The Pan-Angles A Consideration of the Federation of the Seven English-Speaking Nations

Part 7

Chapter 73,679 wordsPublic domain

In sum, the government of the British Isles no longer dictates to the "great nations across the seas." All that is now apparent of its former right of interference consists of appeals from the courts of these younger nations to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the British Isles, and the seldom used veto power of the governors sent out from the British Isles to these younger nations. The appeal power, though of great theoretical importance, is of such limited practical use that a British writer has overlooked its existence in the following description: The {87} Governor is the only link between the Home Government and the Colonial, and in all of them his powers are limited to the exercise of the veto. Even this is circumscribed. It is tacitly understood that the _veto_ will be resorted to only when the _foreign relations_ of the empire are affected, or when some Act is passed which the Secretary of State decides to be incompatible with existent Imperial legislation."[87-1]

In place of the former parental-filial attitude between the British Isles and the five younger nations there is growing up a sympathetic and sentimental friendship. The younger nations as yet have no representatives chosen by their voters to sit in a common legislature with Britishers, but claim, nevertheless, to act with the British Isles as equal partners in the Britannic world. This claim is acknowledged by the British Isles government. In the words of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain at Glasgow, October 6, 1903: "And when I speak of _our_ colonies, it is an expression; they are not ours--they are not ours in a possessory sense. They are sister States, able to treat with us from an equal position, able to hold to us, willing to hold to us, but also able to break with us."[87-2]

In the light of the foregoing testimony, the exact political status of New Zealand, Australia, Newfoundland, Canada, and South Africa becomes increasingly difficult to define. It seems, on the whole, more nearly accurate to regard them as {88} independent and autonomous with certain limitations, than to consider them as dependent with excessive liberties. Accordingly, each of the seven Pan-Angle nations is here considered to be the equal of each of the other six.

The collective Britannic nations have often been styled Greater Britain, or the Britannic Empire. The word empire, though constantly used for lack of a better term, is a misnomer. As Seeley says: "Greater Britain is not in the ordinary sense an Empire at all."[88-1] Another authority says: "The British Empire is not an Empire in the ordinary meaning of the word. It is a system of government."[88-2] "There is no Imperial Government."[88-3]

Men speak of an Imperial Parliament, but in reality no such thing exists. It is an ambitious name applied sometimes to the Parliament of the British Isles which has no members from the other nations, and whose power to enforce its legislation in the other Britannic nations is denied. "By a fine tradition it has the full dignity of sovereignty; but in reality it is as impotent as the Continental Congress, and only less ridiculous because it has learned from experience the timid wisdom not to court rebuffs."[88-4]

Downing Street is often referred to. Downing Street is a term used to sum up the six administrative departments of the British Isles government: the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the India Office, {89} the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Board of Trade. Of these the India Office, does not enter into the matters here discussed, and the Colonial Office "in its present relations with the Dominions, . . . is in reality little more than a clearing house of information and correspondence."[89-1] The remaining four, _i.e._ the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Board of Trade have their normal administrative functions in the government of the British Isles. They are filled by the ministry of the day, and hence are responsible to the majority of the House of Commons and ultimately to the British people. They are in no way representative of, nor responsible to, the other five self-governing nations. Through the theoretical veto of the governors sent out from the British Isles, Downing Street is supposed to wield its power and to prevent legislation in the five younger nations that in matters touching foreign affairs is contrary to the will of the British Parliament. As a matter of fact, this veto is rarely exercised. Its exercise would be, "in plain words, the tyranny of one Parliament over another--of one democracy over another."[89-2] "The theory of the British Constitution is, as it stands, clearly intolerable except in disuse. The powers which are imagined to exist in it would never stand the strain of being put in force."[89-2] What does happen when a veto appears called for by Britannic safety is that the Parliament of the younger nation is induced to reconsider matters in the light of whatever {90} argument Downing Street has at hand. Here, obviously, are not officials who as executives and legislators are part of any common government. They are part of only one government, viz. that of the British Isles. Certain matters in government must proceed from a single source. In the United States the federal government, which represents all the people and each state, has this in its charge and has machinery by which to enforce its power. Among the Britannic nations, the government of one of them controls these matters with no other machinery than persuasion to enforce its often debated authority.

A member of the British Ministry of 1913 is quoted as saying that "the only political organisations common to the whole Empire, . . . are the Crown, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and the Committee of Imperial Defence, but not one of them has any executive or legislative power."[90-1] By "the Crown" is meant the power of Downing Street just discussed. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the British Isles is the supreme appellate court for courts under the British flag outside the British Isles. A like function is performed for British Isles courts by the House of Lords. There is no single court of appeal for the six Britannic nations.[90-2] Consequently, the Judicial {91} Committee of the Privy Council can hardly be called an institution common to all these nations, even were its activity not so limited as to be negligible. As to the Committee of Imperial Defence, in it "the Dominion representatives are guests and not constituents."[91-1]

All this is to say that through certain makeshifts and survivals, whose forms and functions are nowhere clearly defined, the governments of the six Britannic nations come in occasional contact with each other.

Such is the complexity of the English-speaking world control, and such is its lack of uniformity of classification and naming, that it is not safe to say the five new nations and the British Isles and the United States are the only English-speaking autonomous groups. "The British Empire exhibits forms and methods of Government in almost exuberant _variety_." [91-2] For example, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands and such outposts of Pan-Angle civilization as Pitcairn and Tristan da Cunha might well be considered self-governing. These areas are omitted from enumeration in this discussion, not by reason of any lack of appreciation of their worth, but because the inclusion of these many assets and liabilities of the Pan-Angle concern would unduly expand this discussion. These groups have their respective positions with the several Pan-Angle nations to which they are to a greater or less degree connected. On the continued career of the seven Pan-Angle nations {92} depend the political existences of a multitude of these smaller Pan-Angle localities.

Moreover, no direct discussion of the politics of any of the many dependencies is here made. Their needs are not for their own solving. Our control we try to make materially beneficial to their inhabitants by "giving them only what is good for them, not always what they want."[92-1] Our control of ourselves is based on the entirely opposite theorem of taking what we want, not necessarily what someone else thinks is good for us. In short, we govern our dependencies in one way, ourselves in quite another. The dependent countries which "belong to" the several nations may present many problems to the Pan-Angles, but these form no "part of" the Pan-Angle problem. This is no place to question whether Seeley was justified in his doubt as to the value of India to the British Isles.[92-2] Enough here to acknowledge that our present economic policy leads many of our seven nations to believe that the holding of dependencies, especially in the tropics, is of value. To enumerate all these dependencies would be tedious and needless. It is only to distinguish the dependent from the independent that space is here given to the subject.

A united government over and between these seven Pan-Angle nations would be unaffected by the existence of these possessions. At the present {93} time New Zealand and Australia hold dependencies. This in no way interferes with their being somehow, as they believe, parts of a political entity with the British Isles. Similarly, in case of the uniting of the seven Pan-Angle nations, New Zealand and Australia could each retain its dependencies, and the United States could retain its dependencies, without impairing the success of a Pan-Angle government. The history of our civilization shows that such a complicated procedure is the way of natural growth among Pan-Angle peoples.

"Empire," from its long association with states builded of conquered peoples, is no fit word to use for a voluntary combination of Pan-Angles. Nor would any form of government be acceptable that blotted out the individuality that each of the seven nations has established. They are members of a great civilization, each to-day practically self-supreme. Whatever arrangement they may choose to enter upon to protect themselves and their civilization, they will wish to continue always nations.

[79-1] Richard Jebb, _Studies in Colonial Nationalism_, London, 1905, p. 187.

[80-1] Sir Wilfrid Laurier at the Dominion Day Banquet, 1902; quoted Richard Jebb, _Studies in Colonial Nationalism_, London, 1905, p. 1.

[80-2] General Botha at South African Nationalist Congress, November 24, 1913; quoted in _The Times_ Weekly Edition, London, November 28, 1913.

[81-1] Area in Per cent White Per cent sq. miles of total population of total area 1911 population New Zealand 103,658 .92 1,008,468 .71 Australia 2,974,581 26.59 4,455,005 3.15 South Africa 473,954 4.23 1,276,242 .81 Newfoundland 162,750 1.45 242,966 .17 Canada 3,729,665 33.34 7,204,838 5.10 British Isles 121,089 1.08 45,211,888 32.03 United States 3,617,949 32.35 81,735,623 57.91 Total 11,183,646 141,135,030

In comparison with the above figures, England contains 50,890 square miles and 34,045,290 population. United States and South Africa contain 9,828,294 and 4,697,152 respectively of negroes, which together with other non-whites are excluded from the figures in the above table, These figures are based on _Whitaker's Almanack_, London, 1913, pp. 584, 603, 660-667; and _Britannica Year Book_, London, 1913, pp. 680, 682,663, 678,699, 703, 714, 557.

[81-2] Auckland to Sydney, 1264; Wellington to Sydney, 1233; Bluff to Hobart, 940; and St. John's to Glasgow, 1859 miles.

[82-1] _Round Table_, London, September 1912, p. 753, quoting _New Zealand Herald_, Auckland.

[83-1] The British Isles is here used in preference to United Kingdom. None of the other Pan-Angle nations are "kingdoms "; and the term is applicable only historically to that democratic group of people of which England contains the largest portion. For a modern Pan-Angle attitude, see W. H. Moore, _The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia_, 2nd ed., Melbourne, 1910, p. 66, where he says concerning the naming of a nation: '"Kingdom of Australia' would be acceptable to none."

[83-2] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 612: "The United States, the short title usually given to the great federal republic which had its origin in the revolt of the British colonies in North America, when, in the Declaration of Independence, they described themselves as 'The Thirteen United States of America.' Officially the name is 'The United States of America,' but 'The United States' (used as a singular and not as a plural) has become accepted as the name of the country; and pre-eminent usage has now made its citizens 'Americans,' in distinction from the other inhabitants of North and South America."

[84-1] C.P. Lucas, _Historical Geography of the British Colonies_, vol. iv., _South Africa_, Oxford, 1913, pt. i., pp. 146-147.

[85-1] _An Analysis of the System of Government throughout the British Empire_, London, 1912, p. 58: "It should be remembered that in theory there is nothing to prevent the Parliament of the United Kingdom legislating for the internal affairs of a self-governing colony or even imposing taxation on such a colony."

[85-2] _Round Table_, London, September 1913, pp. 588-589.

[86-1] Sir Wilfrid Laurier at Sorel, September 28, 1904, quoted in Richard Jebb, _Studies in Colonial Nationalism_, London, 1905, p.151.

[86-2] F. S. Oliver, _Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union_, London, 1906, p. 448.

[86-3] Lord Milner, November 3, 1908, at Canadian Club, Montreal, in Lord Milner, _The Nation and the Empire_, London, 1913, p. 362.

[87-1] Alfred Caldecott, _English Colonization and Empire_, London, 1891, p. 134.

[87-2] Richard Jebb, _Studies in Colonial Nationalism_, London, 1905, p.272.

[88-1] J.R. Seeley, _The Expansion of England_, London, 1883, p.296.

[88-2] _Round Table_, London, May 1911, p. 232.

[88-3] _Ibid._, February 1911, p. 167.

[88-4] F. S. Oliver, _Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union_, London, 1906, p. 449.

[89-1] _Round Table_, London, September 1913, p. 590.

[89-2] F. S. Oliver, _Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union_, London, 1906, p. 449.

[90-1] _United Empire_, London, January 1914, p. 1.

[90-2] _United Empire_, London, October 1913, p.767: ". . . there is no ultimate court of appeal for the Empire as a whole. A proposal to create one, by fusing the judicial functions of the House of Lords, which hears United Kingdom appeals, and the Privy Council, which hears appeals from oversea, has long been favoured by Australian statesmen." Cf. _The Times_ Weekly Edition, London, August 22, 1913, "An Imperial Court of Appeals."

[91-1] _United Empire_, London, January 1914, p. 1.

[91-2] Alfred Caldecott, _English Colonization and Empire_, London, 1891, p. 121.

[92-1] W. C. Forbes, lately Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands, Address concerning the Philippines, before Boston City Club, November 20, 1913, quoted in _Boston City Club Bulletin_, Boston, January 1, 1914, p. 40.

[92-2] J.R. Seeley, _The Expansion of England_, London, 1883, p. 11.

{94}

V

GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICES

THE seven Pan-Angle nations are similar in their forms of government. This similarity is often obvious, but even where differences of procedure seem to exist the foundations of government are still the same.

In each of the nations the people rule. In each they follow in governing three practices: ultimate control on all questions is in the voters; immediate legislative control is in legislatures composed of representatives who act on behalf of the voters, and subject to restrictions, if any, by the voters only; and executive or administrative control is in charge of elected persons. If "a country where a large portion of the people has some considerable share in the supreme power would be a constitutional country,"[94-1] then these seven nations are more than constitutional countries, for in them the people not only have "some considerable share," but are the final judges on any matters which they desire to adjudicate. As such these nations meet Burke's definition of a free government: "If any man asks me what a free government is, I answer, that, for any practical purpose, it is what the people think {95} so,--and that they, and not I, are the natural, lawful, and competent judges of the matter."[95-1]

Ultimate control in all these nations is secured to the voters by elections and referenda. By these two means the voters choose their representatives and sometimes actively participate in legislation. Often, too, they state the forms under which their representatives shall work and limit the work they shall be allowed to perform. In the British Isles there is no formal limitation on the power of the representatives elected to the House of Commons. In the other six nations the elected representatives are empowered to act only in certain fields. Their power is conveyed to them through written instruments or constitutions which are beyond their control. All power in either case lies ultimately in the voters, whether through the ballot and their ability to defeat at the polls alone, or through this plus a written constitution. Accordingly, as already stated, all seven of our nations have constitutional governments. Outside the British Isles they are, in a sense, doubly constitutional, because not only is this power of election in the voters, but the framework, or written constitution, of each government under which the representatives must act is likewise in the control of the voters.

The word constitution[95-2] is variously used in Pan-Angle {96} parlance, and it may be well here to discuss some of its meanings.

The Constitution of the British Isles consists partly of laws, determining the form of government, which have been passed at various times and are still in force. To this extent it is written. The bulk of the Constitution, however, lies in a mass of tradition, and depends for its force upon the respect in which Parliament holds that tradition. For this reason the British Constitution is frequently called "unwritten." "In one important respect England differs conspicuously from most other countries. Her constitution is to a large extent _unwritten_, using the word in much the same sense as when we speak of unwritten law. Its rules can be found in no written document, but depend, as so much of English law does, on precedent modified by a constant process of interpretation {97}. Many rules of the constitution have in fact a purely legal history, that is to say, they have been developed by the law courts, as part of the general body of the common law. Others have in a similar way been developed by the practice of parliament. Both Houses, in fact, have exhibited the same spirit of adherence to precedent, coupled with a power of modifying precedent to suit circumstances, which distinguishes the judicial tribunals. In a constitutional crisis the House of Commons appoints a committee to 'search its journals for precedents,' just as the court of king's bench would examine the records of its own decisions. And just as the law, while professing to remain the same, is in process of constant change, so, too, the unwritten constitution is, without any acknowledgment of the fact, constantly taking up new ground."[97-1] "'Constitutional law,' as the expression is used in England, both by the public and by authoritative writers, consists of two elements. The one element, which I have called the 'law of the constitution' is a body of undoubted law; the other element, which I have called the 'conventions of the constitution,' consists of maxims and practices which, though they regulate the ordinary conduct of the Crown and of Ministers and of others under the constitution, are not in strictness laws at all."[97-2] It must be borne in mind that Parliament, and Parliament alone, can change these laws of the Constitution, and that the change can occur whenever a majority of Parliament so decides. {98} What these traditions are changes from year to year and even from day to day--in fact, it is difficult to find two Britishers who will agree on what is the Constitution at a given date, so greatly are these traditions a matter of personal, not national, conviction.

In each of the other Pan-Angle countries the Constitution consists of laws and traditions similar to those in the British Isles, plus a written document (or documents) which is a power of attorney limiting in certain ways the power of the national representatives-be they executive, judicial, or legislative. These written documents are either enactments of the Parliament of the British Isles, or successors to such enactments. The Canadian Constitution was drafted in London by delegates from the Canadian colonies and various British officials,[98-1] and was passed by the British Isles Parliament, March 29, 1867, to take effect July 1. It was never submitted to the people,[98-2] although it was pleaded that the general election which ensued was "virtual ratification." The Australian Constitution, drafted by Australians in a national constitutional convention, ratified by referenda in each colony,[98-3] now to become a "state," was altered by the British Isles Parliament only in reference to the clause which prohibited appeals to the King in Council, and was passed by that Parliament July 9, 1900, to take effect January 1, 1901. The South {99} African Constitution was drafted in South Africa by South Africans in a national constitutional convention, ratified by the legislatures in three of the South African provinces, and in Natal by a referendum of the voters, was altered by the British Isles Parliament only in reference to matters affecting "natives" and "Asiatics," and was passed by that Parliament September 20, 1909, to take effect May 31,1910.[99-1] The Constitutions of New Zealand and Newfoundland are to be found in the charters and enactments framed in London for their government, and are historically similar in composition to the constitutions of the thirteen American colonies. The American Constitution was based on the previous experience of the race, especially as acquired under various colonial charters. It was drafted at a national convention, and was subsequently ratified by state representative conventions successively. The work of the National Convention "was a work of selection, not a work of creation, . . . the success of their work was not a success of invention, always most dangerous in government, but a success of judgment, of selective wisdom, of practical sagacity,--the only sort of success in politics which can ever be made permanent."[99-2] The American people changed governmental responsibility from the British Isles to themselves, but did not and could not change the source of their ideas.