CHAPTER VI

INFANTRY

1. Arms of the infantry: the rifle; the machine-gun; the machine-gun rifle; the bayonet; the grenade; the trench knife; the automatic pistol.

2. Instruction of troops. Duties of officers. “Shock-troops.”

3. The infantry of a division: the front; dispositions taken; storming troops; occupying troops; offensive or defensive engagements; preparation of attacks; prolonged engagements; posts of command; signalling; battalions and companies; subaltern staffs.

4. A word about cavalry.

=1. Arms of the infantry.= This war has completely transformed the armament and consequently altered the fighting methods of the infantry.

RIFLE. In 1914 the French soldier was armed with the rifle of the 1886 pattern, not remodelled; _i. e._, a repeating gun with a hand-filled magazine. It was an excellent weapon in use for a long time, but too many of them had lost their accuracy through wear. Since 1914 these rifles have been replaced by others of the same model fitted with loading clips.

MACHINE-GUNS. At the beginning, the number of machine-guns was six per infantry regiment. During a long time they were distributed at the rate of two per battalion; then it was decided to form them into a battery under the command of the Colonel.

This limit of six machine-guns per regiment placed France in a very great inferiority to the Germans, who had reserves of machine-gun companies in every division.

The first battles showed the important part played by the machine-guns, and France prepared to turn out quantities of them. For a long time, however, she remained in a state of inferiority in this respect, by reason of the advances in equipment made by the Germans, and also because, out of the three different models adopted and constructed, two were not strong enough to stand trench warfare. These models gave disappointing results, but the evil has now been remedied.

Each machine-gun company is now provided with sixteen guns--a number which, we believe, has been adopted for the machine-gun company in America. As France now possesses excellent models, the United States troops, who already before the war had good guns, will doubtless receive an efficient equipment. In this war, it is necessary that the component parts of a machine-gun and its ammunition should be easy of transport.

Notwithstanding their reduced effectives, the Germans are still able to increase the number of their machine-guns, and they contemplate raising their number from twenty-four to thirty-four per company. In all likelihood the Allies will very soon have to strengthen their own machine-gun batteries. A battery can seldom fire all its guns at the same time because they get too hot after shooting about five hundred rounds, and because they are likely, especially when operating over muddy ground, to get jammed, and thus remain out of service until the gunners can put them in working order.

For these reasons the ante-bellum regulations prescribed that machine-guns should work in pairs, so that one would always be ready to take up the fire, if the other should, for any reason, go out of action.

This regulation is still adhered to, but only so far as circumstances permit. In cases of emergency, for instance, when an attack has to be repulsed, the simultaneous use of all the guns becomes necessary, especially against an enemy who possesses a superior number of similar guns.

Each belligerent has captured many machine-guns and much ammunition from the enemy. Thus France has complete German batteries, and Germany possesses both French and English batteries.

The principal structural difference between the German and French machine-guns consists in the mechanism for cooling off the guns; the Germans use for this purpose water circulation, and the French air circulation.

To avoid serious burns resulting from contact with the barrels of the guns, the gunners wear gloves covered with very thick steel mail.

We have seen photographs of American machine-gun batteries carried on motorcycles. The French no longer make use of this method, and although it may have proven excellent in Mexico, it is entirely impracticable on the French Front.

The ground for a long distance behind the lines of defence has been so torn up and rendered impassable by prolonged bombardment that motor vehicles cannot get through. Horse-drawn vehicles can approach much nearer but at the entrance of the communication trenches even pack transport has to be abandoned, and from this point (in default of such recent devices as narrow-gauge hand-operated tracks, or pack-donkeys) all war material has to go forward to the advance lines on men’s backs. In case of an advance beyond the front, difficulties would be doubled, since the devastated ground behind the enemy’s lines would have to be traversed.

Pack transport therefore is best suited for machine-gun batteries and their supplies. Where the number of horses or mules is insufficient, light vehicles, each drawn by a single animal, can be used; especially for the machine-gun sections which are to occupy more or less permanent positions.

In order to counterbalance her losses, Germany has constantly increased the number of her machine-guns, using them as a defensive weapon to check the advance of the enemy, and to enable herself to cling to her positions with a small number of men.

Germany does not hesitate to sacrifice machine-guns in order to gain time, and German machine-gunners were often found in their shelters chained to their guns, and so obliged to serve them until killed or released by the enemy.

Machine-guns and grenades are certainly the most powerful arms against assaulting waves. Seldom will the reconnoitring airplanes detect all the numerous machine-gun shelters. Some of them always remain after a bombardment to show activity at the time of the infantry attack.

The British have very efficiently used their tanks for the destruction of these remaining machine-gun posts. The French have commenced to use them advantageously. The Americans, entering the war after they have been perfected, and profiting by their Allies’ experience, will be able, on their arrival at the front, to use well designed and constructed tanks in support of their infantry. Tanks will become more and more indispensable weapons, and their general use will save the infantry heavy losses of life. The Germans now have some.

MACHINE-GUN RIFLE. A new weapon was added to the armament of the infantry in 1916. It is the machine-gun rifle, which is not to be confounded with the automatic rifle (repeating rifle).

Much lighter than the machine-gun, carried and served by one man only, it is easily moved about, and, when well used, is a most dangerous weapon.

To shoot, the man lies down (behind a shelter if possible) and lifts the butt-end to his shoulder, the fore-part of the gun resting on a very short fork. Machine-gun rifles are used principally against machine-guns.

There are several types of machine-gun rifles. The best is without doubt that provided with a plate, containing twenty-five cartridges, which turns on a vertical axis back of the gun and fires the twenty-five cartridges. Each shot causes the plate to make 1/25 part of a revolution and drop a new cartridge in the barrel. When the plate is empty it is immediately removed and replaced by another that has been previously loaded.

Experience shows that machine-gun rifles give good results only when in the hands of cool and clear-sighted men, well acquainted with their manipulation, but that they are not as good as the ordinary rifles in the hands of African troops.

THE BAYONET. All the infantry use the bayonet, a weapon which has maintained its full importance in the present war. French and Russian soldiers handle the bayonet most dangerously. The Germans are not so proficient in its use.

The men must be given a very detailed and thorough instruction in bayonet practice, but as the American troops are in possession of a very complete manual on this subject we will not dwell upon it.

GRENADES. A new weapon (or rather an old one that has been revived) that plays a very important part in the actions of the infantry is the grenade. Many types exist but they can be classified either as offensive or defensive grenades. The former kind is not so destructive as the latter. They are lighter, can be thrown to a greater distance, and are used to prevent the enemy from coming out of their dugouts and trenches when the assailants reach them. The defensive grenades, which are extremely destructive, are used against attacking or counter-attacking troops. Some are thrown by hand, others with the rifle. Well trained soldiers can throw grenades as far as fifty and fifty-five metres.

Rifle grenades are thrown by the propulsive power of the ordinary cartridge. A special contrivance at the muzzle of the gun cocks the grenade, so to speak, as it is driven from the barrel by the bullet, so that it will explode on hitting the ground. It reaches farther than the hand grenade.

Recently General Pershing rightly laid stress on the necessity of perfecting the marksmanship of the recruits. To this accomplishment and skill in the use of the bayonet, which gives the soldier self-reliance, suppleness, and agility (qualities that the Germans do not easily acquire) ought to be added a thorough training in the throwing of grenades, a sport which promptly captivates those who practise it. Excellent results are secured by offering prizes for grenade practice, both for distance and marksmanship. The French soldier is contented with little, and the mere offer of a few cigars or packages of cigarettes to the best throwers has achieved wonderful performances in this line.

We believe that the Germans have no reason to congratulate themselves on having been the first to reintroduce the use of grenades in warfare, because it is a weapon requiring intelligence and skill in its handling. Thrown by shrewd quick Frenchmen, or by sportsmen like the British, it is much more dangerous than in the hands of thick-headed, passive German soldiers. We are sure that the American troops will use the grenade with the same skill as their Allies.

TRENCH KNIVES. The trench-fight is a fight to a finish, and has necessitated the adoption of a strong knife. In the hands of fierce resolute men it is a terrible weapon, much resorted to in the confined space of trenches, tunnels, and dugouts where bayonets cannot be used. The African troops are very fond of these knives, and as the Germans are well aware of this fact, they never surrender to African troops, and the fights between these combatants always smack of savagery.

On account of their fear of knives and daggers the Germans have pronounced their use inhuman, and have shot many prisoners on whom daggers were found. It is advisable, then, for troops obliged to surrender (and the bravest troops may have to do so) to throw their daggers away in good time.

AUTOMATIC PISTOLS. Officers and non-commissioned officers only have automatics, but we would like to see them issued to the infantry, as they _are most useful in hand-to-hand fights_.

The use of the various arms above named has necessitated the division of the company into grenadiers, machine-gunners, and light infantry. The last-named fight especially with the ordinary rifles, bayonets, and daggers.

When circumstances permit, it would be advisable to teach all the men of a company the use of all the arms, one after the other, so as to be able to re-establish after and even during a battle the exact proportion of specialists. There has been too great a tendency to neglect rifle practice. Soldiers ought to lose no occasion to perfect themselves in the use of the rifle, which remains the principal arm of the infantry. Its importance will be even greater in open warfare.

=2. Instruction.= To be a good infantry soldier a man ought to be very vigorous, sufficiently young, not more than thirty-five, well fed and well trained.

The individual instruction should be as thorough as possible, and perfected before the man is sent to the front.

The theoretical instruction of troops must be completed before they can be given the defence of a sector, and it is only in the lines and in the face of the enemy that they can acquire the practical experience. The more thorough their knowledge of theoretical details the sooner the company and battalion will become good fighting units.

The spirit of initiative should be specially encouraged in every soldier, as in the present war every man has an individual part to play, according to his duties, his rank, and his weapons. During the actual fighting the soldier can rely but little on the leadership of his superiors, who are merely expected to set the example, and who are frequently the first shot.

DUTIES OF THE OFFICERS. Before ordering their men to advance and while still in the trenches, the officers, assisted by their non-commissioned officers, should, whenever time and circumstances allow, strive to explain fully to every man what are the objectives to be attained and what means are to be employed. No details should be neglected.

The Major’s duties will be to designate very clearly the fronts assigned to each of his companies, the objectives they are to reach, and the itineraries they are to follow. An assault is usually made in several waves, so the order of departure, the distance to be maintained between the successive waves, the place to station the reserves, and, if need be, the instructions relative to the juncture and reforming of the elements of the various companies, form so many points that must be settled beforehand in their minutest details. The Major will have to decide beforehand how the battalion as well as the several companies will hold the objectives after capturing them, how they will organize these objectives in the shortest time possible, and how they will resist the counter-attacks. The officers in command of battalions and companies must not forget that, once the action has commenced, and often even before it is begun, all communications become difficult and frequently impossible, and that consequently all possible eventualities, within the orders received, must have been thoroughly studied in advance. So it is indispensable to give every man minute instructions.

This extract from a letter found on a French captain who was killed on the Meuse will give to young and inexperienced officers a good idea of the thoughts that must absorb the mind of an efficient commander.

“I am alone,” he wrote, “in this underground shelter, still permeated with the foul atmosphere of the Germans, where the evidences of a disorderly flight, biscuits, bloody rags, stained letters, a biography of Hindenburg, etc., lie scattered in every direction. I am alone after having relieved the company that made the attack. I am alone without counsel if I hesitate, without help if I weaken, in this captured trench which is half destroyed. My two hundred men are blindly piling in, ignorant of their surroundings, of what to do. The sight of them restores my waning energy. I have to think for them, and put everything in order before daybreak. I consult my watch: it is midnight.”

Here is a Chief, a real leader! He goes out; until dawn he inspects his sector, he sets his men at work. To each he assigns a task; he stimulates them, prevents them from falling asleep, and does not spare himself. He can count on all his subordinates to do their best, and at the break of day, if the bombardment is resumed, if the counter-attack is launched, the trench will be ready; the losses will be lessened; resistance will have been made possible. It is by such methods, by the constant co-operation of the officer and his men, that the army performs marvellous feats. It is this constant co-operation, this comprehension of duty by the humblest leader, that enabled us to hold out at Verdun.

The most difficult missions should be entrusted to those known to be the best qualified to fulfil them.

Once the signal of attack is given, the officers and non-commissioned officers will scarcely have any other means of ensuring obedience to their orders than by setting an example to their men.

We take this occasion to render a profound homage to inferior ranking officers of the French armies. They indeed are and shall remain the heroes of this war. They have fallen on the field of honour since August, 1914, not by thousands but by tens of thousands. Never, under the most critical circumstances, has their morale weakened for a single moment. At all times, men equally as brave as their predecessors have been found to fill the places of those who had so heroically (I was going to say so cheerfully) gone down to death. By the sacrifice of their lives to their country, they have not only set an example to the officers of their Allies, but have also given the latter time to form and train themselves, and I can truthfully say, to equal them. The bravery displayed by the infantry officers of the English, Italian, and Russian armies is on a par with that of the French officers, and within a short time, the American officers, I am sure, will show themselves worthy of the same verdict.

Our officers have always and from the very first day of the war invariably marched ahead of their men, leading them straight to the enemy. They have advanced through the most intense curtain-fire; they have exposed themselves to the fire of innumerable machine-guns; they have been the targets of rifles and grenades. Thousands have been killed; not one has hesitated, not one has turned back. The Allied officers have exhibited the same daring, the same bravery.

But what about the German officers? Is it possible not to contrast their attitude with that of our own? The German officers endeavour to keep under shelter as long as possible their precious persons, so greatly superior, in their own estimation, to those of their men, and when they do muster the courage to come out into the open, they are content to follow behind their troops, with revolvers in their hands to exact obedience.

We wish to reproduce here two or three citations taken at random among a thousand similar ones published in the _Journal Officiel de la République Française_, the official organ of the French Government, to give a vivid illustration of the way that officers ought to understand their duties:

On September 1, 1914, _Major Parisot de la Boisse_ said to his chasseurs: “I give you my word of honour, as long as one of us remains alive, the enemy shall not pass.” In spite of heavy losses, though nearly surrounded, he extricated his troops and maintained the fight. The Pass de Mandray he defended remains French!

_Captain Robert Dubarle._ “A living example of impassibility under fire, contempt of danger, energy, and initiative.”

_Captain Mazarde_--11th Chasseurs. “A splendid officer already cited at the order of the Division, of the Army Corps, and of the Army. From June 29th to July 14, 1915, he exhibited the bravery of a hero. While leading his Chasseurs to the air of _Sidi Brahim_ in an attack upon a wood, he was stopped by wire entanglements at 50 metres from its edge. He maintained the line of attack for 36 hours, face to face with the enemy, repulsed a counter-attack, and riddled the line of the enemy with bullets and grenades. He withdrew only when ordered to do so, taking all his wounded and the bodies of the officers killed. He was shot, and died from his wounds.”

_Captain Pierre Mercier_--67th Battalion of Chasseurs. “Entrusted with the mission of defending the passage of a bridge, he maintained his company under an intense fire. Outflanked on both right and left, he did not hesitate to charge an enemy very superior in numbers, and fell mortally wounded, saying to his men, “We have done our duty.”

Space does not allow us to give more numerous citations, but we think that it would benefit the American army to get the minutes of the war, to select therefrom the most brilliant citations of the French and English armies, to have them translated and widely distributed among the American troops. Nothing would be more instructive for the officers, nothing could better rouse their fire, nothing would inspire them with a greater desire to emulate their comrades in the Allied armies. The example of heroism is contagious for young men.

SHOCK-TROOPS (STOSSTRUPPEN). The continual failure of the German attacks or counter-attacks for more than a year led them to the creation of what they call _Stosstruppen_. The new recruits of the German army were lacking greatly in quality--the German soldier at best is wanting in initiative. The High Command therefore resorted to a selection of the best elements to be found in some of their divisions, with which to form battalions or companies for assault.

The promise of receiving better and more abundant food than that given to the other troops (so important is the question of food to the German soldier, who has been on somewhat short rations since 1916) has been sufficient to bring forward volunteers for these companies.

These special troops are exempted from work in the trenches, and are brought up to the lines only when needed. On such occasions they are scattered all over the attacking front for the purpose of encouraging by their example the elements which are not so well organized.

The Germans, who, after the Russian revolution, were enabled to withdraw the best elements from their divisions on their Eastern Front, made, in June and July, 1917, a frequent use of their _Stosstruppen_ in counter-attacks in Artois, and in desperate and daily attacks on the Chemin des Dames, but the result was far from expectation.

The _Stosstruppen_, obliged, like the ordinary troops, to attack in too serried ranks, offer a splendid target to artillery and machine-guns and, nine times out of ten, their rush is stopped before they can engage in a hand-to-hand fight.

We wonder what the German divisions on the Russian Front will be able to accomplish without their best and strongest elements when the Russian Army rallies and re-enters the war in earnest.

=3. Mission and use of the infantry in a division.= We have stated that a division includes three or four regiments. We will now dwell on the disposition of a division comprising two brigades of two regiments each. It seems certain that this is the type that will be adopted by the American Army, which possesses a sufficient number of men for this normal constitution of a division.

_Front of a division._ The front of a division in trench warfare is very variable in extent. The occupation of strong intrenchments, enabling the reserves to be sheltered from the enemy’s fire, allows of the extension of the front, especially if the army remains on the defensive.

As soon as a division takes the offensive, however, its front is reduced to such proportions as will permit of energetic effort. The front of a division in the open field has been fixed at 1800 to 2000 metres. The operations in 1914 showed that the fronts were always longer than this and often twice as long and such will perhaps continue to be the case in future if the war in the open is resumed; but, so long as the war remains one of intrenchments, it will be very dangerous not to limit the fronts, especially at the time of an offensive. This is an acknowledged truth, and there is a growing tendency, especially in the British Army, to shorten the front of attack of a division.

DISPOSITIONS. The most logical mode of disposing the troops in a division on the battlefield will always consist in the junction of the two brigades side by side, and, in the brigades, the junction of the regiments side by side.

The division, the brigade, the regiment, and even the battalion, have each to constitute reserves either to ensure success or to guard against possible failures in their offensive. In this warfare of position, even more perhaps than in one of movement, the necessity of always having troops near at hand, ready to repel counter-attacks, is imperative, owing to the fact that every repulse is followed by the enemy’s occupation of a part of the line of defence which would have to be retaken later with great losses should the enemy be given time to organize themselves therein.

The disposition of the units in depth enables the Command, when the lines are cleverly constructed and their intercommunications well assured, to keep only a few men in the severely bombarded spots, and to shelter the largest part of the troops where they cannot be injured.

The study of the last large operations, especially on the British Front, shows that the experience and training gained by the British troops in the field, and the cohesion of their artillery and infantry, have compelled the Germans to abandon their method of distributing their forces in 1916 and to adopt a quite different system of fighting.

In the battle of the Ypres-Menin road the Germans launched three divisions on a very narrow front, with three battalions, one from each division, on the first line.

Immediately behind each leading battalion a second was placed to support it. The other two battalions of each regiment of four battalion-formation, and the third battalion of the three battalion-regiments, were held in reserve in depth to try and check the English advance and to execute detailed counter-attacks.

Behind these divisions of attack, special troops, carefully selected, composed a general reserve, waiting in very solid shelters where they were protected from heavy-artillery bombardment. These reserves were used when the first line divisions failed to check the enemy’s advance, or when there was a chance of retaking lost ground by violent counter-attacks.

The natural consequence of this new distribution of the German troops is that to counteract it successfully very narrow fronts have to be adopted. Forces strong enough to repel the enemy, and permit no time for the supporting battalions to engage effectively, have to be placed on the first line. The first lines are to be backed up by reserves strong enough to oppose the enemy reserves without any loss of time. A general reserve is to be kept in readiness in sufficient force to hold the conquered positions against all counter-attacks which may be launched by the general reserves of the Germans.

The last operations of October show that these dispositions are now in force in all the armies.

DEFENSIVE. We have just explained the dispositions the Germans had to adopt on the defensive, and we think that all parties will perforce be led to adopt a somewhat similar distribution.

The power of resistance of the trench-lines of the Allies being far inferior to that of the German lines, the Allies must, to guard against the danger of attack, take advantage of the superiority of their artillery. They must dispose their forces in depth, in such a way as to ensure the repulse of the enemy by a succession of assaults that will stagger him and prevent him from re-forming.

It is impossible to give hard and fast rules for the distribution of forces between the different lines of the divisions, regiments, battalions, and companies. The distribution depends entirely on the nature of the operations, and is left for each unit to carry out in conformity with the orders received. When sufficiently detailed instruction has been given to a unit in the course of its training, these distributions are an easy matter to decide upon, provided the officers of all ranks perform conscientiously the duties we have indicated elsewhere.

ASSAULTING AND OCCUPATION TROOPS. Experience has suggested to the Allies to divide their fighting troops into army corps for assault and army corps for occupation.

Once the objectives are attained and strongly held, the assaulting troops are replaced by the occupation troops that arrive fresh on the ground. Their task, though one of defence, is often hard. They have to remain a long time in the first lines, exposed, by reason of the new German methods, to frequent and severe bombardments, and obliged to repel numerous counter-attacks.

The generals commanding-in-chief are the exclusive judges of the part the different army corps will have to play, but, in our opinion, there is one principle which must never be ignored in war. In the army, as well as in the battalion and in the company, it is the duty of the Chief to select for action, irrespective of any rotation of service, that element of the troops under his command which he deems the one most likely to achieve the desired result.

What we have said concerning the use of the artillery, the armament of the infantry, the distribution of the infantry in the division and the trenches of attack, will enable us to give an exact idea of the physiognomy of an offensive action and of its preparation.

OFFENSIVE ENGAGEMENTS. THEIR PREPARATION. The preparation of attacks in a war of position is a long one. On account of the work it necessitates it is very difficult to conceal these preparations on the front from the opposing aviation, and also, alas! from the curiosity of the rear.

An attack can be determined upon only by order of the General-in-Chief, who decides where and on what front it shall be made. He gives his instructions to the General in command of an army group, who, according to circumstances, employs one or several of his armies for the operation. Each General commanding an army prepares an order of operation for each of his army corps, and so on, until the precise instructions reach the elements of the first line.

The preparation then commences. It consists in establishing on the terrain under the protection of the batteries:

1st. The new lines of the infantry, and, if necessary, the communications between these lines;

2d. The location of the artillery of all calibres;

3d. The organization of the posts of command;

4th. The bringing up of the munitions and material of all kinds;

5th. The construction, at the rear of the front of attack, of railroads and ordinary roads in sufficient number, rather in excess of the estimated needs than otherwise;

6th. The organization of the reserves of infantry.

7th. The preparation for the evacuation of the wounded, and the installation of large field hospitals, as close as possible to the lines;

8th. The organization of stations of evacuation;

9th. The organization of the parks;

10th. The organization of the centres of supply, etc.

This enumeration, from which we have omitted the aviation, by reason of its special installations on appropriate grounds, gives a sufficient idea of the labour required in preparing an offensive, which takes generally several weeks to accomplish.

A few days before the attack, an effort is made to secure the mastery of the air. Destruction fire is then directed against the opposing trenches. The comparison of the different photographic plates handed daily to the General Staffs enables the Command to watch the progress of the destruction of the lines and positions of the enemy. When the destruction is deemed thorough enough, the order is given to attack, at given points, at a given hour of a certain day. The last operation of the artillery, called “the rolling surprise fire,” consists in subjecting numerous portions of the front to a series of terrific and rapid bombardments, which leaves the enemy in doubt as to the points against which the attacks of infantry are to be launched. At the time appointed these attacks commence. The field artillery covers its infantry by barrages as intense as possible. The first assaulting waves, followed by those of the supporting troops, rush to the objectives selected, drive off the enemy by all means at their disposal, occupy and organize them. If necessary, the reserves come in, either to help the assaulting troops, or to repulse the counter-attacks of the enemy, if any occur.

It was decided some time ago that the troops must not, yielding to their ardour, or the excitement of a too easily acquired success, go beyond the objectives that have been assigned to them. A close examination of the defensive dispositions of the Germans which we have described reveals the wisdom of this precaution. It does not follow that additional objectives cannot be taken on the same day, but in this case the additional advance will be made by a fresh attack and the effort will be distributed accordingly.

Documents found on Germans in Champagne, in August, furnish the following details of an attack they had prepared north of the Souain Hill. A similar attack had been rendered impossible by the action of the French at Verdun, and by the destruction of the gas reservoirs by the French artillery.

Three fresh divisions and fifteen companies of _stosstruppen_ (shock-troops, or special troops of assault) were to lead the attack with light machine-guns, _minenwerfer_, signalmen, miners, sappers, gasmen, grenadiers, stretcher-bearers, and artillery patrols. Twelve “booty-squads” and twelve “destruction-squads” each composed of an officer and thirty-two men were to follow the _stosstruppen_. Arrangements had been made with a view to removing the captured guns.

They had prepared for a formidable discharge of a new gas by a six-company regiment of sappers.

The gas attack was to be launched for a quarter of an hour. A very strong artillery preparation was to follow, after which the _stosstruppen_ were to rush forward.

The aviation was to play an important rôle, and the attack was to be made with the aid of all the means of liaison known: dispatch-runners, telephonists, optical signals, carrier-pigeons, luminous rockets, and wireless telegraphy.

Orders had been given to bring back as many French gas-victims as possible, with a view to studying the effects of the new product.

On the 20th of November, 1917, the third English army, by a successful surprise attack, penetrated into the German lines to a great depth and on a large front.

This operation, prepared in the greatest secrecy, was carried out without the usual assistance of the artillery or barrages. The infantry attacked under the protection of numerous tanks which destroyed the wire entanglements and the most important obstacles.

We do not think that this method will henceforth become a rule.

Before launching this attack, the British Commander must have been informed by his aviation, or by some other means, that the German Front was lacking in artillery and infantry and he must very cleverly have taken advantage of this momentary situation.

Must we conclude that the rules of preparation of attack, as stated above, will not be applied hereafter? It is very doubtful, in view of the fact that the Germans have prepared in France too many lines of defence, one behind the other.

This English victory, however, shows that the High Command, whenever in possession of information warranting the hope of success, will have to combine regularly prepared attacks with surprise attacks on points where the German effectives happen to be reduced.

The success of this operation on the Cambrai Front proves that, however strong a position may be, however numerous its wire defences, it will always be possible to take it when not protected by a sufficient force of artillery and infantry.

DEFENSIVE ENGAGEMENTS. When the troops have to withstand an attack on their lines, they must bear in mind the very sound principle of war that a passive resistance can only end in defeat. On the first lines all the elements necessary for as long a resistance as possible will have to be accumulated. The infantry will then have occasion to make a telling use of rifles, grenades, rifle machine-guns, and machine-guns in as great a number as possible. The supporting troops and the reserves must be ready to counter-attack the enemy without loss of time, and throw him out of any trenches he may occupy temporarily. We have often seen German attacks on advanced trenches repulsed in the very moment of success by a simple bayonet charge made by the troops of the first lines. To the field artillery, however, belongs the most important rôle in repulsing the attacks of the enemy, and the “communiqués” of all the Allies show that eight out of every ten attacks are repulsed by barrage fire. When the aviators can report in time exactly where the enemy troops are being massed for attack, the trench artillery can work great havoc in the ranks of those usually compact formations.

PROLONGED ENGAGEMENTS. What we have just said refers to attacks made from regularly organized lines which have not been entirely destroyed by shell-fire.

On a ground where fighting has been proceeding continuously, the trenches are entirely destroyed, and the men and machine-guns belonging to the first-line troops remain with no other shelter than shell-craters, which are, as far as possible, connected together during the night by shallow trenches, provided this work is not prevented by continuous shell-fire. The communication trenches with the rear do not exist any more; and connections can only be maintained with the utmost difficulty; by what means, we will later explain.

In order to resume the attack under such conditions, it will be necessary to choose the exact moment when the enemy is supposed to be demoralized by the artillery, and to rush the troops forward. In nearly every case, the assistance of fresh troops or of troops that have suffered little will be needed.

These field operations are difficult and require from both the chiefs and the soldiers a resolute will to conquer, and a thorough knowledge of war conditions.

During the last battles on the Somme, on the Aisne, and at Verdun, advanced infantry fractions had to hold out for several days in shell-craters, not connected with one another, and often filled with water. The heavy enemy shell-fire rendered every move impossible and stopped the arrival of all supplies. The adverse lines were often merged into one another and from hole to hole grenade fighting was kept up. It was nevertheless under such trying conditions that our troops fought inch by inch to defend the French lines at Verdun, and their heroic resistance enabled the Command to prepare new positions, to redistribute the troops and to move them forward, after they had finally thwarted the great German effort.

POSTS OF COMMAND. In a division all the commanders of units from the General of Division to the Major direct the fight from quarters called Command Posts. These quarters, rendered as much as possible proof to field artillery fire, must overlook the battlefield. They are fitted with all the rapid means of communication, both telegraph and telephone. The wires, although numerous and deeply buried seldom resist the bombardment until the time of attack. As a last resource recourse is had to signals, optical devices, carrier-pigeons, and messengers. Apparatus for ground-telegraphy, which seems destined to come into general use, has lately been employed, but we have not seen it in operation.

As communications between the advanced lines and the rear have become so very difficult during the preparation bombardment and the barrages, which are often uninterruptedly kept up for several days, the western armies have again had recourse to the carrier-pigeons, which are furnished in large numbers by private societies, existing before the war. Their co-operation is very useful and helps to save many human lives. They are also sent out by airplanes whenever the use of wireless telegraphy is not deemed expedient. They render great service in keeping the front in communication with the rear, and are also of priceless value for connecting the rear with the front.

SIGNALLING. The difficulty of communication between the rear and the front during the bombardments will necessitate the increasing use of infantry aircraft for the direction of operations. The aircraft, connected by wireless with the various divisional headquarters, are able to send information and in turn, to receive and transmit orders by signal to the troops on the front.

These aircraft will also maintain a connection between the infantry and the field artillery, which must be close and continuous if demoralizing consequences, such as have only too frequently occurred in all camps, are to be averted.

After the Anglo-German battles in Artois, the German prisoners, respectively of the infantry and the artillery, had to be separated, so great was the feeling between them. The infantrymen claimed they had not had sufficient protection, and wanted to “take it out” of the gunners.

So as to avoid confusion during infantry attacks, the guiding aircraft ordinarily send up but one sort of rocket-signal, indicating to the artillery either a lengthening or a shortening of the range by one hundred metres.

BATTALIONS OF THREE COMPANIES. At the same time that the effectives of certain divisions were reduced, the battalions were returned to a three-company formation.

A company of infantry is in principle composed of two hundred and fifty men, a quota which is however purely theoretical, as this number becomes rapidly reduced by various causes, such as illness, loss in battle, etc.

FRAMEWORK OF THE ARMY. The ranks of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the French Army have been renewed several times since the beginning of the war. Many captains in 1917 were mere privates in 1914 and most of them are very young. They are, generally, excellent officers, and it is to be regretted that those who have proved their worth are not even more rapidly promoted.

The spirit of routine that prevails in an army officered by soldiers of regular professional training is often responsible for the promotion to high command of men too old for the effective direction of a long and exhausting war like the present one.

There is no reason to think that the American people, any more than the British and the French, will meet with serious difficulties in recruiting and quickly training a strong staff of officers of all ranks. They will also, like the Allies, find no insuperable difficulties in filling the gaps which the enemy’s fire will make among them.

=4. A word about cavalry.= If in this treatise we have not devoted a chapter to the use of cavalry it is because, since September, 1914, cavalry has had but few opportunities to operate as such.

The cavalry has been generally used in the present trench warfare in the same manner as the infantry. It has been reduced in number; that of the army corps has been suppressed, and only two squadrons have been allotted to each division.

Some regiments of cuirassiers have been dismounted, for want of proper horses.

But we think that, notwithstanding the small part the cavalry has taken in the war during the last thirty months, its opportunity is bound to come.

Some cavalry corps, comprising several divisions, have been retained, and during the offensives they are held in readiness to move to the front in case the enemy lines should be broken.

Cavalry squadrons rendered good services to the British and French during the pursuit in March, 1917.

The Germans will perhaps not always be able to protect their retreats by the desert-like devastation of thirty or forty kilometres of country. Their weak point will be found some day or other, and on that day the cavalry will resume its importance.

The difficulty in feeding and obtaining horses seems to have compelled the Germans to reduce their cavalry forces considerably.