Part 15

The demand for Woman Suffrage has also been withdrawn from the new edition of _Social Statics_, though it retains the original protest against “the reign of man over woman,” and asserts an “equality of rights in the married state.” Here again, Spencer’s final position must be sought in his _Justice_ where it is urged that women cannot justly have equal powers with men unless they have equal responsibilities. They cannot serve their country as men do; and if they take an equal share in the government, “their position is not one of equality but one of supremacy.” Even in time of peace, they are, he thinks, too impulsive to vote judiciously, too sympathetic to oppose “fostering the worse at the expense of the better,” and too fond of “a worship of power under all its forms” to protect individual liberty against the encroachment of authority. This objection seems particularly strong, because there is still great danger of the growth of state despotism at the expense of personal freedom, even in republics. Many recent instances are given by Spencer in “The Man versus the State,” now reprinted in the same volume with _Social Statics_; and it is urged in _Justice_, that even in the United States “universal suffrage does not prevent an enormous majority of consumers from being heavily taxed by a protective tariff for the benefit of a small minority of manufacturers and artisans.”

Our voters are much too ready to follow hasty impulses and unscrupulous leaders; and both faults are most common among the most ignorant. How strongly education encourages independence was acknowledged by those slave-holders who said, “Our negroes shall not learn to read, for that makes them run away.” Public schools have found their worst enemies among Popes and Czars, and their best friends in the statesmen most honored by republics. There is no other institution for whose advantages Americans are practically unanimous. The necessity of popular education at the public cost is acknowledged by Huxley, Mill, and other advanced thinkers so generally, that Spencer’s exceptionally hostile opinion ought not to be taken as a self-evident truth.

Mr. Spencer’s examination of this subject does not appear to have been so thorough as the occasion demands. In denying that education prevents crime, he relies mainly on Joseph Fletcher, who, as stated in both editions of _Social Statics_, “has entered more elaborately into this question than perhaps any other writer of the day,” and who admits that there is a “superficial evidence against instruction.” Spencer takes no notice of Fletcher’s having succeeded completely in breaking down this superficial evidence. In elaborate papers, published in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth volumes of _The Journal of the London Statistical Society_, and illustrated by many tables and maps, Fletcher shows that the proportion to the population, in various parts of England, of people unable to sign their names, corresponded everywhere to the proportion of illegitimate births as well as of commitments for crime. Separating these latter into classes according to degree of guilt, he proves that the worst crimes are most common where there is the most ignorance. Thus he is enabled to say, “The conclusion is therefore irresistible that education is essential to the security of modern society.” That this testimony of Spencer’s principal witness is really the truth can be further proved by the statistics in the _Encyclopædia Britannica_, showing that between 1841 and 1876, while the percentage of illiterates to population in England and Wales was reduced one-half, that of criminals was reduced to one-third of what it was originally. (Vol. VIII, pp. 221 and 249-251.)

Spencer also refers to the fact that schools have sometimes been carried on in the interest of despotism; but most kinds of food are easily adulterated; and education is valuable, notwithstanding, as food for liberty. This last consideration disposes completely of his comparison of state-churches with state-schools; and the fact, mentioned in the revised but not in the original edition of _Social Statics_, that opinions differ about the best methods of education, is really an additional instance of the encouragement given by our system of public schools to independence of thought.

Spencer’s chief objection to this system is that it does not fit his theory that “the liberty of each, limited by the like liberties of all, is the rule in conformity with which society must be organised,” (p. 45). Such a “law of right social relationships,” (p. 55) would, he admits, require us to repeal our laws against indecency, abolish our Boards of Health, and close our poorhouses, postoffices, banks, and lighthouses, except in so far as these institutions, like our streets and roads, might be cared for by benevolent individuals. He does not tell us how a government, thus limited to managing the police, army, and navy, could keep up a fire-department, nor how new streets, roads, railways, or canals could be opened, in case the owners of land put their prices too high for the projectors; but the most unfortunate application of his theory would be to close our public schools.

There is no danger of this, however; and the principal evil likely to result from his pushing his theory so far, is that he prevents people from seeing its real value, as indicating the direction in which our race has advanced and must make all further progress. We shall keep on diminishing the power of the state over the man, as well as that of the man over the child, but neither authority will ever be abolished entirely. We shall dispense, sooner or later, with some of the public institutions which Spencer condemns; but our common schools will, I think, last as long as government itself. The abolitionists helped the slave to freedom by pointing out the North Star; but they did not advise him to quit solid earth. This mistake, although we grant that Spencer shows us our North Star, is sometimes made in _Social Statics_.

Timely help, too, is given by him, in a thoroughly practical way, to those reformers who are passing out from under the cloud with a silver lining into a Cleveland summer and a fair prospect of a Harrison fall. Among the words best worth putting into actions at once, are these: “The right of exchange is as sacred as any other right, and exists as much between members of different nations as between members of the same nation. Morality knows nothing of geographical boundaries.” ... “Hence, in putting a veto upon the commercial intercourse of two nations, or in putting obstacles in the way of that intercourse, a government trenches upon men’s liberties of action, and by so doing directly reverses its function. To secure for each man the fullest freedom to exercise his faculties, compatible with the like freedom of all others, we find to be the state’s duty. Now trade prohibitions and trade restrictions not only do not secure this freedom, but they take it away. So that in enforcing them the state is transformed from a maintainer of rights into a violator of rights.” ... “Whether it kills, or robs, or enslaves, or shackles by trade regulations, its guilt is alike in kind, and differs only in degree.” (_Social Statics_, ed. of 1850, pp. 326, 327; ed. of 1892, p. 137).

F. M. H.

AN ESSAY ON REASONING. By _Edward T. Dixon_. Cambridge (Eng): Deighton, Bell, & Co. 1891. Pp. 88.

Some years ago the author of this essay made public certain views of his, on “Geometry of Four Dimensions.” He was surprised to find that though his arguments were received with incredulity they were not refuted. This result appeared to him to be due to the fact that he was not understood, that his views on geometry of even two and three dimensions being different from those commonly entertained, he had failed of being understood, because he had not begun his explanation at the beginning.

He therefore set to work to analyse those views and ultimately published a book on the subject. This book, _The Foundations of Geometry_, was reviewed by us in _The Monist_ of October, 1891. But now again the author regards himself as not understood. He rested the positions and arguments of his book upon certain views of logic and especially of definition, which depart from the orthodox views, and he misjudged the fullness of explanation that would therefore become needful. Hence this little essay.

The proper approach to the views of the author is through his doctrine of definition. Usually definition is regarded as finding its main motive and utility in the convenience of social converse. The meaning of any term is regarded as resting not in the choice of him who utters it, but in the suppositions of those who are addressed. It is true that a license is accorded to any one upon a sufficient occasion to give a special intent to some word, but only upon condition that that intent shall be made sufficiently express, in other words well understood by those addressed. Hence definition is usually taken to mean the recital or the precision of the meaning of a term by means of language naturally apt for that end. There is no good sense in pretending to effect either one of these ends by language that lacks natural ability on that behalf.

Now Mr. Dixon holds, if we understand him, that conventional usage is of very subordinate consequence in this matter, that it pertains to the prerogative of an author to throw upon those whom he addresses the task of gathering his meanings as best they can; that even when he professes to explain his meanings he need not seek and employ any plain, direct speech, but may supply his instruction indirectly: may ask his audience to solve a problem, or to rightly guess what certain hints mean; may require them to extract the meaning in question out of a set of assertions that involve the same in a collateral way only. This he calls “implicit definition.” It is analogous, he tells us, to an unsolved equation or set of equations in algebra. So far as we are aware no one can claim priority of the author in respect to this expedient. He seems to regard it as of great importance, and proposes by its aid to overcome the difficulties that environ the fundamentals of geometry.

We think that the author is led to put undue confidence in his implicit definition, by his peculiar views upon propositions. He holds that all propositions can, without loss or gain in the meanings as originally stated, be reduced to statements of strict identity. This done, propositions can, as he thinks, be operated upon after the fashion usual with equations. But we submit that between a logical proposition and an algebraic equation there is a difference that is in general irreducible. For example take this proposition, Every parent loves children. To alter this to, Every parent is identical with some [or every] person that loves children, as is, we think, the prescription of Mr. Dixon, will not serve; for by reading our identity in the reverse order we have: Some [or every] person that loves children is identical with every parent.

Mr. Dixon’s views in respect to terms and to the doctrine of denotation and connotation depart as widely from the suppositions usually held, as do his views regarding propositions and definition. To follow out the consequences of his proposed innovations in any adequate fulness is forbidden to us by lack of space. We feel sure that further reflection will lead him to much modification of his doctrines.

ρσλ.

OUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By _Hermann Lotze_. Edited by _E. C. Conybeare_, M.A. London: Swan, Sonnenschein, & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1892. Pp. 176.

This book is an excellent translation of one of the most important works of a prominent philosopher, who made an unusually strong impression upon the minds of his contemporaries. Almost every line of this clean, accurate, and charming translation betrays the translator’s devotion to the subject, for he has taken the utmost care to bring out the ideas of the author in the same brilliant style for which Professor Lotze is justly famous.

The translator says in the preface: “I have completed and venture to publish the following translation of Hermann Lotze’s _Lectures upon the Philosophy of Religion_ in the same hope in which it was undertaken by my late wife, that it may be of use to some who cannot read the German original, and yet desire a concise statement of the form in which one of the clearest-minded of our later thinkers put to himself those great questions—as to the origin and destiny of the spirit of man, as to life in general, and the meaning of the material universe—which occupy us all at some time or another, many of us as soon as we have won food and shelter for our bodies.”

We do not share Mr. Conybeare’s and his deceased wife’s enthusiasm for the author. Although we are not blind to the great deserts of Professor Lotze, his amiable personality, the depth of his religious and emotional nature, the breadth of his scholarly erudition, and the brilliancy of his ingenious, not to say poetical, presentation of philosophical subjects, we cannot conceive that his work is come to abide. On the contrary, we consider his philosophy as antiquated in many respects. He considers problems that originate from a mere confusion of ideas, as being insolvable in their nature, and attempts the solution of other problems with inadequate methods. His thoughts still remind us of the ontological spirit of past philosophies, and his principles are not in agreement with positivism and the methods of scientific research.

As an instance, we quote the following passage: “We must ever set aside any attempt to describe in positive terms, or to construct in thought, the process by which this absolute being came to be not only one, and that unconditionally, but at the same time a many of things which condition one another reciprocally.”

Lotze still believes in an “absolute unity” as something prior to the world of reality, and he declares that “We cannot Know or Explain how this Absolute Unity is also Many” (Sec. XXI); and even if an unconscious being could be a Many-in-One, yet it could not, according to Lotze, generate consciousness (Sec. XXV). We do not believe that this problem is insolvable, and do not, as does Lotze, feel constrained to fall back on idealism. In fact, our position is so different from Lotze’s that in spite of the full recognition of his genius, we feel as much severed from him as if he belonged to ages long gone by.

Mr. Conybeare’s translation is most certainly an invaluable work and is indispensable for any English student of Lotze’s philosophy.

κρς.

ON THE PERCEPTION OF SMALL DIFFERENCES, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE EXTENT, FORCE, AND TIME OF MOVEMENT. By _George Stuart Fullerton_ and _James McKeen Cattell_. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1892. Pp. 159.

This volume of the Philosophical Series of Publications of the University of Pennsylvania gives an account of a large number of experiments made for the purpose of testing the perception of small differences of movement, of weight, and of light. The most noticeable conclusion arrived at by the authors, is that they cannot accept any of the received explanations of Weber’s law. They found from their experiments, by the method of estimated amount of difference, that “we tend to estimate the intensity of sensation as directly proportional to the intensity of the stimulus; consequently, in so far as any deduction concerning quantitative relations in sensation can be made from such estimation, the sensation increases as the stimulus and not as its logarithm,” thus invalidating Fechner’s law. The authors believe also that Weber’s law does not hold for the perception of movement, as they find that the error of observation usually increases “as the stimulus is taken greater but more slowly,” and that it is proportional to the square root of the stimulus. Accordingly, they substitute for Weber’s law the following: “The error of observation tends to increase as the square root of the magnitude, the increase being subject to variation, whose amount and cause must be determined for each special case.” It is proper to add, that Professor Fullerton gives only a qualified assent to these conclusions, on the grounds that mathematicians are not agreed as to the soundness of the theory upon which the law is based, and that the errors in question may not be independent errors. He considers, however, the results obtained by the authors “as sufficiently in accord with the laws to justify them in holding it tentatively, and subject to criticism.”

As Fechner’s law rests on that of Weber, and on assumptions which appear to be incorrect, it also fails, and it follows that the psycho-physical, physiological, and psychological theories put forward to account for the supposed logarithmic relation between mental and physical processes are superfluous. From these conclusions we may judge of the importance of the experiments made by Professors Fullerton and Cattell, whose work requires to be carefully studied by all those interested in the special questions to which it relates.

Ω.

PSYCHOLOGIE DU PEINTRE. By _Lucien Arréat_. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1892. Pp. LIX, 264. Price, 5 fr.

The author of this interesting work informs us that it does not aim at being a natural history of society, nor is it even a study in professional psychology. This is hardly correct, however, as such a study must be based on that of individuals, and a writer of M. Arréat’s reputation cannot treat of a large group of individuals without throwing light on the psychology of the whole class to which they belong. He very aptly likens artists as a whole to a large family, the artist in design to a genus of this family, and painters to a species. This has its varieties, and it is by the study of these that the author seeks to arrive at a knowledge of the psychology of the painter.

Believing that there exists a relation between the temperament and the qualities of the mind and that this is influenced by heredity, he devotes the first part of the work to questions of physiology and heredity. The second part deals with the painter’s vocation, his æsthetic sentiments, his professional memory, and, as the evolution of art is connected with the progress of visual analysis, with his sense of sight. Then comes an examination of the general mental qualities of the painter, his intellectual character, his various phases of memory and aptitudes, and the influences which affect his work. The fourth part of the book treats of the painter’s character, his egoistic and sympathetic traits, his will, and his moral and social traits. And finally reference is made to questions of pathology, particularly defects of vision, and to “the miseries of genius.”

On all these subjects M. Arréat has many acute remarks supported by numerous facts, often derived from painters themselves, who thus, says the author, will be found “living and speaking on each page, just as they are, and making themselves known by their works, sympathetic or disagreeable, indifferent or superior, but always interesting.” It is noticeable, in connection with the important subject of heredity, that in a list of about three hundred painters almost two-thirds are sons of painters or of workers in art, and M. Arréat thinks that if more complete information were obtainable the proportion would be increased.

In the chapter on the miseries of genius, the author takes exception to the view expressed by M. Lombroso that the creative inspiration of genius is, at least in some cases, the equivalent of epileptic convulsion. That genius may lead to insanity is true; and M. Arréat admits that remarkable aptitudes have often appeared in a family at the beginning of its degeneracy. But he adds that painters are for the most part healthy, and they show hardly any more singularity than other men may have. He concludes his work with the following words: “Genius makes use of, as we have sufficiently shown, faculties which are common to nearly all men, if they are unequally strong and variously distributed with each. Genius, moreover, in the most elevated sense that it can be understood, is an exception among artists themselves, and even in genius, the meeting together of several happy gifts is exceptional. But it is willingly attributed to all those, whatever may be their art, whose works are able to touch the human cords that vibrate the most profoundly. Painters appear to us to compose a well-marked type among such. The reader has seen the characters of it brought together and discussed in this volume: he will preserve its living image after having closed the book.” This in itself furnishes a sufficient recommendation for the perusal of M. Arréat’s work, which apart from its psychological value, is a perfect mine of gracefully written information about painters and their peculiarities.

Ω.

PHYSIOLOGIE DE L’ART. By _Georges Hirth_. Traduit de l’Allemand et précédé d’une Introduction par _Lucien Arréat_. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1892. Pp. 247.

We have now occasion to review a work on a subject much akin to the preceding—a work which has been translated from the German by the same author, M. Lucien Arréat, and supplied by him with a very interesting introduction. This Introduction is in reality a résumé by M. Arréat of a series of studies by M. Hirth on physiological optics. These studies are of great importance and are classed by the French editor under the three heads of Form, Illumination, and Movement. The first of these comprises the subjects of monocular and binocular vision, the depth and the bilateral enlargement of the visual field, perspective and identical points. Under the head of illumination the effect of the “double bath of light” through the two eyes, the “luminous equation,” and the problems connected with optical measurement are considered.

We have not space to exhibit fully the author’s ideas on these topics, but we can state what are regarded by M. Arréat as the two principle propositions which give to them their life and unity. One of these propositions is, that the first function of our dioptric apparatus consists in furnishing to our central visual organ, which M. Hirth terms the _internal eye_, material which the latter has to interpret. The other is that it is necessary to get rid of mathematical concepts, which are much too rigid to be applied to the delicate problems of vision, and to fall back on visual sensation such as it is. These propositions imply, moreover, the admission of an electro chemical process, “without which the properties of the eye and the marvels of vision remain inexplicable.” This last conclusion has a bearing on the nature of memory, or the recollection of the impressions received by the nerves and brain after the original excitation has disappeared. Thus, M. Hirth suggests that when we know the physiological procedure in the impregnation of cerebral molecules, or in their electric charging, memory will be found to be only the prolongation of the duration of consecutive images.

The inquiries of M. Hirth throw great light on the difference between monocular and binocular vision, for information as to which and other details of his optical theory we must refer our readers to M. Arréat’s Introduction. This concludes with a consideration of the perception of light-movement, the reproduction of which is said to require a special exercise of attention, direct or indirect. Here we have the third degree of attention, according to the views of M. Hirth, who regards it as artistic apperception, having its end in itself and capable of being reproduced through co-ordination of the movements perceived.