CHAPTER XL

THOMAS AQUINAS

I. THOMAS’S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN BEATITUDE.

II. MAN’S CAPACITY TO KNOW GOD.

III. HOW GOD KNOWS.

IV. HOW THE ANGELS KNOW.

V. HOW MEN KNOW.

VI. KNOWLEDGE THROUGH FAITH PERFECTED IN LOVE.

I

With Albert it seemed most illuminating to outline the masses of his work of Aristotelian purveyorship and inchoate reconstruction of the Christian encyclopaedia in conformity with the new philosophy. Such a treatment will not avail for Thomas. His achievement, even measured by its bulk, was as great as Albert’s. But its size and encyclopaedic inclusiveness do not represent its integral excellences. The intellectual qualities of Thomas, evinced in his work, are of a higher order than those included in intelligent diligence, however exceptional. They must be disengaged from out of the vast product of their energies, in order that they may be brought together, and made to appear in the organic correlation which they held in the mind of the most potent genius of scholasticism.

We are pleased to find some clue to a man’s genius in the race and place from which he draws his origin. So for whatever may be its explanatory value as to Thomas, one may note that he came of Teutonic stocks, which for some generations had been domiciled in the form-giving Italian land. The mingled blood of princely Suabian and Norman lines flowed in him; the nobility of his father’s house, the Counts of Aquinum, was equalled by his mother’s lineage. Probably in 1225 he was born, in Southern Italy, not far from Monte Cassino. Thither, as a child, he was sent to school to the monks, and stayed with them through childhood’s formative period. His education did not create the mind which it may have had part in directing to sacred study. Near his tenth year, the extraordinary boy was returned to Naples, there to study the humanities and philosophy under selected masters. When eighteen, he launched himself upon the intellectual currents of the age by joining the Dominican Order. Stories have come down of the violent, but fruitless opposition of his family. In two years, with true instinct, Thomas had made his way from Naples to the feet of Albert in Cologne. Thenceforth the two were to be together, as their tasks permitted, and the loyal relationship between master and scholar was undisturbed by the latter’s transcendent genius. Plato had the greatest pupil, and Aristotle the greatest master, known to fame. That pupil’s work was a redirecting of philosophy. The work of pupil Thomas perfected finally the matter upon which his master laboured; and the master’s aged eyes beheld the finished structure that was partly his, when the pupil’s eyes had closed. Thomas, dying, left Albert to defend the system that was to be called “Thomist,” after him who constructed and finished it to its very turret points, rather than “Albertist,” after him who prepared the materials.

To return to the time when both still laboured. Thomas in 1245 accompanied his master to Paris, and three years later went back with him to Cologne. Thereafter their duties often separated them. We know that in 1252 Thomas was lecturing at Paris, and that he there received with Bonaventura the title of _magister_ in 1257. After this he is found south of the Alps; it was in the year 1263 that Urban IV. at Rome encouraged him to undertake a critical commentary upon Aristotle, based on a closer rendering into Latin of the Greek. In 1268, at the height of his academic fame, he is once more at Paris; which he leaves for the last time in 1272, having been directed to establish a _studium generale_ at Naples. Two years later he died, on his way to advise the labours of the Council assembled at Lyons.[577]

Thomas wrote commentaries upon the Aristotelian _De interpretatione_ and _Posterior Analytics_; the _Physics_, the _De coelo et mundo_, the _Meteorum_, the _Metaphysics_, _Ethics_, _Politics_, and certain other Aristotelian treatises. His work shows such a close understanding of Aristotle as the world had not known since the days of the ancient Peripatetics. Of course, he lectured on the _Sentences_, and the result remains in his Commentaries on them. He lectured, and the resulting Commentaries exist in many tomes, on the greater part of both the Old and New Testaments. It would little help our purpose to catalogue in detail his more constructive and original works, wherein he perfected a system of philosophy and sacred knowledge. Chief among them were the _Summa contra Gentiles_ and the _Summa theologiae_, the latter the most influential work of all western mediaeval scholasticism. Many of his more important shorter treatises are included in the _Quaestiones disputatae_, and the _Quodlibetalia_. They treat of many matters finally put together in the _Summa theologiae_. _De malo in communi, de peccatis, etc._; _De anima_; _De virtutibus in communi, etc._; _De veritate_; _De ideis_; _De cognitione angelorum_; _De bono_; _De voluntate_; _De libero arbitrio_; _De passionibus animae_; _De gratia_;--such are titles drawn from the _Quaestiones_. The _Quodlibetalia_ were academic disputations held in the theological faculty, upon any imaginable thesis having theological bearing. Some of them still appear philosophical, while many seem bizarre to us; for example: Whether an angel can move from one extreme to the other without passing through the middle. One may remember that such questions had been put, and put again, from the time of the Church Fathers. This question answered by Thomas whether an angel may pass from one extreme to the other without traversing the middle is pertinent to the conception of angels as completely immaterial beings,--a conception upon the elaboration of which theologians expended much ingenious thought.

In the earlier Middle Ages, when men were busy putting together the ancient matter, the personalities of the writers may not clearly appear. It is different in the twelfth century, and very different in the thirteenth, when the figures of at least its greater men are thrown out plainly by their written works. Bonaventura is seen lucidly reasoning, but with his ardently envisioning piety ever reaching out beyond; the personality of Albert most Teutonically wrestles itself into salience through the many-tomed results of his very visible efforts; when we come to Roger Bacon, we shall find wormwood, and many higher qualities of mind, flowing in his sentences. And the consummate fashioning faculty, the devout and intellectual temperament of Thomas, are writ large in his treatises. His work has unity; it is a system; it corresponds to the scholastically creative personality, from the efficient concord of whose faculties it proceeded. The unity of Thomas’s personality lay in his conception of man’s _summum bonum_, which sprang from his Christian faith, but was constructed by reason from foundation to pinnacle; and it is evinced in the compulsion of an intellectual temperament that never let the pious reasoner’s energies or appetitions stray loitering or aberrant from that goal. Likewise the unity of his system consists in its purpose, which is to present that same _summum bonum_, credited by faith, empowered, if not empassioned, by piety, and constructed by reason. To fulfil this purpose in its utmost compass, reason works with the material of all pertinent knowledge; fashioning the same to complete logical consistency of expression.

Therefore, it is from his conception of this _summum bonum_ as from a centre of illumination, that we may trace the characteristic qualities alike of Thomas and his work. His faith, his piety, and his intellectual nature are revealed in his thought of supreme felicity. Man’s chief good being the ground of the system, the thought and study which Thomas puts upon the created universe and upon God, regarded both as Creator and in the relationships of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, conduce to make large and sure and ample this same chief good of man. To it likewise conduce the Incarnation, and the Sacraments springing therefrom; in accord with it, Thomas accepts or constructs his metaphysics, his psychology, his entire thought of human capacity and destiny, and sets forth how nearly man’s reason may bring him to this goal, and where there is need of divine grace. In this goal, moreover, shall be found the sanction of human knowledge, and the justification of the right enjoyment of human faculties; it determines what elements of mortal life may be gathered up and carried on, to form part of the soul’s eternal beatitude.

Thomas’s intellectual powers work together in order to set his thought of man’s _summum bonum_ on its surest foundations, and make clear its scope: his faculty of arrangement, and serious and lucid presentation; his careful reasoning, which never trips, never overlooks, and never either hurries or is taken unprepared; his marvellous unforgetfulness of everything which might remotely bear on the subject; his intellectual poise, and his just weighing of every matter that should be taken into the scales of his determination. Observing these, we may realize how he seemed to his time a new intellectual manifestation of God’s illuminating grace. There was in him something unknown before; his argument, his exposition, was new in power, in interest, in lucidity. On the quality of newness the wretched old biographer rings his reiteration:

“For in his lectures he put out _new_ topics (_articulos_), inventing a _new_ and clear way of drawing conclusions and bringing _new_ reasons into them, so that no one, who had heard him teach _new_ doubts and allay them by _new_ arguments, would have doubted that God had illumined with rays of _new_ light one who became straightway of such sure judgment, that he did not hesitate to teach and write _new_ opinions, which God had deigned _newly_ to inspire.”[578]

His biographer’s view is justified. Thomas was the greatest of the schoolmen. His way of teaching, his translucent exposition, came to his hearers as a new inspiration. Only Bonaventura (likewise Italian-born) may be compared with him for clearness of exposition--of solution indeed; and Thomas is more judicial, more supremely intellectual; his way of treatment was a stronger incitement and satisfaction to at least the minds of his auditors. Albert, with his mass of but half-conquered material, could not fail to show, whether he would or not, the doubt-breeding difficulties of the new philosophy, which was yet to be worked into Christian theology. Thomas exposed every difficulty and revealed its depths; but then he solved and adjusted everything with an argumentation from whose careful inclusiveness no questions strayed unshepherded. Placed with Thomas, Albert shows as the Titan whose strength assembles the materials, while Thomas is the god who erects the edifice. The material that Thomas works with, and many of his thoughts and arguments, are to be found in Albert; and the pupil knew his indebtedness to the great master, who survived him to defend his doctrines. But what is not in Albert, is Thomas, Thomas himself, with his disentangled reasoning, his clarity, his organic exposition, his final construction of the mediaeval Christian scheme.[579]

In the third book of his _Summa philosophica contra Gentiles_, and in the beginning of _Pars prima secundae_ of his _Summa theologiae_, Thomas expounds man’s final end, _ultimus finis_, which is his supreme good or perfect beatitude. The exposition in the former work, dating from the earlier years of the author’s academic activities, seems the simpler at first reading; but the other includes more surely Thomas’s last reasoning, placed in the setting of argument and relationship which he gave it in his greatest work. We shall follow the latter, borrowing, however, from the former when its phrases seem to present the matter more aptly to our non-scholastic minds. The general position of the topic is the same in both _Summae_; and Thomas gives the reason in the Prologus to _Pars prima secundae_ of the _Summa theologiae_. His way of doing this is significant:

“Man is declared to be made in the image of God in this sense (as Damascenus[580] says) that by ‘image’ is meant _intellectual_, _free to choose_, and _self-potent to act_. Therefore, after what has been said of the Exemplar God, and of those things which proceed from the divine power according to its will, there remains for us to consider His image, to wit, man, in so far as he is himself the source (_principium_) of his acts, possessing free will and power over them.”

Thereupon Thomas continues, opening his first Quaestio:[581]

“First one must consider the final end (_ultimus finis_) of human life, and then those things through which man may attain this end, or deviate from it. For one must accept from an end the rationale of those things which are ordained to that end.”

Assuming the final end of human life to be beatitude, Thomas considers wherein man as a rational creature may properly have one final end, on account of which he wills all that he wills. Quaestio ii. shows that man’s beatitude cannot consist in riches, honours, fame, power, pleasures of the body, or in any created good, not even in the soul. Man gains his beatitude _through_ the soul; but in itself the soul is not man’s final end. The next Quaestio is devoted to the gist of the matter: what beatitude is, and what is needed for it. Thomas first shows in what sense beatitude is something increate (_increatum_). He has already pointed out that _end_ (_finis_) has a twofold meaning: the thing itself which we desire to obtain, and the fruition of it.

“In the first sense, the final end of man is an increate good, to wit God, who alone with His infinite goodness can perfectly fulfil the wish (_voluntas_) of man. In the second sense the final end of man is something created existing in himself; which is nought else than attainment or fruition (_adeptio vel fruitio_) of the final end. The final end is called beatitude. If then man’s beatitude is viewed as cause or object, it is something increate; but if it is considered in its beatific essence (_quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis_) it is something created.”

Thomas next shows:

“... that inasmuch as man’s beatitude is something created existing in himself, it is necessary to regard it as action (_operatio_). For beatitude is man’s ultimate perfection. But everything is perfect in so far as it is actually (_actu_, _i.e._ in realized actuality): for potentiality without actuality is imperfect. Therefore beatitude should consist in man’s ultimate actuality. But manifestly action (_operatio_) is the final actuality of the actor (_operantis_); as the Philosopher shows, demonstrating that everything exists for its action (_propter suam operationem_). Hence it follows of necessity that man’s beatitude is action.”

The next point to consider is whether beatitude is the action of man’s senses or his intellect. Drawing distinctions, Thomas points out that

“the action of sense cannot pertain to beatitude essentially; because man’s beatitude essentially consists in uniting himself to the increate good; to which he cannot be joined through the action of the senses. Yet sense-action may pertain to beatitude as an antecedent or consequence: as an antecedent, for the imperfect beatitude attainable in this life, where the action of the senses is a prerequisite to the action of the mind; as a consequence, in that perfect beatitude which is looked for in heaven; because, after the resurrection, as Augustine says, from the very beatitude of the soul, there may be a certain flowing back into the body and its senses, perfecting them in their actions. But not even then will the action by which the human mind is joined to God depend on sense.”

Beatitude then is the action of man’s intellectual part; and Thomas next inquires, whether it is an action of the intelligence or will (_intellectus aut voluntatis_). With this inquiry we touch the pivot of Thomas’s attitude, wherein he departs from Augustine, in apparent reliance on the word of John: “This is eternal life that they should know thee, the one true God.” Life eternal is man’s final end; and therefore man’s beatitude consists in knowledge of God, which is an act of mind. Thomas argues this at some length. He refers to the distinction between what is essential to the existence of beatitude, and what is joined to it _per accidens_, like enjoyment (_delectatio_).

“I say then, that beatitude in its essence cannot consist in an act of will. For it has appeared that beatitude is the obtaining (_consecutio_) of the final end. But obtaining does not consist in any act of will; for will attaches to the absent when one desires it, as well as to the present in which one rests delighted. It is evident that the desire for an end is not an obtaining of it, but a movement toward it. Enjoyment attaches to will from the presence of the end; but not conversely does anything become present because the will shall delight in it. Therefore there must be something besides an act of will, through which the end may become present to the will. This is plain respecting the ends of sense (_fines sensibiles_). For if to obtain money were an act of will, the miser would have obtained it from the beginning. And so it comes to pass with respect to an end conceived by the mind; we obtain it when it becomes present to us through an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end obtained. Thus, therefore, the essence of beatitude consists in an act of mind. But the delight which follows beatitude pertains to will, even in the sense in which Augustine says: ‘beatitudo est gaudium de veritate,’ because indeed joy is the consummation of beatitude.”

The supremely intellectual attitude of the Angelic Doctor, shows at once, and as it were universally, in his conviction of the primacy of the true over the good, and of knowledge over will. Sometimes he argues these points directly; and again, his temperamental attitude appears in the course of argument upon other points. For example, Quaestio xvi. of _Pars prima_ has for its subject _Veritas_. And in the first article, which discusses whether truth is in the thing (_in re_) or only in the mind, he argues thus:

“As _good_ signifies that upon which desire (_appetitus_) is bent, so _true_ signifies that at which understanding aims. There is this difference between desire and understanding or any kind of cognition: cognition exists in so far as what is known (_cognitum_) is in the knower; but desire is as the desirous inclines toward the desired. Thus the end (_terminus_ == _finis_) of desire, which is the _good_, is in the desirable thing; but the end of knowing, which is the true, is in mind itself.”

In _Articulus 4_, Thomas comes to his point: that the true _secundum rationem_ (_i.e._ according to its formal nature) is prior to the good.

“Although both the good and the true have been taken as convertible with being, yet they differ in their conception (_ratione_); and that the true is prior to the good appears from two considerations: First, the true is more closely related to being, which is prior to the good; for the true regards being itself, simply and directly; while the ratio of the good follows being as in some way perfect, and therefore desirable. Secondly, cognition naturally precedes desire. Therefore, since the true regards cognition, and the good regards desire, the true is prior to the good _secundum rationem_.”

This argument, whatever validity it may have, is significant of its author’s predominantly intellectual temperament, and consistent with his conception of man’s supreme beatitude as the intellectual vision of God. Obviously, moreover, the setting of the true above the good is another way of stating the primacy of knowledge over will, which is also maintained: “Will and understanding (_intellectus_) mutually include each other: for the understanding knows the will; and the will wills that the understanding should know.”[582] Evidently all rational beings have will as well as understanding; God wills, the Angels will, man wills. Indeed, how could knowledge progress but for the will to know? Yet of the two, considered in themselves, understanding is higher than will--

“for its object is the _ratio_, the very essential nature, of the desired good, while the object of will is the desired good whose _ratio_ is in the understanding.... Yet will may be the higher, if it is set upon something higher than the understanding.... When the thing in which is the good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the rational cognizance (_ratio intellecta_), the will, through relation to that thing, is higher than the understanding. But when the thing in which is the good, is lower than the soul, then in relation to that thing, the understanding is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the cognizance (_cognitio_); but the cognizance of corporeal things is better than the love. Yet taken absolutely, the understanding is higher than the will.”[583]

These positions of the Angelic Doctor were sharply opposed in his lifetime and afterwards. Without entering the lists, let us rather follow him on his evidently Aristotelian path, which quickly brings him to his next conclusion: “That beatitude consists in the action of the speculative rather than the practical intellect, as is evident from three arguments:

“First, if man’s beatitude is action, it ought to be the man’s best (optima) action. But man’s best action is that of his best faculty in respect to the best object. The best faculty is intelligence, whose best object is the divine good, which is not an object of the practical, but of the speculative intelligence. Wherefore, in such action, to wit, in contemplation of things divine, beatitude chiefly consists. And because _every one seems to be that which is best in him_, as is said in the _Ethics_, so such action is most proper to man and most enjoyable.

“Secondly, the same conclusion appears from this, that contemplation above all is sought on account of itself. The perfection (_actus_, full realization) of the practical intelligence is not sought on account of itself, but for the sake of action: the actions themselves are directed toward some end. Hence it is evident that the final end cannot consist in the _vita activa_, which belongs to the practical intelligence.

“Thirdly, it is plain from this, that in the _vita contemplativa_ man has part with those above him, to wit, God and the Angels, unto whom he is made like through beatitude; but in those matters which belong to the _vita activa_, other animals, however imperfectly, have somehow part with him.

“And so the final and perfect beatitude which is looked for in the life to come, in principle consists altogether in contemplation. But the imperfect beatitude which may be had here, consists first and in principle in contemplation, and secondly in the true operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as is said in the tenth book of the _Ethics_.”

It being thus shown that perfect beatitude lies in the action of the speculative intelligence, Thomas next shows that it cannot consist in consideration of the speculative sciences--

“for the consideration of a science does not reach beyond the potency (_virtus_) of the principles of that science, seeing that the whole science is contained potentially (_virtualiter_) in its principles. But the principles of speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher makes clear. Therefore the entire consideration of the speculative sciences cannot be extended beyond that to which a cognition of sense-objects (_sensibilium_) is able to lead. Man’s final beatitude, which is his perfection, cannot consist in the cognition of sense-objects. For no thing is perfected by something inferior, except as there may be in the inferior some participation in a superior. Evidently the nature (_forma_) of a stone, or any other sensible thing, is inferior to man, save in so far as something higher than the human intelligence has part in it, like the light of reason.... But since there is in sensible forms some participation in the similitude of spiritual substances, the consideration of the speculative sciences is, in a certain way, participation in true and perfect beatitude.”

Neither can perfect beatitude consist in knowledge of the higher, entirely immaterial, or, as Thomas calls them, separate (_separatae_) substances, to wit, the Angels. Because it cannot consist in that which is the perfection of intelligence only from participation. The object of the intelligence is the true. Whatever has truth only through participation in something else cannot make the contemplating intelligence perfect with a final perfection. But the angels have their being (_esse_) as they have their truth, from the participation of the divine in them. Whence it remains that only the contemplation of God, Who alone is truth through His essential being, can make perfectly blessed. “But,” adds Thomas, “nothing precludes the expectation of some imperfect beatitude from contemplating the angels, and even a higher beatitude than lies in the consideration of the speculative sciences.”

So the conclusion is that “the final and perfect beatitude can be only in the vision of the divine essence. The proof of this lies in the consideration of two matters: first, that man is not perfectly blessed (_beatus_) so long as there remains anything for him to desire or seek; secondly, that the perfection of every capacity (_potentiae_), is adjudged according to the nature (_ratio_) of its object.” And a patent line of argument leads to the unavoidable conclusion: “For perfect beatitude it is necessary that the intellect should attain to the very essence of the first cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as its object.”

There are few novel thoughts in Thomas’s conception of man’s supreme beatitude. But he has taken cognizance of all pertinent considerations, and put the whole matter together with stable coherency. He continues, discussing in the succeeding Quaestiones a number of important matters incidental to his central determination of the nature of man’s supreme good. Thus he shows how joy (_delectatio_) is a necessary accompaniment of beatitude, which, however, in principle consists in the action of the mind, which is _visio_, rather than in the resulting _delectatio_. The latter consists in a quieting or satisfying of the will, through the goodness of that in which it is satisfied. When the will is satisfied in any action, that results from the goodness of the action; and the good lies in the action itself rather than in the quieting of the will.[584] Here Thomas’s reasoning points to an active ideal, an ideal of energizing, rather than repose. But he concludes that for beatitude “there must be a concurrence of _visio_, which is the perfect cognizance of the intelligible end; the getting it, which implies its presence; and the joy or fruition, which implies the quieting of that which loves in that which is loved.”[585] Thomas also shows how rectitude of will is needed, and discusses whether a body is essential; his conclusion being that a body is not required for the perfect beatitude of the life to come; yet he gives the counter considerations, showing the conduciveness of the perfected body to the soul’s beatitude even then. Next he follows Aristotle in pointing out how material goods may be necessary for the attainment of the imperfect beatitude possible on earth, while they are quite impertinent to the perfect beatitude of seeing God; and likewise he shows how the society of friends is needed here, but not essential hereafter, and yet a concomitant to our supreme felicity.

The course of argument of the Liber iii. of the _Contra Gentiles_ is not dissimilar. A number of preliminary chapters show how all things tend to an end; that the end of all is God; and that to know God is the end of every intellectual being. Next, that human _felicitas_ does not consist in all those matters, in which the _Summa theologiae_ also shows that _beatitude_ does not lie; but that it consists in contemplation of God. He puts his argument simply:

“It remains that the ultimate felicity of man lies in contemplation of truth. For this is the sole action (_operatio_) of man which is proper to man alone. This alone is directed to nothing else, as an end; since the contemplation of truth is sought for its own sake. Through this action, likewise, man is joined to higher substances (_beings_) through likeness of action, and through knowing them in some way. For this action, moreover, man is most sufficient by himself, needing but little external aid. To this also all other human acts seem to be directed as to an end. For to the perfection of contemplation, soundness of body is needed, to which all the arts of living are directed. Also quiet from the disturbance of passions is required, to which one comes through the moral virtues, and prudence; and quiet also from tumults, to which end all rules of civil life are ordained; and so, if rightly conceived, all human business seems to serve the contemplation of truth. Nor is it possible for the final felicity of man to consist in the contemplation which is confined to an intelligence of beginnings (_principiorum_), which is most imperfect and general (_universalis_), containing a knowledge of things potentially: it is the beginning, not the end of human study. Nor can that felicity lie in the contemplation of the sciences, which pertain to the lowest things, since felicity ought to lie in the action of the intelligence in relationship to the noblest intelligible verities. It remains that man’s final felicity consists in the contemplation of wisdom pursuant to a consideration of things divine. From which it also is evident by the way of induction, what was before proved by arguments, that the final felicity of man consists only in contemplation of God.”[586]

Having reached this central conclusion of the _Contra Gentiles_, as well as of the _Summa theologiae_, Thomas proceeds to trim it further, so as clearly to differentiate that knowledge of God in which lies the ultimate felicity of intelligent beings from other ways of knowing God, which do not fully represent this supreme and final bliss. He first excludes the sort of common and confused knowledge of God, which almost all men draw from observing the natural order of things; then he shuts out the knowledge of God derived from logical demonstration, through which, indeed, one rather approaches a proper knowledge of Him;[587] next, he will not admit that supreme felicity lies in the cognition of God through faith; since that is still imperfect. This felicity consists in seeing[588] the divine essence, an impossibility in this life, when we see as in a glass. The supreme felicity is attainable only after death. Hereupon Thomas continues with the very crucial discussion of the capacity of the rational creature to know God. But instead of following him further in the _Contra Gentiles_, we will rather turn to his final presentation of this question in his _Summa theologiae_.

II

The great _Summa_, having opened with an introductory consideration of the character of _sacra doctrina_,[589] at once fixes its attention upon the existence and attributes of God. These having been reviewed, Thomas begins Quaestio xii. by saying, that “as we have now considered what God is in His own nature (_secundum se ipsum_) it remains to consider what He is in our cognition, that is, how He is known by creatures.” The first question is whether any created intelligence whatsoever may be able to see God _per essentiam_. Having stated the counter arguments, and relying on John’s “we shall see Him as He is,” Thomas proceeds with his solution thus:

“Since everything may be knowable so far as it exists in actuality,[590] God, who is pure actuality, without any mingling of potentiality, is in Himself, most knowable. But what is most knowable in itself, is not knowable to every intelligence because of the exceeding greatness of that which is to be known (_propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum_); as the sun, which is most visible, may not be seen by a bat, because of the excess of light. Mindful of this, some have asserted that no created intelligence could behold the essential nature (_essentiam_) of God.

“But this is a solecism. For since man’s final beatitude consists in his highest action, which is the action of the intelligence, if the created intelligence is never to be able to see the essential nature of God, either it will never obtain beatitude, or its beatitude will consist in something besides God: which is repugnant to the faith. For the ultimate perfection of a rational creature lies in that which is the source or principle (_principium_) of its being. Likewise the argument is against reason. For there is in man a natural desire to know the cause, when he observes the effect; and from this, wonder rises in men. If then the intelligence of the rational creature is incapable of attaining to the first cause of things, an inane desire must be ascribed to nature.

“Wherefore it is simply to be conceded that the blessed may see the essential nature of God.”

So this general conclusion, or assumption, is based on faith, and also leaps, as from the head of Jove, the creature of unconquerable human need, which never will admit the inaneness of its yearnings. And now, assuming the possibility of seeing God in his true nature, Thomas proves that He cannot be seen thus through the similitude of any created thing: in order to behold God’s essence some divine likeness must be imparted from the seeing power (_ex parte visivae potentiae_), to wit, the light of divine glory (which is consummated grace) strengthening the intelligence that it may see God. And he next shows that it is impossible to see God by the sense of sight, or any other sense or power of man’s sensible nature. For God is incorporeal. Therefore He cannot be seen through the imagination, but only through the intelligence. Nor can any created intelligence through its natural faculties see the divine essence. “Cognition takes place in so far as the known is in the knower. But the known is in the knower according to the mode and capacity (_modus_) of the knower. Whence any knower’s knowledge is according to the measure of his nature. If then the being of the thing to be known exceeds the measure of the knowing nature, knowledge of it will be beyond the nature of that knower.” In order to see God in His essential nature, the created intellect needs light created by God: _In lumine tuo videbimus lumen_. And it may be given to one created intellect to see more perfectly than another.

Do those who see God _per essentiam_, comprehend Him? No.

“To comprehend God is impossible for any created intelligence. To have any true thought of God is a great beatitude.... Since the created light of glory received by any created intelligence, cannot be infinite, it is impossible that any created intelligence should know God infinitely, and comprehend Him.”

Again he reasons; They who shall see God in His essence will see what they see through the divine essence united to their intelligence; they will see whatever they see at once, and not successively; for the contents of this intellectual, God-granted vision are not apprehended by means of the respective species or general images, but in and through the one divine essence. But in this life, man may not see God in His essential nature:

“The mode of cognition conforms to the nature of the knower. But our soul, so long as we live in this life, has its existence (_esse_) in corporeal matter. Wherefore, by nature, it knows only things that have material form, or may through such be known. Evidently the divine essence cannot be known through the natures of material things. Any cognition of God through any created likeness whatsoever, is not a vision of His essence.... Our natural cognition draws its origin from sense; it may extend itself so far as it can be conducted (_manuduci_) by things of sense (_sensibilia_). But from them our intelligence may not attain to seeing the divine essence.... Yet since sensible creatures are effects, dependant on a cause, we know from them that God exists, and that as first cause He exceeds all that He has caused. From which we may learn the difference between Himself and His creatures, to wit, that He is not any of those things which He has caused....

“Through grace a more perfect knowledge of God is had than through natural reason. For cognition through natural reason needs both images (_phantasmata_) received from things of sense, and the natural light of intelligence, through whose virtue we abstract intelligible conceptions from them. In both respects human cognition is aided through the revelation of grace. For the natural light of the intellect is strengthened through the infusion of light graciously given (_luminis gratuiti_); while the images in the man’s imagination are divinely formed so that they are expressive of things divine, rather than of what naturally is received through the senses, as appears from the visions of the prophets.”[591]

Natural reason stops with the unity of God, and can give no knowledge of the Trinity of divine Persons. Says Thomas:[592]

“It has been shown that through natural reason man can know God only _from His creatures_. Creatures lead to knowledge of God as effects lead to some knowledge of a cause. Only that may be known of God by natural reason which necessarily belongs to Him as the source of all existences. The creative virtue of God is common to the whole Trinity; it pertains to the unity of essence, not to the distinction of persons. Through natural reason, therefore, those things concerning God may be known which pertain to the unity of essence, but not those which pertain to the distinction of persons.... Who strives to prove the Trinity of Persons by natural reason, doubly disparages faith: first as regards the dignity of faith itself, which concerns invisible things surpassing human reason; secondly as derogating from its efficiency in drawing men to it. For when any one in order to prove the faith adduces reasons which are not cogent, he falls under the derision of the faithless; for they think that we use such arguments, and that we believe because of them. One shall not attempt to prove things of faith save by authorities, and in discussion with those who receive the authorities. With others it is enough to argue that what the faith announces is not impossible.”

Here Thomas seems rationally to recognize the limits upon reason in discovering the divine nature. In the regions of faith, reason’s feet lack the material footing upon which to mount. So Thomas would assert. But will he stand to his assertion? The shadowy line between reason and faith wavers with him. At least so it seems to us, for whom ontological reasoning has lost reality, and who find proofs of God not so much easier than proofs of the Trinity. But Thomas and the other scholastics dwelt in the region of the metaphysically ideal. To them it was not only real, but the most real; and it was so natural to step across the line of faith, trailing clouds of reason. The feet of such as Thomas are as firmly planted on the one side of the line as on the other. And now, as it might also seem, Thomas, having thus formally reserved the realm of faith, quickly steps across the line, to undertake a tremendous metaphysical exposition of the Trinity, of the distinctions between its Persons, of their properties, respective functions, and relationships; and all this is carried on largely in the categories of Aristotelian philosophy. Yet is he not still consistent with himself? For he surely did not conceive the elements of his discussion to lie in the lucubrations or discoveries of the natural reason; but in the data of revelation, and their explanation by saintly doctors. And was not he also a vessel of their inspiration, a son of faith, who might humbly hope for the light of grace, to transfigure and glorify his natural powers in the service of revealed truth?

Thomas’s ideal is intellectual, and yet ends in faith. His intellectual interests, by faith emboldened, strengthened, and pointed heavenward, make on toward the realisation of that intellectual beatitude which is to be consummate hereafter, when the saved soul’s grace-illumined eye shall re-awaken where it may see face to face.

III

Knowledge, then, supplemented in this life by faith, is the primary element of blessedness. We now turn our attention to the forms of knowledge and modes of knowing appropriate to the three rational substances: God, angel, man. The first is the absolute incorporeal being, the primal mover, in whom there is no potentiality, but actuality simple and perfect. The second is the created immaterial or “separated” substance, which is all that it is through participation in the uncreate being of its Creator. The third is the composite creature man, made of both soul and body, his capacities conditioned upon the necessities of his dual nature, his sense-perception and imagination being as necessary to his knowledge, as his rational understanding; for whom alone it is true that sense-apprehension may lead to the intelligible verities of God: “etiam sensibilia intellecta manuducunt ad intelligibilia divinorum.”[593]

The earlier Quaestiones of _Pars prima_, on the nature of God, lead on to a consideration of God’s knowledge and ways of knowing. Those Quaestiones expounded the qualities of God quite as far as comported with Thomas’s realization of the limitation of the human capacity to know God in this life. Quaestio iii. upon the _Simplicitas_ of God, shows that God is not body (_corpus_); that in Him there is no compositeness of form and material; that throughout His nature, He is one and the same, and therefore that He _is_ His _Deitas_, His _vita_, and whatever else may be predicated of Him. Next it is shown (Qu. iv.) that God is perfect; that in Him are the _perfectiones_ of all things, since whatever there may be of perfection in an effect, should be found in the effective cause; and as God is self-existent being, He must contain the whole perfection of being in Himself (_totam perfectionem essendi in se_). Next, that God is the good (_bonum_) and the _summum bonum_; He is infinite; He is in all things (Qu. viii. Art. 1) not as a part of their essence, but as _accidens_, and as the doer is in his deeds; and not only in their beginning, but so long as they exist; He acts upon everything immediately, and nothing is distant from Him; God is everywhere: as the soul is altogether in every part of the body, so God entire is in all things and in each. God is in all things created by Him as the working cause; but He is in the rational creature, through grace; as the object of action is in the actor, as the known is in the knower, and the desired in the wishful. God is immutable (Qu. ix.); for as final actuality (_actus purus_), with no admixture of potentiality, He cannot change; nor can He be _moved_; since His infinitude comprehends the plenitude of all perfection, there is nothing that He can acquire, and no whither for Him to extend. God is eternal (Qu. x.); for him there is no beginning, nor any succession of time; but an interminable now, an all at once (_tota simul_), which is the essence of eternity, as distinguished from the successiveness of even infinite time. And God is One (Qu. xi.). “One does not add anything to being, save negation of division. For One signifies nothing else than undivided being (_ens indivisum_). And from this it follows that One is convertible with being.” That God is One, is proved by His _simplicitas_; by the infiniteness of His perfection; and by the oneness of the world.

“After a consideration,” now says Thomas, “of those matters which pertain to the divine substance, we may consider those which pertain to its action (_operatio_). And because certain kinds of action remain in the doer, while others pass out into external effect, we first treat of knowledge and will (for knowing is in the knower and willing in him who wills); and then of God’s power, which is regarded as the source of the divine action passing out into external effect. Then, since knowing is a kind of living, after considering the divine knowledge, the divine life will be considered. And because knowledge is of the true, there will be need to consider truth and falsity. Again since every cognition is in the knower, the _rationes_ (types, essential natures) of things as they are in God the Knower (_Deo cognoscente_) are called ideas (_ideae_); and a consideration of these will be joined to the consideration of knowledge.”[594]

Thus clearly laying out his topic, Thomas begins his discussion of God’s knowledge (_scientia Dei_); of the modes in which God knows and the knowledge which He has. In God is the most perfect knowledge. God knows Himself through Himself; in Him knowledge and Knower (_intellectum_ and _intellectus_) are the same.[595] He perfectly comprehends Himself; for He knows Himself so far as He is knowable; and He is absolutely knowable being utter reality (_actus purus_). Likewise He knows things other than Himself. For He knows Himself perfectly, which implies a knowledge of those things to which His power (_virtus_) extends. Moreover, He knows all things in their special natures and distinctions from each other: for the perfection, or perfected actuality, of everything is contained in Him; and therefore God in Himself is able to know all things perfectly, and the special nature of everything exists through some manner of participation in the divine perfection. God knows all things in one, to wit, Himself; and not successively, or by means of discursive reasoning. “God’s knowledge is the cause of things. It stands to all created beings as the knowledge of the artificer to the things he makes. God causes things through His knowledge, since His being is His knowing (_cum suum esse sit suum intelligere_).” His knowledge causes things when it has the will joined with it, and, in so far as it is the cause of things, is called _scientia approbationis_. God knows things which are not actually (_actu_). Whatever has been or will be, He knows by the knowledge of sight (_scientia visionis_, which by implication is equivalent to _scientia approbationis_). For God’s knowing, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and eternity includes all time, as present, and without succession; so the present vision (_intuitus_) of God embraces all time and all things existing at any time, as if present. As for whatever is in the power of God or creature, but which never has been or will be, God knows it not as in vision, but simply knows it.

God also knows evil.

“Whoever knows anything perfectly should know whatever might happen to it. There are some good things to which it may happen to be corrupted through evils: wherefore God would not know the good perfectly, unless He also knew the evil. Everything is knowable so far as it _is_; but the being (_esse_) of evil is the privation of good: hence inasmuch as God knows good, He knows evil, as darkness is known through light.”

Thomas now takes up a point curious perhaps to us, but of importance to him and Aristotle: does God know individuals (_singularia_), the particular as opposed to the universal? This point might seem disposed of in the argument by which Thomas maintained that God knew things in their special and distinct natures. But he now proves that God knows _singularia_ by an argument which bears on his contention that man does not know _singularia_ through the intelligence, but perceives them through sense; and as we shall see, that the angels have no direct knowledge of individuals, being immaterial substances.

“God knows individuals (_cognoscit singularia_). For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in higher mode in God. To know (_cognoscere_) individuals pertains to our perfection. Whence it follows that God must know them. The Philosopher (Aristotle) holds it to be illogical that anything should be known to us, and not to God.... But the perfections which are divided in inferior beings, exist simply and as one in God. Hence, although through one faculty we know universals and what is immaterial, and through another, individuals and what is material; yet God simply, through His intelligence, knows both.... One must hold that since God is the cause of things through His knowledge, the knowledge of God extends itself as far as His causality extends. Wherefore, since God’s active virtue extends itself not only to forms, from which is received the _ratio_ of the universal, but also to matter, it is necessary that God’s knowledge should extend itself to individuals, which are such through matter.”

And replying to a counter-argument Thomas continues:

“Our intelligence abstracts the intelligible species from the individuating principles. Therefore the intelligible species of our intelligence cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and, for this reason, our intelligence does not know individuals. But the intelligible species of the divine intelligence, which is the essence of God, is not immaterial through abstraction, but through itself; and exists as the principle of all principles entering the composition of the thing, whether principles of species or of the individual. Therefore through His essence God knows both universals and individuals.”[596]

With these arguments still echoing, Thomas shows that God can know infinite things; also future contingencies; also whatever may be stated (_enuntiabilia_). His knowledge, which is His substance, does not change. It is speculative knowledge, in so far as relating to His own unchangeable nature, and to whatever He can do, but does not; it is practical knowledge so far as it relates to anything which He does.

Thomas concludes his direct discussion of God’s knowledge, by an application of the Platonic theory of _ideas_, in which he mainly follows Augustine.

“It is necessary to place _ideas_ in the divine mind. _Idea_ is the Greek for the Latin _forma_. Thus through _ideas_ are understood the forms of things existing beyond the things themselves. By which we mean the prototype (_exemplar_) of that of which it is called the form; or the principle of its cognition, in so far as the forms of things knowable are said to be in the knower.”

There must be many ideas or (as Augustine phrases it) stable _rationes_ of things. There is a _ratio_ in the divine mind corresponding to whatever God does or knows.

“Ideas were set by Plato as the principles both of the cognition and the generation of things, and in both senses they are to be placed in the divine mind. So far as _idea_ is the principle of the making of a thing, it may be called the prototype (_exemplar_), and pertains to practical knowledge (_practicam cognitionem_); but as the principle of cognition (_principium cognoscitivum_), it is properly called _ratio_, and may also pertain to speculative knowledge. In the signification of _exemplar_, it relates to everything created at any time by God: but when it means _principium cognoscitivum_, it relates to all things which are known by God, although never coming into existence.”[597]

Such are the divine modes of knowledge. Thomas proceeds to discuss other aspects of the divine nature, the life and power, will and love, which may be ascribed to God. He then passes on to a discussion of the Persons of the Trinity. This completed, he turns to the world of created substances; into which we will follow him so far as to observe the forms of knowledge and ways of knowing proper to angels and mankind. We shall hereafter have to speak of the divine and angelic love, and of man’s love of God; but here, as our field is intellectual, we will simply recall to mind that Thomas applies a like intellectual conception of beatitude to both God and His rational creatures:

“Beatitude, as has been said, signifies the perfect good of the intellectual nature; as everything desires its perfection, the intellectual [substance] desires to be _beata_. That which is most perfect in every intellectual nature, is the intellectual operation wherein, in a measure, it grasps all things. Wherefore the beatitude of any created intellectual nature consists in knowing (_in intelligendo_).”[598]

IV

Thomas regards the creation as a _processio_, a going out of all creatures from God. Every being (_ens_) that in any manner (_quocumque modo_) is, is from God.

“God is the _prima causa exemplaris_ of all things.... For the production of anything, there is needed a prototype (_exemplar_), in order that the effect may follow a determined form.... The determination of forms must be sought in the divine wisdom. Hence one ought to say that in the divine wisdom are the _rationes_ of all things: these we have called _ideas_, to wit, prototypal forms existing in the divine mind. Although such may be multiplied in respect to things, yet really they are not other than the divine essence, according as its similitude can be participated in by divers things in divers ways. Thus God Himself is the first _exemplar_ of all. There may also be said to be in created things certain _exemplaria_ of other things, when they are made in the likeness of such others, or according to the same species or after the analogy of some resemblance.”[599]

God not only is the efficient and exemplary cause, but also the final cause of all things (_Divina bonitas est finis omnium rerum_). “The emanation (_emanatio_) of all being from the universal cause, which is God, we call creation.”[600] God alone may be said to create. The function pertains not to any Person, but to the whole Trinity in common. And there is found some image of the Trinity in rational creatures in whom is intelligence and will; and in all creatures may be found some vestiges of the creator.

Thomas, after a while, takes up the distinction between spiritual and corporeal creatures, and considers first the purely spiritual, called Angels. We enter with him upon the contemplation of these conceptions, which scholasticism did not indeed create, but elaborated with marvellous logic, and refined to a consistent intellectual beauty. None had larger share in perfecting the logical conception of the angelic nature, as immaterial and essentially intellectual, than our Angelic Doctor. A volume might well be devoted to tracing the growth of these beings of the mind, from their not unmilitant career in the Old Testament and the Jewish Apocrypha, their brief but classically beautiful mention in the Gospels, and their storm-red action in the Apocalypse; then through their treatment by the Fathers, to their hierarchic ordering by the great Pseudo-Areopagite; and so on and on, through the earlier Scholastics, the Lombard’s _Sentences_, and Hugo of St. Victor’s appreciative presentation; up to the gathering of all the angelic matter by Albertus Magnus, its further encyclopaedizing by Vincent of Beauvais, and finally its perfect intellectual disembodiment by Thomas;--while all the time the people’s mythopoeic love went on endowing these guardian spirits with heart and soul, and fashioning responsive stories of their doings. For men loved and feared them, and looked to them as God’s peculiar messengers. Thus they flash past us in the _Divina Commedia_; and their forms become lovely in Christian art.

As we enter upon the contemplation of the angelic nature, let us not as of course regard angels simply as imaginative conceptions of Scripture and of the patristic and mediaeval mind. Thomas will show his reasons for their necessary existence, which may not convince us. Yet we may believe in angels, inasmuch as any real conception of the world’s governance by God requires the fulfilling of His thoughts through media that bring them down to move and live and realize themselves with each of us. Who, in striving to express, can do more than symbolize, the ways of God? What symbols truer than angels have been devised?

“It is necessary,” opens Thomas,[601] “to affirm (_ponere_) that there are incorporeal creatures. For in created things God chiefly intends the good, which consists in assimilation to Him. Perfect assimilation of the effect to the cause is seen when the effect resembles the cause in that through which the cause produces the effect. God produces the creature through intelligence and will. Consequently the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. To know cannot be the act (_actus_) of the body or of any corporeal faculty (_virtus_); because all body is limited to here and now. Therefore it is necessary, in order that the universe may be perfect, that there should be incorporeal creatures.”[602]

Thomas then argues that the intellectual substance is entirely immaterial. “Angelic substances are above our understanding. So our understanding cannot attain to apprehending them as they are in themselves; but only in its own fashion as it apprehends composite things.” These immaterial substances exist in exceeding great number, and each is a species, because there cannot be several immaterial beings of one species, any more than there could be separate whitenesses or many humanities. Angels in their nature are imperishable. For nothing is corrupted save as its form is separated from its matter. But these immaterial substances are not composed of matter and form, being themselves subsisting forms and indestructible. Brass may have and lose a circular shape; but the circular shape cannot be separated from the circle, which it is.

Thomas next shows (_Pars prima_, Qu. li.) that angels have no bodies by nature joined to them. Body is not of the _ratio_ of intellectual substances. These (when perfect and not like the human soul) have no need to acquire knowledge through sensation. But though angels are intellectual substances, separate (_separatae_) from bodies, they sometimes assume bodies. In these they can perform those actions of life which have something in common with other kinds of acts; as speech, a living act, has something in common with inanimate sounds. Thus far only can physical acts be performed by angels, and not when such acts essentially belong to living bodies. Angels may appear as living men, but are not; neither are they sentient through the organs of their assumed bodies; they do not eat and digest food; they move only _per accidens_, incidentally to the inanimate motion of their assumed bodies; they do not beget, nor do they really speak; “but it is something like speech, when these bodies make sounds in the air like human voices.”

Dropping the sole remark, that scholasticism has no sense of humour, we pass on to Thomas’s careful consideration of the angelic relations to space or locality (Qu. lii. and liii.). “Equivocally only may it be said that an angel is in a place (_in loco_): through application of the angelic virtue to some corporeal spot, the angel may be said in some sense to be there.” But, as angels are finite, when one is said, in this sense, to be in a place, he is not elsewhere too (like God). Yet the place where the angel is need not be an indivisible point, but may be larger or smaller, as the angel wills to apply his virtue to a larger or smaller body. Two angels may not be in the same place at the same time, “because it is impossible that there should be two complete immediate causes of one and the same thing.” Angels are said, likewise equivocally, to move, in a sense analogous to that in which they are said to be in a place. Such equivocal motion may be continuous or not. If not continuous, evidently the angel may pass from one place to another without traversing the intervening spaces. The angelic movement must take place in time; there must be a before and after to it, and yet not necessarily with any period intervening.

Now as to angelic knowledge: _De cognitione Angelorum_. Knowing is no easy thing for man; and we shall see that it is not a simple matter to know, without the senses to provide the data and help build up knowledge in the mind. The function of sense, or its absence, conditions much besides the mere acquisition of the elements from which men form their thoughts. Thomas’s exposition of angelic knowledge and modes of knowing is a logical and consistent presentation of a supersensual psychology and theory of knowledge.

Entering upon his subject, Thomas shows (Qu. liv.) that knowing (_intelligere_) is not the _substantia_ or the _esse_ of an angel. Knowing is _actio_, which is the actuality of faculty, as being (_esse_) is the actuality of substance. God alone is _actus purus_ (absolute realized actuality), free from potentiality. His _substantia_ is His being and His action (_suum esse_ and _suum agere_). “But neither in an angel, nor in any creature, is _virtus_ or the _potentia operativa_ the same as the creature’s _essentia_,” or its _esse_ or _substantia_. The difficult scholastic-Aristotelian categories of _intellectus agens_ and _possibilis_ do not apply to angelic cognition (for which the reader and the angels may be thankful). The angels, being immaterial intelligences, have no share in those faculties of the human soul, like sight or hearing, which are exercised through bodily organs. They possess only intelligence and will. “It accords with the order of the universe that the supreme intellectual creature should be intelligent altogether, and not intelligent in part, like our souls.”

Quaestio lv., concerning the _medium cognitionis angelicae_, is a scholastic discussion scarcely to be rendered in modern language. The angelic intelligence is capable of knowing all things; and therefore an angel does not know through the medium of his _essentia_ or _substantia_, which are limited. God alone knows all things through His _essentia_. The angelic intellect is made perfect for knowing by means of certain forms or ideas (_species_). These are not received from things, but are part of the angelic nature (_connaturales_). The angelic intelligence (_potentia intellectiva_) is completed through general concepts, of the same nature with itself (_species intelligibiles connaturales_). These come to angels from God at the same time with their being. Such concepts or ideas cover everything that they can know by nature (_naturaliter_). And Thomas proves that the higher angels know through fewer and more universal concepts than the lower.

“In God an entire plenitude of intellectual cognition is held _in one_, to wit, in the divine essence through which God knows all things. Intelligent creatures possess such cognition in inferior mode and less simply. What God knows through one, inferior intelligences know through many; and this many becomes more as the inferiority increases. Hence the higher angel may know the sum total of the intelligible (_universitatem intelligibilium_) through fewer ideas or concepts (_species_); which, however, are more universal since each concept extends to more [things]. We find illustration of this among our fellows. Some are incapable of grasping intelligible truth, unless it be set forth through particular examples. This comes from the weakness of their intelligence. But others, of stronger mind, can seize many things from a few statements” (Qu. lv. Art. 3).

Through this argument, and throughout the rest of his exposition of the knowledge of God, angel, and man, we perceive that, with Thomas, knowledge is superior and more delightful, as it is abstract in character, and universal in applicability. By knowing the abstract and the universal we become like to God and the angels; knowledge of and through the particular is but a necessity of our half-material nature.

Thomas turns now to consider the knowledge had by angels of immaterial beings, _i.e._ themselves and God (Qu. lvi.): “An angel, being immaterial, is a subsisting form, and therefore intelligible actually (_actu_, _i.e._ not potentially). Wherefore, through its form, which is its substance, it knows itself.” Then as to knowledge of each other: God from the beginning impressed upon the angelic mind the likenesses of things which He created. For in Him, from the beginning, were the _rationes_ of all things, both spiritual and corporeal. Through the impression of these _rationes_ upon the angelic mind, an angel knows other angels as well as corporeal creatures. Their natures also yield them some knowledge of God. The angelic nature is a mirror holding the divine similitude. Yet without the illumination of grace the angelic nature knows not God in His essence, because no created likeness may represent that.

As for material things (Qu. lvii.), angels have knowledge of them through the intelligible species or concepts impressed by God on the angelic mind. But do they know particulars--_singularia_? To deny it, says Thomas, would detract from the faith which accords to angels the ministration of affairs. This matter may be thought thus:

“Things flow forth from God both as they subsist in their own natures and as they are in the angelic cognition. Evidently what flowed from God in things pertained not only to their universal nature, but to their principles of individuation.... And as He causes, so He also knows.... Likewise the angel, through the concepts (_species_) planted in him by God, knows things not only according to their universal nature, but also according to their singularity, in so far as they are manifold representations of the one and simple essence.”

One observes that the whole scholastic discussion of universals lies back of arguments like these.

The main principles of angelic knowledge have now been set forth; and Thomas pauses to point out to what extent the angels know the future, the secret thoughts of our hearts, and the mysteries of grace. He has still to consider the mode and measure of the angelic knowledge from other points of view. Whatever the angels may know through their implanted natures, they know perfectly (_actu_); but it may be otherwise as to what is divinely revealed to them. What they know, they know without the need of argument. And the discussion closes with remarks on Augustine’s phrase and conception of the _matutina_ and _vespertina_ knowledge of angels: the former being the knowledge of things as they are in the Word; the latter being the knowledge of things as they are in their own natures.[603]

V

That the abstract and the universal is the noble and delectable, we learn from this exposition of angelic knowledge. We may learn the same from Thomas’s presentation of the modes and contents of human understanding. The _Summa theologiae_ follows the Scriptural order of presentation;[604] which is doubtless the reason why Thomas, instead of passing from immaterial creatures to the partly immaterial creature man, considers first the creation of physical things--the Scriptural work of the six days. After this he takes up the last act of the Creation--man. In the _Summa_ he considers man so far as his composite nature comes within the scope of theology. Accordingly the principal topic is the human soul (_anima_); and the body is regarded only in relation to the soul, its qualities and its fate. Thomas will follow Dionysius (Pseudo-Areopagite) in considering first the nature (_essentia_) of the soul, then its faculties (_virtus sive potentiae_), and thirdly, its mode of action (_operatio_).

Under the first head he argues (_Pars prima_, Qu. lxxv.) that the soul, which is the _primum principium_ of life, is not body, but the body’s consummation (_actus_) and _forma_. Further, inasmuch as the soul is the _principium_ of mental action, it must be an incorporeal principle existing by itself. It cannot properly be said to be the man; for man is not soul alone, but a composite of soul and body. But the soul, being immaterial and intellectual, is not a composite of form and matter. It is not subject to corruption. Concerning its union with the body (Qu. lxxvi.), “it is necessary to say that the mind (_intellectus_), which is the principle of intellectual action, is the _form_ (_forma_) of the human body.” One and the same intellectual principle does not pertain to all human bodies: there is no common human soul, but as many souls as there are men.[605] Yet no man has a plurality of souls. “If indeed the _anima intellectiva_ were not united to the body as form, but only as _motor_ (as the Platonists affirm), it would be necessary to find in man another substantial form, through which the body should be set in its being. But if, as we have shown, the soul is united to the body as substantial form, there cannot be another substantial form beside it” (Qu. lxxvi. Art. 4). The human soul is fitly joined to its body; for it holds the lowest grade among intellectual substances, having no knowledge of truth implanted in it, as the angels have; it has to gather knowledge _per viam sensus_. “But nature never omits what is necessary. Hence the _anima intellectiva_ must have not only the faculty of knowing, but the faculty of feeling (_sentiendi_). Sense-action can take place only through a corporeal instrument. Therefore the _anima intellectiva_ ought to be united to such a body, which should be to it a convenient organ of sense” (Art. 5). Moreover, “since the soul is united to the body as form, it is altogether in any and every part of the body” (Art. 8).

It is a cardinal point (Qu. lxxvii.) with Thomas that the soul’s _essentia_ is not its _potentia_: the soul is not its faculties. That is true only of God. In Him there is no diversity. There is some diversity of faculty in an angel; and more in man, a creature on the confines of the corporeal and spiritual creation, in whom concur the powers of both. There is order and priority among the powers of the soul: the _potentiae intellectivae_ are higher than the _potentiae sensitivae_, and control them; while the latter are above the _potentiae nutritivae_. Yet the order of their generation is the reverse. The highest of the sensitive faculties is sight. The _anima_ is the subject in which are the powers of knowing and willing (_potentiae intellectivae_); but the subject in which are the powers of sensation is the combination of the soul and body. All the powers of the soul, whether the subject be soul alone or soul and body, flow from the essence of the soul, as from a source (_principium_).

Thomas follows (Qu. lxxviii.) Aristotle in dividing the powers of the soul into vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, motor, and intellectual. In taking up the last, he points out (Qu. lxxix.) that intelligence (_intellectus_) is a power of the soul, and not the soul itself. He then follows the Philosopher in showing how intelligence (_intelligere_) is to be regarded as a passive power, and he presents the difficult Aristotelian device of the _intellectus agens_, and argues that memory and reason are not to be regarded as powers distinct from the intelligence (_intellectus_).

How does the soul, while united to the body (the _anima conjuncta_), (1) know corporeal things which are beneath it? (2) how does it know itself and what is in itself? and (3) how does it know immaterial substances which are above it? The exposition of these problems is introduced by (Qu. lxxxiv.) a historical discussion of the _primi philosophi_ who thought there was nothing but body in the world. Then came Plato, seeking “to save some certain cognition of truth” by means of his theory of Ideas. But Plato seems to have erred in thinking that the form of the known must be in the knower as it is in the known. This is not necessary. In sense-perception the form of the thing is not in sense as it is in the thing. “And likewise the intelligence receives the _species_ (Ideas) of material and mobile bodies immaterially and immutably, after its own mode; for the received is in the recipient after the mode of the recipient. Hence it is to be held that the soul through the intelligence knows bodies by immaterial, universal, and necessary cognition.”

Thomas sets this matter forth in a manner very illuminating as to his general position regarding knowledge:

“It follows that material things which are known must exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. And the reason of this is that the act of cognition extends itself to those things which are outside of the knower. For we know things outside of us. But through matter, the form of the thing is limited to what is single (_aliquid unum_). Hence it is plain that the _ratio_ (proper nature) of cognition is the opposite of the _ratio_ of materiality. And therefore things, like plants, which receive forms only materially, are in no way _cognoscitivae_, as is said in the second book of _De anima_. The more immaterially anything possesses the form of the thing known, the more perfectly it knows. Wherefore the intelligence, which abstracts the species (Idea) not only from matter, but also from individualizing material conditions, knows more perfectly than sense, which receives the form of the thing known without matter indeed, but with material conditions. Among the senses themselves, sight is the most _cognoscitivus_, because least material. And among intelligences, that is the more perfect which is the more immaterial” (Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 2).

Then Thomas again differs from Plato, and holds with Aristotle, that the intelligence through which the soul knows has not its ideas written upon it by nature, but from the first is capable of receiving them all (sed est in principio in potentia ad hujusmodi species omnes). Hereupon, and with further arguments, Thomas shows “that the _species intelligibiles_, by which our soul knows, do not arise from separate forms” or ideas.

To the converse question, whether intelligent cognition comes from things of sense, Thomas answers, following Aristotle: “One cannot say that sense perception is the whole cause of intellectual cognition, but rather in a certain way is the matter of the cause (_materia causae_).” On the other hand,

“it is impossible that the mind, in the state of the present life, wherein it is joined to the passive body (_passibili corpori_), should know anything actually (_actu_) except by turning itself to images (_phantasmata_). And this appears from two arguments. In the first place, since the mind itself is a power (_vis_) using no bodily organ, its action would not be interrupted by an injury to any bodily organ, if for its action there was not needed the action of some faculty using a bodily organ. Sense and imagination use a bodily organ. Hence as to what the mind knows actually (_actu_), there is needed the action of the imagination and other faculties, both in receiving new knowledge and in using knowledge already acquired. For we see that when the action of the imaginative faculty is interrupted by injury to an organ, as with the delirious, the man is prevented from actually knowing those things of which he has knowledge. Secondly (as any one may observe in himself), whenever he attempts to know (_intelligere_) anything, he forms images by way of example, in which he may contemplate what he is trying to know. And whenever we wish to make any one else understand, we suggest examples, from which he may make for himself images to know by.

“The reason of this is that the knowing faculty is suited to the knowable (_potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili_). The appropriate object of the intelligence of an angel, who is separate from all body, is intelligible immaterial substance (_substantia intelligibilis a corpore separata_); through this kind of intelligible he cognizes also material things. But the appropriate object of the human mind, which is joined to a body, is the essence or nature (_quidditas sive natura_) existing in material body; and through the natures of visible things of this sort it ascends to some cognition of invisible things. It belongs to the idea (_ratio_) of this nature that it should exist in some individual having corporeal matter, as it is of the concept (_ratio_) of the nature of stone or horse that it should be in _this_ stone or _this_ horse. Hence the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, unless it is known as existing in some particular [instance]. We apprehend the particular through sense and imagination; and so it is necessary, in order that the mind should know its appropriate object, that it should turn itself to images, in order to behold the universal nature existing in the particular. If, indeed, the appropriate object of our intelligence were the separate form, or if the form of sensible things did not subsist in the particular [instances], as the Platonists say, our mind in knowing would have no need always to turn itself to images” (Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 7).

It is next queried whether the judgment of the mind is impeded through binding (_per ligamentum_) the senses. In view of the preceding argument the answer is, that since “all that we know in our present state, becomes known to us through comparison with sensible things, it is impossible that there should be in us perfect mental judgment when the senses are tied, through which we take cognizance of sensible things” (Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 8).

This entire argument shows in what firm Aristotelian manner, scholasticism, in the person of Thomas, set itself upon a basis of sense perception; through which it still pressed to a knowledge of the supersensible and abstract. In this argument we also see, as always with Thomas, that knowledge is perfect and blessed, the more immaterial and abstract are its modes. All of which will continue to impress us as we follow Thomas, briefly, through his exposition of the _modus_ and _ordo_ of knowing (_intelligendi_) (Qu. lxxxv.).

The first question is whether our mind knows corporeal things by abstracting the species from the images--the type from the particular. There are three grades of the cognizing faculty (_virtutis cognoscitivae_). The lowest is sensation, which is the act of a bodily organ. Its appropriate object is form as existing in matter. And since matter is the principle of individuation (_i.e._ the particularizing principle from which results the particular or individual), sense perception is confined to the particular. The highest grade of the cognitient faculty is that which is independent of bodily organs and separate from matter, as the angelic intelligence; and its object is form subsisting without matter. For though angels know material things, they view them only in the immaterial, to wit, themselves or God. Between the two is the human mind, which

“is the _forma_ of the body. So it naturally knows form existing individually in corporeal matter, and yet not as form is in such matter. But to know form, which is in concrete matter, and yet know it not as it is in such matter, is to abstract it from this particular matter which the images represent. It follows that our intelligence knows material things by abstracting them from images; and through reflecting on these material abstractions we reach some cognition of the immaterial, just as conversely the angels know the material through the immaterial” (Qu. lxxxv. Art. 1).

It is next proved that the soul, through the intelligible species or forms abstracted from particulars, knows things which are outside the soul. In a way, intellection arises from sense perception; therefore the sense perception of the particular precedes the intellectual knowledge of universals. But, on the other hand, the intelligence, in coming to perfect cognition, proceeds from the undistinguished to the distinguished, from the more to the less general, and so knows _animal_ before it knows _homo_, and _homo_ before it knows Socrates. The next conclusion reads very neatly in scholastic Latin, but is difficult to paraphrase: it is that the intelligence may know many things at once (_simul_) _per modum unius_, but not _per modum multorum_; that is to say, the mind may grasp at once whatever it may grasp under one species, but cannot know a number of things at once which fall under different species.

Next as to what our mind knows in material things (Qu. lxxxvi.). It does not know the particular or singular (_singularia_) in them directly; for the principle of singularity in material things is the particular matter. But our mind _knows_ by abstracting from such the species, that is, the universal. This it knows directly. But it knows _singularia_ indirectly, inasmuch as, when it has abstracted the intelligible species, it must still, in order to know completely (_actu_), turn itself to the images in which it knows the species.

How does the _anima intellectiva_ know itself, and those things which are in it (Qu. lxxxvii.)? Everything is knowable in so far as it is actually (_in actu_) and not merely potentially. So the human intelligence knows itself not through its essence, which is still but potential, but in so far as it has actually realized itself; knows itself, that is, through its actuality. The permanent qualities (_habitus_) of the soul exist in a condition between potentiality and actuality. The mind knows them when they are actually present or operative.

Does the human intelligence know its own act--know that it knows? In God, knowing and being are one. Although this is not true of the angelic intelligence, nevertheless with an angel the prime object of knowledge is his own essence. With one and the same act an angel knows that it knows, and knows its essence. But the primal object of the human intelligence is neither its knowledge (knowing, _intelligere_) nor its essence, but something extrinsic, to wit, the nature of the material thing. Hence that is the first object known by the human intelligence; and next is known its own _actus_, by which that first object is known. Likewise the human intelligence knows the acts of will. An act of will is nothing but a certain inclination toward some form of the mind (_formam intellectam_) as natural appetite is an inclination toward a natural form. The act of will is in the knowing mind and so is known by it.

So far as to how the soul knows material things, which are below it, and its own nature and qualities. It is another question whether the soul knows those things which are above it, to wit, the immaterial substances. Can the soul in the state of the present life know the angels in themselves? With lengthy argument, differing from Plato and adhering to Aristotle, Thomas proves the negative: that in the present life we cannot know _substantias separatas immateriales secundum seipsas_. Nor can we come to a knowledge of the angelic substances through knowing material things.

“For immaterial substances are altogether of another nature (_ratio_) from the whatnesses (_quidditates_) of material things; and however much our intelligence abstracts from matter the essence (_quidditas_) of the material thing, it will never arrive at anything like an immaterial substance. And so, through material substances, we cannot know immaterial substances perfectly” (Qu. lxxxviii. Art. 2).

Much less can we thus know God.

The discussion hitherto has been confined to the intellectual capacities of souls united to their bodies. As to the knowledge which the “separated” soul may have, other considerations arise akin to those touching the knowledge possessed by the separated substances called angels. Is the separated soul able to know? Thomas has shown that so long as the soul is joined to the body it cannot know anything except by turning itself to images. If this were a mere accident of the soul, incidental to its existence in the body, then with that impediment removed, it would return to its own nature and know simply. But if, as we suppose, this turning to images is of the nature of the soul, the difficulty grows. Yet the soul has one mode of existence when united to the body, and another when separated, but with its nature remaining. Souls united to bodies may know through resort to images of bodies, which are in the bodily organs; but when separated, they may know by turning to that which is intelligible simply, as other separate substances do. Yet still this raises doubt; for why did not God appoint a nobler way for the soul to know than that which is natural to it when joined to the body? The perfection of the universe required that there should be diverse grades among intellectual substances. The soul is the lowest of them. Its feeble intelligence was not fit to receive perfect knowledge through universal conceptions, save when assisted by concrete examples. Without these, souls would have had but a confused knowledge. Hence, for their more perfect knowledge of things, they are naturally united to bodies, and so receive a knowledge from things of sense proper to their condition; just as rude men can be led to know only through examples. So it was for a higher end that the soul was united to the body, and knows through resort to images; yet, when separated, it will be capable of another way of knowing.[606]

Separated from the body, the soul can know itself through itself. It can know other separated souls perfectly, but the angels, who are higher natures, only imperfectly, at least through the knowledge which the separated soul has from its nature; but that may be increased through grace and glory. The separated soul will know natural objects through the species (ideas) received from the inflowing divine light; yet less perfectly than the angels. Likewise, less universally than angels, will separated souls, by like means of species received from the divine light, know particular things, and only such as they previously knew, or may know through some affection or aptitude or the divine decree. For the habit and aptitude of knowledge, and the knowledge already acquired, will remain in the separated soul, so far as relates to the knowledge which is in the intellect, and no longer in the lower perceptive faculties. Neither will distance from the object affect the soul’s knowledge, since it will know through the influx of forms (_species_) from the divine light.

“Yet through the cognition belonging to their nature, separated souls do not know what is doing here below. For such souls know the particular and concrete (_singularia_) only as from the traces (_vestigia_) of previous cognition or affection, or by divine appointment. And the souls of the dead by divine decree, and in accordance with their mode of existence, are separated from the intercourse of the living and joined to the society of spiritual substances. Therefore they are ignorant of those things which are done among us.”

Nevertheless, it would seem, according to the opinions of Augustine and Gregory, “that the souls of the saints who see God know all that is done here. Yet, perfectly joined to the divine righteousness, they are not grieved, nor do they take part in the affairs of the living, save as the divine disposition requires.”

“Still the souls of the dead are able to care for the affairs of the living, although ignorant of their condition; just as we have care for the dead, though ignorant of their state, by invoking the suffrages of the Church. And the souls of the dead may be informed of the affairs of the living from souls lately departed hence, or through angels or demons, or by the revealing spirit of God. But if the dead appear to the living, it is by God’s special dispensation, and to be reckoned as a divine miracle” (Qu. lxxxix. Art. 8).

VI

We have thus traced Thomas’s view of the faculty of knowledge, the primary constituent of beatitude in God, and in angels and men. There are other elements which not only supplement the faculty of knowledge, but even flow as of necessity from a full and true conception of that faculty and its perfect energizing. These needful, yet supplementary, factors are the faculties of will and love and natural appetite; though the last does not exist in God or angel or in “separated soul.” The composite creature man shares it with brutes: it is of enormous importance, since it may affect his spiritual progress in this life, and so determine his state after death. Let us observe these qualities in God, in the immaterial substances called angels, and in man.

In God there is volition as well as intelligence; for _voluntas intellectum consequitur_; and as God’s _being_ (_esse_) is His knowing (_intelligere_), so likewise His being is His will (_velle_).[607] Essentially alike in God and man and angel are the constituents of spiritual beatitude and existence--knowing, willing, loving. From Creator down to man, knowledge differs in mode and in degree, yet is essentially the same. The like is true of will. As to love, because passion is of the body, love and every mode of turning from or to an object is passionless in God and the angels. Yet man through love, as well as through willing and through knowing, may prove his kinship with angels and with God.

God is love, says John’s Epistle. “It is necessary to place love in God,” says Thomas. “For the first movement of will and any appetitive faculty (_appetitivae virtutis_) is love (_amor_).” It is objected that love is a passion; and the passionless God cannot love. Answers Thomas, “Love and joy and delight are passions in so far as they signify acts (or actualities, _actus_) of the _appetitus sensitivi_; but they are not passions when they signify the _actus_ of the _appetitus intellectivi_; and thus are they placed in God” (_Pars prima_, Qu. xx. Art. 1).

God loves all existences. Now all existences, in so far as they are, are good. For being itself (_esse_) is in a sense the _good_ of any thing, and likewise its perfection. It has been shown that God’s will is the cause of all things; and thus it is proper that a thing should have being, or good, in so far as it is willed by God. God wills some good to every existent thing. And since to love is nothing else than to will good to something, it is evident that God loves all things that are, yet not in the way we love. For since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by an object, our love by which we will good to anything is not the cause of its goodness; but its goodness calls forth the love by which we wish to preserve and add to the good it has; and for this we work. But God’s love imparts and creates goodness in things.

The divine love embraces all things in one and the same act of will; but inasmuch as His love creates goodness, there could be no greater goodness in one thing than in another unless He willed greater good to one than to the other: in this sense He may be said to love one creature more than another; and in this way He loves the better things more. Besides love, the order of the universe proves God’s _justitia_; an attribute which is to be ascribed to Him, as Dionysius says, in that He grants to all things what is appropriate, according to the dignity of the existence of each, and preserves the nature of each in its own order and virtue. Likewise _misericordia_ is to be ascribed to God, not as if He were affected by pitying sadness, but in that He remedies the misery or defects of others.

Thus far as to will and love in God. Next, as to these qualities in Angels. Have angels will? (_Pars prima_, Qu. lix.). Thomas argues: All things proceed from the divine will, and all _per appetitum_ incline toward good. In plants this is called natural appetite. Next above them come those creatures who perceive the particular good as of the senses; their inclination toward it is _appetitus sensitivus_. Still above them are such as know the _ratio_ of the good universally, through their intelligence. Such are the angels; and in them inclination toward the good is will. Moreover, since they know the nature of the good, they are able to form a judgment as to it; and so they have free will: _ubicumque est intellectus, est liberum arbitrium_. And as their knowledge is above that of men, so in them free will exists more excellently.

The angels have only the _appetitus intellectivus_ which is will; they are not irascible or concupiscent, since these belong to the _appetitus sensitivus_. Only metaphorically can _furor_ and evil concupiscence be ascribed to demons, as anger is to God--_propter similitudinem effectus_. Consequently _amor_ and _gaudium_ do not exist as passions in angels. But in so far as these qualities signify solely an act of will, they are intellectual. In this sense, to love is to will good to anything, and to rejoice (_gaudere_) is to rest the will in a good obtained. Similarly, _caritas_ and _spes_, in so far as they are virtues, lie not in appetite, but in will; and thus exist in angels. With man the virtues of temperance and fortitude may relate to things of sense; but not so with angels, who have no passions to be bridled by these virtues. Temperance is ascribed to them when they temper their will according to the will divine, and fortitude, when they firmly execute it (Qu. lix. Art. 4).

In a subsequent portion of _Pars prima_ (Qu. cx.) Thomas has occasion to point out that, as in human affairs, the more particular power is governed by the more universal, so among the angels.

“The higher angels who preside over the lower have more universal knowledge. It is likewise clear that the _virtus_ of a body is more particular than the _virtus_ of a spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is form particularized (_individuata_) through matter, and limited to the here and now. But immaterial forms are unconditioned and intelligible. And as the lower angels, who have forms less universal, are ruled by the higher angels, so all corporeal things are ruled by angels. And this is maintained not only by the holy Doctors, but by all philosophers who have recognized incorporeal substances.”

Next Thomas considers the action of angels upon men, and shows that men may have their minds illumined by the lower orders of angels, who present to men _intelligibilem veritatem sub similitudinibus sensibilium_. God sends the angels to minister to corporeal creatures; in which mission their acts proceed from God as a cause (_principio_). They are His instruments. They are sent as custodians of men, to guide and move them to good. “To every man an angel is appointed for his guard: of which the reason is, that the guardianship (_custodia_) of the angels is an execution of divine providence in regard to men.” Every man, while as _viator_ he walks life’s _via non tuta_, has his guardian angel. And the archangels have care of multitudes of men (Qu. cxiii.).

Thus Thomas’s, or rather, say the Christian doctrine as to angels, becomes a corollary necessary to Christian theism, and true at least symbolically. But--and this is the last point as to these ministering spirits--do the angels who love without passion, grieve and suffer when those over whom they minister are lost?

“Angels grieve neither over the sins nor the punishment of men. For, as says Augustine, sadness and grief arise only from what contravenes the will. But nothing happens in the world that is contrary to the will of the angels and other blessed ones. For their will is entirely fixed (_totaliter inhaeret_) in the order of the divine righteousness (_Justitiae_); and nothing takes place in the world, save what takes place and is permitted by the same. And so, in brief, nothing takes place in the world contrary to the will of the blessed” (Qu. cxiii. Art. 7).

We come to man. He has will, and free will or choice, as the angels have. Will is part of the intellectual nature: it is as the _intellectivus appetitus_. But man differs from the angels in possessing appetites which belong to his sense-nature and do not perceive the good in its common aspects; because sense does not apprehend the universal, but only the particular.[608] Sometimes Thomas speaks of _amor_ as including every form of desire, intellectual or pertaining to the world of sense. “The first movement of will and of any appetitive faculty (_virtus_) is amor.”[609] So in this most general signification _amor_ “is something belonging to appetite; for the object of both is the good.”

“The first effect of the desirable (_appetibilis_) upon the _appetitus_, is called _amor_; thence follows _desiderium_, or the movement toward the desirable; and at last the _quies_ which is _gaudium_. Since then _amor_ consists in an effect upon the _appetitus_, it is evidently _passio_; most properly speaking when it relates to the yearning element (_concupiscibile_), but less properly when it relates to will” (_Pars prima_, Qu. xxvi. Art. 2).

Further distinguishing definitions are now in order:

“Four names are applied to what pertains to the same: _amor_, _dilectio_, _caritas_, _et amicitia_. Of the three first, _amor_ has the broadest meaning. For all _dilectio_ or _caritas_ is _amor_; but not conversely. _Dilectio_ adds to _amor_ a precedent choice (_electionem praecedentem_) as its name indicates. Hence _dilectio_ is not in the concupiscent nature, but in the will, and therefore in the rational nature. _Caritas_ adds to _amor_ a certain _perfectionem amoris_, inasmuch as what is loved, is esteemed as very precious, as the name shows” (_Ibid._ Art. 3).

Moreover, _amor_ may be divided into _amor amicitiae_, whereby we wish good to the _amicus_, and _amor concupiscentiae_, whereby properly we desire a good to ourselves.

The Good is the object and, in that sense, the cause, of _amor_ (Qu. xxvii.).

“But love requires a cognition of the good which is loved. Therefore the Philosopher says, that bodily sight is the cause of _amoris sensitivi_. Likewise contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the cause of _amoris spiritualis_. Thus, therefore, cognition is the cause of love, inasmuch as the good cannot be loved unless known.”

From this broad conception of _amor_ the argument rises to _amor_ in its purest phases, which correspond to the highest modes of knowledge man is capable of. They are considered in their nature, in their causes, and effects. It is evident whither we are travelling in this matter.

“Love (_amor_) may be perfect or imperfect. Perfect love is that by which some one is loved for himself, as a man loves a friend. Imperfect love is that by which some one loves a thing, not for itself, but in order that that good may come to him, as a man loves the thing he desires. The first love pertains to _caritas_ which cleaves to God (_inhaeret Deo_) for Himself (_secundum seipsum_).”[610]

_Caritas_ is one of the theological virtues, and as such Thomas treats it. To it corresponds the “gift” of _sapientia_, likewise a virtue bestowed by God, but more particularly regarded as the “gift” of the Holy Spirit. _Caritas_ is set not in the _appetitus sensitivus_, but in the will. Yet as it exceeds our natural faculties, “it is not in us by nature, nor acquired through our natural powers; but through the infusion of the Holy Spirit, who is the _amor Patris et Filii_.” He infuses _caritas_ according to His will; and it will increase as we draw near to God; nor is there any bound to its augmentation. May _caritas_ be perfect in this life? In one sense it never can be perfect, because no creature ever can love God according to His infinite lovableness.

“But on the part of him who wills to love (_ex parte diligentis_), _caritas_ is perfect when he loves as much as he is able. Which may be taken in three ways. In one way, as the whole heart of man is always borne toward God; and this is the perfection of the love of home (_caritas patriae_), unattainable here, where because of this life’s infirmities it is impossible always actually to think upon God, and be drawn toward Him by voluntary love (_dilectione_). In another way, as a man may strive to keep himself free for God and things divine, laying other matters aside, save as life’s need requires: and that is the perfection of _caritas_, possible in this life, yet not for all who have _caritas_. And the third way, when any one habitually sets his heart on God, so that he thinks and wills nothing that is contrary to the divine love: this perfection is common to all who have _caritas_.”[611]

The _caritas_ with which we love God, extends to our neighbours, and even to our enemies, for God’s sake; also to ourselves, including our bodies; it embraces sinners, but not their sinfulness. It embraces the angels. There is order and grade in _caritas_, according to its relationship to God, the source of beatitude and voluntary love (_dilectionis_). God is to be loved _ex caritate_ above all; for He is loved as the cause of beatitude, while our neighbour is loved as a participant with us in the beatitude from God. We should love God more than ourselves; because beatitude is in God as in the common and fontal source of all things that participate in beatitude.

“But, after God, man should love himself, in so far as he is spirit (_secundum naturam spiritualem_), more than any one else. This is plain from the very reason of loving. God is loved as the principle of good, on which the _dilectio caritatis_ is based. Man loves himself _ex caritate_ for the reason that he is a participator in that good. He loves his neighbour because of his association (_societas_) in that good.... Participation in the divine good is a stronger reason for loving, than association in this participation. Therefore, man _ex caritate_ should love himself more than his neighbour; and the mark (_signum_) of this is, that man should not commit any sin barring his participation in this beatitude, in order to free his neighbour from sin.... But one should love his neighbour’s salvation more than his own _body_.”[612]

We may love some of our neighbours more than others; for those bound to us by natural ties and proximity can be loved more and in more actual ways. The order and grades of love will endure when our natures are perfected in glory.

Love (_caritas_) is the supreme theological virtue. It comes to us in this life through grace; it can be perfected only when grace is consummated in glory. Likewise the highest knowledge possible in this life comes through grace, to be perfected in glory. All is from God, and that which, of all the rest, seems most freely given is the divine influence disposing the intelligence and will toward good, and illuminating these best God-given faculties. This, as _par excellence_, through the exceeding bounty of its free bestowal, is called _gratia_ (grace). It is a certain habitual disposition of the soul; it is not the same as _virtus_, but a divinely implanted disposition, in which the virtues must be rooted; it is the imparted similitude of the divine nature, and perfects the nature of the soul, so far as that has part in likeness to the divine: it is the medial state between nature and that further consummation of the grace-illumined nature, which is glory; and so it is the beginning, the _inchoatio_, of our glorified beatitude. Clearly, grace is no part of our inborn nature, and does not belong to our natural faculties. It is a divinely bestowed increment, directing our natural faculties toward God and uplifting them to higher capacities of knowing and loving.

To follow Thomas’s exposition of grace a little more closely:[613] man, through his natural powers, may know truth, but not the highest; and without grace, our fallen nature cannot will all the good belonging to it (_connaturale_), nor love God above all else, nor merit eternal life. “Grace is something supernatural in man coming from God.” It

“is not the same as virtue; and its subject (_i.e._ its possessor, that in which it is set) cannot be a faculty (_potentia_) of the soul; for the soul’s faculties, as perfected, are conceived to be virtues. Grace, which is prior to virtue, is set, not in the faculties, but in the essence of the soul. Thus, as through his faculty of knowing (_potentiam intellectivam_), man shares the divine knowledge by the virtue of faith, and through the faculty of will shares the divine love by the virtue of _caritas_, so by means of a certain similitude he shares in the divine nature through some regeneration or recreation” (_Pars_ I. ii., Qu. cx. Art. 4).

Grace may be conceived either as “divine aid, moving us to willing and doing right, or as a formative and abiding (_habituale_) gift, divinely placed in us” (Qu. cxi. Art. 2). “The gift of grace exceeds the power of any created nature; and is nothing else than a sharing (_participatio_) of the divine nature” (Qu. cxii. Art. 1).

So it is clear that without grace man cannot rise to the highest knowledge and the purest love of which he is capable in this life; far less can he reach that final and perfected blessedness which is expected hereafter. For this he must possess the virtue of Faith, which comes not without grace.

“The perfection of the rational creature consists not only in that which may be his, in accordance with his nature; but also in that which may come to him from some supernatural sharing in the divine goodness. The final beatitude of man consists in some supernatural vision of God. Man can attain to that only through some mode of learning from God the Teacher, and he must believe God as a disciple believes his master” (_Pars_ II. ii., Qu. ii. Art. 3).

Within the province of the Christian Faith “it is necessary that man should accept _per modum fidei_ not only what is above reason, but also what may be known through reason.” (Art. 4). He must believe explicitly the _prima credibilia_, that is to say, the Articles of Faith; it is enough if he believes other _credibilia_ implicitly, by holding his mind prepared to accept whatever Scripture teaches (Art. 5).

“To believe is an act of the intellect (_actus intellectus_) as moved by will to assenting. It proceeds from the will and from the intellect.... Yet it is the immediate act of the intellect, and therefore faith is in the intellect as in a subject [_i.e._ possessor]” (Qu. iv. Art. 2).

And Thomas, having shown the function of will in any act of faith, passes on by the same path to connect _fides_ with _caritas_:

“Voluntary acts take their _species_ from the end which is the object of volition. That from which anything receives its species, occupies the place held by _form_ in material things. Hence, as it were, the _form_ of any voluntary act is the end to which it is directed (_ordinatur_). Manifestly, an act of faith is directed to the object willed (which is the good) as to an end. But good which is the end of faith, to wit, the divine good, is the proper object of _caritas_. And so _caritas_ is called the _form_ of faith, in so far as through _caritas_ the act of faith is perfected and given form” (Qu. iv. Art. 3).

Thomas makes his conclusion more precise:

“As faith is the consummation of the intellect, that which pertains to the intellect, pertains, _per se_, to faith. What pertains to will, does not, _per se_, pertain to faith. The increment making the difference between the faith which has form and faith which lacks it (_fides formata_, _fides informis_), consists in that which pertains to will, to wit, to _caritas_, and not in what pertains to intellect” (Qu. iv. Art. 4).

Only the _fides_ which is formed and completed in _caritas_ is a virtue (Art. 5). And Thomas says concisely (Qu. vi. Art. 1) what in many ways has been made evident before: For Faith, it is necessary that the _credibilia_ should be propounded, and then that there should be assent to them; but since man, in assenting to those things which are of the Faith, is lifted above his nature, his assent must proceed from a supernatural principle working within him, which is God moving him through grace.

It is not hard to see why two gifts (_dona_) of the Holy Spirit should belong to the virtue Faith, to wit, understanding and knowledge, _intellectus et scientia_. Thomas gives the reasons in an argument germane to his Aristotelian theory of cognition:

“The object of the knowing faculty is _that which is_.... Many kinds of things lie hidden within, to which the _intellectus_ of man should penetrate. Beneath the _accidens_ the substantial nature of the thing lies hidden; beneath words lie their meanings; beneath similes and figures, lies the figured truth--_veritas figurata_ (for things intelligible are, as it were, within things sensible); and in causes lie hidden the effects, and conversely. Now, since human cognition begins with sense, as from without, it is clear that the stronger the light of the intellect, the further it will penetrate to the inmost depths. But the light of our natural intellect is of finite virtue, and may reach only to what is limited. Therefore man needs the supernatural light, in order to penetrate to the knowledge which through the natural light he is not able to know; and that supernatural light given to man is called the _donum intellectus_” (Qu. viii. Art. 1).

This gift follows grace. Grace is more perfect than nature. It does not abrogate, but perfects the natural faculties. Nor does it fail in those matters in which man’s natural power is competent (Qu. ix. Art. 1). So, besides the _donum intellectus_, to Faith belongs the _donum scientiae_ also, which brings and guides knowledge of human things (Art. 2).

And now we shall not be surprised to find _sapientia_, the very highest gift of the Spirit, attached to the grace-given virtue caritas. For _caritas_ is the informing principle of Faith, and the highest virtue of the grace-illumined will. The will, be it remembered, belongs to man’s intellectual nature; its object is the good which is known by the mind (_bonum intellectum_). “_Sapientia_ (wisdom, right knowledge as to the highest cause, which is God) signifies rectitude of judgment in accordance with the _rationes divinae_,” the ideas and reasons which exist in God. Rectitude of judgment regarding things divine may arise from rational inquiry; in which case it pertains to the _sapientia_ which is an intellectual virtue. But it may also spring from affinity to those things themselves; and then it is a gift of the Holy Spirit (II. ii., Qu. xlv. Art. 2).

Says Thomas:

“By the name _beatitude_ is understood the final perfection of the rational or intellectual nature. This consists for this life in such contemplation as we may have here of the highest intelligible good, which is God; but above this felicity is that other felicity which we expect when we shall see God as He is” (_Pars_ I., Qu. lxii Art 1).

But mark: the perfection of the intellectual nature does not consist merely in knowing, narrowly taken. The right action of will is also essential, of the will directed toward the highest good, which is God: and this is _caritas_, of which the corresponding gift from the Spirit is wisdom. In accord with this full consummation of human nature, comprising the perfection of cognition and will, Thomas outlines his conception of the _vita contemplativa_, the life of most perfect beatitude attainable on earth:

“The _vita contemplativa_ is theirs whose resolve is set upon the contemplation of truth. Resolve is an act of will; because resolve is with respect to the end, which is the object of will. Thus the _vita contemplativa_, according to the essence of its action, is of the intelligence; but so far as it pertains to what moves us to engage in such action, it is of the will, which moves all the other faculties, including the intelligence, to act. Appetitive energy (_vis appetitiva_) moves toward contemplating something, either sensibly or intellectually: sometimes from love of the thing seen, and sometimes from love of the knowledge itself, which arises from contemplation. And because of this, Gregory sets the _vita contemplativa_ in the love of God--_in caritate Dei_--to wit, inasmuch as some one, from a willing love (_dilectio_) of God burns to behold His beauty. And because any one is rejoiced when he attains what he loves, the _vita contemplativa_ is directed toward _dilectio_[614] which lies in affect (_in affectu_); by which _amor_ also is intended” (II. ii., Qu. clxxx. Art. 1).

The moral virtues, continues Thomas, do not pertain _essentially_ to this _vita_. But they may promote it, by regulating the passions and quieting the tumult of outside affairs. In principle it is fixed upon the contemplation of truth, which here we see but in a glass darkly; and so we help ourselves along by contemplating the effects of the divine cause in the world.

Thus final beatitude, and its mortal approach in the _vita contemplativa_ of this earth, is of the mind, both in its knowledge and its love. Immateriality, spirituality, is with Thomas primarily intellectual. Yet his beatitude is not limited to the knowing faculties. It embraces will and love. The grace of God and the gifts of the Holy Spirit touch love as well as knowledge, raising one and both to final unison of aim. Thus far in this life, while in the life to come, these grace-uplifted qualities of knowledge, and that choosing love (_dilectio_) which rises from knowledge of the good, are perfected _in gloria_.

Further than this we shall not go with Thomas, nor follow him, for example, through his exposition of the means of salvation--the Incarnation and the sacraments. Nor need we further mark the prodigious range of his theology, or his metaphysics, logic, or physics. To all this many books have been devoted. We are but seeking to realise his intellectual interests and qualities, in such way as to bring them within the compass of our sympathy. A more encyclopaedic and systematic presentation of his teaching is proper for those who would trace, or perhaps attach themselves to, particular doctrines; or would find in scholasticism, even in Thomas, some special authoritativeness. For us these doctrines have but the validity of all human striving after truth. Moreover, perhaps a truer view of Thomas, the theologian and philosopher, is gained from following a few typical forms of his teaching presented in his own exposition, than by analyzing his thought with later solvents which he did not apply, and presenting his matter classified as he would not have ordered it, and in modern phrases, which have as many meanings foreign to scholasticism as scholasticism has thoughts not to be translated into modern ways of thinking.