Part 1

ILLUSTRATED MICHELIN GUIDES TO THE BATTLE-FIELDS.

BATTLE-FIELDS

OF

THE MARNE

1914

Published:

in FRANCE; by +MICHELIN & Cⁱᵉ.+, Clermont-Ferrand.

in ENGLAND; by +MICHELIN TYRE Cº Lᵗᵈ.+, 81 Fulham Road, London, S.W.

in the U.S.A.; by +MICHELIN TIRE Cº+, Milltown, New Jersey.

_For all Information and Advice_--

MOTORISTS MAY APPLY TO THE 'BUREAU DE TOURISME MICHELIN' 99, Boulevard Pereire--PARIS

* * * * *

Hotels and Motor-agents.

[** 5 hotels symbol]Palatial and luxuriously appointed hotels. [** 4 hotels symbol]Well-appointed, first-class hotels. [** 3 hotels symbol]Comfortable hotels with modern improvements. [** 2 hotels symbol]Well-managed hotels with good accommodation. [** 1 hotel symbol]Hotels with good service for luncheon and dinner. [** small hotel symbol]Small hotels or inns where good meals are provided.

Compressed Air Depôt for 'bouteilles d'air Michelin' for inflation of tyres.

[** wrench symbol] Repair shop.

_Agt de_ Manufacturer's Agent.

[** 3 symbol] Garage showing car capacity.

[** pit symbol] Repair Pit.

[** electric symbol] Electric installation for recharging accumulators.

[** phone symbol] 104 Telephone number.

[** telegraph symbol] Telegraphic address.

=MEAUX= (Seine-et-Marne).

[** 2 hotels symbol] de la Sirène, _34 r. St-Nicolas_. Ⓑ(wc) Gar [** 3 symbol] Shed [** 5 symbol] [** telegraph symbol] Sirène [** phone symbol] 83.

[** 1 hotel symbol] des Trois-Rois, _1 r. des Ursulines and 30 r. St-Rémy_. (wc) Shed [** 4 symbol] Inner courtyard [** 10 symbol] [** phone symbol] 146.

[** wrench symbol] =MICHELIN STOCK (Compressed Air) Garage Central (A. Feillée)=, _17-21 r. du Grand-Cerf_. _Agt. de_: +Panhard+, +Renault+, +de Dion+. [** 30 symbol] [** pit symbol] G Petrol Depôt [** phone symbol] 59.

-- =MICHELIN STOCK Auto-Garage de Meaux (E. Vance)=, _55-57 pl. du Marché_. _Agt de_: +Delahaye+. [** 20 symbol] [** pit symbol] G [** electric symbol] [** phone symbol] 84.

=SENLIS= (Oise).

[** 3 hotels symbol] du Grand-Cerf, _47 r. de la République_. Central heating [** dial symbol] Ⓑ (wc) Inner coach-house [** 6 symbol] [** pit symbol] [** telegraph symbol] Grandcerf [** phone symbol] 111.

[** 1 hotel symbol] des Arènes, _30 r. de Beauvais_. (wc) Inner coach-house [** 7 symbol] ott [** phone symbol] 17.

[** wrench symbol] =MICHELIN STOCK Guinot=, _8 pl. de la Halle_. _Stock_: +de Dion+. _Agt de_: +Peugeot+. [** 3 symbol] [** pit symbol] [** phone symbol] 46.

-- =MICHELIN STOCK L. Buat and A. Rémond=, _2 r. de Crépy_. _Agts de_: +Panhard+, +Renault+, +Cottin-Desgouttes+, +Delahaye+, +Rochet-Schneider+, +Mors+. [** 10 symbol] [** pit symbol] G [** electric symbol] [** phone symbol] 38.

=CHANTILLY= (Oise).

[** 4 hotels symbol] du Grand-Condé, _av. de la Gare_. Closed in 1917. Asc Central heating [** dial symbol] Ⓑ (wc) Gar [** 50 symbol] [** pit symbol] [** phone symbol] 52.

[** 3 hotels symbol] d'Angleterre, _r. de Paris and pl. de l'Hôpital_. [** dial symbol] Ⓑ (wc) Inner shed [** 8 symbol] [** phone symbol] 59.

[** 3 hotels symbol] Noguey's Family Hotel, _10 av. de la Gare_. [** dial symbol] Ⓑ (wc) Inner coach-house [** 5 symbol] [** phone symbol] 146.

[** wrench symbol] =MICHELIN STOCK Grigaut=, _72 r. du Connétable_. [** phone symbol] 1.14.

-- =MICHELIN STOCK Garage Bourdeau=, _1 bis r. de Gouvieux_. [** 6 symbol] [** pit symbol] G [** electric symbol] [** phone symbol] 1.90.

=COULOMMIERS= (Seine-et-Marne).

[** 1 hotel symbol] du Soleil-Levant, _62 r. de Melun_. Central heating, Inner coach-house [** 3 symbol] courtyard [** 15 symbol] [** phone symbol] 22.

[** 1 hotel symbol] de l'Ours, _r. de Melun_. Central heating. Inner coach-house [** 3 symbol] courtyard [** 10 symbol] [** phone symbol] 27.

[** wrench symbol] =MICHELIN STOCK Doupé-Lejeune=, _42 r. de Paris_. _Agt de_: +Panhard+, +Delage+, +Darracq+. [** 10 symbol] [** pit symbol] Petrol Depôt [** electric symbol] [** phone symbol] 92.

-- =Gautier=, _6 av. de la Ferté-sous-Jouarre_. _Agt de_: +Peugeot+, +Vinot-Deguingand+, +de Dion+. [** 4 symbol] [** pit symbol] Petrol Depôt [** phone symbol] 1.19.

-- =P. Fritsch=, _51 av. de Strasbourg_. _Agt de_: +Brasier+, +Le Zèbre+. [** 6 symbol] [** pit symbol] Petrol Depôt.

-- =Purson=, cycles, _1 r. de Melun_. _Agt de_: +Clément-Bayard+. [** 2 symbol] [** pit symbol] Petrol Depôt.

-- =A. Gontier=, cycles, _Le Martroy_.

-- =Doupé-Boucher=, cycles, _1 r. de la Ferté-sous-Jouarre_. Petrol Depôt.

'OFFICE NATIONAL DU TOURISME'

_17, Rue de Surène, PARIS (VIIIᵉ)_

The 'Office National du Tourisme' was created by an Act of April 8, 1910, and reorganised in 1917. It enjoys civil privileges and financial autonomy.

It is directed by an administrative council chosen by the Minister of Public Works.

Its mission is to seek out every means of developing travel; to urge and, if necessary, to take any measure capable of ameliorating the condition of the transport, circulation and sojourn of tourists.

It co-ordinates the efforts of touring societies and industries, encourages them in the execution of their programmes and stimulates legislative and administrative initiative with regard to the development of travel in France.

It promotes understanding between the public services, the great transport companies, the 'Syndicats d'Initiative' and the 'Syndicats Professionnels.'

It organises propaganda in foreign countries; and arranges for the creation of travel enquiry offices in France and abroad, with a view to making known the scenery and monuments of France as well as the health-giving powers of French mineral waters, spas and bathing places.

* * * * *

ALL ENQUIRIES WITH REGARD TO TRAVELLING SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE 'TOURING-CLUB DE FRANCE'

65, Avenue de la Grande Armée, 65 PARIS

'THE TOURING-CLUB DE FRANCE'

ADVANTAGES OF MEMBERSHIP

The 'Touring-Club de France' (founded in 1890), is at the present time the largest touring association in the world. Its principal aim is to introduce France--one of the loveliest countries on earth--to the French people themselves and to tourists of other nations.

It seeks to develop travel in all its forms: on foot, horseback, bicycle, in carriage, motor, yacht or railway, and, eventually, by aeroplane.

Every member of the association receives a badge and an identity ticket, free of charge, and also the 'Revue Mensuelle' every month.

Members have the benefit also of special prices in a certain number of affiliated hotels; and this advantage holds good in the purchasing of guide-books and Staff (Etat-major) maps, as well as those of the 'Ministère de l'Intérieur,' the T.C.F., etc. They may insert notices regarding the sale or purchase of travelling requisites, in the 'Revue' (1 fr. per line). The 'Comité de Contentieux' is ready to give them council with regard to travelling, and 3,000 delegates in all the principal towns are retained to give advice and information about the curiosities of art or of nature of the neighbourhood, as well as concerning the roads, hotels, motor-agents, garages, etc.

Members are accorded free passages across the frontier for a bicycle or motor-bicycle. For a motor-car the association gives a 'Triptyque' ensuring free passage through the 'douane,' etc.

* * * * *

TO TOUR FRANCE IN COMFORT JOIN THE 'TOURING-CLUB DE FRANCE'

+-----------------------------------------------------------------+ | | | IN MEMORY OF THE MICHELIN EMPLOYEES AND WORKMEN WHO DIED | | GLORIOUSLY FOR THEIR COUNTRY. | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------------+

THE MARNE BATTLE-FIELDS (1914)

Copyright 1919 by Michelin & Cie.

_All rights of translation, adaptation, or reproduction (in part or whole) reserved in all countries._

FOREWORD

_For the benefit of tourists who wish to visit the battlefields and mutilated towns of France we have tried to produce a work combining a practical guide with a history._

_Such a visit should be a pilgrimage, not merely a journey across a ravaged land. Seeing is not enough, one must understand: a ruin is more moving when one knows what has caused it; a stretch of country which might seem dull and uninteresting to the unenlightened eye, becomes transformed at the thought of the battles which have raged there._

_We have, therefore, prefaced the description of our journeys by a short account of the events which took place in the vicinity, and we have done our best to make this account quite clear by the use of many illustrations and maps._

_In the course of the description we give a brief military commentary on the numerous views and panoramas contained in the book._

_When we come across a place that is interesting either from an archæological or an artistic point of view, there we halt, even though the war has passed it by; that the tourist may realise it was to preserve intact this heritage of history and beauty that so many of our heroes have fallen._

_Our readers will not find any attempt at literary effect in these pages; the truth is too beautiful and tragic to be altered for the sake of embellishing the story. We have, therefore, after carefully sifting the great volume of evidence available, selected only that obtained from official documents or from reliable eye-witnesses._

_This book was written before the end of the war, even then the country over which it leads the reader had long been freed. The wealth of illustration in this work allows the intending tourist to make a preliminary trip in imagination, until such time as circumstances permit of his undertaking a journey in reality beneath the sunny skies of France._

HISTORICAL PART

IMPORTANT NOTE.--On pages 4 to 16 will be found a brief summarized account of the Battle of the Marne and of the events which immediately preceded it. We recommend the reading of these few pages attentively, and the consultation of the maps annexed to the same, before reading the descriptive part which commences at page 17.

A clear understanding of the action as a whole is absolutely necessary to comprehend with interest the description of the separate combats.

The above map gives a general view of the ground on which took place successively: the battle of the frontier, the retreat of the Allies, the victorious stand, and the pursuit of the retreating enemy.

The distance from Paris to Verdun is 140 miles as the crow flies; from Charleroi to the Marne is 97 miles.

In consequence of the tearing up of that fateful "scrap of paper" which preceded the invasion of Belgium by Germany, in violation of the common rights of man, the Battle of the Frontier (also called the Battle of Charleroi) was fought in August 1914 on the line Mons--Charleroi--Dinant--Saint-Hubert--Longwy--Metz.

On August 22, 1914, and the two succeeding days this Allied offensive failed at Charleroi, in consequence of which the French Commander-in-chief, General Joffre, broke off contact with the enemy and ordered a general retreat.

It was impossible to do otherwise as the enemy forces were greatly superior in numbers. Moreover, they were well equipped with powerful artillery and machine-guns, whereas the Franco-British forces were short of both. Lastly, the German soldier had long been trained in trench warfare, whereas the Allies had yet to learn this art.

To help in readjusting the balance between the opposing forces, Joffre fell back in the direction of the French reserves.

The respite thus afforded was utilized to re-arrange the commands, and to train the reserves in the form of warfare adopted by the Germans. Meanwhile, the latter greatly extended their line of communications and more or less tired themselves.

Then began that heroic retreat, without precedent in history, which attained a depth of 122 miles, and in the course of which the Allied soldiers, though already fatigued, marched as much as thirty miles a day facing about from time to time and counter-attacking fiercely, often with success.

The Germans followed in pursuit, overrunning the country like a plague of locusts. Using their left wing as a pivot, their right undertook a vast turning movement taking in Valenciennes, Cambrai, Péronne, and Amiens.

By August 27 Joffre had fixed up a plan according to which the offensive was to be taken again at the first favourable opportunity. In view of the execution of this plan an important mass of troops, under the orders of General Maunoury, was formed on the French left.

General Maunoury's task was to outflank at a given moment the German right wing while, at the same time, a general attack, or at least unflinching resistance, was to be made along the rest of the front.

This was the Allies' reply to the turning movement of the German general Von Kluck.

A first line of resistance offered itself on the River Somme, where fierce fighting took place. It was, however, realized that the battle front could not be reformed there successfully. Joffre wanted a flanking position not only for his left wing, but also for his right, which the Somme line did not offer. He therefore continued the withdrawal of the whole front towards the River Marne and Paris.

On September 3 German cavalry patrols were signalled at Ecouen, only eight miles from the gates of Paris. The inhabitants of the latter were asking themselves anxiously whether they, too, would not have to face the horrors of a German occupation. The suspense was cruel. Fortunately, a great man, General Gallieni, was silently watching over their destinies.

This great soldier had just been made Military Governor of Paris, with General Maunoury's Army, mentioned a moment ago, under his orders. The entrenched camp of Paris and this army were, in turn, under the authority of the French Commander-in-Chief, Joffre, who thus had full liberty of action from Paris to Verdun.

On September 3 General Gallieni issued his stirring proclamation which put soldiers and civilians alike on their mettle:

"_Armies of Paris, Inhabitants of Paris, the Government of the Republic has left Paris to give a new impulse to the National Defence. I have received orders to defend Paris against invasion. I shall do this to the end._"

The temptation to push straight on to the long-coveted capital must have been very great for the German High Command. However, in view of the danger presented by the Franco-British forces, which were still unbroken, it was eventually decided first to crush the Allied armies, and then to march on Paris, which would fall like 'a ripe pear.'

Seemingly ignorant of Maunoury's existence, Von Kluck's Army slanted off eastwards in pursuit of the British force, which it had received orders from the Kaiser to exterminate and which it had been harrying incessantly during its retreat from the Belgian frontier.

There will be heated arguments for many years to come as to whether the German High Command was right or wrong in giving up the direct advance on Paris, but whatever the consensus of expert opinion on the point may eventually be, one thing is certain--Von Kluck did not expect the furious attack by the Army of Paris, which followed.

Later, he declared: "There was only one general who, against all rules, would have dared to carry the fight so far from his base. Unluckily for me, that man was Gallieni."

On September 3, thanks to the Flying Corps, General Gallieni learned of the change of direction taken by Von Kluck's Army. Realising the possibilities which this offered, he suggested a flank attack by the Army of Paris. As previously mentioned, such an attack formed part of Joffre's general plan, matured on August 27. It was, however, necessary that the attack should be not merely a local and temporary success, as would have been the case on the Somme line for instance, where the remainder of the front was not in a favourable position for resistance, or attack.

On September 4, after conferring with General Gallieni, Joffre decided that conditions were favourable for a new offensive, and fixed upon September 6 as the date on which the decisive battle should be begun along the whole front.

SEPTEMBER 5, 1914

The map before you shows the respective positions occupied by the opposing armies on September 5, 1914, the eve of the great battle. The Allied forces are represented by a thick black line, those of the Germans by a black and white line.

Joffre directed the operations first from Bar-sur-Aube and afterwards from Romilly.

As you see, the half-circle formed by the Allies, into which the Germans imprudently penetrated, was supported at the western extremity by the entrenched camp of Paris and at the eastern extremity by the fortified position of Verdun. The River Marne flows through the middle.

Although the battle was only to begin on the 6th, General Maunoury's Army was already engaged the day before. Its orders were to advance to the River Ourcq (see map), but, despite furious fighting, it was unable to get there.

The British forces were to occupy a line running north and south, with Coulommiers as point of support. Unfortunately, the exceedingly fatiguing retreat it had just accomplished, retarded the execution of the necessary _volte-face_. The map shows them on the 5th, still far to the south of Coulommiers.

The fact that neither of these two forces was able to take up its assigned position greatly increased the difficulties of the turning movement planned by Joffre.

In front of the forces under Maunoury and French, were the right and centre of the First German Army, under Von Kluck.

The Fifth French Army, under General Franchet d'Esperey, whose position extended from the north of Provins to Sézanne, delivered a frontal attack against the left wing of Von Kluck's army and the right wing of the Second German army under Von Bulow.

At the right of Franchet d'Esperey's army was the Ninth French Army under General Foch, whose task it was to cover his neighbour on the left by holding the issues south of the Marshes of St.-Gond.

Opposing Foch was the left of Von Bulow's army, with the right of the Third German Army commanded by Von Hausen.

The Fourth French Army, under General Langle de Cary, was minus two army corps which had helped to form Foch's army. This diminution of the forces of the Fourth Army prevented the latter from breaking off contact with the enemy. While, at the extreme left, General Maunoury had already begun his advance towards the River Ourcq, General Langle de Cary received orders to hold up the opposing forces under the Duke of Wurtemberg. Unfortunately, Langle de Cary's forces had not sufficient liberty of movement to effect the necessary _volte-face_.

At the extreme right of the Allied front was the Third French Army, under General Sarrail, established in a position extending from the north-east of Revigny to Verdun, with a reserve group to the west of Saint-Mihiel, to be moved either east or west, according to circumstances.

The forces opposing General Sarrail were commanded by the future "War-Lord": the Crown Prince.

While the French were preparing to thrust back the invader, "War Lord the Second," drunk with victory, ordered the pursuit to be continued as far as the line Dijon--Besançon--Belfort: triumphal dreams destined to give place first to surprise, then to uncertainty, and finally to the bitterness of defeat.

Posterity will compare this arrogant order of the Crown Prince's with the stirring proclamation which Joffre caused to be made known to the whole of the French army on the eve of the great battle:

"_On the eve of the battle, on which the future of our country depends, it is important to remind all that there must be no looking back. Every effort mast be made to attack and drive back the enemy. Troops which can no longer advance must at all costs keep the ground they have won, and die rather than fall back. Under present circumstances no weakness can be tolerated._"

SEPTEMBER 6, 1914

On this and the succeeding maps, the Allied positions of the previous evening and at the end of the next day are shown.

The German positions are not shown, as too many lines might create confusion in reading the maps.

Maunoury's Army effected an advance of about six miles, but his left was unable to accomplish its task, which was to outflank the German right. Von Kluck who, till then, seeming to ignore Maunoury had concentrated all his efforts against the British and Franchet d'Esperey's Army, now perceived this manœuvre. With the promptitude and audacity which particularly marked his character, he completely changed his plans and rounded on Maunoury. Taking advantage of the state of extreme fatigue of the British forces, Von Kluck withdrew one of the army corps which were facing them and despatched it by forced marches to the help of his right wing. It was these unexpected reinforcements which enabled Von Kluck to hold up Maunoury's left.

On this day the British army finally recovered itself, and reached a line running from the north-west to the south-east of Coulommiers.

The armies of Generals Franchet d'Esperey and Foch fought with great stubbornness. The former wrested several dominating positions from the Germans and approached Esternay, but the latter was able only to maintain himself on the line of resistance assigned to him south of the Marshes of Saint-Gond.

General Langle de Cary was eventually able to hold up the bulk of the troops under the Duke of Wurtemberg on positions extending from the south-west of Vitry-le-François to Revigny.

The general plan of operations included an attack by the Third Army, under General Sarrail, against the German left wing, such attack to coincide with that of General Maunoury at the other end of the line. This was, however, anticipated by the Germans who, under the Crown Prince, and in far greater numbers, forced back Sarrail's left and prevented all progress on his right.

SEPTEMBER 7, 1914

On September 7, Maunoury's army began to feel the effects of the German heavy artillery, established out of range of the French 75's, and could advance but very slowly.

However, at the end of the day, Maunoury still hoped to be able to outflank the German right. Meanwhile, Von Kluck continued his risky manœuvre, and detached a second army corps from the forces opposed to the British, adding it to his right. Each was endeavouring to outflank the other.

Fronting the British, there was now only a thin curtain of troops taken from two of the German army corps opposed to Franchet d'Esperey.

This small force fought with great stubbornness, in order, if possible, to give Von Kluck time to crush Maunoury, before the advance by the British and Franchet d'Esperey could become really dangerous.

The slow progress effected in the British sector is explained by the extreme fierceness of the struggle.