The Medallic History of the United States of America 1776-1876

Chapter 19

Chapter 193,734 wordsPublic domain

On the 23d we saw Cape Clear and S. W. part of Ireland. That afternoon, it being calm, I sent some armed boats to take a brigantine that appeared in the N. W. quarter. Soon after in the evening it became necessary to have a boat ahead of the ship to tow, as the helm could not prevent her from laying across the tide of flood, which would have driven us into a deep and dangerous bay, situated between the rocks on the south called the Shallocks, and on the north called the Blaskets. The ship's boats being absent, I sent my own barge ahead to tow the ship. The boats took the brigantine, she was called the Fortune, and bound with a cargo of oil, blubber, and staves, from Newfoundland for Bristol; this vessel I ordered to proceed immediately for Nantes or St. Malo. Soon after sunset the villains who towed the ship, cut the tow rope and decamped with my barge. Sundry shots were fired to bring them to without effect; in the mean time the master of the Bonhomme Richard, without orders, manned one of the ship's boats, and with four soldiers pursued the barge in order to stop the deserters. The evening was clear and serene, but the zeal of that officer, Mr. Cutting Lent, induced him to pursue too far, and a fog which came on soon afterwards prevented the boats from rejoining the ship, although I caused signal guns to be frequently fired. The fog and calm continued the next day till towards evening. In the afternoon Captain Landais came on board the Bonhomme Richard and behaved towards me with great disrespect, affirming in the most indelicate manner and language that I had lost my boats and people through my imprudence in sending boats to take a prize! He persisted in his reproaches, though he was assured by Messrs. de Weibert and de Chamillard that the barge was towing the ship at the time of elopement, and that she had not been sent in pursuit of the prize. He was affronted because I would not the day before suffer him to chase without my orders, and to approach the dangerous shore I have already mentioned, where he was an entire stranger, and when there was not sufficient wind to govern a ship. He told me he was the only American in the squadron, and was determined to follow his own opinion in chasing when and where he thought proper, and in every other matter that concerned the service, and that, if I continued in that situation three days longer, the squadron would be taken, etc. By the advice of Captain de Cottineau, and with the free consent and approbation of M. de Varage, I sent the Cerf in to reconnoitre the coast, and endeavour to take the boats and people the next day, while the squadron stood off and on in S. W. quarter, in the best possible situation to intercept the enemy's merchant ships, whether outward or homeward bound. The Cerf had on board a pilot well acquainted with the coast, and was ordered to join me again before night. I approached the shore in the afternoon, but the Cerf did not appear; this induced me to (p. 101) stand off again in the night in order to return and be joined by the Cerf the next day; but to my great concern and disappointment, though I ranged the coast along, and hoisted our private signals, neither the boats nor the Cerf joined me. The evening of that day, the 26th, brought with it stormy weather, with the appearance of a severe gale from the S. W., yet I must declare I did not follow my own judgment, but was led by the assertion which had fallen from Captain Landais, when I in the evening made a signal to steer to the northward and leave that station, which I wished to have occupied at least a week longer. The gale increased in the night with thick weather; to prevent separation, I carried a top light and fired a gun every quarter of an hour. I carried also a very moderate sail, and the course had been clearly pointed out by a signal before night; yet, with all this precaution, I found myself accompanied only by the brigantine Vengeance in the morning, the Granville having remained astern with a prize, as I have since understood the tiller of the Pallas broke after midnight, which disabled her from keeping up, but no apology has yet been made in behalf of the Alliance.

On the 31st we saw the Flannen Islands, situated near the Lewis, on the N. W. coast of Scotland; and the next morning, off Cape Wrath, we gave chase to a ship to windward, at the same time two ships appearing in the N. W. quarter, which proved to be the Alliance and a prize ship which she had taken, bound, as I understood, from Liverpool to Jamaica. The ship which I chased brought to at noon; she proved to be the Union, letter of marque, bound from London for Quebec, with a cargo of naval stores on account of government, adapted for the service of British armed vessels on the lakes. The public despatches were lost, as the Alliance very imprudently hoisted American colours, though English colours were then flying on board the Bonhomme Richard. Captain Landais sent a small boat to ask whether I would man the ship, or he should, as in the latter case he would suffer no boat nor person from the Bonhomme Richard to go near the prize. Ridiculous as this appeared to me, I yielded to it for the sake of peace, and received the prisoners on board the Bonhomme Richard, while the prize was manned from the Alliance. In the afternoon another sail appeared, and I immediately made the signal for the Alliance to chase; but, instead of obeying, he wore and laid the ship's head the other way. The next morning I made a signal to speak with the Alliance, to which no attention was shown; I then made sail with the ships in company for the second rendezvous which was not far distant, and where I fully expected to be joined by the Pallas and Cerf.

The 2d of September we saw a sail at daybreak, and gave chase; that ship proved to be the Pallas, and had met with no success while separated from the Bonhomme Richard.

On the 3d the Vengeance brought to a small Irish brigantine, bound homeward from Norway. The same evening I sent the Vengeance in the N. E. quarter to bring up the two prize ships that appeared to me to be too near the islands of Shetland, while with the Alliance and Pallas I endeavoured to weather Fair Isle, and to get into my second rendezvous, where I directed the Vengeance to join me with the three prizes. The next morning, having weathered Fair Isle, and not seeing the Vengeance nor the prizes, I spoke the Alliance, and ordered her to steer to the northward and bring them up to the rendezvous.

On the morning of the 4th the Alliance appeared again, and (p. 102) had brought to two very small coasting sloops in ballast, but without having attended properly to my orders of yesterday. The Vengeance joined me soon after, and informed me that in consequence of Captain Landais' orders to the commanders of the two prize ships, they had refused to follow him to the rendezvous. I am to this moment ignorant of what orders these men received from Captain Landais, nor know I by virtue of what authority he ventured to give his orders to prizes in my presence, and without either my knowledge or approbation. Captain Ricot further informed me that he had burnt the prize brigantine, because that vessel proved leaky; and I was sorry to understand afterward that though the vessel was Irish property, the cargo was property of the subjects of Norway.

In the evening I sent for all the captains to come on board the Bonhomme Richard, to consult on future plans of operations. Captains Cottineau and Ricot obeyed me, but Captain Landais obstinately refused, and after sending me various uncivil messages, wrote me a very extraordinary letter in answer to a written order which I had sent him, on finding that he had trifled with my verbal orders. The next day a pilot boat came on board from Shetland, by which means I received such advices as induced me to change a plan which I otherwise meant to have pursued; and as the Cerf did not appear at my second rendezvous, I determined to steer towards the third in hopes of meeting her there.

In the afternoon a gale of wind came on, which continued four days without intermission. In the second night of that gale the Alliance, with her two little prizes, again separated from the Bonhomme Richard. I had now with me only the Pallas and the Vengeance, yet I did not abandon the hopes of performing some essential service. The winds continued contrary, so that we did not see the land till the evening of the 13th, when the hills of the Cheviot in the S. E. of Scotland appeared. The next day we chased sundry vessels, and took a ship and a brigantine, both from the Firth of Edinburgh, laden with coal. Knowing that there lay at anchor in Leith Road an armed ship of 20 guns, with two or three fine cutters, I formed an expedition against Leith, which I purposed to lay under a large contribution, or otherwise to reduce it to ashes. Had I been alone, the wind being favourable, I would have proceeded directly up the Firth, and must have succeeded, as they lay there in a state of perfect indolence and security, which would have proved their ruin. Unfortunately for me, the Pallas and Vengeance were both at a considerable distance in the offing, they having chased to the southward; this obliged us to steer out of the Firth again to meet them. The captains of the Pallas and Vengeance being come on board the Bonhomme Richard, I communicated to them my project, to which many difficulties and objections were made by them; at last, however, they appeared to think better of the design, after I had assured them that I hoped to raise 200,000 pounds sterling on Leith, and that there was no battery of cannon there to oppose our landing. So much time, however, was unavoidably spent in pointed remarks and sage deliberation that night, that the wind became contrary in the morning.

We continued working to windward up the Firth without being able to reach the road of Leith, till, on the morning of the 17th, when, being almost within cannon shot of the town, having (p. 103) everything in readiness for a descent, a very severe gale of wind came on, and being directly contrary, obliged us to bear away, after having in vain endeavoured for some time to withstand its violence. The gale was so severe that one of the prizes that had been taken on the 14th sunk to the bottom, the crew being with difficulty saved. As the alarm by this time had reached Leith by means of a cutter that had watched our motions that morning, and as the wind continued contrary (though more moderate in the evening), I thought it impossible to pursue the enterprize with a good prospect of success; especially as Edinburgh, where there is always a number of troops, is only a mile distant from Leith, therefore I gave up the project.

On the 19th, having taken a sloop and a brigantine in ballast, with a sloop laden with building timber, I proposed another project to M. Cottineau, which would have been highly honourable though not profitable; many difficulties were made, and our situation was represented as being the most perilous. The enemy, he said, would send against us a superior force, and that if I obstinately continued on the coast of England two days longer, we should all be taken. The Vengeance having chased along shore to the southward, Captain Cottineau said he would follow her with the prizes, as I was unable to make much sail, having that day been obliged to strike the main-top-mast to repair damages; and as I afterward understood, he told M. de Chamillard that unless I joined them the next day, both the Pallas and the Vengeance would leave that coast. I had thoughts of attempting the enterprize alone after the Pallas had made sail to join the Vengeance. I am persuaded, even now, that I would have succeeded, and to the honour of my young officers, I found them as ardently disposed to the business as I could desire; nothing prevented me from pursuing my design but the reproach that would have been cast upon my character, as a man of prudence, had the enterprize miscarried. It would have been said, was he not forewarned by Capt. Cottineau and others?

I made sail along shore to the southward, and next morning took a coasting sloop, in ballast, which, with another that I had taken the night before, I ordered to be sunk. In the evening I again met with the Pallas and Vengeance, off Whitby. Captain Cottineau told me he had sunk the brigantine, and ransomed the sloop, laden with building timber, that had been taken the day before. I had told Captain Cottineau, the day before, that I had no authority to ransom prizes.

On the 21st we saw and chased two sail, off Flamborough Head, the Pallas in the N. E. quarter, while the Bonhomme Richard followed by the Vengeance in the S. W. The one I chased, a brigantine collier in ballast, belonging to Scarborough, was soon taken, and sunk immediately afterward, as a fleet then appeared to the southward. It was so late in the day that I could not come up with the fleet before night; at length, however, I got so near one of them as to force her to run ashore, between Flamborough Head and the Spurn. Soon after I took another, a brigantine from Holland, belonging to Sunderland; and at daylight the next morning, seeing a fleet steering towards me from the Spurn, I imagined them to be a convoy, bound from London for Leith, which had been for some time expected; one of them had a pendant hoisted, and appeared to be a ship of force. They had not, however, courage to come on, but kept back, all except the one which seemed to be armed, and that one also kept to windward (p. 104) very near the land, and on the edge of dangerous shoals, where I could not with safety approach. This induced me to make a signal for a pilot, and soon afterward two pilot boats came off; they informed me that the ship that wore a pendant was an armed merchant ship, and that a king's frigate lay there in sight, at anchor within the Humber, waiting to take under convoy a number of merchant ships bound to the northward. The pilots imagined the Bonhomme Richard to be an English ship of war, and, consequently, communicated to me the private signal which they had been required to make. I endeavoured by this means to decoy the ships out of the port, but the wind then changing, and with the tide becoming unfavourable for them, the deception had not the desired effect, and they wisely put back. The entrance of the Humber is exceedingly difficult and dangerous, and, as the Pallas was not in sight, I thought it not prudent to remain off the entrance; I, therefore, steered out again to join the Pallas off Flamborough Head. In the night we saw and chased two ships until three o'clock in the morning, when, being at a very small distance from them, I made the private signal of recognizance, which I had given to each captain before I sailed from Groaix. One half of the answer only was returned. In this position both sides lay to till daylight, when the ships proved to be the Alliance and the Pallas.

On the morning of that day, the 23d of September, the brig from Holland not being in sight, we chased a brigantine that appeared laying to windward. About noon we saw and chased a large ship that appeared coming round Flamborough Head, from the northward, and at the same time I manned and armed one of the pilot boats to sail in pursuit of the brigantine, which now appeared to be the vessel that I had forced ashore. Soon after this a fleet of forty-one sail appeared off Flamborough Head, bearing N. N. E.; this induced me to abandon the single ship which had then anchored in Burlington Bay; I also called back the pilot boat and hoisted a signal for a general chase. When the fleet discovered us bearing down all the merchant ships crowded sail towards the shore. The two ships of war that protected the fleet at the same time steered from the land, and made the disposition for the battle. In approaching the enemy I crowded every possible sail, and made the signal for the line of battle, to which the Alliance showed no attention. Earnest as I was for the action, I could not reach the commodore's ship until seven in the evening, being then within pistol shot, when he hailed the Bonhomme Richard. We answered him by firing a whole broadside.

The battle being thus begun, was continued with unremitting fury. Every method was practised on both sides to gain an advantage, and rake each other; and I must confess that the enemy's ship being much more manageable than the Bonhomme Richard, gained thereby several times an advantageous situation, in spite of my best endeavours to prevent it. As I had to deal with an enemy of _greatly superior force_, I was under the necessity of closing with him, to prevent the advantage which he had over me in point of manoeuvre. It was my intention to lay the Bonhomme Richard athwart the enemy's bow, but as that operation required great dexterity in the management of both sails and helm, and some of our braces being shot away, it did not exactly succeed to my wishes; the enemy's bowsprit, however, came over the Bonhomme Richard's poop, by the mizzen mast, and I made both ships fast together in that situation, which, by the action of the wind (p. 105) on the enemy's sails, forced her stern close to the Bonhomme Richard's bow, so that the ships lay square alongside of each other, the yards being all entangled, and the cannon of each ship touching the opponent's side. When this position took place it was eight o'clock, previous to which the Bonhomme Richard had received sundry eighteen pound shot below the water and leaked very much. My battery of 12-pounders, on which I had placed my chief dependence, being commanded by Lieut. Dale and Col. Weibert, and manned principally with American seamen and French volunteers, were entirely silenced and abandoned. As to the six old 18-pounders that formed the battery of the lower gun-deck, they did no service whatever; two out of three of them burst at the first fire, and killed almost all the men who were stationed to manage them. Before this time, too, Col. de Chamillard, who commanded a party of twenty soldiers on the poop, had abandoned that station, after having lost some of his men. These men deserted their quarters. I had now only two pieces of cannon, 9-pounders, on the quarter-deck that were not silenced, and not one of the heavier cannon was fired during the rest of the action. The purser, Mr. Mease, who commanded the guns on the quarter-deck, being dangerously wounded in the head, I was obliged to fill his place, and with great difficulty rallied a few men, and shifted over one of the lee quarter-deck guns, so that we afterwards played three pieces of 9-pounders upon the enemy. The tops alone seconded the fire of this little battery, and held out bravely during the whole of the action; especially the main top, where Lieut. Stack commanded. I directed the fire of one of the three cannon against the main-mast with double-headed shot, while the other two were exceedingly well served with grape and canister-shot to silence the enemy's musketry, and clear her decks, which was at last effected. The enemy were, as I have since understood, on the instant of calling for quarter, when the cowardice or treachery of three of my under officers induced them to call to the enemy. The English commodore asked me if I demanded quarter, and I having answered him in the most determined negative, they renewed the battle with double fury; they were unable to stand the deck, but the fire of their cannon, especially the lower battery, which was entirely formed of 18-pounders, was incessant. Both ships were set on fire in various places, and the scene was dreadful beyond the reach of language. To account for the timidity of my three under officers, I mean the gunner, the carpenter, and the master-at-arms, I must observe that the two first were slightly wounded, and as the ship had received various shots under water, and one of the pumps being shot away, the carpenter expressed his fear that she would sink, and the other two concluded that she was sinking, which occasioned the gunner to run aft on the poop, without my knowledge, to strike the colours; fortunately for me, a cannon ball had done that before, by carrying away the ensign staff; he was, therefore, reduced to the necessity of sinking, as he supposed, or of calling for quarter, and he preferred the latter.

All this time the Bonhomme Richard had sustained the action alone, and the enemy, though much superior in force, would have been very glad to have got clear, as appeared by their own acknowledgments, and their having let go an anchor the instant I laid them on board, by which means they would have escaped, had I not made them well fast to the Bonhomme Richard.