Part 12

One of the most striking features of this Plan of 1737 is the care which is taken to safeguard the royal authority. The local officers are placed under the absolute control of the Sub-delegates, and the unit of popular action is nothing more formidable than the parish or the ward. "_Divide et impera_" was the legislator's device. To us who have daily experience of the harmonious working of local and central institutions, this solicitude may appear a little singular. To d'Argenson however it was not so. His devotion to the Crown was hereditary; and he shared the belief in the sovereign virtues of monarchical government which was held unanimously in 1737. Any project which would tend in the slightest degree to impair the authority of the Crown, could neither be proposed by him nor listened to by others. It was this point which drew from Voltaire his only suggestion of dissent. The poet had been travelling in England and Holland; and his natural reverence for the Monarchy had been qualified by an acquaintance with republican societies. He had very little faith in Louis XV., and he expresses the real weakness of his friend's proposals in a single trenchant line. D'Argenson had averred[424] that when the King has nothing to think of but governing, he will always govern well.

"Well then," exclaims Voltaire, "for God's sake let the King think of governing!"[425]

At that date, with the history of Louis Quatorze behind him, and before him his hopes of Louis Quinze, d'Argenson could have no uneasiness upon that score. It took twenty years of experience of the Monarchy at close quarters, of further knowledge of the actual principles by which it was conducted, to show him how far and fatally the reality fell short of the ideal design. In the few years that elapsed between his disgrace and death, he came to understand that excellent as absolutism may be in theory, it has certain disadvantages in fact: and that for one monarch who is found to satisfy the standard of sovereign virtue, there are twenty who fall immeasurably beneath it. At the cost of the convictions of a lifetime he accepted the truth that the only warrant of the people against anarchy or oppression lay in their own power of self-defence; and he felt that if strength and virtue were to be restored to the Government, the people must be placed in a position where they would at once be able to assist it to do good, and have absolute power to prevent it doing harm. What the country needed was no longer a great administrative reform, but nothing less than a national constitution.

That constitution d'Argenson endeavoured to work out; and the fruit of his reflections was the scheme published in 1784. It cannot be discussed in the light of experience; for it never was, nor had a chance of being, submitted to the test of practice. It was not until twenty-eight years after the author's death that it first saw the light; and by that time popular demands had become loud and instant, while a constitutional ideal of a wholly different type had taken possession of the mind of France. Still there is a certain sense developed by acquaintance with history and politics which enables us to estimate with approximate justice the worth of any particular project in relation to a given set of circumstances; and upon that sense it is necessary to rely. There is reason to suggest that if examined in the light of such knowledge as we have of the state of the Government and of popular feeling about the year 1755, the constitution d'Argenson conceived at that time is by no means least among the many proofs of his extraordinary political wisdom.

As few documents of so much importance are so inaccessible or so little known,[426] a brief abstract of this remarkable scheme may not be without use. In presenting it, the form of the original, that of a royal proclamation, is, so far as possible, preserved; while some striking passages, which illustrate the prevailing tone and spirit, are given in

"_Les Rois n'aiment point à être Tyrans; mais la plupart le sont sans le savoir._"--"Considérations" (1784).

d'Argenson's own words. In considering it, it is necessary to remember two things. In the first place, though popular criticism is irascible and alert, it has yet made but little way; the people, though beginning to despise the monarch, are still devoted to the monarchical tradition. Further it has to be borne in mind that when the Government did endeavour to act with vigour and to prosecute measures of constructive reform, it was hampered and clogged at every turn by the influence of the privileged orders: while there was no great popular organisation upon which it could lean for support.

The Constitution is set forth in thirty-four articles, the substance of which is as follows:--

PLAN FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE.

(Ed. 1784.)

Louis, &c. Whereas our royal authority, however acquired, has been given us for the happiness of our people, we desire that this our people should co-operate with us in our efforts to attain so desirable an end. Our will is set forth in the articles here following.

I.

The ancient divisions of our Realm into Provinces shall continue, though all feudal relation connected therewith shall hereby cease.

The internal administration of the provinces shall be uniform; and "they shall have more freedom than any among them has hitherto enjoyed."

No landed property shall be exempt from the common burdens:

"Et que la noblesse, quelque ancienne qu'elle soit, ni aucun emploi, charge ni dignité, soit un titre pour dispenser nos sujets de payer les impositions réelles et personnelles."

II.

The subsisting divisions of the Provinces into districts "of greater or less extent" shall remain very much as before. They shall retain their ancient usages, but notwithstanding shall be mutually independent in respect of administration.

III.

Each District shall be further subdivided into cities, boroughs, and parishes (or divisions composed of several villages); and each of these subdivisions shall have its own officers charged with matters of finance and police. These officers shall be chosen from among the persons living, and holding property, in the place itself. The election shall take place in an annual meeting (assemblée) convened for the purpose.

IV.

Immediate steps shall be taken to prepare a Schedule, or statement of property and income, to cover each District and to serve as the basis of assessment.

V.

In each District there shall be holden an annual Assembly, which shall last fifteen days, and which shall consist of:

(_a_) The officers of the principal city of the District.

(_b_) One deputy from each of the boroughs.

(_c_) A certain number of the officers of the Parishes and smaller divisions (arrondissements) to be returned in rotation.

The holders of large landed properties may also attend.

In this Assembly the financial and other affairs of the District shall be transacted, and deputies shall be chosen to represent the District in the Provincial Estates.

"_La liberté est l'appui du Trône: l'ordre rend légitime la liberté._"--"Considérations" (1764).

VI.

In each of the Provinces of our Realm there shall be holden Provincial Estates, which shall consist of deputies chosen in the District Assemblies.

The Estates shall also include certain great landholders (Propriétaires), to whom the perpetual right to be present at the Estates will be granted in consideration of the dignity and extent of their possessions in the Province, of which they shall be regarded as the Peers.

VII.

Such members of the nobility as have a right to attend the Estates shall have certain privileges of ceremony and none other.

It is our pleasure that the nobility do not constitute a separate body in the said Estates; and that no person of birth, however noble, shall be present, who is not either a deputy from some District, or who does not hold property which connects his interests intimately with those of the Province.

Such Peers of the Province may be present by proxy.

"Nous aurons nous-mêmes pour les terres dont nous conserverons la domaine utile, des Représentans (qui seront tout à fait distincts de nos Commissaires), dont les fonctions se borneront à opiner comme membres des États, et dont la voix ne sera comptée dans les délibérations générales que comme celle des autres Propriétaires: nous fondant sur ce principe incontestable, que l'autorité de nos Provinces reste toute entière entre nos mains: que nous confions aux États que la seule administration, c'est-à-dire l'exécution de nos ordres, la répartition juste et exacte des charges que nous croyons utiles et nécessaires d'imposer, le droit de nous éclairer sur les besoins de chaque Province et sur les mesures à prendre pour en augmenter la population et le commerce, et la liberté de nous représenter les abus que pourraient faire de nos ordres ceux qui les reçoivent immédiatement de nous."[427]

VIII.

To each of the Provincial Estates there shall be attached a Syndic-General (or president), a Secretary-General, and a Treasurer-General.

"Celui-ci touchera de chaque Receveur particulier[428] le montant des impositions de son District, fera passer au Trésor Royal la partie des impositions qui devra y être versée pour contribuer aux dépenses générales du Royaume: conservera entre ses mains la portion destinée à subvenir aux besoins de la Province et à procurer des avantages à ses habitants: l'emploiera conformément aux ordres des commissaires des États: sera comptables à nos ministres des finances de la recette et de la dépense du premier genre, et aux États et à ses commissaires de celle du second genre."

To each District Assembly shall likewise be attached a Syndic, a Secretary, and a Receiver.

IX.

The Provincial Estates shall be opened by four Royal Commissioners, who shall explain the amount of the contribution assessed upon the Province.

"Quand ces impositions seront plus considérables qu'elles ne l'étaient les années précédentes, ils en expliqueront les motifs, afin que nos peuples soient parfaitement instruits des raisons qui nous déterminent à imposer de nouvelles charges; mais d'ailleurs, il ne sera pas à l'option des États d'accorder ou de refuser, de restreindre ou de modifier, les charges qui leur seront imposées."

Notwithstanding the Estates, after making due arrangements for the execution of our orders, shall be privileged to present representations in regard to them.

"Nous les recevrons toujours avec bonté, et nous nous ferons un devoir d'y répondre article par article."

The Royal Commissioners shall likewise present to the Estates the different Regulations with regard to police, commerce, and civil and military administration. They shall in all cases be accepted by the Estates, who shall then have power to make representations in regard to them.

"Nous proscrivons à jamais le mot et l'idée de don gratuit."

X.

After arranging for the execution of our will, the Estates may give their attention to any measures affecting the Province which they may desire to propose to us (solliciter auprès de nous); their petitions shall be presented by deputies. Matters not requiring our sanction shall be disposed of finally by the Estates, and the officers of the Crown shall second them in the prosecution of their arrangements.

XI.

The Estates shall meet at the end of every November, and shall dissolve at the beginning of the following January. Before dissolving they shall elect an executive commission, consisting of one of the deputies from each District and the three principal officers of the Estates. The Commission shall hold office until the meeting of the Assembly next ensuing.

Four deputies shall also be elected to reside at Court as the representatives of the Estates.

The District Assemblies shall likewise elect a small executive commission.

XII.

The four Royal Commissioners shall appoint subordinates to control the troops, to execute orders committed to them by their superiors, and to report to them events as they occur. These officers shall have no power to give any orders in their own name, or to employ force against the inhabitants except in cases of the last emergency; they shall at once report such cases to their superiors, at whose will they may be deprived of their posts.

Our Commissioners shall hold office during our royal pleasure. Their salaries and those of their subordinates shall be charged upon the general expenses of the Kingdom; and no officer in the direct service of the Crown shall touch one penny of the Provincial revenue.

On the other hand, the maintenance of the Provincial executive shall fall entirely upon the Province.

XIII.

The Revenue of the Crown shall be collected by, and at the expense of, the Provincial Estates, "whose business it will be to make this collection as inexpensively as possible, and by the method

"_Fixer des lois à un abus, c'est l'autoriser et le rendre durable._"--"Considérations" (1764-1784).

the least disagreeable to the people." It shall be paid entire into the Royal Treasury.

In the same manner, the Provincial Revenue shall be collected by, and shall remain at the absolute disposition of, the Estates.

XIV.

The Provincial Treasurers shall be accountable to our Council of Finance and our Chamber of Accounts at Paris, for the revenues of the Crown: and to the Provincial Estates for those of the Province.

XV.

These measures will involve the disappearance of the Receivers-general, the Receivers of the Taille, the Receivers-general of Domains and Woods, all the officers of Waters and Forests, the Treasurers of Roads and Bridges, and all persons employed in the construction of high roads and public buildings: their duties devolving upon the administration of the Provinces and Districts. All expenses in connection with the "Aides, Gabelles, Traites et autres droits des Fermes" will lapse, the dues in question being collected by the officials of the Province in conjunction with the rest of the taxes. There shall also be suppressed the Treasurerships of France, the Provincial Chambers of Accounts, the Courts of Aides, and the "Élections." Persons subjected to forfeiture will receive compensation.

XVI.

The offices of the Governors, Lieut.-Governors and Lieutenants of the Provinces, and also those of the "Baillis d'épée," shall be suppressed.

XVII.

Questions in dispute between different local authorities shall be decided, if possible, by the superior authority, or, in default, by our Council.

XVIII.

The dispensation of justice shall remain the prerogative of the Crown.

The administration of justice shall be rendered uniform, and the high seigneurial jurisdictions shall be suppressed.

XIX.

(Provides certain rules of judicial procedure.)

XX.

The laws of the nation, local customs and corporate charters shall be revised; but shall only be abrogated in so far as they may be found contrary to natural equity, morality, and public order,

"Persuadés qu'il ne faut pas faire perdre, sans une véritable nécessité, les habitudes anciennement contractées, et qui sont compatibles avec le maintien de la tranquillité des familles et de la bonne police."

XXI.

(Prescribes method of revision.)

XXII.

The administrative arrangements already existing shall remain in force until the promulgation of the reforms designed to supersede them. It is our intention to suppress "la vénalité des charges de judicature"; persons subjected to forfeiture will receive compensation.

XXIII.

To certain posts in the department of Finance alone shall a pecuniary interest be attached, as a guarantee for the integrity of the holders.

The system of official reversions (survivances) shall be wholly suppressed.

Steps will be taken to provide for the efficiency of the service of the Crown, both administrative and judicial.

XXIV.

The payment of the Royal officers shall be arranged in the interests of the people; _Il faut savoir économiser les graces les plus justes comme les supplices les plus sévères._"--"Considérations" (1784).

"Nous voulons leur épargner par ce moyen des faux frais qui leur seraient infiniment plus coûteux. D'un autre côté, nous ferons en sorte que nos officiers supérieurs et subalternes trouvent dans la prompte expédition des affaires autant d'avantages qu'ils en trouveraient en les faisant traîner."

XXV.

No person in holy orders (clerc) shall henceforth be admitted to any share in the civil administration, "the constant work" demanded by the latter being inconsistent with the performance of his duties as an ecclesiastic.

XXVI., XXVII., XXVIII.

There shall be no evocation of provincial causes for judgment in the capital (XXVI.). Appeals (requêtes en cassation) shall be done away with so far as possible (XXVII.). The constitution of our "Conseil des Parties" shall be reformed (XXVIII.).

XXIX.

"Quant aux ordres qui s'expédient en notre nom, et qui tendent à priver quelques-uns de nos sujets de leur liberté et à les éloigner de leur état ou de leur domicile ordinaire, nous ne voulons point qu'il en soit donné sans une approbation précise de notre main, que nous n'accorderons jamais que sur le rapport au moins d'un de nos ministres, secrétaires ou conseillers d'État, qui nous en garantira la justice et la nécessité, et signera sur la feuille qui nous sera présentée."

XXX.

"La gloire et la grandeur de la noblesse de notre Royaume qui nous est si cher à tant de titres, consistant bien plus dans le souvenir des services que nous ont rendus ses ancêtres et dans le mérite de ceux qu'elle nous rende elle-même que dans le vain honneur de jouir de certaines exemptions qui n'empêchent pas les nobles de partager avec le reste de nos sujets le poids des impositions: et qui, si elles avaient plus d'effet, seraient injustes, puisque la partie la plus pauvre et la plus laborieuse de notre nation ne pourrait pas supporter seule le fardeau pesant mais nécessaire des impôts: nous jugeons à propos d'abolir les distinctions établies entre les nobles et les roturiers, qui assujetissent ceux-ci à payer la taille et en exemptent les autres, d'autant plus que notre intention est de rendre la taille réelle par toute l'étendue de notre Royaume, et d'abolir la taille personelle.

"Enfin nous réduisons tous les priviléges de notre noblesse à des droits purement honorifiques, et à la considération résultante d'une naissance ancienne et illustre, sans que ce genre de gloire puisse jamais autoriser aucun acte de tyrannie, ni rien qui tende à la surcharge de nos peuples."

XXXI.

It shall no longer be possible to buy a patent of nobility.

XXXII.

In no charge, office, or post in connection with the judicial or administrative bodies shall any proof of nobility be required. Notwithstanding the Noblesse are encouraged to serve in these posts.

"Nous ne prétendons pas même que les emplois les plus subalternes ou le commerce en détail entraînent pour les anciens gentilhommes d'autre dérogeance qu'une suspension passagère de leurs titres honorables,"

which their descendants may at any time resume.

XXXIII.

(Provides for the constitution of a heraldic Court.)

XXXIV.

The Catholic Establishment shall be maintained as

"la base de la morale, dont le maintien est essentiel à la tranquillité et au bonheur public. Ceux que auraient le malheur de n'être pas convaincus des vérités qu'elle nous enseigne"

will be ineligible for public office; but no step shall be taken in the direction of persecution or proscription.

Complete toleration shall be maintained in so far as it is compatible with public order.

* * * * *

Such was the constitution projected by d'Argenson during the few years before his death. Its real meaning is clear and unmistakable: yet it has not escaped the evil fortune which has pursued so many of its author's plans. It is true that to concede to thirty-two provincial assemblies a virtually absolute power, while providing that the authority of the Crown shall be in no way diminished, may appear at first sight as strange an inconsequence as M. de Broglie[429] and others have found it. Yet a patient reading of d'Argenson's scheme is sufficient to show that with all its elaborate reservations, it involved nothing more nor less than the provisional surrender of the Sovereignty of France into the hands of the French people.

It is to be remembered that in the years which succeeded the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, d'Argenson had been watching with growing alarm the disaffection which was beginning to ferment:[430] and at the same time his old belief in the sovereign virtues of absolutism had been profoundly modified by a more lengthened experience.[431] We have only to bear in mind this change of opinion in considering his project of reform, to be alive to the numerous hints which it contains and to detect the real significance of its provisions. What d'Argenson proposed was virtually this: the whole administration of the interior was to be ceded to the people of France, organised in their parishes, districts, and provinces; the royal bureaucracy, the entire system of intendancies and sub-delegacies was to be swept away; and the Crown was to be represented in each Province by four Royal Commissioners, who should open the Estates at the end of November and explain to the deputies the wishes of the King, while leaving the execution of them to the Provincial government. These Royal Commissioners had power to appoint a flying squadron of subordinates, who were attached to no particular place nor any defined duty, whose principal business was to report to their superiors, and who were strictly forbidden to act upon their own authority, or, except in cases of the last emergency, to employ force against the people. Within the province not only the whole administration, but the assessment, collection and payment of the taxes, was entirely in the hands of the Estates.

"_La guerre se faisait alors en nature, et actuellement elle se fait, pour ainsi dire, en argent._"--"Considérations" (1784).

We cannot mistake the possible significance of these proposals, however implicitly it be conveyed. The provision that the King alone should make laws and impose taxes might be really little more than a constitutional fiction, which, so long as the laws were prudently made and the taxes equitably imposed, might pass as undisputed fact. The proposition that the royal ordinances must always be accepted might prove to be a fiction of the same kind. Indeed, in certain eventualities the whole scheme might be one continued fiction in so far as it relates to the Crown. The Provincial Estates shall not legislate, but they shall have power to present bills for the royal ratification. What will happen if their petitions are rejected is a question for time and circumstance, and not for legislation, to decide. In the same way the Estates must accept the contribution assessed upon them: but they may present representations in regard to it. If those representations are neglected the Estates will proceed as their power and wisdom may dictate. In a word, the absolute power of the Crown in legislation was conditioned only by the proper use of it.