The Making of Modern Japan An Account of the Progress of Japan from Pre-feudal Days to Constitutional Government & the Position of a Great Power, With Chapters on Religion, the Complex Family System, Education, &c.

CHAPTER XVIII

Chapter 434,166 wordsPublic domain

Imperial Authority—Privy Council—Local Self-Government—Promulgation of Constitution—Imperial Prerogatives—The Two Houses of Parliament—Features of Constitution and First Parliamentary Elections.

The Peace Preservation Regulations provided, as we have seen, amongst other things, for the removal of persons suspected of designs to disturb the public peace from areas in the Capital, and its suburbs, within a radius of seven miles from the Imperial Palace. This mention of the Imperial Palace shows how strong the force of habit was, and still is, in Japan. The maintenance of “the security of the Throne,” a phrase borrowed from the Chinese classics, was for centuries a leading idea in Japanese administration. The expression, usually to be found in association with another classical phrase, “the tranquillity of the people,” recurs from an early date in all official literature, in Decrees, Memorials and Manifestos. As remarkable as the continuity of the dynasty, of which the nation is not unnaturally proud, this constant solicitude for the Imperial welfare, this manifestation of what to foreign eyes may seem a somewhat excessive degree of reverence for the Throne, was often in inverse ratio to the authority it wielded. We have seen, for instance, how the policy of the founder of the Tokugawa line of Shōguns was to increase the outward respect paid to the Court by surrounding it with an enhanced semblance of dignity, while at the same time its authority was sensibly diminished. At no time was the ceremonial governing relations between what was left of the Court and the Shōgunate more elaborate than under the rule of the Shōguns of this line; never, perhaps, was the authority of the Throne less effective. This was, however, the effect of deliberate policy, in which may be traced a desire to hoodwink the nation, and conceal the ambitious designs of its rulers. When in the closing years of Shōgunate rule its prestige declined, the reassertion of Imperial authority was accompanied by a tendency to lay additional emphasis on the immemorial respect due to the Throne. It was this feeling which led the Court party before the Restoration to insist on no “treaty port” being opened in the five “home provinces” because of the vicinity of Kiōto, where the Emperor resided. When the opening of the port of Hiogo could no longer be withstood, the same feeling inspired the narrowing of “treaty limits”—the name given to the area in the neighbourhood of a “treaty port” in which foreigners were allowed under the treaties to make excursions—in the direction of the old Capital; now, several years later, after the personal rule of the Sovereign had, in name at least, been re-established, we notice the same anxiety for the security of the Throne still closely connected with the maintenance of public tranquillity. And evidence of the same exalted respect for the Throne will be seen in the Constitution which was shortly to be promulgated, and in the official “Commentaries” which accompanied its promulgation. But the unusual context in which the indirect allusion to the Throne appeared in the Peace Preservation Regulations showed that a further reason lay behind this mention of the Imperial Palace. It was customary then, as now, for the official measurement of all distances from the new Capital to be taken from a central point in the city. This was the _Nihonbashi_, or Bridge of Japan, situated in the centre of the old town. It being generally understood, however, that all distances were measured from this centre, it was considered unnecessary to mention the point. The fact that in the present instance the point from which distances were to be measured was mentioned at all, coupled with the substitution of the Imperial Palace for the bridge in question, could not fail to attract attention. The public was thereby reminded both of its duty in the matter of solicitude for the security of the Throne, and of the Imperial authority that supported the course adopted by the Government. Throughout the stormy times which followed the establishment of parliamentary institutions in Japan, the invocation of the Imperial authority, either directly or indirectly, served as a political barometer by which the seriousness of a political crisis might be definitely gauged.

In April, 1888, two months after the return of Ōkuma to the Ministry with the title of Count, the Privy Council (_Sūmitsu-in_) was established. The decree announcing its creation stated that the Emperor found it expedient “to consult personages who had rendered signal service to the State” in regard to important matters, thus making it clear that the functions of the Council would be of a purely advisory nature—a point confirmed later on by the Constitution—and that its members would be chosen from officials of wide experience. The scope of its duties, as defined in the rules governing its organization, covered a wide field, including, amongst other matters, the drafting and consideration of new administrative measures, the revision of existing laws, amendments to the Constitution, the presentation of its views on treaties with foreign countries and financial questions.

With functions in some few respects similar to those of the corresponding body in Great Britain, the Japanese Privy Council fills a larger place in the political machinery of the State and takes a more active part in legislation, though it has no judicial functions. Even more so than with us is it the final goal to which all public servants aspire, and where their services are still available for the State. But it is something else, too. It has a political influence which does not exist in the case of our own institution of the same name; its members are eligible for re-entry into the Ministry or for other State employment; and they are in constant and close touch with public affairs.

The need for something of the kind in Japan was far greater than in Europe. To realize its necessity it must be remembered that the same tendencies in Japan which encouraged the system of figure-head government favoured the existence of advisory councils, whose duties were to suggest or offer an opinion on administrative policy, the carrying out of which was entrusted to executive officials. When the whole system of government was reorganized on a Western basis, the opportunity of introducing this feature of Western administrative systems was eagerly seized, as it was felt that it would in some sense fill the embarrassing gap caused by the disappearance of the groups of advisers which had played so leading a part under the old _régime_.

Prompt use was made of the services of the new Council. The Constitution had by this time been drafted, and was ready for the consideration of the Privy Council. Accordingly, within a fortnight of its coming into existence the new Privy Councillors were, in accordance with the duties assigned to them, discussing the draft Constitution at a series of meetings, to which the attendance of the Emperor gave an increased importance.

The year 1888 was marked by the enactment of another important measure. This was the local Self-government Act, known as the Law of Cities, Towns and Villages (_Shi-chō-som-pō_). The first step in the reform of local government, by which a representative character was given to it, had been taken in 1878, when drafts of the “Three Great Laws,” as they were popularly called, were prepared by the Conference of Prefects. One of these, the law creating Prefectural Assemblies, came into force, as we have seen, two years later. The operation of the other arrangements drafted at the same time, and affecting smaller areas of local administration, had been postponed. These now came into force in the spring of 1889, some changes having in the meantime been made. In the following year these arrangements, as well as the whole system of local government, underwent further revision. The revised system then introduced is now in operation in forty-five of the forty-six prefectures into which Japan proper is divided, the exception being Loochoo, known since its annexation as the Okinawa prefecture. The basis of the present system is the separation of local administration into two main branches, urban and rural. Each of these prefectures—three of which (Tōkiō, Kiōto and Ōsaka) have a separate status as urban prefectures (_Fu_), the rest being rural prefectures (_Ken_)—is now divided into urban districts, or “cities” (_Shi_), and rural districts, or counties (_Gun_). A rural district, or county (_Gun_), is again subdivided into towns (_Chō_) and villages (_Son_). The classification of a town as an urban district, or “city” (_Shi_), or a “town” (_Chō_), depends on its population. Unless otherwise determined by the Minister of the Interior, with whom the final decision rests, all towns of over 25,000 inhabitants have the status of “cities,” enjoying as such a somewhat larger measure of self-government than those not in this category. In each prefecture there is a prefectural assembly (_Kenkwai_ or _Fukwai_, as the case may be), and an executive council (_Sanjikwai_). Similar assemblies and executive councils exist in each rural district and “city,” but towns and villages, though they are provided with assemblies, have no executive councils, the duties of these latter bodies being entrusted to the mayors.

The system of election to local administrative bodies is more or less the same in each administrative unit. In prefectures where the population does not exceed 700,000 an assembly has thirty members. Where the population is larger another member may be elected for each additional 50,000 inhabitants. “City” assemblies contain more members, the number varying from thirty to sixty, the latter number being the maximum. The _Sanjikwai_, or executive council, of a prefecture consists of ten councillors chosen by the assembly from amongst its members. The prefect presides, and is assisted by two prefectural officials. In rural districts the presiding official is the _Gunchō_, or district administrator, who, as in the case of prefects, is appointed by the Minister of the Interior. In “cities” the mayor of the city presides, being assisted by a deputy, or deputies, as the case may be. The chief duty of all these assemblies is to regulate expenditure, and apportion the taxation required to meet it. In the scheme of local taxation the _corvée_ still occupies a prominent place, though, except on occasions of emergency, substitutes may be provided, or money payments made in commutation. In the election of members voting is by secret ballot. The property qualification for electors, and for those eligible as members, is determined by the annual amount of national, or Imperial, taxes paid by an individual. The age qualification is fixed at twenty-five years, the legal age at which majority is attained. The possession of civil rights is also necessary.

The legislative activity displayed in the series of administrative measures above mentioned shows how wide an effect was produced by the decision to create a Parliament, to which a Constitution became under the circumstances an essential corollary. In some cases this legislation was the direct offspring of that decision. The new peerage, the reorganization of the Ministry, the Privy Council, all had their separate places in the scheme of the Constitution. In other cases the connection, though not so close, was still obvious; for it was not possible to make a Constitution and fit it into the existing framework of government, put together, as the latter had been, piece by piece, without some sensible alterations of administrative machinery. From this point of view it will be seen that the reform of local government, and even the institution of Court Councillors, who might be chosen to sit in the Upper House, had a definite, albeit indirect, bearing on the Constitution, and on the National Parliament about to be established.

The Constitution having been considered and approved by the Privy Council, to whose deliberations on the subject an increased dignity had, as we have seen, been given by the attendance of the Sovereign, was promulgated by the Emperor in person on the 11th February, 1889. The ceremony took place in the Throne Room of the newly built palace in Tōkiō, a building of Japanese architecture, modified in some of its features by a slight admixture of foreign designs. The Emperor and Empress occupied daises of unequal height at one end of the hall, which was filled with the dignitaries of the Empire, and officials of senior grades. Seats outside the Court circle were arranged according to the new rules of precedence. The three first places were assigned to the ex-daimiōs of Satsuma and Chōshiū and to the new head of the Tokugawa family, in the order named, all three having the rank of princes in the new nobility. The head of the Tokugawa House was the cousin and adopted heir of the ex-Shōgun Kéiki, and succeeded to the headship of the family on the enforced retirement at the close of the civil war of the last of the Shōguns. The dignitaries and officials present all wore modern Court costume of European style, with the marked exception of Prince Shimadzu of Satsuma, whose appearance in Japanese costume, with hair dressed in the old-fashioned cue, bore witness to the ingrained conservatism of the clan he represented. Never before in the country’s history had a scene more impressive occurred, nor, indeed, one less in keeping with Japanese traditional ideas. Great as had always from time immemorial been the reverence felt by all classes of the people for the Crown, it was a reverence tinged with political expediency, which showed itself in the fixed policy of screening from public view the object of veneration. The atmosphere of mystery and seclusion which surrounded the monarch had naturally extended to the palace and its precincts, and in a still greater degree, for reasons common to all Oriental countries, to the person of the Imperial Consort. Now for the first time the palace was thrown open to a gathering so large as to deprive it of any very select or exclusive character, and the tradition of centuries was broken in a manner contrary, not to say repugnant, to all previous ideas by the attendance of the Sovereign and his Consort in person, the former taking an active part in the proceedings. The ceremony, therefore, in a certain sense symbolized the new spirit which inspired the nation, ushering in a different order of things. Apart from the pomp and magnificence of its surroundings, it set the seal on the new departure in State policy, and represented the final bridging of the gulf between old and new Japan.

The speech read by the Emperor on this occasion was couched in the vague and grandiloquent style common to all utterances from the Throne. It spoke of the Constitution as “an immutable fundamental law,” and described the foundations of the Empire as having been laid by the Founder of the Imperial House and other Imperial ancestors, with the help of their subjects, on a basis that was to last for ever, an achievement due to the glorious virtues of the Imperial ancestors and the bravery and loyalty of the people; and it expressed the hope that the same loyal co-operation between Sovereign and subject would for ever secure the stability of the fabric of State bequeathed by the Imperial ancestors.

The Imperial Decree, or Rescript, issued on the same day as that on which the Constitution was promulgated, and bearing the sign-manual of the Sovereign and the signatures of the nine Ministers of State, appears as a Preamble in the official English text of the “Commentaries on the Constitution,” though it is not found in the original Japanese text. It provided that the Imperial Diet (the name given to the new Parliament) should be convoked for the first time in 1890, and that the date of its opening should be that on which the Constitution should come into force. The date thus fixed was the 29th November, 1890. In this Decree, which contained a reference to the promise of a Parliament made in 1881, the Emperor stated his intention to exercise his Sovereign rights in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, for the execution of which the Ministers of State would be responsible. Stress was also laid on the important condition that any proposal for the amendment of the Constitution in the future must proceed from the Throne, and that in no other way would any attempt on the part of the Emperor’s descendants, or subjects, to alter it be permitted.

Additional solemnity was given to the promulgation of the Constitution by an Oath taken by the Emperor in the Shintō Shrine (called the “Sanctuary” in the English official text of the “Commentaries”) attached to the palace. In this Oath—the second of its kind, the first having, as we have seen, been taken in 1869—the Emperor bound himself “to maintain and secure from decline the ancient form of government,” and, while acknowledging the help received from the Imperial ancestors in the past, implored the continuance of their support in the future.

The Constitution, as promulgated, consisted of seventy-six articles divided into seven chapters, dealing, respectively, with the position and prerogatives of the Sovereign, the rights and duties of the people, the functions of the Diet, the relations between the Cabinet and the Privy Council, the judicature and finance; and one of the supplementary rules attached to it provided for its revision, a point reserved, as we have seen, for the initiative of the Crown. Simultaneously with its promulgation various accessory laws were enacted. These were the Imperial House Law, mentioned in the Imperial Oath, the Imperial Ordinance concerning the House of Peers, the Law of the Houses, the Law of Election of the members of the House of Representatives and the Law of Finance.

The general lines of the Constitution follow those of the Bavarian Constitution, which was taken as the model. Its leading principles are the small limitations placed on the Imperial prerogative and the independence of the Cabinet, which is responsible to the Sovereign alone, and not in any way to the Diet. No mention either of the Cabinet, or of the Minister President, occurs in the Constitution, though they are referred to in Prince Itō’s “Commentaries.” But Article LXXVI of the Constitution provides that all existing enactments, in so far as they do not conflict with it, shall continue in force. The enactment of 1885 reorganizing the Ministry comes under this rule. Consequently the position of the Minister President, and of the Cabinet over which he presided, remained unaltered after the Constitution came into operation.

The enumeration of the Imperial prerogatives occupies much space in the Constitution. The chief points to be noted are that the Sovereign exercises the legislative powers with the consent of the Diet; that his sanction is necessary for all laws; that he is empowered on occasions of emergency which arise when the Diet is not sitting to issue “Imperial Ordinances” which have provisionally the force of law, but which require the approval of the Diet at its next session, when, if not approved, they cease to be operative; that he determines the peace standing of both army and navy; and that the authority to declare war, make peace, announce a state of siege and conclude treaties rests with him. All of these matters are removed from the control of the Diet, which has also no voice in any future modifications of the Law of the Imperial House. The remarkable reverence for the Throne which is characteristic of the people is illustrated by the declaration, in one of the early articles, of the sacredness and inviolability of the person of the Emperor. This, we are told in the “Commentaries,” is a consequence of his divine descent. He must, indeed, it is explained, “pay due respect to the law, but the law has no power to hold him accountable to it”—a statement which seems to involve a contradiction in terms, for it is difficult to understand how a Sovereign who is not accountable to law can be bound to respect it.

Among the duties of Japanese subjects, as defined in the Constitution, is liability to service in the army or navy. It should be explained, however, that whereas service in the army is based on conscription alone, recruiting for the navy is, in practice, based on the volunteer system, supplemented by conscription. Their rights include immunity from arrest, trial or punishment, except in accordance with the provisions of the law; similar immunity in the matter of the entry or search of houses, and as regards private correspondence; and freedom of religious belief. With regard to the omission to place on record the fact that there are two officially recognized religions, Shintō and Buddhism, one may, after reading the explanations on this point given in the “Commentaries,” be tempted to think that the last word has not been said on the subject. At the same time it will be recognized that the course adopted represents the simplest solution of the question.

The Diet, or Parliament—for Japanese writers, when writing in English, use both terms indifferently—comprises two Chambers, a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. The House of Peers is composed of members of five different categories: (1) Members of the Imperial family who have attained majority, fixed in such cases at twenty years; (2) princes and marquises who have attained legal majority, namely, twenty-five years; (3) other members of the nobility chosen by their respective orders; (4) distinguished persons specially nominated by the Emperor; and (5) persons (one for each urban and rural district) elected by and from the highest taxpayers. Those coming under the first, second and fourth categories are life members; those coming under the third and fifth categories are elected for seven years. The number of members of the House of Representatives, as originally fixed by the Constitution, was 300, and there was a property qualification for membership. They are elected by voters who have attained legal majority, and pay annually direct national taxes amounting to about £1. Under the revised Electoral Law which came into force in 1902 there is no longer any property qualification for membership, the only conditions now being an age limit of thirty years and the possession of civil rights. The same law reduced both property and age qualifications in the case of electors, this extension of the franchise resulting in the number of electors being increased to 1,700,000; substituted the secret ballot for open voting; and raised the number of members of the Lower House to 381, urban districts returning 73 and rural districts 308. The large majority of members in this Chamber have always belonged to the agrarian class. The natural term of the House of Representatives is four years. Dissolution, which is one of the Imperial prerogatives, applies only to the Lower House. When it occurs, the Upper House (or House of Peers) is prorogued. New elections must take place within five months from the date of dissolution, the next session of the Diet becoming what is known as an Extraordinary Session.

The Imperial House Law contains various provisions relating to the succession to the Throne, which is limited to the male line; the appointment of a Regent, for which post in certain circumstances the Empress, Empress Dowager and other ladies of the Court are eligible, and, during the minority of the Sovereign, of a governor, or guardian; and the age (18) at which a Sovereign attains majority. A point to be noted is the restriction of the custom of adoption in the case of the Imperial Family, no member of which is allowed to adopt a son.

In concluding this brief sketch of the Constitution and accessory laws, it may be well to mention a point which has an important bearing on the practical working of the Japanese parliamentary system, namely, the control exercised by the Diet over the Budget. This to some extent remedies the weakness of parliamentary opposition parties—as compared with similar parties elsewhere—which arises out of the fact that the Cabinet is independent of the Diet. When conflicts over the Budget take place, the Diet may by withholding supplies force a dissolution. In these cases by the terms of the Constitution the Government is obliged to substitute, in place of the rejected Budget, the Budget of the previous financial year passed in the preceding session. Any new financial programme, therefore, to which the Government may have committed itself in the rejected Budget is consequently held up, and cannot be proceeded with until a fresh Budget has been passed in a subsequent extraordinary session of Parliament. This means a delay of at least several months. The Government is, however, not necessarily always the sufferer financially thereby, for, as Marquis Ōkuma points out in his book already referred to, the effect of dissolutions occurring through this cause has usually been to reduce expenditure rather than revenue.

The first parliamentary elections were held in the summer of 1890, the first session of the Diet taking place in the following autumn.