CHAPTER I

INTUITIONISM

1. The fundamental assumption of Intuitionism is that we have the power of seeing clearly what actions are in themselves right and reasonable. 199-201

2. Though many actions are commonly judged to be made better or worse through the presence of certain _motives_, our common judgments of right and wrong relate, strictly speaking, to _intentions_. One motive, indeed, the desire to do what is right as such, has been thought an essential condition to right conduct: but the Intuitional method should be treated as not involving this assumption. 201-207

3. It is certainly an essential condition that we should not believe the act to be wrong; and this implies that we should not believe it to be wrong for any similar person in similar circumstances: but this implication, though it may supply a valuable practical rule, cannot furnish a complete criterion of right conduct. 207-210

4. The _existence_ of apparent cognitions of right conduct, intuitively obtained, as distinct from their validity, will scarcely be questioned; and to establish their validity it is not needful to prove their ‘originality.’ 210-214

5. Both particular and universal intuitions are found in our common moral thought: but it is for the latter that ultimate validity is ordinarily claimed by intuitional moralists. We must try, by reflecting on Common Sense, how far we can state these Moral Axioms with clearness and precision. 214-216