CHAPTER V

THE METHOD OF UTILITARIANISM (_continued_)

1. It is, then, a Utilitarian’s duty at once to support generally, and to rectify in detail, the morality of Common Sense: and the method of pure empirical Hedonism seems to be the only one that he can at present use in the reasonings that finally determine the nature and extent of this rectification. 475-480

2. His innovations may be either negative and destructive, or positive and supplementary. There are certain important general reasons against an innovation of the former kind, which may, in any given case, easily outweigh the special arguments in its favour. 480-484

3. Generally, a Utilitarian in recommending, by example or precept, a deviation from an established rule of conduct, desires his innovation to be generally imitated. But in some cases he may neither expect nor desire such imitation; though cases of this kind are rare and difficult to determine. 485-492

4. There are no similar difficulties in the way of modifying the Ideal of Moral Excellence--as distinguished from the dictates of Moral Duty--in order to render it more perfectly felicific. 492-495

CONCLUDING CHAPTER

THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF THE THREE METHODS

1. It is not difficult to combine the Intuitional and Utilitarian methods into one; but can we reconcile Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism? 496-498

2. In so far as the latter coincides with Common Sense, we have seen in Book ii. chap. v. that no complete reconciliation is possible, on the basis of experience. 498-499

3. Nor does a fuller consideration of Sympathy, as a specially Utilitarian sanction, lead us to modify this conclusion; in spite of the importance that is undoubtedly to be attached to sympathetic pleasures. 499-503

4. The Religious Sanction, if we can show that it is actually attached to the Utilitarian Code, is of course adequate: 503-506

5. but its existence cannot be demonstrated by ethical arguments alone. Still, without this or some similar assumption, a fundamental contradiction in Ethics cannot be avoided. 506-509

APPENDIX ON KANT’S CONCEPTION OF FREE WILL 511

INDEX 517