CHAPTER V

THE METHOD OF UTILITARIANISM--_Continued_

§ 1. If, then, we are to regard the morality of Common Sense as a machinery of rules, habits, and sentiments, roughly and generally but not precisely or completely adapted to the production of the greatest possible happiness for sentient beings generally; and if, on the other hand, we have to accept it as the actually established machinery for attaining this end, which we cannot replace at once by any other, but can only gradually modify; it remains to consider the practical effects of the complex and balanced relation in which a scientific Utilitarian thus seems to stand to the Positive Morality of his age and country.

Generally speaking, he will clearly conform to it, and endeavour to promote its development in others. For, though the imperfection that we find in all the actual conditions of human existence--we may even say in the universe at large as judged from a human point of view--is ultimately found even in Morality itself, in so far as this is contemplated as Positive; still, practically, we are much less concerned with correcting and improving than we are with realising and enforcing it. The Utilitarian must repudiate altogether that temper of rebellion against the established morality, as something purely external and conventional, into which the reflective mind is always apt to fall when it is first convinced that the established rules are not intrinsically reasonable. He must, of course, also repudiate as superstitious that awe of it as an absolute or Divine Code which Intuitional moralists inculcate.[364] Still, he will naturally contemplate it with reverence and wonder, as a marvellous product of nature, the result of long centuries of growth, showing in many parts the same fine adaptation of means to complex exigencies as the most elaborate structures of physical organisms exhibit: he will handle it with respectful delicacy as a mechanism, constructed of the fluid element of opinions and dispositions, by the indispensable aid of which the actual _quantum_ of human happiness is continually being produced; a mechanism which no ‘politicians or philosophers’ could create, yet without which the harder and coarser machinery of Positive Law could not be permanently maintained, and the life of man would become--as Hobbes forcibly expresses it--“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

Still, as this actual moral order is admittedly imperfect, it will be the Utilitarian’s duty to aid in improving it; just as the most orderly, law-abiding member of a modern civilised society includes the reform of laws in his conception of political duty. We have therefore to consider by what method he will ascertain the particular modifications of positive morality which it would be practically expedient to attempt to introduce, at any given time and place. Here our investigation seems, after all, to leave Empirical Hedonism as the only method ordinarily applicable for the ultimate decision of such problems--at least until the science of Sociology shall have been really constructed. I do not mean that the rudiments of Sociological knowledge which we now possess are of no practical value: for certainly changes in morality might be suggested--and have actually been proposed by persons seriously concerned to benefit their fellow-creatures--which even our present imperfect knowledge would lead us to regard as dangerous to the very existence of the social organism. But such changes for the most part involve changes in positive law as well: since most of the rules of which the observance is fundamentally important for the preservation of an organised community are either directly or indirectly maintained by legal sanctions: and it would be going too far beyond the line which, in my view, separates ethics from politics, to discuss changes of this kind in the present book. The rules with which we have primarily to deal, in considering the utilitarian method of determining private duty, are rules supported by merely moral sanctions; and the question of maintaining or modifying such rules concerns, for the most part, the well-being rather than the very existence of human society. The consideration of this question, therefore, from a utilitarian point of view, resolves itself into a comparison between the total amounts of pleasure and pain that may be expected to result respectively from maintaining any given rule as at present established, and from endeavouring to introduce that which is proposed in its stead. That this comparison must generally be of a rough and uncertain kind, we have already seen; and it is highly important to bear this in mind; but yet we seem unable to find any substitute for it. It is not meant, of course, that each individual is left to his own unassisted judgment in dealing with such questions: there is a mass of traditional experience, which each individual imbibes orally or from books, as to the effects of conduct upon happiness; but the great formulæ in which this experience is transmitted are, for the most part, so indefinite, the proper range of their application so uncertain, and the observation and induction on which they are founded so uncritical, that they stand in continual need of further empirical verification; especially as regards their applicability to any particular case.

It is perhaps not surprising that some thinkers[365] of the Utilitarian school should consider that the task of hedonistic calculation which is thus set before the utilitarian moralist is too extensive: and should propose to simplify it by marking off a “large sphere of individual option and self-guidance,” to which “ethical dictation” does not apply. I should quite admit that it is clearly expedient to draw a dividing line of this kind: but it appears to me that there is no simple general method of drawing it; that it can only be drawn by careful utilitarian calculation applied with varying results to the various relations and circumstances of human life. To attempt the required division by means of any such general formula as that ‘the individual is not responsible to society for that part of his conduct which concerns himself alone and others only with their free and undeceived consent’[366] seems to me practically futile: since, owing to the complex enlacements of interest and sympathy that connect the members of a civilised community, almost any material loss of happiness by any one individual is likely to affect some others without their consent to some not inconsiderable extent. And I do not see how it is from a utilitarian point of view justifiable to say broadly with J. S. Mill that such secondary injury to others, if merely “constructive or presumptive,” is to be disregarded in view of the advantages of allowing free development to individuality; for if the injury feared is great, and the presumption that it will occur is shown by experience to be strong, the definite risk of evil from the withdrawal of the moral sanction must, I conceive, outweigh the indefinite possibility of loss through the repression of individuality in one particular direction.[367] But further: even supposing that we could mark off the “sphere of individual option and self-guidance” by some simple and sweeping formula, still within this sphere the individual, if he wishes to guide himself reasonably on utilitarian principles, must take some account of all important effects of his actions on the happiness of others; and if he does this methodically, he must, I conceive, use the empirical method which we have examined in Book ii. And--to prevent any undue alarm at this prospect--we may observe that every sensible man is commonly supposed to determine at least a large part of his conduct by what is substantially this method; it is assumed that, within the limits which morality lays down, he will try to get as much happiness as he can for himself and for other human beings, according to the relations in which they stand to him, by combining in some way his own experience with that of other men as to the felicific and infelicific effects of actions. And it is actually in this way that each man usually deliberates (_e.g._) what profession to choose for himself, or what mode of education for his children, whether to aim at marriage or remain single, whether to settle in town or country, in England or abroad, etc. No doubt there are, as we saw,[368] other ends besides Happiness, such as Knowledge, Beauty, etc., commonly recognised as unquestionably desirable, and therefore largely pursued without consideration of ulterior consequences: but when the pursuit of any of these ends involves an apparent sacrifice of happiness in other ways, the practical question whether under these circumstances such pursuit ought to be maintained or abandoned seems always decided by an application, however rough, of the method of pure empirical Hedonism.

And in saying that this must be the method of the Utilitarian moralist, I only mean that no other can normally be applied in reducing to a common measure the diverse elements of the problems with which he has to deal. Of course, in determining the nature and importance of each of these diverse considerations, the utilitarian art of morality will lay various sciences under contribution. Thus, for example, it will learn from Political Economy what effects a general censure of usurers, or the ordinary commendation of liberality in almsgiving, is likely to have on the wealth of the community; it will learn from the physiologist the probable consequences to health of a general abstinence from alcoholic liquors or any other restraint on appetite proposed in the name of Temperance; it will learn from the experts in any science how far knowledge is likely to be promoted by investigations offensive to any prevalent moral or religious sentiment. But how far the increase of wealth or of knowledge, or even the improvement of health, should under any circumstances be subordinated to other considerations, I know no scientific method of determining other than that of empirical Hedonism. Nor, as I have said, does it seem to me that any other method has ever been applied or sought by the common sense of mankind, for regulating the pursuit of what our older moralists called ‘Natural Good,’--_i.e._ of all that is intrinsically desirable _except_ Virtue or Morality, within the limits fixed by the latter; the Utilitarian here only performs somewhat more consistently and systematically than ordinary men the reasoning processes which are commonly admitted to be appropriate to the questions that this pursuit raises. His distinctive characteristic, as a Utilitarian, is that he has to apply the same method to the criticism and correction of the limiting morality itself. The particulars of this criticism will obviously vary almost indefinitely with the variations in human nature and circumstances: I here only propose to discuss the general points of view which a Utilitarian critic must take, in order that no important class of relevant considerations may be omitted.

§ 2. Let us first recall the distinction previously noticed[369] between duty as commonly conceived,--that to which a man is bound or obliged--, and praiseworthy or excellent conduct; since, in considering the relation of Utilitarianism to the moral judgments of Common Sense, it will be convenient to begin with the former element of current morality, as the more important and indispensable; _i.e._ with the _ensemble_ of rules imposed by common opinion in any society, which form a kind of unwritten legislation, supplementary to Law proper, and enforced by the penalties of social disfavour and contempt. This legislation, as it does not emanate from a definite body of persons acting in a corporate capacity, cannot be altered by any formal deliberations and resolutions of the persons on whose _consensus_ it rests; any change in it must therefore result from the private action of individuals, whether determined by Utilitarian considerations or otherwise. As we shall presently see, the practical Utilitarian problem is liable to be complicated by the conflict and divergence which is found to some extent in all societies between the moral opinions of different sections of the community: but it will be convenient to confine our attention in the first instance to the case of rules of duty clearly supported by ‘common consent.’ Let us suppose then that after considering the consequences of any such rule, a Utilitarian comes to the conclusion that a different rule would be more conducive to the general happiness, if similarly established in a society remaining in other respects the same as at present--or in one slightly different (in so far as our forecast of social changes can be made sufficiently clear to furnish any basis for practice). And first we will suppose that this new rule differs from the old one not only positively but negatively; that it does not merely go beyond and include it, but actually conflicts with it. Before he can decide that it is right for him (_i.e._ conducive to the general happiness) to support the new rule against the old, by example and precept, he ought to estimate the force of certain disadvantages necessarily attendant upon such innovations, which may conveniently be arranged under the following heads.

In the first place, as his own happiness and that of others connected with him form a part of the universal end at which he aims, he must consider the importance to himself and them of the penalties of social disapprobation which he will incur: taking into account, besides the immediate pain of this disapprobation, its indirect effect in diminishing his power of serving society and promoting the general happiness in other ways. The prospect of such pain and loss is, of course, not decisive against the innovation; since it must to some extent be regarded as the regular price that has to be paid for the advantage of this kind of reform in current morality. But here, as in many Utilitarian calculations, everything depends on the quantity of the effects produced; which in the case supposed may vary very much, from slight distrust and disfavour to severe condemnation and social exclusion. It often seems that by attempting change prematurely an innovator may incur the severest form of the moral penalty, whereas if he had waited a few years he would have been let off with the mildest. For the hold which a moral rule has over the general mind commonly begins to decay from the time that it is seen to be opposed to the calculations of expediency: and it may be better for the community as well as for the individual that it should not be openly attacked, until this process of decay has reached a certain point.

It is, however, of more importance to point out certain general reasons for doubting whether an apparent improvement will really have a beneficial effect on others. It is possible that the new rule, though it would be more felicific than the old one, if it could get itself equally established, may be not so likely to be adopted, or if adopted, not so likely to be obeyed, by the mass of the community in which it is proposed to innovate. It may be too subtle and refined, or too complex and elaborate: it may require a greater intellectual development, or a higher degree of self-control, than is to be found in an average member of the community, or an exceptional quality or balance of feelings. Nor can it be said in reply, that by the hypothesis the innovator’s example must be good to whatever extent it operates, since _pro tanto_ it tends to substitute a better rule for a worse. For experience seems to show that an example of this kind is more likely to be potent negatively than positively; that here, as elsewhere in human affairs, it is easier to pull down than to build up; easier to weaken or destroy the restraining force that a moral rule, habitually and generally obeyed, has over men’s minds, than to substitute for it a new restraining habit, not similarly sustained by tradition and custom. Hence the effect of an example intrinsically good may be on the whole bad, because its destructive operation proves to be more vigorous than its constructive. And again, such destructive effect must be considered not only in respect of the particular rule violated, but of all other rules. For just as the breaking of any positive law has an inevitable tendency to encourage lawlessness generally, so the violation of any generally recognised moral rule seems to give a certain aid to the forces that are always tending towards moral anarchy in any society.

Nor must we neglect the reaction which any breach with customary morality will have on the agent’s own mind. For the regulative habits and sentiments which each man has received by inheritance or training constitute an important force impelling his will, in the main, to conduct such as his reason would dictate; a natural auxiliary, as it were, to Reason in its conflict with seductive passions and appetites; and it may be practically dangerous to impair the strength of these auxiliaries. On the other hand, it would seem that the habit of acting rationally is the best of all habits, and that it ought to be the aim of a reasonable being to bring all his impulses and sentiments into more and more perfect harmony with Reason. And indeed when a man has earnestly accepted any moral principle, those of his pre-existing regulative habits and sentiments that are not in harmony with this principle tend naturally to decay and disappear; and it would perhaps be scarcely worth while to take them into account, except for the support that they derive from the sympathy of others.

But this last is a consideration of great importance. For the moral impulses of each individual commonly draw a large part of their effective force from the sympathy of other human beings. I do not merely mean that the pleasures and pains which each derives sympathetically from the moral likings and aversions of others are important as motives to felicific conduct no less than as elements of the individual’s happiness: I mean further that the direct sympathetic echo in each man of the judgments and sentiments of others concerning conduct sustains his own similar judgments and sentiments. Through this twofold operation of sympathy it becomes practically much easier for most men to conform to a moral rule established in the society to which they belong than to one made by themselves. And any act by which a man weakens the effect on himself of this general moral sympathy tends _pro tanto_ to make the performance of duty more difficult for him. On the other hand, we have to take into account--besides the intrinsic gain of the particular change--the general advantage of offering to mankind a striking example of consistent Utilitarianism; since, in this case as in others, a man gives a stronger proof of genuine conviction by conduct in opposition to public opinion than he can by conformity. In order, however, that this effect may be produced, it is almost necessary that the non-conformity should not promote the innovator’s personal convenience; for in that case it will almost certainly be attributed to egoistic motives, however plausible the Utilitarian deduction of its rightness may seem.

The exact force of these various considerations will differ indefinitely in different cases; and it does not seem profitable to attempt any general estimate of them: but on the whole, it would seem that the general arguments which we have noticed constitute an important rational check upon such Utilitarian innovations on Common-Sense morality as are of the negative or destructive kind.

If now we consider such innovations as are merely positive and supplementary, and consist in adding a new rule to those already established by Common Sense; it will appear that there is really no collision of methods, so far as the Utilitarian’s own observance of the new rule is concerned. For, as every such rule is, _ex hypothesi_, believed by him to be conducive to the common good, he is merely giving a special and stricter interpretation to the general duty of Universal Benevolence, where Common Sense leaves it loose and indeterminate. Hence the restraining considerations above enumerated do not apply to this case. And whatever it is right for him to do himself, it is obviously right for him to approve and recommend to other persons in similar circumstances. But it is a different question whether he ought to seek to impose his new rule on others, by express condemnation of all who are not prepared to adopt it; as this involves not only the immediate evil of the annoyance given to others, but also the further danger of weakening the general good effect of his moral example, through the reaction provoked by this aggressive attitude. On this point his decision will largely depend on the prospect, as far as he can estimate it, that his innovation will meet with support and sympathy from others.

It should be observed, however, that a great part of the reform in popular morality, which a consistent Utilitarian will try to introduce, will probably lie not so much in establishing new rules (whether conflicting with the old or merely supplementary) as in enforcing old ones. For there is always a considerable part of morality in the condition of receiving formal respect and acceptance, while yet it is not really sustained by any effective force of public opinion: and the difference between the moralities of any two societies is often more strikingly exhibited in the different emphasis attached to various portions of the moral code in each, than in disagreement as to the rules which the code should include. In the case we are considering, it is chiefly conduct which shows a want of comprehensive sympathy or of public spirit, to which the Utilitarian will desire to attach a severer condemnation than is at present directed against it. There is much conduct of this sort, of which the immediate effect is to give obvious pleasure to individuals, while the far greater amount of harm that it more remotely and indirectly causes is but dimly recognised by Common Sense. Such conduct, therefore, even when it is allowed to be wrong, is very mildly treated by common opinion; especially when it is prompted by some impulse not self-regarding. Still, in all such cases, we do not require the promulgation of any new moral doctrine, but merely a bracing and sharpening of the moral sentiments of society, to bring them into harmony with the greater comprehensiveness of view and the more impartial concern for human happiness which characterise the Utilitarian system.

§ 3. We have hitherto supposed that the innovator is endeavouring to introduce a new rule of conduct, not for himself only, but for others also, as more conducive to the general happiness than the rule recognised by Common Sense. It may perhaps be thought that this is not the issue most commonly raised between Utilitarianism and Common Sense: but rather whether exceptions should be allowed to rules which both sides accept as generally valid. For no one doubts that it is, _generally speaking_, conducive to the common happiness that men should be veracious, faithful to promises, obedient to law, disposed to satisfy the normal expectations of others, having their malevolent impulses and their sensual appetites under strict control: but it is thought that an exclusive regard to pleasurable and painful consequences would frequently admit exceptions to rules which Common Sense imposes as absolute. It should, however, be observed that the admission of an exception on general grounds is merely the establishment of a more complex and delicate rule, instead of one that is broader and simpler; for if it is conducive to the general good that such an exception be admitted in one case, it will be equally so in all similar cases. Suppose (_e.g._) that a Utilitarian thinks it on general grounds right to answer falsely a question as to the manner in which he has voted at a political election where the voting is by secret ballot. His reasons will probably be that the Utilitarian prohibition of falsehood is based on (1) the harm done by misleading particular individuals, and (2) the tendency of false statements to diminish the mutual confidence that men ought to have in each other’s assertions: and that in this exceptional case it is (1) expedient that the questioner should be misled; while (2), in so far as the falsehood tends to produce a general distrust of all assertions as to the manner in which a man has voted, it only furthers the end for which voting has been made secret. It is evident, that if these reasons are valid for any person, they are valid for all persons; in fact, that they establish the expediency of a new general rule in respect of truth and falsehood, more complicated than the old one; a rule which the Utilitarian, as such, should desire to be universally obeyed.

There are, of course, some kinds of moral innovation which, from the nature of the case, are not likely to occur frequently; as where Utilitarian reasoning leads a man to take part in a political revolution, or to support a public measure in opposition to what Common Sense regards as Justice or Good Faith. Still, in such cases a rational Utilitarian will usually proceed on general principles, which he would desire all persons in similar circumstances to carry into effect.

We have, however, to consider another kind of exceptions, differing fundamentally from this, which Utilitarianism seems to admit; where the agent does not think it expedient that the rule on which he himself acts should be universally adopted, and yet maintains that his individual act is right, as producing a greater balance of pleasure over pain than any other conduct open to him would produce.

Now we cannot fairly argue that, because a large aggregate of acts would cause more harm than good, therefore any single act of the kind will produce this effect. It may even be a straining of language to say that it has a _tendency_ to produce it: no one (_e.g._) would say that because an army walking over a bridge would break it down, therefore the crossing of a single traveller has a tendency to destroy it. And just as a prudent physician in giving rules of diet recommends an occasional deviation from them, as more conducive to the health of the body than absolute regularity; so there may be rules of social behaviour of which the general observance is necessary to the well-being of the community, while yet a certain amount of non-observance is rather advantageous than otherwise.

Here, however, we seem brought into conflict with Kant’s fundamental principle, that a right action must be one of which the agent could “will the maxim to be law universal.”[370] But, as was before[371] noticed in the particular case of veracity, we must admit an application of this principle, which importantly modifies its practical force: we must admit the case where the belief that the action in question will not be widely imitated is an essential qualification of the maxim which the Kantian principle is applied to test. For this principle,--at least so far as I have accepted it as self-evident--means no more than that an act, if right for any individual, must be right on general grounds, and therefore for some _class_ of persons; it therefore cannot prevent us from defining this class by the above-mentioned characteristic of believing that the act will remain an exceptional one. Of course if this belief turns out to be erroneous, serious harm may possibly result; but this is no more than may be said of many other Utilitarian deductions. Nor is it difficult to find instances of conduct which Common Sense holds to be legitimate solely on the ground that we have no fear of its being too widely imitated. Take, for example, the case of Celibacy. A universal refusal to propagate the human species would be the greatest of conceivable crimes from a Utilitarian point of view;--that is, according to the commonly accepted belief in the superiority of human happiness to that of other animals;--and hence the principle in question, applied without the qualification above given, would make it a crime in any one to choose celibacy as the state most conducive to his own happiness. But Common Sense (in the present age at least) regards such preference as within the limits of right conduct; because there is no fear that population will not be sufficiently kept up, as in fact the tendency to propagate is thought to exist rather in excess than otherwise.

In this case it is a non-moral impulse on the average strength of which we think we may reckon: but there does not appear to be any formal or universal reason why the same procedure should not be applied by Utilitarians to an actually existing moral sentiment. The result would be a discrepancy of a peculiar kind between Utilitarianism and Common-Sense morality; as the very firmness with which the latter is established would be the Utilitarian ground for relieving the individual of its obligations. We are supposed to see that general happiness will be enhanced (just as the excellence of a metrical composition is) by a slight admixture of irregularity along with a general observance of received rules; and hence to justify the irregular conduct of a few individuals, on the ground that the supply of regular conduct from other members of the community may reasonably be expected to be adequate.

It does not seem to me that this reasoning can be shown to be necessarily unsound, as applied to human society as at present constituted: but the cases in which it could really be thought to be applicable, by any one sincerely desirous of promoting the general happiness, must certainly be rare. For it should be observed that it makes a fundamental difference whether the sentiment in mankind generally, on which we rely to sustain sufficiently a general rule while admitting exceptions thereto, is moral or non-moral; because a moral sentiment is inseparable from the conviction that the conduct to which it prompts is objectively right--_i.e._ right whether or not it is thought or felt to be so--for oneself and all similar persons in similar circumstances; it cannot therefore coexist with approval of the contrary conduct in any one case, unless this case is distinguished by some material difference other than the mere non-existence in the agent of the ordinary moral sentiment against his conduct. Thus, assuming that general unveracity and general celibacy would both be evils of the worst kind, we may still all regard it as legitimate for men in general to remain celibate if they like, on account of the strength of the natural sentiments prompting to marriage, because the existence of these sentiments in ordinary human beings is not affected by the universal recognition of the legitimacy of celibacy: but we cannot similarly all regard it as legitimate for men to tell lies if they like, however strong the actually existing sentiment against lying may be, because as soon as this legitimacy is generally recognised the sentiment must be expected to decay and vanish. If therefore we were all enlightened Utilitarians, it would be impossible for any one to justify himself in making false statements while admitting it to be inexpedient for persons similarly conditioned to make them; as he would have no ground for believing that persons similarly conditioned would act differently from himself. The case, no doubt, is different in society as actually constituted; it is conceivable that the practically effective morality in such a society, resting on a basis independent of utilitarian or any other reasonings, may not be materially affected by the particular act or expressed opinion of a particular individual: but the circumstances are, I conceive, very rare, in which a really conscientious person could feel so sure of this as to conclude that by approving a particular violation of a rule, of which the _general_ (though not _universal_) observance is plainly expedient, he will not probably do harm on the whole. Especially as all the objections to innovation, noticed in the previous section, apply with increased force if the innovator does not even claim to be introducing a new and better general rule.

It appears to me, therefore, that the cases in which practical doubts are likely to arise, as to whether exceptions should be permitted from ordinary rules on Utilitarian principles, will mostly be those which I discussed in the first paragraph of this section: where the exceptions are not claimed for a few individuals, on the mere ground of their probable fewness, but either for persons generally under exceptional circumstances, or for a class of persons defined by exceptional qualities of intellect, temperament, or character. In such cases the Utilitarian may have no doubt that in a community consisting generally of enlightened Utilitarians, these grounds for exceptional ethical treatment would be regarded as valid; still he may, as I have said, doubt whether the more refined and complicated rule which recognises such exceptions is adapted for the community in which he is actually living; and whether the attempt to introduce it is not likely to do more harm by weakening current morality than good by improving its quality. Supposing such a doubt to arise, either in a case of this kind, or in one of the rare cases discussed in the preceding paragraph, it becomes necessary that the Utilitarian should consider carefully the extent to which his advice or example are likely to influence persons to whom they would be dangerous: and it is evident that the result of this consideration may depend largely on the degree of publicity which he gives to either advice or example. Thus, on Utilitarian principles, it may be right to do and privately recommend, under certain circumstances, what it would not be right to advocate openly; it may be right to teach openly to one set of persons what it would be wrong to teach to others; it may be conceivably right to do, if it can be done with comparative secrecy, what it would be wrong to do in the face of the world; and even, if perfect secrecy can be reasonably expected, what it would be wrong to recommend by private advice or example. These conclusions are all of a paradoxical character:[372] there is no doubt that the moral consciousness of a plain man broadly repudiates the general notion of an esoteric morality, differing from that popularly taught; and it would be commonly agreed that an action which would be bad if done openly is not rendered good by secrecy. We may observe, however, that there are strong utilitarian reasons for maintaining generally this latter common opinion; for it is obviously advantageous, generally speaking, that acts which it is expedient to repress by social disapprobation should become known, as otherwise the disapprobation cannot operate; so that it seems inexpedient to support by any moral encouragement the natural disposition of men in general to conceal their wrong doings; besides that the concealment would in most cases have importantly injurious effects on the agent’s habits of veracity. Thus the Utilitarian conclusion, carefully stated, would seem to be this; that the opinion that secrecy may render an action right which would not otherwise be so should itself be kept comparatively secret; and similarly it seems expedient that the doctrine that esoteric morality is expedient should itself be kept esoteric. Or if this concealment be difficult to maintain, it may be desirable that Common Sense should repudiate the doctrines which it is expedient to confine to an enlightened few. And thus a Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian principles, that some of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally; or even that the vulgar should keep aloof from his system as a whole, in so far as the inevitable indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations render it likely to lead to bad results in their hands.

Of course, as I have said, in an ideal community of enlightened Utilitarians this swarm of perplexities and paradoxes would vanish; as in such a society no one can have any ground for believing that other persons will act on moral principles different from those which he adopts. And any enlightened Utilitarian must of course desire this consummation; as all conflict of moral opinion must _pro tanto_ be regarded as an evil, as tending to impair the force of morality generally in its resistance to seductive impulses. Still such conflict may be a necessary evil in the actual condition of civilised communities, in which there are so many different degrees of intellectual and moral development.

We have thus been led to the discussion of the question which we reserved in the last section; viz. how Utilitarianism should deal with the fact of divergent moral opinions held simultaneously by different members of the same society. For it has become plain that though two different kinds of conduct cannot both be right under the same circumstances, two contradictory opinions as to the rightness of conduct may possibly both be expedient; it may conduce most to the general happiness that _A_ should do a certain act, and at the same time that _B_, _C_, _D_ should blame it. The Utilitarian of course cannot really join in the disapproval, but he may think it expedient to leave it unshaken; and at the same time may think it right, if placed in the supposed circumstances, to do the act that is generally disapproved. And so generally it may be best on the whole that there should be conflicting codes of morality in a given society at a certain stage of its development. And, as I have already hinted, the same general reasoning, from the probable origin of the moral sense and its flexible adjustment to the varying conditions of human life, which furnished a presumption that Common-Sense morality is roughly coincident with the Utilitarian code proper for men as now constituted, may be applied in favour of these divergent codes also: it may be said that these, too, form part of the complex adjustment of man to his circumstances, and that they are needed to supplement and qualify the morality of Common Sense.

However paradoxical this doctrine may appear, we can find cases where it seems to be implicitly accepted by Common Sense; or at least where it is required to make Common Sense consistent with itself. Let us consider, for example, the common moral judgments concerning rebellions. It is commonly thought, on the one hand, that these abrupt breaches of order are sometimes morally necessary; and, on the other hand, that they ought always to be vigorously resisted, and in case of failure punished by extreme penalties inflicted at least on the ring-leaders; for otherwise they would be attempted under circumstances where there was no sufficient justification for them: but it seems evident that, in the actual condition of men’s moral sentiments, this vigorous repression requires the support of a strong body of opinion condemning the rebels as wrong, and not merely as mistaken in their calculations of the chances of success. For similar reasons it may possibly be expedient on the whole that certain special relaxations of certain moral rules should continue to exist in certain professions and sections of society, while at the same time they continue to be disapproved by the rest of the society. The evils, however, which must spring from this permanent conflict of opinion are so grave, that an enlightened Utilitarian will probably in most cases attempt to remove it; by either openly maintaining the need of a relaxation of the ordinary moral rule under the special circumstances in question; or, on the other hand, endeavouring to get the ordinary rule recognised and enforced by all conscientious persons in that section of society where its breach has become habitual. And of these two courses it seems likely that he will in most cases adopt the latter; since such rules are most commonly found on examination to have been relaxed rather for the convenience of individuals, than in the interest of the community at large.

§ 4. Finally, let us consider the general relation of Utilitarianism to that part of common morality which extends beyond the range of strict duty; that is, to the Ideal of character and conduct which in any community at any given time is commonly admired and praised as the sum of Excellences or Perfections. To begin, it must be allowed that this distinction between Excellence and Strict Duty does not seem properly admissible in Utilitarianism--except so far as some excellences are only partially and indirectly within the control of the will, and we require to distinguish the realisation of these in conduct from the performance of Duty proper, which is always something that _can_ be done at any moment. For a Utilitarian must hold that it is always wrong for a man knowingly to do anything other than what he believes to be most conducive to Universal Happiness. Still, it seems practically expedient,--and therefore indirectly reasonable on Utilitarian principles,--to retain, in judging even the strictly voluntary conduct of others, the distinction between a part that is praiseworthy and admirable and a part that is merely right: because it is natural to us to compare any individual’s character or conduct, not with our highest ideal--Utilitarian or otherwise--but with a certain average standard and to admire what rises above the standard; and it seems ultimately conducive to the general happiness that such natural sentiments of admiration should be encouraged and developed. For human nature seems to require the double stimulus of praise and blame from others, in order to the best performance of duty that it can at present attain: so that the ‘social sanction’ would be less effective if it became purely penal. Indeed, since the pains of remorse and disapprobation are in themselves to be avoided, it is plain that the Utilitarian construction of a Jural morality is essentially self-limiting; that is, it prescribes its own avoidance of any department of conduct in which the addition that can be made to happiness through the enforcement of rules sustained by social penalties appears doubtful or inconsiderable. In such departments, however, the æsthetic phase of morality may still reasonably find a place; we may properly admire and praise where it would be inexpedient to judge and condemn. We may conclude, then, that it is reasonable for a Utilitarian to praise any conduct more felicific in its tendency than what an average man would do under the given circumstances:--being aware of course that the limit down to which praise worthiness extends must be relative to the particular state of moral progress reached by mankind generally in his age and country; and that it is desirable to make continual efforts to elevate this standard. Similarly, the Utilitarian will praise the Dispositions or permanent qualities of character of which felicific conduct is conceived to be the result, and the Motives that are conceived to prompt to it when it would be a clear gain to the general happiness that these should become more frequent: and, as we have seen,[373] he may without inconsistency admire the Disposition or Motive if it is of a kind which it is generally desirable to encourage, even while he disapproves of the conduct to which it has led in any particular case.

Passing now to compare the contents of the Utilitarian Ideal of character with the virtues and other excellences recognised by Common Sense, we may observe, first, that general coincidence between the two on which Hume and others have insisted. No quality has ever been praised as excellent by mankind generally which cannot be shown to have some marked felicific effect, and to be within proper limits obviously conducive to the general happiness. Still, it does not follow that such qualities are always fostered and encouraged by society in the proportion which a Utilitarian would desire: in fact, it is a common observation to make, in contemplating the morality of societies other than our own, that some useful qualities are unduly neglected, while others are over-prized and even admired when they exist in such excess as to become, on the whole, infelicific. The consistent Utilitarian may therefore find it necessary to rectify the prevalent moral ideal in important particulars. And here it scarcely seems that he will find any such Utilitarian restrictions on innovation, as appeared to exist in the case of commonly received rules of duty. For the Common-Sense notions of the different excellences of conduct (considered as extending beyond the range of strict duty) are generally so vague as to offer at least no definite resistance to a Utilitarian interpretation of their scope: by teaching and acting upon such an interpretation a man is in no danger of being brought into infelicific discord with Common Sense: especially since the ideal of moral excellence seems to vary within the limits of the same community to a much greater extent than the code of strict duty. For example, a man who in an age when excessive asceticism is praised, sets an example of enjoying harmless bodily pleasures, or who in circles where useless daring is admired, prefers to exhibit and commend caution and discretion, at the worst misses some praise that he might otherwise have earned, and is thought a little dull or unaspiring: he does not come into any patent conflict with common opinion. Perhaps we may say generally that an enlightened Utilitarian is likely to lay less stress on the cultivation of those negative virtues, tendencies to restrict and refrain, which are prominent in the Common-Sense ideal of character; and to set more value in comparison on those qualities of mind which are the direct source of positive pleasure to the agent or to others--some of which Common Sense scarcely recognises as excellences: still, he will not carry this innovation to such a pitch as to incur general condemnation. For no enlightened Utilitarian can ignore the fundamental importance of the restrictive and repressive virtues, or think that they are sufficiently developed in ordinary men at the present time, so that they may properly be excluded from moral admiration; though he may hold that they have been too prominent, to the neglect of other valuable qualities, in the common conception of moral Perfection. Nay, we may even venture to say that, under most circumstances, a man who earnestly and successfully endeavours to realise the Utilitarian Ideal, however he may deviate from the commonly-received type of a perfect character, is likely to win sufficient recognition and praise from Common Sense. For, whether it be true or not that the whole of morality has sprung from the root of sympathy, it is certain that self-love and sympathy combined are sufficiently strong in average men to dispose them to grateful admiration of any exceptional efforts to promote the common good, even though these efforts may take a somewhat novel form. To any exhibition of more extended sympathy or more fervent public spirit than is ordinarily shown, and any attempt to develop these equalities in others, Common Sense is rarely unresponsive; provided, of course, that these impulses are accompanied with adequate knowledge of actual circumstances and insight into the relation of means to ends, and that they do not run counter to any recognised rules of duty.[374] And it seems to be principally in this direction that the recent spread of Utilitarianism has positively modified the ideal of our society, and is likely to modify it further in the future. Hence the stress which Utilitarians are apt to lay on social and political activity of all kinds, and the tendency which Utilitarian ethics have always shown to pass over into politics. For one who values conduct in proportion to its felicific consequences, will naturally set a higher estimate on effective beneficence in public affairs than on the purest manifestation of virtue in the details of private life: while on the other hand an Intuitionist (though no doubt vaguely recognising that a man ought to do all the good he can in public affairs) still commonly holds that virtue may be as fully and as admirably exhibited on a small as on a large scale. A sincere Utilitarian, therefore, is likely to be an eager politician: but on what principles his political action ought to be determined, it scarcely lies within the scope of this treatise to investigate.

FOOTNOTES:

[364] I do not mean that this sentiment is in my view incompatible with Utilitarianism; I mean that it must not attach itself to any subordinate rules of conduct, but only to the supreme principle of acting with impartial concern for all elements of general happiness.

[365] For example, Mr. Bain in _Mind_ (Jan. 1883, pp. 48, 49).

[366] This sentence is not an exact quotation, but a summary of the doctrine set forth by J. S. Mill in his treatise _On Liberty_ (Introduction).

[367] See Mill _On Liberty_, chap. iv. It may be observed that Mill’s doctrine is certainly opposed to common sense: since (_e.g._) it would exclude from censure almost all forms of sexual immorality committed by unmarried and independent adults.

[368] Cf. Book iii. chap. xiv.

[369] Cf. especially Book iii. chap. ii.

[370] Cf. Book iii. chap. i. and chap. xiii.

[371] Book iii. chap. vii. § 3.

[372] In particular cases, however, they seem to be admitted by Common Sense to a certain extent. For example, it would be commonly thought wrong to express in public speeches disturbing religious or political opinions which may be legitimately published in books.

[373] Cf. chap. iii. § 2 of this Book.

[374] We have seen that a Utilitarian may sometimes have to override these rules; but then the case falls under the head discussed in the previous section.

CONCLUDING CHAPTER

THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF THE THREE METHODS

§ 1. In the greater part of the treatise of which the final chapter has now been reached, we have been employed in examining three methods of determining right conduct, which are for the most part found more or less vaguely combined in the practical reasonings of ordinary men, but which it has been my aim to develop as separately as possible. A complete synthesis of these different methods is not attempted in the present work: at the same time it would hardly be satisfactory to conclude the analysis of them without some discussion of their mutual relations. Indeed we have already found it expedient to do this to a considerable extent, in the course of our examination of the separate methods. Thus, in the present and preceding Books we have directly or indirectly gone through a pretty full examination of the mutual relations of the Intuitional and Utilitarian methods. We have found that the common antithesis between Intuitionists and Utilitarians must be entirely discarded: since such abstract moral principles as we can admit to be really self-evident are not only not incompatible with a Utilitarian system, but even seem required to furnish a rational basis for such a system. Thus we have seen that the essence of Justice or Equity (in so far as it is clear and certain), is that different individuals are not to be treated differently, except on grounds of universal application; and that such grounds, again, are supplied by the principle of Universal Benevolence, that sets before each man the happiness of all others as an object of pursuit no less worthy than his own; while other time-honoured virtues seem to be fitly explained as special manifestations of impartial benevolence under various circumstances of human life, or else as habits and dispositions indispensable to the maintenance of prudent or beneficent behaviour under the seductive force of various non-rational impulses. And although there are other rules which our common moral sense when first interrogated seems to enunciate as absolutely binding; it has appeared that careful and systematic reflection on this very Common Sense, as expressed in the habitual moral judgments of ordinary men, results in exhibiting the real subordination of these rules to the fundamental principles above given. Then, further, this method of systematising particular virtues and duties receives very strong support from a comparative study of the history of morality; as the variations in the moral codes of different societies at different stages correspond, in a great measure, to differences in the actual or believed tendencies of certain kinds of conduct to promote the general happiness of different portions of the human race: while, again, the most probable conjectures as to the pre-historic condition and original derivation of the moral faculty seem to be entirely in harmony with this view. No doubt, even if this synthesis of methods be completely accepted, there will remain some discrepancy in details between our particular moral sentiments and unreasoned judgments on the one hand, and the apparent results of special utilitarian calculations on the other; and we may often have some practical difficulty in balancing the latter against the more general utilitarian reasons for obeying the former: but there seems to be no longer any theoretical perplexity as to the principles for determining social duty.

It remains for us to consider the relation of the two species of Hedonism which we have distinguished as Universalistic and Egoistic. In chap. ii. of this Book we have discussed the rational process (called by a stretch of language ‘proof’) by which one who holds it reasonable to aim at his own greatest happiness may be determined to take Universal Happiness instead, as his ultimate standard of right conduct. We have seen, however, that the application of this process requires that the Egoist should affirm, implicitly or explicitly, that his own greatest happiness is not merely the rational ultimate end for himself, but a part of Universal Good: and he may avoid the proof of Utilitarianism by declining to affirm this. It would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the distinction between any one individual and any other is real and fundamental, and that consequently “I” am concerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of the existence of other individuals: and this being so, I do not see how it can be proved that this distinction is not to be taken as fundamental in determining the ultimate end of rational action for an individual. And it may be observed that most Utilitarians, however anxious they have been to convince men of the reasonableness of aiming at happiness generally, have not commonly sought to attain this result by any logical transition from the Egoistic to the Universalistic principle. They have relied almost entirely on the Sanctions of Utilitarian rules; that is, on the pleasures gained or pains avoided by the individual conforming to them. Indeed, if an Egoist remains impervious to what we have called Proof, the only way of rationally inducing him to aim at the happiness of all, is to show him that his own greatest happiness can be best attained by so doing. And further, even if a man admits the self-evidence of the principle of Rational Benevolence, he may still hold that his own happiness is an end which it is irrational for him to sacrifice to any other; and that therefore a harmony between the maxim of Prudence and the maxim of Rational Benevolence must be somehow demonstrated, if morality is to be made completely rational. This latter view, indeed (as I have before said), appears to me, on the whole, the view of Common Sense: and it is that which I myself hold. It thus becomes needful to examine how far and in what way the required demonstration can be effected.

§ 2. Now, in so far as Utilitarian morality coincides with that of Common Sense--as we have seen that it does in the main--this investigation has been partly performed in chap. v. of Book ii. It there appeared that while in any tolerable state of society the performance of duties towards others and the exercise of social virtues seem _generally_ likely to coincide with the attainment of the greatest possible happiness in the long run for the virtuous agent, still the _universality_ and _completeness_ of this coincidence are at least incapable of empirical proof: and that, indeed, the more carefully we analyse and estimate the different sanctions--Legal, Social, and Conscientious--considered as operating under the actual conditions of human life, the more difficult it seems to believe that they can be always adequate to produce this coincidence. The natural effect of this argument upon a convinced Utilitarian is merely to make him anxious to alter the actual conditions of human life: and it would certainly be a most valuable contribution to the actual happiness of mankind, if we could so improve the adjustment of the machine of Law in any society, and so stimulate and direct the common awards of praise and blame, and so develop and train the moral sense of the members of the community, as to render it clearly prudent for every individual to promote as much as possible the general good. However, we are not now considering what a consistent Utilitarian will try to effect for the future, but what a consistent Egoist is to do in the present. And it must be admitted that, as things are, whatever difference exists between Utilitarian morality and that of Common Sense is of such a kind as to render the coincidence with Egoism still more improbable in the case of the former. For we have seen that Utilitarianism is more rigid than Common Sense in exacting the sacrifice of the agent’s private interests where they are incompatible with the greatest happiness of the greatest number: and of course in so far as the Utilitarian’s principles bring him into conflict with any of the commonly accepted rules of morality, the whole force of the Social Sanction operates to deter him from what he conceives to be his duty.

§ 3. There are, however, writers of the Utilitarian school[375] who seem to maintain or imply, that by due contemplation of the paramount importance of Sympathy as an element of human happiness we shall be led to see the coincidence of the good of each with the good of all. In opposing this view, I am as far as possible from any wish to depreciate the value of sympathy as a source of happiness even to human beings as at present constituted. Indeed I am of opinion that its pleasures and pains really constitute a great part of that internal reward of social virtue, and punishment of social misconduct, which in Book ii. chap. v. I roughly set down as due to the moral sentiments. For, in fact, though I can to some extent distinguish sympathetic from strictly moral feelings in introspective analysis of my own consciousness, I cannot say precisely in what proportion these two elements are combined. For instance: I seem able to distinguish the “sense of the ignobility of Egoism” of which I have before spoken--which, in my view, is the normal emotional concomitant or expression of the moral intuition that the Good of the whole is reasonably to be preferred to the Good of a part--from the jar of sympathetic discomfort which attends the conscious choice of my own pleasure at the expense of pain or loss to others; but I find it impossible to determine what force the former sentiment would have if actually separated from the latter, and I am inclined to think that the two kinds of feeling are very variously combined in different individuals. Perhaps, indeed, we may trace a general law of variation in the relative proportion of these two elements as exhibited in the development of the moral consciousness both in the race and in individuals; for it seems that at a certain stage of this development the mind is more susceptible to emotions connected with abstract moral ideas and rules presented as absolute; while after emerging from this stage and before entering it the feelings that belong to personal relations are stronger.[376] Certainly in a Utilitarian’s mind sympathy tends to become a prominent element of all instinctive moral feelings that refer to social conduct; as in his view the rational basis of the moral impulse must ultimately lie in some pleasure won or pain saved for himself or for others; so that he never has to sacrifice himself to an Impersonal Law, but always for some being or beings with whom he has at least some degree of fellow-feeling.

But besides admitting the actual importance of sympathetic pleasures to the majority of mankind, I should go further and maintain that, on empirical grounds alone, enlightened self-interest would direct most men to foster and develop their sympathetic susceptibilities to a greater extent than is now commonly attained. The effectiveness of Butler’s famous argument against the vulgar antithesis between Self-love and Benevolence is undeniable: and it seems scarcely extravagant to say that, amid all the profuse waste of the means of happiness which men commit, there is no imprudence more flagrant than that of Selfishness in the ordinary sense of the term,--that excessive concentration of attention on the individual’s own happiness which renders it impossible for him to feel any strong interest in the pleasures and pains of others. The perpetual prominence of self that hence results tends to deprive all enjoyments of their keenness and zest, and produce rapid satiety and _ennui_: the selfish man misses the sense of elevation and enlargement given by wide interests; he misses the more secure and serene satisfaction that attends continually on activities directed towards ends more stable in prospect than an individual’s happiness can be; he misses the peculiar rich sweetness, depending upon a sort of complex reverberation of sympathy, which is always found in services rendered to those whom we love and who are grateful. He is made to feel in a thousand various ways, according to the degree of refinement which his nature has attained, the discord between the rhythms of his own life and of that larger life of which his own is but an insignificant fraction.

But allowing[377] all this, it yet seems to me as certain as any conclusion arrived at by hedonistic comparison can be, that the utmost development of sympathy, intensive and extensive, which is now possible to any but a very few exceptional persons, would not cause a perfect coincidence between Utilitarian duty and self-interest. Here it seems to me that what was said in Book ii. chap. v. § 4, to show the insufficiency of the Conscientious Sanction, applies equally, _mutatis mutandis_, to Sympathy. Suppose a man finds that a regard for the general good--Utilitarian Duty--demands from him a sacrifice, or extreme risk, of life. There are perhaps one or two human beings so dear to him that the remainder of a life saved by sacrificing their happiness to his own would be worthless to him from an egoistic point of view. But it is doubtful whether many men, “sitting down in a cool hour” to make the estimate, would affirm even this: and of course that particular portion of the general happiness, for which one is called upon to sacrifice one’s own, may easily be the happiness of persons not especially dear to one. But again, from this normal limitation of our keenest and strongest sympathy to a very small circle of human beings, it results that the very development of sympathy may operate to increase the weight thrown into the scale against Utilitarian duty. There are very few persons, however strongly and widely sympathetic, who are so constituted as to feel for the pleasures and pains of mankind generally a degree of sympathy at all commensurate with their concern for wife or children, or lover, or intimate friend: and if any training of the affections is at present possible which would materially alter this proportion in the general distribution of our sympathy, it scarcely seems that such a training is to be recommended as on the whole felicific.[378] And thus when Utilitarian Duty calls on us to sacrifice not only our own pleasures but the happiness of those we love to the general good, the very sanction on which Utilitarianism most relies must act powerfully in opposition to its precepts.

But even apart from these exceptional cases--which are yet sufficient to decide the abstract question--it seems that the course of conduct by which a man would most fully reap the rewards of sympathy (so far as they are empirically ascertainable) will often be very different from that to which a sincere desire to promote the general happiness would direct him. For the relief of distress and calamity is an important part of Utilitarian duty: but as the state of the person relieved is on the whole painful, it would appear that sympathy under these circumstances must be a source of pain rather than pleasure, in proportion to its intensity. It is probably true, as a general rule, that in the relief of distress other elements of the complex pleasure of benevolence decidedly outweigh this sympathetic pain:--for the effusion of pity is itself pleasurable, and we commonly feel more keenly that amelioration of the sufferer’s state which is due to our exertions than we do his pain otherwise caused, and there is further the pleasure that we derive from his gratitude, and the pleasure that is the normal reflex of activity directed under a strong impulse towards a permanently valued end. Still, when the distress is bitter and continued, and such as we can only partially mitigate by all our efforts, the philanthropist’s sympathetic discomfort must necessarily be considerable; and the work of combating misery, though not devoid of elevated happiness, will be much less happy on the whole than many other forms of activity; while yet it may be to just this work that Duty seems to summon us. Or again, a man may find that he can best promote the general happiness by working in comparative solitude for ends that he never hopes to see realised, or by working chiefly among and for persons for whom he cannot feel much affection, or by doing what must alienate or grieve those whom he loves best, or must make it necessary for him to dispense with the most intimate of human ties. In short, there seem to be numberless ways in which the dictates of that Rational Benevolence, which as a Utilitarian he is bound absolutely to obey, may conflict with that indulgence of kind affections which Shaftesbury and his followers so persuasively exhibit as its own reward.

§ 4. It seems, then, that we must conclude, from the arguments given in Book ii. chap. v., supplemented by the discussion in the preceding section, that the inseparable connexion between Utilitarian Duty and the greatest happiness of the individual who conforms to it cannot be satisfactorily demonstrated on empirical grounds. Hence another section of the Utilitarian school has preferred to throw the weight of Duty on the Religious Sanction: and this procedure has been partly adopted by some of those who have chiefly dwelt on sympathy as a motive. From this point of view the Utilitarian Code is conceived as the Law of God, who is to be regarded as having commanded men to promote the general happiness, and as having announced an intention of rewarding those who obey His commands and punishing the disobedient. It is clear that if we feel convinced that an Omnipotent Being has, in whatever way, signified such commands and announcements, a rational egoist can want no further inducement to frame his life on Utilitarian principles. It only remains to consider how this conviction is attained. This is commonly thought to be either by supernatural Revelation, or by the natural exercise of Reason, or in both ways. As regards the former it is to be observed that--with a few exceptions--the moralists who hold that God has disclosed His law either to special individuals in past ages who have left a written record of what was revealed to them, or to a permanent succession of persons appointed in a particular manner, or to religious persons generally in some supernatural way, do not consider that it is the Utilitarian Code that has thus been revealed, but rather the rules of Common-Sense morality with some special modifications and additions. Still, as Mill has urged, in so far as Utilitarianism is more rigorous than Common Sense in exacting the sacrifice of the individual’s happiness to that of mankind generally, it is strictly in accordance with the most characteristic teaching of Christianity. It seems, however, unnecessary to discuss the precise relation of different Revelational Codes to Utilitarianism, as it would be going beyond our province to investigate the grounds on which a Divine origin has been attributed to them.

In so far, however, as a knowledge of God’s law is believed to be attainable by the Reason, Ethics and Theology seem to be so closely connected that we cannot sharply separate their provinces. For, as we saw,[379] it has been widely maintained, that the relation of moral rules to a Divine Lawgiver is implicitly cognised in the act of thought by which we discern these rules to be binding. And no doubt the terms (such as ‘moral obligation’), which we commonly use in speaking of these rules, are naturally suggestive of Legal Sanctions and so of a Sovereign by whom these are announced and enforced. Indeed many thinkers since Locke have refused to admit any other meaning in the terms Right, Duty, etc., except that of a rule imposed by a lawgiver. This view, however, seems opposed to Common Sense; as may be, perhaps, most easily shown[380] by pointing out that the Divine Lawgiver is Himself conceived as a Moral Agent; _i.e._ as prescribing what is right, and designing what is good. It is clear that in this conception at least the notions ‘right’ and ‘good’ are used absolutely, without any reference to a superior lawgiver; and that they are here used in a sense not essentially different from that which they ordinarily bear seems to be affirmed by the _consensus_ of religious persons. Still, though Common Sense does not regard moral rules as being _merely_ the mandates of an Omnipotent Being who will reward and punish men according as they obey or violate them; it certainly holds that this is a true though partial view of them, and perhaps that it may be intuitively apprehended. If then reflection leads us to conclude that the particular moral principles of Common Sense are to be systematised as subordinate to that pre-eminently certain and irrefragable intuition which stands as the first principle of Utilitarianism; then, of course, it will be the Utilitarian Code to which we shall believe the Divine Sanctions to be attached.

Or, again, we may argue thus. If--as all theologians agree--we are to conceive God as acting for some end, we must conceive that end to be Universal Good, and, if Utilitarians are right, Universal Happiness: and we cannot suppose that in a world morally governed it can be prudent for any man to act in conscious opposition to what we believe to be the Divine Design. Hence if in any case after calculating the consequences of two alternatives of conduct we choose that which seems likely to be less conducive to Happiness generally, we shall be acting in a manner for which we cannot but expect to suffer.

To this it has been objected, that observation of the actual world shows us that the happiness of sentient beings is so imperfectly attained in it, and with so large an intermixture of pain and misery, that we cannot really conceive Universal Happiness to be God’s end, unless we admit that He is not Omnipotent. And no doubt the assertion that God is omnipotent will require to be understood with some limitation; but perhaps with no greater limitation than has always been implicitly admitted by thoughtful theologians. For these seem always to have allowed that some things are impossible to God: as, for example, to change the past. And perhaps if our knowledge of the Universe were complete, we might discern the _quantum_ of happiness ultimately attained in it to be as great as could be attained without the accomplishment of what we should then see to be just as inconceivable and absurd as changing the past. This, however, is a view which it belongs rather to the theologian to develop. I should rather urge that there does not seem to be any other of the ordinary interpretations of Good according to which it would appear to be more completely realised in the actual universe. For the wonderful perfections of work that we admire in the physical world are yet everywhere mingled with imperfection, and subject to destruction and decay: and similarly in the world of human conduct Virtue is at least as much balanced by Vice as Happiness is by misery.[381] So that, if the ethical reasoning that led us to interpret Ultimate Good as Happiness is sound, there seems no argument from Natural Theology to set against it.

§ 5. If, then, we may assume the existence of such a Being, as God, by the _consensus_ of theologians, is conceived to be, it seems that Utilitarians may legitimately infer the existence of Divine sanctions to the code of social duty as constructed on a Utilitarian basis; and such sanctions would, of course, suffice to make it always every one’s interest to promote universal happiness to the best of his knowledge. It is, however, desirable, before we conclude, to examine carefully the validity of this assumption, in so far as it is supported on ethical grounds alone. For by the result of such an examination will be determined, as we now see, the very important question whether ethical science can be constructed on an independent basis; or whether it is forced to borrow a fundamental and indispensable premiss from Theology or some similar source.[382] In order fairly to perform this examination, let us reflect upon the clearest and most certain of our moral intuitions. I find that I undoubtedly seem to perceive, as clearly and certainly as I see any axiom in Arithmetic or Geometry, that it is ‘right’ and ‘reasonable’ for me to treat others as I should think that I myself ought to be treated under similar conditions, and to do what I believe to be ultimately conducive to universal Good or Happiness. But I cannot find inseparably connected with this conviction, and similarly attainable by mere reflective intuition, any cognition that there actually is a Supreme Being who will adequately[383] reward me for obeying these rules of duty, or punish me for violating them.[384] Or,--omitting the strictly theological element of the proposition,--I may say that I do not find in my moral consciousness any intuition, claiming to be clear and certain, that the performance of duty will be adequately rewarded and its violation punished. I feel indeed a desire, apparently inseparable from the moral sentiments, that this result may be realised not only in my own case but universally; but the mere existence of the desire would not go far to establish the probability of its fulfilment, considering the large proportion of human desires that experience shows to be doomed to disappointment. I also judge that in a certain sense this result _ought_ to be realised: in this judgment, however, ‘ought’ is not used in a strictly ethical meaning; it only expresses the vital need that our Practical Reason feels of proving or postulating this connexion of Virtue and self-interest, if it is to be made consistent with itself. For the negation of the connexion must force us to admit an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct; and from this admission it would seem to follow that the apparently intuitive operation of the Practical Reason, manifested in these contradictory judgments, is after all illusory.

I do not mean that if we gave up the hope of attaining a practical solution of this fundamental contradiction, through any legitimately obtained conclusion or postulate as to the moral order of the world, it would become reasonable for us to abandon morality altogether: but it would seem necessary to abandon the idea of rationalising it completely. We should doubtless still, not only from self-interest, but also through sympathy and sentiments protective of social wellbeing, imparted by education and sustained by communication with other men, feel a desire for the general observance of rules conducive to general happiness; and practical reason would still impel us decisively to the performance of duty in the more ordinary cases in which what is recognised as duty is in harmony with self-interest properly understood. But in the rarer cases of a recognised conflict between self-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side; the conflict would have to be decided by the comparative preponderance of one or other of two groups of non-rational impulses.

If then the reconciliation of duty and self-interest is to be regarded as a hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental contradiction in one chief department of our thought, it remains to ask how far this necessity constitutes a sufficient reason for accepting this hypothesis. This, however, is a profoundly difficult and controverted question, the discussion of which belongs rather to a treatise on General Philosophy than to a work on the Methods of Ethics: as it could not be satisfactorily answered, without a general examination of the criteria of true and false beliefs. Those who hold that the edifice of physical science is really constructed of conclusions logically inferred from self-evident premises, may reasonably demand that any practical judgments claiming philosophic certainty should be based on an equally firm foundation. If on the other hand we find that in our supposed knowledge of the world of nature propositions are commonly taken to be universally true, which yet seem to rest on no other grounds than that we have a strong disposition to accept them, and that they are indispensable to the systematic coherence of our beliefs,--it will be more difficult to reject a similarly supported assumption in ethics, without opening the door to universal scepticism.

FOOTNOTES:

[375] See J. S. Mill’s treatise on Utilitarianism (chap. iii. passim): where, however, the argument is not easy to follow, from a confusion between three different objects of inquiry: (1) the actual effect of sympathy in inducing conformity to the rules of Utilitarian ethics, (2) the effect in this direction which it is likely to have in the future, (3) the value of sympathetic pleasures and pains as estimated by an enlightened Egoist. The first and third of these questions Mill did not clearly separate, owing to his psychological doctrine that each one’s own pleasure is the sole object of his desires. But if my refutation of this doctrine (Book i. chap. iv. § 3) is valid, we have to distinguish two ways in which sympathy operates: it generates sympathetic pleasures and pains, which have to be taken into account in the calculations of Egoistic Hedonism; but it also may cause impulses to altruistic action, of which the force is quite out of proportion to the sympathetic pleasure (or relief from pain) which such action seems likely to secure to the agent. So that even if the average man ever should reach such a pitch of sympathetic development, as never to feel prompted to sacrifice the general good to his own, still this will not prove that it is egoistically reasonable for him to behave in this way.

[376] I do not mean to imply that the process of change is merely circular. In the earlier period sympathy is narrower, simpler, and more presentative; in the later it is more extensive, complex, and representative.

[377] I do not, however, think that we are justified in stating as _universally_ true what has been admitted in the preceding paragraph. Some few thoroughly selfish persons appear at least to be happier than most of the unselfish; and there are other exceptional natures whose chief happiness seems to be derived from activity, disinterested indeed, but directed towards other ends than human happiness.

[378] See chap. iii. § 3 of this Book, pp. 432-33.

[379] See Book iii. chap. i. § 2: also Book iii. chap. ii. § 1.

[380] Cf. Book i. chap. iii. § 2.

[381] It may perhaps be said that this comparison has no force for Libertarians, who consider the essence of Virtue to lie in free choice. But to say that _any_ free choice is virtuous would be a paradox from which most Libertarians--admitting that Evil may be freely chosen no less than Good--would recoil. It must therefore be Free choice of good that is conceived to realise the divine end: and if so, the arguments for the utilitarian interpretation of Good--thus freely chosen--would still be applicable _mutatis mutandis_: and if so, the arguments for regarding rules of utilitarian duty as divinely sanctioned would be similarly applicable.

[382] It is not necessary, if we are simply considering Ethics as a possible independent science, to throw the fundamental premiss of which we are now examining the validity into a Theistic form. Nor does it seem always to have taken that form in the support which Positive Religion has given to Morality. In the Buddhist creed this notion of the rewards inseparably attaching to right conduct seems to have been developed in a far more elaborate and systematic manner than it has in any phase of Christianity. But, as conceived by enlightened Buddhists, these rewards are not distributed by the volition of a Supreme Person, but by the natural operation of an impersonal Law.

[383] It may be well to remind the reader that by ‘adequate’ is here meant ‘sufficient to make it the agent’s interest to promote universal good’; not necessarily ‘proportional to Desert.’

[384] I cannot fall back on the resource of thinking myself under a moral necessity to regard all my duties _as if they_ were commandments of God, although not entitled to hold speculatively that any such Supreme Being really exists. I am so far from feeling bound to believe for purposes of practice what I see no ground for holding as a speculative truth, that I cannot even conceive the state of mind which these words seem to describe, except as a momentary half-wilful irrationality, committed in a violent access of philosophic despair.

APPENDIX

THE KANTIAN CONCEPTION OF FREE WILL

[_Reprinted, with some omissions, from_ MIND, 1888, _Vol. XIII., No. 51_.]

My aim is to show that, in different parts of Kant’s exposition of his doctrine, two essentially different conceptions are expressed by the same word freedom; while yet Kant does not appear to be conscious of any variation in the meaning of the term.

[In the one sense, Freedom = Rationality, so that a man is free in proportion as he acts in accordance with Reason.] I do not in the least object to this use of the term Freedom, on account of its deviation from ordinary usage. On the contrary, I think it has much support in men’s natural expression of ordinary moral experience in discourse. In the conflict that is continually going on in all of us, between non-rational impulses and what we recognise as dictates of practical reason, we are in the habit of identifying ourselves with the latter rather than with the former: as Whewell says, “we speak of Desire, Love, Anger, as mastering us, and of ourselves as controlling them”--we continually call men “slaves” of appetite or passion, whereas no one was ever called a slave of reason. If, therefore, the term Freedom had not already been appropriated by moralists to another meaning--if it were merely a question of taking it from ordinary discourse and stamping it with greater precision for purposes of ethical discussion--I should make no objection to the statement that “a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally.” But, what English defenders of man’s free agency have generally been concerned to maintain, is that “man has a freedom of _choice_ between good and evil,” which is realised or manifested when he deliberately chooses evil just as much as when he deliberately chooses good; and it is clear that if we say that a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally, we cannot also say, in the same sense of the term, that it is by his free choice that he acts irrationally when he does so act. The notions of Freedom must be admitted to be fundamentally different in the two statements: and though usage might fairly allow the word Freedom to represent either notion, if only one or other of the above-mentioned propositions were affirmed, to use it to represent both, in affirming both propositions, is obviously inconvenient; and it implies a confusion of thought so to use it, without pointing out the difference of meaning.

If this be admitted, the next thing is to show that Kant does use the term in this double way. In arguing this, it will be convenient to have names for what we admit to be two distinct ideas. Accordingly, the kind of freedom which I first mentioned--which a man is said to manifest more in proportion as he acts more under the guidance of reason--shall be referred to as ‘Good’ or ‘Rational Freedom,’ and the freedom that is manifested in choosing between good and evil shall be called ‘Neutral’ or ‘Moral Freedom.’[385]

But before I proceed to the different passages of Kant’s exposition in which ‘Good Freedom’ and ‘Neutral Freedom’ respectively occur, it seems desirable to distinguish this latter from a wider notion with which it may possibly be confounded, and which it would be clearly wrong to attribute to Kant. I mean the “power of acting without a motive,” which Reid and other writers, on what used to be called the Libertarian side, have thought it necessary to claim. “If a man could not act without a motive,” says Reid, “he could have no power”--that is, in Reid’s meaning, no free agency--“at all.” This conception of Freedom--which I may conveniently distinguish as ‘Capricious Freedom’--is, as I said, certainly not Kantian: not only does he expressly repudiate it, but nowhere--so far as I know--does he unconsciously introduce it. Indeed it is incompatible with any and every part of his explanation of human volition: the originality and interest of his defence of Neutral Freedom--the power of choice between good and evil--lies in its complete avoidance of Capricious Freedom or the power of acting without a motive _in any particular volition_.

[This] distinction helps me to understand how [it is that] many intelligent readers have failed to see in Kant’s exposition the two Freedoms--Good or Rational Freedom and Neutral or Moral Freedom--which I find in Kant. They have their view fixed on the difference between Rational or Moral Freedom, which Kant maintains, and the Freedom of Caprice, which he undoubtedly repudiates: and are thus led to overlook with him the distinction between the Freedom that we realise or manifest in proportion as we do right, and the Freedom that is realised or manifested equally in choosing either right or wrong. When we have once put completely out of view the Freedom of Caprice, the power of acting without a motive, or against the strongest motive when the competition is among merely natural or non-rational desires or aversions,--when we have agreed to exclude this, and to concentrate attention on the difference between Good Freedom and Neutral Freedom--I venture to think that no one can avoid seeing each member of this latter antithesis in Kant. It will be easily understood that, as he does not himself distinguish the two conceptions, it is naturally impossible for the most careful reader always to tell which is to be understood; but there are many passages where his argument unmistakably requires the one, and many other passages where it unmistakably requires the other. Speaking broadly, I may say that, wherever Kant has to connect the notion of Freedom with that of Moral Responsibility or moral imputation, he, like all other moralists who have maintained Free Will in this connexion, means (chiefly, but not solely) Neutral Freedom--Freedom exhibited in choosing wrong as much as in choosing right. Indeed, in such passages it is with the Freedom of the wrong-chooser that he is primarily concerned: since it is the wrong-chooser that he especially wishes to prevent from shifting his responsibility on to causes beyond his control. On the other hand, when what he has to prove is the possibility of disinterested obedience to Law as such, without the intervention of sensible impulses, when he seeks to exhibit the independence of Reason in influencing choice, then in many though not all his statements he explicitly identifies Freedom with this independence of Reason, and thus clearly implies the proposition that a man is free in proportion as he acts rationally.

As an example of the first kind, I will take the passage towards the close of chap. iii. of the “Analytic of Practical Reason,”[386] where he treats, in its bearing on Moral Responsibility, his peculiar metaphysical doctrine of a double kind of causation in human actions. According to Kant, every such action, regarded as a phenomenon determined in time, must be thought as a necessary result of determining causes in antecedent time--otherwise its existence would be inconceivable--but it may be also regarded in relation to the agent considered as a thing-in-himself, as the “noümenon” of which the action is a phenomenon: and the conception of Freedom may be applied to the agent so considered in relation to his phenomena. For since his existence as a noümenon is not subject to time-conditions, nothing in this noümenal existence comes under the principle of determination by antecedent causes: hence, as Kant says, “in this his existence nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action ... even the whole series of his existence as a sensible being, is in the consciousness of his supersensible existence nothing but the result of his causality as a noümenon.” This is the well-known metaphysical solution of the difficulty of reconciling Free Will with the Universality of physical causation: I am not now concerned to criticise it,--my point is that if we accept this view of Freedom at all, it must obviously be Neutral Freedom: it must express the relation of a noümenon that manifests itself as a scoundrel to a series of bad volitions, in which the moral law is violated, no less than the relation of a noümenon that manifests itself as a saint to good or rational volitions, in which the moral law or categorical imperative is obeyed. And, as I before said, Kant in this passage--being especially concerned to explain the possibility of moral imputation, and justify the judicial sentences of conscience--especially takes as his illustrations noümena that exhibit bad phenomena. The question he expressly raises is “How a man who commits a theft” can “be called quite free” at the moment of committing it? and answers that it is in virtue of his “transcendental freedom” that “the rational being can justly say of _every unlawful action_ that he performs that he could very well have left it undone,” although as phenomenon it is determined by antecedents, and so necessary; “for it, with all the past which determines it, belongs to the one single phenomenon of his character which he makes for himself, in consequence of which he imputes to himself” the bad actions that result necessarily from his bad character taken in conjunction with other causes. Hence, however he may account for his error from bad habits which he has allowed to grow on him, whatever art he may use to paint to himself an unlawful act he remembers as something in which he was carried away by the stream of physical necessity, this cannot protect him from self-reproach:--not even if he have shown depravity so early that he may reasonably be thought to have been born in a morally hopeless condition--he will still be rightly judged, and will judge himself “just as responsible as any other man”: since in relation to his noümenal self his life as a whole, from first to last, is to be regarded as a single phenomenon resulting from an absolutely free choice.

I need not labour this point further; it is evident that the necessities of Kant’s metaphysical explanation of moral responsibility make him express with peculiar emphasis and fulness the notion of what I have called Neutral Freedom, a kind of causality manifested in bad and irrational volitions no less than in the good and rational.

On the other hand, it is no less easy to find passages in which the term Freedom seems to me most distinctly to stand for Good or Rational Freedom. Indeed, such passages are, I think, more frequent than those in which the other meaning is plainly required. Thus he tells us that “a free will must find its principle of determination in the [moral] ‘Law,’”[387] and that “freedom, whose causality can be determined only by the law, consists just in this, that it restricts all inclinations by the condition of obedience to pure law.”[388] Whereas, in the argument previously examined, his whole effort was to prove that the noümenon or supersensible being, of which each volition is a phenomenon, exercises “free causality” in unlawful acts, he tells us elsewhere, in the same treatise, that the “supersensible nature” of rational beings, who have also a “sensible nature,” is their “existence according to laws which are independent of every empirical condition, and therefore belong to the autonomy of pure [practical] reason.”[389] Similarly, in an earlier work, he explains that “since the conception of causality involves that of laws ... though freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless; on the contrary, it must be a causality according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind; otherwise, a free will would be a chimæra (_Unding_).”[390] And this immutable law of the “free” or “autonomous” will is, as he goes on to say, the fundamental principle of morality, “so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same.”

I have quoted this last phrase, not because it clearly exhibits the notion of Rational Freedom,--on the contrary, it rather shows how easily this notion may be confounded with the other. A will subject to its own moral laws _may_ mean a will that, so far as free, conforms to these laws; but it also _may_ be conceived as capable of freely disobeying these laws--exercising Neutral Freedom. But when Freedom is said to be a “causality according to immutable laws” the ambiguity is dispelled; for this evidently cannot mean merely a faculty of laying down laws which may or may not be obeyed; it must mean that the will, _quâ_ free, acts in accordance with these laws;--the human being, doubtless, often acts contrary to them; but then, according to this view, its choice in such actions is determined not “freely” but “mechanically,” by “physical” and “empirical” springs of action.

If any further argument is necessary to show that Kantian “Freedom” must sometimes be understood as Rational or Good Freedom, I may quote one or two of the numerous passages in which Kant, either expressly or by implication, identifies Will and Reason; for this identification obviously excludes the possibility of Will’s choosing between Reason and non-rational impulses. Thus in the _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_,[391] he tells us that “as Reason is required to deduce actions from laws, Will is nothing but pure practical reason”; and, similarly, in the _Kritik der praktischen Vernunft_, he speaks of the “objective reality of a pure Will or, _which is the same thing_, a pure practical reason.”[392] Accordingly, whereas in some passages[393] the “autonomy” which he identifies with “Freedom” is spoken of as “autonomy of _will_,” in others we are told that the “moral law expresses nothing else than autonomy of the pure practical _reason_: that is, Freedom.”[394]

I think that I have now established the verbal ambiguity that I undertook to bring home to Kant’s account of Free Will; I have shown that in his exposition this fundamental term oscillates between incompatible meanings. But it may, perhaps, be thought that the defect thus pointed out can be cured by a merely verbal correction: that the substance of Kant’s ethical doctrine may still be maintained, and may still be connected with his metaphysical doctrine. It may still be held that Reason dictates that we should at all times act from a maxim that we can will to be a universal law, and that we should do this from pure regard for reason and reason’s law, admitting that it is a law which we are free to disobey; and it may still be held that the reality of this moral freedom is to be reconciled with the universality of physical causation by conceiving it as a relation between the agent’s noümenal self--independent of time-conditions--and his character as manifested in time; the only correction required being to avoid identifying Freedom and Goodness or Rationality as attributes of agents or actions.

I should quite admit that the most important parts both of Kant’s doctrine of morality, and of his doctrine of Freedom may be saved:--or I should perhaps rather say that the latter may be left to conduct an unequal struggle with the modern notions of heredity and evolution: at any rate I admit that it is not fundamentally affected by my present argument. But I think that a good deal more will have to go from a corrected edition of Kantism than merely the “word” Freedom in certain passages, if the confusion introduced by the ambiguity of this word is to be eliminated in the manner that I have suggested. I think that the whole topic of the “heteronomy” of the will, when it yields to empirical or sensible impulses, will have to be abandoned or profoundly modified. And I am afraid that most readers of Kant will feel the loss to be serious; since nothing in Kant’s ethical writing is more fascinating than the idea--which he expresses repeatedly in various forms--that a man realises the aim of his true self when he obeys the moral law, whereas, when he wrongly allows his action to be determined by empirical or sensible stimuli, he becomes subject to physical causation, to laws of a brute outer world. But if we dismiss the identification of Freedom and Rationality, and accept definitely and singly Kant’s other notion of Freedom as expressing the relation of the human thing-in-itself to its phenomenon, I am afraid that this spirit-stirring appeal to the sentiment of Liberty must be dismissed as idle rhetoric. For the life of the saint must be as much subject--in any particular portion of it--to the necessary laws of physical causation as the life of the scoundrel: and the scoundrel must exhibit and express his characteristic self-hood in his transcendental choice of a bad life, as much as the saint does in his transcendental choice of a good one. If, on the other hand, to avoid this result, we take the other horn of the dilemma, and identify inner freedom with rationality, than a more serious excision will be required. For, along with ‘Neutral’ or ‘Moral’ Freedom, the whole Kantian view of the relation of the noümenon to the empirical character will have to be dropped, and with it must go the whole Kantian method of maintaining moral responsibility and moral imputation: in fact, all that has made Kant’s doctrine interesting and impressive to English advocates of Free Will (in the ordinary sense), even when they have not been convinced of its soundness.

FOOTNOTES:

[385] The terms ‘rational’ and ‘moral’ seem to me most appropriate when I wish to suggest the affinity between the two notions: the terms ‘good’ and ‘neutral’ seem preferable when I wish to lay stress on the difference.

[386] _Werke_, v. pp. 100-104 (Hartenstein).

[387] _Werke_, v. p. 30.

[388] _Ibid._ p. 83.

[389] _Ibid._ p. 46.

[390] _Werke_, iv. p. 294.

[391] _Werke_, iv. p. 260 (Hartenstein).

[392] _Werke_, v. p. 58. See an acute discussion of Kant’s perplexing use of the term “Will” in Prof. Schurman’s _Kantian Ethics_, which has anticipated me in the above quotations.

[393] _E.g._ _Werke_, iv. p. 296.

[394] _E.g._ _Werke_, v. p. 35.

INDEX

‘Absolute’ and ‘Relative’ Ethics, 18 note 2, 177 note 1

‘Act,’ meaning of, 200 note 3, 201, 202

Action, ultimate end of, 3, 4, etc.; motive to, may be non-rational, 5; instinctive, 24, 61; deliberate, 24, 61; deliberate and impulsive, 61

Acuteness, 236

Æsthetic Intuitionism, 228, 392; implicit reference to Ultimate Good in, 392, 393

Æsthetic sensibility, theories of, 189

Affections, Duties of the, 345-349

Affections, social and domestic, 138, 153, 156, 157, 433, 434

‘Altruism,’ 439

ἀνδρεία, 456

‘Apathy’ as ideal of happiness, 125

Aristotle, 59 note 1, 92, 92 note 2, 98-99, 99 note 1, 121-122, 180, 180 note 1, 181 note 1, 215, 224, 231 note 1, 264 note 2, 281, 375 note 1, 376, 403, 456

Art, Definition of, 4

‘Art of conduct,’ 4

Austin, 300 note 1

Aversion, 42, 43, 46, 145

Axioms, 215, 338-343, 379-389 _passim_; must (_a_) have the terms clear and precise, 338, 339; (_b_) be really self-evident, 339-341; (_c_) not conflict with any other accepted proposition, 341; (_d_) be supported by consensus of experts, 341, 342

Axiom--of Justice or Equity, and Rational Benevolence, 387; of Prudence, the logical basis of Egoism, 386; of Rational Benevolence, the logical basis of Utilitarianism, 387, 388; -s of Impartiality, 379-383, 496, 497

Bacon, 338

Bain, 43 note 2, Note 54-56, Note 87-88, 125, 126, 127, 477 note 1; (_The Emotions and the Will_) 54, 55 Note, 126 note 1; (_Mental and Moral Science_) 127 notes 1-3, 177 note 1

Bastiat, 278 note 1

Beauty, 114

Benevolence, 238-263 _passim_, 391, 393; comprehensiveness and supremacy of, 238, 238 note 2; common maxim of, 238-239; axiom of, 382, 385, 387, 496; prescribes promotion of others’ Happiness rather than Perfection, 240, 241; principles of its distribution, 241, 242, 261, 262, 263; and Justice, spheres of, 242, 243, 268; virtue of, 244, 253; duty of, 252, 253, 253 note 1, 258; Kant’s view of the duty of, 239, 240; intellectual _versus_ emotional excellence of, 244 note 1; conflicting claims to, 246; duties of, classified, 248; rational, cf. _Rational Benevolence_; Intuitional and Utilitarian notions of, reconciled, 430-431

Benevolent--emotion, 239; disposition, 239

Bentham, 10, 41, 41 note 1, 84, 85, 86, Note 87-88, 92, 94, 119, 124 note 1, 143, 164, 203, 292, 364, 414, 417, 423 note 2, 424; (_Memoirs_) 10 notes 2 and 3, (_Deontology, Works_, Bowring’s edition) 87, 88 Note, (_Principles of Morals and Legislation_) 26 note 1, (_Constitutional Code_) 41 note 2

Bequest, change of view respecting, 246, 247

Berkeley, Bishop, 120

Blackstone, _Introduction_, 302 note 1

Bouillier, 180 note 2

Butler, 7, 39, 44, 44 note 2, 81, 86, 93, 94, 119, 133 note 2, 136, 172, 200, 222, 366, 366 note 3, 371, 372, 378, 386, 401, 405, 501; (_Analogy_) 378; (_Dissertation Of the Nature of Virtue_) 86 note 2, 176 note 1, 327 note 1; (_Sermons on Human Nature_) 7 note 1, 86 note 2, 93 note 2, 120 note 1, 200 note 2, 323 note 1

Candour, 355

Cardinal Virtues, 375

Carelessness, Culpability of, 60, 292

Casuistry, 99

Categorical Imperative, 7, 8, 15, 35, 36, 37, 209, 209 note 1

Caution, 236, 236 note 1, 237

Celibacy, 487, 488

Charity (Philanthropy), 222, 239, 430, 431, 434

Chastity and Purity, 223, 329-331, 329 note 2

‘Chief Good’ (Summum Bonum), 134, 407 note 1

Chivalry, 326

Chrysippus, 376

Cicero, 376; _De Finibus_, 125 note 1

Clarke, 86, 104, 120, 120 note 2, 384, 384 notes 3 and 4, 385; _Boyle Lectures_, 120 note 2, 385 notes 1 and 2

Classification of Duties, 312-315

‘Cognition,’ use of, 34 note 2

“Common good of all Rationals,” Cumberland’s ultimate end, 104, 423

Common Morality, 215-216; (cf. _Morality of Common Sense_)

Common Sense aversion to admit Happiness as sole ultimate Good, explanation of, 402-406

Compassion, 262, 371

Conditional prescriptions (Hypothetical Imperatives), 6, 7

Conjugal relation, the duties relating to it, 254, 255, 256, 255 notes 1 and 2, 347, 348, 348 note 1

Conscience, popular view of, 99; jural view of, 100-101

Conscience (Moral Faculty) and Benevolence, Butler’s view of the relation between, 86, 86 note 2; and Self-love, Butler’s view of relation between, 119, 120, 200, 200 note 2, 327 note 1, 366

Conscious Utilitarianism rather the adult than the germinal form of morality, 455-457

Consciousness not normally without pleasure or pain, 125

Consequences of actions, ulterior, 96, 97; may be judged desirable without reference to pleasure or pain, 97

Contract, claims arising from, 269; and Freedom, 276, 276 note 1

Courage, 332-334; defined, 332; Greek view of, 456; and Fortitude, are subordinate duties, 332, 333; Moral, 333 note 3; Virtue of, 313, 333, 334; and Foolhardiness, distinguished by Utilitarian considerations, 334, 355

Courtesy, 253

Cudworth, 103 Note

Culture, 157, etc.

Cumberland, 86, 86 note 1, 104; and Utilitarianism, 423, 423 note 1

Custom, alterations in, 247

Decision, 236, 237

Deductive Hedonism, 176-195

Descartes, 338, 339

Desert--Good, how determined, 284-290; Ill, how determined, 291-292; requital of, as principle of Ideal Justice, 280, 281, 283, 294, 349; and Freedom, 280, 287; and Right of Property, 280, 280 note 1; and Determinism, 284, 285; Utilitarian interpretation of, 284 note 1; and Free Will, 71, 72, 284, 291

‘Desirable,’ confusion in Mill’s use of, 388 note 2

Desirable consciousness is either happiness or certain objective relations of the conscious mind, 398-400

Desire, 43, 45-47; non-rational, 23-24; irrational, 23, 24; and Pleasure, relation between, 39-56 _passim_

Determinism and Free Will, 57 _seq._; Aristotelian, 59 note 1; and Materialism, 62; arguments for, 62-65; argument against, 65, 66

Determinist meaning of ‘desert,’ etc., 71, 72, 284 note 1

Development as ethical aim, 90 _seq._, 192 _seq._, 473

‘Dictates,’ how used, 96 note 1

δικαιοσύνη, two meanings of, 264 note 2

‘Disinterested action,’ 57

Distribution, Principle of Equality a _prima facie_ reasonable Principle of, 417

Divine penalties, 31

‘Doing good,’ ambiguity of, 239, 240

Dualism of the Practical (or Moral) Reason, 200, 205, 206, 366, 404, 404 note 1; need of harmonising, 507-509

Dumont, 180 note 2

‘Duties to God’ and ‘duty to man,’ 218

Duties, division of, into Self-regarding and Social, 163, 312, 313

‘Duties to oneself,’ 7

‘Duty’--meaning and use of, 78, 217, 218, 220 note 3, 239, 504-505; and ‘right conduct’ distinguished, 217

Duty relativity of, 218, 219; and Happiness of agent, 36, 162-175 _passim_, 495 _seq._; implies conflict of impulses, 81; of self-preservation, 356; of promoting others’ happiness, Kant’s arguments for, 389-390; most of the received maxims of, involve reference to Ultimate Good, 391, 392

‘Egoism,’ 11, 80 note 1, 89 _seq._; ordinary use, and ambiguity of, 89; indefiniteness of, 95; and Greek ethical controversy, 91-92

Egoism, cf. _Egoistic Hedonism_

Egoism--meaning of, 120-121; and Self-love, 36, 89-95 _passim_; Principle and Method of, 119-122; precepts of, not clear and precise, 199-200; rationality of, 119-120, 199, 200 note 1; sense of ignobility of, 199-200, 200 note 1 (cf. 402 _seq._), 501; = Pure (or Quantitative) Egoistic Hedonism, 95; and Utilitarianism, relation between, 497 _seq._; and Utilitarian sanctions, 499-503

‘Egoist,’ meaning of, 121

Egoistic End--and Positive Religion, 121; and Natural Religion, 121

Egoistic Hedonism designated as Egoism or as Epicureanism, 11, 84, 95

Egoistic Hedonism, 42, 119-121; End of, 93; Pure or Quantitative, defined, 95; Fundamental Principle of, 93, 120, 121; Empirical-reflective Method of, 121, 122, 131 _seq._; and Conscience, 161 note 1; Fundamental Paradox of, 48, 130, 136, 137, 173-174, 194

Empirical Hedonism, 123-150; fundamental assumption of, 123, 131, 146; objections to, 460; Method of, takes advantage of traditional experience and of special knowledge, 477, 479

Empirical Quantitative Hedonism, 146

Empiricism, 104

‘End,’ ethical use of the term, 134

End, Interdependence of Method and, 8, 83, 84; adoption of any, as paramount, a phenomenon distinct from Desire, 39

Ends accepted as rational by Common Sense, 8, 9

Energy, 237

Epicureanism, 11, 84

Epicurus, 158

‘Equal return,’ ambiguity of, 261 (cf. 288 _seq._)

‘Equality of Happiness,’ as Social End, 284 note 2

Ethical--judgment, 23-38, 77; Principles and Methods, 77-88 _passim_; Method, three principal species of, 83 _seq._; controversy, ancient and modern, 105, 106, 392; Hedonism, fundamental proposition of, 129; and Psychological Hedonism, 40-42, 412, 412 note 1; and Physical Science, structure of, compared, 509

Ethics--boundaries of, 1; Study or Science? 1, 2; forms of the problem of, 2, 3, 391; and man’s ‘True Good,’ 3; definition of, 4, 15; Absolute and Relative, 18 note 2, 177 note 1; and geometry, analogy between, 18-19; and astronomy, analogy between, 19; concerned with Duty under present conditions, 19; aim of, 40, 77; and Rational or Natural Theology, 504-506; mutual relations of the three Methods of, 496-509

Ethics and Politics (cf. _Law_), 15-22 _passim_, 266, 457; distinguished from Positive sciences, 1, 2; Utilitarian, 457 (cf. 274, 298); in an ideal society, 18 _seq._

εὐδαιμονία (= Well-being = the Good attainable in human life), 91, 92; misunderstanding of Aristotle’s use of, 92 note 2

Excellence (cf. _Perfection_)

‘Excellence’ and ‘Perfection,’ 10 note 3

Excellence beyond strict duty, Utilitarian attitude towards, 492, 493

_Explanation_ essentially different from _Justification_, 2

Fame, 9, 155, 157, 159, 368, (Posthumous) 156 note 1

Feeling--preferableness of, other than pleasantness, dependent on objective relations of the feeling mind, 127, 128, 399; _quâ_ feeling, can only be judged by the person who feels, 128, 129, 398

Fidelity (cf. _Good Faith_), 258, 259

Firmness, 235, 236

Fitness and Desert, 350

‘Formal’ and ‘Material’ Rightness, 206-207, 206 note 1

Fortitude defined, 332

Free choice as virtuous, 504 note 1

Freedom--sentiment of, 39; as absolute end of ideal law, 274 _seq._, 293, 297, 350-351; sphere of, must be limited, 275; ambiguity of, 275, 276, 293; and Contract, 276, 276 note 1; and Property, 276, 277; Civil and Constitutional, 298, 351

Free Will--controversy, 57-76 _passim_, 59, 61-62, 65 note 1, 74, 75; conception of, applied (_a_) in judging the conduct of others, 63 note 1, 66, 67, (_b_) in forecasting our own future, 64; partial illusoriness of the belief in, 64, 65; and Happiness, 68; and Perfection (or Excellence), 68, 68 note 2; and Moral government of the world, 69, 69 note 2, 70; and Determinism, practical unimportance of issue between, 67, 68, 72-76, 285; and Justice, 71, 72, 284, 291; and Desert (or Merit), 68 note 2, 285, 291; and Duty, 78; (or Freedom of Will)--two senses of, 57-59; and Moral responsibility, 58; conception of, involved in ordinary meaning of ‘responsibility,’ ‘desert,’ etc., 71; metaphysical--ethical import of, as regards (_a_) choice between rational and irrational alternatives, 67, 68, 70-71, (_b_) view of what is rational, 68, 69, (_c_) forecasts of future action, 69, 70, 70 note 1

Friendship and its duties, 257-259, 257 note 1, 437

‘General Good,’ 392

Generosity, 219, 326

Gentleness, 253, 321

God’s Will--conformity to, 79; as ultimate reason for action, 79, 80

‘Golden Rule,’ the, unpreciseness of, 379-380

‘Good,’ 105-115 _passim_; indefiniteness of, 91-92; use and force of the term, 86 note 1, 105, 107 _seq._, 112, 113; and not ‘Right’ the fundamental notion in Greek ethics, 105; has not the same connotation as ‘pleasant,’ 107, 108, 109, 110; implies reference to an universally valid standard, 108-109, 114; adjective, and ‘Good’ substantive, 109; notion of, distinct from ‘Pleasure’ and ‘the Pleasant,’ and = ‘what ought to be desired,’ 109 _seq._

Good, The, 3, 92, 106; (human) or Well-being, its relation to Happiness and to Duty, 3; (human) is either (_a_) Happiness or (_b_) Perfection or Excellence of human existence, 114, 115; the absolute and unconditional, in Kant’s view, 222; in English ethical thought, 423 note 1

Good conduct, 106, 107, 112-113; standard of, needed, 113; Greek conception of, 107 note 1, 404-405, 405 note 1

Good Faith, 224, 303-311 _passim_, 352-354, 355; stringency of the duty of, 304-305; obligation of, affected by (_a_) fraud or force, 305-306, 306 note 1, (_b_) material change of circumstances, 306-308, (_c_) misapprehension, 309, (_d_) use of a prescribed formula, 309, 310

Good Taste, 108

Good humour, 321

Goodness, implies relation to consciousness or feeling, 113-114, 113 note 2; (Moral) and Beauty, 107-108, 107 note 1, 228

Government--by Consent of Subjects, 297, 351; Aristocratic and Democratic Principles of, 299; established, difficulty of identifying, 300, 301

Governmental Authority, conflicting claims to, 296, 297, 299-301; ideal, 297-299

Grant Allen, 187; _Physiological Æsthetics_, 187 note 1

Gratitude, 259-261, 437-438; universalised, furnishes the principle ‘that desert ought to be requited,’ 279, 279 note 1, 280; Kant on, 223, 223 note 1

‘Greatest Happinesss,’ meaning of, 121, 413; Utilitarian notion of, its extent, 414; total and average, distinguished, 415, 416

‘Greatest Pleasure,’ explanation of, 44 note 3

Greek ethical thought, the problem of, 106; tautological maxims of, 375-376

Green, T. H., 132 _seq._, 134 note 3, 135 note 3; (_Introduction to Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature_) 132 note 2, 133 note 3; (_Prolegomena to Ethics_) 93 note 1, 133 note 1, 134 notes 1 and 2, 135 notes 1 and 2, 363 note 1

Grote, J., _An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy_, 432 note 1

Gurney, E., 123, 184; (_Tertium Quid_) 123 note 1; (_Power of Sound_) 184 note 1

Hallam, 423 note 1

Hamilton, 139, 180-182; (_Lectures on Metaphysics_) 180 note 3

Happiness--as End, 7, 8, 78; and Duty, connexion between, 162-175 _passim_; and Duty, are they coincident? 162, 163, 165, 176; and Duty, Plato’s view of relation between, 171-172; and Virtue, 174-175, 459; and Virtue, connexion of, in Aristotle’s view, 121-122; determination and measurement of, an inevitable problem for Ethics, 176; production of, 176-177; relation of, to mental concentration and dissipation, 193; and Self-development, 192-193; rejection of, as end, leaves us unable to frame a coherent account of Ultimate Good, 406; an objection to, as Ultimate Good, considered, 407 note 1; principle of distribution of, required, 416, 417; universal, as divine end, 503-505; Christian view of, 120, 138; Sources of, 151 _seq._

‘Happiness,’ 41 note 1, 92, 92 note 2, 93 note 1; ambiguity of, 92; precise meaning of, 120

Harm, 292, 293

Harmony as cause of Pleasure, 189

Health, 153, 154, 159

‘Hedonism,’ meaning of, 93

Hedonism (Ethical), the two Methods of, are Universalistic and Egoistic, 11; connexion between the two Methods of, 84, 497 _seq._; objections to, stated and considered:--(_a_) that the calculation required by the Empirical-reflective method is too complex for practice, 131, 132; (_b_) that “pleasure as feeling cannot be conceived,” 132, 133; (_c_) that “a sum of pleasures is intrinsically unmeaning,” 133, 134; (_d_) that transient pleasures are unsatisfying, 135; (_e_) that the pursuit of pleasure tends to defeat its own end, 136 _seq._; (_f_) that the habit of introspective comparison of pleasures is unfavourable to pleasure, 138-140; (_g_) that any quantitative comparison of pleasures is vague and uncertain, 140-150; Deductive, 176-195 _passim_; deductive, Spencer’s view of, 177 note 1; Method of, must be empirical, 195; Empirical, method of, 460; and Intuitionism, 461; and Pessimism, 131 Note

Hedonistic Zero (or neutral feeling), 124, 125

Helvetius, 88

Highest Good, the (cf. _The Good_ and _Ultimate Good_), 106

Hobbes, 44 note 1, 56, 86, 89, 103, 109, 300 note 1, 423, 476; (_Leviathan_) 89 note 1

Holmes, O. W., jun., _The Common Law_, 281 note 1

Honour, Code of, 30, 31, 168, 340

Hume, 23, 86, 104, 220, 384, 419, 423, 424, 423 notes 1 and 2, 426, 440, 441, 493; (_Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals_) 44 note 2, 220 note 2, 424

Humility, 334-336 _passim_, 355, 356 note 1, 429

Hunger, 45, 46

Hutcheson, 44 note 2, 50, 86, 86 note 2, 104, 366; (_System of Moral Philosophy_) 366 note 1

Hypothetical Imperatives imply an ulterior end, 6, 7, 37

Ideal and Actual, relation between, 79; connected (_a_) in the conception of “God’s Will,” 79, (_b_) in the notion of “Nature,” 80-83

Ideal--Government, no consensus as to what kind is legitimate, 299 _seq._; and Traditional Authority, 296; Society, ethics of, how far useful, 22-24, 465

“Idols of the Cave” and “Idols of the Tribe,” 152

Impulse to do acts _quâ_ recognised as right (= Moral Motive), 77

Impulses, extra-regarding and self-regarding may conflict, 51, 52, 136

Indifference (Neutrality) of feeling, cf. _Hedonistic Zero_

Individualistic--Ideal, 286-287; and Socialistic Ideals, 293, 294, 444-445

Inequality, Reasonable, 268 _seq._

Ingenuity, 236

Intention, 60 note 1, 202, 202 note 1

Interest, meaning of, 7, 120; ethical character of, in Butler’s view, 176 note 1

‘Internal acts,’ 204

Instinctive impulses regarded as inherited experience, 193, 194

Intrinsic value, how determined, 288, 289

Intuition of rightness of acts, excludes consideration of (_a_) ulterior consequences, 96, 97, (_b_) “induction from experience” of pleasures, 97, 98 (cf. 102 note 1)

Intuitional--Method, cf. _Intuitionism_; moralists, English, may be broadly classified as Dogmatic and Philosophical, 103, 104

‘Intuitional’--sense in which used, 96, 97, 98; wider and narrower senses of, 97, 102 note 1, 201

Intuitionism, 3, 8, 17, 20, 96-104 _passim_, 199-216 _passim_; differences of its method due to two causes, 103; its method issues in Universalistic Hedonism (Utilitarianism), 406-407; chronological development of the method of, in England, 103-104; and Utilitarianism, 85-86, 388-389, 423-457 _passim_, 496-497; Philosophical, 102-104, 373-389 _passim_; Perceptional, 98-100, 102; Dogmatic, 100-101 (cf. _Intuitionism_, _Intuitive Morality_, _Positive Morality_, _Morality of Common Sense_); Dogmatic, fundamental assumption of, 101, 200, 201; three phases of, 102, 103; a variety of, constituted by substituting for ‘right’ the notion ‘good,’ 105-107; Æsthetic, 228, 392; Jural or Rational, 228-229

‘Intuitive’ or ‘_a priori_’ Morality generally used to mean Dogmatic Intuitionism or Morality of Common Sense, 101-102

Irrational choice--sometimes conscious and deliberate, 36, 37-38, 41-42, 58, 59, 110; Socratic and Aristotelian view compared with modern view of, 59 note 1

Jural method of Ethics, 100-101

Just claims--arising from contract, 269; arising from natural and normal expectations, 269, 270, 270 note 1

‘Justice,’ ‘justify,’ etc., uses of, 264 note 2, 270, 286, 442

Justice, 20, 99, 264-294 _passim_, 349-352, 355, 440-448 _passim_; or Equity, essence of, 496; specially difficult to define, 264; intuitional view of the definition of, 264; involves notion of distribution, 265, 266, 268, 271; and Law, connexion between, 265, 266, 267 note 1; distinct from Order (or Law-observance), 265; and Equality, 266, 267, 267 note 1, 268, 268 note 1, 279, 285 note 1; and taxation, 266, 266 note 1; Conservative and Ideal, 272-273, 273 note 1, 274, 293, 294; Ideal, 273, 274, 293, 294, 444, 445; Ideal, and Natural Eights, 274, 275; Ideal, and Freedom, 278, 279; Corrective, 281; Reparative, 281, 282, 281 note 1, 282 note 1, 293; Reparative and Retributive, distinguished, 282-283, 282 note 2; and Free Will, 71, 72, 284, 285; and ‘Equity’ or ‘Fairness,’ 285, 286; Hume’s treatment of, 440

Kant, 6, 7, 11 note 1, 36, 58, 58 note 1, 209, 210, 210 note 1, 222, 223, 239, 240, 315, 327 note 1, 366, 385, 386, 386 note 1, 389-390 Note, 486, Appendix 510; (_Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_) 209 note 1, 389-390 Note; (_Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre_) 223 note 1, 327 note 1, 366 note 3, 386 note 2, 389 Note; (_Kritik der reinen Vernunft_) 366 note 3

Kant’s Fundamental Moral Rule or Categorical Imperative as criterion of rightness, 209-210, 209 note 1, 210 note 1, 339 note 1, 386, 389 Note, 486

Knowledge--as an End, 114, 399, 401; and Feeling (= Cognition and Pleasure or Pain), relation between, 139, 140; and Feeling, Hamilton’s view of the relation between, 139

_Laisser faire_ and economic production, 445 note 2

Law, 295-303; and Morality, relation between, 29, 457; and Positive Morality, 164; Austin’s definition of, 300 note 1

Laws--just, characteristics of, 266, 267, 271-272; that ought to be obeyed, are laid down by rightful authority, 296

Law-observance (or Order), 295-303 _passim_, 352, 440, 441; and Good Faith, 295, 303; in regard to _mala prohibita_, 302 note 1

Lecky, _History of European Morals_, 50 note 1, 399 note 1, 427 note 1

Legal obligation and punishment, 29

Liberality, 324-326, 325 note 1, 355

Libertarian position, 58, 64-65, 66

Liberty, Sentiment of, 58

Locke, (_Essay_) 205, 280 note 1, 503; ethical view of, 205, 206

Love, 50, 244, 245, 367, 368; common sense estimate of, 245, 258, 258 note 1

Loyalty, 223, 244, 254

Mackenzie, J. S., 47, 48

Maine, Sir H., (_Ancient Law_) 461 note 2

Malevolence--character of, as motive, 364; sometimes sweepingly condemned, 321, 324; sometimes partially approved on Utilitarian grounds, 322, 323, 324

Malevolent affections natural and normal, 320, 321

Marcus Aurelius, 376 note 1

‘Market value,’ 286 _seq._

Marriage, Plato’s ideal of, 358-359 (cf. 348 note 1)

Martineau, 366, 367, 369, 370, 371, 372; (_Types of Ethical Theory_) 367 note 1, 369 note 1

Maxims--of Virtue, dependence or independence of, 313; of Justice, Prudence and Benevolence, self-evident element in, 380-382

‘Maximum Happiness’ as criterion of conduct, 134

Meanness, notion of, examined, 325, 326

Meekness, 321

Mercy, 321

Merit, 68 note 2, 284 _seq._; (cf. _Desert_)

Method of Ethics, definition of, 1; only one rational, 6, 12; more than one natural, 6

_Methods of Ethics, The_, purpose of, 11-14, 78

Mildness, 321

Mill, J. S., 44, 85, 87, 94, 121, 177 note 1, 412 notes 1 and 2, 414, 418, 440, 478, 504; (_Utilitarianism_) 93 note 1, 461 note 1, 499 note 1; (_On Liberty_) 478 notes 1 and 2

_Mind_, 87 Note, 477 note 1

Modern ethical thought quasi-jural in character, 106

Moral Faculty--a function of Reason, 23-38 _passim_; why subject of ethical discussion, 4, 5; Utilitarian theory of origin of, 461, 462, 497

Moral Judgment, 23-38; object of, 60, 61, 201-202, 202 note 1, 222, 362, 364; (or Practical) Reason, 33-34, 34 notes 1, 2, 3; 39, 40, 100 _seq._; Sense, 34; Reasoning, the most natural type of, 6, 12 _seq._, 102-103, 493-494; Sentiment, 26-28, 77; Sentiments, (_a_) difficulties of admitting or rejecting them as motives, 365-367, (_b_) theory of their derivation from experiences of pleasure and pain, 461, 462; and Quasi-moral Sentiments, 28, 173, 174; Motive, 77, 204 _seq._, 223; Motive, varying forms of:--(_a_) Reverence for Authority, (_b_) Religious Sentiment, (_c_) Self-respect, (_d_) sentiment of Freedom, (_e_) Admiration or Aspiration, 39-40; instincts and crude Utilitarian reasonings--discrepancy between, 466, 467; Intuitions, 211-216 _passim_; Intuitions, existence of, 211, 212, 337; Intuitions, connexion between (_a_) Existence and Origin of, 211, 212, (_b_) Origin and Validity of, 34 note 1, 212-213, 212 note 2, 214; Intuitions, Particular and General, 99-102, 214-216; Rules, imperative and indicative forms of, 101 note 1; Rules and Axioms, importance of, 229; Axioms, abstract but significant, 379-384, 505; Axioms, Kant’s view of, 385-386, 386 notes 1 and 2; Maxims, 337-361 _passim_; Maxims which _are_, and which are _not_, directly self-evident, distinction between, 383; Responsibility, 59-60; Obligation, 217; and non-moral excellence distinguished, 426, 427

‘Moral’ (in narrower sense) and ‘Prudential’ distinguished, 25-26

Moral Courage, 333 note 3

Moral Philosophy, some problems of modern, 374

Morality--‘inductive’ and ‘intuitive,’ double ambiguity of antithesis between, 97-99; _a priori_ and _a posteriori_ (or inductive and intuitive), 97; and growth of Sympathy, 455-456, 455 note 1

Morality of Common Sense (Intuitionism), 85, 102, 229, 263 Note, 337-361 _passim_; and Positive Morality, 215; and Egoism, 498-499 (cf. _Happiness and Duty_); development of, not perfectly Utilitarian, 455-456; axiomatic character of its maxims questioned, 338, 342, 343; furnishes valuable practical rules but not ultimate axioms, 360, 361; and Utilitarianism, 361 note 1, 423-457 _passim_, 461, 498, 499; first principles of, as “middle axioms” of Utilitarianism, 461; Mill’s view of, 461 note 1; not to be accepted by Utilitarianism without modification, 461 _seq._, 467

Motive meaning of, 202, 362, 363; and Intention, 202, 203, 203 note 1; -s, different views of Right, 204-207; and Desire, Green’s view of, 363 note 1; and Disposition, Utilitarian estimate of, 493, 494

Motives to action, 23; as subjects of moral judgment, 362-372; as affecting morality of actions, 60-61, 224; regarded as _better_ and _worse_ rather than _good_ and _bad_, 363-364; ‘seductive,’ 364; (“Springs of action”) Dr. Martineau’s table of (369) ethically estimated, 371, 372; ‘higher’ not always to be preferred to ‘lower,’ 369, 370, 371; moral regulation of, 370

Natural, The--Interpretation of, 80 _seq._; gives no definite practical criterion of right conduct, 82

Natural--Selection, effect of, on impulses, 194; and normal claims, indefiniteness of, 270, 271, 272, 272 note 1; expectations, ambiguity of, 272, 273, 352; Rights--difficulty of determining, 298; Good, 477

Nature--Life according to, 79 _seq._, 377, 378; conformity to, 80; Stoic use of, 377, 378 note 1; Butler’s use of, 378

Neighbourhood and Nationality, duties of, 250, 251, 252

Neutral excitements, 186 note 1 (cf. _Hedonistic Zero_)

‘Objective’ and ‘subjective,’ ethical application of, 207, 207 note 1, 208 notes 1 and 2, 208, 209, 210, 344 note 2, 394, 395, 429, 430

Objective Hedonism, meaning of, 151; and Common Sense, 151-161; advantages of, 151; defects of, 151 _seq._, 458, 459

Objective relations of conscious mind, how far desirable, 400, 401

Objectivity of Moral Judgment, 27, 33

Order, cf. _Law-observance_

Origin of Moral Intuitions, ethical importance of, 383, 384, 384 note 1

‘Ought,’ 23-38 _passim_; relative and unconditional uses of, 6, 7, 39; implies reasonableness, 25; and ‘right’ imply the same notion, 1 note 1, 23, 25; does not refer to matters of fact, 25; implies objectivity, 27, 33; does not merely signify (_a_) appropriateness of means to ends, 26, (_b_) an emotion of the person judging, 26-28, nor (_c_) bound under penalties, 29 _seq._; an elementary and irresolvable notion, 32-33; narrower and wider sense of, 33, 34, 34 note 4; carries with it an impulse to action, 34; implies possible conflict with reason (thus distinguishable from ‘right’), 34, 35, 217; determinist sense of, 78; loose meaning of, 508

Owen, Robert, 291

Pain--definition of, 42-43 note 1, 180, 191; the negative quantity of pleasure, 124, 125; physical concomitant of, 183 _seq._; Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, 180 _seq._, 180 note 1, 181 note 1; Mr. Stout’s theory of, 182, 188, etc.; Mr. Spencer’s theory of, 183 _seq._; Grant Allen’s view of, 187; biological theory of, 190 _seq._

Paley, 86, 121

Parents and children, duties of, 243, 243 note 1, 248-250, 248 note 1, 346, 347

Patriotism, 223, 244, 245; duties of, 251, 252, 252 note 1

‘Perception,’ ethical use of, by Dugald Stewart, 103 Note

Perfection or Excellence as End, 10, 11, 10 notes 3 and 4, 20 note 1, 78, 114, 115; and Intuitionism, 11, 83, 84, 97; Kant’s treatment of, 386 note 2

Perfectionists, view of, 97

Philosophical Intuitionism, its relation to Common Sense Morality, 373

φρόνησις, 231 note 1

Pity or Compassion, 262

Placability, 321

Plato, (_Republic_) 21, 171, 172; 140, 145, 148, 171, 172, 281, 345, 348 note 1, 358, 375 note 1, 376; (_Gorgias_) 405 note 1; 441

Pleasure--definitions of, 42, 43, 43 note 1, 125, 127 _seq._, 131, 190; ambiguities of, 43, 44, 93 _seq._; forecast of, must take account of moral or quasi-moral pleasures, 40, 173; the less sometimes chosen in preference to the greater, 41, 42, 42 note 1, 136; of Virtue, its ‘disinterestedness’ not abnormal, 50, 51; as aim of unconscious action, 52, 53; as ‘original’ aim of action, 53, 54; application of the term, 93; has only quantitative differences, 94, 95, 121; maximum, deductive methods of determining, 121, 122; rational as opposed to impulsive pursuit of, 124 note 1; ‘quality’ of, 94, 95, 121, 128-129, 128 note 1; as Feeling, conceivableness of, 132, 133; permanent sources of, 135, 136, 153; how estimated, 141 _seq._ (cf. 127, 128, 398); from others’ pain, various modes of, 321 note 1; and Appetite, identified by Hobbes, 44 note 1; and Desire, controversy as to relation between, 39-56; Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, 180 _seq._, 180 note 1, 181 note 1; Mr. Stout’s theory of, 182, 188, etc.; Mr. Spencer’s theory of, 183 _seq._; Grant Allen’s view of, 187; biological theory of, 190 _seq._; and Desire, (_a_) Mill’s view of, 43-44, (_b_) Butler’s view of, 44, (_c_) Bain’s view of, 54-56; effect of desire on estimate of, 144, 145; and Preservation, 190, etc.; (Hobbes’ view of) 89; and Perfection or Reality, (Self-development), Spinoza’s view of, 90; and ‘quantity of life,’ 192; ‘pure’ 143; of pursuit, 46 _seq._, 47 note 1, 55-56; of attainment, 47; of business, 49; intellectual and æsthetic, 107-108, 153, 157, 472; benevolent and sympathetic, 49, 50; of virtue, 153, 170, 171, 174, 175; -s, of the animal life, 154, 157, 159; of wealth and greatness, Adam Smith’s view of, 155 note 1--(cf. _Health_, _Wealth_, etc.); Stoic view of, 129; Green’s view of, 132 _seq._; Plato’s view of its illusoriness, 140; Spencer and Grant Allen’s ‘Intermittence’ theory of, 187

Pleasures and Pains, Moral, 170 _seq._, 171 note 1; of Sympathy, 49, 50, 499-502, 499 note 1; scale of, involves assumption of a Hedonistic zero, 124, 125; commensurability of, 123-125, 124 note 1, 128 note 1, 131, 132, 140-150; difficulties of a clear, definite and consistent evaluation of, 140-150; incommensurable intensity of, doubtful, 123, 124; intensity of, commensurable with duration, 124; Bentham’s four dimensions of, 124 note 1; volitional efficacy of, 125-127; their relation to normal activities, 185, etc.; Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, 180 _seq._; Stout’s theory of, 182; Wundt’s theory of, 184; Spencer’s biological theory of, 190 _seq._

Plutarch, 376

Politeness (Good Breeding, Fashion, Etiquette), 253; Code of, 30, 340, 341

Political order, Rousseau’s view of an ideally just, 298

Politics--and Ethics, 15-22; definition of, 1 note 1, 15 (cf. Law)

Positive Morality--and Morality of Common Sense, 215; relation of, to preservation and to happiness, 464, 465; alteration of, 164, 480

Power, 156, 157, 159

Practical efficacy and speculative truth, relation between, 507 note 1

Practical Empirical Hedonism, an assumption of, 131

Practical (or Moral) Judgment, 23 seq.

Practical (or Moral) Reason, 23-38 _passim_; its relation to Interest and to non-rational and irrational desires, 36; and Nature, 81; a postulate of, 6, 12; Dualism of, 404 note 1, 366, 200, 205-206, 499, 507-509 (cf. _Happiness and Duty_)

Praise, common sense award of, explained by utility, 428, 429

Priestley, 88 Note

Promise, 303-311 _passim_; conditions and meaning of, 304; conditions of bindingness of a, 311

Proof of a first principle, how possible, 419, 420

Proof--of Egoism may be demanded, 418, 419; of ordinary moral rules is often required and given, 419

Proof of Utilitarianism, 418-422 _passim_; clear demand of common sense for, 418, 419; addressed to Egoism, 420, 421, 497-498; addressed to Intuitionism, twofold character of, 421, 422

“Proof” of Utilitarian principle, Mill’s, 387, 388

Property and Right of Bequest, 277

Prudence (or Forethought), 7, 36, 96, 391; common sense view of, 327, 328; Kant’s and Butler’s views of, 327 note 1; self-evident maxim of impartiality educible from the rule of, 381; and Benevolence, subordination of other virtues to, 496-497

‘Prudential’ and ‘Moral,’ 25-26

Psychological Hedonism, 40 _seq._; of Bentham, 85; ethical import of, 41, 205

Public Opinion, Code of, 30

Public and private virtue, Utilitarian and Intuitionist estimates of, 495

Punishment, 281, 290 _seq._, 290 note 1, 291 note 1; preventive and retributory views of, 71-72

Purity, 223, 329-331, 329 note 2, 357-359

Quantitative Hedonism, 129

Quasi-moral Sentiment, 27-28, 173-174

Quasi-moral Sentiments and Rational Self-love, 173-174

Rank of Motives, difficulties of estimating, 365-367, 369; conflicting estimates of, by moralists, 366; difficulty due to complexity of motive, 368

Rational action, not to be identified with (_a_) disinterested or (_b_) free action, 57; Spinoza’s view of the principle of, 89-90

Rational Benevolence, 96; may be self-limiting, 385; Kant’s treatment of, 385-386 Note, 389-390

Rational Self-love (Rational Egoism, Prudence)--and Conscience, 172, 200, 200 note 2, 366; and Rational Benevolence, 386 note 4, 498 _seq._

Reason--and Ultimate Ends, 9, 77, 77 note 1; relation of, to Will and Desire, 23 _seq._; reference of moral judgments to, signifies merely their _objectivity_, 33; conflict with, implied in the terms _dictate_, _precept_, _imperative_, _ought_, _duty_, _moral obligation_, 34, 35; dictate or precept of, is a rule which may be deviated from, 41; dictates or imperatives of, 34, 36, 77; and the Divine Will, 79, 80; dictate of, implied by _right_, _rightness_, and their equivalents, 105; and instinct, 193-195; may be self-limiting, 345; _dictates_ and _dictation_ of, 345, 395, 404

Reason for doing what is seen to be right, why men demand a, 5-6

Reasonableness of Self-love, Butler’s view of, 119, 120; Clarke’s view of, 120; Christian view of, 120; common sense view of, 120

Rebellion, when justifiable?, 299, 300, 301, 352

Reciprocity, principle of, 167, 168

Religious deception, 316, 316 note 2

Renan quoted, 108 note 1

Reputation, 155

Resentment, instinctive and deliberate, 322, 323; deliberate, Butler’s view of, 323 note 1, 371; universalised the principle of retributive (criminal) justice, 281; evaluation of, 449

Resolutions, 37; general, may be contradicted by particular volitions, 37-38

Respect, tokens of, 336, 336 note 1

Reverence for Authority, 39

‘Right’--notion involved in, is unique, 25; and ‘good,’ 3, 4; and ‘ought,’ distinction between, 34, 35; conduct and ‘good’ conduct, 106, 113

Right Conflict and Ultimate Good, 3

Rights, 274, etc.

Rightful authority, how known?, 296; what are its limits?, 301, 302

Rousseau, 298; his political ideal, difficulty of realising, 298, 299

‘Rule of Equity,’ Clarke’s, 384-385

‘Rule of Love or Benevolence,’ Clarke’s, 385

‘Rules of Righteousness,’ Clarke’s, 384, 384 note 4, 385

Rules prescribing actions as _good_ or _right_ open to Utilitarian interpretation, 430

Sagacity, 236

Sanctions, 164-175 _passim_, 498, 499, 500 _seq._, 502, 505, 507-508; conflict of, 164, 165; legal, and happiness, 165, 166, 165 note 1; social, and happiness, 166, 167; social, and extra-legal duty, 167, 168; internal, and happiness, 170, 170 note 1, 171, 171 note 1, 172, 173, 501-502

Scottish School of Ethical Thought, 104

Self-control, 235-237, 331, 344, 345, 356

Self-development (Self-realisation), indefiniteness of the notion, 90, 91; as ethical aim, 192, 193; understood as = _yielding to instinctive impulses_, 193-194

Self-evidence, difficulty of discerning real, 339, 340, 341

Self-interest, 25, 26

Self-love, ordinary use and ambiguity of, 89; and certain elevated impulses, 137-138; Butler’s view of, 93; and benevolence and affection, 138, 403, 502

Self-preservation, 89

Self-realisation, 80, 90, 95

Self-regarding virtues, 327-331

Self-sacrifice, 109 note 1, 138, 431, 432

Self-satisfaction, Green’s view of, 133, 135, 135 note 3

Selfishness, 499

Services, comparative worth of, how determined, 286, 287; reward of, how determined, 290

Shaftesbury, 86, 86 notes 1 and 2, 138, 423, 423 note 1, 433, 501

Sidgwick, _Principles of Political Economy_, 267 note, 445 note 2, 446 note 1

Sincerity, 355

Smith, Adam, 424, 461, (_Wealth of Nations, Theory of Moral Sentiments_) 155 note 1

Social Contract, 17, 297-298, 303, 351

Social rank and status, 153, 155

Socialistic ideal, 289, 293-294

Sociology--scope and subject of, 2; present condition of, 472, 473

Socrates, 59 note 1, 98-99, 215, 231 note 1, 299

Socratic Induction, 98-99

Socratic principle of “Government by experts,” 299

σοφία, σοφός, 231, 231 note 1

Sources of Happiness, 135, 136, 153 _seq._; judgments of common sense respecting them, only roughly trustworthy, 158-160; common sense estimates of (_a_) at best are only true for ordinary persons, (_b_) are vitiated by mal-observation, (_c_) confuse between objects of natural desire and sources of experienced pleasure, 151, 152, (_d_) mix moral and æsthetic preferences with hedonistic, 153, (_e_) are found to be full of inconsistencies, 153-158

Sovereign power, Hobbist and Austinian views of, 300 note 1

Special moral codes, 30, 31, 168, 169, 340, 341

Special need, duties arising out of, 261, 262

Spencer, H., 125-126, 177 note 1, 183 _seq._, 194 note 1, 470, 471, 470 notes 1 and 2, 473; (_Social Statics_), 18 note 2, 194 note 1; (_Data of Ethics_), 18 note 2, 177 note 1, 194 note 1, 470 note 1

“Sphere of individual option” determined by Utilitarian calculation, 477-479

Spinoza, 90

Stephen, Leslie, 319 Note, 471, 471 note 2, 472, 473; (_Science of Ethics_), 42 note 1, 471

Stewart, Dugald, 454, 455; (_Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers_), 92 note 2, 454 note 1

Stoic system, its place in the development of ethical thought, 106; ethics, circular reasonings of, 376, 377

Stoicism, later compared with earlier, 376 note 1

Stoics, 92, 105, 129

Stout, G. F., 180 note 2, 182, 186; (_Analytic Psychology_), 182 note 1

Subjective, cf. _Objective_

_Suggestio falsi_, 317

Suicide prohibited by Common Sense, 327, 331, 356

Sully, _Pessimism_, 136 note 1, 186 note 1

_Suppressio veri_, 317

Sympathy--and Moral Sensibility, relation between, 170 note 1, 500-501; with impulses prompting to action, 463, 463 note 2; limitations and perversions of, 464; twofold operation of, on moral impulses, 483; confusion in Mill’s view of, 499 note 1; and happiness of agent, 170 note 1, 499 note 1, 499-503

Systematic Morality, explanation of indifference or hostility to, 99-100

Tautological propositions offered as ethical axioms, 374 _seq._

Temperance, 224, 328, 329, 344 note 1, 356

Torquemada, 226 note 1

‘True Good,’ 3 (cf. _Good_, _Ultimate Good_)

Truth, Cartesian Criterion of, 339

Ultimate End, for the individual and for the whole, 404, 497-498

Ultimate Good, My, 109 _seq._, 109 note 1, 497-498

Ultimate Good, The (the Good), 3, 106 _seq._, 391-407 _passim_

Ultimate reasonableness, different views of, implicit in ordinary thought, 6

Ultimate reasons for conduct, 78, 79; differences in, correspond to different aspects of human existence, 78 (cf. 79)

‘Ultra-intuitional,’ 100

‘Unconscious Utilitarianism’ of Common Sense Morality, 453 _seq._, 489, etc.

Universal Happiness as standard and motive, 413

Universalistic and Egoistic Hedonism, connexion between (_a_) in Bentham’s view, 87 Note; (_b_) in Paley’s view, 121

Unveracity, common, 316 _seq._, 486

Utilitarian--formula of distribution not really at variance with Common Sense, 432, 433; justification of special affections, 433, 434; ideal code, difficulties of constructing such, for present human beings, 467-470; rectification of Common Sense Morality must proceed by empirical method, 476-480; innovation, negative and destructive, probable effects of (_a_) on the agent, 481, 482-483, (_b_) on others, 482, 483; innovation, positive and supplementary, as affecting the agent and others, 483, 484; innovation in relation to degree of publicity and generality of acceptance, 489-490, 489 note 1; reform, consists largely in enforcing old rules, 484; exceptions to current morality (_a_) may generally be stated as fresh rules, 485, 489, (_b_) special and rare cases of, 486-487; Duty and Religious Sanction, 503-506; Sanction, 500 _seq._

Utilitarianism, 8, 11, 119; (= Universalistic or Benthamite Hedonism), 84, 119, 411; Proof of, 418-422; Principle of, 87, (Mill’s view of) 387, 388; Method of, 460-495; meaning of, 411-417 _passim_; to be distinguished from (_a_) Egoistic Hedonism, 411, 412, (_b_) any psychogonical theory of the Moral Sentiments, 412-413; _motive_ and _standard_ of, to be discriminated, 413; contradictory objections to, 87; and Intuitionism, relation between, 85-86, 386 _seq._, 496-497; and Intuitionism, history of relation between, in English ethical thought, 86, 423, 424; and Egoism, relation between, 497, 498; and Egoism, harmony of, (_a_) not empirically demonstrable, 503, (_b_) required by Reason, 506; and Common Sense Morality, 8, 423-457 _passim_, 468, 469, 475, 476, 480 _seq._, 498, 499; justifies the unequal distribution which Common Sense approves, 432 _seq._; more rigid than Common Sense, 499, 504; function of, as arbiter to Common Sense, 454, 455; reasonable attitude of, to Common Sense Morality, 473-474, 475-476; aims at remedying imperfections of Common Sense Morality, 476; and Axiom of Benevolence, 387, 388, 496-497, 498; and Conjugal and Parental Duties, 435, 436; and Duties of Special Need, 436, 437; and Gratitude, 437, 438; and benevolent Duties, 435 _seq._; and Law-observance, 440, 441; and Impartiality, 441, 442, 447, 447 note 1; and Normal Expectations, 442-443; and Good Faith, 443, 444, 443 note 3; and Freedom, 444, 445; and distribution according to Desert, 445-447; and Justice, 440 _seq._, 447; and Veracity, 448, 449, 483; and Malevolence, 449; and Self-regarding virtues, 450; and Purity, 449-450; and Sympathy, 500 _seq._; and Christianity, 504

‘Utility,’ Hume’s and Bentham’s uses of, 423 note 2

Veracity, 97, 224, 313, 314-319 _passim_, 355, 448, 449; and Good Faith, 303, 304, 313, 314

Virtue (Moral Perfection or Excellence), 10, 14, 78, 106, 219, 219 note 1, 220, 220 note 3, 221, 222, 226, 227; or Right Action, its relation to the Good, 106; and Happiness, 119, 120, 174-175, 461; Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts of, 376; involves reference to an Ultimate Good which is not Virtue, 393, 394, 395; and Duty, 217-230 _passim_; and emotion, 222-223, 226; voluntariness of, 220, 227; and motive, 223-224; and habit, 227; and moral effort, relation between, 224, 225, 429; intellectual conditions of, 225; is Knowledge, Socratic doctrine that, 227 note 1; felicific character of, 424, 425

Virtues, intellectual, 231-237 _passim_; self-regarding, 327-331 _passim_

Virtuous conduct, commonly regarded as disinterested, 77, 78

Virtuous motives, admitted by some moralists, 365, 366; Dr. Martineau’s rejection of, 367

Vivisection controversy, 402, 406 note 1

Volition, analysis of, 61, 62; Determinist view of, 62 note 1; conception of, how far inevitably Libertarian, 67, 71; causes muscular contractions, 73; affects thought and feeling, 73, 74; acting through resolutions alters men’s tendencies to action, 74, 75, 75 note 1; its emotional antecedents of secondary ethical importance, 77

Voluntary action, definition of, 59

Voluntary choice and irresistible impulse, 67 note 3

Wayland, _Elements of Moral Science_, 256 note 2

Wealth, 153, 154, 155

Well-being (the Good attainable in human life), 92, 92 note 1; Stoic view of, 92; Aristotle’s view of, 92, 92 note 2; not = mere promise of future being, 396, 397

Whewell, 58, 86; (_Elements of Morality_), 58 note 2, 317 note 1, 329 note 1

Will--Subjective Rightness of, and Ultimate Good, 394, 395; divorced from Objective Rightness is fanaticism, 395

Wisdom, 230, 231-236 _passim_, 344, 345, 393, 430; meaning and use of term, 231; Greek view of, 231; common sense definition of, 233; refers to ends as well as means, 231-233; in selection of ends and means, how far voluntary, 233-235; in adoption of selected ends, 235; comprehensiveness of, 238; and Temperance and Justice, tautological maxims of, 375; and Caution and Decision, do not furnish independent rules, 237 Note

Wundt, 184 note 3

Zeal or Moral Ardour, 237, 392

Zeno, 376

THE END

_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_.

* * * * *

Transcriber's Note

Many references in the index are to the original numbers of the notes, which do not correspond to the renumbering used in this e-text.

The following apparent errors have been corrected:

p. ix "more that" changed to "more than"

p. xii "chap iv." changed to "chap. iv."

p. xix "chap iv." changed to "chap. iv."

p. xxviii "201" changed to "201-207"

p. xxxv "legal code" changed to "legal code."

p. 44 "his own," changed to "his own."

p. 55 "adapted by" changed to "adopted by"

p. 272 (note) "§ 2" changed to "§ 2."

p. 318 (note) "chap i." changed to "chap. i."

p. 415 (note) "appear" changed to "appears"

p. 492 "let as" changed to "let us"

p. 518 "285:" changed to "285;"

p. 519 "cf. Law" changed to "cf. _Law_"

p. 519 "cf. Perfection" changed to "cf. _Perfection_"

p. 520 "180-182," changed to "180-182;"

p. 521 "Hedonistic Zero" changed to "_Hedonistic Zero_"

p. 522 "Note; 486" changed to "Note, 486"

p. 523 "203 note 1," changed to "203 note 1;"

p. 524 "84, 97:" changed to "84, 97;"

p. 526 "Good, Ultimate Good" changed to "_Good_, "Ultimate Good"

The following possible errors have been left as printed:

p. 177 evaluing

p. 524 405 note 1; 441

The following are used inconsistently in the text:

Common-sense and Common-Sense

counterbalancing and counter-balancing

fairminded and fair-minded

goodwill and good-will

highminded and high-minded

lawgiver and law-giver

note and Note

truthspeaking, truth-speaking, Truthspeaking and Truth-speaking

twofold and two-fold

_vice versâ_ and _vice versa_

wellbeing, well-being, Wellbeing and Well-being

widespread and wide-spread

wrongdoing and wrong-doing