PART I.

"At the distance at which I am placed from the theatre of events, and in my almost total ignorance of the state of negociations, I can scarcely reason fitly. Nevertheless, as I have long had a definite system touching the foreign policy of France, as I was, so to speak, the first to call for the emancipation of Greece, I readily, noble count, submit my ideas to your judgment.

"There was as yet no question of the Treaty of the 6th of July[676], when I published my Note on Greece[677]. That Note contained the germ of the treaty: I proposed to the five Great Powers of Europe to address a collective dispatch to the Divan imperatively to demand the cessation of all hostility between the Porte and the Hellenes. In case of refusal, the five Powers were to declare that they recognised the independence of the Greek Government and that they would receive the representatives of that Government.

"This Note was read by the several Cabinets. The position which I had occupied as Minister for Foreign Affairs lent some importance to my opinion: what is singular is that Prince Metternich showed himself less opposed to my Note than Mr. Canning.

"The latter, with whom I had had fairly intimate relations, was an orator rather than a great politician, a man of talent rather than a statesman. He entertained a certain jealousy of success in general, and especially of that of France. When the Parliamentary Opposition either wounded or exalted his self-esteem, he flung himself into false measures, he launched out into sarcasm or boasting. It was thus that, after the Spanish War, he rejected the demand for intervention, which I had extracted with so much difficulty from the Cabinet of Madrid, for the settlement of affairs across the Atlantic: the secret reason was that he had not himself made that demand, and he refused to see that, even according to his system (always presuming that he had one), England, represented in a general congress, would in no way be bound by the acts of that congress, and would always remain free to act separately. It was thus again that Mr. Canning moved troops into Portugal, not to defend a Charter at which he was the first to laugh, but because the Opposition reproached him with the presence of our soldiers in Spain and he wanted to be able to say that the British Army was occupying Lisbon as the French Army occupied Cadiz. Lastly, it was thus that he signed the Treaty of the 6th of July against his private opinion, against the opinion of his country, which was unfavourable to the cause of the Greeks. If he agreed to that treaty, it was solely because he was afraid of seeing us take the initiative in the question with Russia and gain the glory of a generous resolution alone. That minister, who, after all, will leave a great reputation, also thought that he was hindering Russia's movements by this very treaty; nevertheless, it was clear that the text of the instrument in no way tied down the Emperor Nicholas and in no way obliged him to waive a war of his own with Turkey.

"The Treaty of the 6th of July is a crude document hurriedly drafted, devoid of all foresight and teeming with contradictory provisions.

"In my Note on Greece, I presupposed the adhesion of the five Great Powers; as Austria and Prussia have kept aloof, their neutrality leaves them free, according to events, to declare for or against either of the belligerent parties.

"There is no longer any question of going back to the past, we must take things as they are. All that the governments are obliged to do is to make the most of the facts when they are accomplished. Let us therefore examine those facts.

"We are occupying the Morea[678], the towns on that peninsula have fallen into our hands. So much for what concerns ourselves.

"Varna is taken, Varna becomes an outpost at seventy hours' march from Constantinople. The Dardanelles are blockaded; the Russians will, in the course of the winter, seize Silistria[679] and some other fortresses; numbers of recruits will arrive. In the early days of spring, all will move for a decisive campaign; in Asia, General Paskevitch[680] has invaded three pashalics, he commands the sources of the Euphrates and threatens the road to Erzeroum. So much for what concerns Russia.

"Would the Emperor Nicholas have done better to undertake a winter campaign in Europe? I think so, if it were possible. By marching on Constantinople, he would have cut the Gordian knot and put an end to all diplomatic intrigue; people embrace the side of success; the way to secure allies is to be victorious.

"As for Turkey, it has been made clear to me that she would have declared war on us if Russia had failed before Varna. Will she have the good sense to-day to open up negociations with England and France, if only to rid herself of both? Austria would gladly advise her to adopt that course; but it is difficult to foresee the conduct of a race of men who have not European ideas. At the same time cunning as slaves and haughty as tyrants, with them anger is never tempered by anything save fear. Sultan Mahmud II.[681] appears, in some respects, to be a superior prince to the last sultans; he has, above all, political courage; but has he personal courage? He is content to hold reviews in the suburbs of his capital, and he lets himself be entreated by the magnates not to go even so far as Adrianople. The mob of Constantinople would be better held in check by triumphs than by the presence of its master.

"Let us, however, admit that the Divan consents to a parley on the basis of the Treaty of the 6th of July. The negociation would be a very intricate one; even if one had only to fix the limits of Greece, there would be no end to it. Where shall those limits be placed on the Continent? How many islands shall be restored to liberty? Shall Samos, which has so gallantly defended its independence, be abandoned? Let us look further, suppose the conference to be established: will it paralyze the armies of the Emperor Nicholas? While the plenipotentiaries of the Turks and of the three Allied Powers are treating in the Archipelago, every step of the invading forces in Bulgaria will change the state of the question. If the Russians were repulsed, the Turks would break up the conference; if the Russians arrived at the gates of Constantinople, there would be a fine question of the independence of the Morea! The Hellenes would need neither protectors nor negociators.

"Therefore, to persuade the Divan to apply itself to the Treaty of the 6th of July is to postpone the difficulty, not to solve it. The coincidence of the emancipation of Greece and the signing of peace between the Turks and Russians is, in my opinion, necessary to extricate the Cabinets of Europe from their present embarrassment.

"What conditions will the Emperor Nicholas lay down for peace?

"In his manifesto, he declares that he waives conquests, but he speaks of indemnities for the cost of the war: that is vague and may lead to much.

"Will the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, pretending to regularize the Treaties of Akerman[682] and Jassy[683] demand (1) the complete independence of the two principalities; (2) liberty of commerce in the Black Sea, not only for Russia, but the other nations; (3) the repayment of the sums expended in this last campaign?

"Innumerable difficulties present themselves against the conclusion of a peace on these bases.

"If Russia desires to give the principalities sovereigns of her choosing, Austria will look upon Moldavia and Wallachia as two Russian provinces and will oppose this political transaction.

"Will Moldavia and Wallachia fall under the sway of a prince who shall be independent of any Great Power, or of a prince installed under the protectorate of several sovereigns?

"In that case, Nicholas would prefer the hospodars appointed by Mahmud, for the principalities, continuing to be Turkish, would remain vulnerable to the Russian armies.

[Sidenote: On Eastern affairs: part I.]

"Liberty of commerce in the Black Sea, the opening of that sea to all the fleets of Europe and America would shake the power of the Porte to its foundations. To grant the right of passage of warships under Constantinople is, with reference to the geography of the Ottoman Empire, as though one were to recognise the right of foreign armies to cross France at all times along the walls of Paris.

"Lastly, where would Turkey find the money to pay the costs of the campaign? The so-called treasure of the Sultans is an antiquated fable. The provinces conquered beyond the Caucasus might, it is true, be ceded as security for the sum demanded: of the two Russian armies, one, in Europe, appears to me to be entrusted with the interests of Nicholas' honour; the other, in Asia, with his pecuniary interests. But, if Nicholas did not consider himself bound by the declarations of his manifesto, would England with an indifferent eye see the Muscovite soldier advancing along the road to India? Was she not alarmed already in 1827, when he took one more step forward in the Persian Empire?

"If the double difficulty arising from the carrying into effect of the treaty and from the pertinence of the conditions of a peace between Turkey and Russia were to render useless the efforts made to overcome so many obstacles; if a second campaign were to open in the spring, would the powers of Europe take sides in the quarrel? What part ought France to play? This is what I propose to examine in the second part of this Note."