CHAPTER XXIII

THE SOUDAN WAR OF 1884-5

I. SUMMARY OF EVENTS

NOTE

A year before the British forces restored order in Egypt, trouble was beginning in the Soudan. One Mahomet Ahmed, who was the son of a boat-builder, and who had the peculiar conformation of the teeth which betokened the fore-ordained of the Prophet, announced that he was the Mahdi. In July, 1881, the holy man dwelt upon the island of Abba, on the White Nile, above Khartoum. Thence he caused it to be made known that he was the chosen instrument for the reformation of Islam, and that all those who denied him would be abolished. Reouf Pasha, who was then Governor-General of the Soudan, summoned the Mahdi to Khartoum, there to give an account of himself. The Mahdi naturally refused; and when Reouf sent soldiers to fetch him, the Mahdi slew most of them, and departed into the hills, he and all his following. The Governor of Fashoda took an expedition to Gheddeer, and was also slain, together with most of his men. Then Giegler Pasha, a German, acting as temporary Governor-General of the Soudan, succeeded in defeating the forces of the Mahdi. But Abdel Kader, who, succeeding Reouf, took over the command from Giegler, was defeated in his turn. On 7th June, 1882, the Egyptian forces were cut to pieces near Fashoda. In July, the Mahdi was besieging Obeid and {212} Bara. By October, 1882, both places were in danger of falling, and Abdel Kader was demanding reinforcements from Egypt.

The Soudan is a country as large as India; at that time it had no railways, no canals, no roads, and, excepting the Nile during a part of the year, no navigable rivers. In November, 1882, the British Government informed the Khedive that they declined to be responsible for the condition of the Soudan. Lord Granville's intimation to this effect was the first step in the policy which progressed from blunder to blunder to the desertion and death of General Gordon.

The Egyptian Government, left in the lurch, hastily enlisted some 10,000 men, the most part being brought in by force, and dispatched them to Abdel Kader at Berber. At Abdel Kader's request, Colonel Stewart and two other British officers were sent to Khartoum to help him to deal with the raw and mutinous levies.

In December, a number of British officers were appointed to the Egyptian Army in Egypt, in accordance with the recommendations of Lord Dufferin, and Sir Evelyn Wood was appointed Sirdar. The British Army of Occupation had now been reduced to 12,000 men, under the command of General Sir Archibald Alison, who, in the following April (1883) was succeeded by Lieutenant-General F. C. S. Stephenson.

In January, 1883, Colonel W. Hicks, afterwards Hicks Pasha, was appointed by the Khedive chief of the staff of the Army of the Soudan. Before he proceeded to the theatre of war, Abdel Kader had lost and won various engagements, and had reoccupied the province of Sennar; while the Mahdi had taken El Obeid and Bara and occupied the whole of Kordofan.

In February, it was announced in the Queen's Speech that "the British troops will be withdrawn as promptly as may be permitted by a prudent examination of the country"; a declaration provoking intense alarm among the European {213} inhabitants of Egypt. Their protests, however, were totally disregarded. The Egyptians naturally concluded that England owned no real interest in that reform of administration which her influence alone could achieve.

On 7th February, 1883, Colonel Hicks left Cairo for Khartoum, with his staff, consisting of Colonels Colborne and De Coetlogon, Majors Farquhar and Martin, and Captains Warner, Massey and Forrestier-Walker. Upon the night before their departure, Colonel Hicks and his staff dined with Lord and Lady Charles Beresford in Cairo. Lord Charles Beresford, who was then on half-pay, had expressed a wish to accompany Colonel Hicks, but Lord Dufferin disapproving of his suggestion, Lord Charles Beresford withdrew it.

Hicks and his men disappeared into the desert, which presently swallowed them up.

On the 28th April, Hicks defeated a large force of the Mahdi's army on the White Nile. The Egyptian Government then decided to reconquer the province of Kordofan, and dispatched reinforcements to Khartoum. On the 9th September, Hicks Pasha, at the head of 10,000 men, marched for Duem. The last dispatch received from him was dated 3rd October, 1883. Upon a day early in November, Hicks and his whole army were annihilated.

His defeat left Khartoum in great danger. On 9th November, before the news of the disaster reached England, the British Government stated that all British troops were to be withdrawn from Egypt. When the fact was known, the decision of the Government was modified; but they still declined to interfere in the Soudan; and advised the Egyptian Government to evacuate at least a part of that territory. The Egyptian Government protesting, the British Government, on 4th January, 1884, sent a peremptory message insisting that the policy of evacuation should be carried into execution. The inconsequence of Her Majesty's Ministers is sufficiently apparent.

In the meantime, during August of the preceding year, {214} 1883, trouble had arisen in the Eastern Soudan, where Osman Digna, a trader, joined the Mahdi, and brought all the tribes of that country to his standard. At the beginning of November, 1883, just at the time when Hicks Pasha and his army had come to their end, an Egyptian force under Mahmoud Talma Pasha was defeated by Osman Digna in the attempt to relieve Tokar, besieged by the rebels, Captain Moncrieff, Royal Navy, British Consul at Souakim, being killed in the action. A second expeditionary force under Suleiman Pasha was cut to pieces on 2nd December at Tamanieh.

The Egyptian Government then dispatched reinforcements under the command of General Valentine Baker, among whose staff were Colonel Sartorius, Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington, Lieutenant-Colonel Hay, Majors Harvey, Giles, and Holroyd, Morice Bey and Dr. Leslie. On the 4th February, 1884, Baker was defeated at El-Teb, with the loss of nearly two-thirds of his force. Morice Bey, Dr. Leslie, and nine other European officers were killed. Souakim being threatened, Admiral Hewett, on 10th December, was given the command of the town, having under him some 3800 troops. Two days later came the news of the taking of Sinkat by the rebels, and of the massacre of the garrison. During the period in which these successive disasters occurred, the British Army of Occupation was kept idle in Cairo by the orders of the British Government.

The current of events now divides, one leading to Khartoum, the other still flowing in the Eastern Soudan. The British Government, hopelessly at fault, turned to General Charles Gordon, as the one man in the world who could apparently perform miracles. Ten years previously, "Chinese" Gordon, as Governor-General of the Soudan, and again in 1877, as Governor-General of the Soudan, Darfur and the Equatorial Provinces, had freed the country from Turkish rule, broken the slave trade, established peace, opened trade routes, and laid the foundations of civilisation. Since 1877 he had been engaged in setting wrong things right in Egypt {215} in the Soudan again, in Abyssinia, in China, in the Mauritius, at the Cape, in Palestine, and in the Congo.

On 18th January, 1884, Gordon was instructed by the British Government to report upon the best method of evacuating the Soudan. When he arrived at Cairo, these instructions were radically altered by Sir Evelyn Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer), who, on the 25th January, informed Gordon that he was required actually to direct the evacuation of Khartoum and of the whole Soudan, and afterwards to establish an organised government in that country. Gordon arrived at Khartoum on the 18th February, where he was hailed as the father and saviour of the people.

On the same day, Major-General Sir Gerald Graham left Suez to join at Souakim the force which had been placed under his command. That force was chiefly drawn from the British Army of Occupation in Egypt. The object of the expedition was the relief of Tokar, or, if that place had already fallen, the protection of Souakim, an alternative which involved an attack upon Osman Digna's victorious army. Tokar was in fact taken by the enemy before the expedition started.

The British Government, whose original intention had been to refrain from any action in the Soudan whatsoever; which had been compelled by force of circumstances, including the most frightful bloodshed, to change a wholly negative policy to a definite scheme of evacuation; now perceived, of course too late, that if the European population was to be brought away, at least some measure of military force must be employed. What Her Majesty's Ministers were unable to see, or what, if they saw, they chose to ignore, was the plain fact that the same force and the same measures and the same promptitude would be required for the salvation of Europeans in face of the enemy, as for the reconquest and reoccupation of the country. In this delusion, or dereliction, resides the explanation of an affair which has left an indelible stain upon British honour.

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On 28th February, 1884, Graham defeated the enemy, inflicting upon them severe losses, at El-Teb, near the spot upon which Baker's disastrous action had occurred some three weeks previously. On 13th March, after a hard and at times a dubious fight, Graham won another victory at Tamaai, and the power of Osman Digna was broken. Graham was then ordered to return, and the expedition was over.

By withdrawing Graham's troops, the Government both threw away the fruits of his success, and deliberately abandoned the control of the Souakim-Berber route from Khartoum, by which alone Gordon could have brought away the refugees. Berber was the key to the Soudan. Thenceforth, the Souakim-Berber route was impracticable; and it was for this reason that Lord Wolseley was obliged to take the much longer Nile route.

On the very day after Graham's victory at El-Teb, and before Graham had left Souakim, Gordon had telegraphed from Khartoum as follows:--

"There is not much chance of the situation improving, and every chance of it getting worse; for we have nothing to rely on to make it better. You must, therefore, decide whether you will or will not make an attempt to save the two-thirds of the population who are well affected before these two-thirds retreat. Should you wish to intervene, send 200 British troops to Wady Halfa, and adjutants to inspect Dongola, and then open up Souakim-Berber road by Indian Moslem troops. This will cause an immediate collapse of the revolt."

On 2nd March he telegraphed again to the same effect; but Lord Granville declined to accede to General Gordon's suggestions. A few days later, when the Eastern Soudan and the Souakim-Berber route had been definitely abandoned, Sir Evelyn Baring strongly advised the British Government to obtain command of the Souakim-Berber route. But the {217} advice was refused by Lord Granville, and the most urgent appeals continued to be addressed to him in vain.

Deserted by the Government, Gordon tried, and failed, to raise money privately for the purpose of engaging Turkish troops. Early in April, Khartoum was closely besieged. At this time, Lord Wolseley urged upon the Government the necessity of relieving Gordon. In May, preparations for war were begun. A part of the British Army of Occupation in Egypt was sent up the Nile; and Commander Hammill and other naval officers were employed to report upon the navigation of the river. These facts did not prevent Lord Hartington from informing the House of Commons, early in July, that the Government had no intention of sending an expedition to relieve General Gordon, unless it were made clear that by no other means could he be relieved, and adding that the Government had "received no information making it desirable that we should depart from that decision" (Royce, _The Egyptian Campaigns_). On 24th July, Lord Wolseley made a spirited protest against the procrastination of the Government. The pressure of public opinion could no longer be entirely withstood. On 30th July, Gordon sent a message in which he declared his retreat to be impossible.

On 5th August, Mr. Gladstone asked and obtained a vote of credit. Then, and not until then, were the preparations for war begun in England. Having decided, upon the advice of Lord Wolseley, to follow the Nile route instead of the Souakim-Berber route, the Government ordered 800 boats. These were 30 feet long, having six feet six inches beam, two feet six inches draught, fitted with 12 oars, two masts and lug sails; each designed to carry two boatmen and 10 soldiers with provisions, arms and ammunition. Eight steam pinnaces and two stern-wheel paddle-boats were also fitted out; the Nile steamers belonging to the Egyptian Government were taken over; and 380 _voyageurs_ from Canada were engaged. The total force of troops selected numbered 7000. Messrs. Thomas Cook & Son contracted to transport the {218} whole expedition to above the Second Cataract. Lord Wolseley was appointed commander-in-chief; General Sir Redvers Buller was chief of staff; General Earle was given command of a brigade; special service officers were: Colonels Sir Charles Wilson, Brackenbury, Harrison, Henderson, Maurice, Lord Anson (Royce, _The Egyptian Campaigns_). Lord Charles Beresford was attached to Lord Wolseley's staff.

Even now, the Government failed to recognise the plain facts of the case. Their instructions to Lord Wolseley were that the main object of the expedition was to rescue General Gordon. Her Majesty's Ministers considered that it might be practicable to achieve his release without going to Khartoum, and that in any case it was desirable to avoid any fighting so far as possible.

When Lord Wolseley started from Cairo on 27th September, 1884, the advance was already going rapidly forward. Under the direction of Sir Evelyn Wood and Commander Hammill, a number of the whaler boats had been transported to Wady Halfa, which is nearly 900 miles from Khartoum, the total length of the Nile route being 1650 miles. Along the river, up to Wady Halfa and a little beyond to Sarras, bases of supply had been established; an advance guard was already at New Dongola, about 100 miles above Wady Halfa, under the command of General Sir Herbert Stewart, he who afterwards led the Desert Column.

Arriving at Wady Halfa on 5th October, Lord Wolseley received news that Colonel J. S. Stewart, Mr. Power, British Consul at Khartoum and correspondent of _The Times_, M. Herbin, French Consul, and a party of Greek and Egyptian refugees, who had left Khartoum in the steamer Abbas, had all been slain. Stewart had with him Gordon's papers, which, of course, were taken by the Mahdi's men.

On the 8th October a letter from M. Herbin was received at Cairo. It was dated from Khartoum, 29th July, 1884, and stated that there were then provisions for two months in the {219} place. The time had thus expired--and M. Herbin had been murdered--ere the letter arrived.

A temporary base was formed at Wady Halfa; and bases of supplies were established along the river up to New Dongola. By means of extraordinary exertions, boats and steamers were hauled up to Dongola through the rapids. Lord Wolseley formed a Camel Corps of 1500 men, consisting of four regiments, Heavy Cavalry, Light Cavalry, Guards, and Mounted Infantry, with a detachment of Royal Marines. Early in November, a general advance was made from Wady Halfa. Wolseley arrived at Dongola on 3rd November. Two days previously, on 1st November, Sir Evelyn Baring had received a message from Gordon, dated 13th July, saying that he could hold out for four months. The limit, therefore, had nearly been reached by the time the expedition was leaving Wady Halfa, 900 miles from Khartoum.

Lord Wolseley, early in November, considered that it would take to the end of the year to concentrate his forces at Ambukol, just above Old Dongola. He returned to Wady Halfa to expedite progress; and by the middle of December headquarters were established at Korti, and by Christmas the greater part of the force was concentrated there. During the whole of this period, Wolseley's army must be figured as a river of men flowing along the river Nile, the infantry struggling up in boats, the mounted men toiling along the banks; the stream of men banking up at headquarters, the military front, which is steadily pushed forward from Wady Halfa to New Dongola, from New Dongola to Old Dongola 60 to 70 miles farther up, from Old Dongola to Korti.

On 17th November a letter was received from Gordon saying that he could hold out for forty days from the date of the superscription, 4th November, 1884, thus leaving Wolseley barely four weeks to accomplish a task needing as many months. On 28th November another letter from Gordon, dated 9th September, gave the relief expedition four months, thus leaving Wolseley five weeks from the {220} date upon which the letter was received. It was now clear that the expedition could not reach Khartoum in time.

When Lord Wolseley, towards the end of December, had his forces concentrated at Korti, he decided to divide them into two columns, the Desert Column and the Nile Column. The reasons for his scheme can only be clearly apprehended by a reference to the map. At Korti, the Nile turns north-east, looping back again, and resuming its southward course at Metemmeh. A straight line drawn across the Bayuda Desert from Korti to Metemmeh is the short cut. This was the route given to the Desert Column. The Nile Column was to proceed up the loop of the river to Hamdab, there to avenge the murder of Colonel Stewart and his party, to proceed higher up to Berti, and thence to secure the bend of the river and to open up the desert route back to Korosko, below Wady Halfa, and from Korosko it was intended to attack Berber, and thence to join forces with the Desert Column at Metemmeh.

The Nile Column, numbering about 3000 men, under the command of Major-General Earle, Brigadier-General Brackenbury being second in command, left Korti on 28th December, 1884.

The Desert Column was placed under the command of General Sir Herbert Stewart. With him was Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, who was instructed to take a body of troops from Metemmeh to Khartoum. The Column consisted of sections of the Camel Corps, a company of the Royal Engineers, a detachment of the 19th Hussars, detachments of the Commissariat and Medical Corps, and the Naval Brigade, which was placed under the command of Lord Charles Beresford. The total force numbered 73 officers, 1032 non-commissioned officers and men, 2099 camels, and 40 horses. The Desert Column left Korti on 30th December, 1884. It was, in fact, a forlorn hope.

(The writer desires to acknowledge the use he has made of the excellent narrative of events contained in _The Egyptian Campaigns_, by the Hon. Charles Royle.)

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