Part 17

The danger to the Britannic nations was expressed in May 1911: "The truth is that the safety of the Imperial system cannot be maintained much longer by the arrangements which exist at present. No one, in the face of the facts brought {228} forward in this article, can believe that the need for national strength is disappearing. The British naval budget and the creation of the Dominion navies alone disprove it. Yet it is quite clear that Great Britain alone cannot indefinitely guarantee the Empire from disruption by external attack. The further one looks ahead the more obvious does this become. A nation of 45,000,000 souls, occupying a small territory and losing much of the natural increase in its population by emigration, cannot hope to compete in the long run even against single powers of the first magnitude--with Russia, for instance, with its 150,000,000 inhabitants, with America with its 90,000,000, with Germany with its 65,000,000, increasing by nearly a million a year, to say nothing of China with its 430,000,000 souls. Far less can if hope to maintain the dominant position it has hitherto occupied in the world, with a dozen new powers entering upon the scene. Each of these powers, of small account by itself, is already an important factor in the scale which measures the balance of power. And as they are steadily increasing in wealth and population, it is only a question of time before some of them will become first-class powers in their turn. What will be the position of the Empire then, if it has to depend upon the navy of England alone? Obviously the day must come when, if the Empire is to continue, it must be defended by the joint efforts of all its self-governing peoples."[228-1]

In March 1913 another Britannic writer states: "The urgency of the situation does not diminish. {229} Already, without striking a blow, Germany has practically detached the British navy from every sea except the North Sea--a result which no Englishman a few years ago would have believed to be possible in any circumstances whatever."[229-1]

The Britannic nations are not united in any single foreign policy. Hence they offer many opportunities for fatal discord. "It is simply impossible for the Dominions to set up independent foreign policies and independent defensive systems of their own without destroying the Empire, even if foreign powers refrain from attack. Suppose the present tendency carried to its logical conclusion. Instead of there being one government responsible for the safety of the Empire, there will be five. Each of these governments will be free to pursue any policy it likes, and each will have military or naval strength with which to back its policy. Each of them, therefore, may involve itself in war. And if the policy of one government, or the use it makes of its navy, does lead to war, what is to be the position? Are the other governments to be involved? The Dominions, not unreasonably, do not admit their responsibility for the policy of Great Britain, because they have no share in framing it. Is Great Britain to be responsible for the policy of the Dominions? Australia, for instance, is committed to the policy of Asiatic exclusion--a policy which may lead to international complications of the gravest kind."[229-2] Again, "Obviously, the principle of complete local autonomy, admirably as it works for the {230} internal politics of the Empire, cannot be applied to foreign affairs. The Empire will infallibly disappear if anyone of five governments can involve it in war."[230-1]

The _Round Table_ article does not even consider the chance of war between Britannic nations. Doubtless the thought is so abhorrent that the possibilities which the facts present are often overlooked. Yet such possibilities do exist, and are added reasons for Britannic unity of government.

Whatever dangers threaten the Britannic nations, threaten also America. In some cases these dangers are indirect or seemingly remote, in others, more immediately pressing. Injury to any part of the race would be an injury to America. If the Britannic nations receive any substantial damage, America must face the world as the head naval power of the English-speaking civilization. It would succeed to all the responsibilities and difficulties of that position, and its ability to discharge that duty would have been diminished by whatever damage the Britannic nations had sustained.

War between any of the Britannic nations and America would be as fratricidal as that between any of the six Britannic nations. But the possibility of such a war, however abhorrent, is not to be ignored. America's population among the Pan-Angle nations soon will be approximated only by that of Canada. Rivalry between America and Canada would weaken the civilization in its population and wealth centre--its heart. If such rivalry should involve the clash of the six Britannic nations against America, the struggle {231} would be more stupendous than any the race has yet experienced.

All that is written as argument for closer union among the Britannic nations applies with equal force to a project intended to check the intra-racial struggles and safeguard the inter-racial security of our whole Pan-Angle civilization. The Pan-Angles have had their civil wars, both in and out of England: the English Civil War, the American Revolution, and the American Civil War. The Pan-Angles have had their foreign wars. They have outrun the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and French. These struggles warn us to co-operate to avoid further civil wars and to meet the foreign wars to come.

The race centre has moved, as Franklin foresaw, across the Atlantic. Canada, reaching to the two oceans, is the keystone of the Britannic arch. Its population will soon exceed that of the British Isles, whether compared with the present or any future British Isles population now imaginable. A proposal to establish the Britannic capital in Canada commends itself to some who are anxious for Britannic closer union. This, however, concerns the political unity of only the smaller portion of the race. The Pan-Angle house would still be divided. The future will be better secured to the race if the seven nations, taking counsel together, build a common capital on that unfortified boundary between the two Atlantic-Pacific nations.

Bound into one federal body politic, the seven Pan-Angle nations would ensure to each of their component groups as final a sense of political security as any people have ever experienced {232} within the knowledge of history. We should doubtless prefer to enjoy such a security without entering into any political combination. Each nation desires to go its own gait, yielding no iota of its independence. Since we cannot do that in safety, it is better to be bound into a co-operative unity with our fellow Pan-Angles, than to run any risk of suffering the bondage of an alien government. Most of us have already tried federation and found it effective. The British Isles appears about to adopt it. While it makes for strength, it permits and encourages individual freedom and local self-government, essentials to Pan-Angle existence.

The reasons for federation are many, and the obstacles are not as great as those we have met and overcome in previous instances of like nature in our local histories.

Only a few reasons for federation have been here given. They are based on some of the reiterative similar facts which in our various local histories emphasize the same Pan-Angle principles. Many other reasons drawn from Pan-Angle experience will occur to the reader. He who wishes to see these arguments supplemented in the stories of the downfall of other civilizations can find much in non-Pan-Angle history to verify the theme of this book. But he will fail to find any case of the rule of one people over areas so extensive and so populous; he will fail to find free men so equal in freedom--religious, political, and personal. There are to-day over one hundred and forty-one millions of white, English-speaking, self-governing people, who are living witnesses that government of the {233} people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

For the citizens, and subject to their presentative sanction, the practice of representative government exists. The citizens do not exist for the sake of the government. To enlarge the sphere of the individual with due regard to the preservation of the group, Pan-Angles have used and proved the federal idea of government.

England gave us the tenets of presentative and representative control manifested in unitary governments. New England, beginning in the days of "The United Collonyes" of 1643, added to our English heritage the tenet of the co-existence of a federal common government and partner unitary governments. England is now merged into the nationality of the British Isles, and New England is merely a small corner of America. But the ideas they gave to us live wherever Pan-Angles talk of the safety of our civilization.

The success of our former attempts at lesser "closer unions," is the best evidence of our co-operative ability in the face of obstacles. American, Canadian, Australian, and South African experiences show how difficulties are overcome when the need is understood. Rhode Island held back--the last to enter the new America; Nova Scotia held back--the last willingly to enter the new Canada; Queensland held back--the last to enter the constitutional convention for the new Australia; and Natal held back--the last to support the new South Africa. Obstacles have always been present. They will arise in any effort for similar co-operations. But the common danger and common need is {234} enough to dispel the obstacles in the path of Pan-Angle federation.

Only by the force of public opinion do we accomplish our common intentions. We are slow to act politically. The refusal seven times repeated of the British Government to acknowledge New Zealand as within the Britannic world, and the long delayed start by America to build an Atlantic-Pacific canal are typical of all of us. But when our public desires are once formed they find a way to realization.

While we Pan-Angles wait, our rivals are growing stronger.

If anyone searches here for unfriendly criticism or disparagement, or for an ulterior motive in advocating such a federation, he will be disappointed or self-deceived. If he be an American who thinks he sees here a suggestion that the United States should assert the hidden might of her eighty odd millions of resourceful people to compel by diplomacy or tariffs such joint action; if he be a Britisher who thinks he sees here another pushing American plan of wider world control; if he be from one of the five new Britannic nations and guards jealously his own worthy pride of nationhood from the numerical domination of both the British Isles and America, and fears that his own nation's autonomy is covertly attacked--in any such case the reader, whoever he be, is wrong.

These pages are to tell Pan-Angles that their efforts will be wasted in any work not based on mutual respect and--may the word be used between men of a race who hesitate to show it--affection; to tell the Pan-Angle who has not {235} before realized it that we are all of the same race, hard fighters and firm friends; and to tell the men of each Pan-Angle nation that their system of individual representation, with primary and final control in the voters of the nation, is the race system. To the Pan-Angle reader, wherever he be, just around the corner or at the other side of the globe (which ought to be the same in this, our world), these pages are addressed in hopes of helping each of us better to understand each other, and to remind us how much we need each other's help.

This attempt to express ourselves in terms of ourselves may seem a trite treatise to those familiar with our history. The reason for saying trite things is lest we forget.

The federation of the Pan-Angles is, perhaps to many of us, the vision that is to become a reality as a result of this "Era of English-speaking Good Feeling." We have inherited not only lands but ideals from the men who fought for them, regardless of whether it was they or we, their children, who should inherit and enjoy them. To defend these lands, these ideals of personal freedom, and this language we speak, we once had unquestioned supremacy over the seas of the world. By a federation of the English-speaking white people of these seven nations, the control of the world and the self-control of our own citizens will again be in the certain care of the Pan-Angles.

"We sailed wherever ship can sail, We founded many a noble state; Pray God our greatness may not fail Through craven fear of being great."

[228-1] _Round Table_, London, May 1911, pp. 251-252.

[229-1] Richard Jebb, _The Britannic Question_, London, 1913, p. 258.

[229-2] _Round Table_, London, May 1911, pp. 252-253.

[230-1] _Round Table_, London, May 1911, pp. 253-254.

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INDEX

Aborigines, the, of Pan-Angle lands, 27, 135.

Adams, John, _cited_, 107.

Administration, the, 118.

Administrative control, 94, 111.

Africa. _See_ South Africa.

Albany Conference, 184, 186, 187, 191.

Aliens, assimilation of, 25, 26.

Alliance stage in Pan-Angle relations, 181.

America. _See_ United States.

American:

Characteristics, 51.

National language, 39, 40.

Nationhood demonstrated in the issue of the Civil War, 168.

People, the, 23.

States, combination between, 53, 179, 180. _See also under_ United States.

American Ambassador, the, _quoted_, 36-37.

American Bar Association, 172, 226 _n._ 2.

American Civil War, 150, 166-168, 173; effect of, on the attitudes of the British Isles and the United States, 169-170.

American colonies, the, 8, 10, 11; commercial friction in, in the eighteenth century, 121.

American colonization, 51 _n._ 1; women's share in, 51 _and n._ 2.

American Revolution, the, 15, 114 _and n._, 122, 161, 164, 174, 180; migrations incident to, 161-162.

Americanisms, 29.

Americans, defined, 84 _n._

Angles, the, 4, 5, 6.

Anglican, the term, 18.

Anglo-Japanese treaty, 145, 223.

Anglo-Saxon: the term considered, 18; element in United States government, the, 37.

Appeal Court, 90.

Arbitration courts, 121, 122, 175 _n._ 2, 215.

Arbitration treaty between America and the British Isles, 182 _n._ 2.

Asiatic:

Immigration, 125, 138.

Indian, the, 138.

Races, problem of, 27.

Australia, 16, 27, 79, 158.

Asiatic immigration, 125, 143-146 _passim_, 158, 229.

Constitution, the, 98, 110 _and n._, 112.

Federation in, 121, 168, 180.

Government, 112-113 _and n._, 193.

Upper House, election to, 109.

Australian, characteristics of the, 52.

Barbados, suggestion from, for closer union between England and colonies, 184.

Bible, English version of, 28.

Boer War, the, 123, 213.

Boone, Daniel, 50.

Botha, General, _quoted_, 80.

Britain, early history of, 2 _et seq._

Britannic nations, the, 88; an alliance existent among, 181-183, 210; federation of, 208, 209, 210, 224; attitude of, in foreign policy, 229-230; and America, 230.

{238}

_Britannica Year Book_, 109.

British-American friendship, 174-175 _and n._ 2, 182-183.

British Columbia and Oriental immigration, 125, 144-146.

British Isles:

Ascendency, 170.

Colonies and federation, 189. attitude to Colonial question in the Cobden era and during the era of Gladstone, 163.

Constitution, 96 _et seq._

Defined, 83 _n._

Federal model for, the, 197.

Government, 62, 95, 111-115 _passim_, 193; weakness of unitary system in, 195, 224; executive office during the American Revolution, 114.

Naval defence, 157-159, 228; Big Fleet policy, 127, 128, 154.

Parliament. _See below_.

Privy Council, Judicial Committee, 90, 91, 124.

British-Japanese treaty, 145, 223.

British North America Act, 85, 168.

British Parliament, 95; and the constitution, 96-98, 102, 103; development of, 57-58; now in essence unicameral, 58, 104.

American representatives in, suggested, 184.

Cabinet, the, 115.

General Election, 112.

Relations with the Colonial Governments, 85 _et seq._

British South African Company, 49.

Britons, the, 2; under Roman administration, 2-3.

Brown, John, and the abolition of slavery, 50.

Bryce, Lord, 176; on British-American friendship, _quoted_, 176-177; _cited_, 32; _quoted_, 101.

Buller, Charles, 162.

Burke, E., _cited_, 11, 61; _quoted_, 94, 214-216, 226.

Cabot, John and Sebastian, 7 _n._ 1.

Caldecott, H., _English Colonization and Empire_, quoted, 59, 87, 91, 172 _n._ 2.

Canada, 13, 16, 23, 79, 110, 133, 158, 169, 172 _and n._ 2, 180, 191, 230, 231.

Government, 193, 194.

Immigration, 24-25 _n._

Loyalist migrations into, during the American Revolution, 161-162.

Separation, the question of, 162, 163-164.

Upper House, election to, 109, 110.

Canadian Constitution, the, 98, 168.

Canadian Rebellion (1837), 15.

Cape Colony, native franchise in, 67.

_Cape Times_, quoted; 120 _n._ 1.

Carnarvon, Lord, _cited_, 123.

Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, _quoted_, 87, 175; reply to Sir Wilfrid Laurier at Colonial Conference (1902), 181.

Chatham, Lord, 134, 174 _and n._

China, 140-142, 143, 228; civilization of, as a danger for Pan-Angles, 141.

Choate, Joseph H., _quoted,_ 176, _n._

Churchill, Mr Winston, _quoted,_ 197, 201-202.

Civil discord as a danger for Pan-Angles, 120.

Cobden, _cited_, 163.

Colonial Conference (1902), the, 79, 85, 181-182.

Colonial government, inauguration of modern, 162.

Colonial independence, 170.

Colonial Office, the, 89.

Colonial representation favoured by Pownall and Franklin, 184 _n._, 185, 187-189, 192, 199.

Colonies and possessions, distinction between, not appreciated by the rulers of England, 9-10, 13.

Colonization, by the Pan-Angles, 8, 51.

Commerce, competitions of, between nations, 121.

Common law of England and of Scotland, 67-68, 96, 97.

Conference of Education Associations, 216-217.

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Congress and the American Constitution, 102-103.

Constitutional:

Government, 95.

Law, 97-98.

Constitutions, 60; as restrictions on the power of the people's representatives, 60.

American, 99 _et seq._

Ancient and modern compared, 95 _n._ 2.

British, 96 _et seq._

Written, 100, 105.

Converging tendency, 170, 173, 174.

Co-operation for protection of lands and trade, 46.

Corfield, Richard C., 49.

Court of Arbitration, 121, 122, 215.

Court of Appeal, 90.

Crown colonies, the, 16 _n._

Danes, the, 4, 5, 6.

Dangers to the Pan-Angle civilization, 120 _et seq._, 227.

Civil discord, 120, 231.

Frictions, 121 _et seq._

Sense of security as a danger, 135-137.

Subject populations as a source of, 156.

Defoe, Daniel, _quoted_, 6.

Delegation, 194 _n._ 1.

Democracy, 63.

Dependencies, distinguished from colonies, 9, 91-93.

Devolution, 194 _and n._ 1.

Dewey, Admiral, 54.

Dilke's _Greater Britain_, cited, 168.

Downing Street, 88, 89, 90, 125.

Dunraven, Lord, on the principles of Home Rule, 198.

Durham, Lord, Governor of Canada, 162.

East India Company, 162.

Education, 76-78.

Egerton, H. E., _Federation and Unions_, quoted, 205 _n._

Election of representatives, the right of, 59.

Emerson, _English Traits_, quoted, 35, 191.

Emigration from Great Britain and Ireland, 22 _and n._

Empire, the term, considered, 15-16 _and nn._, 88, 93.

England, the term, considered, 19.

England, 5; the Norman invasion, 5-6; in the Age of Discovery, 7; the union with Scotland, 10.

England and the American Colonies, 8, 10, 11, 177-179; Franklin's plans for closer union between, 184 _et seq._

England, modern area of, 48 _and n._ 1

English Civil War and law reform, 68.

English common law, 67 _et seq._, 96, 97.

English, the term, considered, 18-19.

English language: the tie between Pan-Angles, 31-32, 39, 40; characteristics of, 33; development of, 28, 30, 33; standards in, 29; differences of dialect and colonization, 29; local variations of speech, 29, 30, 31; the written language, 31; place of, as a world language, 35; Americanisms, 29.

English-speaking peoples: the seven nations, 16 _et seq._, 79 _et seq._, 189; number of, 33 _and n._ 1 232; the assumption of superiority in, 35 _et seq._

European migrations into Britain, 2.

Executive control, 94, 111.

Federal courts, 102-103.

Federalism, 200, 224.

Federated Malay States, the, 13, 14, 200 _n._ 1.

Federation, 200 _n._ 1, 232; evolution of, 205.

Federation of Pan-Angles, considered,93, 129-130, 203, 206 _et seq._, 227 _et seq._; methods of, 208-209; plans for, 210 _et seq._; arbitration as leading to, 216; conferences as stepping-stones to, 216-217; educative influences as factors in, 218-220, 221-222; facilities for communication as a factor in promoting, 217; voluntary {240} associations for promotion of, 218-220; defensive efforts previous to, 222-223.

Forbes, W. C., _quoted_, 92.

Foreign alliances, 223.

Foreign immigration and the Pan-Angle lands, 24, 25.

France, 131, effect of the Seven Years War on, 178; oversea possessions of, 132-133; regarded by British Isles as an effective ally, 133; holds no true colonies, 133.

Franklin, Benjamin, on colonial representation in the British Parliament, 184, _n._, 185, 192, 199; scheme of, for Pan-Angle union, 184-191 _passim_; a hoax by, 187 _n._ 2; _quoted_, 34, 53; _cited_, 12, 61, 173, 210, 231.

French and British in North America, characteristics of, 51.

French language, the, 34.

Galloway, Pennsylvanian loyalist, _cited_, 11; _quoted_, 12.

Germanic tribes, early system of government in, 54-55.

Germany, 131, 138, 142, 143, 229; as a rival of the Pan-Angles, 152-156, 158, 228; rise of, 154; bureaucracy in, 155.

Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., _cited_, 163.

Government, different significations of the word in England and United States, 118.

Government, ultimate control of, with the voters, 94, 95.

Non-unitary, 6, 193.

Unitary, 194. inadequacy of, 195.

Governmental practices, 94 _et seq._

Governments: complementary functions in, 170; presentative and representative, 61, 62, 63.

Governors, the British, 86, 87, 108-109 _n._; the power of veto of, 86, 87, 89.

Grant, President, 167, 169,

Grey, Sir Edward, 152.

Hague Tribunal, the, 121-122.

Haldane, Lord, _quoted_, 226 _and n._ 2.

Hamilton, Alexander, 117.

Hardinge, Lord, _cited_, 120 _n._ 1.

Hawaiian Islands, the, 143, 144.

Hay-Pauncefoote treaty, 128.

Hindus, 125 _n._ 1.

Holland, 131; oversea possessions of, 132 _and n._ 2.

Home Rule, 165 _and n._ 1, 198.

House of Commons, 57, 58, 95, 97, 104, 108.

House of Lords, 57 _and n._ 6, 58, 59, 90, 104, 108.

Howe, Joseph, 191.

Howe, Lord, 178 _and n._

Howe, Sir William, 178 _n._

Hudson's Bay Company, 49.

Hutchinson, _quoted_, 9.

Imperial Civil War, the. _See_ American Revolution.

Imperial Defence Committee, 90, 91.

Imperial Federation, 15-16.

Joseph Howe's statement, 191.

Imperial Parliament, 88. India, 8, 9, 13, 16 _n._, 178.

Individualism of the Pan-Angles, 40, 47 _et seq._, 154; and the gift for combining, 52; and territorial acquisition, 48; and personal liberty, 50; in religion, 73-75.

Initiative, 60.

International arbitration, 121, 122, 175 _n._ 2, 215.

International postal arrangements, 217.

Ireland and the Irish question, 13, 164 _and n._ 4, 165, 197, 198; union with Great Britain, 192.

Japan, 139, 142-143; rise of, as a world power, 142, 147, 149, 152; the increasing population and the search for land, 143-144.

Japanese migration and Pan-Angle lands, 144-146, 151; Admiral Mahan on, 147 _et seq._; the question of assimilation, 149-151.

Japanese treaty with Great Britain, 145, 223.

Jefferson, Thomas, 107, 126.

{241}

Jenks, E., _The Future Of British Law_, quoted, 68, 70,

Johnson, Dr., _quoted_, 38.

Johnston, Sir H, H., _cited_, 132 _n._ 1, 153.

Jutes, the, 4.

Land and the standard of living, 42 _et seq._; co-operation for protection of, 46.

Language of the Pan-Angles, growth of, 28.

Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, _quoted_, 80, 86, 181.