CHAPTER VI

LAWS AND PROMISES

1. The duty of obeying Laws, though it may to a great extent be included under Justice, still requires a separate treatment. We can, however, obtain no _consensus_ for any precise definition of it. 295-297

2. For we are neither agreed as to what kind of government is ideally legitimate, 297-299

3. nor as to the criterion of a traditionally legitimate government, 299-301

4. nor as to the proper limits of governmental authority. 301-303

5. The duty of fulfilling a promise in the sense in which it was understood by both promiser and promisee is thought to be peculiarly stringent and certain 303-304

6. (it being admitted that its obligation is relative to the promisee, and may be annulled by him, and that it cannot override strict prior obligations). 304-305

7. But Common Sense seems to doubt how far a promise is binding when it has been obtained by force or fraud: 305-306

8. or when circumstances have materially altered since it was made--especially if it be a promise to the dead or absent, from which no release can be obtained, or if the performance of the promise will be harmful to the promisee, or inflict a disproportionate sacrifice on the promiser. 306-308

9. Other doubts arise when a promise has been misapprehended: and in the peculiar case where a prescribed form of words has been used. 308-311