iv. 19,) whom he held up as a warning, recording of him only that he had

two wives, and that he was a murderer. With this he contrasts the conduct of Noah and his sons, who had only one wife each. In the history of the patriarchs he shows the evil consequences of polygamy. He shows that it was not the will of Abraham to take a second wife, but that Sarah in her eagerness to have children misled him, and that discord and domestic trouble soon followed. And by all the troubles which the sons of Ishmael have since inflicted upon the children of Isaac, God has, in his providence, confirmed the moral to be drawn from the Mosaic narrative. Moses then points out the happiness of Isaac, who had only one wife; and the troubles of Jacob, who, not by his own choice, but by the wickedness of Laban and the folly of Laban’s daughters, had more than one; and last of all, Moses gave in himself an example of the conduct which he wished Israel to pursue by having only one wife himself. A careful examination, therefore, of the law of Moses will show that he only tolerated polygamy as an existing evil, but that he intended to discourage it, by exhibiting the original institution of marriage, and the many evils that result from a departure from God’s purpose. When, therefore, we show that the oral law permits men to have more wives than one, and that consequently it is accountable for all the evil thence resulting, we cannot be charged with reproaching the law of Moses. The oral law says expressly, that a man may marry many wives, even a hundred. The law of Moses nowhere says any thing of the kind. It only legislates in case that such a thing should happen. The oral law plainly advises a man not to take more than four wives. The law of Moses holds up the evil of having more than one. If men would carefully read the law of Moses, they would see that the original intention was, that a man should have only one wife. But if a man follow the oral law, he will be encouraged to take as many as he can support. It is evident, therefore, that if the Jews in Europe do not practise polygamy, their conduct is not to be ascribed to the influence of Judaism, but of Christianity.

It is, further, evident that this Christian practice of having only one wife, cannot be objected to as an unauthorized alteration of the law of Moses. If R. Gershom was allowed to forbid polygamy, and the Jews considered themselves bound to obey him, they cannot reasonably object to the Christian laws on the same subject. Christianity has only effected by its influence what R. Gershom endeavoured to accomplish by anathema. The only difference is, that Christianity was first, and that R. Gershom learnt the evil of polygamy from Christians. If it was lawful for a rabbi, it was still more lawful for the Messiah to restore the original constitution of marriage as established in Paradise, and to deliver Jewish wives and families from all that confusion and discord which results from polygamy. But it is particularly deserving of notice that R. Gershom, by forbidding the Jews to have more wives than one, made a great and decided change in the oral law. That which the oral law allows, R. Gershom forbids. We grant, indeed, that by thus changing the oral law, he approximated to the mind and intention of Moses: but he altered the oral law, and thereby shows us that he himself did not believe that the oral law was to last for ever, or that it is of eternal obligation. If he had considered it unchangeable, he would not have dared to make the change; but by making so important a change as this, to forbid what it allows, he plainly shows it as his opinion, that where there is a grave reason, the oral law may be changed or abolished; and all the Jews who acquiesce in his ordinance, and think it is unlawful to marry more wives than one; consent to the change. But if it be lawful to change in one thing, it must also be lawful to change in another, so that the rabbinical Jews have no reason whatever for reproaching their brethren who renounce the oral law totally. Such persons are only acting upon a principle practically acknowledged by all the Jews of Europe. It may be said that R. Gershom’s change was only temporary, and that the present acquiescence of European Jews is only a sort of homage to Christian principles. This is certainly true, and this reply leads us to consider the dreary prospect presented to Jewish females, if ever modern Judaism should obtain power. The influence of Christian principle would then cease,—polygamy would again be lawful, and the matrons of Israel, who now appear as the participators in the family government and the guides of their households, would again be degraded into one of a herd of female slaves. They might have a hundred competitors and rivals in their husbands’ affections, and even if the husband should follow the advice of the rabbies, and take only four wives, they would at least have three. Now, we ask every matron in Israel whether she would wish such a change, or whether she would prefer the present state of things, where a man can have only one wife? If she prefers the present state, then she prefers the Christian principle, and acknowledges that Christianity is better than Judaism. If she does not wish for the restoration of polygamy, then she confesses that the doctrines of Judaism are injurious, and that she does not desire the triumph of her own religion. Then why should she profess a religion which she acknowledges to be prejudicial to her welfare—or why should she reject a religion which protects her peace and comfort? There can be no question, that Christianity has prevented amongst the Jews that practice of having many wives; it has, therefore, been a blessing to Jewish families for centuries; why, then, should they despise or oppose a religion which has been, and still is, a blessing? And we propose this question, not only to Jewish wives, but to Jewish husbands. Is it not a fact, that God’s original institution was that a man should have only one wife—does not Moses show that the first polygamist was a descendant of wicked Cain, and, that family discord and unhappiness is the consequence of having more wives than one? Does not reason, and the state of Mahometan countries, show that where there are many wives, woman is degraded, and the education of children necessarily neglected? Is not the moral, the intellectual, and scientific progress of mankind greatly superior in Christian countries, where men have only one wife? Is not, then, the practice of having only one wife a blessing? Has it not been a blessing to Jewish husbands, wives, and children? Are not, then, the Jews deeply indebted to Christianity for that measure of peace and moral improvement which they have derived from this practice? And would not an adherence to their own oral law in the same degree have proved a disadvantage, if not a curse? How, then, can they oppose a religion which has been to them a blessing?—or how can they adhere to a religion which contains principles subversive of their domestic peace, and destructive to the well-being, and the moral and intellectual improvement of one-half the human race? The rabbies say, that the oral law is eternal in its obligation: if so, then polygamy is to be eternal in its continuance, and then men are never to return to that state of perfection which they enjoyed in Paradise. Who is there that does not see that the race of men was most happy when sin was unknown, and most perfect in intellect when he could hold converse with the Deity and dwell in the garden of God? But if Judaism be true, men are never again to enjoy that state, for then polygamy was unknown. Adam had only one wife; and until sin entered into the world, and ripened even into murder, no man had two wives. Judaism is, therefore, opposed to the pure and perfect state of things that existed in Paradise, and favourable to that confusion introduced by the murderous Lamech, the son of murderous Cain—and Christianity resembles, in its principles of marriage, the happy state ordained by God in Paradise. Here, then, we have another and a practical proof that the oral law is not of God. Its authors totally misunderstood the mind and purpose of Moses, the servant of God, and misinterpreted his temporary toleration of an existing evil into a positive permission and sanction for continuing it. We have also another proof of the divine origin of Christianity.

No. XLVIII. DIVORCE.

When God delivered the commandments at Sinai, he placed those which related to himself first, to teach us that our first duty is to love and serve him: and immediately after these he gave the command “Honour thy father and thy mother,” to show us that, next to himself, we are bound to reverence, to love, and to obey those to whom we owe our existence. This order of things was not an arbitrary choice, but founded in that natural constitution of creation which God ordained as most conducive to the intellectual and moral well-being as well as to the happiness of his creatures. He does not command us to love and serve Him, and Him only, merely because He has the light on the one hand, and it is our bounden duty on the other; but because a conformity to his will is an approximation both to wisdom and happiness. Neither does he tell us to honour father and mother, because we owe them all such reverence, as from them we have derived our being, and to them are indebted for all the care and affection with which they have tended and watched over our infancy; but because He has himself constituted the relation of parent and child, and ordained parental affection and filial duty as the means of promoting our welfare in time and in eternity. Any religion, therefore, whose tendency is to render obedience to that command impossible, must not only be contrary to the will of God, but to the happiness of man; and this is one of the many reasons for which we think that Judaism must be false. The religion of the oral law has a direct tendency to diminish a son’s respect for his mother. We do not mean to say that in this or any other Christian country Jewish sons despise their mothers. The co-existence of Christianity necessarily counteracts the development of rabbinical principles. We intend only to exhibit the natural and necessary consequences, if there were no counteracting force. The contempt which the oral law pours upon women in general, and the encouragement which it gives to polygamy have necessarily the effect of lessening their respect both in the eyes of their husbands and their sons, and this tendency is still more increased by the _rabbinic doctrine of divorce_, which we now propose to consider. The law of Moses permits divorce under certain circumstances. It says, “When a man hath taken a wife, and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness, רות דבר, in her; then let him write her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house,” &c. (Deut. xxiv. 1.) But this permission, founded on grave and important considerations, the rabbies have perverted into an unlimited licence to divorce on the most trifling pretext.

בית שמאי אומרים לא יגרש אדם את אשתו אלא אם כן מצא בה ערות דבר דדרשי ליה לקרא כפשטיה אם לא תמצא חן בעינו לפי שמצא בה ערות דבר , ובית הלל סברי אפילו הקדיחה תכשילו דדרשי לקרא הכי כי מצא בה ערות דבר או ערוה או דבר אחר שפשעה כנגדו , ור׳ עקיבא סבר אפילו מצא אחרת נאה הימנה דדריש ליה לקרא הכי והיה אם לא תמצא חן בעיניו פי׳ חן של נוי או שמצא ערות דבר והלכה כבית הלל שאם פשעה כנגדו יכול לגרשה ׃

“The school of Shamai says, A man is not to divorce his wife unless he shall find some uncleanness in her, for they interpret the verse according to its simple meaning, if she find no favour in his eyes on account of his finding some uncleanness in her. The school of Hillel thinks, that if a woman let the broth burn it is sufficient for they interpret the words, ‘a matter of uncleanness,’ to mean, Either uncleanness, or any other matter in which she has offended him. But R. Akiva thinks, that a man may divorce his wife, if he only find another handsomer than she is, for he interprets the verse thus, ‘If she find no favour in his eyes,’ where he explains favour to refer to the favour of beauty, or if he find a matter of uncleanness. But the legal decision is according to the school of Hillel, that is, if a wife sin against her husband, he may divorce her.” (Arbah Turim, Hilchoth Gittin., 1.) This monstrous passage is in itself sufficient to shake the authority of the oral law, for in the first place we find three grave authorities, Shamai, Hillel, and Akiva, all differing as to the sense of a most important passage, bearing upon a subject that most nearly affects the happiness and well-being of human society. One of the gravest questions that can be propounded is, When is a man justified in divorcing his wife? If there be an oral law at all, it ought certainly to answer this question clearly, unequivocally, and satisfactorily. The existence of disputation shows that these three rabbies had no authoritative tradition on the subject, but were merely giving their own private opinions: and that therefore the assertion, that an oral law exists, is a mere fiction invented to impose upon the credulous, but insufficient to beget faith in any man or woman that will make use of the reason given by God. The old fable, that God caused a voice to be heard from heaven, saying, when the rabbies differ, “That

אלו ואלו דברי אלהים חיים ׃

both speak the words of the living God,” will not do now. Every one can understand that God does not speak contradictions. No one will believe that the profane sentiment of R. Akiva, That a man may divorce his wife as soon as he finds another who pleases him better, can proceed from the God of holiness and justice. It is true that his opinion is not the law; but the opinion of Hillel, which is the law, is not a whit better. It pronounces that if a woman only spoil the broth she may be divorced: now this interpretation or the words of Moses is plainly contrary to the grammatical sense: עֶרְוַת is in Regimen (סמיכה) and joined to דָּבָר by a munach, and can therefore by no means be separated from it so as to signify “Either uncleanness or some other matter.” The words of Moses, the points, and the accents, all decide that there is only one cause for which a man may put away his wife. Hillel and his successors have wilfully passed by the plain sense of the Hebrew words, in their eagerness to obtain a facility for putting away their wives. They were not ignorant of the right sense, for that was plainly asserted by Shamai, but were determined to get rid of it; and such was the state of the Jews at the time, that they had influence enough to turn their false interpretation into law; and such has been the state of the Jews ever since, that it continues law to this very hour. A rabbinical Jew may, according to his religious tenets, turn away his wife, the mother of his children, on a pretext that would hardly justify the dismissal of a servant. He may rudely tear asunder the sacred ties of conjugal affection, and separate between mother and children, if the unhappy woman should only make a mistake in her cookery. One of the worst charges brought against the slave-dealers was, that they had no respect either for maternal or filial affection; that they separated between mother and children. The very same accusation can be brought against modern Judaism, which legitimatizes the very same disregard for the feelings of a mother. Can, then, such a religion, which thus daringly snaps the ties of nature, be from God? Is it possible that God should thus expose one half of his rational creatures to the caprice and the tyranny of those who ought to be their defenders and protectors from every insult and every harm? If the same right were given to women, though the laws would be most contrary to the divine institution of marriage, it would at least have the appearance of justice; but this is denied. The oral law says,—

אם לא תמצא חן בעיניו , מלמד שאינו מגרש אלא ברצונו ואם נתגרשה שלא ברצונו אינה מגורשת , אבל האשה מתגרשת ברצונה ושלא ברצונה ׃

“The words, ‘If she find no favour in his eyes,’ teach, that the husband does not divorce except voluntarily; and if the woman be divorced against his will, she is not divorced. But the woman is divorced with or without her will.” (Jad Hachazakah Hilchoth, Gerushin, c. 1, 2.) According to this doctrine the happiness of the wife and the children is absolutely vested in the power of the man; and in any paroxysm of ill-humour, he may make them both unhappy for life; he may turn the mother out of her home, drive her forth like a criminal from the bosom of her family, and introduce a stranger. Who does not see that this is a power unfit to be trusted to the hands of any man or any people? We do not mean to impute anything peculiar to the Jews; we believe that as to their natural propensities, humours, and caprices, all men are much alike, and that therefore none ought to have the power of thus lightly breaking up the domestic constitution. It is no answer to this to say, that in this country divorce is not so lightly practised. Thanks to the power of Christian principle and the existence of Christian laws, it cannot be. But every one, who has had much opportunity of seeing rabbinical Jews, knows that divorce is practised amongst them with a facility and frequency that is astonishing. But this is not the question; we are not examining Jewish manners, but the modern Jewish religion; and if divorce had never been practised, we should still pronounce of the oral law, which inculcates such principles, that it cannot be from God; and of its authors that they were bad men, or they would never have thus trifled with God’s most holy institution. The truth is, that the rabbies were altogether ignorant of the nature of marriage as God established it. They not only allow divorce on the most trifling pretext, but they sanction the practice of marrying for a given length of time, and, when that time is expired, of dissolving the marriage by divorce:—

לא ישא אדם אשה ודעתו לגרשה , ואם הודיעה בתחלה שהוא נושא אותה לימים מותר ׃

“A man must not marry a woman with the intention of divorcing her; but, if he previously inform her that he is going to marry her for a season, it is lawful.” (Hilchoth Gittin in Even Haezer, 1.) Now how contrary is such doctrine to the express words of Scripture. “This is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife; and they shall be one flesh.” (Gen. ii. 23.) Here Adam, in his state of innocence, pronounces that the tie of marriage is more sacred and more binding, than even that which exists between parent and child. A man may, and for his wife’s sake shall, forsake father and mother, but should no more think of separating from his wife, than from his own bones and flesh. Who would lightly think of parting with a limb, or a portion of his body? Urgent, indeed, must be the necessity that will induce a man to permit the separation of a portion of himself, and equally urgent should be the cause that should move a man to part with her who is bone of his bones, and flesh of his flesh. Such is the Mosaic doctrine of the marriage obligation; but so little did the rabbies understand it, that they permit a man to marry for a week, a month, or a year; and when that season is expired, to tear asunder the sacred ties, and that without any cause whatever. But the evident evil that must result from the rabbinic doctrine of divorce is still more apparent from the first sentence of the passage last quoted—“A man must not marry a woman with the intention of divorcing her.” These words show the direct tendency of the doctrine. When power is given to a man to turn out his wife when he likes, a temptation is at once held out to the evil-disposed to marry with the express intention of divorcing. The rabbies, therefore, find it necessary to forbid it; but is it likely that this prohibition will have much force in the eyes of a man who is wicked enough to form the intention? And suppose a wicked man does form the intention, and execute it, what remedy had the poor injured woman? Thus the oral law leaves the daughters of Israel completely at the mercy of the unprincipled, and places them beyond this possibility of obtaining justice.

But the cruelty and total want of feeling which the oral law displays and teaches, with regard to women, appears still more plainly from the following extract:—

מי שנתחרשה אשתו הרי זה מגרשה בגט ותהיה מגורשת , אבל אם נשתטת אינו מוציאה עד שתבריא , ודבר זה תקנת חכמים הוא , כדי שלא תהיה הפקר לפרוצין שהרי אינה יכולה לשמור את עצמה ; לפיכך מניחה ונושא אחרת ומאכילה ומשקה משלה ; ואין מחייבין אותו בשאר כסות ועונה , שאין כח בבן דעת לדור עם השוטים בבית אחד , ואינו חייב לרפאותה ולא לפדותה , ואם גרשה הרי זו מגורשת ומוציאה מביתו ואינו חייב לחזור ולהטפל בה ׃

“If a man’s wife should become deaf and dumb, he gives her a bill of divorce, and she is divorced. But if she become insane, he is not to send her forth until she is recovered: and this thing is an ordinance of the wise men, that she should not become a prey to the immodest, because she is not able to take care of herself. The husband therefore, leaves her where she is, and marries another, and gives her meat and drink out of her own property. But he is not to be compelled to give her food and raiment, and duty of marriage, for it is not in the power of a sane person to dwell in one house with the insane. Neither is he obligated to have her cured, nor to ransom her. But if he should divorce her, then she is divorced, and is to be put out of his house: and he is not obligated to return and take any trouble about her.” (Hilchoth Gerushin, x. 23.) Principles more contrary to God’s Word, and to the common feelings of humanity, were never inculcated under the name of religion. We have been astonished at the cruelty with which the oral law treats Gentiles—we have been horrified at the coolness with which it speaks of splitting open an _Amhaaretz_—but here it surpasses itself, and out-herods Herod. A man accustomed to judge of his duty by the words of Moses and the prophets, or even to follow toe dictates of unsophisticated nature, would conclude that, as he is at all times bound to love and cherish his wife, the obligation is doubly imperative in case of sickness, but especially so when that sorest calamity with which human frailty is visited, insanity, attacks the partner of his life. Then it is that the man, who has one spark of the fear of God or of the love of man, will show all his tenderness, watch over the sufferer with all care and anxiety, and if necessary, devote all his worldly goods to minister to her recovery. No, says the oral law, when the wife of your bosom most requires your attention, then marry another: give her neither food nor raiment, and, if you please, cast her out of your house, and leave her to her fate. The most charitable conclusion would be, to suppose that the men who uttered such sentiments under the mask of religion, were themselves insane. But what are we to think of Israel, that for eighteen hundred years they have been unable to detect so manifest an imposture? And what are we to think of Israel at present, that they sit still and suffer their children to be deluded, by being taught that this most atrocious system of inhumanity, is that pure and holy religion which the God of Israel revealed to Moses? Let not any Israelite mistake us. We do not mean to charge such wickedness upon them. The Providence of God has in a measure delivered them from such an odious yoke. The influence of Christianity has successfully counteracted the full development of these anti-human principles. We only mean to direct their attention to the nature of that religion to which they have adhered so long; and to induce them to consider what would be the state of the world, if Jesus of Nazareth had not arisen to protest against such gross corruptions, and to assert the truth. Just suppose that the traditions had triumphed. The universal law would then be, that men might divorce their wives when they please, and in the time of their calamity cast them forth into the streets. All the bonds of natural affection would be rent asunder. Conjugal affection would cease, filial duty be unknown—no son would honour his mother, for how could a son honour the unhappy being whom his religion pronounces unworthy either of succour or compassion in the time of her utmost need? If such principles had attained dominion, mankind would have been turned into a race of fiends, and this earth have become a hell. What, then, has stopped all this misery? Christianity, and Christianity alone. It teaches very different principles. When a Christian man is married, the vow which he is required to make is this—“Wilt thou have this woman to thy wedded wife, to live together after God’s ordinance in the holy estate of matrimony? Wilt thou love her, comfort her, honour, and keep her in sickness and in health; and, forsaking all other, keep thee only unto her, so long as ye both shall live?” This is the doctrine of the New Testament. The Pharisees asked the Lord Jesus, “Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? And he answered and said unto them, Have ye not read, that He which made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.” (Matt. xix. 3-7.) In like manner, Paul teaches, “So ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself.” (Ephes. v. 28.) And Peter teaches in the same spirit, “Likewise, ye husbands, dwell with them according to knowledge, giving honour unto the wife, as unto the weaker vessel, and as being heirs together of the grace of life; that your prayers be not hindered.” (1 Peter iii. 7.)

Let any unprejudiced, yea, or any prejudiced, man, if he have only the use of his senses, compare these two doctrines, and say which is most agreeable to the will and character of God, as revealed in the Old Testament—and, which is most calculated to promote the happiness of the human race. The combination of mercy and justice forms a striking feature in the revealed character of God, but is there either justice or mercy in the laws which we have just considered? The happiness of the human race depends, in a more than ordinary measure, upon the right organization of the family relations: but how can there be any such thing as domestic order or peace, so long as the mother is looked upon as belonging to an inferior caste, whom it is permitted at any moment, even in the most afflictive of all visitations, to outlaw, and drive forth from the family circle? The uncontrolled dominion of the oral law would practically annihilate all the sympathies and consolations of the domestic constitution. The husband could not love the wife whom his religion teaches to despise, and forbids to pity. The wife could not love the husband, whom she must suspect not only of being destitute of affection, but devoid of pity; and from whom she could only expect divorce and expulsion in the hour of calamity. The son would learn to despise his mother, whom his religion marks out as a fit object for contempt, and a suitable victim for the exercise of cruelty. The mother, cast out by her own partner, would not even have the consolation of being pitied by her own children. A false religion would have taught them that this unnatural conduct was only obedience to the Divine will. The principles of Christianity, on the contrary, produce and protect all that domestic happiness which distinguishes Christian countries from the rest of the world; and in which Jews participate. The influence of Christianity has prevented that misery of which we have given but a faint outline. Can, then, the Jews deny that Christianity has been, and is, to them a blessing? or that it is, in its principles and effects, more agreeable to the character of God, and more productive of human happiness, and therefore more excellent and more true than modern Judaism.

No. XLIX. RABBINIC LAWS CONCERNING MEAT.

Conscientious adherence to the dictates of true religion is one of the noblest traits that can adorn the human character, and this trait has appeared in its most vivid light in not a few of the Israelite nation. Elijah the prophet, for instance, is a bright example of religious constancy. At a time when all Israel had forsaken the true God, and zealously professed a false religion, neither the allurements of self-interest, nor the power of universal example, nor the natural desire of self-preservation, could draw him aside from the paths of truth and righteousness. Daniel and his three friends in Babylon exhibit the same unwavering firmness in the assertion of truth. The Royal dainties could not prevail upon them to partake of food offered to idols. The fiery furnace could not terrify Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, to commit idolatry; the lions’ den possessed no terrors that could move Daniel to omit the worship of his God. But as constancy for the truth ennobles and adorns, in the very same degree an obstinate perseverance in error diminishes from man’s moral or intellectual value. It shows either that his moral perception is so blunted as to be unable to discern between truth and error, or his moral taste so perverted as not to care for the difference—or that there is some intellectual deficiency which renders the moral powers inoperative. It leads to the suspicion that there is something wrong either with the head or the heart. There is, however, a class of persons, who persevere in error, not because the head is weak, or the heart sick, but because they have never fairly beheld the light of truth. They have grown up in a mist of error, and circumstances have prevented them from emerging into a purer atmosphere. To this class, we would hope, the professors of modern Judaism belong. That they have been for centuries in error is certain. Many incontestable proofs of this have been already advanced; _The rabbinic laws concerning_ שחיטה, _or the slaughtering of animals_, will add another link to the chain of evidence. The Rabbinists have an idea that wherever they may be wrong, in this doctrine they are infallibly in the right; and yet, if the force of education did not afford some aid, it would be impossible to imagine how they can be deceived by a doctrine so manifestly false, and so entirely devoid of Scriptural foundation. In the first place, the slaughtering of beasts is, like eating, of every-day and universal concernment—a matter that affects the poor and unlearned as much as the studious; and yet the rabbinic rules are so many and so intricate that either a man must be learned himself, or employ a man of competent learning, to perform this business; or, he must, in spite of himself, turn Pythagorean and renounce the use of animal food. The oral law gives the following outline of what is to be understood by the word שחיטה or _slaughtering_:—

זביחה זו האמורה בתורה סתם צרך לפרש אותה ולידע באי זה מקום םן הבהמה שוחטין , וכמה שיעור השחיטה , ובאיזה דבר שוחטין ומתי שוחטין והיכן שוחטין וכיצד שוחטין , ומה הן הדברים המפסידין את השחיטה ומי הוא השוחט , ועל כל הדברים האלה צונו בתורה ואמר וזבחת מבקרך וכו׳ כאשר צותיך ואכלת בשעריך וכו׳ ׃

“It is absolutely necessary to explain the killing (or slaughtering mentioned in the law), and to know, in what part of the beast one slaughters—what is the measure of the slaughtering—with what implement one slaughters—when—where—and how one slaughters—what things they are which invalidate the act of slaughtering—and who is permitted to slaughter. Concerning all these things, He has commanded us in the law where it is said, ‘Then thou shalt kill of thy herd and of thy flock, which the Lord hath given thee, as I have commanded thee, and thou shalt eat in thy gates whatsoever thy soul lusteth after!’ (Deut. xii. 21.)” (Jad Hachazakah, Hilchoth Shechitah, c. i. 4.) Here we have at once a list of eight particulars, which must first be known, but then most of these again require a long and learned explanation; for instance the first is thus defined:—

ואיזה הוא מקום שחיטה בקנה משפוי כובע ולמטה עד ראש כנף הריאה כשתמשוך הבהמה צוארה לרעות זה הוא מקום השחיטה בקנה , וכל שכנגד המקוא הזה מבחוץ נקרא צואר , אנסה הבהמה עצמה ומשכה צוארה הרבה או שאינס השוחט את הסימנין ומשכן למעלה ושחט במקום שחיטה בצואר , ונמצאת השחיטה בקנה או בושט שלא במקום שחיטה הרי זה ספק נבלה ׃

“On what part of the animal is the slaughtering to be effected? On the wind-pipe, from the edge of the uvula downwards as far as the top or the extremity of the lungs, as these parts are situated when the beast stretches out its neck to feed: this is the place of the slaughtering in the wind-pipe; and all the part outside which answers to this place, is called the neck. If the beast forces itself and stretches out its neck much, or if the slaughterer has forced the sinews, and drawn them upwards, and he slaughters at the right part of the neck, but afterwards it is found that the wind-pipe or the œsophagus is not cut at the right place, then it is a doubtful case of carrion.” (Ibid. 7.) In like manner, the _measure of the slaughtering_ is accurately defined, and must be as accurately attended to, or else the slaughtering must be considered unlawful, and then it becomes unlawful for the Rabbinists to eat it. But the most care is required in examining the knife, which may be of any material that will cut, on condition that there be no gap in it:—

אבל אם היה כמו תלם בחודו של דבר ששוחטין בו ואפילו היה התלם קטן ביותר שחיטתו פסולה ׃

“But if there be anything like a furrow in the edge of the implement wherewith the slaughtering is effected, even though the furrow be the least possible, the slaughtering is unlawful.” The slaughterer is therefore required to examine the knife before and after the act; for if a gap be found in it after the slaughtering, it is doubtful whether the beast is not be considered carrion:—

לפיכך השוחט בהמות רבות או עופות רבות צריך לבדוק בין כל אחת ואחת שאם לא בדק ובדק אחרונה ונמצאת סכין פגומה הרי הכל ספק נבלות ואפילו הראשונה ׃

“Therefore he that has to slaughter many beasts or many fowls, must examine the knife after each; for if he does not, but examines at the end, and the knife is found to have a gap, then all are to be considered as doubtful carrion, even the first.” (Ibid. 24.) From these few particulars, it appears that great care, and not a little study and practice, are required in order to slaughter an animal for food according to the oral law, and that it is very easy, by mistake or want of knowledge, to make the meat unfit for rabbinic eating: but then, besides all this, there are the five circumstances which invalidate the slaughtering altogether:—

חמשה דברים מפסידים את השחיטה ועיקר הלכות שחיטה להזהר בכל אחת מהן ואלו הן שהיית דרסה חלדה הגרמה ועיקר ׃

“There are five things which invalidate the slaughtering: and the most important thing respecting the constitutions of slaughtering is, to attend to each one of them, and these are they—1st, If the person makes a stop of a certain length before the act is completed. 2d, If the throat be cut at a single blow, as with a sword. 3d, If the knife enters too deep, and is hidden. 4th, When the knife slips up or down from the right place. 5th, When the wind-pipe or œsophagus is torn and comes out, before the act is completed.” (Ibid. c. iii.) These five essentials of rabbinic slaughtering lead again to endless questions and definitions; so that, putting all together, it is much to be doubted whether a beast ever was, or ever will be, rightly slaughtered according to the oral law. And yet these things, of which there is not the slightest mention in the Mosaic law, are tied like a heavy burden about the necks of the poor and ignorant, and are most oppressive to their bodies and their souls. The rich may not, perhaps, feel the oppression, but the poor sigh and groan under the load; and no man considers their sorrow, or stretches out a hand to help them. In the first place, the intricacy of the act always makes rabbinic meat a great deal dearer than other meat, so that the poor man and his family, who can at any time, or under any circumstances, afford to buy but little food, are compelled by the oral law to do with still less, and in many cases to do without it altogether. Let any one visit the haunts of the poor Jews in this city, or enter their abodes, and he will find many a wretched family pining away for want of proper food; and yet it is too dear to procure a sufficiency; and if any benevolent Christian should wish to assist them, offer them some of his own, or give them a ticket to some of those institutions which distribute meat to the poor, the starving family would not dare to accept it, even if their conscience allowed them, or if they did, would inevitably draw down upon themselves a storm of persecution, and be treated as if they had committed the greatest crimes: yea, if the oral law had power, the poor starving creatures, that had partaken of Christian bounty, would be flogged for satisfying the wants of nature:—

נכרי ששחט אע׳׳פ ששחט בפני ישראל בסכין יפה ואפילו היה קטן שחיטתו נבלה ולוקה על אכילתה מן התורה שנאמר , וקרא לך ואכלת מזבחו ׃

“If a Gentile slaughters, even though he does it in the presence of an Israelite, with a proper knife, his slaughtering is carrion; and he that eats of it is to be flogged according to the written law, for it is said, ‘And one call thee, and thou eat of his sacrifice.’ (Exod. xxxiv. 15.)” Yea, the oral law goes so far as to extend this rule even to the case of a Gentile who is not an idolater:—

וגדר גדול גדרו בדבר שאפילו גוי שאינו עובד ע׳׳ז שחיטתו נבלה ׃

“A very strong fence has been made round this matter, so that the slaughtering even of a Gentile, who is not on idolater, is carrion.” (Ibid., c. iv. 11, 12.) It is hardly necessary to say, that the above quotation from the oral law is now-a-days altogether out of place. Moses was not speaking of Christians nor of the inhabitants of these countries, but of the nations of Canaan. He had been declaring the words of the Lord, “Behold, I drive out before thee the Amorite, and the Canaanite, and the Hittite, and the Perizzite, and the Jebusite.” And then adds, “Take heed to thyself, lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, and they go a whoring after their gods, and do sacrifice unto their gods, and one call thee, and thou eat of his sacrifice.” (Exod. xxxiv. 11-15.) So then, according to the oral law, because Moses forbade the Israelites to partake of the idolatrous sacrifices of the Hivites and the Jebusites, a poor famished creature here in London is not to touch Christian meat, nor to partake of Christian bounty. A more cruel or oppressive law could hardly have been devised. It is all very well for the rich, but it is very little short of murder to the poor. It binds their consciences with fetters of iron, so that even when relief is offered, many turn from good and wholesome food sent to them by a kind Providence; and if a spark of light has visited the mind of some victim of poverty, and he thinks it lawful to bring home the Christian bounty to save the lives of his starving children, fear prevents him. Perhaps his wife is still enveloped in all the darkness of superstition, and would spurn the proffered relief as an unclean thing, or perhaps his children might innocently betray him, and draw down all the weight of rabbinic indignation. A grosser insult has rarely been offered to the Majesty of heaven, than to call good and proper food, the work of his hands, carrion. A mistake in the slaughtering, an ignorance of the rabbinic art, a Gentile hand, is to be sufficient to turn the bounty of Almighty God into an unclean thing, and to deprive the poor of their daily food. How can the Jews expect God’s blessing so long as this state of things continues—how can they be surprised if poverty and want, and wretchedness and scorn, tread close upon their heels, when they themselves spurn God’s bounty from them with disdain? As nations deal with God and his word, so he deals with them, מדה כמדה, measure for measure; and therefore, so long as the oral law teaches them to scorn his bounty, and to deprive the poor of their food—so long as the cries of the poor ascend and enter into the ears of the Lord of Hosts, so long must they expect to feel the rod of his indignation. The times of ignorance and superstition God winked at; but those times have passed away. Good or bad, there is a stir in the world—there is a shaking of all old opinions, true and false; and from its effects the Jews have not escaped. There are many who, for themselves and their families, have renounced Rabbinism—who eat Gentile food, and know that in doing so they commit no sin. These are the persons who are most guilty in looking upon the misery of their poor brethren without pity or concern and without an effort to deliver them. The rabbinic zealot who would persecute his brother for eating meat not slaughtered according to rabbinic precept is in comparison innocent. He conscientiously thinks that he is doing right; but for the man, who himself openly transgresses the oral law, and yet sees the faces of his brethren ground by that system, without a sentiment of pity, there is no excuse. If he had the common feelings of humanity, he would rise up, fearless of all consequences, and cry out with all his might against those principles which have been and are the curse of his nation. He would stand forth as the advocate and defender of the poor—yea, and he would have God’s blessing. But so long as this class of anti-rabbinic Jews remain silent, whether from fear or from interest, or from indifference, let them not boast of their superior light. Let them not look with self-complacency on the poor victims of superstition. They are themselves less respectable and more guilty. They are conniving at what they know to be falsehood. They are with their eyes open consenting to oppression and starvation. They are, by their silence, helping to strengthen and confirm a system of anti-social intolerance, which has been the source of all the calamities which their nation has endured for eighteen centuries. What can be more pernicious than to teach the ignorant that the food which their neighbours eat is carrion, so unfit for the nourishment of a Rabbinist that he ought to die, and suffer his family to die of want, rather than eat it? Is it likely to produce kindly feeling on either side, considering that the mass of mankind is not actuated by the dictates of reason or the precepts of the Bible? On the one side it is likely to produce proud contempt, and on the other a spirit of retaliation. Every Jew that wishes well to his nation, and knows that these rabbinic principles are false, is bound to protest against them. He ought not to be a poor selfish thing, insensible to the wants and the sufferings of others, but should do what in him lies, to assert what he knows to be the truth. And is it necessary to remind such of the misery which these rabbinic principles are still working in every part of the world? Here in London the poor are suffering. In the various towns of England many Jews are suffering. In some places a single Jewish family is found, generally poor, and the father ignorant of the rabbinic art of slaughtering: such persons are compelled to abstain altogether from animal food, or to do violence to their conscience. The poor Jews who go out to the colonies to seek employment are in the same case, and are precluded from taking such situations as require them to partake of the food of their employers. Even if they can buy an animal, they are not allowed to kill it for themselves:—

ישראל שאינו יודע חמשה דברים שמפסידין את השחיטה וכיוצא בהן מהלכות שחיטה שביארנו ושחט בינו לבין עצמו אסור לאכול משחיטתו לא הוא ולא אחרים , והרי זו קרובה לספק נבלה והאוכל ממנה כזית מכין אותו מכת מרדות ׃

“If an Israelite does not know the five things which invalidate the act of slaughtering, as we have explained, and slaughters by himself, it is unlawful to eat of his slaughtering, both for himself and others; for this case is much the same as that of doubtful carrion, and he that eats of it a quantity equal to an olive, is to be flogged with the flogging of rebellion.” (Ibid., c. iv.) Such is the mercy of the oral law, and such its justice. It punishes the eating of what God has allowed, with the same severity that it would visit a great crime. It makes no provision for those numerous cases of distress which we have mentioned. Whether one of its disciples has or has not food, it never considers. Without reflection and without mercy it sentences every one, who eats meat not rabbinically slaughtered, to be flogged. But, besides the cruelty, what is the effect upon the minds of its votaries? It teaches them that to transgress this mere human observance is a sin of the deepest die, more dreadful far than many which God has forgiven. A Rabbinist would be more grieved to hear that his son had transgressed the law of slaughtering, than to find that he had been guilty of falsehood. Its tendency is directly to draw off the mind from the weightier matters of the law, judgment, justice, and mercy, and to flatter the ill-informed that they are good Jews, if only they abstain from meat not slaughtered according to rabbinic art.

Let not any Jew imagine that we wish him lightly to transgress the law of Moses, or to eat of food which the law of God has forbidden. We now speak of that which Moses has allowed. If a Jew would see meat offered to idols, or be invited to partake of an idolatrous feast, let him abstain—let him refuse, and protest as strongly as he will and can against the sinfulness of such conduct. But where does Moses forbid the poor to partake of meat slaughtered by a Gentile worshipper of the true God, or by an Israelite who has not learned the rabbinic art? Certainly not in that passage to which the oral law refers. Moses gives a general permission to every Israelite, without exception, to kill and eat. “Notwithstanding thou mayest kill and eat flesh in all thy gates, whatsoever thy soul lusteth after, according to the blessing of the Lord thy God which he hath given thee.” (Deut. xii. 15.) He makes no mention of any mysteries, connected with the art of slaughtering, the ignorance of which would disqualify. Why then should a Jew be prevented from doing what Moses has allowed—why should he be flogged with the flogging of rebellion, or avow that that mode and measure of punishment is impracticable—why should he be persecuted for satisfying the cravings of nature, and endeavouring to supply the wants of his family? There is not room now to show fully how groundless the rabbinic commands are; but the one fact of their cruelty and oppression of the poor is sufficient to show that they are not from God. Is it possible that any man in his senses can believe that God would sentence a poor famishing creature to be flogged without mercy for doing what the letter of the law allows him to do? or, that the All-wise Being, who foresees and foreknows all things, would give a system of laws respecting food, which must expose a large portion of his chosen people to want and starvation? The worshippers of some cruel heathen deity might possibly be led to believe such things, but the disciples or Moses and the Prophets know that God is a God of mercy. Let, then, every one who has got the sacred books contrast their doctrines with those of the rabbies. But, above all, let those Israelites, who reject the rabbinic laws concerning the slaughtering of meat, show that they have not done it from levity nor indifference, but upon principle. Let them explain to their brethren the reasons and the motives by which they are actuated, and let them protest, by word and deed, against such cruelty, oppression, and intolerance.

No. L. THE BIRTH OF MESSIAH.

This season of the year naturally draws away our thoughts from the subject last under consideration, and reminds us of a remarkable difference between Jews and Christians. The latter are now about to commemorate the birth of the Messiah.[36] In two days more the voice of praise and thanksgiving will ascend to the Creator and Preserver of men from every part of the world. On the frozen shores of Labrador, and the glowing plains of Hindostan—in the isles of the sea, and on the continents of the old and new worlds, millions of Christians will lift up their hands and voices to thank the God of heaven for his unspeakable gift, and this shall be the burden of their song, “Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given: and the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace.” (Isaiah ix. 6.) But amongst the followers of the oral law not a sound of sympathy will be heard. Not a single heart will beat with joy, not a tongue offer up the tribute of praise. Here is a great and sinking difference, that should naturally lead both Jew and Christian to inquire, Who is in the right: Those who believe that Messiah is born, and joy in the remembrance of his nativity; or, those who refuse to join in the general rejoicing, and deny that the Redeemer has appeared? The question is whether there is reason to believe that the Messiah was born eighteen hundred years ago? and there are several ways in which it can be satisfactorily answered. An appeal may be made to the predictions contained in the Old Testament, or to the evidence for the truth of the Christian Scriptures—or, it may be shown that the Jewish rabbies have plainly confessed that the time for the birth and appearance of the Messiah is long since past; and this is the mode which we shall adopt at present. The Jews now deny that Messiah is come, and consequently believe that Christians are mistaken as to the time of his appearing. If they had always said so—if they had always assigned a time for the coming of Messiah different from that in which Christians think the Messiah was born, their present assertion would have at least the merit of consistency, and the Jews of the present day might urge that their present belief has been inherited from their fathers, and that Christians have adopted a notion unknown to the nation at large. But, if it should appear that the ancient Jews expected the coming of Messiah at the very time, when, as Christians say, he did actually come, then the ancient Jews testify that Christians are in the right, and that modern Jews are in the wrong, and this is really the state of the case. In the first place, the Talmud contains a general declaration that the time is long since past:—

אמר רב כלו כל הקצין ׃

“Rav says, The appointed times are long since past” (Sanhedrin, fol. 97, col. 2), where it is to be noted that the word קץ is taken from Daniel, and literally signifies “End,” as it is said:—

עד מתי קץ הפלאות ׃

“How long shall it be to the end of these wonders; and again:—

ואתה לך לקץ ותנוח ותעמוד לגורלך לקץ הימין ׃

“But go thou thy way till the end be, for thou shalt rest, and stand in thy lot at the end of the days.” (Daniel xii. 6-13.) Rav was therefore of opinion that the period appointed by Daniel the prophet was past. But is it possible to believe that the God of truth would suffer the time, which he had appointed, to pass away without accomplishing what he had promised? When the time which God had fixed for the deliverance from Egypt had arrived, not a single day was lost. “It came to pass at the end קץ of the four hundred and thirty years, even the self-same day,

בעצם היום הזה ׃

it came to pass, that all the hosts of the Lord went out from the land of Egypt.” (Exod. xii. 41.) When the period fixed for the return from Babylon was come, we read, “In the first year of Cyrus, King of Persia (that the word of the Lord by the mouth of Jeremiah might be accomplished), the Lord stirred up the spirit of Cyrus king of Persia, that he made a proclamation through all his kingdom.” (2 Chron. xxxvi. 22.) And can we think that the Lord God, who so graciously fulfilled his word on these occasions should break it with reference to the coming of the Messiah? Rav is either right or wrong. If he be right, then the time fixed by God is long since past, and as God cannot break his word, the Messiah must have come long since. But if, to get out of a difficulty, the Rabbinists say, that Rav was wrong, then we have another proof that no reliance is to be placed on the doctors of the oral law; indeed we have a proof that the Rabbinists themselves do not believe it, except when they like; and that therefore they are not thoroughly in earnest about their religion.

But, secondly, the ancient Jews not only believed that the time for the coming of the Messiah was past: they also fixed the exact period:—

תנא דבי אליהו ששה אלפים שנה הוי עלמא שני אלפים תוהו , שני אלפים תורה , שני אלפים ימות המשיח ׃

“Tradition of the school of Elijah. The world is to stand six thousand years. Two thousand, confusion. Two thousand, the law. Two thousand, the days of Messiah.” (Sanhedrin, fol. 97, col. 1.) Upon which Rashi remarks—

שלאחר שני אלפים תורה הוה דינו שיבוא משיח ותכלה מלכות הרשעה ויבטל השיעבוד מישראל ׃

“After the two thousand years of the law, according to the decree. Messiah ought to have come, and the wicked kingdom should been destined, and Israel’s state of servitude should have been ended.” Here, then, it is expressly stated, that Messiah ought to have come at the end of the fourth thousand years, that is, according to the Jewish reckoning, fifteen hundred and ninety-seven years ago; or, according to the Christian reckoning, about eighteen hundred and thirty-six years ago—that is, at the very time when Jesus of Nazareth did appear. We do not quote this tradition because we believe that it is really a tradition of the school of Elijah, but to show what was the opinion of the more ancient Jews, and this it certainly does, if the general expectation of the Jews at that time had not been that Messiah was to appear at the end of the four thousand years, this tradition, whether genuine or forged, could never have obtained currency nor belief. If it be a genuine tradition from Elijah, then the Messiah is certainly come. But if it be fictitious, then it shows the general belief of the Jews at the time, and in every case proves that the modern Jews do not hold the doctrines of their forefathers, but have got a new doctrine of their own. And it further shows, that Christians do not hold any new or peculiar opinion about the time of Messiah’s coming, but that they believe, as the ancient Jews believed, that the end of the fourth thousand years is the right time of Messiah’s coming.

The only answer that the Jews have, is, that the promise of Messiah’s coming was conditional upon their repentance, but that evasion has been long since refuted in the Talmud as contrary to Scripture:—

ר׳ אליעזר אומר אם ישראל עושין תשובה נגאלין ואם לאו אינם נגאלין , אמר לו ר׳ יהושע אם אין עושין תשובה אינם נגאלין אלא הקב׳׳ה מעמיד להן מלך שגזרותיו קשות כהמן וישראל עושין תשובה ומחזירן למוטב , תניא אידך ר׳ אליעזר אומר אם ישראל עושין תשובה נגאלין , שנאמר שובו בנים שובבים ארפא משובותיכם , אמר לו ר׳ יהושע והלא כבר נאמר חנם נמכרתם ולא בכסף תגאלו חנם נמכרתם בעבודה זרה ולא בכסף תגאלו לא בתשובה ומעשים טובים , אמר לו ר׳ אליעזר לר׳ יהושע והלא כבר נאמר שובה אלי ואשובה אליכם , אמר לו ר׳ יהושע והלא כבר נאמר כי אנכי בעלתי אתכם ולקחתי אתכם אחד מעיר ושנים ממשפחה והבאתי אתכם ציו , אמר לו ר׳ אליעזר והלא כבר נאמר בשובה ונחת תושעון אמר לו ר׳ יהושע לר׳ אליעזר והלא כבר נאמר כה אמר ה׳ גואל ישראל וקדושו לבזה נפש למתעב גוי לעבד מושלים מלכים יראו וקמו שרים וישתחוו , אמר לו ר׳ אלֻיעזר והלא כבר נאמר אם תשוב ישראל נאם ה׳ אלי תשוב אמר לו ר׳ יהושע והלא כבר נאמר ואשמע את האיש לבוש הבדים אשר ממעל למימי היאר וירם ימינו ושמאלו אל השמים נפץ יד עם קודש תכלינה כל אלה וגו׳ ושתק ר׳ אליעזר ׃

“R. Eliezer said, If Israel do repentance they will be redeemed, but, if not, they will not be redeemed. R. Joshua replied, If they do not repent they will not be redeemed: but God will raise up to them a king whose decrees shall be as dreadful as Haman, and then Israel will repent, and thus he will bring them back to what is good. Another tradition. R. Eliezer said, If Israel do repentance, they shall be redeemed, for it is said, ‘Turn, O backsliding children; I will heal your backsliding.’ R. Joshua replied, But was it not said long since, ‘Ye have sold yourselves for nought; and ye shall be redeemed without money,’ (Isaiah lii. 3.) Where the words ‘sold for nought’ mean, for idolatry; and the words ‘redeemed without money,’ signify, not for money and good works. R. Eliezer then said, to R. Joshua, But has it not been said long since, ‘Return unto me, and I will return unto you.’ (Mal. iii. 7.) R. Joshua replied, But has it not been said long since, ‘I am married unto you, and I will take you one of a city, and two of a family, and I will bring you to Zion.’ (Jer. iii. 14.) R. Eliezer said, But has it not been written long since, ‘In returning and rest ye shall be saved.’ (Isaiah xxx. 15.) R. Joshua replied to R. Eliezer, But has it not been said long since, ‘Thus saith the Lord, the Redeemer of Israel, and his Holy One, to him whom man despiseth, to him whom the nation abhorreth, to a servant of rulers, kings shall see and arise, princes also shall worship.’ (Isaiah xlix. 7.) R. Eliezer said to him again, But has it not been said long since, ‘If thou wilt return, O Israel, return unto me.’ (Jer. iv. 1.) To which R. Joshua replied, But has it not been written long since, ‘I heard the man clothed in linen, which was upon the waters of the river, when he held up his right hand and his left hand unto heaven, and swore by Him that liveth for ever, that it shall be for a time and times and half a time; and when he shall have accomplished to scatter the power of the holy people, all these things shall be finished.’ Whereupon R. Eliezer was silent.” Here then, on the showing of the Talmud itself, the opinion that the coming of the Messiah is dependent upon Israel’s repentance, is false; and consequently it is true, that Messiah was to come unconditionally at the time appointed; and therefore, as the time is long since past, the Messiah must have come. But the ancient rabbies do not leave us to reason upon their words; on the contrary, they tell us expressly that Messiah was born about the time that the temple was destroyed. In the Jerusalem Talmud, R. Judan tells us a story of a Jew who actually went and saw him:—

עובדא הוה בחד יהודאי דהוה קאים רדי געת תורתיה קומוי עבר חד ערביי ושמע קלה , אמר ליה בר יודאי בר יודאי שרי תורך ושרי קנקנך דהא חרב בית מקדשא , געת זמן תניינות , אמר ליה בר יודאי בר יודאי קטור תורך וקטור קנקנך דהא יליד מלכא משיחא , אמר ליה מה שמיה אמר ליה מנחם , אמר ליה ומה שם דאבוי אמר ליה חזקיהו , אמר ליה םן הן הוא , אמר ליה מן בירת מלכא דבית לחם יהודה ׃

“It happened once to a certain Jew, who was standing ploughing, that his cow lowed before him. A certain Arab was passing and heard its voice; he said, O Jew, O Jew! unyoke thine ox, and loose thy plough-share, for the temple has been laid waste. It lowed a second time, and he said, O Jew, O Jew! yoke thine oxen, and bind on thy plough-shares, for King Messiah is born. The Jew said, What is his name? Menachem. He asked further, What is the name of his father? The other replied, Hezekiah. He asked again, Whence is he? The other said from the Royal residence of Bethlehem of Judah.” (Berachoth, fol. 5, col. 1.) The story, then, goes on to tell us how he went and saw the child, but when he called the second time, the mother told him that the winds had carried the child away. We are quite willing to grant that this story is a fable. We do not quote it because we give it the slightest degree of credit, but simply to show that the more ancient Jews were so fully persuaded that the right time of Messiah’s advent was past, that they readily believed also that he was actually born. The Babylonian Talmud, also, evidently takes for granted that Messiah is born, as appears from the following legend:—

ר׳ יהושע בן לוי אשכחיה לאליהו דהוה קיים אפיתחא דמערתא דר׳ שמעון בן יוחאי אמר ליה אתינא לעלמא דאתי אמר ליה אם ירצה האדון הזה , אמר ר׳ יהושע בן לוי שנים ראיתי וקול ג׳ שמעתי , אמר ליה אימת אתי משיח אמר ליה זיל שייליה לדידיה והיכא יתיב אפיתחא דרומי ומאי סימניה יתיב ביני עניים סובלי חלאים וכולן שרו ואסירי בחד זמנא איהו שרי חד ואסיר חד אמר דילמא מבעינא דלא איעכב אזל לגביה אמר ליה שלים עליך רבי ומורי אמו ליה שלום עליך בר ליואי אמר ליה לאימת אתי מר אמר ליה היום ׃

“R. Joshua, the son of Levi, found Elijah standing at the door of the cave of R. Simeon ben Jochai, and said to him, Shall I arrive at the world to come? He replied, If this Lord will. R. Joshua, the son of Levi, said, I see two, but I hear the voice of three. He also asked, When will Messiah come? Elijah replied, Go, and ask himself. R. Joshua then said, Where does he sit? At the gate of Rome. And how is he to be known? He is sitting amongst the poor and sick, and they open their wounds and bind them up again all at once: but he opens only one, and then he opens another, for he thinks, perhaps I may be wanted, and then I must not be delayed. R. Joshua went to him and said, Peace be upon thee, my master and my Lord. He replied, Peace be upon thee, son of Levi. The rabbi then asked him, When will my Lord come? He replied, To-day (alluding to the words of the Psalm, To-day, if ye will hear his voice).” (Sanhedrin, fol. 98, col. 1.) This is evidently a fiction, and a proof how little those doctors regarded truth; but it shows that he who invented it, and those who received it, all equally believed that Messiah was born, and ready waiting to come forth for the redemption of Israel. It does, indeed, confirm the common idea, that Messiah’s advent depends upon the repentance of Israel, for it makes the Messiah say that he would come this very day, if Israel would only hear his voice. But if the Messiah may any day, when they repent, come and save Israel, then it is plain that he must have been born long since. The testimony of the ancient Jews, then, goes to establish these points—First, That the time for Messiah’s advent has been long past; Secondly, That the end of the fourth thousand years was the time when he ought to have come: and, Thirdly, That at that time he did really come; for about that time, they say, he was born in Bethlehem of Judah. Fourth, That he was taken into Paradise, as Rashi explains the gate of Rome to mean the gate of Paradise opposite Rome; and, Fifthly, That he is waiting to return to this earth for the redemption of his people. Now who is there that does not see at once, that this agrees in the main with the Christian doctrine? We believe that, at the end of the fourth thousand years, the Messiah was born, and at this season of the year we rejoice at the remembrance of the Saviour’s birth. The Jews refuse to join with us, but who has the greatest show of right? Not now to speak of the prophecies, and of the historical evidence which we have, we have the testimony even of our opponents to show that we are in the right. The most ancient rabbinical writings unanimously confess, that the time is past, and that the Messiah has been long since born, and thus testify the correctness of our faith respecting the time of Messiah’s advent. Christians, however, go on consistently and believe further, that God did not break his word, but performed his promise, and therefore we rejoice. The Jews do not believe, because they are so engrossed with the temporal deliverance of the nation, that they cannot see that another and a greater redemption was necessary. We do not, by any means, wish to deny that Israel is to be restored to the land of promise, and to inherit all the blessings promised in the prophets. On the contrary, we fully believe that the Messiah, who visited this earth, for a short season, will return and re-establish the Theocracy which was once the glory of Israel, and that, in a much more glorious form than Israel ever saw under any of their kings. We heartily wish Israel the enjoyment of every blessing promised; but we cannot help remembering that Messiah has another and more important office than that of restoring the kingdom to Israel, and that is the redemption of the human race. The highest pitch of national glory and earthly prosperity would be as nothing, and less than nothing unless the children of men were delivered from the effects of Adam’s sin, and made partakers of a good hope of everlasting life. Even the gathering of Israel from all the ends of the earth would appear but a very insignificant business, if it did not stand in immediate connexion with the eternal welfare of all nations. Many of the sons of men have appeared as conquerors and heroes, and have raised their country to a high degree of glory, and conferred upon them much temporal prosperity; but if Messiah was to be nothing more, we confess we should not think him worth the having. We think of the Messiah as the Being, in whom all the families of the earth shall be blessed, as the restorer indeed of Israel, but also God’s salvation unto the end of the earth. This is the doctrine which Christianity teaches, and which is confirmed by the law and the prophets; and therefore we rejoice that this great Deliverer has been born—that He came at first in great humility to bruise the serpent’s head, and to lay down his life a ransom for many. We remember that this blessed news, these glad tidings of great joy, were brought to us by Jews; and, therefore, feeling our deep obligations, we desire to show our gratitude by inviting Israel to come and partake in our joy. We feel assured that our joy is no illusion. Even the rabbies themselves bear witness that the Messiah ought to have been born, and was born at the very time in which we believe the Messiah to have been born. But if he was born who was he? What other person can make any claim to the Messiahship, but He whom we acknowledge? Is it reasonable to believe, as the rabbies do, that God actually sent the Great Deliverer down into this wretched world, and then took him away again, without permitting him to accomplish his work? No; if ever he visited this earth—and that he did visit it, both the ancient Jews and Christians assert—he could not have left it again without bestowing upon its inhabitants a remedy for their woes. The ancient rabbies and the Christians both agree as to the time of Messiah’s birth, and the fact of his birth in Bethlehem. Indeed the whole nation practically showed their agreement with Christians, as to the time of Messiah’s advent, by readily following every military adventurer, who laid claim to the character of Redeemer. Even before the destruction of the temple, multitudes had suffered by their credulity; but immediately after the desolation, the people and the rabbies with one accord followed Bar Chochba, and thereby showed the reality of their belief, that that was about the time when Messiah ought to appear. Judaism, therefore, teaches this doctrine—that God promised the Messiah, that God fixed a time, that that time is past, and yet that God did not keep his promise. Christianity, on the contrary, acknowledges the promise, recognises the time, believes that Messiah was born, but believes further that God fulfilled his word—that Messiah was not carried away into Paradise, until he had accomplished the work that was to be done at his first advent. Then, indeed, we acknowledge that He ascended into heaven, and sitteth at God’s right hand, from whence he will come again for the final redemption of his people, and the establishment of the reign of righteousness. The only real difference between us is, as to the VERACITY of God. We believe that God did not, and could not, break his word. Modern Judaism teaches that God broke his promise. It is for rational beings to decide which doctrine is most agreeable to the Divine character. For our own parts, we will rejoice in God’s unchangeableness, and say, in the remembrance, that “His truth endureth for ever.”

Footnote 36:

This number was originally published December 23, 1836.

No. LI. SLAUGHTERING OF MEAT, CONTINUED.

According to the confessions of the rabbies themselves, the time for the advent of Messiah is long since past, what is there then that prevents the Jews from believing in him, who came at the appointed time? The grand objection is, that the nation is still in captivity; they say that Messiah ought to have given them liberty. The answer to this objection is, that Messiah was willing, and is willing to this hour, to give them liberty, but that they will not have it. The very first condition of national liberty and independence is moral and intellectual emancipation. No nation was ever yet enslaved until the hearts and intellects of the people had first become the slaves of corruption or superstition—and no nation that hugs to its heart the chains of moral slavery, can ever be made free, nor could it retain its liberty if it got it. When Messiah came, therefore, as he found the Jewish nation already under the Roman yoke, the very first step was to endeavour to emancipate their hearts and minds, and to deliver them from that moral bondage, of which their national degradation was only a consequence. This first step Messiah immediately took—he protested against the superstitions of the oral law, and pointed them to the perfect liberty of God’s written Word. But the nation chose to retain the cause of their misfortunes, and to reject the overtures of deliverance. If therefore they are still in a state of national dependence, they must not cast the blame on God, and say that He suffered the time to pass away without fulfilling his promise; nor upon the Messiah, when they themselves refused to receive that without which no national liberty can possibly exist. They chose to give themselves, body and soul, as bond-slaves to the oral law, there was, therefore, no possibility of national redemption. It would require an act of omnipotent coercion, such as God does not employ, to make a nation free against its will. But perhaps the Jews of the present day will deny that they are in a state of moral and intellectual slavery. We refer them, in reply, to the numerous proofs already given in these papers, and especially the laws of שחיטה or _slaughtering_, upon which we have a few words to add. Where in all the world can a more wretched slave be found, than the man, who himself, together with his family, is ready to perish of hunger, and yet dare not partake of wholesome food, offered by the providence of God, because his rabbinical task-masters say, No? But now take another instance:—

כל טבח שלא בדק הסכין שלו ששוחט בה לפני חכם ושחט לעצמו בודקין אותה , אם נמצאת יפה ובדוקה מנדין אותו לפי שיסמוך על עצמו פעם אחרת ותהיה פגומה וישחוט בה , ואם נמצאת פגומה מעבירין אותו ומנדין אותו ומכריזין אל כל בשר ששחט שהוא טרפה ׃

“If a slaughterer, who has not had his slaughtering knife examined before a wise man [a rabbi], slaughters by himself, his knife must be examined. If it be found in good order and examined, he is to be excommunicated, because he may depend upon himself another time, when it has a gap in it and yet slaughter therewith. But, if it be found to have a gap, he is to be deposed from his office, and excommunicated, and proclamation is to be made, that all the meat which he has slaughtered is carrion.” (Jad Hachazakah, Hilchoth Sh’chitah, c. i. 26.) Here we have the same slavery and the same cruel oppression. In the first place we see the intention to make the Jews entirely dependent upon the rabbies. The Jews are not to eat meat unless it be slaughtered as the rabbies direct, and the slaughterer himself is not even to do that, which he knows to be right according to the oral law, without the express sanction of the rabbies. All are to be in bondage, not merely to the oral law, but to the rabbi for the time being. They are to have no mind and no judgment of their own. In the simplest concerns of life they are to be entirely dependent upon the will and judgment of another. In the second place, we see the determination to maintain this tyranny by the severest punishments. The man who has slaughtered without showing his knife to the rabbi, even though they have no fault to find with him, is to be excommunicated—but if a rabbinic flaw in the knife should be detected, then not only the man himself is to suffer, but those who employed him, and also the Israelites themselves to be deprived of food. All that he has slaughtered is to be declared unfit for use. Who can deny that those who think their consciences bound by such laws are in miserable bondage? Who, that has his senses and God’s Word to guide them, can believe that a small gap in a knife is sufficient to make meat unfit for food? Who ever saw a knife, or even the finest razor that ever was manufactured, without a series of such imperfections? Let a rabbi, who has just pronounced, concerning a knife, that it has no gap in it, apply a microscope, and he will soon find out that a knife without gaps never existed. He will be convinced that the oral law requires what is impossible, and therefore cannot possibly be from God. Who then can deny that those who are bound by it, are the slaves of superstition? There never was, and never will be in the world, such a thing as a knife without the least possible gap, and consequently there never was, and never will be, any meat fit for the food of a Rabbinist. The Jews must therefore either give up the use of meat entirely, or they must give up the oral law.

If the oral law were uniformly severe, and everywhere required that its adherents should obtain the best possible evidence that their meat was properly slaughtered: or in case they could not obtain this evidence, that they should entirely abstain from meat, the consistency of the doctrine would in some measure justify, or at least excuse the credulity of the Jews. But this is not the case, its authors felt the inconvenience of their own doctrine, and therefore relaxed whenever it suited themselves. For instance, they say:—

הרי שראינו ישראל מרחוק ששחט והלך לו ולא ידענו אם יודע או אינו יודע הרי זו מותרת , וכן האומר לשלוחו צא ושחוט לי ומצא הבהמה שחוטה , ואין ידוע אם שלוחו שחטה אם אחר הרי זו מותרת , שרוב הטצויין אצל שחיטה מומחין הן ׃

“If we were to see an Israelite at a distance who had slaughtered a beast, and he was to go his way, and we were ignorant of the fact whether he understood the art or not, in that case the meat is lawful. And in like manner, if a man should say to his messenger, Go and slaughter for me, and should find the beast slaughtered, but it should not be certain whether his messenger, or another person, had slaughtered it, this also is lawful, for the majority of persons concerned in slaughtering are skilful.” (Ibid., c. iv. 7.) This relaxation shows how exceedingly inconvenient the doctrine was found, and how unwilling the doctors were to bear inconvenience themselves. No doubt cases often occurred in real life similar to those supposed. An Israelite travelling might come to a town in which lived a small congregation of Jews, and might wish to have some dinner, and would of course wish to have it of lawful meat. The only satisfactory way of obtaining it would be to go to the person who had slaughtered it, and examine him as to his competency, but he might be absent, if therefore he should be scrupulous, he would have to go without his dinner; and the same thing would happen to a rich man, who might send a messenger to a neighbouring town to have a beast killed for him. The messenger might send back the meat by some one else, and thus the owner would not have satisfactory evidence, that the rabbinic laws had been observed. Here again the man who was rich enough to do this, might have to go without his dinner, or to wait an inconvenient time. The oral law has therefore provided in this case that the meat is lawful for use without any further scruples. But this decision shows of how little real importance all these precepts about slaughtering are. If it be a sin to eat meat not properly killed, then it is also a sin to eat meat, when there is no satisfactory evidence of this fact. Whenever a man doubts about the right or wrong of any particular action, he is certainly wrong if he does it. But if it be certain that he may either do it or leave it undone without guilt, then that action cannot be sinful. And as the rabbies here affirm, that men may lawfully eat meat, concerning which they have no satisfactory evidence that it has been lawfully slaughtered, it follows that the rabbinic art cannot be of much value. Why then should a poor man be starved if he does not eat, or flogged if he does eat, meat slaughtered by a Gentile, when, if he had money to send a beast to be killed, he might eat what was sent back, even though he had no proof that the laws were kept? Indeed how are the poor and unlearned ever to know, that they eat lawful meat? If they were even to stand by, and see the operation performed, still, as being ignorant of the rabbinic laws, they could not understand, and must therefore take the matter entirely upon trust: and thus the mass of the nation, the unlearned and the women, are made the blind slaves of laws which they neither understand nor know; or rather of those who expound those laws, for how can it be said that a man transgresses that of which he does not know the right or wrong?

If the rabbies were all unanimous in their statement of what is and is not lawful, the unanimity might in some degree excuse the Jews for submitting to a yoke so grievous, and holding it that round the necks of their brethren. They might urge the uniformity of the tradition as a proof of its genuineness. But this cannot be pretended in the present case. To this very hour the rabbies themselves are not agreed as to what is, or what is not the oral law. We have just seen that if a man send a messenger to have a beast slaughtered, and afterwards find it slaughtered, that he may eat of it without asking any more questions. This is the general principle, but as soon as it comes to be applied in detail the rabbies differ. The Baal Turim thus states the difference:—

וכתב הרמב׳׳ם דוקא שמצאה בבית אבל מצאה בשוק או באשפה שבבית אסורה וכן כתב בעל העיטור וא׳׳א ז׳׳ל התיר אפילו באשפה שבבית ולא אסר אלא באשפה שבשוק וכן הרשב׳׳א ׃

“Rambam has written expressly, In case that it should be found in the house; but, if he find it in the street, or on the dunghill in the house, it is forbidden. The Baal Haittur has given the same judgment: but my lord my father of blessed memory says, the meat is lawful, even if it be found on the dunghill in the house, and has not pronounced it unlawful, except when found on the dunghill in the street; and Rashba is of the same opinion.” (Joreh Deah., 1.) Here, then, we have the most learned of the rabbies, disputing as to what is the law; the one party pronouncing that to be unlawful which the other party declares lawful. What, then, are the unlearned to do in this case? Or how can it be said that there is an oral law which gives the true meaning of the written law? Or, if there be an oral law, what use is it, when it is itself a subject of dispute? Every one who has looked into the oral law knows that this difference of opinion is by no means a rare case; and that it cannot be said that the difference of opinion is in matters of minor importance. Let us, for example, consider the case of an Israelite who is accustomed to eat unlawful meat, and does so to vex Israel—is it lawful to eat the meat which he has killed?

כתב הרשב׳׳א שאין מוסרין לו בתחלה לשחוט אפילו אם ישראל עומד על גביו , ואם שחט בדיעבד כשר ע׳׳י בדיקת סכין תחילה או סוף וא׳׳א הרא׳׳ש ז׳׳ל כתב שדינו כגוי ׃

“Rashba has written that it is not lawful to give him a beast intentionally to slaughter, even if an Israelite should stand by. But if he has slaughtered the beast, it may be declared lawful by means of examining the knife, either at the beginning or at the end; and my lord my father of blessed memory has written that in the case of such a person the law is the same as in that of a Gentile.” (Ibid. 2.) Now the difference here is very great and very important. The one opinion says, that, under certain circumstances, such meat is lawful. The other, that it is unlawful as that killed by a Gentile—that is, what the one allows, the other pronounces to be so unlawful as to deserve the flogging of rebellion, as we saw in No. 49. Here, then, is a case involving severe corporal punishment, and yet the rabbies are not agreed as to which is the law. How, then, can men of sense and reflection give themselves up to a system, the doctors of which cannot agree upon a question so simple as this, What sort of food is lawful, and what is unlawful? and who, nevertheless, require unlimited obedience under the heaviest penalties temporal and eternal? The oral law does not suffer a wise man to be contradicted, and declares that all their sayings are “the words of the living God;” and yet here they contradict one another so widely, that if a man follow the one, he will be sentenced to a flogging by the other—and if from fear of the flogging he should agree with the latter, he will then be contradicting the former, and thereby incur the sentence of excommunication, and even run a risk of losing his soul. But in every case he must give up his judgment and his reason, and submit to be led by those, who are still disputing about the right road: yea, and if he would obey the oral law, must confess that they are both in the right. If this be not moral and intellectual slavery of the worst kind, we have yet to learn the meaning of these words. It will not be a pertinent reply to say that Christians also differ in opinion on important points. We confess that they do, and will continue to do so, as long as they continue to be fallible men: but then these persons do not profess to have an oral law given by God in order to preserve them from a wrong interpretation. There is one Christian Church that has followed the example of the rabbies in this particular, and has therefore fallen into many of their absurdities. Difference of opinion amongst those who make no such pretensions is no argument against the truth of the original records, whence both professedly draw their religion. Two men may differ as to the sense of a verse in the law of Moses, and yet we know that the verse itself contains the truth. But when each of these persons tells us that his interpretation is an inspired tradition, and that both, though contradicting each other, are equally true and correct, then it is evident that they say not only what is false, but what is absurd, and that they are labouring under a delusion. If it be a mere speculative delusion it is to be deplored—but if it be a practical delusion, involving the happiness and welfare of thousands, it must be combated and exposed—and this is precisely the case with the oral law. The particular part of it which we have now been considering seriously affects the temporal comfort of many thousands of the poor in every part of the world. The general principles enslave the minds of the whole nation, and thus prevent the state of happiness and glory which the prophets have promised. The Jewish nation is in a state of dispersion, and in some parts of the world victims of a cruel oppression, simply because they are the willing slaves of superstition. Until an intellectual and moral change is effected, they never can appear as “the peculiar people, the kingdom of priests, the holy nation.” High and holy is their destiny, and great is the providential mercy of God in still preserving them, when they refuse obstinately to fulfil it. But neither their destiny nor God’s forbearance can be of any avail, until they reassert the glorious liberty of the children of God. The chains of Rabbinism must be broken, and the mild yoke of Messiah taken upon their shoulders, before national independence and liberty can return. How could a nation exist, whose moral and intellectual energies are all crampt by the endless subtleties of the rabbies? How could a people maintain national liberty whilst they are such perfect slaves to superstition as to believe that traditions, which are the curse of the poor, and many of which flatly contradict others, all proceed from the God of mercy and truth? The temple must first be cleansed of all defilement before the glory of God can enter. It is therefore a matter of the first and highest importance, to every Jew who wishes well to his nation, to examine that system, whose constant companion for so many centuries has been misery; and if they are convinced of its falsehood, then to use every exertion to deliver their brethren, from that which is mischievous as well as false. We might urge its tendency to produce and perpetuate an unfriendly separation between the Jews and their neighbours: not that we are ignorant of God’s declaration,

הן עם לבדד ישכון ובגוים לא יתחשב ׃

“Lo, the people shall dwell alone, and shall not be reckoned among the nations.” (Numb, xxiii. 9.) We know it and believe it, and are therefore fully convinced, that all the wit and power of man will never be able to effect what some so ardently desire, an amalgamation with the nations where Israel is dispersed. We have no desire to contravene the declared will of God, and to degrade Israel from their position as a holy nation to the rank of an inconsiderable religious sect. But still we might urge against the oral law, that it goes beyond God’s intention by producing an unfriendly separation and an estrangement between man and man, which is injurious to the welfare of both Jew and Gentile; we leave this, however, to the consideration of those Israelites who feel, or profess to feel, a love and affection for all men; and content ourselves at present with the indubitable fact, that the laws concerning slaughtering are most oppressive to the poor and enslaving to the minds of all. It is not merely the bodily grievance of starvation to which we now allude, though that is wicked and vexatious to the last degree, and should therefore not be tolerated for a moment by the humane and the merciful. There is something that is worse than any bodily suffering, and that is, to be tempted to do violence to conscience by professing what we do not believe, or by congealing our real sentiments. And yet in many a Jewish congregation this is frequently the case. It pleases God to give to the poor the power of reasoning as well as to the rich, and thus some of this class are occasionally led to see the absurdity of the oral law, and to detest those inventions which doom them and their families to starvation, but yet they would not dare either to avow or to act upon their conviction. To eat any ether than rabbinical food would at once cut them off from the bounty of the synagogue, and from the sympathy of its worshippers. To express their convictions would be sufficient to have them numbered with the profane and ungodly, and therefore they conceal their real sentiments, and pretend to be what they are not, that they may not deprive their families of the little assistance which an apparent conformity to rabbinic usages may procure. Here then is another and more unequivocal badge of slavery. The oral law deprives the poor entirely of liberty of conscience. He not only must not eat, he must not think, at least he must not express a thought, no, nor even a doubt, about that system which is the cause of his misery. It is true, that those who profess or suppress religious sentiments merely to serve their temporal interests, are either very weak or very guilty. But we must make some allowance for the infirmity of human nature, and especially in the case of a poor man, who has no bread for his children, and whose mind has been debased from his youth by such bondage. It is to the system that we are to impute these debasing effects. It not only torments the body, but degrades the mind; and, therefore, every Israelite who loves and respects liberty of conscience, should endeavour to procure it for his brethren. According to the law of the land they have it. They are free to worship and serve God as they think most agreeable to his will; but the oral law steps in between, and deprives them of the benefit. The Jewish poor dare not serve God according to their conscience, nor even express the convictions of their heart. All the legislators in Christendom could not set them free. The duty as well as the possibility of delivering them from this bondage rests with their brethren. But they, alas! whatever the motive, decline the glorious task.

No. LII. LAWS CONCERNING MEAT WITH MILK.

It is recorded of the Cutheans and those other nations whom the King of Assyria placed as colonists at Samaria, that they endeavoured to combine the service of the true God with the worship of idols. “So these nations feared the Lord, and served their craven images, both their children and their children’s children: as did their fathers, so do they unto this day.” (2 Kings xvii. 41.) Every one can see that this conduct was as foolish as it was wicked. It was wicked to dishonour the true God by associating him with them that were no gods; and it was foolish to imagine that God could be pleased with a partial homage and a divided heart. Total idolatry would have been more reasonable and less offensive to the Divine Being, for he, whom we acknowledge as God, must necessarily have the whole of our fear, our love, and our obedience. And yet there is perhaps a way of serving God more unreasonable still, and that is by giving to sinful and fallible men the honour that is due to God alone. The Cutheans falsely thought that God was one amongst many; and if they worshipped the many, it was under the impression that they were really gods. But suppose a nation to acknowledge the one true God, and then to fix upon a certain number of men to be honoured and served with the same degree of reverence and obedience; none can doubt that this nation would be far more irrational than that of the Cutheans, inasmuch as to pay Divine honours to a number of our fellow-men is more extravagant still than to worship a plurality of imaginary deities. Some may think that such a degree of absurdity is impossible, but fact shows that it is not only possible, but that it has actually occurred. When men exalt the inventions of their teachers to a level with the known and acknowledged laws of God, and make obedience to these inventions an essential part of their religion, they confer upon men the highest degree of honour and of service that can be rendered to God. The unreserved submission of the heart and conscience to the will of God is the highest act of worship, and when it is given to the will of men, in that degree men are made gods. Whether these remarks apply to those who make the הלכות בשר בחלה , _i.e._, “The constitutions concerning meat in milk” a part of their religion, it is for the adherents of the oral law to inquire.

The general principle of these constitutions is thus expressed—

בשר בחלב אסור לבשלו ואסור לאכלו מן התורה ואסור בהנאה וקוברין אותו ואפרו אסור כאפר כל הנקברין , ומי שיבשל משניהם כזית כאחד לוקה שנאמר לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו , וכן האוכל כזית משניהם מהבשר והחלב שנתבשלו כאחד לוקה ואע׳׳פ שלא בשל ׃

“It is unlawful to boil meat in milk—according to the law, it is also unlawful to eat it; it is likewise unlawful to make any profit by it, and it is to be buried. Its ashes are also unlawful, like the ashes of other things that are buried. Whosoever boils together a quantity of these two things, equal to an olive, is to be flogged, for it is said, ‘Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mothers milk.’ (Exod. xxiii. 19.) In like manner, he that eats a quantity of the flesh and the milk, which have been boiled together, amounting in value to an olive, is to be flogged, even though be did not boil them.” (Hilchoth Maakhaloth Asuroth, c. ix. i.) Here the oral law determines generally, that it is unlawful to boil meat in milk, or to make any use of meat so boiled, and sentences the transgressor to a severe and degrading corporal punishment, and yet this determination is altogether an invention of men, for which there is not the slightest authority in the Word of God. The prohibition of Moses is confined to one single case, which is exactly defined: “Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother’s milk,” but there the prohibition ends, for the specification of one particular shows that that alone is intended, and necessarily excludes all others. To give some colour to the unwarranted extension, it is asserted that

וגדי הוא כולל ולד השור ולד השה ולד העז עד שיפרוט ויאמר גדי עזים ׃

“Kid includes the young of kine, of sheep, and of goats, so that to particularize, the word goat is added as ‘a kid of the goats.’” And so Rashi also affirms in his commentary. Aben Ezra, however, has saved us the trouble of giving a refutation of our own, for he says—

ואיננו כן כי גדי לא יקרא רק שהוא מהעזים ובלשון ערבי הוא גדי ולא יאמר על מין אחר , רק יש הפרש בין גדי ובין גדי עזים כי גדי גדול מגדי עזים כי עודנו צריך היותו עם העזים וככה שעיר ושעיר עזים וחכמים קבלו שלא יאכלו ישראל בשר בחלב ׃

“This is not so, for nothing is called kid except the young of the goats; and in Arabic the word has the same signification, and is never applied to any other species. But there is a difference between _kid_ and _kid of the goats_, for the former is larger, and it is necessary for the latter still to be with the goats; and the same thing is true of שעיר, which is used in the same way. It is by tradition that the wise men received, that Israel should not eat meat in milk.” (Comment. in Exod. xxiii. 19.) Thus Aben Ezra, himself a most learned rabbi, confesses that the words of the written law restrict the prohibition to one particular case, and that the rest is mere matter of tradition. Of course if it could be proved that this tradition came from God through Moses, it would be equivalent to the written law, but there is no attempt to prove anything of the kind. The authors of the oral law calculated throughout upon the blind credulity of their followers, and therefore here, as elsewhere, there is an entire absence of proof. Indeed, the tradition itself bears the plain mark of forgery. How can any one possibly believe that, if God meant to forbid meat and milk entirely, he should first express himself incorrectly, and then leave the correction of the error to uncertain tradition? If the command had only been once noticed, it would have been hard to believe such a thing; but when we remember that this command is thrice repeated, in Exod. xxiii. 19, xxxiv. 26, and Deut. xiv. 21, it is plainly incredible. Thrice is the command written, and thrice it is restricted to one particular case, and yet the rabbies have dared to make unauthorized additions of their own, and their followers to this day exalt them to a level with the laws of God. It cannot be replied that the rabbies would not commit such wickedness as this, for every one who knows anything of the oral law, knows that a great proportion of it consists merely of the _words of the Scribes_, acknowledged as such, and distinguished by that name from the supposed traditions from Sinai. Thus in the constitutions before us, it is plainly confessed that the written law allows the flesh of wild animals and of fowl in milk, and yet the rabbies forbid it:—

וכן בשר חיה ועוף בין בחלב חיה בין בחלב בהמה אינו אסור באכילה מן התורה לפיכך מותר לבשלו וםותר בהנאה , ואסור באכילה מדברי סופרים כדי שלא יפשטו העם ויבואו לידי איסור בשר בחלב של תורה ויאכלו בשר בהמה טהורה בחלב בהמה טהורה שהרי אין משמעות הכתוב אלא גדי בחלב אמו ממש לפיכך אסרו כל בשר בחלב ׃

“And thus the flesh of a wild animal or of fowl, whether in the milk of a wild or tame animal, is not forbidden as food by the written law, and therefore it is lawful to boil it, and to profit by it. But according to the words of the scribes, it is unlawful to eat it, lest the people should go farther, and be led into a transgression of the written law, and eat the flesh of a clean beast in the milk of a clean beast: for the letter of the written law refers only to a kid in its mother’s milk in the strictest sense; therefore the wise men have forbidden all meat in milk.” In this there is no equivocation, but a simple confession that the rabbies have taken upon themselves to forbid what God has allowed; and have, without ceremony or scruple, made great additions to his law. It matters little what the motive was, the conduct itself is in the highest degree presumptuous. The pretence, that these additions were made only for the purpose of keeping the people far removed from sin, will not serve as a ground of justification. If God had desired such precautionary measures, as being either necessary or beneficial, he would have prescribed them himself. If he did not prescribe them, and the rabbies themselves confess that he did not, but that they are the words of the scribes, then they can be neither necessary nor beneficial, unless we can believe what it would be blasphemy to assert, that is, that God’s law was imperfect until it was mended by the scribes. It is truly astonishing that men professing respect for the law of Moses should treat it with such indignity, and still more so that those who appear so anxious to avoid transgression, should themselves systematically transgress that plain command.

לא תוסיפו על הדבר אשר אנכי מצוה אתכם ׃

“Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you.” (Deut. iv. 2.) But the most extraordinary thing of all is, that the modern Jews should pride themselves on the purity of their faith, and think that they only of all the nations serve the true God and him only, when they are in truth serving the authors of the oral law, and dividing their religious obedience between God and the rabbies. If the rabbinic additions were specimens of profound wisdom in legislation, or had a tendency to promote either the moral or temporal welfare of mankind, there would be some excuse, but what shall we say of those who transgress a plain command for the sake of such an addition as the following:—

הבשר לבדו מותר והחלב לבדו מותר ובהתערב שניהם ע׳׳י בישול יאסרו שניהם , במה דברים אמורים שנתבשלו שניהם ביחד או שנפל חם לתוך חם או צונן לתוך חם אבל אם נפל אחד משניהם והוא חם לתוך השני והוא צונן קולף הבשר כולו שנגע בו החלב ואוכל השאר ואם נפל צונן לתוך צונו מדיח החתיכה ואוכלה ׃

“The flesh by itself is lawful, and the milk by itself is lawful, but as soon they are mixed together by means of boiling (or cooking) they both become unlawful. In what cases does this hold? When both are boiled together, or when one being hot falls into the other also being hot, or when one, cold, falls into the other hot. But if one of them being hot falls upon the second being cold, then all that part of the meat which was touched by the milk is to be peeled off, and the remainder may be eaten. But if one in a cold state falls upon the other also cold, then that piece is to be washed, and after that may be eaten.” (Hilchoth Maakhaloth Asuroth, c. ix. 17.) We have, in the first place, an unwarranted extension of the divine command. God has simply forbidden to seethe a kid in its mother’s milk. The rabbies first extend this to the young of kine, and sheep. Then they advance another step and forbid the boiling or cooking of any sort of meat in milk, and now we have seen another advance still, whereby even any mixture of flesh and milk is strictly forbidden. Thus the rabbies aim at universal dominion, and are satisfied with nothing short of an entire subjugation of the heart and conscience. Other tyrants must rest satisfied with the enslavement of the body, but cannot touch the thought. The authors of the oral law attack the liberty of thought, and intrude even into the kitchens of their victims. They are determined that their followers shall not eat excepting as they please, and boldly invade the prerogative of God himself, by forbidding the food which he provides for his people. But this extract presents, in the second place, an outrage on common sense. If milk and meat each be lawful by itself, how can the mixture make them unlawful? Whatever God forbids is unlawful, no matter whether we understand the reason or not. But here the rabbies themselves acknowledge that God has not forbidden this mixture; but that the prohibition is entirely their own invention. We are therefore bound to use our senses, if God has given us any, and to ask a reason why. Then, again, why should that which is lawful when cold, be made unlawful by being hot? It may be said, that this is a matter of little importance. In itself it is; but as a burden on the consciences of men, it is of the very highest importance, and as a cheat upon the ignorant it is more important still. In many countries, these and similar inventions constitute the whole religion of the ignorant, and especially of the women. The oral law affirms that it is not necessary to teach women the law of God, but it is almost a matter of life and death that they should know these rabbinic laws about meat and milk. If a woman is unable to read the Word of God, and is as ignorant as a heathen, of God’s will, the rabbies think that is a trifle. But if a woman were, through ignorance to serve up meat with any admixture of milk, the whole family would be in an uproar, and the rabbi himself would have to be consulted about a remedy for so dreadful a calamity. The consequence is, that with the mass of the uneducated, accuracy in these observances passes for piety, and these poor beings hope that they are going straight to heaven, when they are utterly devoid or ignorant of that holiness, truth, and purity, which are the first essentials for admission into the presence of God. Thus the oral law destroys the souls of multitudes, but others will have to answer for their blood. All who uphold the system must share in the responsibility. The rabbies who teach, the learned Jews who aid and abet, the priests and Levites to whom God has committed the pastorship of his people, but who neglect their sacred office, all will have to answer for the souls of the lost. But most of all those who know that these things are wrong, who themselves eat meat and milk, and laugh at rabbinic superstition, and yet are insensible to the miseries of their poor and ignorant brethren. Every one practically acquainted with the working of these laws, knows not only that they beget a false notion of religion, but that they are also a torment in this life. In domestic and culinary economy, accidents will happen. Meat may fall into milk, or milk into a pot of meat. Misery and vexation are the consequence, and if the unfortunate woman to whom the accident has happened cannot get satisfaction at home, she must go to the rabbi to inquire what is to be done. For instance—

בשר שנפל לתוך החלב , או חלב שנפל לתוך הבשר ונתבשל עמו שיעורו בנותן טעם , כיצד חתיכה של בשר שנפלה לקדירה רותחת של חלב , טועם הגוי את הקדרה אם אמר שיש בה טעם בשר אסורה ואם לאו מותרת ואותה חתיכה אסורה , בד׳׳א שקדם והוציא את החתיכה קודם שתפלוט חלב שבלעה , אבל אם לא סלק משערים אותה בששים מפני שהחלב שנבלע בה ונאסר יצא ונתערב עם שאר החלב ׃

“With respect to meat which falls into milk, or milk that falls into the midst of meat, the measure is, if it give a taste? How so? If a peace of meat fall into a boiling pot of milk, a Gentile is to taste the contents of the pot: and if he says that it has a taste of meat, then it is unlawful. But if it has not the taste of meat, then the milk is lawful, but that piece of meat is unlawful. In what cases does this hold? In case that the piece of meat has been taken out, before it has emitted the milk which it has sucked in. But if it has not been taken out, then a calculation must be made whether its proportion to the whole is as one to sixty; because the milk that was sucked in, and had become unlawful, has been emitted and has mixed with the rest of the milk.” (Ibid.) Now, in the most tolerable case, that is, if the owner of the milk can afford to lose it and the meat too, there is, first, an unnecessary inconvenience and vexation, which no man has a right to inflict upon another. But there is, secondly, and what is of far more consequence, a great sin in wasting good and wholesome, and, according to the written law, lawful food. If the milk tastes of meat, then the milk and the meat are rendered not only unlawful but perfectly useless. How then can the Jews expect peace and plenty, when their oral law teaches them to despise and cast from them with disdain God’s blessings? But suppose that the owner of the milk and the meat is a poor man, and that he has laid out his hard and scanty earnings to provide food for his family, an accident of this kind will leave them destitute. Their last hope of support is taken away, and they may die of hunger. If they go to the rabbies, and urge the necessity of the case—plead that they have no more—reason that if meat by itself is lawful, that milk is also lawful—that the law of Moses no where forbids this food—the teachers of the oral law will answer, that their traditions cannot be broken; and the poor people must learn that to eat food permitted and given by God is a sin, but to die of starvation is lawful. How can men with any of the feelings of humanity believe that such a law is from God?—how can men of any common sense suffer the consciences and the bodies of the poor and ignorant to be thus tormented? Above all, how can a nation that prides itself on the purity of its faith yield an idolatrous obedience to cruel and oppressive laws invented by men? It is a vain boast for them to say that they have no images—the oral law and its enactments constitute a whole host of idols. It is an unfounded triumph which they celebrate over the worshippers of Moloch. The oral law is a deity as fierce and as bloody, and to it are daily immolated the souls and bodies of the poor and ignorant. Any homage rendered to falsehood, or to cruelty, is idolatrous; and every thinking man must admit, that the worship of the oral law is of this character. To the Rabbinists themselves we would say, Just think whether it be possible that God would have given a law so oppressive, or whether he can have any pleasure in the obedience which is rendered at the expense of mercy? To those who reject the oral law we would say, You have a duty to perform from which nothing can exempt you—and that is, to rest neither day nor night until Israel is delivered from this idolatrous worship of men, and set free from a yoke so oppressive to body and soul. We grant that Christians have also a duty, and in these papers we endeavour to discharge our share of it. But the duty incumbent upon Israelites is tenfold more imperative. The ties of flesh and blood—their office as a kingdom of priests—the mercy of God in giving them the law as their inheritance—all increase their responsibility and add to the weight of obligation. It would be a shame for Israel to be silent when even the Gentiles cry out for the restoration of the religion of Moses and the prophets. Israelites may have peculiar difficulties. They may be united in commercial relations or by family ties with those who are in bondage to the oral law. They may fear the injury of their worldly prospects—they may dread the frown of relatives and friends. This was also the case of Abraham, when he determined to renounce the false gods of his fathers, and to worship the true God alone; and every one who determines by God’s help to follow and assert the truth, must make up his mind to love it even more than life itself. But can a son of Abraham hesitate? Will he forfeit the smile of God to escape the frown of friends? Nay, if his friends are still in error, is this not a double motive to urge him forward in the overthrow of that error? Must he not he doubly anxious to deliver his father, his mother, his brothers and his sisters from such bondage? The first attempt may be difficult—the immediate results may be unpleasant; but if for God’s sake he asserts God’s truth, he shall have God’s blessing, and at last find peace even amongst those who are now offended. As long as the present state of things continues, Israel can never be restored to their ancient position. God in mercy keeps them in dispersion, to prevent the triumph of the oral law. But when is this state of misery to cease? There must be a beginning. Some one follower of Moses must be zealous enough and bold enough to attack the strong holds of superstition, and to rouse his brethren to a sense of their condition—some one who not only professes to be a follower of Moses, but who has imbibed his spirit, and whose trust is in the God of his fathers.

No. LIII. RABBINISM OPPRESSIVE TO THE POOR.

When God gave Israel the law, by the hand of Moses, he also gave them several tests, whereby they might at all times try themselves, and know to a certainty whether they were really obedient or not—and whether the laws, to which they yielded obedience, were really the laws given by Moses. One of these tests is found in the following words:—“Behold, I have taught you statutes and judgments, even as the Lord my God commanded me, that ye should do so in the land whither ye go to possess it. Keep, therefore, and do them; for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations, which shall hear all these statutes, and say, Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people.” (Deut. iv. 5.) By the help of these words, Israel may know at any time whether they are really keeping the laws of Moses. They have only to consult their own experience, and determine whether they are honoured by all nations on account of their wisdom. Moses promises that a reputation for wisdom, and the honour that accompanies it, shall be the reward of obedience. If therefore the Jews at this present time are obedient, this promise must be in daily fulfilment. But, if they are not honoured and respected for their wisdom, then we must conclude, that they are deficient in obedience, and further, that the laws to which they are at present so devoted are not the laws of Moses. Now it is a certain fact, that admiration for the wisdom of Israel has not been the prevailing sentiment amongst the nations of the world for the last two thousand years. The Jewish people has been most deplorably underrated. Their genius and their literature have been ignorantly undervalued, and the folly of the authors of the oral law has been unjustly visited upon each and every individual of the nation. We grant the injustice and the impiety of such hasty judgments, but cannot deny the fact, and the fact proves that the laws to which Israel now yields obedience are not the laws of Moses. They now obey the commands of the oral law, and the nations have heard of the statutes thereof, but no one says, “Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people.” Some may, perhaps, ascribe this to prejudice, and no doubt there are cases where prejudice has much to do with the decision, but this is not our case. Our prepossessions are all in favour of the Jews, and yet we cannot help questioning the wisdom of those, who make such laws as the following a part of their religion:—

אין לשין העיסה בחלב ואם לש כל הפת אסורה מפני הרגל עבירה שמא יאכל בה בשר , ואין טשין את התנור באליה ואם טש כל הפת אסורה עד שיסיק את התנור שמא יאכל בה חלב , ואם שינה בצורת הפת עד שתהיה נכרת כדי שלא יאכל בה לא בשר ולא חלב הרי זה מותר ׃

“It is not lawful to knead the dough with milk, and if it be done, all the bread is unlawful, lest this should lead to further transgression, and it should be eaten with meat. It is also unlawful to smear the oven with the tail of a sheep; and if it be done, all the bread is unlawful, lest milk should be eaten with it. But, if some change be made in the form of the bread whereby it may be recognized, so as that neither meat nor milk should be eaten with it, then it is lawful.” (Hilchoth Maakhaloth Asuroth, c. ix. 22.) We do not wish to persuade the Jews either to knead dough with milk, or to smear an oven with the tail of a sheep, but when we remember all the poverty and want that is in the world, we cannot help asking, What is there so sinful in either of the above actions, as to make such bread unlawful for the use of God’s people? Has God forbidden it? or has he so strictly prohibited the use of meat and milk together, as to make this excess of caution necessary? Neither the one nor the other. The law of God as given by Moses, allows the use of meat and milk together. It forbids only one particular case, the boiling of a kid in its mother’s milk: and to this the rabbies have, without any authority, added all these other commands, and thus burdened the conscience, and made religion an intricate and difficult science intelligible only to the learned, and not always to them. What wisdom is there in forbidding what God did not think necessary to forbid? What wisdom is there in neglecting or disregarding the revealed will of God, and giving up the conscience to the guidance of weak and fallible men like ourselves? But above all, what wisdom is there in oppressing and tormenting the poor? The oral law says—

מי שאכל גבינה או חלב תחלה מותר לאכול אחריו בשר מיד .

מי שאכל בשר בתחלה בין בשר בהמה בין בשר עוף לא יאכל אחריו חלב עד שיהיה ביניהם כדי שיעור סעודה אחרת והוא כמו שש שעות מפני הבשר שבין השינים שאינו סר בקינוח ׃

“He that eats cheese or milk first, may eat meat immediately after.

“He that eats meat first, whether it be the meat of a beast or of a fowl, must not eat milk after it, until the regular time between two meals, that is six hours, shall have elapsed; because of the meat which remains between the teeth, and which is not got out by wiping.” (Ibid., 26, 28.) Now in the case of the rich or the affluent, who can procure a good and sufficient meal of meat, and can therefore wait for six hours, this may be no great hardship, though even in that case, we must protest against the unauthorized burden imposed upon the conscience; but when applied to the needy and the destitute, this law becomes an intolerable yoke. Just suppose the father of a starving family who goes forth to beg assistance from the charitable. He receives a small portion of meat, and hastens back to divide it with his wife and children. They partake of the relief, but it is not sufficient to supply their wants. He therefore goes forth again, and some friend of the poor gives him some milk or cheese, he brings it home with thankfulness, but dare not touch it himself nor give it to his children—they have already fasted many an hour—they are still weak with hunger—a little of the milk or the cheese would recruit exhausted nature—the children cry and entreat for six hours more, for though God allows this food, rabbies have forbidden it. Is there wisdom in this? Is God honoured by such a religion, which counts his permission as nothing, and exalts the authority of the rabbies above that of God himself? And may we not ask the some question of the following law?

האוכל גבינת הגוים או חלב שחלבו גוי ואין הישראל רואהו מכין אותו מכת מרדות , והחמאה מקצת הגאונים התירוה שהרי לא גזרו על חחמאה וחלב טמא אינו עומד ומקצת הגאונים אסרוה מפני צחצוח חלב שישאר בה ׃

“He that eats Gentile cheese, or milk which a Gentile has milked, but the Israelite did not see him, is to be flogged with the flogging of rebellion. But, as to the butter, some of the Gaons have pronounced it lawful, because there is no express decision about it, and because unclean milk will not set. Others of the Gaons, on the contrary, have pronounced it unlawful, on account of the small drops of milk which remain in it.” (Joreh Deah, 115.) Here we have the same total want of consideration for the poor, and the same fierce and cruel spirit. Just suppose, again, the case of a destitute Jewish family, where the father is laid on a bed of sickness, and unable to earn daily bread for his children. The mother, weary with tending the sick couch of her husband, and her heart half-broken with the children’s cry for bread, goes to solicit help from the almoners of the synagogue. She obtains eighteen pence per month, but finds that on this small sum it is impossible for a family to subsist; she then goes to individuals of her nation, and gets what she can, but still not sufficient to the wants of her children, and of her sick husband. In her distress, she goes to some Christian neighbours, who give her some milk and cheese. The pangs of hunger, and the affections of a wife and mother overcome her superstition, she carries this bounty home and partakes of it along with her husband and children. Has, she thereby committed a sin; has she violated any one precept of the Mosaic law; has she blasphemed the name of her God? Let reason, let the Law and the Prophets answer, and they will say, No: she has done her duty. But what does the oral law say? It says, that she has committed a dreadful sin. And what is to be her punishment, and that of her husband and children? Flogging—the flogging of rebellion. If the oral law had power, it would lead them forth to the place of execution, and there inflict stripes without number and without mercy. The bystanders, and those attracted by the cries would ask, What dreadful crime has this family committed? and the answer would be, To save themselves from starvation they dared to eat Gentile cheese and milk. Gentiles would ask again, What, is this the law? Does Judaism teach that so innocent an action is to be punished with such severity? and being answered in the affirmative, would go away exclaiming, “What a merciful religion! Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people!” No: they would retire in horror, thanking God that they are not Jews, and that God has preserved them from so dreadful a delusion, and from such iniquitous cruelty. What, then, do our Jewish readers think of this law, and the religion of which it is a part? It is certain that there are multitudes of Jews in this city who live in the constant violation of this command; who constantly use milk supplied by Gentiles, and yet pretend to profess Judaism as their religion. Let all such ask themselves, by what authority they transgress a command sanctioned by so severe a punishment. Is it because they think it irrational, or unwarranted by the law of Moses? if so, they attack at once the authority of the whole system of Judaism. If the oral low can be proved to be absurd, or unjust, or cruel, in any one particular, its value as a divine tradition is utterly destroyed. Let them, then, be consistent; if they reject Judaism, let them say so, let them not pretend to have the Jewish religion, when they have it not. Let them honestly confess that their reason, directed by Scripture, has led them to reject it; and let them fulfil the consequent duty of endeavouring to deliver their poor brethren from a bondage so cruel. They must know that these laws about milk and butter, and the art of slaughtering, cut off many a poor Jew from the last refuge of the destitute—the poor-house. Many a one who is now starving with his family, would be glad to have the relief which the parish provides, but he dare not accept of it. Either his conscience, perverted by these rabbinical statutes, will not permit him, or he is afraid of his brethren, who would think that in going into such an asylum he had renounced his God. Those who use Gentile milk without scruple, will have much to answer for, if they suffer such oppression and such superstition to continue. It is a vain excuse for any one to say, “What can I do?” Any one individual, however weak and uninfluential, has it in his power by God’s blessing, to deliver the poor. Let him continually protest against such superstition, let him reason with his brethren. Let him determine to take no rest, until the yoke is torn from the necks of his nation. He will ultimately prevail. He will be the instrument in God’s hand, of offering a greater deliverance than that from Egypt, inasmuch as the emancipation of the soul is of more importance than that of the body. In this respect, amongst others, Jesus of Nazareth has done more than Moses. If he had not arisen, the oral law would have been universal, and the world have continued either sunk in idolatry or slaves to a cruel superstition. The cruelty of a religion, which commands a man to be flogged for eating that which God permits, is not to be disputed; the prohibition of Gentile bread furnishes another instance of similar inhumanity.

יש דברים שאסרו חכמים אע׳׳פ שאין להם עיקר מן התורה כמו פת של גוים אפילו אפאו לו ישראל והשלקות שמבשלין הגוים ואסרו לשתות במסיבתן אפילו שאר משקין שאין בהן משום חשש יין נסך וכל אלו דברים אסרו משום חתנות וכו׳ ׃

“There are some things which the wise men have pronounced unlawful, although they have no foundation for the prohibition in the law, as bread of the Gentiles, even though an Israelite should have baked it for him—and cooked victuals, which the Gentiles have cooked. They have also pronounced it unlawful to drink at a Gentile table, even those drinks of which there can be no suspicion that wine of libation is mixed with them. And they pronounced these things unlawful to prevent the possibility of intermarriage,” &c. (Ibid. 112.) There are many remarks suggested by this passage, but at present we limit ourselves to the prohibition of Gentile bread. It is here confessed that there is no foundation for it in the law of Moses, and that therefore the rabbies have no authority for the prohibition; and yet a very little consideration is sufficient to show that great inconvenience may arise. For instance, if a poor Jew is travelling in this country, exhausts his stock of money, and goes to a farm-house to ask relief, he cannot accept any meat—he is not to drink any milk on pain of a flogging. Suppose, then, that the people offer him some home-baked bread, even this is forbidden:—

פת של בעל הבית אסורה לעולם ׃

“Bread baked by a private house-keeper is eternally forbidden.” The poor man, therefore, may starve. But the inhumanity appears still more in the discussion of the question, whether and when it is lawful to eat baker’s bread. The rabbies are divided. Some allow it, because the rule is—

מי שהתענה ג׳ ימים מותר בפת של גוים משום חיי נפש וברוב מקומות גליותנו אין פלטר ישראל מצוי והוה כאלו התענה ג׳ ימים , ויש אוסרין אותו אלא א׳׳כ התענה ג׳ ימים ממש ׃

“He that has fasted three days may lawfully eat Gentile bread, and as in many places of our captivity there is no Israelite baker, this case is considered parallel to that of him who has fasted three days. But there are others who say that it is unlawful, unless he has fasted three days, in the strictest sense of the word.” (Ibid.) One would think that, in a case of doubt, men that had the fear of God would naturally incline to the side of mercy; but here we find teachers of religion forbidding what God has allowed, unless the victim of poverty has first endured the torment of starvation for three days; and in one case actually determining that a fellow-creature shall die of hunger, rather than suffer their unauthorized traditions to be broken. If a Gentile Government should seize on a number of unfortunate Israelites guilty of no crime, and shut them up in a prison, and then leave them to die of starvation, what just indignation would be excited! Every man would protest against such wanton cruelty, and yet this is just what modern Judaism has done. By forbidding Gentile meat, milk, cheese, and bread, it has consigned hundreds to starvation. There are at this moment numbers of individuals, if not families, pining away in want, whose wants could be relieved, if the oral law did not interpose its iron front, and pronounce starvation lawful, and help from Gentiles unlawful; and yet their brethren, who pride themselves upon their benevolence and humanity, leave them to perish, and suffer the system to remain that it may be a curse to coming generations. It is truly astonishing to see the indifference of those who pride themselves upon their emancipation from superstition, and who themselves eat Gentile bread, and milk, and cheese, and perhaps meat, without any scruple. It is more astonishing still, how the nation at large suffers itself to be deluded by men who do not agree amongst themselves as to what the law really is. We saw above, that the greatest of the rabbies, even the Gaons themselves, differ as to the lawfulness of Gentile butter;—here we see that they cannot agree as to the lawfulness of Gentile bakers’ bread. How is it, then, that the Jews cannot see that their present religion of the oral law is altogether one of uncertainty and that, therefore, there is no dependence upon it? Here they eat freely, even the strictest, of Gentile bread; but yet, according to some of their greatest men, they are thereby committing a deadly sin. These wise men humanely say, that it is necessary first to fast for three days. Now of what use is an oral law that cannot even tell us certainly what sort of bread it is unlawful to eat? The Rabbinist boast is, that the oral law teaches them the true meaning of the written law, and thus saves them from all doubtful disputation. But how can that be true, when the oral law has not yet settled when it is lawful to eat Gentile bread? If the rabbies cannot agree on so simple a matter, what trust can be placed in them in difficult questions? The Jews cannot even tell, by the help of their religion, whether they are not committing a sin, and leading their children to commit a sin, when they give them a piece of bread and butter. How, then, can they be satisfied with a religion where the simplest concerns of life are still a matter of doubt and disputation; and especially where the poor are made to suffer the greatest hardships, whilst, by keeping to Moses and the prophets, they might find relief? But, above all, how can they believe that a religion is divine, or its authors good and pious men, when an innocent action, nay, the fulfilment of a natural duty, is punished with flogging? There is no punishment of which the oral law is so fond; and it would be a curious and interesting employment to furnish a list of all the offences to which it is annexed. Perhaps in nothing does the Talmud differ more from the New Testament. The New Testament has not, in any one case, prescribed so cruel a punishment. The Talmud and all its compendiums prescribe it on the most trifling occasion. The maxim of the New Testament is that of the Old also, “I will have mercy, not sacrifice.” Now, if the practice of mercy be more agreeable in the eyes of God, than even those ceremonial rites which he himself ordained, with what pleasure can he contemplate the religion of the oral law, which punishes, even what God has allowed, with unmeasured cruelty? Aben Ezra supposed that this command, “Not to seethe a kid in its mother’s milk,” was given in order to prevent cruelty even to the brute creation; if this be true, how does God regard the perversion of his mercy, which pretends to keep this command, to spare the brute creation, by dooming hundreds of mankind to starvation, and by flogging those who endeavour to escape from their misery by eating what he has nowhere forbidden? If God has compassion upon the beasts that perish, what can he think of those teachers of religion who talk with such composure of a fellow-creature’s fasting for three days before he may eat bread sold by a Gentile baker, and who absolutely decide that it is his duty to die, rather than partake of bread baked by a private individual who is not a Jew? We appeal to the good sense of every Israelite to answer these questions. Is it not evident that the God of mercy must view with indignation, those teachers who thus misrepresent the nature of revealed religion, and who cause his holy name to be blasphemed amongst the ignorant? But if those men are guilty, a portion of their guilt rests upon all those who aid and abet in upholding the system. There can be but little excuse for those who have the Law and the Prophets in their hands, and who therefore ought to know, that the cruelty of the oral law is as contrary to the character of God, as light is to darkness. And there is no excuse at all for those Israelites who themselves despise these Rabbinical laws, and yet by their silence and indifference leave their brethren still in misery. They are answerable for all the dishonour done to God; for all the misery inflicted upon man; and for all the contempt heaped upon the wisdom of Israel.

No. LIV. GENTILE WINE.

The Jews of the present day have got one religion—the Christians have got another. It is much to be desired that all the sons of men should have the one true religion, but, as this is not likely to be the case for some little time longer, it becomes those who differ to examine the nature and grounds of their differences. Whatever Jews may think upon the subject, Christians feel themselves bound to inquire whether they have really erred so grievously as modern Judaism asserts. The oral law brings no less a charge against them than this, That they are guilty of idolatry, and therefore in a worse state than even the Mahometans.

כל גוי שאינו עובד עכו׳׳ם כגון אלו הישמעאכים יינן אסור בשתיה ומותר בהנאה , וכן הורו כל הגאונים , אבל הנוצרים עובדי עכו׳׳ם הם וסתם יינם אסור בהנאה ׃

“As to those Gentiles who, like the Ishmaelites, are not idolaters, their wine is unlawful to drink, but is lawful for purposes of profit, as is taught by all the Gaons; but Christians are idolaters, and their wine, even such as has not been used as wine of libation, is unlawful even for purposes of profit.” (Hilchoth Maakhaloth Asuroth, c. xi. 7.) These words are very plain, and are confirmed by the practice of Rabbinists in every part of the world, who abstain as carefully from the wine belonging to Christians, as their forefathers would have done from the idolatrous libation of the Canaanites. Jews, therefore cannot be astonished if we examine with care a religion that brings against us so grave an accusation, and endeavour to defend ourselves against the charge. We might ask them, whether they behold in our churches any of the emblems of idolatry. We might refer them to the ten commandments written up in the most holy place of our sacred edifices. We might quote from the New Testament many warnings against idolatry as plain and as solemn as any to be found in the law of Moses; but there is a previous question to be considered, and that is, What is the character of that system, which witnesses against us? Is it worthy of credit—can its testimony be depended upon? If the oral law be really from God, and if its teachers should appear as faithful depositories of Divine truth, their testimony would have great weight. But if the rabbies be detected as daring corrupters of Divine revelation, and their religion be proved to be a perversion of the law of Moses, then this charge must fall to the ground as unworthy of all credit; and this is what we assert. We have already given many reasons in support of this assertion, and now add some more which we find in the laws about יין נסך, “wine of libation,” which laws appear to us to be not only unwarranted additions, but unmerciful, uncharitable, and irrational.

We do not mean to deny that it is utterly unlawful to partake of wine that has been consecrated to idols; on the contrary, we would assert this as zealously as any Israelite. Concerning things offered to idols, the New Testament says, “The things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God: and I would not that ye should have fellowship with devils. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of devils.” (1 Cor. x. 20, 21.) Let not therefore any Israelite think that we wish to defend what is contrary both to the Old and New Testament. But though fully convinced of the unlawfulness of drinking wine or anything else consecrated to the service of idolatry, we confess that we cannot see why it is unlawful to make use of wine not consecrated to idolatry, simply because it belongs to, or has been touched by, a Gentile; and yet this is the rabbinic law:—

יין הגוים שאין אנו יודעים אם נתנסך או לא נתנסך והוא הנקרא סתם יינם אסור בהנאה כמו יין שנתנסך ודבר זה מגזירת הסופרים הוא והשותה מסתם יינם רביעית מכין אותו מכת מרדות , וכל יין שיגע בו הגוי הרי זה אסור שמא נסך אותו שמחשבת הגוי לעכו׳׳ם הא למדת שיין ישראל שנגע בו הגוי דינו כסתם יינם שהוא אסור בהנאה ׃

“Wine belonging to Gentiles, of which we do not know whether it has been consecrated or not, and what is called _common Gentile wine_, is unlawful even to make a profit of, just like wine that has been consecrated; and this is by the decree of the scribes. Whosoever drinks so much as one quarter measure of this common Gentile wine is to be flogged with the flogging of rebellion. All wine also which a Gentile touches is unlawful because he may have consecrated it, for the thought of a Gentile is to idolatry. Hence thou hast learned, that concerning wine belonging to an Israelite which a Gentile has touched, the law is the same as in the case of common Gentile wine, which is unlawful even to make a profit of.” (Ibid., 3, 4.) Now in this law we have first the unauthorized additions of the rabbies. We have already granted, that wine, and everything else, consecrated to the service of idols is unlawful, but with this the rabbies are not content. They forbid wine that was made by, or ever in the possession of, a Gentile, or even if a Gentile has touched it, and that not only to drink it, but to make any use of it, or to sell it, or to be in any way employed about it, so as to make any profit by it.

והחמירו חכמים בסתם יינם להיות דמיו אסורין כדמי יין שנתנסך לעכו׳׳ם לפיכך גוי ששכר את ישראל לעשות עמו ביין שכרו אסור , וכן השוכר את החמור להביא עליו יין או ששכר ספינה להביא בה יין שכרן אסור , אם מעות נתנו לו ישליכון לים המלח , ואם נתנו לו בשכרו כסות או כלים או פירות בו , שכר לגוי חמור לרכוב עליו והניח עליו לוגין של יין שכרו מותר ׃

“The wise men have been very strict with respect to the common Gentile wine, and have pronounced its price to be unlawful, as that of wine which has been consecrated to idolatry; therefore, if a Gentile have an Israelite to labour with him, in any thing concerning wine, his wages are unlawful. In like manner, if he hire an ass, or a ship, to carry wine, the hire thereof is unlawful: and if it be given to him in money, he is to throw it into the salt sea. But if the hire be given him in clothes, or vessels, or fruits, he is to burn them, and to bury their ashes, that no profit may arise therefrom. But if an Israelite has hired an ass to a Gentile to ride upon, and he lays upon it bottles of wine, then the hire thereof is lawful.” (Ibid., c. xiii. 15, &c.) For all this there is no authority whatever in the law of Moses,—it is a pure invention of the rabbies, who had but little respect for the Divine law, and no consideration at all for the necessities of man. It is evident that these additions must, in many cases, become so many impediments in the way of earning a subsistence. The proprietor of a ship, or the owner of cattle, is cut off from one source of employment and profit. Now, even in the case of the rich, though they may feel it less, this is an unjustifiable severity; but in the case of the poor, it becomes a most cruel oppression. In the wine-countries, for example, a poor Jew might perchance find employment with some of the growers of that article; but the rabbies have declared that honest industry, in a matter which God has nowhere forbidden, is unlawful, and the fruits of it so abominable, as to be fit only for destruction. In this city, also, many examples of the absurdity and cruelty of this law might be found. Suppose that a Christian wine-merchant should wish to employ some one or more of those numerous Israelites, who are destitute of the means of earning a livelihood, and should therefore offer him a situation, either in his cellar or his counting-house, the rabbies say that he dare not accept of it: and that it is more pleasing in the sight of God that the man should go about idle, and that his family should starve, than that he should labour honestly, and do what God has permitted. Who is there, except the rabbies themselves, who does not see that such a decision is irrational, oppressive, and unmerciful, not now to speak of its injustice to Christian nations, by classing them with the idolaters of Canaan? But take another case, suppose that some Christian, finding a Jewish family in deep distress, some of the members perhaps recovering from sickness, to whom a little wine might be beneficial, gives them a bottle of wine, What are they to do with it? May they make use of it to strengthen their exhausted frames? The rabbies answer, No. May they sell it, and with the money purchase food, or some other necessary of life? The rabbies answer, No. What then are they to do with it? The rabbies answer, Destroy it; destroy what would recruit your fainting bodies—what would purchase bread for your starving children—destroy what might perhaps save your life, simply because we have forbidden it; and it is more important that our unauthorized laws should be preserved inviolate, than that you should be comforted or strengthened or relieved in your misery. This is the mercy of Judaism. But we have not done yet. Suppose that the mother of the family should begin to reason, and say, This wine would preserve my poor child’s life; a little of it would strengthen me, and enable me to tend the sick bed with more alacrity; God has nowhere forbidden it. She accordingly administers to her child, and partakes herself, when some rabbinic zealot enters and perceives what she has done. Now suppose that the ministers of the oral law had the liberty to follow out all its enactments, what would be the consequence? The poor woman would be summoned before a בית דין, a tribunal; the oral law would be opened, and her sentence be, The flogging of rebellion, as we have cited above. Is this merciful, is it just, is it rational? Is there anything like it in the New Testament, or in the religion of Jesus of Nazareth? The oral law says that we are idolaters, but is it worthy of credit? Can any reasonable man place confidence in the teaching of those who are so senseless as to forbid a perishing fellow-creature to make use of proffered relief, and so merciless as to flog him with the flogging of rebellion, if he regards God’s permission more than their prohibition? But it is not only absurdity and cruelty, which here are to be noticed, there is also a certain measure of that cleverness which we have remarked on former occasions, which provides for the transgression of the law and the retaining of the merit of keeping it. The above extract says, “If an Israelite has hired an ass to a Gentile to ride upon, and he lays upon it bottles of wine, then the hire thereof is lawful;” and on this principle the owner of a ship or a wagon may let either generally for the transport of merchandize, and provided the word _wine_ is not mentioned, the Gentile may transport his wine, and the Jew lawfully receive and use his money, though if the word _wine_ had been mentioned, the money would have been so unlawful, that it ought not even be given to relieve the wants of the poor, but thrown into the salt sea. Here the rabbies betray their own insincerity, and their unbelief in their own enactments, by their determination to evade their severity, whenever it interfered with their own interests. But even if there were no cruelty, no contempt for the law of God, and no evasion, the effect of multiplying such observances is to lead away the mind from the weightier matters of religion. The ignorant think, even whilst they are violating the ten commandments, that, if they abstain from Gentile wine, they are fulfilling a most meritorious duty, and making compensation for their other transgressions. Indeed the rabbies themselves are not free from this effect, if we may judge by the following passage:—

זונה גויה במסיבה של ישראל היין מותר מפני שאימתה עליה ולא תגע אבל זונה ישראלית במסיבת גוים יינה שלפניה בכליה אסור מפני שהם נוגעין שלא מדעתה ׃

“If a Gentile harlot be at an entertainment of Israelites, the wine is lawful, for their fear is upon her, so that she would not touch it. But if an Israelite harlot be at an entertainment of Gentiles, her wine that is before her in her own vessel is unlawful, because they may touch it without her knowledge.” (Ibid., c. xii. 26.) Now if men or women are so wicked as to be found in such circumstances, in the open disregard of God’s law, is it not deceiving them to tell them, or to lead them to suppose, that there can be any merit in any mere ceremonial observance, even though it should have been ordained by God himself: and is it not straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel, to forbid a poor perishing Jew to taste wine touched by a Gentile, and to allow it to those who are feasting with a harlot? Perhaps some one will reply that it is on account of the idolatry of the Gentile; but we have seen in the first extract given in this paper, that if wine be touched even by a Gentile who is not an idolater, it is unlawful for a Jew to drink it; so that to be a Gentile at all is in the eyes of the rabbies a greater degradation and of more contaminating influence, than to be guilty of gross immorality. Now we appeal to the good sense of every Israelite, whether this is not to exalt vice, and to degrade humanity? God chose a people to himself, Israel is that people; we honour them as such: but, is that any reason why Israel should trample upon the ties of our common humanity, and look upon the touch even of a Gentile who fears God, as so defiling that it makes wine unfit for the use of a Jew? How are peace and charity ever to prevail between Jews and Gentiles, so long as this is looked upon as religion? Yea, and how is true religion and true fear of God ever to prevail amongst the mass of the Jewish community, so long as they are taught that Israelites guilty of immorality are more holy than a Gentile who fears God, and that sin is not so dreadful as uncircumcision? The object of such commands was plainly to prevent all social and friendly intercourse between Jews and Gentiles under any circumstances, and to build up an eternal wall of separation between them. This is very different from that national and official distinction instituted by God himself. The object of God’s choice was not to put an end to the practice of love and charity between the Jews and all the other nations of the earth, but to cement the bonds of affection. He made Israel the depository of his oracles, that they might communicate the truth to other nations, and that thus the nations should feel gratitude for the benefit conferred, and the Israelites feel that affection for the nations, which a teacher naturally feels for those who, by his instrumentality, have forsaken error and embraced the truth. The oral law prevents the fulfilment of the Divine law, and cuts asunder also these ties of amity and peace. It makes it impossible for Israel to communicate any blessing, and for the Gentiles to receive any blessing at their hands, and goes far towards throwing suspicion on the Divine law. If there were no other medium of communication, than the rabbies, between the Divine law and the world, the worship of Jupiter and Bacchus and all the other heathen deities would still prevail. How could the nations ever have been converted by those who taught them, in the first place, that God is such a respecter of persons, as to think immorality in a Jew less contaminating than the mere external touch of a pious Gentile? Reason revolts at such profane absurdity, and therefore if God had had no better messengers and representatives of his truth, idolatry would still continue. Some may reply, idolatry does still continue, such at least is the sentence of the oral law, and, though grieved that any should be so blind as to bring such a charge against Christianity, we are by no means angry or offended at it. If the Jews still believe in their own religion, and therefore think that Christians are idolaters, it is their bounden duty to say so. But then we ask in reply, if Christianity be idolatry, how is it that its doctrine is more pure, more merciful, more charitable, and more rational than that of the oral law? Christianity has no ceremonial laws to be observed by those who feast together with harlots—Christianity nowhere sentences the poor to flogging, because they partake of what God allows—Christianity nowhere represents God as an unjust and impartial judge, who looks not at moral good and evil, but at a man’s nation. Christianity teaches that true religion is that of the heart—that at the day of judgment mercilessness will obtain no mercy, and that God is the God of the spirits of all flesh. Let then the lovers of the oral law account for this fact, that Christianity, which they call idolatry, teaches a doctrine that glorifies God and benefits all men; whilst Judaism, which they say is the truth, teaches a doctrine dishonouring to God, oppressive to the Jews, and degrading to all other nations. Some Jews will reply, that Christians are not idolaters; then we ask such persons how they can pretend to profess Judaism, which has asserted the contrary for so many centuries, and also acted upon this principle, prohibiting all intercourse, as much as Moses did in the land of Canaan? Either Christianity is idolatry, or Judaism is false; there is no alternative. Every Jew, therefore, who asserts that Christians are not idolaters, pronounces of Judaism that it is false. Let all such persons then deal honestly, let them renounce what they do not believe; and let them denounce to their brethren what they think it necessary to disavow before Christians. They are bound to do this, not only to renounce the injustice with which the oral law treats Christians, but to take away the cruel and oppressive yoke which bows down their brethren the Jews. If Christianity be not idolatry, then all the laws concerning יין נסך, “wine of libation,” are utterly out of place in this country. Then poor Jews may accept of Christian bounty, and the offices of kindliness and charity may be practised between Jew and Christian. Those Jews therefore who profess to believe that Christians are not idolaters, are bound, by their obligations both to Jews and Christians, to protest against the oral law, and publicly to disavow all belief in it. So long as they do not make such a public disavowal, their professions of love and charity and respect for the religion of Christians must be looked upon as hollow and insincere. So long as they make such professions, contrary to the oral law, and yet frequent the worship of the synagogue, which asserts the divinity of the oral law, they must be regarded either as persons who have motives for professing what they do not feel, or who want moral courage to renounce what they disapprove. These remarks apply particularly to those Israelites who have practically forsaken Judaism, who associate with Christians, eat Gentile food, and drink Gentile wine, and some of whom perhaps even deal in it as an article of merchandize. Such persons, though Israelites by nation, are not Jews by religion, at least according to that sense in which the word Jew has been used both by Israel and Gentile nations for the last two thousand years. Such persons cannot pretend to be professors of the Jewish persuasion. Any one who is in the habit of drinking Gentile wine has practically forsaken Judaism, just as much as if he had assumed the turban and professed himself a Mahometan. It becomes such persons especially to make a stand against the oral law, and to declare publicly what their religion is, and whether they have any fixed principles at all. They cannot be regarded as Christians, for they have not been baptized; they cannot, say that they are Jews, for they have forsaken Judaism; they cannot assert that they have the religion of Moses, for unless that religion be found amongst Christians, it does not exist. There is no body of religionists to be found in this country who profess themselves Mosaists. In the synagogue the oral law is professed; in the Church Christianity is professed; but where is the place of worship frequented by those who have forsaken Judaism without embracing Christianity? Such persons appear in a light that is not at all advantageous to their principles. In private they profess to abhor the intolerance of the oral law, they violate its precepts, and yet on the occasion of the great Jewish fasts and festivals they are to be seen in the synagogue joining in the worship, and observing the rites of the oral law. What then are we to believe concerning such persons? Are they indifferentists, who have no religion at all? or are they secret admirers of the oral law, who, for worldly purposes, deny it when occasion suits, and conform to it when the conscience is uneasy? We are far from pronouncing them either one or the other, but simply propose these questions for their own consideration, remind them of the equivocal light in which they appear, and would give them advice similar to that of Elijah to their forefathers. If the oral law be true religion, profess and practise it. If the oral law be erroneous, superstitious, and uncharitable, renounce it openly and honestly.

No. LV. MOURNING FOR THE DEAD.

Modern Judaism, or the religion of the Jews, as it is professed by the majority of the nation scattered through the world, confessedly consists of two parts. The first is composed of those laws which are מן התורה, _i.e._, which are either really found in the written law, or are supposed to be based upon some passage of it. The second, of those laws which are מדברי הסופרים “of the words of the scribes,” and which are, therefore, mere human institutions. Concerning those that were given by God, we readily grant that they can be changed or abrogated only by God himself. But respecting the latter, both reason and Scripture concur in assuring us, that what human authority has ordained, a similar human authority may also abrogate. We grant that so long as the Jewish polity remained, and the scribes were magistrates, their ordinances, so far as they were not contrary to the Word of God, were binding upon the Jews: but even then those ordinances were not immutable. They might have been repealed by the scribes and magistrates who succeeded them. And even then, whenever they stood in opposition to the Word of God, it was the bounden duty of the Jews to refuse obedience. For what reason, then do the Jews of the present day still pay the same homage to the words of the scribes that they do to the Word of God? The scribes are not now the civil magistrates of the countries where the Jews reside; their words, therefore, carry with them no authority whatever. The Jews are now in different circumstances—are subject to other magistrates and lawgivers. The magisterial sanction, which the words of the scribes had before the dispersion, has long since been lost; but God nowhere commands the Jews in England to obey laws made by the civil magistrates of Palestine two thousand years ago. There is not a shadow of obligation remaining; and therefore the Jews of the present day have a full right to examine into their tendency and effects, and if they should be found injurious or unsuitable to present circumstances, to reject them. If the words of the scribes be not obligatory by virtue of Divine authority, the only imaginable reason for observing them is the supposition that they are conducive to the welfare and happiness of Israel, but if it can be shown that this supposition is false, then both reason and religion would suggest the wisdom of rejecting them. We have already shown of several such laws that they are alike noxious to man and dishonouring to God, and think now to exhibit a similar result with regard to the _laws concerning mourners for the dead_. Of many of these it is confessed that they are not of God, but simply ordinances of the scribes: thus, of the command to mourn seven days, it is acknowledged, that it is not to be found in the law:—

ואין אבלות מן התורה אלא ביום ראשון בלבד שהוא יום המיתה ויום הקבורה אבל שאר השבעה ימים אינו דין תורה ׃

“The only mourning commanded in the law is that on the first day, which is the day of the death and of the burial. But that of the rest of the seven days is not an ordinance of the law.” (Hilchoth Avel., c. i. 1.) And thus with regard to the various things from which the mourner is to abstain during those seven days, it is acknowledged expressly that the command is altogether an ordinance of the scribes:—

אלו הדברים שהאבל אסור בהן ביום הראשון מן התורה ובשאר ימים מדבריהם אסור לספר ולכבס ולרחוץ ולסוך ולשמש מטתו ולנעול את הסנדל ולעשות מלאכה ולקרות בדברי תורה ולזקוף את המטה ולפרוע את ראשו ולשאול שלום הכל ׃

“These are the things which the mourner is prohibited from doing, according to the law, on the first day, but according to the words of the scribes on the remaining days—shaving, washing the clothes, bathing, anointing, duty of marriage, putting on shoes, working, reading in the words of the law, elevating the chair, uncovering the head, asking after the peace of any one.” (Ibid., c. v.) As therefore the rabbies themselves do not pretend that abstinence from these things during those days of mourning is required in the law; and it is further a matter of fact, that this abstinence is not inculcated by the laws of the land, it naturally becomes a question, Why then do the Jews now observe these rites? Are they conducive to the happiness and welfare of Israel? We might doubt respecting several of them, but one is so obviously oppressive to the poor as to be almost beyond controversy; we mean the prohibition to work during the seven days’ mourning. We do not mean to deny, that when death enters a family, it is a providential call to humiliation and serious reflection, and that therefore those who can should withdraw for a while from their every-day occupation, and seek by prayer and penitence to have the affliction turned into a blessing. But to require of those who have not food for themselves or their families to embitter their cup of sorrow by adding the pangs of hunger, is to act the part of an inconsiderate and merciless tyrant, and this is what the oral law does. It says—

כל שלשה ימים הראשונים אסור בעשיית מלאכה , אפילו היה עני המתפרנס מן הצדקה , מכאן ואילך אם היה עני עושה בצנעה בתוך ביתו ׃

“All the first three days it is unlawful to work, even though the man should be so poor as to live on alms. But after that, if he be poor, he may work privately in his own house.” Thus, all those whose business lies out of doors, and who are obliged to wander about in order to get a livelihood, are completely cut off from the possibility of supplying the wants of their family. The law was evidently made under very different circumstances from those in which the Jewish people are now found. It presupposes that every one has got some trade or occupation whereby he can earn his bread at home, but this is not the case at present. A large proportion of the people, in every part of the world, now get a living by frequenting the public resorts of men: to forbid these, then, from going forth to their work, is equivalent to forbidding them to eat during seven days. Why then should Israel be bound by these laws, which even, according to the confession of the rabbies, have no Divine authority, and are now only oppressive to the poor?

But it is not merely of inconsideration for the poor that the oral law is guilty: we have more than once remarked the proud contempt with which it treats the poor and the unlearned, and are sorry to find it even in the laws concerning the last sad offices to humanity:—

עיר שיש בה שני מתים כאחד מוציאין הראשין ואחר כך מוציאין השני , חכם ותלמיד חכם מוציאין החכם , תלמיד חכם ועם הארץ מוציאין תלמיד חכם ׃

“If there be two persons dead in a city at once, he that died first, is first to be carried forth to burial, and then the second. But if one of them be a wise man, and the other the disciple of a wise man, the wise man is to have the precedency. If one be the disciple of a wise man and the other an unlearned one (amhaaretz), the disciple of the wise man is to be carried forth first.” (Joreh Deah, 354.) We do not here object to the practical result, but to the spirit of the law. God has ordained different ranks and grades of society, and wills, therefore, that honour should be given to whom honour is due, and the common course of the world brings men and things to their level. But the doctors of the oral law were determined not to leave their posthumous honour to the natural course of events, but whilst they lived, took the matter into their own hands, and decreed that the honour paid them in life should also be rendered to their poor bodies after death; and that no plebeian or unlearned person should take precedency, even in the last sad memento of human frailty. After death there is but little difference between the learned and the unlearned, and the real difference is made, not by their previous learning or ignorance, but by their moral worth. An unlearned man may be, and often is, far more beloved by man, and far more pleasing in the sight of God, than the most learned, and therefore, when death has destroyed the imaginary distinctions of time, if religion makes any difference between the dead, it surely ought to make it according to that estimate, which is eternal. But the religion of the oral law cannot forget worldly distinction, even in the solemn moment of death, and therefore commands, that as the unlearned man, no matter what his moral worth may have been, has been despised in his life, he should still bear the marks of dishonour even in his death and burial. But the homage which the oral law pays to wealth and mere worldly distinction, is still more apparent in its commands respecting the measure of lamentation to be dealt out to the deceased. It says, on this subject—

בני עשירים כבני חכמים , בני חכמים כבני מלכים לענין שבח מעשיהם ׃

“The sons of the rich are to be regarded as the sons of the wise men; and the sons of the wise men as the sons of kings, with regard to praising their deeds.” (Ibid., 344.) Here there is no concealment. The learned makers of the oral law choose to have their children honoured with the honours of royalty, and show that, however highly they might prize their learning, they had a due estimate of the value of wealth; and that however they might despise the unlearned, their contempt might be moderated, if the object of it was only rich. In the world we are not astonished at the inordinate homage paid to wealth, but when the teachers of religion bow down before the golden idol, and assign to mere wealth an honour which they refuse to the piety and moral worth of the poor, we cannot help doubting the purity of their professed principles, and questioning the truth of their religious system. The main object of religion should be to raise men above the delusive appearances of this present world—to teach men to look beyond the distinctions of rank, and wealth, and learning, to that eternal distinction which the righteous Judge will make according to man’s deeds. And if there be one season more than another where religion ought to disregard the principles and customs of the world, it is with respect to the hour of death and burial. But here the oral law still maintains its love for wealth and worldly distinction, and its haughty contempt for ignorance, poverty, and humbleness of station. If any additional proof is still necessary, it is found in the forms prescribed on the death of slaves:—

העבדים והשפחות אין עומדין עליהן בשורה ואין אומרים עליהן ברכת אבלים ולא תנחומי אבלים אלא כשם שאומרין לאדם אל שורו וחמורו שמת המקום ימלא תסרונך כך אומר על עבדו ושפחתו שמתו ׃

“In the case of male and female slaves, the people are not to stand in a row, nor to say the benediction of the mourners, nor the consolations of the mourners; but, as one says, to a man whose ox or ass is dead, God replace your loss, so one is to say, in the case of a male or female slave who has died.” (Ibid., 377.) Volumes could not so clearly set forth the genius of Judaism, and the spirit of its authors, as this one short law. It exhibits the founders of Judaism, not only as void of all true religious sentiment, but absolutely dead to all the natural feelings of humanity. If mourners of any description require sympathy and respect, surely they are the mourning family of a slave, for, excepting crime, there is not anything that can aggravate the bitterness of death more than slavery. Here religion should pour in its oil and wine, and as it alleviated the miseries of life, diminish from the pangs of death. At such an hour, religion should assert the liberty of the soul, and remind the children of pride, that in the life after death the distinction of master and slave is unknown; that there eternal and spiritual liberty awaits all the children of God, whatever their outward condition here. At such an hour, religion should especially console the survivors with the hope, that there is another and better state of existence, where the slave and the freeman are equally regarded, and dealt with according to one eternal rule of justice. But the religion of the oral law, on the contrary, carries the degradation of slavery even down to the grave, and helps it to survive the period of bondage. It ordains that the usual religious rites should not be observed, and places the slave on the same level with the brute that perisheth. It prescribes no consolation for the slave’s afflicted family, but ordains that his master should receive the same words of comfort, as if he had lost an ox or ass. The death of the slave is looked upon as nothing; it is only for the slave-owner’s loss that the oral law has any consideration. The fact of his having been a human being, an inheritor of God’s image, and an heir of everlasting life, is entirely overlooked by the rabbies. He was a slave, and they think, therefore, that as he was treated like a beast whilst he lived, he may be buried like a beast now that he is dead. If these slaves had been Gentiles, it would not have been surprising that the oral law should treat them with such little ceremony. But we must remember that all such slaves were compelled to become proselytes to Judaism. They were, therefore, co-religionists with their masters; but even this could not procure them the respect due to human beings. Because the providence of God had made them slaves, the oral law endeavoured to turn them into beasts. We are sure that many Jews of the present day will revolt with horror from such a doctrine; and acknowledge that it is a libel upon religion. They will be ready to confess, that the poor slave is a fellow-creature, and an expectant of life eternal; but let such persons stop to consider whence they have derived these sentiments, so much more just, more merciful, and more worthy of religion, than those expressed in the oral law. That they have not derived them from Judaism is clear. May they not, then, be indebted for them to the influence and atmosphere of Christianity in which they live? Certain it is, that the New Testament contains very different principles, respecting the treatment of slaves, from those which we have discovered in the oral law. But, further, would it not be well for those who disapprove these rabbinic principles, to ask themselves why they profess the rabbinic religion? If it be true that a slave is something better than an ox or an ass, Judaism, which classes them altogether, must be false: and the men who made such laws, must be confessed to be very unfit teachers of religion. Nay more, Judaism must be acknowledged as a religion most unfit to promote the happiness of the human race. If Judaism should prevail again, and, as its advocates expect, prevail universally, slavery would also prevail in the same degree: slaves would again be compelled to become proselytes, and again be treated as beasts. Such is the great consummation, the regeneration that Judaism promises the world. We therefore ask every Jewish reader, Whether he can pray for such a state of things, and whether he wishes to be thus enabled to degrade and trample upon his fellow-sinners? If he does not, there must be something wrong in the religious system which he professes—and if he only detects this one error, or acknowledges only this one falsehood respecting the classification of slaves with oxen and asses, it is sufficient to shake the whole rabbinic fabric: and if he has any concern for the honour of the Jewish nation, he will endeavour to deliver them from such a foul imputation upon their mercy and their humanity.

But there is one point more in these laws respecting mourners, which it is necessary to notice. The oral law forbids the mourner, as we have seen above, to read in the words of the law for seven days:—

אבל אסור לקרות בתורה ונביאים וכתובים , ואסור לשנות במשנה תלמוד הלכות ואגדות ׃

“The mourner is forbidden to read in the law, the prophets, and the Hagiographa: it is also forbidden to study in the Mishna, Talmud, Constitutions, and Agadoth.” That a mourner would have no great loss in not being allowed to study in the oral law, we can readily believe; but why should he be prohibited from going to the great fountain of consolation—the revealed Word of God? If there be one season of life more fit than another for studying the Word of God, surely it is when death has entered a family, and reminded all its inmates that the wages of sin is death. If a husband or wife be left to mourn over the bereavement of a beloved partner, what consolation can be equal to that which they find in God’s promise of a world where there is neither sorrow nor death, and where those who meet shall never part again? If children be left to mourn over the removal of their parents, whither should they flee for consolation rather than to that Word which tells them of him who is the father of the fatherless? Every reasonable person will think also that, when the heart is softened by the paternal chastisement, then is a peculiarly appropriate season for learning his precepts and taking heed to his exhortations—and yet the oral law, with a sort of most perverse ingenuity, has just selected that period of human life, in which the consolations of God’s Word are most necessary and its instruction likely to be of most use, to forbid the reading of it altogether. And here, the rabbies have not scrupled to set aside the plain command of God. God says of his law, “Thou shalt meditate therein day and night and makes no exception for the seven days of mourning for the dead.” In describing the character of the righteous he says, “His delight is in the law of the Lord, and in his law doth he meditate day and night and pronounces a blessing upon such a character.” But the rabbies, in contempt both of the command and of the promised blessing, forbid the already afflicted mourner to obey the command and to seek the blessing. Even when the scribes and rabbies were in the plenitude of their power as civil magistrates in the land of Israel, obedience to such a command would have been unlawful, as implying disobedience to the command of God. The law of God and the law of man are here plainly in collision; the former commanding Israel to study in his law day and night; the latter prohibiting all study for the seven days of the mourning; but whenever these two authorities are opposed, no rational being can doubt that it is Israel’s duty to obey God rather than man. But, in the present day, when the oral law is not the law of the land, when, therefore, the ordinances of the scribes have no authority whatever, it is impossible to conceive why Israel should obey this prohibition, unless they wish, by some public act, to exhibit their determination to transgress the laws or God. Every one who abstains from the study of God’s Word for seven days, plainly disobeys the Divine command as given by Moses and the prophets; how then can the Jews of the present day deceive themselves by supposing that they have the religion of Moses? The main difference between Heathenism and the religion of Moses is, that the latter gives a revelation of God’s will to guide us in difficulty and to comfort us in affliction. The main difference between a Heathen and a Jewish mourner ought to be, that the Jew flees for consolation to God and his Word, whilst the Heathen indulges in sorrow as those that have no hope. The oral law, however, breaks down with this distinction, and reduces the Jew to the level of the Heathen, by robbing him in his hour of need of God’s promises, and commanding him to abstain for seven days from all study of God’s Word. These laws respecting mourning, then, as being oppressive to the poor, insulting to the unlearned, degrading to humanity, and contrary to the express precepts of the Divine law, have no intrinsic merit to commend them to Israel, and no claim upon their obedience.

No. LVI. DISPENSATION FROM AN OATH.

A religion which is plainly contrary to any of the Divine attributes, must necessarily be false. For instance, God is a holy God: a religion, therefore, which would promote unholiness could not have the Holy One of Israel for its author. God is also a merciful and a just God: a religion, therefore, which is characterized by cruelty or injustice, cannot proceed from him; and for this reason, amongst others, we believe that the religion of the oral law cannot be that true religion which God gave to Moses and the prophets. The oral law is most unjust in its laws respecting Gentiles, slaves, and unlearned men, and most unmerciful in very many of its enactments. But if there be one attribute more than another, which is distinctive of the true God, it is truth. In the prophecies of Jeremiah, He is even identified with truth, as it is said:—

וה׳ אלהים אמת ׃

“The Lord God is Truth.” (Jer. x. 10.) And in that prediction, which he put into the mouth of Balaam, he says, that it is by this attribute that he is distinguished from the sons of men. “God is not a man that he should lie; neither the son of man that he should repent: hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?” (Numbers xxiii. 19.) Men may be wicked enough to promise what they do not intend to perform, or after promising, may change their mind, and refuse to fulfil their engagements; but God is too holy to deceive wilfully, or to alter what has proceeded out of his mouth. A religion, therefore, which in any wise tends to lessen our reverence for truth, or encourages men to alter a solemn engagement, or, what is still worse, teaches how to absolve from oaths, cannot proceed from the God of truth; and this is what the oral law does in certain cases. We do not mean to accuse it of teaching, as the religion of Rome does, that dispensation may be had from every kind of oath. On the contrary, the rabbies assume the power of dispensation only in the case of שבועות בטוי, “rash oaths;” but we mean to assert, that even that assumption is contrary to the Word of God, and injurious to the cause of truth; and, therefore, sufficient to overthrow the credit of the oral law as a religion given by God. The doctrine itself is as follows:—

מי שנשבע שבועת בטוי ונחם על שבועתו וראה שהוא מצטער אם קיים שבועה זו ונהפכה דעתו לדעת אחרת , או שנולד לו דבר שלא היה בדעתו בשעת השבועה וניחם בגללו הרי זה נשאל להכם אחד או לשלשה הדיוטות במקים שאי שם חכם ומתירין לו שבועתו , ויהיה מותר לעשות דבר שנשבע שלא לעשותו או שלא לעשות דבר שנשבע לעשותו וזה הוא הנקרא היתר שבועות , ודבר זה אין לו עיקר כלל בתורה שבכתב , אלא כך למדו ממשה רבינו מפי הקבלה שזה הכתוב לא יחל דברו שלא יחלל הוא בעצמו דרך קלות ראש בשאט נפש כענין שנאמר וחללת את שם אלהיך אבל אם נחם וחזר בו חכם מתיר לו ׃

“If any man swear a rash oath, and afterwards repent of it, because he sees that if he keep this oath it will cause him grief, and therefore changes his mind; or if something should occur to him which was not in his mind at the time when he swore, and he repent on that account; behold, a person, in such circumstances, is to ask one wise man (rabbi), or three common men in any place where there is not a wise man, and they absolve him from his oath; and then it will be lawful to do a thing which he had sworn not to do, or to leave undone a thing which he had sworn to do: and this is what is called absolution from oaths. _This matter has no foundation whatever in the written law_, but it has been learned from Moses, our master, by oral tradition, that the Scripture, ‘He shall not profane his word,’ (Numbers xxx. 3, in the English Bible 2,) means, that a man shall not himself profane his word in a way of levity and with a contemptuous mind, according as it is written, ‘Neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God’ (Levit. xix. 12); but if a man repent and change his mind, a wise man is to absolve him.” (Hilchoth Sh’vuoth, c. vi. 1, 2.) Here it is plainly taught, that if a man has reason to fear any personal inconvenience, or even if he changes his mind, he may escape from the most solemn obligation that can be laid upon the consciences of men; and that, after appealing to God in confirmation of his declaration to do or to leave undone some particular action, one or more of his fellow-sinners can remit his duty to his Creator, and give him a license to do the very contrary of that which he had promised before and unto God, that he would do. Now let every Israelite reader first consult his own reason, and reflect whether this doctrine is agreeable to the character of God, as set forth in the Scripture. The God of the Bible is a God of eternal and immutable truth. One of his peculiar characteristics, that he keepeth covenant and mercy. A man, therefore, who breaks his word, and still more so, a man who breaks an oath, is unlike God. Is it probable, then, that God would give a religion with a special provision for making men unlike himself? Again, God is a God of knowledge, and therefore knows that the children of men are in a great degree the children of habit; he knows also that by habit the evil propensities are strengthened, and that there is in men a strong propensity to shrink from their word, if it cause any trouble or damage: is it likely, then, that God would give a law directly tending to strengthen that evil propensity by forming a habit of breaking one’s word, even under the solemn circumstances of an oath? Reason decides that such a law cannot proceed from the God of Israel. Has it then any support in the written Word of God? It would be strange, indeed, if the Word of God should contain anything contrary to reason. As revealing the nature of Him who is incomprehensible, it may contain things above our reason: but that in giving laws for man it should give him license to do what his reason tells him is directly opposed to the character of God, is altogether incredible. The rabbies, themselves, however, do not endeavour to justify the doctrine by a reference to Scripture. They say in plain terms, “_This matter has no foundation whatever in the written law_,” and thus acknowledge that it is altogether a matter of tradition, the argument against it, therefore, becomes doubly strong. Every one knows, that a story loses nothing by passing through many mouths, but that in the course of its progress it gets so many additions, and undergoes so many changes as at last to be scarcely recognisable. This circumstance makes all oral tradition uncertain and unsatisfactory, but is particularly suspicious when it appears, not only opposed to the Scripture character of God, but also favourable to the evil propensities of man. If it had exacted a more scrupulous regard to truth and a willing submission to hardship and inconvenience for the sake of truth, then, as opposing the principles of self-interest, it would have been less suspicious; but when it actually tells men that to do what may save them from worldly trouble or personal disadvantage is a Divine institution, one cannot help suspecting that it is an invention of men, who found it convenient occasionally to escape from the obligation of an oath. But after all, the great arbiter must be the written Word of God. The rabbies say, That it has been learned from Moses by oral tradition, that the words, “He shall not profane his word,” mean that a man shall not himself profane his word in a way of levity, but that he shall go to a wise man and get absolution; let us then read the whole verse from which those words are taken:—

איש כי ידור נדר לה׳ או השבע שבועה לאסר אסר על נפשו לא יחל דברו ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה ׃

“If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word, he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.” Now let any man of common sense and honesty say, whether if it had been God’s intention to forbid all absolution from oaths, He could have employed words more to the purpose than these; or whether the plain simple grammatical meaning is not directly opposed to the rabbinic doctrine? God says, If a man swear, he shall not profane his word. The rabbies say, he may profane his word. To prevent all mistake, God further adds, “He shall do according to all that proceeds out of his mouth.” The rabbies say, he need not do what proceeds out of his mouth; and yet they have the face to tell us, that their doctrine is from Moses, and is the traditional interpretation of words which signify the very reverse of what they say. It is only wonderful that they should have referred to this verse at all, and the fact can only be accounted for by the supposition that this verse was too plain to be got over, and therefore they thought it best to take the bull by the horns, by selecting this very verse as the basis of their interpretation. That this verse in its grammatical construction is directly opposed to the oral law no one can doubt, for it forbids what the rabbies allow, and commands what the rabbies forbid. But the opposition is not found in this verse only. The other verse to which the rabbies also allude is equally plain against it. The words, “Ye shall not swear by my name falsely, neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God. I am the LORD,” plainly forbid that absolution from oaths which the rabbies teach not only as lawful, but as of Divine authority. We know that the rabbies make a distinction between שבועת שקר a false oath and a שבועת בטוי rash oath; but the distinction, as made by them is unfounded. A rash oath, according to their doctrine, is an oath concerning something which it is possible and lawful for a man to do or to leave undone; for as soon as it interferes with the fulfilment of a Divine command, it belongs to that class of oaths which they call שבועות שוא vain oaths. If, therefore, a man swears to do what is both lawful and possible for him to do, and afterwards draws back and does it not, what man in his senses can doubt, that that individual, no matter what the pretext for not keeping the oath, is guilty of having sworn falsely? What is it to swear falsely, if voluntarily to refuse to do what a man had previously sworn to do, constitute not that sin? A sinful falsehood is a wilful departure from truth; here there is that wilful departure: who, then, will dare to affirm, that such conduct is not contrary to the express command of God? Rabbinists sometimes say, that though the oral law sometimes commands more than is commanded in the Scriptures, it never allows what God has forbidden; but here we have a plain example of the contrary. Here the oral law allows false swearing, which God has positively forbidden. The doctrine of absolution from oaths teaches men to transgress three מטות לא תעשה negative precepts. The man who swears to do anything and then does it not, because he has got absolution, violates, first, the negative precept, “He shall not profane his word;” he violates, secondly, the negative precept, “Ye shall not swear by my name falsely;” and, lastly, he violates a negative precept more important than either of the others; and that is, “Neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God.” Any man, pretending to religion, who should act upon these principles, first swear and then obtain absolution from his oath, would expose his religion to the contempt and indignation of all honest men, and thereby do all that in him lies to profane the name of his God. Let, then, every Israelite who thinks that the negative precepts are more important than the affirmative, remember, that in this one instance the oral law teaches him to violate three such precepts; and let him reflect further, that the upholding such a law as this is to profane the name of the God of Israel before those who are ignorant of the Scripture.

But the rabbinical doctrine does not stop at prospective absolution, it goes so far as to absolve from the guilt of perjury actually committed:—

מי שנשבע שבועת בטוי להבא ושקר בשבועתו , כגון שנשבע שלא יאכל פת זו ואכלה , ואחר שאכלה קודם שיביא קרבנו אם היה שוגג , או קודם שילקה אם היה מזיד , נחם ונשאל לחכם והתירה לו הרי זה פטור מן הקרבן או מן המלקות , ולא עוד אלא אפילו כפתוהו ללקות ונשאל והתירו לו קודם שיתחילו להלקותו הרי זה פגור ׃

“If a man swear a rash oath concerning the future, but lies in that which he has sworn, as, if he should swear not to eat this bread, and afterwards should eat it; and if, after he has eaten it, before he brings his sacrifice, in case he did it ignorantly, or before he is flogged, in case he did it presumptuously—he repent and ask a wise man, and he absolve him, behold such an one is exempt from the sacrifice or from the flogging: and not only so, but if they had actually bound him in order to flog him, and he ask a wise man, and he absolve him before the flogging has commenced, he is exempt.” (Ibid. 18.) In this rabbinic decision there are two cases, and both contrary to the Word of God. First, we have the case of the man who has broken his oath ignorantly, and respecting whom God has decided in the following words: “If a soul swear, pronouncing with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever it be that a man shall pronounce with an oath, and it be hid from him; when he knoweth of it, then he shall be guilty in one of these. And it shall be, when he shall be guilty in one of these things, that he shall confess that he hath sinned in that thing: and he shall bring his trespass-offering unto the Lord for his sin which he hath sinned,” &c. (Levit. v. 4, &c.) Here God positively commands, first, that he should confess his sin, and secondly, that he should bring a sacrifice in order to obtain forgiveness; and, by the above law, the rabbies as positively declare that obedience to these commands is superfluous. A man need only say that he has changed his mind, and get a rabbi to absolve him, and then he can set the Word of God at defiance, he need neither confess his sin, nor bring the sacrifice. How can the men who profess such a religion pretend to have any regard for the law of Moses, or how can they with any consistency reproach Christians with the non-observance of the ceremonial precepts, when they themselves profess religious principles which unceremoniously subvert such plain commands? The second case is, however, far more flagrant. It supposes a man to have sworn that he would not do a certain thing, but afterwards wilfully to have done it—that is, it supposes a man to have been guilty of wilful perjury, and yet declares that he may be delivered both from the guilt and the punishment, by going to a rabbi and getting absolution. This oral law, which would flog a poor starving creature for eating Gentile food, or meat and milk together, devises an expedient for delivering him who is guilty of the grave crime of perjury—that is, though cruel to the poor, it is merciful to the criminal. If this be not to violate the laws of God with a high hand, then we know not what sin is. Here both classes of the precepts, negative and affirmative, are treated with the same contempt; both equally trampled under foot. The guilty are absolved, not only from doing what God commands, but from the penalty of actual transgression. The rabbies presume not only to absolve a man from doing what he has sworn to do, but also to turn perjury actually committed into innocence. They have assumed the high prerogative of God, have abrogated his laws, and taught the guilty to set his threatenings at defiance. We verily believe that the mass of the Jewish people have been ignorant of this gross contempt for the Mosaic law, or they could never have continued so long in such a system, nor so long have suffered the name of God to be profaned by the attempt to pass off such a religion as proceeding from Him. Now, then, we call on every reader of this paper to decide whether the oral law can really be from God? Has this doctrine of absolution from oaths anything resembling the character of the Divine Being as a God of truth? Is it possible that God should give an oral law directly subversive of that which he has given in writing; or will any one dare to say that the Almighty, when he wished to give a law permitting absolution from oaths, knew so little of the Hebrew language as to enunciate it in words which directly forbid it? Let no one misunderstand us, as if we applied the passages quoted from the oral law generally to the case of all oaths, or as if we attributed this doctrine of the oral law to all Israel. We do neither the one nor the other; in a future number we hope to consider the case of an oath between man and man, and at present our only intention is to show that the oral law is dishonouring to God, subversive of the commands given by Moses, and injurious to the best interests of the Jewish people; nay, that it is actually a libel on the children of Abraham; and that, therefore, if they have any love to God, any reverence for Moses, and any respect for themselves and their brethren, they are bound publicly to renounce the principles which it inculcates, and by which they have been deluded for so many centuries. It is possible to do one of two things—either to approve the doctrine of absolution from oaths, or to disapprove of it. Those who approve of it will, of course, endeavour to uphold it, and will thereby continue the profanation of God’s name; and, so far as they can, stamp dishonour upon the religion of Israel. Those, who disapprove the idea of a rabbi’s absolving from a solemn oath, and think that oaths are not to be tampered with, are bound not only to protest against this particular abuse, but to reject the whole oral law. The rabbies declare that this doctrine is not an ordinance of the scribes, but an oral tradition from Moses; if then it be false, the rabbies are again convicted of passing off an invention of their own as an ordinance of God, and are therefore wholly unworthy of credit. The oral law depends altogether upon the validity of the testimony, and if the witnesses can be proved, in any one instance, to have spoken falsehood, the credit of the whole is destroyed. Now this is eminently the case, for not only have they said what is false, but have endeavoured to establish a principle subversive of all reverence for truth. It would be difficult for any man, who was known as one in the habit of getting dispensation from oaths, to find belief or credit in the world, and he would scarcely be admitted as a valid witness in a court of justice; but the man who propounds dispensation from oaths as a religious doctrine, and teaches it systematically as agreeable to the will of God, is a more suspicious person still, and such are the authors of the oral law. The former might be regarded as a deluded person, who only broke his oaths when he got dispensation, but the latter would be considered an artful underminer of principle, and a wilful despiser of truth; his testimony would, therefore, have no weight. Now, it is upon the testimony of such persons that the authority of the oral law entirely depends. It is confessed, that until the Mishna and Gemara were compiled, there was no written record of its contents, but that it was propagated from mouth to mouth. If, therefore, it appear that those who transmitted it were men whose love for truth was equivocal, we cannot be sure that they did not transmit a forgery. The doctrine, which we have just considered, shows that they did not love truth, and that they have actually libelled the memory of Moses, the servant of God, by asserting that he taught them how to get absolution from oaths. It is for the Jews to consider whether they will still be deluded by such incompetent witnesses, and still, even silently, uphold a doctrine so dishonouring to their religion.

No. LVII. DOCTRINE OF OATHS, CONTINUED.

Every one naturally thinks that his own religion is the true one. The Mussulman thinks thus of Mahometanism, the Christian of Christianity, and the Jew of Judaism, and yet it is plain that they cannot all be right—two out of the three must necessarily be in error. What then is to be done? Are they all to go on in listless and lazy indifference, and leave it to another world to find out whether or not they have been in the right, or are we to lay it down as a maxim that every one is to continue in that religion in which he was born, whether right or wrong, and that therefore the Turk is to remain a Mahometan, and the Hindoo an idolater, to his life’s end? There are very many in the world who seem to think so, and who adhere to a religion simply because it was the religion of their forefathers. Now we grant that no man should carelessly or lightly abandon the religion of his childhood, and have no scruple in saying that he who changes his religion as he would his clothes must be a fool, or something worse. But we must say, at the same time, that he who retains his religion, merely as a matter of prejudice or interest, is not a great deal better, and can hardly be considered as a rational being. Every being, whom the Creator has endowed with reason, ought to have a religion and to know why he prefers it to all others. But perhaps some reader will say, I have a religion—I am a Jew, and I prefer this religion to all others, because God himself gave it to Moses on Mount Sinai. To this we reply, But how do you know that you have got the religion of Moses? If you really had Moses’ religion you could not be wrong, but how can you prove that the religion which you now profess is really that true religion? Your fathers in the times of old often forsook Moses and the Prophets, and taught their children a false religion, how, then, can you be sure that this is not the case with what you have got at present? Certainty can be had only by examination and comparison. The Judaism of the present day must be compared with the Law and the Prophets. If it agrees with them, then the Jews have reason to believe that they are in the right; but if not, then they must be in the wrong. Our own firm conviction is, that modern Judaism is altogether spurious, and plainly opposed to that religion which God gave to your fathers. The doctrine of dispensation from oaths is sufficient to prove this, as was shown in the last number. But we have more objections still to make against that doctrine, and all confirmatory of the conclusion to which we have come. We saw in our last, that if a man swear an oath to himself only, where others are not concerned, he can have absolution, but we now come to consider the case of an oath, made to another person, respecting which the oral law teaches us as follows:—

ראובן שהשביע לשמעון וענה אמן או קבל השבועה ונחם שמעון על שבועתו ונשאל עליה אין מתירן לו אלא בפני ראובן שהשביעו , וכן אם נשבע ראובן או נדר שלא יהנה בשמעון או שלא יהנה בו שמעון ונחם ונשאל לחכם אין מתירין לו אלא בפני שמעון שנדר ממנו הנאה ואפילו היה שידע הנידר שהתיר זה נדרו או שבועתו ולפיכך יהנה ממנו או יהנה לו ׃

“If Reuben should adjure Simeon, and he answer Amen, or accept the oath; and afterwards Simeon should repent of his oath, and ask concerning it, he is not to be absolved except in the presence of Reuben who adjured him. In like manner, if Reuben should swear an oath not to receive any profit from Simeon, or that Simeon should receive no profit from him, and afterwards should repent and ask a wise man, he is not to be absolved except in the presence of Simeon, concerning whose profit he had vowed: yea, even though Simeon were an infant or a Gentile, he is not to be absolved except in his presence, in order that he, with respect to whom the vow was made, may know that the other has got absolution from his oath or vow, and that therefore he may receive from or confer profit upon him.” (Hilchoth Sh’vuoth, c. vi. 7.) Now in considering this doctrine, we must not withhold that measure of approbation which is due to the rabbies. There is here a certain degree of honesty and plain dealing. The rabbies have determined that where one man swears to another, he is not to be absolved, except in the presence of that other, and are in so far vastly superior in morality to those who hold and teach, not only that all oaths may be absolved, but that they may be absolved secretly, so that he who is most affected by the dispensation, knows nothing about it. Bad as the oral law is, it does not descend to such a depth of hypocrisy and profaneness. Another trait which deserves notice is, that it does not teach that no faith is to be kept towards those who have got another religion, but expressly determines, that if a Jew swear to a Gentile, he is not to be absolved without that Gentile’s knowledge. We readily admit that this is greatly superior to a doctrine of dispensation, taught and practised by some who call themselves Christians; but, having made this admission, and given the rabbies their due, We must also say, that the doctrine of absolution here taught is plainly contrary to reason and Scripture, and if extensively practised, would destroy all confidential intercourse or dealings between man and man. Just suppose that the law of this country was, that any one who had entered into a solemn engagement with another, could be enabled to break it, simply, by calling up the person to whom he had mode the promise before a magistrate, and by declaring, in his presence, that he repented of what he had done, who would ever trust another, or value even an oath? Not only would the commercial transactions of the country be at an end, but the very bonds of society would be rent asunder. The existence of human society depends upon that measure of confidence which a man can place in his brother, but if the rabbinical doctrine prevailed and were acted upon, there could be no confidence more. A man’s oath would be good for nothing, and if so, the value of his word still less. But, besides this, the doctrine that a rabbi may absolve Simeon from his sworn obligation to Reuben, is absurd. If Simeon swear to Reuben a lawful oath, no one on earth but Reuben can release him; but here we are told that a rabbi, who has nothing at all to do with the matter, may remit the obligation. He might, with as much reason and with less profanity, undertake to absolve Simeon from his pecuniary debts. That the dispensation must take place in the presence of the party to whom Simeon swore, is but poor satisfaction, and would not remove the inconvenience, nor diminish the guilt. Suppose, for instance, that Simeon should promise Reuben with an oath, that within a given time he would complete certain business, or lend him a certain sum of money, or anything else of the kind, and that Reuben should arrange his affairs in dependence upon this oath, what satisfaction would it be to Reuben to be present at the absolution! It would not remove the inconvenience nor indemnify him for the loss to which the non-fulfilment of the oath exposed him, nor abate the vexation and sorrow which he must feel to see a teacher of religion trampling upon the most solemn sanction with which religion guards the intercourse between man and man. For, after all, the main objection to the doctrine is, that it allows what God forbids, as we showed in the last number, and under the pretence of religion, makes perjury systematic.

But to estimate this doctrine fully, and also the character of the men with whom it originated, we must look at the original passage in the Talmud, on which the above-cited decision is founded:—

המודר הנאה מחברו אין מתירין לו אלא בפניו מנהני מילי אמר רב נחמן דכתיב ויאמר ה׳ אל משה במדין לך שוב מצרימה כי מתו כל האנשים אמר לו במדין נדרת לך והתר נדרך במדין דכתיב ויואל משה אין אלה אלא שבועה דכתיב ויבא אותו באלה וגם במלך נבוכדנצר מרד אשר השביעו באלהים חיים מאי מרדותים אשכחיה צדקיהו לנבוכדנצר דהוה קאכיל ארנבת חייא אמר ליה אישתבע לי דלא מגלית עלוי ולא תיפוק מילתא אישתבע ליה לסוף הוה קא מצטער צדקיהו בגופיה איתשיל אשבועתיה ואמר שמע נבוכדנצר דקא מבזין ליה שלח ואייתי סנהדרין וצדקיהו אמר להון חזיתין מאי קא עביד צדקיהו לאו הכי אישתבע בשמא דשמיא דלא מגלינא אמר ליה איתשלי אשבעתיה [ אמר ליה מתשלין אשבועתא ] אמרי ליה אין אמר להו בפניו או שלא בפניו אמרי בפניו וכו׳ ׃

“He that has a vow upon him, with respect to profit from his neighbour, is not to be absolved, except in that neighbour’s presence. How is this proved? Rav Nachman says, it is proved by the words, ‘And the Lord said unto Moses, in Midian, Go return into Egypt; for all the men are dead which sought thy life;’ he said to him, In Midian thou hast vowed, go and get absolution from thy vow in Midian, for it is written, וַיּוֹאֶל משֶׁה , ‘And Moses was content.’ (Exodus ii. 21.) Now this word means nothing else but swearing, as it is written, ‘And he took an oath of him.’ (Ezek. xvii. 13.) It is farther proved by the words, ‘And he also rebelled against King Nebuchadnezzar, who had made him swear by God.’ (2 Chron. xxxvi. 13.) What was the nature of his rebellion? Zedekiah found Nebuchadnezzar eating a live hare, whereupon Nebuchadnezzar said to him, swear to me not to reveal this, nor to report the matter. Zedekiah swore, but afterwards he was grieved, and went and got his oath absolved and told. Nebuchadnezzar heard that they despised him, and sent and fetched the Sanhedrin and Zedekiah, and said to them, Ye see what Zedekiah has done, although he swore by the name of God not to reveal the matter. They said to him, He got a dispensation from his oath. He said, Is it lawful, then, to get dispensation from an oath? They said, Yes. He said again, Is this to be done in the other’s presence or absence? They say, In his presence,” &c. (Nedarim, fol. lxv. 1.) Now this passage not only illustrates the doctrine of dispensation, but throws much light upon the character and knowledge of the men from whom the tradition is derived. In the first place, it shows a strange confusion of mind to derive וַיּוֹאֶל, “he was willing,” from אלה, “he sware;” but it is stranger still out of this mistranslation, to invent a story of Moses having sworn and got absolution; but the most strange of all is, that any one should be found who can believe this a sufficient warrant for the doctrine of dispensation from an oath made to a fellow-creature. If even it were true, as the rabbies say, that Moses had sworn to Jethro not to return into Egypt, still this is not a case in point; for Moses did not get absolution from any third person, but received express permission from Jethro himself to return, as we find in the chapter referred to, where it is said, “And Moses went and returned to Jethro, his father-in-law, and said unto him, Let me go, I pray thee, and return unto my brethren which are in Egypt, and see whether they be yet alive. And Jethro said to Moses, Go in peace.” (Exod. iv. 18.) If there was any oath, we see that it was dispensed with, not by a wise man, nor by any third person or persons, but by him to whom the oath was made. This passage is, therefore, decidedly against the rabbinic doctrine, and therefore the rabbinic doctrine cannot be true. The second case cited by the Talmud is still stronger, as a testimony, both against the system and the men. It tells us that Zedekiah swore to Nebuchadnezzar not to betray him in a certain matter, which no law, either of God or man, compelled him to divulge—that he swore by the name of the God of Israel, and yet that, after this most solemn transaction, he did what he had sworn not to do. He betrayed a man from whom he had received kindness, and equally disregarded the obligations of gratitude and the sacred ties of an oath—in short, that he committed perjury. This is in itself bad enough; but the Talmud proceeds further to tell us, that this was not his own individual act, but the solemn decision of the Supreme Council of the Sanhedrin. Zedekiah did not perjure himself without having advice. He went to the Sanhedrin, and they absolved him from the obligation of the oath, and that contrary to their own maxim, that an oath sworn to a neighbour cannot be absorbed, except in his presence. Here, then, the Talmud plainly confesses that the Sanhedrin did wrong, in fact, that they were aiders and abettors in Zedekiah’s perjury; that, therefore, they were men who had no regard to truth, and no fear of God; and, consequently, that no man of any common sense would believe a single word that came out of their mouths. What, then, becomes of the whole fabric of Jewish tradition? It depends altogether upon the unimpeachable character of the various Sanhedrins through whose hands it passed. If, therefore, we should, find that any one Sanhedrin consisted of notorious liars, the genuineness of the oral law is at an end. But here the Talmud itself tells us that even before the deportation of Zedekiah, the Sanhedrin consisted, not of common liars, but of false swearers, of men who had so little regard for the name of the Lord, as to absolve a solemn oath of which that name was the safeguard. If they had done this in accordance with their traditions, there would be some appearance of consistency, but they did it in the face of the tradition, which says, that when an oath is sworn to another person absolution cannot be given except in his presence. When Zedekiah demanded absolution, they should have refused, and told him that it was contrary to the oral law; but, whether from fear or from self-interest, they acceded to the king’s wish, and helped hint to commit perjury: and these are the men who have handed down the oral law; what trust, then, can be placed in their word, when they disregard an oath? The story is either true or false. If true, then all the members of the Sanhedrin were guilty of perjury,—if false, then the Talmud has handed down a falsehood as truth, and in neither case is it worthy of credit. Surely it is time for the chosen people of God to use the reason which God has given, and to examine the grounds upon which they profess Judaism. The ignorant and the thoughtless may retain their profession as a mere matter of prejudice, but it would be very strange if any, who think religion worth a thought, should still adhere to a system for which there is not only no evidence, but against which there is evidence so satisfactory. According to the Talmud itself, and on its own showing, the persons whose office it was to guard the traditions in the days of Zedekiah were men who transgressed those traditions, and made themselves guilty of perjury; what warrant, then, have the Jews for believing that those men did not change the traditions, and hand down mere inventions of their own? What was there to restrain them from such conduct, if they could free themselves from the obligation of an oath by the name of the God of Israel?

But as the men who handed down the traditions are described by their own successors as wicked and ungodly persons, so the traditions which they have handed down are of the same character, and, as we have said, if generally acted upon, would rend asunder all the ties of human society, and beget universal distrust and suspicion. The oral law plainly and unequivocally allows a man to swear to his neighbour that he will do or leave undone something that his neighbour requires, and then to get absolution from that oath and do the contrary. It is true that it requires this to be done in the presence of the other person, but that does not much alter the matter. Whether Zedekiah divulged what he had sworn to Nebuchadnezzar to keep secret, in his presence or behind his back, is a thing of very little consequence; the oath is just as much and as really broken, and the results might be just as pernicious and injurious. Take, for example, the case of a manufacturer who communicates to his servant some important secret in his trade, and for his own security binds him by an oath not to divulge it. In a little time, the servant, for some reason or other, finds it convenient or profitable to make this secret known, and goes to a wise man, summons the manufacturer to be present, gets absolution, and then divulges what he had sworn to keep secret,—where is the difference as to all practical purposes, or as to the actual guilt of perjury? But again, suppose that the wise man was to act as the Sanhedrin did, and absolve the man without summoning the person to whom he swore, it is a question whether the servant would then he bound. Zedekiah evidently thought not. All he was concerned about was to have absolution, and if there was any sin in giving it, he evidently thought that the onus rested upon those who gave, and not upon him who received it. According to the oral law, the Sanhedrin was wrong in giving absolution under the circumstances: but, according to the same oral law, Zedekiah was right in obeying their decision. Implicit and universal obedience to the words of the Sanhedrin and wise men is required by the Talmud; and, therefore, if a wise man give absolution, even though he give it unlawfully, it is still the duty of him who is absolved to obey his decision, and act upon it. A Rabbinist is not allowed to reason; but as we have seen on a former occasion, to believe that his right hand is his left, and _vice versa_, if the rabbies say so—and, consequently, if a wise man absolve him, he is not to trouble either his conscience or his reason as to the right or the wrong; his duty is not to dispute, but to receive the determination as the words of the living God. The provision, therefore, that if Simeon swear to Reuben he is not to be absolved, except in Reuben’s presence, affords but little protection. If it was possible for the Sanhedrin, a body consisting of seventy-one persons, to disregard it, it is surely possible that any other wise man might disregard it also, and absolve Simeon, even in Reuben’s absence. Now the bare possibility of such occurrences would make all promises, whether sanctioned by oaths or not, of no value, and have the most pernicious effect as to the practice of speaking truth. Men might reason from the greater to the less, and say, If it be lawful, by means of absolution, to break an oath, קל וחומר, _à fortiori_, it is lawful to break one’s word without absolution; and, at all events, those to whom the promise was given would be likely to reason thus, and say, If we cannot depend upon this man’s oath, much less can we place confidence in his word. But what is worse still, such a doctrine is calculated to make men despise all religion, and to render them a prey to infidelity. The thoughtless and the rash are very likely to say, If this be religion, better far to be without it; or, to conclude that as such doctrine cannot possibly be the offspring of the Divine mind, all revealed religion is a mere imposture. In every case it is a reproach to the good sense and piety of Israel to profess such a doctrine; or, if they do not believe it, to remain silent, and suffer mankind to suppose that this is the religion of the children of Abraham. So long as they profess that the oral law is the source of their religion, so long are they responsible for the doctrines which it teaches; and so long as they abstain from a public renunciation of the oral law, they must be considered as believers in its authority. It will not do to renounce one particular doctrine, whilst they profess faith in the general system. The body of traditions is a whole which cannot be parted. They have all come down, resting on the same evidence; if, therefore, the evidence be invalid in any one case, it is invalid in all; and if any one admits its validity in some cases, he cannot, if a reasonable man, deny it in others. He may dispute about the conflicting opinions of the rabbies, but if he admit any one of those doctrines which are called traditions from Sinai, he must admit them all, and, consequently, this which professes to be one of them. It remains, therefore, for the Israelites of the present day to choose, whether they will still retain the system of the oral law, and thereby sanction the dispensation from oaths, or whether they will repudiate this doctrine, and thereby renounce the whole oral law.

No. LVIII. MERITORIOUSNESS OF CIRCUMCISION.

Wherever there is an internal principle of religion, it will, like all other principles, manifest itself in external acts, and in an external form of rites and ceremonies. It is just as impossible for a living man to continue without giving any signs of life, as for the religious principle to exist without an outward expression. It is the universal law of creation that every vital principle should manifest itself and therefore, when the Creator himself was pleased to give a religion, he ordained certain rites and ceremonies to give notice of its existence, and to serve as the body in which the soul should reside. Rites and ceremonies, therefore, are not to be despised, even when devised by man, for they are demonstrations of an internal life from which they proceed; but when instituted by God, they are doubly important, because besides being a sign, they have all the authority of a Divine command. False religion, however, is not satisfied with this acknowledgment, nor this measure of reverence. It goes still further, and elevates the external sign above the thing signified, by making the external rites the great essentials of religion. Thus, in the time of the Prophet Isaiah, the Israelites thought that the act of sacrifice, and the external observation of the Sabbath and holidays, formed the substance of religion, and therefore God told them, that even these things, though ordained by himself, were not pleasing in his sight, unless they proceeded from the living principle within. “Bring no more vain oblations: incense is an abomination unto me; the new moons and Sabbaths, the calling of assemblies, I cannot away with; it is iniquity, even the solemn meeting.” (Isaiah i. 13.) And again in a subsequent chapter he says, “They seek me daily, and delight to know my ways, as a nation that did righteousness and forsook not the ordinances of their God: they ask of me the ordinances of justice; they take delight in approaching to God.” (lviii. 2.) And yet at the same time he shows that this was all mere outside work, and displeasing in his sight. Wherever, therefore, we find a religion, which places external observances above the moral duties, we may be sure it is not of God; and for this reason, amongst others, we believe that the oral law is the invention of men. We had an instance in the subject last considered, the dispensation from oaths. The rabbies disregard the moral obligation, but make the mere form of going to a rabbi to get absolution an essential requisite. Another proof is furnished by their doctrine concerning _The meritoriousness of Circumcision_, which is set forth as follows:—

מצות עשה לכל אדם מישראל שימול את בנו וגדולה היא משאר מצוות עשה שיש בה צד כרת , וגם נכרתו עליה שלש עשרה בריתות בפרשת מילה , ולא נקרא אברהם שלם עד שנימול ובזכותה נכרתה לו ברית על נתינת הארץ והיא מצלת מדינה של גיהנם כמו שאמרו חכמים שאברהם אבינו יושב שנימול , ומאוסה היא הערלה שנתגנו בה הגוים שנאנר כי כל הגוים ערלים , וכל המפר בריתו של אברהם או שמושך ערלתו אע׳׳פ שיש בידו תורה ומעשים טובים אין לו חלק לעולם הבא ׃

“It is an affirmative precept, binding on every man of Israel, to circumcise his son; and this is greater than any of the other affirmative precepts, for there is a threat of excision attached to it; and further, on account of it, thirteen covenants were made, as is recorded in the chapter of circumcision. Abraham was not called perfect until he was circumcised, and by the merit of circumcision, a covenant was made with him respecting the giving of the land. It also delivers from the judgment of hell, for the wise men have said, that Abraham our father sits at the door of hell, and does not suffer any one that is circumcised to be cast into it. Uncircumcision is despised, for the Gentiles are reproached with it, as it is said, ‘All the nations are uncircumcised’ (Jer. ix. 25); and every one who breaks the covenant of Abraham our father, either by not being circumcised or by becoming uncircumcised, has no part in the world to come, even though he possess a knowledge of the law and good works.” (Joreh Deah., 260.) Here we have the very same misconception, which God reproved by the mouth of Isaiah; an external act is preferred to holiness of life, and a mere preparation of the body to purity of heart. It is gravely and solemnly asserted that the precept concerning circumcision is greater than all the other affirmative precepts, that is, it is exalted above our duty to God and our duty to our neighbour. The command

ואהבת לרעך כמוך

“Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,” is an affirmative precept, and is therefore one of those to which circumcision is preferred. The command

כבד את אביך ואת אמך

“Honour thy father and thy mother,” is an affirmative precept, and has a promise of long life in the land attached to it. It concerns our duty to those, to whom, under God, we owe our existence, and yet the oral law teaches that obedience to it is not so important as to the precept concerning circumcision. We do not mean to deny the scriptural importance of circumcision, nor of any other of the Divine institutions, but we do mean to appeal to every Israelite of understanding to judge, which of these commandments is of most importance. Can an Israelite, merely because he is circumcised, though he has no love to his fellow-men, and no reverence for his parents, be acceptable in the sight of God, or can he be more acceptable than a Gentile who obeys these commands? But the sweeping declaration of the oral law, not only teaches men that circumcision is more valuable than love to man, but exalts it even above love to God. The commandment, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart,” &c., is an affirmative precept, and is consequently included amongst those which are stated to be inferior to circumcision. This conclusion seems so monstrous, that one is almost afraid of having misunderstood the sense; but Rashi, who must be acknowledged as an authority, goes still farther, and endeavours to prove that circumcision is equal in importance to all the other commandments put together.

שהיא שקולה כנגד כל המצוות שבתורה ׃

“It is equivalent to all the commandments which are in the law.” (Nedarim, fol. 31, col. ii.) So that there can be no doubt that this is the doctrine of the oral law. Now just let the reader consider the nature of circumcision. It is, in the first place, an external act,—it is, in the second place, an act performed without the will of the infant, and at a time when he can exercise no act of moral responsibility, and yet the mere act is placed above the highest perfection of a created being, love to God and his fellow-creatures. But the oral law does not merely assert this doctrine, but gives its proofs, and the first is, that to the precept of circumcision the threat of excision is annexed. Of course, we admit the fact, for it is plainly said, “The uncircumcised man-child, whose flesh of his foreskin is not circumcised, that soul shall be cut off from his people; he hath broken my covenant” (Gen. xvii. 14.); but we deny the consequence. There is nothing peculiar to circumcision in the annexed threat of excision. God has pronounced the same threat against every presumptuous sin, as it is written, “But the soul that doeth ought presumptuously, whether he be born in the land or a stranger, the same reproacheth the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from among his people. Because he hath despised the word of the Lord, and hath broken his commandment, that soul shall be utterly cut off; his iniquity shall be upon him.” (Numb. xv. 30, 31.) Here we see that presumptuous transgression of any one of God’s commandments will be visited with the same punishment denounced against the omission of circumcision, so that the annexed threat is far from proving that this precept is superior to all the other affirmative commandments. On the contrary, it shows that God does not judge by the external act, but by the state of the heart, and that presumptuous disobedience of any commandment, as demonstrating an utter want of love to him, will be visited with the severity of his wrath. It is further alleged, “That Abraham was not called perfect until he was circumcised,”—and this is proved in the Talmud, by the words, “Walk before me, and be thou perfect.” But these words do not prove that, even after his circumcision, Abraham was called perfect; they are a command to be perfect, but not a declaration that he was so; and it cannot be urged that by being circumcised he obeyed this command, and thus became perfect, for this would open an easy way of attaining perfection to the most abandoned of mankind. Besides, it is easy to prove that this word “perfect” is also given to the uncircumcision. Long before circumcision was given, it was applied to Noah. “Noah was a just man, and perfect in his generations, and Noah walked with God” (Gen. vi. 9), where that which is only commanded to Abraham, is asserted to have been found in Noah. God commanded to Abraham to walk with him, and to be perfect; but he declares of the uncircumcised Noah, that he was perfect, and did walk with him. In this respect, therefore, even if the rabbinic interpretation of the words were correct, circumcision has no superiority over uncircumcision. The next proof, namely, “That by the merit of circumcision a covenant was made with Abraham, respecting the giving of the land,” is equally inconclusive. Long before the covenant of circumcision God had promised the land to Abraham, and that repeatedly; and not only had promised it, but had actually made a covenant with him respecting the gift, as we read, “In the same day, the Lord made a covenant with Abram, saying, Unto thy seed have I given this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates.” (Gen. xvi. 18.) This covenant was made before the birth of Ishmael; and when Ishmael was born, Abraham was eighty-six years of age; consequently, it was at least fourteen years before circumcision, so that the assertion that the covenant respecting the land was made on account of the merit of circumcision is altogether false. God made the covenant, not because Abraham deserved it, but according to his own grace and mercy, when Abraham had no bodily mark to distinguish him from the surrounding nations. Here again, then, the oral law asserts what is false. But the rabbies were not contented with Scripture proof; they felt that the letter of Scripture was against them, and therefore had recourse to their own invention, and have devised the fable that “Circumcision delivers from the judgment of hell, for that Abraham sits at the door of hell, and does not suffer any one that is circumcised to be cast into it.” That this is a regular and wilful falsehood, no one that has reason, and takes the Scripture to guide it, can possibly doubt. It implies that many who are circumcised deserve the punishment of hell, and are led to the very door, but that Abraham interferes, and delivers them from their just punishment. If they did not deserve it, and were not liable to it, there could be no necessity for Abraham’s sitting in so unpleasant a situation. The guilt of these persons is, therefore, fully admitted, and yet the wise men say, that out of regard to the mere external token of the covenant, God gives up his attribute of justice, and acquits those who deserve punishment. But it implies further, that God does not deal thus to the Gentiles—that to them he exercises all justice, and shows no mercy. Abraham looks on with unconcern when a Gentile is brought to the place of the damned, feels no compassion and exercises none, and the Divine Being himself is made a party in this injustice, and want of compassion. Religion is misrepresented as a mere system of favouritism, and the Judge of all the earth as a doer of wrong. That this is the plain drift of the story is plain from what follows: “Circumcision is despised, for the Gentiles are reproached with it, as it is said, ‘All the nations are uncircumcised.’” Here the rabbies plainly tell us, that God despises the works of his own hands, that he disdains the overwhelming majority of his rational creatures, and that not because of their wickedness, or their cruelty, or their idolatry, or their profanity, but because they have not got a commandment which He never gave them. The rabbies themselves will admit that God never gave the Gentiles the commandment of circumcision, how then is it possible that he should blame them, or despise them, or treat them with unmitigated severity, because they have not got what He never gave them? If it had been offered to them, and they had refused, there would have been some ground for such a representation, but at present there is none. It is not true that God reproaches the Gentiles in the words, “All the nations are uncircumcised;” on the contrary, He is reproaching Israel. The context is, “Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will punish all them which are circumcised with the uncircumcised; Egypt, and Judah, and Edom, and the children of Ammon and Moab, and all that are in the utmost corners, that dwell in the wilderness; for all the nations are uncircumcised, and all the house of Israel are uncircumcised in the heart.” (Jer. ix. 25, 26.) This is very different doctrine from that of the rabbies. God declares that the mere outward sign of circumcision shall not save from punishment; that he makes no difference whatever between the uncircumcised and the circumcised, but that he looks upon the heart, and deals out to all evenhanded justice. He says, that he will punish the idolatrous nations, whom he has enumerated, but declares that he will punish the sinners of Israel along with them, and then to obviate the very objection which the oral law urges, and to take away all false confidence in circumcision, he adds, “The nations are uncircumcised, and all the house of Israel are uncircumcised in heart;” as if he would have said, Do not deceive yourselves, thinking that your circumcision will save you: there is a worse uncircumcision than that of the flesh, the uncircumcision of the heart. This is doctrine worthy of the Divine Being, consistent with his attributes of justice and holiness, and consolatory and encouraging to all his rational creatures; whereas the rabbinic doctrine is dishonouring to God, and contemptuous to all the Gentile nations. If it were believed, no Gentile would have any motive to serve or honour the true God, from whom he could expect neither justice nor mercy. It is equally pernicious and destructive to the moral and spiritual welfare of the Israelites themselves. Any man who believes that his circumcision will save him from hell, will feel himself at liberty to violate other commands without fear. Why should he be holy, or chaste, or honest, or true? His father Abraham is sitting at the gate of hell waiting for him, and will deliver him from the just reward of his delinquencies. We do not mean to attribute such reasoning to all Israelites—far from it; but it is certain that on the minds of the ignorant and superstitious this doctrine must have this effect. Those who are acquainted with the Word of God, or know how to reason, must believe that it is false, but then it is their duty not only to disbelieve it in their hearts, but to renounce it publicly, and to teach the ignorant and uneducated that it is false. Israelites often feel justly indignant at the want of due appreciation which characterizes public opinion with regard to the nation, but let them reflect on the causes, and they will cease to wonder. Mankind in general does not distinguish between the Jews and Judaism, but erroneously attribute, without any discrimination, the errors of the system to the men; and how can they do otherwise, so long as the oral law is still upheld as a Divine code of law? Let Israel renounce the errors publicly, and all the causes of misconception will be removed.

But we would ask our readers to go a little farther, and compare the doctrines of Christianity on this subject with those of the oral law. They will find that where the rabbies have erred, the disciples of Jesus of Nazareth have taught the truth. St. Paul admits the importance and the privileges of circumcision. He asks, “What advantage then hath the Jew? or what profit is there of circumcision?” And answers, “Much every way: chiefly, because that unto them were committed the oracles of God.” (Rom. iii. 1.) He does not undervalue God’s mercy to Israel, but at the same time he honours God’s justice and holiness, by declaring that “God will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life: but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil, of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile; but glory, honour, and peace, to every man that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile: for there is no respect of persons with God.” (Romans ii. 6-11.) This exactly agrees with the words of Jeremiah, and with the character of God, as set forth by Moses and the Prophets, and must commend itself to the mind of every reflecting person. Let then those who reject Christianity account for the fact, that where the rabbies are wrong, the preachers of Christianity are right. If all truth come from God, and unassisted human reason must go wrong, how is it that God should have helped Christians to the truth, and left the Jews in deadly error for so many centuries?

Judaism teaches that the Gentiles are despised, simply because they have not got an outward sign, which God never intended they should have. Christianity proclaims that God is a just Judge. It says, “Circumcision verily profiteth, if thou keep the law; but if thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumcision is made uncircumcision. Therefore if the uncircumcision keep the righteousness of the law, shall not his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision?” Judaism teaches that Abraham sits at the gate of hell to deliver even the wicked, if they be only circumcised. Christianity teaches that Abraham has no respect to the outward sign, unless it be accompanied by purity of heart. “There was a certain rich man, which was clothed in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day: and there was a certain beggar named Lazarus, which was laid at his gate, full of sores. And it came to pass that the beggar died, and was carried by the angels into Abraham’s bosom: the rich man also died, and was buried; and in hell he lifted up his eyes, being in torments, and seeth Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his bosom. And he cried and said, Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, and cool my tongue; for I am tormented in this flame. But Abraham said, Son, remember that thou in thy lifetime receivedst thy good things, and likewise Lazarus evil things; but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented. And beside all this, between us and you there is a great gulf fixed: so that they which would pass from hence to you cannot; neither can they pass to us, that would come from thence. Then he said, I pray thee therefore, father, that thou wouldest Send him to my father’s house: for I have five brethren; that he may testify unto them, lest they also come into this place of torment. Abraham said unto him, They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them. And he said, Nay, father Abraham: but if one went to them from the dead, they will repent. And he said unto him, If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead.” (Luke xvi. 19-31.) Let the reader compare this with the rabbinic doctrine, and then explain why it is that where the oral law errs, God has given the truth in the New Testament.

No. LIX. CRUELTY TO THE UNLEARNED.

The great object of these papers has been to compare Judaism, as it at present exists, with the religion of Moses and the Prophets, and thus to ascertain whether the Jews of the present day walk in the good old paths pointed out to their forefathers. We have endeavoured to give our reasons for believing that the Jews have been imposed upon by the inventors of the oral law, and have now got a religion diametrically opposed to that which was revealed to them by God. More than a year has elapsed since the first of these papers was published, and yet no answer has appeared. This silence may be attributed to one of three causes. Either there has been a want of sufficient zeal on the part of those who profess Judaism—or, prudence has suggested that the system would not bear discussion—or, these papers have been thought unworthy of notice. It is for the Jewish people at large to consider, which of these three reasons have influenced the champions of the oral law. The Jews certainly have a right to some explanation from those, whose learning and station point them out as the natural defenders of Judaism. Every reflecting man must be staggered by the fact, that a strong case has been made out against the oral law—that, contemporaneously with the publication of these papers, strong symptoms of dissatisfaction with certain parts of Judaism have been manifested in one of the most respectable synagogues in London—and yet, that nothing has appeared, either in the shape of defence or explanation. That this silence has not proceeded altogether from contempt is made probable by another fact, and that is, That it is confidently asserted that a public answer was given orally to the first number, and that this answer was satisfactory to those who heard it. It is much to be regretted that the answer was not made known generally, so as to afford the same satisfaction to others. For ourselves, we should have been most happy, if convinced of error, to have retracted any erroneous charge. We have, in the interval, frequently considered the subject which is said to have been answered; and now consider it our duty, before closing this series, to make known our reasons for still believing, that that one topic is in itself sufficient to prove that the religion of the oral law is a system of error. Our arguments were simply these. A religion which despises and insults the unlearned cannot be from God. The oral law does despise and insult the unlearned, for it commands its disciples not to marry the daughters of the unlearned on the ground that they are no better than beasts. Therefore the oral law cannot be from God. Secondly, a religion which makes the murder of an unlearned man lawful, cannot be from God. The oral law does make it lawful, for, as we showed in No. 1, Rabbi Eleazer says, That it is lawful even on the most solemn day of the Jewish year, to kill an unlearned man without observing any of the technicalities of the rabbinic art of slaughtering; or, as another says, to rend him asunder like a fish. Therefore the oral law cannot be from God. We now proceed to show why we still think that that line of argument is valid.

The first step is, to establish the meaning of the expression עם הארץ _Amhaaretz_, which we translated “an unlearned man.” The literal English of this expression is, “People of the land,” it might therefore signify the inhabitants of Canaan, but in the Bible it is more commonly used of the mass of the Israelitish people, as for instance:—

וכל עם הארץ שמח ותוקע בחצוצרות ׃

“And all the people of the land rejoiced, and blew with trumpets.” (2 Kings xi. 14. See also verses 18-20.) Here the expression is opposed to king and princes, and evidently means the mass of the population, or, as some would say, “The common people.” And, again, to give an example from the Prophets:—

ועתה חזק זרבבל נאם ה׳ וחזק יהושע בן יהוצדק הכהן הגדול וחזק כל עמי הארץ ׃

“Yet now be strong, O Zerubbabel, saith the Lord; and be strong, O Joshua, son of Josedech, the high priest; and be strong, all ye people of the land.” (Hag. ii. 4.) Here, also, the expression is opposed to the governor of Judah and the high priest, and plainly signifies the mass of the population. In the oral law, it has much the same signification; it stands for those who are not counted amongst the learned, nor the great men of the time, nor the almoners, nor the schoolmasters, as appears in the extract given in page 7, with this difference, that in the oral law the want of learning is a prominent idea, and the expression may therefore be applied to a high priest if he be unlearned. In further proof we might appeal to the common parlance of the Jews, even at this day, for they commonly call an unlearned man an _Amhaaretz_. We prefer, however, giving one or two extracts more from the laws, where the expression _Amhaaretz_ is put in opposition to “The disciple of a wise man,” that is, to a learned man. We read, for instance, that in a court of justice,

דין תלמיד חכם קודם לדין עם הארץ ׃

“The cause of the disciple of a wise man takes precedence of the cause of an Amhaaretz.” (Hilchoth Sanhedrin, c. xxi. 6.) Again,

וכן אסור לו לנהוג בהן קלות ראש אע׳׳פ שהן עמי הארץ , ולא יפסיע על ראשי עם הקודש אע׳׳פ שהן הדיוטות ושפלים בני אברהם יצחק ויעקב הם ׃

“In like manner, it is unlawful for an elder to behave with levity to the congregation, even though they be Amharatzin. Neither let him behave haughtily to the holy people, for although they be common and humble persons, they are children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.” (Ibid., c. 25.) Again,

לפיכך כשמלמדין את הקטנים ואת הנשי וכל עמי הארץ אין מלמדין אותן אלא לעבוד מיראה וכדי לקבל שבר וכו׳ ׃

“Therefore, when children and women, and the whole genus of Amharatzin, are instructed, they are to be taught to serve God only from the motive of fear, and the desire to receive a reward until,” &c. (Hilchoth T’shuvah, c. x. 5.) In these passages, and many, many more may be added, _Amhaaretz_ plainly signifies an unlearned man, and it does not appear from any one, that there is any crime to be laid to his charge. He may appear as suitor in a court of law; he is considered as a son or Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; he is put on a level with the children and the women of Israel. The only disparagement is, that he has not been brought up at the feet of a learned rabbi, and, therefore, cannot be reckoned amongst the disciples of the wise men.

The next thing to be established is, that the oral law despises and insults those whose misfortune it is to be unlearned; and here, in addition to the complement paid to their wives and daughters, noticed in No. 1, we bring, as a proof, the general rule which is given respecting their treatment:—

תנו רבנן ששה דברים נאמרו בעמי הארץ אין מוסרין להן עדות ואין מקבלין מהן עדות ואין מגלין להן סוד ואין ממנין אותן אפוטרופוס על היתומים ואין ממנין אותן אפוטרופוס על קופה של צדקה וא׳׳ן מתלוין עמהן בדרך וי׳׳א אף אין מכריזין על אבדתן ׃

“Our rabbies have handed down as a tradition, that six things are said with respect to Amharatzin. Testimony is not to be given to them, nor received from them. A secret is not to be revealed to them. They are not to be appointed as guardians to orphans, nor to an alms-fund. One is not to bear them company in the way. And some say, that if they have lost any thing, and it is found, no public notice is to be given respecting it.” (Pesachim, fol. 49, col. 2.) Here, then, the unlearned are branded as liars, whose word is not to be depended upon—as rogues, unfit to be trusted with property—as murderers, with whom it is unsafe to walk by the way-side. Can contempt or insult add more? Yes; rabbinic contempt had one insult more galling than these, and that was to put them on a level with Gentiles, and this it has done by forbidding public notice to be given, if any thing which they had lost should be found. Now, we fear not to assert, that this one passage is fatal to the claims of the oral law. There is not a particle of resemblance in it to the merciful and just religion made known by Moses. It is the effusion of a mind intoxicated with self-conceit and arrogance. The authors of the oral law were determined, so far as they could, to lay it down as a maxim, not only that no wisdom, but no truth, no honesty, and no humanity, was to be found, except amongst themselves, and their disciples; they wished to have the monopoly of all moral virtue, as well as of all learning. We ask both the learned and the unlearned, whether it be possible that such a law could have emanated from the God of Israel? But there is not only excessive arrogance, there is also gross injustice in their law. It is ordained, first, that in a court of law, the cause of the learned is to be heard before the cause of the unlearned; this is in itself most unjust, but is not to be compared with what follows. The oral law forbids the appointment of an unlearned man as guardian to orphans; can any thing be more oppressive? Suppose that an unlearned man, on his death-bed, thinks of a guardian for his orphan children, and looks to a brother, or an intimate friend, as unlearned as himself, but whose worth, and honesty, and affection, he has long known and valued; the oral law forbids him to make such an appointment; and if he has no learned friend—and how, where such a law exists, is it ever possible that the learned and the unlearned should be friends?—he must die with the agonizing thought, that his children must be left to the guardianship of a perfect stranger. Is it possible to conceive anything more oppressive, unjust, or cruel? But the oral law is not content with this; it will not permit an unlearned man, even in his lifetime, to recover property that has been lost. Whoever finds it may keep it. The law for other people is, that if any thing be found, the finder is to have proclamation made in the city, or, if the majority of the inhabitants be Gentiles, in the synagogue, that the loser may hear of it. But the poor Amhaaretz is excluded from the benefit of this command. It may, however, puzzle the reader, how the finder is to know whether the thing which he has found belongs to a learned or an unlearned man. One of the commentators has solved this difficulty in the following manner:—

וא׳׳ת מאין יודע שהוא של עם הארץ ואמר ר׳ יצחק כגון ששיירא של עם הארץ עוברת וראינו שנפל מהם ׃

“If you ask, How is the finder to know that the thing found belongs to an Amhaaretz? R. Isaac says, it is in such a case as when a crowd of Amharatzin is passing, and we see that it fell from them.” (Ibid.) So that, according to this interpretation, the disciples of the wise men are positively allowed to retain what they know does not belong to them, if they only see that it does belong to an unlearned man; and yet these are the men who are so afraid of the dishonesty of the unlearned, as to forbid their appointment to the office of guardian to orphans, or treasurer to a charitable fund. Let any man of common sense decide, whether this law is honest or dishonest, and then let him decide, whether it can come from God, and whether such a religion is fit for an honest man?

The most important point, however, remains, and that is, the permission to kill an unlearned man, or to rend him like a fish. We have been told that this is merely figurative language, but the context is not such as to lead to this conclusion; on the contrary, the passage itself, and all that precedes and follows, leads us to believe that it was meant literally. In the first place, it is said, that it is lawful to kill an Amhaaretz without observing the rules of שחיטה slaughtering, and when the disciples ask the reason, R. Eleazar replies, Because these rules would require a benediction to be pronounced, whereas he would not have an Amhaaretz treated with such respect. Let any man explain the figurative meaning of all this. Secondly, R. Samuel, to take away all ambiguity, says, in the name of R. Johannan, that it is lawful to rend him as a fish. Now it is known that, with regard to fish, the rules of שחיטה or slaughtering, are not observed. All ambiguity, therefore, as to R. Eleazar’s meaning, is here removed. Thirdly, it is evident that the rabbies looked upon the unlearned as nothing better than beasts. They say, that the daughters of the unlearned are an abomination, and their wives vermin: yea, that their daughters are beasts. Now, when men are so wicked as to use such language concerning their fellow-creatures, are we to be astonished that they would draw the conclusion that necessarily follows from such premises, and that they should allow these beasts and vermin to be killed? When we see that these rabbies allow an unlearned man to be robbed with impunity of that which he has lost, what principle of conscience or justice is there left to prevent them from killing him whom they have robbed? If all the other principles of these rabbies were just, honest, upright, and merciful, we might be tempted to suppose, that in these words they enveloped some mystical sense. But when we see that the principles which precede and follow are an outrage upon humanity, justice, and mercy, no such supposition is necessary.

But, after all, how did the commentators understand the passage? If we, as Gentiles, are accused of misrepresenting the sense, what did the rabbies, who succeeded, make of this passage? The commentary from which we have just quoted, after saying, that if a crowd of Amharatzin let any thing fall, it is lawful to keep it without giving public notice, adds, that this is to be understood strictly of what is lost, but that it does not warrant the learned to rob them by force; upon which the following difficulty is started:—

אמאי ממונו אסור השתא נופו מותר שמותר לקרצו כדג וכו׳ ׃

“Why should it be unlawful to deal thus with his money, when it is lawful to deal violently with his body, for it is lawful to rend him as a fish.” (Ibid.) Now here this rabbi evidently interpreted the permission to kill literally, and he naturally asks, If it be lawful to take away a man’s life by violence, why should it not be lawful to take away his money? If the words had been taken figuratively, there would have been no room for this question. We have, therefore, neither misunderstood nor misrepresented the meaning. The oral law allows the murder of an unlearned man, and that with as little ceremony as it permits the killing of an unclean animal, or a fish. We therefore repeat our assertion, that the oral law cannot be from God. One such passage is quite sufficient to discredit the whole, not only because of its intrinsic wickedness, but because it displays the character of those men with whom the oral law originated. Superabundant self-conceit, cold-blooded cruelty, and unrelenting enmity, are the striking characteristics of those men, who, by dint of force and fraud, gradually enslaved the minds of the Jewish people. It appears from these passages, and from the plain confessions of the rabbies in the context, that the common people struggled hard before they submitted to the yoke of the oral law. The attempt to impose such a burden, evidently produced the most bitter animosity between the rabbies and the people. The people were ready, as one of the rabbies says, to kill all the wise men, and these, in return laid down the principles of retaliation which we have just considered, and which are a disgrace to the name of religion. These principles, however, would not have triumphed if the rabbies had not got the whole power of the State into their own hands. By means of that unlawful and heathenish tribunal, the Sanhedrin, they were able to coerce the people, and to kill all who refused to submit. Judaism, therefore, as it at present exist, is a religion which was originally forced upon the Jewish people against their will, and therefore has no claims upon their reverence or gratitude. By the dispersion, God has removed the main difficulties in the way of their moral and spiritual emancipation. Christianity is in the ascendant, and will not permit any “wise men” to kill the unlearned without ceremony. The people may, therefore, assert their religious liberty in perfect security, and without any fear of the Sanhedrin. We tell the Jews, even on the admissions of the Talmud itself, that their present religion is not even the object of their choice, and much less the religion given by God, but that it was imposed upon the consciences of their fathers by force; and, therefore, ask the Jews, Whether they still wish to continue slaves to superstition and cruelty, when God has, in his providence, arranged the means of their delivery? The Jewish people have often had reason to complain of the injustice, contempt, and cruelty of the nations amongst whom they have been scattered; but we ask them, Have the most barbarous nations ever treated them with more contempt, injustice, and cruelty than that which we have just found authorized by the oral law? Ignorant and superstitious Gentiles have turned the holy name of Jew into a term of reproach, but where was it ever known or heard of, that the most ignorant and most superstitious called the Jews vermin, or compared the wives and daughters of Israel to beasts? It is Judaism, and Judaism only, that utters this foul and inhuman slander. In seasons of popular tumult, mobs have risen and plundered the Jews; but where is the nation, or the religion, which has made a law that it is lawful to keep the lost property of a Jew? Judaism, and Judaism alone, is guilty of this injustice. Prejudice has unjustly assailed the character of the Jewish people, but what sect or party of Christians ever thought of branding them as liars, whose evidence is not to be received; as rogues, unworthy to be appointed as guardians to orphans or property; as murderers, with whom it is unsafe to walk by the road-side? Yet this is the deliberate sentence of Judaism respecting the unlearned; that is, respecting the great mass of the Jewish people. Just suppose that the Parliament of England was to pass a law, declaring that the Jews are to be considered incompetent to give testimony, or to be guardians of property, warning people to beware of walking with a Jew, and permitting men to kill them, or to rend them like a fish; would not the Jewish people perceive in a moment the injustice and the cruelty of such legislation? Would they not have just reason to complain of the blind prejudice which possessed the minds of the legislators? And yet, this is only what the rabbies have done. If Judaism be true, then the mass of the Jewish people are liars, rogues, and murderers; for this is what Judaism asserts; and if the Jewish people consent to its truth, they are stamping themselves, their wives, and their daughters with infamy. The truth or falsehood of the oral law is not simply a speculative question, or a question relating to their eternal interests in another world; it is a question deeply affecting their characters and their welfare at present. It simply comes to this, are all unlearned Jews, that is, the overwhelming majority of the people, to be considered as utterly destitute of truth, honesty, and humanity? If Judaism be true, the answer is, Yes. Let, then, every Jew, rich or poor, learned or unlearned, consider whether he will still profess a religion that defames and insults the mass of his countrymen. The character of the nation is foully attacked, defamed, and vilified, but not by Gentiles, not by Turk, Infidel, or Heretic, but by the Talmud and the Rabbies. The only way in which this calumny can be met and wiped away, is, by a renunciation of that system which has dared to utter it. If there live a Jew who has the slightest regard for the honour of the nation, he is bound to protest aloud against the falsehood of the oral law. That it is false, requires no great stretch of argument to prove. Every unlearned Jew, who is conscious that he is not a liar, a rogue, and a murderer, has the proof in his own breast, that Judaism is false. Every unlearned Jew, who duly honours and respects his wife and daughters, and believes that they are neither vermin nor beasts, is a witness against the truth of the oral law. Every one who believes that dishonesty is contrary to the will of God, and that the murder of the unlearned is unlawful, has the proof that that system which was imposed upon his fathers, is not from God.

No. LX. RECAPITULATION.

Having, by the help and mercy of God, brought those papers to the last number, we propose here to sum up their contents, and to give a review of the arguments which have been urged. The topics discussed have been very various, but the object in all has been the same,—To show that Judaism, or the religion of the oral law, is not the old religion of Moses and the Prophets, but a new and totally different system, devised by designing men, and unworthy of the Jewish people. That Judaism is identical with the religion of the oral law was proved in the first number by an appeal to the highest possible authority, the Prayer-book of the synagogue, which is not only formed in obedience to the directions of the oral law, but declares expressly that the Talmud is of Divine authority. So long, therefore, as that Prayer-book is the ritual of the synagogue, the worshippers there must be considered as Talmudists, believers in all the absurdities, and advocates of all the intolerance of that mass of tradition. That this is no misrepresentation and no unfounded conclusion of our own, appears from the latest book published in this country by a member of the Jewish persuasion. Joshua Van Oven, Esq., has, in his “Introduction to the Principles of the Jewish Faith,” a chapter, headed JUDAISM, which begins thus,—“The Jewish religion, or Judaism, is founded solely on the law of Moses, so called from its having been brought down by him from Mount Sinai. With the particulars of these laws he had been inspired by the Almighty during the forty days he remained on the mount, after receiving the Ten Commandments; these he afterwards embodied in the sacred volume, known and accepted as the written law, and called the Pentateuch, or the Five Books of Moses, contained in the volume we term the Bible. _We also, from the same source, receive, as sacred and authentic_, a large number of traditions not committed to writing, but transmitted by word of mouth down to later times; without which many enactments in the Holy Bible could not have been understood and acted upon; these, termed traditional or oral laws, were collected and formed into a volume called the ‘Mishna,’ by Rabbi Jehudah Hakodesh, A.M. 4150. In addition to this, _we are guided_ by the explications of the later schools of pious and learned rabbies, _constituting what is now known by the name of the Talmud, or Gemara_.”[37]

Nothing can be more explicit than this avowal. A learned and pious Jew of the nineteenth century honestly avows that Judaism is the religion of the Talmud; and upon this principle we have examined Judaism, and compared it with Moses and the Prophets, and the result of this comparison is—

I. THAT JUDAISM IS A FALSE RELIGION.

The premises, from which we draw this conclusion, are—

1. _That the oral law is altogether destitute of external evidence._ To establish the authority of the oral law, it is absolutely necessary to prove a succession of Sanhedrins from the time of Moses to that of Rabbi Jehudah, or at the least an unbroken chain of tradition. But it has been proved, in Nos. xliii. and xliv., that there was no such thing as a Sanhedrin until after the Greek conquest of Judea, and in No. xlv., that there is no continuous chain of tradition. The only evidence, therefore, which could beget faith in the mind of a reasonable man is wanting.

2. _The oral law itself is full of manifest fables._ This has been proved almost in every number, but particularly from Nos. xvii.-xxi., where the fables selected are such as are particularly noticed in the prayers of the synagogue. No one can doubt that the stories about Leviathan and Behemoth—of Adam’s singing the 92d Psalm after a conversation with Cain—of the river Sambation—of the experiment made by Turnus Rufus to raise his father—of Mount Sinai having been turned, like a tub, over the Israelites—of the descent of 600,000 angels to crown the Israelites—of the people’s travelling 240 miles backwards and forwards during the delivery of the Ten Commandments, &c., &c.,—are all downright fables, not a whit more authentic than similar stories contained in the Koran, or the Arabian Nights’ Entertainments. Any one fable would be sufficient to overturn the credit of the oral law, but what are we to think of the host of downright falsehoods here enumerated?

3. _It is directly subversive of the state of things established in the written law._ Moses appointed the priests, the sons of Levi, as the religious teachers of Israel. The oral law has ousted them altogether from their office, as was shown in No. xli.

4. _The oral law encourages those Heathen superstitions expressly forbidden by Moses and the Prophets_, such as magic, astrology, amulets, and charms, as is shown from Nos. xxii.-xxvi.

5. _The oral law loosens the moral obligations._ It teaches men how to evade the Divine commandments, as was shown in Nos. xi., xiv., and xv. It allows dispensation from oaths, as proved in Nos. lvi. and lvii. It allows men to retain what they know does not belong to them, if it only belongs to a Gentile (p. 18), or to an unlearned Jew, as appears from No. lix. It sanctions the murder of the unlearned.

6. _It leads men to put trust in mere external acts as a compensation for moral delinquencies._ The washing of hands (No. x.)—the external sanctification of the Sabbath (No. xxix.)—the blowing of the cornet at the new year (No. xxxiv.)—the rite of circumcision (No. lviii.), &c., &c., are represented as sufficient to save wicked men from the just punishment of their misdeeds.

7. _Though called an oral law, because not written with ink, it is really written in blood._ For the most trifling offences it sentences the offender to be flogged (Nos. xiii. and liii.)—for the transgression of the rabbinic commands respecting the Sabbath, it awards the sentence of death (No. xxvii.)—and, by its laws respecting the killing and cooking meat (Nos. xlix.-liv.), it prevents the poor from getting food for themselves and their children.

8. _It degrades the female sex_, by permitting polygamy (No. xlvii.)—by permitting divorce on the most trifling pretext (No. xlviii.)—by declaring women incompetent to give evidence—by excluding them from the public worship of God—and by teaching that they are under no obligation to learn the revealed will of their Creator (No. iii.).

9. _It oppresses and insults slaves_, by forbidding them to be instructed in the law (No. iii.), and by placing them, when dead, on a level with brutes (No. lv.).

10. _It is a persecuting and intolerant system._ It gives every rabbi the power of excommunicating the Jews (No. xxxi.), and it commands the conversion of all the Gentile nations by the sword (No. vi.).

11. _It forbids the exercise of the commonest feelings of humanity to those whom it calls idolaters._ It will not permit a drowning idolater to be helped, nor a perishing idolater to be rescued, nor an idolatrous woman in travail to be delivered (Nos. iv. and v.).

12. _It leaves those Gentiles who are not idolaters without religion._ It teaches that they are not commanded to love God, and breaks up all the happiness of domestic life, by asserting that amongst Gentiles there is no such thing as marriage (No. viii.). For these and other reasons which might be adduced, we believe that Judaism is contrary to the religion of Moses and the Prophets—that it has not proceeded from God, but is the mere invention of men, and therefore false.

II. From these premises we have concluded, secondly, THAT JUDAISM HAS FOR ITS AUTHORS WICKED MEN, UNWORTHY OF CREDIT. One of the most daring acts of wickedness, that can be committed is to invent laws and principles, and pass them off as the laws of God. Every degree of wilful falsehood is sinful; but to forge Divine laws, and impose upon the consciences of men, is the most daring of all wickedness, for it not only deceives men, but it dishonours God. The Divine Being is represented as the author of principles and practices which are abhorred by the good even amongst men. Is it possible that those men could be good, who invented the fables of which we have spoken above—or who overturned the Mosaic constitution for the purposes of personal aggrandisement—or who teach that oaths may be broken with impunity—or that men may keep what does not belong to them—or that unlearned men may be murdered without ceremony—or that it is lawful to look upon the agonies and pain of an idolater without rendering him any assistance or feeling any pity? If falsehood, perjury, dishonesty, cruelty, and inhumanity, constitute men wicked, then the authors of the oral law are wicked men, and altogether unworthy of credit. And therefore we conclude—

III. THAT THEIR TESTIMONY AGAINST CHRISTIANITY IS OF NO VALUE. Many Jews of the present day reject Christianity simply because the rulers of the nation rejected the Lord Jesus Christ. But the discoveries which we have made of the principles and practices of these men show, that there is no force whatever in this argument. Their testimony against Jesus of Nazareth is not to be trusted any more than Mahomet’s testimony against the fidelity of the Jewish nation in preserving the Scriptures. This impostor says, that the Jews have corrupted the Old Testament, but no one believes the charge, because he has been convicted himself of forging revelations and laws. The authors of the oral law have been convicted of the same offence, and their testimony must be rejected for the very same reason. They have passed off their own inventions as Divine laws—they have taught their absurd legends as undoubted matters of fact—they are plainly convicted of falsehood, and the only alternative is to say that these falsehoods are wilful, and then the men who witness against Christianity are wilful liars, or to confess that the authors were mad, and therefore incompetent to give any testimony. In every case they must be regarded as propagaters of falsehood. But falsehood is not the only trait in their character; they were interested in their testimony against Jesus: they were his personal enemies, because he opposed their pretensions and condemned all their inventions. They had, therefore, a strong motive for condemning him, and there is nothing in their character to lead us to suppose that their love of justice would prevail over their private feelings. When the general tenour of a man’s conduct is evidently the result of upright principle, it is possible to believe that he would be just even to an enemy. When a man’s whole life has been distinguished by tender compassion, it is possible to believe that he would not be cruel even to a foe. But neither supposition holds good with respect to the authors of the oral law. They do not even profess integrity, for they teach that it is lawful to defraud an unlearned man—they declare, by their permission to kill an Amhaaretz, that they had no value for human life. If they were capable of murdering in cold blood a man who had never offended them, simply because he did not belong to their party, is it to be wondered at that they should endeavour to destroy one who who was a direct opposer? The condemnation of the Lord Jesus Christ by such men is not only no argument against his character or claims, but even an argument in his favour. It is a decisive proof that he did not belong to their party, and that, therefore, there are not the same objections to his testimony as to theirs. The Jews of the present day, therefore, must find some other reasons for rejecting Jesus of Nazareth. The conduct of their great and learned men at the time can supply no warrant for unbelief at present: it is, on the contrary, a sort of presumptive evidence that He was a good man. And this presumption is much strengthened by comparing the oral law with the New Testament, whereby we learn—

IV. THAT IN ALL THOSE POINTS WHERE THE ORAL LAW IS WEAK, THE NEW TESTAMENT IS STRONG. In the first place, it is entirely free from all fabulous additions to the Old Testament history. It recognises the authority, and frequently cites the writings, of Moses and the Prophets, but it is never, like the Talmud, guilty of forgeries. Neither Jesus nor his disciples pretended to have an oral interpretation of the law, unknown to the people at large, and therefore capable of being twisted to their own purposes. They referred simply to the written word, and by it desired to have all their doctrines judged. In the second place, it is free from all superstitious doctrines concerning magic, astrology, and other heathenish arts. It does not allow absolution from oaths, nor mark out any class of society as the lawful victims of fraud and violence. It is merciful to the poor and to slaves. It teaches that the souls of women are as precious in the sight of God as those of men. It forbids polygamy, and allows divorce only in one case where it is necessary, and thus protects the weaker sex, and guards the sacredness and the happiness of domestic life. It differs especially from the oral law in its estimation of external rites, and thus gives the strongest evidence of its Divine origin. If there be one sign of true religion more satisfactory than another, it is the placing of holiness of heart and life as the first great requisite, at the same time that it does not undervalue any of God’s commands. Now this mark Christianity has, and Judaism wants. The former teaches expressly, That without holiness no man shall see the Lord, and that for the want of it no external ceremonies can compensate. Further, Christianity knows of no violent methods of propagating the truth. It nowhere tells its followers, when they have the power, to compel all men to embrace its doctrines, or to put them to death if they refuse. It has not a criminal code written in blood, and prescribing floggings of rebellion, or even death, for a mere ceremonial offence. It does not allow each individual teacher to torment the people by excommunication and anathema at his pleasure. And lastly, it does not misrepresent God as an unjust and partial judge, who confines the benefits of revelation to one small nation, and sentences the overwhelming majority of mankind to unholiness and unhappiness. If ever Judaism should attain to universal dominion, and the principles of Judaism be brought into action, the whole Gentile world would be doomed to misery and ignorance. By pronouncing that amongst Gentiles there is no marriage-tie, it would rob them of all domestic peace. By sentencing every Gentile reader of the Bible to death, it would deprive them of all the consolations and instructions of the Word of God, and by forbidding them to keep a Sabbath, it would, so far as it could, annihilate every token of God’s care and loving-kindness. The triumph of Christianity, on the contrary, and the full development of all its principles, would fill the world with peace, and joy, and happiness. The fundamental principles of Christianity, namely, that the Messiah has died for the sins of the whole world, sets forth God as the tender father who cares for all his children, and therefore teaches all men to regard one another as fellow-heirs of the same eternal salvation. It does not deny that Israel has peculiar privileges as a nation, but fully acknowledges that “they are still beloved for the fathers’ sakes,” and that they are yet to be the benefactors of the human race as they were of old. But it asserts, at the same time, that God is not the God of the Jews only, but of the Gentiles also, and thus makes it possible for Jew and Gentile to love each other. The only foundation for the peace and unity of all nations is the recognition of God as the Father of all, and this foundation is the very corner-stone of Christianity, whilst it neither does nor can form any part of the fabric of Judaism. Christianity teaches that the first and great commandment is, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart; and the second is, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself; and teaches, at the same time, that all men are our neighbours. Judaism teaches that circumcision is the greatest of all the commandments, and that none but Jews and proselytes are neighbours. Thus Judaism divides, whilst Christianity tends to unite, all the children of men in the bands of peace. It has only one principle of God’s dealings to men, and that principle is love; and one principle for the guiding of man’s conduct to men, and that is love also. Let not the Jewish reader think that we Gentiles wish to ascribe any merit to ourselves, as if by our own wit or wisdom we had found out a religious system superior to anything that Israel had been able to devise. Far from it; we acknowledge again, as we did in the first number, that we are only disciples of one part of the Jewish nation. From the Jews Christianity came to us. It has been a light to lighten us Gentiles, but we acknowledge its Divine Author as the glory of his people Israel. All we mean by instituting the comparison is, to show those who still adhere to the oral law, that there is another Jewish religion infinitely superior, and more like that of Moses and the Prophets. And we appeal confidently to every reader of these papers to decide whether the New Testament or the Talmud is the better book, and to say which is the most agreeable to the will of God as revealed to their forefathers. We earnestly call upon them to make the decision, and to deliver themselves from that unmerited weight of odium which has rested upon them for centuries; and from that still more dreadful evil, the displeasure of Almighty God, which has followed them ever since they forsook the Old Paths wherein their fathers walked.

It is time for those, at least, who profess to abhor certain parts of the Talmud and oral law, to justify their professions by consistent conduct. If they wish people to believe them when they profess love and charity towards all men, they must begin by repudiating the authority of the oral law, and renouncing the worship of the synagogue. How can we possibly believe that those are sincere in their professions to men, who declare that they are insincere in their worship of the heart-searching God? Every man who uses the prayers of the synagogue, there confesses himself to God as a believer in the oral law, and consequently ready to execute all its decrees of cruelty, fraud, and persecution—ready, when he has the power, to convert all nations with the sword. That is his profession in the synagogue; when, then, he comes forth from the solemn act of Divine worship, and tells me that he is liberal and charitable, and that he abhors persecution, how can I possibly believe him? There is falsehood somewhere, and the only possible mode of removing this appearance is by a public renunciation of the oral law, and an erasure of those passages in the public prayers which affirm its Divine authority. This all truly liberal-minded Jews owe to themselves, to the Christian public, to their brethren, and, above all, to their God. To themselves they owe it, because so long as their words and their deeds contradict each other, a mist hangs over them. To the Christian public they owe it, for they must naturally desire to know the principles of those with whom they are connected. To their brethren they owe it, for this is the only way of delivering the nation from the calamities of centuries. To their God they owe it, for by the blasphemies of the oral law, His character is misrepresented, and His name blasphemed.

THE END.

Footnote 37:

“A Manual of Judaism,” by Joshua Van Oven, Esq., M.R.C.S.L., London, 1835. Page 22.

INDEX.

Abarbanel, 124

Aben Ezra, 123

Abraham at the door of hell, 450

Adam, 136

Agadah, recognized in Jewish Prayer-book, 3

Ahijah, the Shilonite, fable about, 352

Almsgiving, Rabbinic, 302 merit of, 307

Amhaaretz, meaning of the word, 458 disqualifications of, 459 may be robbed and slain with impunity, 461 lawful to kill, 6

Amulets, virtues of, 183

Angels carry up the sound of the horn at new year, 267

Angels, of the waves, 197

Angel, evil, 229

Angels ministering, 164

Apostates, to be killed, 36

Arbah, Turim, 112

Astrology, taught and practised, 175

Atonement, day of, 279 itself an atonement, 279 repentance an, 279 a cock killed as an, 283 death an, 299

Baptism necessary to a proselyte, 304

Bar Kochav, 222

Bechai, 142

Behemoth, legend of, 128, &c.

Bither, the city of, 216

Cain, 138

Catechism, Bavarian Jewish, 25 gives a false view of Judaism, 26

Charity, Rabbinic, 112

Charm, Rabbinic, for a bleeding of the nose, 192 for the bite of a mad dog, 193 for a storm at sea, 196 for the bite of a scorpion, 200

Charms allowed on the Sabbath-day, 200

Charm for bed time, 201

Christianity, a Jewish religion, 1

Christianity, the religion of the New Testament, 2

Christians considered as idolaters, 419 not counted amongst the pious of the nations, 4 not in a state of salvation, 4

Circumcision equivalent to all the commandments, 451 meritoriousness of, 450

Cock, killing a cock as atonement, 283

Commandments, 442; 162

Cruelty, Rabbinic, 8, 99, 209 to women, 377

Dead, Rabbinic mourning for, 428 prayers for the, 295

Death, an atonement, 299

Demons, asking counsel of, 203

Deniers of the law, three classes of, 4

Deputies, French Jewish, 24

Deuteronomy xvii. 8, &c., explained, 11

Dispensation, Rabbinic, from oaths, 434

Divorce, Rabbinic, doctrine of, 373

Drunkenness allowed on feast of Purim, 47

Edomites, Christians called, 123

Eleazar, Rabbi, 6

Elijah, the Prophet, conversation of, with R. Jose, 323

Epicureans, 4 to be killed, 36

Epicurean, reader in synagogue suspected of being, 127

Evasion, Rabbinic, 80, 83, 107, 225, 235

Excommunication for not washing hands, 75 Rabbinic, 239 laws concerning, with respect to the unlearned and learned, 239 injustice of, 239

Fast on the ninth of Av, 216

Fasting, merit of, 264

Fire, not to be extinguished, 102

Flogging of rebellion, 99, 211, 228, 383, 386, 420

Friday, Good, 87

Gentile, who studies the law, guilty of death, 22 who keeps a Sabbath-day, guilty of death, 22 good advice not to be given to, 33 woman not to be helped in child-bed, 33 not neighbour, 34 lost property not to be restored to, 35 Daniel punished for giving good advice to, 33 who wishes to turn Jew, 63 a Jew not publicly to receive alms from, 306 Sabbath not to be profaned to save a Gentile’s life, 212, 214 food regarded as carrion, 383 food not to be eaten, 383, 416 wine unlawful, 419 he that steals from, only to pay the principal, 34 wine, to drink, worse than fornication, 424

Gentiles, idolatrous, to be exterminated, 42 to be converted by force, 42 idolatrous, not to be suffered in the land of Israel, 28

Gentile, drowning, not to be delivered, 30

Gentiles, duties towards, 24 not brethren, 26 not neighbours, 26 not to be greeted except from fear, 10, 26, 28 condemned for transgressing the command about tabernacles, 288 still have the defilement of the serpent, 156 cursing the, on the feast of Passover, 120, 121, 122 no pious, now, 67 marriage of, not binding, 58 and dogs, 107

Gershom, R., anathema by, 366

Hands, laying on of, 328 washing of, 71

Heathen, who are not in a state of salvation, 5

High Priest, an unlearned man, 7

Hilchoth Accum, 28, 33 Avadim, 21 Avel, 428 Berachoth, 71, 73 Deoth, 113 Genevah, 34 Gezelah, 34 Girushin, 375 Gittin, 374 Iom Tov, 116 Ishuth, 366 Issure Biah, 64 Kiddush Hachodesh, 100 Maakaloth Asuroth, 419 Mamrim, 335 Matt’noth Aniim, 304 Megillah, 48 Mikvaoth, 72 M’lachim, 22, 25 P’riah u’r’viah, 7 Rotzeach, 32, 33 Sanhedrin, 172, 342 Sh’vuoth, 436 Taanith, 216 Talmud Torah, 17, 148 T’phillah, 2, 128 T’shuvah, 4, 247

Hillel, the elder, 187

Holyday, how to make fire on, 106

Holydays, additional, prescribed by the rabbies, 98, 101

Jeremiah unjustly condemned, 13

Jewish-German, 283

Jews persecuted in Spain and Portugal, 42

Illegitimate, a learned man takes precedence of High Priest, 7

Intolerance, Talmudic, 28-39

Ioma, 19

Jonathan, son of Uzziel, 187

Jost’s history, 125

Isaac, merit of offering, 271

Jubilee, year of, 66

Judaism the religion of the oral law, 2 and of the Jewish Prayer-book, 2 and Christianity cannot both be true, 3 a false religion, 465 its authors wicked men, 467

Judgment, Rabbinic, idea of the final, 287

Karo, R. Joseph, 17

K’hillath Shlomoh, 282

Kiddushin, 19

Kimchi, 93

Leaven, putting away of, 80

Legends, 127-167

Levi, family of, still known, 312 privileges of, in the synagogue, 313 David, 134

Leviathan, legend of, 128, &c.

Levites, scriptural privileges of, 311

Liberty, religious, first taught by Jesus Christ, 46

Luck, good, 182

Magic allowed by Talmud, 168-174

Maimonides, 25, et passim intolerance, 26

Meat, lawful and unlawful, 397 in milk, laws concerning, 404 contrary to Scripture, 404, 405

Medrash Rabba, 153

Merit of ancestors, 285

Merit, doctrine of, 247, &c.

Messiah, already come, 387

Miracles, Rabbinic, 203

Mishna, recognised in Jewish Prayer-book, 3

Mixture, Rabbinic, command of, 116

Muktzeh, 103

Napoleon, 24

New Year, Jewish, 247

New Year, judgment at, 247 prayers for, 264 merit and advantage of blowing the horn on, 266

Noachidæ, 25, 41 who they are, 55 seven commandments of, 56 may transgress commandments, 57 murderer of, not to be put to death, 62 unintentionally killing a Jew, to be put to death, 61 when received, 67 how received, 68

Oral law opposed to the Word of God in duty to parents, 9, 10 a mixed system of good and evil, 16 how much time to be devoted to the study of, 16 women and children not to study, 18 perpetual and unchangeable, 53 precepts of, given to Moses, 161

Oaths, Rabbinic dispensation from, 435, 450

Parable of Good Samaritan illustrated, 29

Parents, if in captivity, to be redeemed after the Rabbi, 9 duty to, according to oral law, 9

Passover, rites of, 79 Christ our, 91 four cups of, 96

Pentecost prayers, 145

Pesachim, treatise, 6

Pharisees, enemies of the Lord Jesus, 9 bad men, 8

Physician, Jewish, not to cure idolaters, 33

Pirke, Eleazer, 137

Planets, 175

Polygamy, allowed, 366

Poor, Rabbinic, oppression of the, 97 Rabbinic religion not for the, 237 Rabbinic cruelty to, 414, 429

Power, Rabbinic, to excommunicate, 239

Prayer-book, Jewish, acknowledges and teaches the authority of the Talmud, 2, 3 Jewish, full of legends, 127-167

Priests, scriptural office of, 310

Proselytes, sojourning, 26 how to be instructed, 63 baptism of, 304

Purgatory, Rabbinic, 296

Purim, feast of, 47

Rabbi, duty to, goes before duty to parents, 9, 10 fear of, as the fear of God, 11 reverence due to, 15 whosoever despises a, to be excommunicated, 15 not to forgive a public affront, 243 method of creating a, 328

Rabbies not agreed, 399, 400

Rabbinic charity, 112 evasion, 107, 110 order, novelty of, 328 power to excommunicate, 239 acknowledgments that Messiah is born, 389-393

Ramban, 142

Rome called Edom, 123

Rosh Hashanah, 298

Saadiah Gaon, 162

Sabbath, unlawful for a Gentile to keep a, 22 laws of, 104, 114-119 spirits cannot be cited on, 141 damned have rest on, 141

Sabbath-day, amulets on, 184

Sabbath, laws concerning, 285-290 lamp, reward for, 229 moving things on, 232 merit of keeping the, 224 jurisdictions, 232

Salvation, who are excluded from, by the oral law, 4

Sambation, 139

Sanhedrin, not infallible, 8 great council of, 168 members of, magicians, 168 understood seventy languages, 168 all handsome men, 171 pillar of the oral law, 335 a later, may reverse the decision of a former, 335 not a Divine institution, 337 of Greek origin, 341 greater and lesser, 343 business of, 345 death to those who rebelled against, 344 contrary to Scripture, 345 Parisian, 366

Satan deceived by the blowing of the horn in the month of Elul, 266

Scapegoat, 280

Schoolmasters, Rabbinic, 315

Scripture, women not bound to study, 18 not to be studied so much as the Talmud, 16 when not to be studied at all, 17

Sepher Jetzirah, 181

Schulchan Aruch, 7

Sinai, 163

Slaughtering, laws concerning, 380 laws of, 396

Slaves exempt from the duty of studying the law of God, 17 unlawful to teach, 21 regarded as beasts, 431

Souls of all Israel at Sinai, 152

Sotah, 76

Stars, influence of, 175

Study of the law equivalent to all the commandments, 51

Tabernacles, feast of, 287 merit of, 287 prayers for the feast of, 295

Talmud, recognised in Jewish Prayer-book, 3 legends of, 128, 167

Tradition, Rabbinic argument for overthrow, 11 no unbroken train of, 350

Treatise, Avodah Zarah, 291 Bava Bathra, 187 Berachoth, 161 Gittin, 192 Moed Katon, 175 Shabbath, 157 Succah, 180 Z’vachin, 150

Turnus Rufus, 140, 216

Unlearned man, lawful to kill, 6 the wives and daughters of, not to be taken as wives, 6 to be accounted as beasts, 6 man, unlawful for, to eat meat, 7

Van Oven, Joshua, Esq., Manual of Judaism, 465

Venus planet, 177

Washing of hands, 71 to neglect, as bad as fornication, 76 who neglects, excommunicated, 75

Wine, Gentile, unlawful, 419

Woman, insane, to be turned out, 377

Women, exempt from the duty to study the law, 17 do not receive the same reward as a man, 18 not to be taught the law, 18 minds of, not equal to the study of the law, 18 command of Moses, respecting, 21 duties of, prescribed in New Testament, 22 Rabbinic degradation of, 359 cannot give testimony, 360 not regarded as part of the congregation, 361

World to come, who are excluded from, 4 all Israel has a share in, 64 Rabbinic opinions about, 129

Printed at the Operative Institution, Palestine Place, Bethnal Green, London.

● Transcriber’s Notes: ○ Text that was in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_). ○ Footnotes have been moved to follow the chapters in which they are referenced.