Part 11

Preliminary to annexation in past histories has often gone occupation. But even if annexation by a foreign power is not to follow the occupation of our lands by any considerable number of aliens, who remain aliens loyal to a foreign power, our integrity and welfare are thereby seriously disturbed. Several of our groups are awakening to this fact. Alaska, British Columbia, and the Pacific Slope states on one side of the ocean, New Zealand and Australia on the other, and the Hawaiian Islands between, all find the problem of Japanese migration a live topic of practical politics. In every one of these places legislation has been enacted to discriminate against the Japanese. To both New Zealand and Australia, the nearness of Japan has been a stimulus toward undertaking means of self-protection, naval and military, since these countries have come to feel that the British navy does not furnish adequate protection to their exposed shores. He who looks into the conditions of exclusion of the Japanese from these Britannic and American shores will note the fact that the {145} action of British Columbia, California, New Zealand, and Australia has at one time or another been in conflict with the treaties made by the larger political entity of which each respectively is a part. He will see how Australia and New Zealand have changed their legislation to accord with the letter, but not the spirit, of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, and how British Columbia and California have insisted on protecting themselves.[145-1]

As new areas of the Pan-Angle world are affected by the problem, such comment as the following appears: "A brisk controversy is going on in the South over the proposed colonization of Japanese in Florida. The newspapers of that state ridicule the alarm shown by Representative Clark; the three or four Japanese seen in Jacksonville, says the _Times-Union_ of that city, appear to be perfectly tame, and the editor concludes: 'It is not at all probable that many Japanese will ever wish to come to Florida, and we are willing that all who wish to come should come. 'The _New Orleans Times-Democrat_ is more pessimistic, and remarks: 'That, it will be remembered, was California's attitude not many years ago.'" [145-2]

In the solution of this problem, which relates not only to the Pacific but which is a problem of a civilization, we are aided by the Pan-Angle individualistic habit of each locality controlling its own local questions. "'No one,' said the Premier of British Columbia the other day . . . 'no one {146} can question the supreme authority of the Legislature of British Columbia to deal with oriental immigration.'"[146-1] In cases where no one does question such authority, the matter is promptly settled according to the wishes of the locality affected. If, on the other hand, anyone does question such authority, the locality has, at least, by its insistence warned the whole race of its perils. Each such insistence offends the Asiatics. To those Pan-Angles concerned, it is becoming increasingly understood that the struggle has only just begun.

The anti-Asiatic feeling has been expressed from Vancouver to Hobart, and from Auckland to Durban. Its utterance has been earnest and measured, bitter and extravagant, loud and long. A whole race would not in various corners of the earth so talk and act for no reason. It would be tedious here to catalogue the phrases ranging from mild to execrative. Nor can the credit be given to any special one of the Pan-Angle nations involved for moderation of statement or care in analysis of the problem.

Enough here to quote a statement of one[146-2] who is known throughout the Pan-Angle world: "The question discussed . . . is based . . . upon the Alien Land Bill recently passed by the California Legislature. Upon that particular measure I have no comment to make; it is in fitter hands than mine. It is to 'the ultimate issue involved,' . . . {147} that I direct my remarks. 'The ultimate issue involved'. ..'is whether Japan, who has made good her title to be treated on a footing of complete equality as one of the Great Powers of the world, is not also entitled to rank among the civilized nations whose citizens the American Republic is ready to welcome, subject to a few well-defined exceptions, within its fold whenever they are prepared to transfer their allegiance to it.' In brief, this means, I apprehend, whether the attainment by Japan of the position of a Great Power entitles her to claim for her citizens free immigration into the territories of any other Great Power, with accompanying naturalization.

". . . In my own appreciation there is no necessary connexion between a nation's status as a Great Power and her right to receive for her people the privileges of immigration and naturalization in the territory of another State; and the reasonings adduced in support of the proposition seem to me defective, both in some of their assertions and still more so in ignoring certain conspicuous facts.

"Primary among these facts is that of the popular will, upon which, in the fundamental conceptions of both British and American government, the policy of a nation must rest. Be the causes what they may--economical, industrial, social, racial, or all four; and if there be any other motives--the will of the people is the law of the Government. So far as that will has been expressed in America and in Canada it is distinctly contrary to the concession of such immigration. With the question of immigration that of naturalization {148} is inextricably involved. There cannot be naturalization without immigration; while immigration without concession of naturalization, though conceivable and possible, is contrary to the genius of American institutions, which, as a general proposition, do not favour inhabitancy without right to citizenship.

"Another tacit assumption is that changes of governmental methods change also natural characteristics, to such an extent as to affect radically those qualities which make for beneficial citizenship in a foreign country. Stated concretely, this means that the adoption of Western methods by Japan has in two generations so changed the Japanese racial characteristics as to make them readily assimilable with Europeans, so as to be easily absorbed. This the Japanese in their just pride of race would be the first to deny. It ignores also the whole background of European history, and the fact that European civilization (which includes America) grew up for untold centuries under influences of which Eastern Asia--including therein Japan--experienced nothing. The 'Foundations of the Twentieth Century,' are not only a succession of facts, or combination of factors. They are to be _found_ chiefly in the moulding of character, national and individual, through sixty-odd generations.

"It is, I conceive, this deep impress of prolonged common experience which constitutes the possibility of assimilation, even among the unhappy, poverty-stricken mass often coming to us, . . . Undoubtedly they constitute a problem, but one with which the immense assimilative force of {149} English institutions, especially when Americanized, has been able so far to deal successfully, and I believe will continue able. But there are those who greatly doubt whether, in view of the very different foundations of the Japanese 20th century, and of the recognized strength and tenacity of character of the Japanese people emphasized by strong racial marks, they could be so assimilated. We who so think--I am one--cordially recognize the great progresses of Japan and admire her achievements of the past half century, both civil and military; but we do not perceive in them the promise of ready adaptability to the spirit of our own institutions which would render naturalization expedient; and immigration, as I have said, with us implies naturalization. Whatever our doubts as to the effect upon national welfare of the presence of an unassimilable multitude of naturalized aliens, the presence of a like number of unnaturalized foreigners of the same type would be even worse.

"The question is fundamentally that of assimilation, though it is idle to ignore that clear superficial evidences of difference, which inevitably _sautent aux yeux_, due to marked racial types, do exasperate the difficulty. Personally, I entirely reject any assumption or belief that my race is superior to the Chinese, or to the Japanese. My own suits me better, probably because I am used to it; but I wholly disclaim, as unworthy of myself and of them, any thought of superiority. But with equal clearness I see and avow the difficulties of assimilation due to formative influences of divergent pasts and to race. . . .

"Let me say here that . . . is mistaken in the {150} statement that the United States' within living memory waged the greatest civil war of modern times in order to establish the claim of American negroes to equal right of citizenship with the white population.' With the statement falls necessarily his inference from it, that 'a colour bar cannot be logically pleaded as prohibitive.' The United States did not wage the War of Secession even for the abolition of slavery, still less for equal rights of citizenship. Goldwin Smith, as a contemporary, held against us that the war, not being for abolition, was one of conquest. Lincoln said distinctly:--'I will restore the union with slavery or without slavery, as best can be.' Myself a contemporary and partaker, I can affirm this as a general tone, though there was a strong minority of abolition sentiment. The abolition proclamation came 18 months after the war began, and purely as a measure of policy. The full rights of citizenship came after the war ended, as a party political measure, though doubtless with this mingled much humanitarian feeling. Concerning this legislation a very acute American thinker, himself in the war, said to me within the past two years, 'The great mistake of the men of that day was the unconscious assumption that the negro was a white man, with the accident of a black skin.' That is, the question was not one of colour, but of assimilation as involved in race character. Now, while recognizing what I clearly see to be the great superiority of the Japanese, as of the white over the negro, it appears to me reasonable that a great number of my fellow-citizens, knowing the problem we have in the coloured race among us, should dread the introduction {151} of what they believe will constitute another race problem; and one much more difficult, because the virile qualities of the Japanese will still more successfully withstand assimilation, constituting a homogeneous foreign mass, naturally acting together irrespective of the national welfare, and so will be a perennial cause of friction with Japan, even more dangerous than at present. . . .

[Here follows a personal appreciation of the Japanese as Admiral Mahan had known them for forty years, and to which most thoughtful Pan-Angles would gladly subscribe. He then concludes:]

". . . Despite gigantic success up to the present in assimilative processes--due to English institutions inherited and Americanized, and to the prevalence among the children of our community of the common English tongue over all other idioms--America doubts her power to digest and assimilate the strong national and racial characteristics which distinguish the Japanese, which are the secret of much of their success, and which, if I am not mistaken, would constitute them continually a solid homogeneous body, essentially and unchangingly foreign."

If there are, as Admiral Mahan suggests, good reasons why the Japanese should not be allowed to settle in Pan-Angle countries, those certainly form the best of reasons why the Pan-Angles should not allow themselves to occupy a position where Japan could demand of them this privilege for its subjects.

But while Japanese immigration, for the present peaceful except in the field of economics, has been {152} agitating the nations that border the Pacific, half way round the world other Pan-Angles have had nightmares of a military invasion. "Within twelve hours' steam of Essex and Lincolnshire is the port of Emden, recently adapted for the embarkation of large bodies of troops."[152-1] "The past need not concern us here. However serious the old scares may have been, at least they came and went, leaving a clear sky behind them when they had gone. But now the sky refuses to clear. The 'scare' of 1909, launched on that March afternoon when Sir Edward Grey told the House of Commons that, in view of German competition, the whole British Fleet would have to be rebuilt in Dreadnought form, has left a permanent mark upon the public mind."[152-2]

There, at England's door, has been growing a nation small in geographical area but with a population of 65,000,000 whites,[152-3] which, though less than the number of whites of the United States, is more than the number of whites of the six Britannic nations. Roughly stated, Germany has about one-half as many whites as have all the Pan-Angle nations combined.[152-4] In many respects Germany's position is not unlike Japan's. Both nations have had a victorious rise based on military efficiency, and there is no proof that their naval efficiency is not similarly high. Both nations {153} have, relatively speaking, but a small subject population to control. Both nations must necessarily be warlike on account of the pressure of population about them, and both have birth-rates which are already crowding their lands more than the Pan-Angles are crowding theirs.

Practically all the non-European areas of the world which the white race can occupy are held by the seven Pan-Angle nations, or protected by one of them, or are in the hands of their out-run rivals, or in the control of Japan, Russia, or China. The same is true of lands unsuited for white occupation, but desirable as dependencies. Germany arrived on the scene so recently that it shared practically only the last divisions of the lands of the blacks. Consequently, the only lands available for Germany are those now held by the white and yellow races.

Under such circumstances, if Germany is to take land from whites, Pan-Angle common-sense suggests that such land should not be ours. In accord with such policy is Sir Harry H. Johnston's suggestion that Portugal's African dependencies be divided between the British Isles and Germany.[153-1] If Germany should, however, show a preference for Pan-Angle lands and should ask for those lands on which we now depend for our life and comfort, common-sense equally suggests that we be in a position to refuse. We could not expect the Germans to starve themselves and their children, or even to reduce their standard of living out of respect for claims we could no longer uphold. We did not so respect the claims {154} of Portugal or Spain, Holland or France. Episodes in our own history ought to point plain the only road to security of possession.

The rise of the German Empire might by Pan-Angles be regarded with antagonism, if Japan, Russia, and China offered no dangers. The old and lasting fear that Pan-Angles have for centuries held toward Europe was the fear that called for the naval supremacy of the British Isles and for the Monroe Doctrine of America. Antagonism toward Germany might seem justified were it not that the fear of these other three powers, so different in civilization from us, makes Germany our natural and civilization ally. The victory of Germany over any portion of the Britannic world would be a Pan-Angle calamity. The fall of modern Germany would be hardly less of a Pan-Angle calamity. Any thought of the whites weakening each other, and especially of weakening their chance for developing their individualism, should be abhorrent to every Pan-Angle or German who can see further than the mass of his fellows.

International politenesses often verge towards the extravagant. But certainly, if human relationships can be ascribed to nations, Germany is our near of kin. German blood has enriched ours for fifteen hundred years. Pan-Angle ideals of religious and political freedom came originally from Germany. Pan-Angle language, Pan-Angle law, and many of the qualities of which we are most proud had the same source. Individualism has developed more highly among the Pan-Angles--at least in matters of government. This is {155} demonstrated by Pan-Angle and German ideas regarding civil officers. "Of course, in every nation its affairs are, and must be, conducted by officials. That is as true of America as of Germany. The fundamental difference is that with us these official persons are executive officers only, the real captain is the people; while in Germany these official persons are the real governors of the people, subject to the commands of one who repeatedly and publicly asserts that his commission is from God and not from the people."[155-1] Contrast with this the utterance of an American "official": "the people have not transferred their government to us. They still retain ownership and all the rights and powers of ownership. We are merely their temporary agents in performing duties which they have delegated to us."[155-2] The German point of view would be intolerable to a Pan-Angle, but there is no reason for assuming that this bureaucratic country may not develop a truly representative form of government.[155-3]

To prevent a conflict with Germany should be not merely a matter of Pan-Angle sentiment, but of Pan-Angle business. If the Pan-Angles were so strong that Germany was no longer a source of danger to anyone of their nations, Germany would be changed from a dangerous rival to a political ally. It would be the buffer state for the Pan-Angles {156} against Russia, indeed against all Europe, providing thus greater security for itself as well as for us. We now realize the world has already been staked off by the white and yellow races. While the British Isles and Germany are making extraordinary efforts to build navies, Japan, Russia, and China are growing unmolested. Germany should be the nation with which all Europe and all Pan-Angles should unite to neutralize Japanese and other Asiatic questions that press for solution, and the nation with which all other whites should rally if this test of strength ever has to come. Properly understood in reference to the economic and political struggle between the white and yellow races, a Pan-Angle federation should be welcomed by every German.

The Pan-Angles are responsible for large subject populations, which they both control and protect. This requires a greater or less military effort according to local circumstance and the fluctuating make-up of the international situation. Fortunately, from a military point of view, these Pan-Angle dependencies are widely scattered over the earth, and of such diverse languages that no combination among them has thus far appeared probable. But in case of any conflict with a foreign power they must always be regarded as an element of weakness to us. The Pan-Angles are not a military people. In each of our recent wars we have had to make ready an army after hostilities began--even though we were not taken unawares. In this regard we are at a disadvantage with those powers who keep {157} their military force in constant readiness. In the past we have been willing to forego a fighting efficiency, if thereby we could be free of a possibly tyrannical system and obtain greater play for our individualism. We may continue of this mind for the future. But if we choose to disregard the usual national precaution of military safety, we must make doubly sure of other strength as its equivalent.

The Pan-Angles do not occupy a contiguous land area. They are scattered over the globe, and are exposed not only on their many shores but throughout the length of their lines of sea communication. The oceans sever them from each other and sever some of them from their food. One answer to the problems which arise from this wide separation is sea power. On this depends the very daily existence of some of our groups.

Until recently six of our nations have relied almost entirely upon the taxing power and efforts of the British Isles to maintain a navy for them.

The burden on the British Isles has been heavy, and is growing steadily heavier. To defend the British Isles from Germany the British navy was withdrawn to European waters. Since 1910 this concentration has been practically a defence of the North Sea shores of the British Isles. How long can the British Isles alone bear the strain of its own naval defence? And who is to defend the other five Britannic nations? "We have made great efforts, as in the past, but we are realizing that even so our efforts, in Great Britain alone, may before long fall short of what Imperial security requires. And this increasing anxiety is not due solely to a narrow {158} apprehension of German aims. It is due to the rate of naval expansion everywhere."[158-1] "It is quite clear that external pressure is already more severe than it has been for nearly a hundred years, and that it will probably become even greater in the future."[158-2]

Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have now taken steps towards maintaining their own navies to co-operate with the British navy, but it is still true that, "Once the command of the sea is lost by the [British] Empire no local system of defence, naval or military, could secure Australia's autonomy, and she would become the prey of the strongest maritime power."[158-3] A like statement could be made of the other younger Britannic nations. And while the American navy is not to be disregarded as a possible aid, it is not wise for either the Britannic or American people to assume that navies under separate governments will act with that promptness possible under a single control.

In comparison with some of their competitors now rising to the stage of active rivalry, all the seven Pan-Angle nations are collectively only one first-class world-power. Each Pan-Angle nation is naturally more solicitous for its own welfare than for that of its fellow nations. The Englander is exasperated that the other Britannic nations take so little interest in the German peril. Australia and South Africa block the immigration of Asiatics from British dependencies. Canada dallies over {159} the merits or demerits of a naval appropriation bill. The United States fortifies its Canal. Our co-operation is still uncertain, for we are still divided into seven different nations. Neither New Zealand, nor Australia, nor Newfoundland, nor Canada, nor South Africa, nor the British Isles, nor the United States would care to try to stand alone against the possible combinations that might be brought against it; sentiments of warmest friendship, or even treaties, are a poor substitute for a machinery of government tried and tested before the crash comes. As they now are, the seven Pan-Angle nations offer the maximum of inducements for inter-Pan-Angle friction and extra-Pan-Angle aggressions. Together the Pan-Angles could ensure the peace of the world.

[120-1] _The Times_, London, November 28, 1913, Cape Town despatch concerning Lord Hardinge's speech at Madras, November 26, in reference to treatment of Indians in South Africa states: "After criticizing severely several passages in the speech, the _Cape Times_, referring to the suggestion that the Imperial Government should intervene in South Africa, utters the warning that this way madness lies."

[121-1] _Bouvier's Law Dictionary_, Rawle's revision, Boston, 1897, "Court."

[122-1] _Round Table_, London, February 1911, pp. 107-108; _cf._ also _Round Table_, December 1912, p. 29: "Arbitration is no cure for war so long as there is no agreement between nations to substitute arbitration for war, and no power strong enough to enforce such an agreement if made."