CHAPTER III

ETHICAL JUDGMENTS

1. By ‘Reasonable’ conduct--whether morally or prudentially reasonable--we mean that of which we judge that it ‘ought’ to be done. Such a judgment cannot be legitimately interpreted as a judgment concerning facts, nor as referring exclusively to the _means_ to ulterior ends: in particular, the term ‘ought,’ as used in moral judgments, does not merely signify that the person judging feels a specific emotion: 23-28

2. nor does it merely signify that the conduct in question is prescribed under penalties: 28-31

3. The notion expressed by “ought,” in its strictest ethical use is too elementary to admit of formal definition, or of resolution into simpler notions; it is assumed to be objectively valid; and judgments in which it is used when they relate to the future conduct of the person judging, are accompanied by a special kind of impulse to action. 31-35

4. This ‘dictate of reason’ is also exemplified by merely prudential judgments; and by merely hypothetical imperatives. 35-38