CHAPTER XI

REVIEW OF THE MORALITY OF COMMON SENSE

1. We have now to examine the moral maxims that have been defined, to ascertain whether they possess the characteristics of scientific intuitions. 337-338

2. We require of an Axiom that it should be (1) stated in clear and precise terms, (2) really self-evident, (3) not conflicting with any other truth, (4) supported by an adequate ‘consensus of experts.’ These characteristics are not found in the moral maxims of Common Sense. 338-343

3. The maxims of Wisdom and Self-control are only self-evident in so far as they are tautological: 343-345

4. nor can we state any clear, absolute, universally-admitted axioms for determining the duties of the Affections: 345-349

5. and as for the group of principles that were extracted from the common notion of Justice, we cannot define each singly in a satisfactory manner, still less reconcile them: 349-352

6. and even the Duty of Good Faith, when we consider the numerous qualifications of it more or less doubtfully admitted by Common Sense, seems more like a subordinate rule than an independent First Principle. Still more is this the case with Veracity: 352-355

7. similarly with other virtues: even the prohibition of Suicide, so far as rational, seems to rest ultimately on utilitarian grounds. 355-357

8. Even Purity when we force ourselves to examine it rigorously yields no clear independent principle. 357-359

9. The common moral maxims are adequate for practical guidance, but do not admit of being elevated into scientific axioms. 359-361