Book XV. is Natural Philosophy--animals and plants. Book XVI., _De

mathematica_, treats of arithmetic, music, geometry, astronomy, and metaphysics cursorily. Book XVII. likewise thins out in a somewhat slight discussion of Theology, which was to form the topic of the tome that Vincent did not write.

But Vincent did complete another tome, the _Speculum historiale_. It is a loosely chronological compilation of tradition, myth, and history, with discursions upon the literary works of the characters coming under review. It would be tedious to follow its excerpted presentation of the profane and sacred matter.

We may leave Vincent, with the obvious reflection that his work is a conglomerate, both in arrangement and contents. It has the pious aim of contributing to man’s salvation, and yet is an attempted universal encyclopaedia of human knowledge, much of which is plainly secular and mundane. The monstrous scope and dual purpose of the work prevented any unity in method and arrangement. More single in aim, and better arranged in consequence, are the _Sentences_ of Peter Lombard and the _Summa theologiae_ of Aquinas. For although their scope, at least the scope of the _Summa_, is wide, all is ordered with respect to the true aim of _sacra doctrina_, just as Thomas explained in the passage which we have already given.

The alleged principle of the Lombard’s division strikes one as curious; yet he got it from Augustine: _Signum_ and _res_--the symbol and the thing: verily an age-long play of spiritual tendency lay back of these contrasted concepts. Christian _doctrina_ related, perhaps chiefly, to the significance of _signa_, signs, symbols, allegories, mysteries, sacraments. It was not so strange that the Lombard made this antithesis the ground of his arrangement. Quite as of course he begins by saying it is clear to any one who considers, with God’s grace, that the “contents of the Old and New Law are occupied either with _res_ or _signa_. For as the eminent doctor Augustine says in his _Doctrina Christiana_, all teaching is of things or signs; but things also are learned through signs. Properly those are called _res_ which are not employed in order to signify something; while _signa_ are those whose use is to signify.” Then the Lombard separates the sacraments from other _signa_, because they not only signify, but also confer saving aid; and he points out that evidently a _signum_ is also some sort of a thing; but not everything is a _signum_. He will treat first of _res_ and then of _signa_.

As to _res_, one must bear in mind, as Augustine says, that some things are to be enjoyed (_fruendum_), as from love we cleave to them for their own sake; and others are to be used (_utendum_) as a means; and still others to be both enjoyed and used.

“Those which are to be enjoyed make us blessed (_beatos_); those which are to be used, aid us striving for blessedness.... We ourselves are the things which are both to be enjoyed and used, and also the angels and the saints.... The things which are to be enjoyed are Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and so the Trinity is _summa res_.”

So the Lombard’s first two Books consider _res_ in the descending order of their excellence; the third considers the Incarnation, which, if not itself a sacrament, and the chief and sum of all sacraments, is the source of those of the New Law, considered in the fourth Book. The scheme is single and orderly; the difficulty will be in actually arranging the various topics within it. Endeavouring to do so, the Lombard in Book I. puts together the doctrine of the Trinity, the three Persons composing it, and their attributes and qualities. Book II. considers in order, the Angels, and very briefly, the work of the Six Days down to the creation of man; then the Christian _doctrina_ as to man is presented: his creation and its reasons; the creation of his _anima_; the creation of woman; the condition of man and woman before the Fall; their sin; next free-will and grace. Book III. treats of the Incarnation, in all the aspects in which it may be known, and of the nature of Christ, His saving merit, and the grace which was in Him; also of the virtues of faith, hope, and charity, the seven gifts of the Spirit, and the existence of them all in Christ. Book IV. considers the Sacraments of the New Law: Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, extreme unction, ordination to holy orders, marriage. It concludes with setting forth the Resurrection and the Last Judgment.

The first chapters of Genesis were the ultimate source of the Lombard’s actual arrangement. And the _Summa_ will follow the same order of treatment. One may perceive how naturally the adoption of this order came to Christian theologians by glancing over Augustine’s _De Genesi ad litteram_.[445] This Commentary was partially constructive, and not simply exegetical; and afforded a _cadre_, or frame, of topical ordering, which could readily be filled out with the contents of the _Sentences_ or even of the _Summa_: God, in His unity and trinity, the Creation, man especially, his fall, the Incarnation as the saving means of his restoration, and then the Sacraments, and the final Judgment unto heaven and hell. One may say that this was the natural and proper order of presenting the contents of the Christian _sacra doctrina_.

So the great _Summa theologiae_ of Thomas Aquinas adopts the same order which the Lombard had followed. The _Pars prima_ begins with defining _sacra doctrina_.[446] It then proceeds to consider God--whether He exists; then treats of His _simplicitas_ and _perfectio_; next of His attributes; His _bonitas_, _infinitas_, _immutabilitas_, _aeternitas_, _unitas_; then of our knowledge of Him; then of His knowledge, and therein of truth and falsity; thereupon are considered the divine will, love, justice, and pity; the divine providence and predestination; the divine power and beatitude.

All this pertains to the _unitas_ of the divine essence; and now Thomas passes on to the _Trinitas personarum_, or the more distinctive portions of Christian theology. He treats of the _processio_ and _relationes_ of the _divinae Personae_, and then of themselves--Father, Son, Holy Spirit, and then of their essential relationship and properties. Next he discusses the _missio_ of the divine Persons, and the relations between God and His Creation. First comes the consideration of the principle of creation, the _processio creaturarum a Deo_, and of the nature of created things, with some discussion of evil, whether it be a thing.

Among created beings, Thomas treats first of angels, and at great length; then of the physical creation, in its order--the work of the six days, but with no great detail. Then man, created of spiritual and corporeal substance--his complex nature is to be analysed and fathomed to its depths. Thomas discusses the union of the _anima ad corpus_; then the powers of the anima, _in generali_ and _in speciali_--the intellectual faculties, the appetites, the will and its freedom of choice; how the _anima_ knows--the full Aristotelian theory of cognition is given. Next, more specifically as to the creation of the soul and body of the first man, and the nature of the image and similitude of God within him; then as to man’s condition and faculties while in a state of innocence; also as to Paradise.

This closes the treatment of the _creatio et distinctio rerum_; and Thomas passes to their _gubernatio_, and the problem of how God conserves and moves the corporeal and spiritual; then concerning the action of one creature on another, and how the angels are ranged in hierarchies, and although purely spiritual beings, minister to men and guard them; then concerning the action of corporeal things, concerning fate, and the action of men upon men.

Here ends _Pars prima_. The first section of the second part (_Prima secundae_) begins. In a short Prologue Thomas says:

“Because man is made in the image of God, that is, free in his thought and will, and able to act through himself (_per se potestativum_), after what has been said concerning the Exemplar, God, and everything proceeding from the divine power according to His will, it remains for us to consider His image, to wit, man, in so far as he is the source or cause (_principium_) of his own works, having free-will and power over them.”

Hereupon Thomas takes up in order: the ultimate end of man; the nature of man’s beatitude, and wherein it consists, and how it may be attained; then voluntary and involuntary acts, and the nature and action of will; then fruition, intention, election, deliberation, consent, and actions good and bad, flowing from the will; then the passions; concupiscence and pleasure, sadness, hope and despair, fear, anger; next habits (_habitus_) and the virtues, intellectual, cardinal, theological; the gifts of the Spirit, and the beatitudes; the vices, and sin, and penalty. Thereupon it becomes proper to consider the external causes (_principia_) of acts: “The external cause (_principium_) moving toward good is God; who instructs us through law, and aids us through grace. Therefore we must speak, first of law, then of grace.” So Thomas discusses: the _essentia_ of law, and the different kinds of law--_lex aeterna_, _lex naturalis_, _lex humana_--their effect and validity; then the precepts of the Old Law (of the Old Testament); then as to the law of the Gospel and the need of grace; and lastly, concerning grace and human merit.

The _Secunda secundae_ (the second division of the second part) opens with a Prologue, in which the author says that, having considered generally the virtues and vices, and other things pertaining to the matter of ethics, it is needful to consider these same matters more particularly, each in turn; “for general moral statements (_sermones morales universales_) are less useful, inasmuch as actions are always _in particularibus_.” A more special statement of moral rules may proceed in two ways: the one from the side of the moral material, discussing this or that virtue or vice; the other considers what applies to special orders (_speciales status_) of men, for instance prelates and the lower clergy, or men devoted to the active or contemplative religious life. “We shall, therefore, consider specially, first what applies to all conditions of men, and then what applies to certain orders (_determinatos status_).” Thomas adds that it will be best to consider in each case the virtue and corresponding gift, and the opposing vice, together; also that “virtues are reducible to seven, the three theological,[447] and the four cardinal virtues. Of the intellectual virtues, one is Prudence, which is numbered with the cardinal virtues; but ars does not pertain to morals, which relate to what is to be done, while ars is the correct faculty of making things (_recta ratio factibilium_).[448] The other three intellectual virtues, _sapientia_, _intellectus_, _et scientia_, bear the names of certain gifts of the Holy Spirit, and are considered with them. Moral virtues are all reducible to the cardinal virtues; and therefore, in considering each cardinal virtue, all the virtues related to it are considered, and the opposite vices.”

This classification of the virtues seems anything but clear. And perhaps the weakest feature of the _Summa_ is this scarcely successful ordering, or combination, of the Aristotelian virtues with those more germane to the Christian scheme. However this may be, the author of the _Summa_ proceeds to consider in order: _fides_, and the gifts (_dona_) of _intellectus_ and _scientia_ which correspond to the virtue faith; next the opposing vices: _infidelitas_, _haeresis_, _apostasia_, _blasphemia_, and _caecitas mentis_ (spiritual blindness). Next in order come the virtue _spes_, and the corresponding gift of the Spirit, _timor_, and the opposing vices of _desperatio_ and _praesumptio_.[449] Next, _caritas_, with its _dilectio_, its _gaudium_, its _pax_, its _misericordia_, its _beneficentia_ and _eleemosyna_, and its _correctio fraterna_; then the opposite vices, _odium_, _acedia_, _invidia_, _discordia_, _contentio_, _schisma_, _bellum_, _rixa_, _seditio_, _scandalum_. Next the _donum sapientiae_, and its opposite, _stultitia_; next, _prudentia_, and its correspondent gift, _consilium_; and its connected vices, _imprudentia_, _negligentia_, and its evil semblances, _dolus_ and _fraus_.

Says Thomas: _Consequenter post prudentiam considerandum est de Justitia_. Whereupon follows a juristic treatment of _jus_, _justitia_, _judicium_, _restitutio_, _acceptio personarum_; then _homicide_ and other crimes recognized by law. Then come the virtues, connected with _justitia_, to wit, _religio_, and its acts, _devotio_, _oratio_, _adoratio_, _sacrificium_, _oblatio_, _decimae_, _votum_, _juramentum_; then the vices opposed to _religio_: _superstitio_, _idolatria_, _tentatio Dei_, _perjurium_, _sacrilegium_, _simonia_. Next is considered the virtue of _pietas_; then _observantia_, with its parts, i.e. _dulia_ (service), _obedientia_, and its opposite, _inobedientia_. Next, _gratia_ (thanks) or _gratitudo_, and its opposite, _ingratitudo_; next, _vindicatio_ (punishment); next, _veritas_, with its opposites, _hypocrisis_, _jactantia_ (boasting), and _ironia_; next, _amicitia_, with the vices of _adulatio_ and _litigium_. Next, the virtue of _liberalitas_, and its vices, _avaritia_ and _prodigalitas_; next, _epieikeia_ (_aequitas_). Finally, closing this discussion of all that is connected with _Justitia_, Thomas speaks of its corresponding gift of the Spirit, _pietas_.

Now comes the third cardinal virtue, _Fortitudo_--under which _martyrium_ is the type of virtuous act; _intimiditas_ and _audacia_ are the two vices. Then the parts of _Fortitudo_, to wit, _magnanimitas_, _magnificentia_, _patientia_, _perseverantia_, and the obvious opposing vices. Next, the fourth cardinal virtue, _Temperantia_, its obvious opposing vices, and its parts, to wit, _verecundia_, _honestas_, _abstinentia_, _sobrietas_, _castitas_, _clementia_, _modestia_, _humilitas_, and the various appropriate acts and opposing vices related to these special virtues.

So far,[450] Thomas has been considering the virtues proper for all men; and now he comes to those specially pertaining to certain kinds of men, according to their gifts of grace, their modes of life, or the diversity of their offices, or stations. Of the special virtues related to gifts of grace, the first is _prophetia_, next _raptus_ (vision), then _gratia linguarum_, and _gratia miraculorum_. After this, the _vita activa_ and _contemplativa_, with their appropriate virtues, are considered. And then Thomas proceeds to speak _De officiis et statibus hominum_, and their respective virtues.

Here ends the _Secunda secundae_, and _Pars tertia_ opens with this Prologue:

“Inasmuch as our Saviour Jesus Christ (as witnesseth the Angel, _populum suum salvum faciens a peccatis eorum_) has shown in himself the way of truth, through which we are able to come to the beatitude of immortal life by rising again, it is necessary, for the consummation of the whole theological matter, after the consideration of the final end of human life, and of the virtues and vices, that our attention should be fixed upon the Saviour of all and His benefactions to the human race.

“As to which, first one must consider the Saviour himself; secondly, His sacraments, by which we obtain salvation; thirdly, concerning the end (_finis_), immortal life, to which we come by rising again through Him.

“As to the first, one has to consider the mystery of the Incarnation, in which God was made man for our salvation, and then those things that were done and suffered by our Saviour, that is, God incarnate.”

This Prologue indicates sufficiently the order of topics in the _Pars tertia_ of the _Summa_, through Quaestio xc., at which point the hand of the Angelic Doctor was folded to eternal rest. He was then considering _penance_, the fourth in his order of Sacraments. All that he had to say as to the person, and attributes, and acts and passion of Christ had been written; and he had considered the Sacraments of baptism, confirmation, and the eucharist; he was occupied with _poenitentia_; and still other sacraments remained, as well as his final treatment of the matters which lie beyond the grave. So he left his work unfinished, and, in spite of many efforts, unfinishable by any of his pupils or successors.[451]

II

Inasmuch as the matter of their thoughts was transmitted to the men of the Middle Ages, and was not drawn from their own observation or constructive reasoning, the fundamental intellectual endeavour for mediaeval men was to apprehend and make their own, and re-express. Their intellectual progress followed this process of appropriation, and falls into three stages--learning, organically appropriating, and re-expressing with added elements of thought. Logically, and generally in time, these three stages were successive. Yet, of course, they overlapped, and may be observed progressing simultaneously. Thus, for example, what was known of Aristotle at the beginning of the twelfth century was slight compared with the knowledge of his philosophy that was opened to western Europe in the latter part of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth. And while, by the middle of the twelfth century, the elements of Aristotle’s logic had been thoroughly appropriated, the substantial Aristotelian philosophy had still to be learned and mastered, before it could be reformulated and re-expressed as part of mediaeval thought.

Looking solely to the outer form, the three stages of mediaeval thought are exemplified in the Scriptural Commentary of the later Carolingian time, in the twelfth-century _Books of Sentences_, and at last in the more organic _Summa theologiae_. With this significant evolution and change of outer form, proceeded the more substantial evolution consisting in learning, appropriating, and re-expressing the inherited material. In both cases, these three stages were necessitated by the greatness of the transmitted matter; for the intellectual energies of the mediaeval period were fully occupied with mastering the data proffered so pressingly, with presenting and re-presenting this superabundant material, and recasting it in new forms of statement, which were also expressions, or realizations, of the mediaeval genius. So the mediaeval product may be regarded as given by the past, and by the same token necessitated and controlled. But, on the other hand, each stage of intellectual progress rendered possible the next one.

The first stage of learning is represented by the Carolingian period, which we have considered. It was then that the patristic material was extracted from the writings of the Fathers, and rearranged and reapplied, to meet the needs of the time. The mastery of this material had scarcely made such vital progress as to enable the men of the ninth and tenth and eleventh centuries to re-express it largely in terms of their own thinking. In the ninth century, Eriugena affords an extraordinary exception with his drastic restatement of what he had drawn from Pseudo-Dionysius and others; and at the end comes Anselm, whose genius is metaphysically constructive. But Anselm touches the coming time; and the springs of Eriugena’s genius are hidden from us.

As for the antique thought during these Carolingian centuries, Eriugena dealt in his masterful way with what he knew of it through patristic and semi-patristic channels. But let us rather seek it in the curriculum of the Trivium and Quadrivium. What progress Gerbert made in the Quadrivium, that is, in the various branches of mathematics which he taught, has been noted, and to what extent his example was followed by his pupil Fulbert, at the cathedral school of Chartres.[452] The courses of the Trivium--grammar, rhetoric, logic--demand our closer attention; for they were the key of the situation. We must keep in mind that we are approaching mediaeval thought from the side of the innate human need of intellectual expression--the impulse to know and the need to formulate one’s conceptions and express them consistently. For mediaeval men the first indispensable means to this end was grammar, including rhetoric, and the next was logic or dialectic. The Latin language contained the sum of knowledge transmitted to the Middle Ages. And it had to be learned. This was true even in Italy and Spain and France, where each year the current ways of Romance speech were departing more definitely from the parent stock; it was more patently true in the countries of Teutonic speech. Centuries before, the Roman youth had studied grammar that they might speak and write correctly. Now it was necessary to study Latin grammar, to wit, the true forms and literary usages of the Latin tongue, in order to acquire any branch of knowledge whatsoever, and express one’s corresponding thoughts. And men would not at first distinguish sharply between the mediating value of the learned tongue and the learning which it held.[453]

Thus grammar, the study of the Latin language, represented the first stage of knowledge for mediaeval men. This was to remain true through all the mediaeval centuries; since all youths who became scholars had to learn the language before they could study what was contained in it alone. One may also say, and yet not speak fantastically, that grammar, the study of the correct use of the language itself, corresponded spiritually with the main intellectual labour of the Carolingian period. Alcuin’s attention is commonly fixed upon the significance of language, Latin of course. And the labours of his pupil Rabanus, and the latter’s pupil Walafrid, are as it were devoted to the grammar of learning. That is to say, they read and endeavour to understand the works of the Fathers; they compare and collate, and make volumes of extracts, which they arrange for the most part as Scripture commentaries; commentaries, that is, upon the significance of the canonical writings which were the substance of all wisdom, but needed much explication. Such works were the very grammar of knowledge, being devoted to the exposition of the meaning of the Scriptures and the vast burden of patristic thought. A like purpose was evinced in the efforts of the great emperor himself to re-establish schools of grammar, in order that the Scriptures might be more correctly understood, and the expositions of the holy Fathers. In fine, just as knowledge of the Latin tongue was the end and aim of grammar, so a correct understanding of what was contained in Latin books was the aim of the intellectual labours of this period. It all represented the first stage in the mediaeval acquisition of knowledge, or in the presentation or expression of the same; and thus the first stage in the mediaeval endeavour to realize the human impulse to know.

The next course of the Trivium was logic; and likewise its study will represent truly the second stage in the mediaeval realization of the human impulse to know, to wit, the second stage in the appropriation and expression of the knowledge transmitted from the past. We have spoken at some length of the logical studies of Gerbert, and his endeavours to adjust his thinking and classify the branches of knowledge by means of formal logic.[454] Those discussions of his which seem somewhat puerile to us, were essential to his endeavours to formulate what he had learned, and present it as rational and ordered knowledge. Logic is properly the stage succeeding grammar in the formulation of rational knowledge. At least it was for men of Gerbert’s time, and the following centuries. Rightly enough they looked on logic as a _scientia sermotionalis_, which on one side touched sheer linguistics, and on the other, had for its field the further processes of reason. Thus Hugo of St. Victor, Abaelard’s very great contemporary, says:

“Logic is named from the Greek word _logos_, which has a twofold interpretation. For _logos_ means either _sermo_ or _ratio_; and therefore logic may be termed either a _scientia sermotionalis_ or a _scientia rationalis_. _Logica rationalis_ embraces dialectic and rhetoric, and is called _discretiva_ (argumentative and exercising judgment); _logica sermotionalis_ is the genus which includes grammar, dialectic and rhetoric, to wit, discursive science (_disertiva_).”[455]

The close connection between grammar and logic is evident. Logic treats of language used in rational expression, as well as of the reasoning processes carried on in language. Its elementary chapters teach a rational use of language, whereby men may reach a more deeply consistent expression of their thoughts than is gained from grammar. Yet grammar also is logic, and based on logical principles. All this is exemplified in the logical treatises composing the Aristotelian _Organon_, which the Middle Ages used. First comes Porphyry’s _Isagoge_, which clearly is bound up in language. Likewise Aristotle’s _Categories_ treat of the rational and consistent use of language, or of what may be stated in language. Next it is obvious that the _De interpretatione_ treats of language used to express thought, its generic function. The more advanced treatises of the _Organon_, the _Prior_ and _Posterior Analytics_, the _Topics_, and _Sophistical Elenchi_, treat directly and elaborately of the reasoning processes themselves. So one perceives the grammatical affinities of the simpler treatises in the _Organon_. The more advanced ones seem to stand to them as oratorical rhetoric stands to elementary grammar. For the _Analytics_, _Topics_, and _Sophistical Elenchi_ are a kind of _eristic_, training the student to use the processes of thought and their expression in order to attain an end, commonly argumentative. The prior treatises have taught the elements, as it were the orthography and etymology of the rational expression of thought in language; the latter (even as syntax and rhetoric), train the student in the use of these elements. And one observes a nice historical fitness in the fact that only the simpler treatises of the _Organon_ were in common use in the early Middle Ages, since they alone were necessary to the first stage in the appropriation of the substance of patristic and antique thought. The full _Organon_ was rediscovered, and retaken into use in the middle or latter part of the twelfth century, when men had progressed to a more organic appropriation of the patristic material and what they knew of the antique philosophy.

Thus in mediaeval education, and in the successive order of appropriating the patristic and the antique, logic stood on grammar’s shoulders. It was grammar’s rationalized stage, and treated language as the means of expressing thought consistently and validly; that is, so as not to contravene the necessities of that whereof it was the vehicle. And since language thus treated was in accord with rational thought, it would accord with the realities to which thought corresponds; and might be taken as expressing _them_. This last reflection introduces metaphysics.

And properly. For the three stages in the mediaeval appropriation and expression of knowledge were grammar, logic, metaphysics. Logic has to do with the processes of thought; with the positing of premises and the drawing of the conclusion. It does not necessarily consider whether the contents of its premises represent realities. This is matter for ontology, metaphysics. Now mediaeval metaphysics, which were those of Greek philosophy, were extremely pre-Kantian, in assuming a correspondence between the necessities or conclusions of thought and the supreme realities, God and the Universe. Nor did mediaeval logic doubt that its processes could elucidate and express the veritable natures of things. So mediaeval logic readily wandered into the province of metaphysics, and ignored the line between the two.

Yet there is little metaphysics in the _Organon_; none in its simpler treatises. So there was none in the elementary logical instruction of the schools before the twelfth century at least.[456] One may always distinguish between logic and metaphysics; and it is to our purpose to do so here. For as we have taken logic to represent the second stage in the mediaeval appropriation of knowledge, so metaphysics, poised in turn on logic’s shoulders, is very representative of the third stage, to wit, the stage of systematic and organic re-expression of the ancient matter, with elements added by the great schoolmen.

Metaphysics was very properly the final stage. The grammatical represented an elementary learning of what the past had transmitted; the logical a further retrying of the matter, an attempt to understand and express it, formulate parts of it anew, with deeper consistency of expression. Then follows the attempt for final and universal consistency: final inasmuch as thought penetrates to the nature of things and expresses realities and the relationships of realities; and universal, in that it seeks to order and systematize all its concepts, and bring them to unity in a _Summa_--a perfected scheme of rational presentation of God and His creation. This will be, largely speaking, the final endeavour of the mediaeval man to ease his mind, and realize _his_ impulse to know and express himself with uttermost consistency.

So for mediaeval men, metaphysics stood on logic’s shoulders and represented the final completion of their thought, in a universal system and scheme of God and man and things.[457] But the first part of this proposition had not been true with Greek philosophy. Metaphysics is properly occupied with being, in its ultimate essence and relationships; with the consistent putting together of things, to wit, the presentation or expression of them so as not to disagree with any of the data recognized as pertinent. The thinker considers profoundly, seeking to penetrate the ultimate reality and relationships of things, through which a universal whole is constituted. This makes ontology, metaphysics--the science of being, of causes, and so the science of the first Cause, God. Aristotle called this the “first” philosophy, because lying at the base of all branches of knowledge, and depending on nothing beyond itself. Some time after his death, the Peripatetics and then the Neo-Platonists called this first science by the name of Metaphysics, “after” or “beyond” physics, if one will, perhaps because of the actual order of treatment in the schools.

The term Metaphysics is vague enough; either “first” philosophy or “ontology” is preferable. Yet as to Greek philosophy the term has apt historical suggestiveness. For it did come after physics in time, and was in fact evoked by the imperfect method and consequent contradictions of the earlier philosophies. From the beginning, Greek philosophy drove straight at the cause or origin of things--surely the central problem of metaphysics. Thales and the other Ionians began with rational, though crude, hypotheses as to the sources of the universe. These were first attempts to reach a consistent expression of its origin and nature. Each succeeding philosopher considered further, from the vantage-ground of the recognized inconsistencies or inadequacies in the theories of his predecessors. He was thus led on to consider more profoundly the essential relationships of things, the very truth of their relationships, and on and on into the problem of their being. For the verity of relations must be according to the verity of being of the things related. The world about us consists in relationships, of antecedents and sequences, of cause and effect; and our thought of it is made up of consistencies or contradictions, which last we struggle to eliminate, or to transform to consistencies.

These early philosophers looked only to the Aristotelian material cause for the origin and cause of things; yet reflection plunged them deeper into a consideration of the nature of being and relationships. The other causes were evoked by Anaxagoras and then by Plato, and by them were led into the arena of debate; and philosophers discussed the efficient and final cause as well as the material. Such discussions are recognized by Plato, and finally by Aristotle as relating to the first principles of cognition and being, and so as constituting metaphysics. The constant search for a deeper consistency of explanation had led on and on through a manifold consideration of those palpable relationships which make up the visible world; it had disclosed the series of necessary assumptions required by those visible relationships; and thus the search for causality and origins, and essential relationships, became one and the same--metaphysics.

Metaphysics was not ineptly called so, since it had in time come after the cruder physical hypotheses. But such was not the order of _mediaeval_ intellectual progress. The Middle Ages passed through no preliminary course of physical hypotheses, explanatory of the universe. Not physics, but logic (introduced by grammar) led up to the final construction--or rather adoption and reconstruction--of ultimate hypotheses as to God and man, led up to the all-ordering and all-compassing _Theologia_. _Metalogics_, rather than Metaphysics, would be the proper name for these final expressions or actualizations of the mediaeval impulse to know.