CHAPTER V

FREE WILL

1. The Kantian identification of ‘Free’ and ‘Rational’ action is misleading from the ambiguity of the term ‘freedom.’ 57-59

2. When, by definition and analysis of voluntary action, the issue in the Free Will Controversy has been made clear, it appears that the cumulative argument for Determinism is almost overwhelming: 59-65

3. still it is impossible to me in acting not to regard myself as free to do what I judge to be reasonable. However the solution of the metaphysical question of Free Will is not important--Theology apart--for systematic Ethics generally: 65-70

4. it seems however to have a special relation to the notion of Justice: 71-72

5. The practical unimportance of the question of Free Will becomes more clear if we scrutinize closely the range of volitional effects.72-76