe's affairs, and interferences on Europe's part in the affairs of this hemisphere." ". . . Whenever a specific issue arises in our relations with Latin-America, a practical test of what the public feeling in this country amounts to is offered. Our history for the past dozen years abounds in 'incidents' that revealed the public temper. It is certain that whenever such a test has been made in the Latin-American states around the Caribbean Sea, the fear of the jealousy of European encroachment manifests itself instantly and warns the administration of the day what the people expect the government to do. The Monroe doctrine, or the idea, feeling or instinct upon which it is based, thus is repeatedly referred to the people for a fresh expression of their sentiment, and there is no prospect that it will become an obsolete feature of our foreign policy so long as these re current {127} tests find the people vitally interested in its preservation."[127-1]

The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, whatever it may mean, is to the American voter what the maintenance of a Big Fleet, whatever the size may be, is to the British voter. A Britannic authority thus expresses the feelings of the average Britisher: "Our 'man on the omnibus' has never failed as yet to respond to an agitation on behalf of the Fleet. He did so instantly in 1909, and he will always do so again. Given a serious division between the parties on the naval question, there can be no doubt which will win. . . . Whenever the controversy is taken to the country, the country decides for the larger Fleet."[127-2] The American Monroe Doctrine and the British Big Fleet are the outcome of the instinctive fears Pan-Angles hold towards Europe.

The Monroe Doctrine was not designed as a weapon against the British Isles any more than the Big Fleet is built to fight American ships. The older country was in hearty agreement with President Monroe's original pronouncement. "Indeed it was Canning's policy, summed up three years later by his famous reference to the necessity of calling the New World into existence to restore the balance of the Old."[127-3] As long, however, as the British Isles remains an outsider it falls within the definition of "any European power" of the message, just as there is nothing to prevent the {128} United States, as long as it remains an outsider, from suffering from the strength of the Big Fleet.

The two countries are independent now and must in the last resort each protect itself from the other, however much they may prefer friendship. As members of a federation each would be spared the necessity of self-protection against the other. In such event the Monroe Doctrine would apply to non-Pan-Angles only and the Fleet would be the instrument by which it was enforced.