Chapter 46

Major-General Quitman, nobly supported by Brigadier-Generals Shields and Smith, (P. F.,) his other officers and men, was up with the part assigned him. Simultaneously with the movement on the west, he had gallantly approached the southeast of the same works, over a causeway with cuts and batteries, and defended by an army strongly posted outside, to the east of the works. Those formidable obstacles Quitman had to face, with but little shelter for his troops or space for manoeuvring. Deep ditches flanked the causeway, made it difficult to cross on either side into the adjoining meadows, and these again were intersected by other ditches. Smith and his brigade had been early thrown out to make a sweep to the right, in order to present a front against the enemy's lines, (outside,) and to turn two intervening batteries near the foot of Chapultepec. This movement was also intended to support Quitman's storming parties, both on the causeway. The first of these, furnished by Twiggs' division, was commanded in succession by Captain Casey, 2d Infantry, and Captain Paul, 7th Infantry, after Casey had been severely wounded; and the second, originally under the gallant Major Twiggs, Marine Corps, killed, and then Captain Miller, 2d Pennsylvania Volunteers. The storming party, now commanded by Captain Paul, seconded by Captain Roberts, of the Rifles, Lieutenant Stewart, and others of the same regiment, Smith's brigade, carried the two batteries in the road, took some guns, with many prisoners, and drove the enemy posted behind in support. The New York and South Carolina Volunteers (Shields' brigade) and the 2d Pennsylvania Volunteers, all on the left of Quitman's line, together with portions of his storming parties, crossed the meadows in front, under a heavy fire, and entered the outer enclosure of Chapultepec just in time to join in the final assault from the west.

Besides Major-Generals Pillow and Quitman, Brigadier-Generals Shields, Smith, and Cadwallader, the following are the officers and corps most distinguished in those brilliant operations: The Voltigeur regiment in two detachments, commanded respectively by Colonel Andrews and Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone, the latter mostly in the lead, accompanied by Major Caldwell; Captains Barnard and Biddle, of the same regiment, the former the first to plant a regimental color, and the latter among the first in the assault; the storming party of Worth's division, under Captain McKenzie, 2d Artillery, with Lieutenant Selden, 8th Infantry, early on the ladder and badly wounded; Lieutenant Armistead, 6th Infantry, the first to leap into the ditch to plant a ladder; Lieutenants Rodgers of the 4th, and J. P. Smith of the 5th Infantry, both mortally wounded; the 9th Infantry, under Colonel Ransom, who was killed while gallantly leading that gallant regiment, the 15th Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard and Major Woods, with Captain Chase, whose company gallantly carried the redoubt, midway up the acclivity; Colonel Clarke's brigade (Worth's division) consisting of the 5th, 8th, and part of the 6th regiments of Infantry, commanded respectively by Captain Chapman, Major Montgomery, and Lieutenant Edward Johnson, the latter specially noticed, with Lieutenants Longstreet (badly wounded, advancing, colors in hand), Pickett, and Merchant, the last three of the 8th Infantry; portions of the United States (p. 329) marines, New York, South Carolina, and 2d Pennsylvania Volunteers, which, delayed with their division (Quitman's) by the hot engagement below, arrived just in time to participate in the assault of the heights, particularly a detachment under Lieutenant Reid, New York Volunteers, consisting of a company of the same, with one of marines; and another detachment, a portion of the storming party, (Twiggs' division, serving with Quitman,) under Lieutenant Steele, 2d Infantry, after the fall of Lieutenant Gantt, 7th Infantry.

In this connection, it is but just to recall the decisive effect of the heavy batteries, Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, commanded by those excellent officers, Captain Drum, 4th Artillery, assisted by Lieutenants Benjamin and Porter of his own company; Captain Brooks and Lieutenant Anderson, 2d Artillery, assisted by Lieutenant Russell, 4th Infantry, a volunteer; Lieutenants Hagner and Stone of the Ordnance, and Lieutenant Andrews, 3d Artillery; the whole superintended by Captain Huger, chief of Ordnance with this army, an officer distinguished by every kind of merit. The mountain howitzer battery, under Lieutenant Reno, of the Ordnance, deserves, also, to be particularly mentioned. Attached to the Voltigeurs, it followed the movements of that regiment, and again won applause.

In adding to the list of individuals of conspicuous merit, I must limit myself to a few of the many names which might be enumerated. Captain Hooker, assistant adjutant-general, who won special applause, successively, in the staff of Pillow and Cadwallader; Lieutenant Lovell, 4th Artillery (wounded), chief of Quitman's staff; Captain Page, assistant adjutant-general (wounded), and Lieutenant Hammond, 3d Artillery, both of Shields' staff, and Lieutenant Van Dorn (17th Infantry), aid-de-camp to Brigadier-General Smith.

Those operations all occurred on the west, southeast, and heights of Chapultepec. To the north and at the base of the mound, inaccessible on that side, the 11th Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hebert, the 14th, under Colonel Trousdale, and Captain Magruder's field battery, 1st Artillery: one section advanced under Lieutenant Jackson, all of Pillow's division, had, at the same time, some spirited affairs against superior numbers, driving the enemy from a battery in the road, and capturing a gun. In these, the officers and corps named gained merited praise. Colonel Trousdale, the commander, though twice wounded, continued on duty until the heights were carried.

Early in the morning of the 13th, I repeated the orders of the night before to Major-General Worth, to be, with his division, at hand to support the movement of Major-General Pillow from our left. The latter seems soon to have called for that entire division, standing momentarily in reserve, and Worth sent him Colonel Clarke's brigade. The call, if not unnecessary, was at least, from the circumstances, unknown to me at the time; for, soon observing that the very large body of the enemy, in the road in front of Major-General Quitman's right, was receiving re-enforcements from the city, less than a mile and a half to the east, I sent instructions to Worth, on our opposite flank, to turn Chapultepec with his division, and to proceed cautiously by the road at its northern base, in order, if not met by very superior numbers, to threaten or to attack, in rear, that body of the enemy. The movement, it was also believed, could not fail to distract and to intimidate the enemy generally.

Worth promptly advanced with his remaining brigade, Colonel (p. 330) Garland's, Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Smith's light battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan's field battery, all of his division, and three squadrons of dragoons, under Major Sumner, which I had just ordered up to join in the movement.

Having turned the forest on the west, and arriving opposite to the north centre of Chapultepec, Worth came up with the troops in the road, under Colonel Trousdale, and aided, by a flank movement of a part of Garland's brigade, in taking the one gun breastwork, then under the fire of Lieutenant Jackson's section of Captain Magruder's field battery. Continuing to advance, this division passed Chapultepec, attacking the right of the enemy's line, resting on that road, about the moment of the general retreat consequent upon the capture of the formidable castle and its outworks.

Arriving some minutes later, and mounting to the top of the castle, the whole field to the east lay plainly under my view.

There are two routes from Chapultepec to the capital, the one on the right entering the same gate, Belen, with the road from the south, via Piedad; and the other obliquing to the left, to intersect the great western or San Cosmo road, in a suburb outside of the gate of San Cosmo.

Each of these routes (an elevated causeway) presents a double roadway on the sides of an aqueduct of strong masonry and great height, resting on open arches and massive pillars, which together afford fine points both for attack and defence. The sideways of both aqueducts are, moreover, defended by many strong breastworks at the gates, and before reaching them. As we had expected, we found the four tracks unusually dry and solid for the season.

Worth and Quitman were prompt in pursuing the retreating enemy, the former by the San Cosmo aqueduct, and the latter along that of Belen. Each had now advanced some hundred yards.

Deeming it all important to profit by our successes, and the consequent dismay of the enemy, which could not be otherwise than general, I hastened to dispatch from Chapultepec, first Clarke's brigade, and then Cadwallader's, to the support of Worth, and gave orders that the necessary heavy guns should follow. Pierce's brigade was, at the same time, sent to Quitman, and, in the course of the afternoon, I caused some additional siege pieces to be added to his train. Then, after designating the 15th Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard (Morgan, the Colonel, had been disabled by a wound at Churubusco), as the garrison of Chapultepec, and giving directions for the care of the prisoners of war, the captured ordnance and ordnance stores, I proceeded to join the advance of Worth, within the suburb, and beyond the turn at the junction of the aqueduct with the great highway from the west to the gate of San Cosmo.

At this junction of roads, we first passed one of these formidable systems of city defences, spoken of above, and it had not a gun! a strong proof, 1. That the enemy had expected us to fail in the attack upon Chapultepec, even if we meant anything more than a feint; 2. That, in either case, we designed, in his belief, to return and double our forces against the southern gates: a delusion kept up by the active demonstration of Twiggs and the forces posted on that side; and, 3. That advancing rapidly from the reduction of Chapultepec, the enemy had not time to shift guns--our previous captures had left him, (p. 331) comparatively, but few--from the southern gates.

Within those disgarnished works, I found our troops engaged in a street fight against the enemy posted in gardens, at windows, and on house-tops, all flat, with parapets. Worth ordered forward the mountain howitzers of Cadwallader's brigade, preceded by skirmishers and pioneers with pickaxes and crowbars, to force windows and doors, or to burrow through walls. The assailants were soon in an equality of position fatal to the enemy. By eight o'clock in the evening, Worth had carried two batteries in this suburb. According to my instructions, he here posted guards and sentinels, and placed his troops under shelter for the night. There was but one more obstacle, the San Cosmo gate, (custom-house,) between him and the great square in front of the cathedral and palace, the heart of the city; and that barrier it was known could not, by daylight, resist our siege guns thirty minutes.

I had gone back to the foot of Chapultepec, the point from which the two aqueducts begin to diverge, some hours earlier, in order to be near that new depot, and in easy communication with Quitman and Twiggs, as well as with Worth.

From this point I ordered all detachments and stragglers to their respective corps, then in advance; sent to Quitman additional siege guns, ammunition, intrenching tools; directed Twiggs' remaining brigade, Riley's from Piedad, to support Worth, and Captain Steptoe's field battery, also at Piedad, to rejoin Quitman's division.

I had been, from the first, well aware that the western or San Cosmo, was the less difficult route to the centre, and conquest of the capital, and therefore intended that Quitman should only manoeuvre and threaten the Belen or southwestern gate, in order to favor the main attack by Worth, knowing that the strong defences at the Belen were directly under the guns of the much stronger fortress, called the citadel, just within. Both of these defences of the enemy were also within easy supporting distance from San Angel (or Nino Perdido) and San Antonio gates. Hence the greater support, in numbers, given to Worth's movement as the main attack.

These views I repeatedly, in the course of the day, communicated to Major-General Quitman; but being in hot pursuit, gallant himself, and ably supported by Brigadier-Generals Shields and Smith, Shields badly wounded before Chapultepec, and refusing to retire, as well as by all the officers and men of the column, Quitman continued to press forward, under flank and direct fires, carried an intermediate battery of two guns, and then the gate, before two o'clock in the afternoon, but not without proportionate loss, increased by his steady maintenance of that position.

Here, of the heavy battery, (4th Artillery,) Captain Drum and Lieutenant Benjamin were mortally wounded, and Lieutenant Porter, its third in rank, slightly. The loss of those two most distinguished officers the army will long mourn. Lieutenants J. B. Morange and William Canty, of the South Carolina Volunteers, also of high merit, fell on the same occasion, besides many of our bravest non-commissioned officers and men, particularly in Captain Drum's veteran company. I cannot, in this place, give names or numbers; but full returns of the killed and wounded, of all corps, in their recent operations, will accompany this report.

Quitman within the city, adding several new defences to the position he had won, and sheltering his corps as well as practicable, now awaited the return of daylight under the guns of the formidable citadel, yet to be subdued.

About 4 o'clock next morning (September 14th) a deputation (p. 332) of the _ayuntamiento_ (city council) waited upon me to report that the federal government and the army of Mexico had fled from the capital some three hours before; and to demand terms of capitulation in favor of the church, the citizens, and the municipal authorities. I promptly replied that I would sign no capitulation; that the city had been virtually in our possession from the time of the lodgments effected by Worth and Quitman the day before; that I regretted the silent escape of the Mexican army; that I should levy upon the city a moderate contribution, for special purposes; and that the American army should come under no terms not self-imposed: such only as its own honor, the dignity of the United States, and the spirit of the age, should, in my opinion, imperiously demand and impose.

For the terms, so imposed, I refer the department to subsequent General Orders, Nos. 287 and 289 (paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of the latter), copies of which are herewith enclosed.

At the termination of the interview with the city deputation, I communicated, about daylight, orders to Worth and Quitman to advance slowly and cautiously (to guard against treachery) towards the heart of the city, and to occupy its stronger and more commanding points. Quitman proceeded to the great plaza or square, planted guards, and hoisted the colors of the United States on the national palace, containing the halls of Congress and executive departments of Federal Mexico. In this grateful service Quitman might have been anticipated by Worth, but for my express orders, halting the latter at the head of the Alameda (a green park), within three squares of that goal of general ambition. The capital, however, was not taken by any one or two corps, but by the talent, the science, the gallantry, the prowess of this entire army. In the glorious conquest all had contributed, early and powerfully, the killed, the wounded, and the fit for duty, at Vera Cruz, Cerro-Gordo, Contreras, San Antonio, Churubusco, (three battles,) the Molinos del Rey, and Chapultepec, as much as those who fought at the gates of Belen and San Cosmo.

Soon after we had entered, and were in the act of occupying the city, a fire was opened upon us from the flat roofs of the houses, from windows and corners of streets, by some two thousand convicts, liberated the night before by the flying government, joined by perhaps as many Mexican soldiers, who had disbanded themselves and thrown off their uniforms. This unlawful war lasted more than twenty-four hours, in spite of the exertions of the municipal authorities, and was not put down till we had lost many men, including several officers, killed or wounded, and had punished the miscreants. Their objects were to gratify national hatred, and in the general alarm and confusion, to plunder the wealthy inhabitants, particularly the deserted houses. But families are now generally returning; business of every kind has been resumed, and the city is already tranquil and cheerful, under the admirable conduct (with exceptions very few and trifling) of our gallant troops.

This army has been more disgusted than surprised that by some sinister process on the part of certain individuals at home, its numbers have been, generally, almost trebled in our public papers, beginning at Washington.

Leaving, as we all feared, inadequate garrisons at Vera Cruz, Perote, and Puebla, with much larger hospitals; and being obliged, most reluctantly, from the same cause (general (p. 333) paucity of numbers) to abandon Jalapa, we marched (August 7-10) from Puebla with only 10,738 rank and file. This number includes the garrison of Jalapa, and the 2,429 men brought up by Brigadier-General Pierce, August 6.

At Contreras, Churubusco, etc. (August 20), we had but 8,497 men engaged, after deducting the garrison of San Augustin (our general depot), the intermediate sick and the dead; at the Molinos del Rey (September 8), but three brigades, with some cavalry and artillery, making in all 3,251 men, were in battle; in the two days, September 12th and 13th, our whole operating force, after deducting again the recent killed, wounded, and sick, together with the garrison of Miscoac (the then general depot) and that of Tacubaya, was but 7,180; and, finally, after deducting the new garrison of Chapultepec, with the killed and wounded of the two days, we took possession (September 14th) of this great capital with less than 6,000 men. And I re-assert, upon accumulated and unquestionable evidence, that, in not one of those conflicts was this army opposed by fewer than three and a half times its numbers, in several of them, by a yet greater excess. I recapitulate our losses since we arrived in the basin of Mexico.

_August 19-20._ Killed, 137, including 14 officers. Wounded, 877, including 62 officers. Missing (probably killed), 38 rank and file. Total 1,052.

_September 8._ Killed, 116, including 9 officers. Wounded, 665, including 49 officers. Missing, 18 rank and file. Total 789.

_September 12, 13, 14._ Killed, 130, including 10 officers. Wounded, 703, including 68 officers. Missing, 29 rank and file. Total 862.

Grand total of losses, 2,703, including 383 officers.

On the other hand, this small force has beaten on the same occasions in view of their capital, the whole Mexican army, of (at the beginning) thirty odd thousand men; posted always in chosen positions, behind intrenchments, or more formidable defences of nature and art; killed or wounded, of that number, more than 7,000 officers and men; taken 3,730 prisoners, one-seventh officers, including 13 generals, of whom 3 have been presidents of this republic; captured more than 20 colors and standards, 75 pieces of ordnance, besides 57 wall pieces, 20,000 small arms, an immense quantity of shots, shells, powder, &c., &c.

Of that enemy, once so formidable in numbers, appointments, artillery, &c., twenty odd thousand have disbanded themselves in despair, leaving, as is known, not more than three fragments, the largest about 2,500, now wandering in different directions, without magazines or a military chest, and living at free quarters upon their own people.

General Santa Anna, himself a fugitive, is believed to be on the point of resigning the chief magistracy, and escaping to neutral Guatemala. A new president, no doubt, will soon be declared, and the federal Congress is expected to reassemble at Queretaro, 125 miles north of this, on the Zacatecas road, some time in October. I have seen and given safe conduct through this city to several of its members. The government will find itself without resources; no army, no arsenals, no magazines, and but little revenue, internal or external. Still, such is the obstinacy, or rather infatuation, of this people, that it is very doubtful whether the new authorities will dare to sue for peace on terms which in the recent negotiations were made known by our minister.