CHAPTER XXXV

CLASSIFICATION OF TOPICS; STAGES OF EVOLUTION

I. PHILOSOPHIC CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES; THE ARRANGEMENT OF VINCENT’S ENCYCLOPAEDIA, OF THE LOMBARD’S _SENTENCES_, OF AQUINAS’S _SUMMA THEOLOGIAE_.

II. THE STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT: GRAMMAR, LOGIC, METALOGICS.

I

Having considered the spirit, the field, and the dual method, of mediaeval thought, there remain its classifications of topics. The problem of classification presented itself to Gerbert as one involved in the rational study of the ancient material.[431] But as scholasticism culminated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the problem became one of arrangement and presentation of the mass of knowledge and argument which the Middle Ages had at length made their own, and were prepared to re-express. This ordering was influenced by a twofold principle of classification; for, as abundantly shown by Aquinas,[432] theology in which all is ordered with reference to God, will properly follow an arrangement of topics quite unsuitable to the natural or human sciences, which treat of things with respect to themselves. But the mediaeval practice was more confused than the theory; because the interest in human knowledge was apt to be touched by motives sounding in the need of divine salvation; and speculation could not free itself of the moving principles of Christian theology. On the other hand, an enormous quantity of human dialectic, and a prodigious mass of what strikes us as profane information, or misinformation, was carried into the mediaeval _Summa_, and still more into those encyclopaedias, which attempted to include all knowledge, and still were influenced in their aim by a religious purpose.[433]

As the human sciences came from the pagan antique, the accepted classifications of them naturally were taken from Greek philosophy. They followed either the so-called Platonic division, into Physics, Ethics, and Logic,[434] or the Aristotelian division of philosophy into theoretical and practical. The former scheme, of which it is not certain that Plato was the author, passed on through the Stoic and Epicurean systems of philosophy, was recognized by the Church Fathers, and received Augustine’s approval. It was made known to the Middle Ages through Cassiodorus, Isidore, Alcuin, Rabanus, Eriugena and others.

Nevertheless the Aristotelian division of philosophy into theoretical and practical was destined to prevail. It was introduced to the western Middle Ages through Boëthius’s Commentary on Porphyry’s _Isagoge_,[435] and adopted by Gerbert; later it passed over through translations of Arabic writings. It was accepted by Hugo of St. Victor, by Albertus Magnus and by Thomas, to mention only the greatest names; and was set forth in detail with explanation and comment in a number of treatises, such as Gundissalinus’s _De divisione philosophiae_, and Hugo of St. Victor’s _Eruditio didascalica_,[436] which were formal and schematic introductions to the study of philosophy and its various branches.

The usual subdivisions of these two general parts of philosophy were as follows. Theoretica (or _Theorica_) was divided into (1) Physics, or _scientia naturalis_, (2) Mathematics, and (3) Metaphysics or Theology, or _divina scientia_, as it might be called. Physics and Mathematics were again divided into more special sciences. _Practica_ was divided commonly into Ethics, Economics, Politics, or into Ethics and _Artes mechanicae_. There was a difference of opinion as to what to do with Logic. It had, to be sure, its position in the current Trivium, along with grammar and rhetoric. But this was merely current, and might not approve itself on deeper reflection. Gundissalinus speaks of three propaedeutic sciences, the _scientiae eloquentiae_, grammar, poetics, and rhetoric, and then puts Logic after them as a _scientia media_ between these primary educational matters and philosophy, _i.e._ the whole range of knowledge, theoretical and practical. Again, over against _philosophia realis_, which contains both the _theoretica_ (or _speculativa_) and the _practica_, Thomas Aquinas sets the _philosophia rationalis_, or logic; and Richard Kilwardby opposes _logica_, the _scientia rationalis_, to _practica_, in his division.[437]

The last-named philosopher was the pupil and then the hostile critic of Aquinas, and also became Archbishop of Canterbury. He was the author of a careful and elaborate classification of the parts of philosophy, entitled _De ortu et divisione philosophiae_.[438] In it, following the broad distinction between _res divinae_ and _res humanae_, Kilwardby divides philosophy into _speculativa_ and _practica_. _Speculativa_ is divided into _naturalis_ (physics), _mathematica_, and _divina_ (metaphysics). He does not divide the first and third of these; but he divides _mathematica_ into those sciences which treat of quantity in continuity and separation respectively (_quantitas continua_ and _quantitas discreta_). The former embrace geometry, astronomy and astrology, and perspective; the latter, music and arithmetic. _Practica_, which is concerned with _res humanae_, is divided into _activa_ and _sermocinalis_: because _res humanae_ consist either of _operationes_ or _locutiones_. The _activa_ embraces Ethics and mechanics; the _scientia sermocinalis_ embraces grammar, logic, and rhetoric. Such are Kilwardby’s bare captions; his treatise lengthily treats of the interrelations of these various branches of knowledge.

An idea of the scholastic discussion of the classification of sciences may be had by following Albertus Magnus’s ponderous approach to a consideration of logic: whether it be a science, and, if so, what place should be allotted it. We draw from the opening of his _liber_ on the _Predicables_,[439] that is to say, his exposition of Porphyry’s Introduction. Albert will consider “what kind of a science (_qualis scientia_) logic may be, and whether it is any part of philosophy; what need there is of it, and what may be its use; then of what it treats, and what are its divisions.” The ancients seem to have disagreed, some saying that logic is no science, since it is rather a _modus_ (mode, manner or method) of every science or branch of knowledge. But these, continues Albertus, have not reflected that although there are many sciences, and each has its special _modus_, yet there is one _modus_ common to all sciences, pertaining to that which is common to them all: the principle, to wit, that through reason’s inquiry, from what is known one arrives at knowledge of the unknown. This mode or method common to every science may be considered in itself, and so may be the subject of a special science. After further balancing of the reasons and authorities _pro_ and _con_, Albertus concludes:

“It is therefore clear that logic is a special science just as in ironworking there is the special art of making a hammer, yet its use pertains to everything made by the ironworker’s craft. So this process of discovering the unknown through the known, is something special, and may be studied as a special art and science; yet the use of it pertains to all sciences.”

He next considers whether logic is a part of philosophy. Some say no, since there are (as they say) only three divisions of philosophy, physics, mathematics, and metaphysics; others say that logic is a _modus_ of philosophy and not one of its divisions. But, on the contrary, it is shown by others that this view of philosophy omits the practical side, for philosophy’s scope comprehends the truth of everything which man may understand, including the truth of that which is in ourselves, and strives to comprehend both truth and the process of advancing from the known to a knowledge of the unknown. These point out that

“... the Peripatetics divided philosophy first into three parts, to wit, into _physicam generaliter dictam_, and _ethicam generaliter dictam_ and _rationalem_ likewise taken broadly. I call _physica generaliter dicta_ that which embraces _scientia naturalis_, _disciplinalis_, and _divina_ (_i.e._ physics in a narrower sense, mathematics which is called _scientia disciplinalis_, and metaphysics which is _scientia divina_). And I call _ethica_, that which, broadly taken, contains the _scientia monastica_, _oeconomica_ and _civilis_. And I call that the _scientia rationalis_, broadly taken, which includes every mode of proceeding from the known to the unknown. From which it is evident that logic is a part of philosophy.”

And finally it may be shown that

“if anything is within the scope of philosophy it must be that without which philosophy cannot reach any knowledge. He who is ignorant of logic can acquire no perfect cognition of the unknown, because he is ignorant of the way in which he should proceed from the known to the unknown.”

From these latter arguments, approved by him and in part stated as his own, Albertus advances to a classification of the parts of logic, which he makes to include rhetoric, poetics, and dialectic, and to be demonstrative, sophistical or disputatious, according to the use to which logic (broadly taken) is applied and the manner in which it may in each case proceed, in advancing from the known to some farther ascertainment or demonstration.[440] Soon after this, in discussing the subject of this science, Albertus points out how logic differs from rhetoric and poetics, although with them it may treat of _sermo_, or speech, and be called a _scientia sermonalis_; for, unlike them, it treats of _sermo_ merely as a means of drawing conclusions, and not in and for itself.

From the purely philosophical division of the sciences we pass to the hybrid arrangement adopted by Vincent of Beauvais, who died in 1264. This man was a prodigious devourer of books, and for a sufficient pabulum, St. Louis set before him his collection of twelve hundred volumes. Thereupon Vincent compiled the most famous of mediaeval encyclopaedias, employing in that labour enormous diligence and a number of assistants. His ponderous _Speculum majus_ is drawn from the most serviceable sources, including the works of Albertus, his contemporary, and great scholastics like Hugo of St. Victor, who were no more. It consisted of the _Speculum naturale_, _doctrinale_, and _historiale_; and a fourth, the _Speculum morale_, was added by a later hand.[441] Turning its leaves, and reading snatches here and there, especially from its Prologues, we shall gain a sufficient illustration of the arrangement of topics followed by this writer, whose faculties seem to drown in his shoreless undertaking.[442]

In his turgid _generalis prologus_ to the _Speculum naturale_, Vincent presents his motives for collecting in one volume

“... certain flowers according to my modicum of faculty, gathered from every one I have been able to read, whether of our Catholic Doctors or the Gentile philosophers and poets. Especially have I drawn from them what seemed to pertain either to the building up of our dogma, or to moral instruction, or to the incitement of charity’s devotion, or to the mystic exposition of divine Scripture, or to the manifest or symbolical explanation of its truth. Thus by one grand _opus_ I would appease my studiousness, and perchance, by my labours, profit those who, like me, try to read as many books as possible, and cull their flowers. Indeed of making many books there is no end, and neither is the eye of the curious reader satisfied, nor the ear of the auditor.”

He then refers to the evils of false copying and the ascription of extracts to the wrong author. And it seems to him that Church History has been rather neglected, while men have been intent on expounding knotty problems. And now considering how to proceed and group his various matters, Vincent could find no better method than the one he has chosen, “to wit, that after the order of Holy Scripture, I should treat first of the Creator, next of the creation, then of man’s fall and reparation, and then of events (_rebus gestis_) chronologically.” He proposes to give a summary of titles at the end of the work. Sometimes he may state as his own, things he has had from his teachers or from very well-known books; and he admits that he did not have time to collate the _gesta martyrum_, and so some of the abstracts which he gives of these are not by his own hand, but by the hand of scribes (_notariorum_).

Vincent proposes to call the whole work _Speculum majus_, a Speculum indeed, or an _Imago mundi_, “containing in brief whatever, from unnumbered books, I have been able to gather, worthy of consideration, admiration, or imitation _as to things which have been made or done or said in the visible or invisible world from the beginning until the end, and even of things to come_.” He briefly adverts to the utility of his work, and then gives his motive for including history. This he thinks will help us to understand the story of Christ; and from a perusal of the wars which took place “before the advent of our pacific King, the reader will perceive with what zeal we should fight against our spiritual foes, for our salvation and the eternal glory promised us.” From the great slaughter of men in many wars, may be realized also the severity of God against the wicked, who are slain like sheep, and perish body and soul.[443]

As to nature, Vincent says:

“Moreover I have diligently described the nature of things, which, I think, no one will deem useless, who, in the light of grace, has read of the power, wisdom and goodness of God, creator, ruler and preserver, in that same book of the Creation appointed for us to read.”

Moreover, to know about things is useful for preachers and theologians, as Augustine says. But Vincent is conscious of another motive also:

“Verily how great is even the humblest beauty of this world, and how pleasing to the eye of reason diligently considering not only the modes and numbers and orders of things, so decorously appointed throughout the universe, but also the revolving ages which are ceaselessly uncoiled through abatements and successions, and are marked by the death of what is born. I confess, sinner as I am, with mind befouled in flesh, that I am moved with spiritual sweetness toward the creator and ruler of this world, and honour Him with greater veneration, when I behold at once the magnitude, and beauty and permanence of His creation. For the mind, lifting itself from the dunghill of its affections, and rising, as it is able, into the light of speculation, sees as from a height the greatness of the universe containing in itself infinite places filled with the divers orders of creatures.”

Here Vincent feels it well to apologize for the limitlessness of his matter, being only an excerptor, and not really knowing even a single science; and he refers to the example of Isidore’s _Etymologiae_. He proceeds to enumerate the various sources upon which he relies, and then to summarize the headings of his work; which in brief are as follows:

The Creator.

The empyrean heaven and the nature of angels; the state of the good, and the ruin of the proud, angels.

The formless material and the making of the world, and the nature and properties of each created being, according to the order of the Works of the Six Days.

The state of the first man.

The nature and energies of the soul, and the senses and parts of the human body.

God’s rest and way of working.

The state of the first man and the felicity of Paradise.

Man’s fall and punishment.

Sin.

The reparation of the Fall.

The properties of faith and other virtues in order, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the beatitudes.

_The number and matter of all the sciences._

_Chronological history of events in the world, and memorable sayings, from the beginning to our time_, with a consideration of the state of souls separated from their bodies, of the times to come, of Antichrist, the end of the World, the resurrection of the dead, the glorification of the saints and the punishments of the wicked.

One may stand aghast at the programme. Yet practically all of it would go into a _Summa theologiae_, excepting the human history, and the matter of what we should call the arts and sciences! A programme like this might be handled summarily, according to the broad captions under which it is stated; or it might be carried out in such detail as to include all available information, or opinion, touching every part of every topic included under these universal heads. The latter is Vincent’s way. Practically he tries to include all knowledge upon everything. The first of his tomes (the _Speculum naturale_) is to be devoted to a full description of the forms and species of created beings, which make up the visible world. Yet it includes much relating to beings commonly invisible; for Vincent begins with a treatment of the angels. He then passes to a consideration of the seven heavens; and then to the physical phenomena of nature; then on to every known species of plant, the cultivation of trees and vines, and the making of wine; then to the celestial bodies, and after this to living things, birds, fishes, savage beasts, reptiles, the anatomy of animals,--and at last comes to man. He discusses him body and soul, his psychology, and the phenomena of sleep and waking; then human anatomy--nor can he keep from considerations touching the whole creation; then human generation, and a description of the countries and regions of the earth, with a brief compendium of history until the time of Antichrist and the Last Judgment. Of course he is utterly uncritical, even the pseudo-Turpin’s fictions as to Charlemagne serving him for authority.

Vincent’s Prologue to his second tome, the _Speculum doctrinale_, briefly mentions the topics of the _tota naturalis historia_, contained in his first giant tome. In that he had brought his matter down to God’s creation of _humana natura, omnium rerum finis ac summa_--and its spoliation (_destitutio_) through sin. _Humana natura_ as constituted by God, was a _universitas_ of all nature or created being, corporeal and spiritual. Now

“in this second part, in like fashion we propose to treat of the plenary restitution of that destitute nature.... And since that restitution, or restoration, is effected and perfected by _doctrina_ (imparted knowledge, science), this part not improperly is called the _Speculum doctrinale_. For of a surety everything pertaining to recovering or defending man’s spiritual or temporal welfare (_salutem_) is embraced under _doctrina_. In this book, the sciences (_doctrinae_) and arts are treated thus: First concerning all of them in general, to wit, concerning their invention, origin, and species; and concerning the method of acquiring them. Then concerning the singular arts and sciences in particular. And here first concerning those of the Trivium, which are devoted to language (grammar, rhetoric, logic); for without these, the others cannot be learned or communicated. Next concerning the practical ones (_practica_), because through them, the eyes of the mind being clarified, one ascends to the speculative (_theorica_). Then also concerning the mechanical ones; since, as they consist in making (_operatio_), they are joined by affinity to the _practica_. Finally concerning the speculative sciences (_theorica_), because the end and aim (_finis_) of all the rest is placed by the wise in them. And since (as Jerome says) one cannot know the power (_vis_) of the antidote unless the power of the poison first is understood, therefore to the _reparatio doctrinalis_ of the human race, the subject of the book, something is prefixed as a brief epilogue from the former book, concerning the fall and misery of man, in which he still labours, as the penalty for his sin, in lamentable exile.”

So Vincent begins with the fall and misery of man; the _peccatum_ and the _supplicium_. Then he proceeds to discuss the goods (_bona_) which God bestows, like the mental powers, by which man may learn wisdom, and how to strive against error and vice, and be overcome solely by the desire of the highest and immutable good. He speaks also of the corporeal goods bestowed on man, and the beauty and utility of visible things; and then of the principal evils;--ignorance which corrupts the divine image in man, concupiscence which destroys the divine similitude, sickness which destroys his original bodily immortality. “And the remedies are three by which these three evils may be repelled, and the three goods restored, to wit, Wisdom, Virtue, and Need.”

Here we touch the gist of the ordering of topics in the _Speculum doctrinale_, which treats of all the arts and sciences:

“For the obtaining of these three remedies every art and every _disciplina_ was invented. In order to gain Wisdom, _Theorica_ was devised; and _Practica_ for the sake of virtue; and for Need’s sake, _Mechanica_. _Theorica_ driving out ignorance, illuminates Wisdom; _Practica_ shutting out vice, strengthens Virtue; _Mechanica_ providing against penury, tempers the infirmities of the present life. _Theorica_, in all that is and that is not, chooses to investigate the true. _Practica_ determines the correct way of living and the form of discipline, according to the institution of the virtues. _Mechanica_ occupied with fleeting things, strives to provide for the needs of the body. For the end and aim of all human actions and studies, which reason regulates, ought to look either to the reparation of the integrity of our nature or to alleviating the needs to which life is subjected. The integrity of our nature is repaired by Wisdom, to which _Theorica_ relates, and by Virtue, which _Practica_ cultivates. Need is alleviated by the administration of temporalities, to which _Mechanica_ attends. Last found of all is Logic, source of eloquence, through which the wise who understand the aforesaid principal sciences and disciplines, may discourse upon them more correctly, truly and elegantly; more correctly, through Grammar; more truly through Dialectic; more elegantly through Rhetoric.”[444]

Thus the entire round of arts and sciences is connected with man’s corporeal and spiritual welfare, and is made to bear directly or indirectly on his salvation. All constitutes _doctrina_, and by _doctrina_ man is saved. This is the reason for including the arts and sciences in one tome, rightly called the _Speculum doctrinale_. We need not follow the detail, but may view as from afar the long course ploughed by Vincent through his matter. He first sketches the history of antique philosophy, and then turns to books and language, and presents a glossary of Latin synonyms. Book II. treats of Grammar, Book III. of Logic, Book IV. of _Practica scientia_ or _Ethica_, first giving pagan ethics and then passing on to the virtues of the monastic life. Book V. is a continuation of this subject. Book VI. concerns the _Scientia oeconomica_, treating of domestic economy, then of agriculture. Books VII. and VIII. take up Politica, and, having discussed political institutions, proceed to a treatment of law--the law of persons, things, and actions, according to the canon and the civil law. Books IX. and X. consider Crimes--simony, heresy, perjury, sacrilege, homicide, rape, adultery, robbery, usury. Book XI. is more cheerful, _De arte mechanica_, and tells of building, the military art, navigation, alchemy, and metals. Book XII. is Medicine, and Books XIII. and XIV. discuss Physics, in connection with the healing art.